‘The Power of Naming’; Co-option in Fine Art practice

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the University of Northumbria at Newcastle for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Research undertaken in the School of Arts and Social Sciences

February 2010
Abstract

At every possible level, from undergraduate study to postgraduate research and teaching, art school practitioners working in the field of fine art have to negotiate the relationship between theory and practice. This practice-led research project involves an investigatory journey in which I explore the terrains of ‘interest’ that have opened up, stimulated, and then informed, my studio and exhibition practices since I was an undergraduate art student. It is a journey that plots a shift from illustrative to poetic forms of creative practice. My central concern has been to understand how these theoretical terrains of interest interact with the practical production of artworks whilst remaining separate, self-sufficient entities. As a result, my aim has been to produce a doctoral submission in which the exhibition of artworks has an equivalent role to the thesis. In practice-led research neither should be subservient to the other.

My thesis proposes that the most persuasive way to respond to my topic is through an exploration of the indexical sign (as defined by C. S. Peirce) and the power of naming (as described in Michel Foucault’s critique of the scientific systems of classification, resemblance, signs and signatures). My chapters explore, firstly, my interests in natural history classification and the political interpretations that critique the history of these systems and ideas; secondly, my interests in the forensic theories that notice the physical signs at a crime scene and then interpret them as indicators of criminal intentions; and lastly, my interest in the productive conflict created through the juxtaposition of poetic artworks and forensic titles, a combination that either ignores or celebrates the indexical nature of my studio techniques.

A period of living and working in Japan, where I studied the martial art of Kendo, was responsible for transforming my fascination with lists and glossaries into an interest in the creative tension between waza and keiko,
between rigorous technique and intuitive freedom. The conclusion of my research journey applies a range of ideas about, and methodological engagements with, the power of naming to the realm of practice-led research which is, for this researcher, situated on the shadowy side of the poetics of exhibition reception.
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Acknowledgements

I wish to express my sincere thanks to:

The Art and Humanities Research Council for their generous funding, without which, this research would not have been possible.

I have been very fortunate to be part of a highly engaged, creative community of researchers providing incalculable inspiration, support and friendship - All Maps very much Welcome!

For images and assistance my thanks:

Christina Kolaiti, Hiro Oshima, Daniel Marston and Iku Tsuchiya.

A special thank you to Mark Hill for walks, talks and diagrams.

The Visual Arts Staff and Technicians at Northumbria University for their help and support.

Andrew Poole for his patience and understanding.

My secondary supervisor Steve Hall for his interest and advice.

Mike and Alison for listening.

Nick and Trace for always being there.

Ellen, Louise, Vincent, Sue and Phil for loving support.

My sincerest gratitude to my principal supervisor Chris Dorsett for all his guidance and help.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents; Vincent and Bernadette Lavell.
Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work.

Name: John Christopher Lavell

Signature:

Date:
When a man howls or shouts or threatens, we other animals understand him very well! Then his attention is not in that other world! But he barks in a way all his own—he speaks. And this has enabled him to invent what does not exist and to overlook what exists. As soon as he gives a thing a name he ceases to see the thing itself; he only hears that the name that he gave it or sees it written….For him, everything in the world is merely a pretext for talking to other men or for talking to himself.

Funeral oration, by Orfeo the dog on Augusto, the man in Miguel de Unamuno’s novel Mist (1914).
Chapter 1. An introduction

1.1 The interests of an undergraduate art student in the 1980s

This Introduction revisits the interests that seem to motivate my activities as an art student in the 1980s. I hope to furnish some background to a very broad range of ideas that informed my undergraduate fine art studio practice. The themes I would have described at the time revolved around notions of identification, classification, labelling, and the resulting tables, lists, glossaries and taxonomies, dealing predominantly, but not always exclusively with the natural world. These broad interests did not include a particularly in depth study of the philosophy of the biological sciences and any associated discussion and debates but there was an awareness that terms associated with them such as natural philosophy or history and indeed what is meant or described by the term the natural world have been continuously studied, documented, (re-) constructed, changed, and challenged over a long period of time (Dupré 1993, Hull & Ruse 1998, 2007). This contested history provided a productive stimulus for a large body of work, resulting final degree show and contextual studies essay. The use of the phrase ‘contested history’ here is intended to refer not only to the well documented accounts of debates, discussions, competing theories and philosophies in the history of the natural sciences (Teleology, Catastrophism, the theory of evolution and its opponents for example) but also to the various writers and ideas of the 1970’s and 1980's that tended towards multi-perspective critiques of various aspects of history including the natural sciences which provided the lens through which the essay was focussed. At this time in the undergraduate studios books, photocopies and notes by or about writers and theorists such as Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Julia Kristiva, Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard and Michel Foucault were as likely to be found as those about Ernst Gombrich, Alan Bowness or Edward-Lucie Smith.
In particular in this case the influential historian and philosopher, Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) *The Order of Things* (first English publication in 1970) was perhaps the most influential text on the final essay submitted as a requirement of fine art undergraduate study. The writings and ideas of Michel Foucault in particular, surrounding natural history, systems of classification, resemblance, signs and signatures certainly resonated at some level, more, it could be suggested by way of an intuitive grasp, an overlapping of fact and the fantastic, a touchstone of sorts. Additionally: ‘Like Sartre, Foucault began from a relentless hatred of bourgeois society and culture and with a spontaneous sympathy for groups at the margins of the bourgeoisie (artists, homosexuals, prisoners).’ (Gutting, 2008:1)

At the core of this activity and what has remained a provocative source of inspiration (to how many was not really appreciated at this time and perhaps it is not so important now, as is often the case, it could be suggested, in these ‘discoveries’ the feeling of being spoken to directly remains) was a particular segment from the preface to *The Order of Things* wherein Foucault relates what seemed a gift; a classificatory system described in Jorge Luis Borges’ essay *The Analytical Language of John Wilkins* (1942) which refers to a ‘certain Chinese encyclopaedia’ in which:

animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very find camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies. In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking *that*. (Foucault, 2003: xvi)

The limitations of the Aristotelian system that has shaped the European concept of knowledge became the key motivation for writing my undergraduate essay. The desire to undermine the grand taxonomic enterprise of European culture suggested to me that the enterprise itself
could be critiqued by classificatory process that resembled the system itself. Undermining the wonder of the system by exaggerating the ‘wonderment of this taxonomy’ (Foucault, 2003: xvi) seemed to offer disruptive, and therefore, creative potential. Of increasing interest at this time was the idea that the process of listing named things could, by itself, ‘disturb and threaten.’ (Foucault, 2003: xvi)

Geoff Dyer’s introduction to The Ongoing Moment (2005), in responding to The Order of Things, explains that the very idea of taxonomy involves categories that are distinct. There should be no overlap: ‘there is no such thing as a dat or a cog or a dog–cat.’ (Dyer, 2005:6-7) Nevertheless, all attempts at generating true classificatory distinctions result in ‘...a great deal of seepage or traffic between categories. (Dyer, 2005:6-7) There would always be a point at which the ‘static grid of the taxonomy began to melt into the looser more fluid forms of narratives and stories.’ (Dyer, 2005:6-7) The assumed rigour of classificatory systems, and the impossibility of sustaining the rigidity necessary to that rigour, infused my attitude as an undergraduate art student and informed the contents of the essay. At this point I had established a set of interests on which I wished to build a practice as an artist. I intended to continue my subversion of taxonomic systems after I left college. As a result, the inventing of glossaries, indexes and lists became a creative technique in which ‘seepage or traffic between categories’ sabotaged the aura of certainty we usually associate with the taxonomic process. I wanted to make art works which looked like natural history collections that had surrendered to the fluidity of storytelling or other forms of creative fiction.
1.2 My undergraduate essay and the power of naming

It would be inaccurate to suggest that the essay, or indeed any of my studio research at this time, dealt with the complexities of Foucauldian theory with any authoritative depth. Indeed, in the 1980s art school communities were divided between those who theorized practice and those who simply practiced. Here even the most casual engagement with Foucault or Derrida placed a student on the ‘progressive’ side of a borderline that separated fine art as social and political critique from fine art as instrument of personal expression and skill. The journalist Jared Bland has published an interview with Nick Mount, a Professor of English at Toronto University, who articulates the alienation experienced by many students at this time: ‘they got to art school and they got Foucault and Derrida’ (Bland, 2008:1) In a sense, I too felt marginalized by the relentless intellectualism of art school theorizing in the 80s. However, for me, the wide terrain of natural history, with its many interesting philosophical debates, provided ample scope for eclectic and intuitive exploitation by an artist. It had a critical dimension because of Foucault’s thinking but, with or without *The Order of Things*, the natural sciences became my chosen platform on which I could create new work.

The essay I submitted as part of the contextual studies element of my undergraduate course was entitled: *A History of Natural History Classification*. It contained a broad survey of the philosophy, historical periods, events, activities, and individuals associated with the development of the natural sciences in European culture. The introduction was constructed around a rather provocative biblical ‘anecdote’ (discussed by Foucault in *The Order of Things*): that is, Adam’s naming of the animals. As the Bible says: ‘The man gave names to all livestock and to the birds of the heavens and to every beast of the field’. (Genesis 2:20) Here the implication is that the name of each bird and beast was inherent in its appearance and Adam ‘did no more than read those visible and silent marks.’ (Foucault, 2003:43) This idea of ‘written in [or on] the body’ is an important skill related to Adam’s God-given instruction to: ‘fill the earth and subdue it’. (Genesis
1:28) Here Adam is told to: ‘[r]ule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground’ (Genesis 1:28). Thus the ability to read the signs inherent in the natural environment was an aspect of Man’s power over nature.¹ The ‘systems’ of identification that told *Homo sapiens* (i.e. wise or knowing men) what was good or not good to eat is just one example within a complex weave of interpretative engagements that informed the lore of the trackers, hunters, diviners and healers:

...a symptomatic or divinatory paradigm which could be oriented toward past or present or future, depending on the form of knowledge called upon. Toward future- was the divination proper; toward past, present and future –there was the medical science of symptoms, with its double character, diagnostic, explaining past and present , and prognostic suggesting the likely future; and toward past-that was jurisprudence, or legal knowledge. But lurking ...one glimpses the gesture which is the oldest, perhaps, of the intellectual history of the human race: the hunter crouched in the mud, examining a quarry's tracks. (Eco & Sebeok, 1983:90-91)

Here naming nature was the same as not only surviving within the environment but also controlling the natural world. Human power was manifest in the semiotic process, in the skill of naming and placing names in list-like classificatory systems. The symptomatic and legalistic relationship to past and present, the ‘double character’ alluded to above, will also become part of this discussion in later sections. Throughout this thesis I am going to continually return to the power of naming, the hidden politics of giving names to the world.²

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¹ In his paper on the relationship between animals and man, *I Named Them as They Passed: Kinds of Animals and Humankind* (1995) the poet and critic, John Hollander suggests ‘Naming, and thereby “understanding their nature,” was at once the first poetry and the first zoology’ (Hollander, 1995:456)

² Physician and writer Frank Davidoff in his essay *Mystery, murder and medicine: reading the clues* (1995) comments ‘By giving form to the formless, the act of naming itself carries great power, for better or worse.’ (Davidoff, 1995:1)
1.3 Changing interests

My essay described the historical context in which the naming and listing of natural phenomena shifted from a purely scientific project to a cultural and political issue. The systematic division and classification of nature created by Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC) dominated European science in the nineteenth century and without this platform it is hard to imagine the development of familiar concepts such as ‘natural selection’ (Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species* 1859) and the ‘survival of the fittest’ (Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Biology* 1864). However, concerns that the taxonomic enterprise resulted in over-rigid and restrictive hierarchical labels began to emerge in the early years of the twentieth century. Whilst scientists continued to find classificatory processes useful, in the arts thinkers such as novelist-philosopher Miguel de Unamuno (1864 –1936) worried that the scientific observer ‘ceases to see the thing itself’ and ends up ‘talking to himself’. This early example of ‘naming’ anxiety appeared in Unamuno’s novel *Mist* (1914) and served as the key quote in the artist’s statement that I provided for the undergraduate degree show catalogue. My point was that this way of thinking generates prejudice, exclusion and oppression. In the wrong hands it becomes a tool of inhumanity of the kind perpetrated in relation to the Holocaust, the slave trade, eugenic experimentation and the incarceration or disposal of ‘undesirables’. This point was, perhaps, simplistic but my ambition was to produce a piece of writing alongside my practical work that discussed my political concerns. The political critique of scientific ‘naming’ processes continues in recent books such as *The Pure Society: From Darwin to Hitler* by Andre Pichot (2009). Pichot’s premise has been heavily criticised. For example, Simon Underdown’s review describes the content of Pichot’s book as full of:

Many flawed and confused assertions that turn a fascinating history of the misapplication of science into a jumble of ill-thought-out conclusions and strange statements...While no credible scientist would deny that in the past scientific ideas relating to evolution and to humans have been misunderstood with sometimes appalling results
In a sense, my essay also suffered from a view of science as a ‘grand conspiracy’ but this perspective was part of the political climate in the 80s when students went to art schools and got Foucault. In *The New Art History*, Marcia Pointon states: ‘The climate of opinion as expressed in the Thatcherite media presents art subjects as Mickey Mouse subjects, non-vocational and, therefore, by definition, useless.’(Rees & Borzello, 1986:149) As a result, it was felt by many that there should be an oppositional agenda in the arts. As an undergraduate art student I certainly felt that my art works should try to address or deal with issues of race, gender, power, and knowledge in the context of the Tory politics of the day. My writing was very much infused with the flavour of these 1980’s debates, particularly those reinterpretations or reassessments of history, or indeed multiple and fragmentary de-constructed histories, discussed in books such as Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, (1978). Of particular influence was Said’s interest in the use of taxonomic frames to suppress or conceal social tensions, oppositions or disruptions:

...the culturally sanctioned habit of deploying large generalizations by which reality is divided into various collectives: languages, races, types, colors, mentalities, each category being not so much a neutral designation as an evaluative interpretation. Underlying these categories is the rigidly binomial opposition of “ours” and “theirs” with

3 Tim Gray a fellow student, in his artist's statement in the 1991 Degree Show catalogue states a very clear position regarding this agenda ‘During the period of my life I have known nothing but a society which has been governed by the values of greed, banality, mediocrity, and inhumanity. All these values I reject totally, with the belief that these values...must be challenged and confronted...as an artist I attempt to confront these values in my work, with the belief that art should interact with society.’
the former always encroaching on the latter...This opposition was reinforced not only by anthropology, linguistics and history but also, of course, by the Darwinian theses on survival and natural selection. (Said, 2003:227)

Said catches the political spirit of the art school culture in which I wrote my essay. This context, which is the topic of the first chapter of this thesis, is here under re-examination in the light of the artistic journey I was to undertake after I was awarded my BA. For example, at the time of my degree show, my studio practices often felt, following the example set by Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), like an excavation of the dark history that been buried with the simple act of collecting and naming things. The undergraduate who wrote the essay could not have understood much of what interests me now as I write this thesis. The process of retrospective reconsideration occasioned by this doctoral research continually notes resemblances between my later engagement with crime scene forensic analysis and the notion of uncovering evidence. In forensic science pieces of often puzzling material are identified, sorted and evaluated as the Archaeologist and theorist Michael Shanks suggests:

> At a scene of crime anything might be relevant. The archaeological site is cognate with the crime scene. The tiny fragment may be significant and provide a clue to some deeper meaning or knowledge. The fragment or trace is here conceived as a kind of clue or symptom. (Shanks, 2009:1)

This resemblance between crime scene investigation and an archaeological dig was earlier noted by the forensic pioneer Dr. Edmond Locard (1877–1966) who likened the evidence left behind by a criminal to the ‘artifacts from which archaeologists re-create the lives of people of the past’. (Ricciuti, 2007:15) Locard and his work will feature later in this thesis but I introduce

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4 Shanks, echoing the ambitions of the crime scene investigator, tells us how the archaeologist employs a range of ‘mediating practices’ operating between ‘past and present’ in an attempt to turn ‘traces and remains’ into an ‘inventory, account, narrative, explanation, whatever.’ (Shanks, 2009:1)
this retrospective link now in order to open discussion on the elusive nature of references and associations within studio practice. As this thesis progresses I give increasing significance to the interpretation of the past through the evidence of present signs. In this way I hope to address the nature of practice-led research by artists.

Figure 2: Archive (detail) assemblage, 1991
1.4 A terrain of interests and its impact on my artistic practice

Documenting and cataloguing of the natural world, as a parodic form of fine art practice, led me to study the historical and philosophic traditions in which the notion of classifying the contents of the environment according to what was perceived to be their natural relationship had occurred. Aristotle is usually described as the founder of this tradition: he is ‘the one great philosopher in our tradition who was also a great biologist.’ (Grene & Depew, 2004:1) Indeed it is Aristotle’s methodological interest in ‘types’ and their hierarchical relationships that provides the analytical platform for the taxonomic activities which were influencing my studio practices. An extensive body of writing (History of Animals, Generation of Animals, Parts of Animals) contains exhaustive descriptions of many creatures, with commentaries that could only have been derived from first-hand empirical observations. In noting the behaviour of birds, Aristotle writes: ‘These latter kind of birds fly with their feet tucked up close to the belly: but the small rumped or short-tailed fly with their legs stretched out at full length.’ (Aristotle, 2004:47).

In addition to the detailed observations of Aristotle, his student Theophrastus (371 – 287 BC) extended the practice of field observation producing a range of writing which included the Enquiry into Plants and On the Causes of Plants, two large-scale studies of the plant world (a unique form of study at the time) in which more than 500 plants were examined in great detail. These books are almost certainly the earliest documented example of a systematized approach to the classification of plants in which internal and external sexual parts and modes of reproduction were listed and classified through their similarity and difference. Theophrastus also used these studies to develop terminology to describe the parts classified. Like Aristotle, Theophrastus has been referred to as the father of taxonomy and my undergraduate interest in these two pioneers of the Western Classical tradition was primarily focused (somewhat simplistically) on their unwitting role in the creation of an overbearing ‘imperialistic’ Eurocentric monopoly that
steamrollered over any localized, regional or culturally-specific form of giving names to the natural world.

The rigidity of the European system was embodied in the all-encompassing Aristotelian principle of the *scala naturae* or natural ladder. This metaphor that pictures the hierarchical position of all of creation was subsequently softened, alloyed and recast as a ‘great chain of being’ within the Christian scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) whose eventual goal would be the revelation of a God-authored, finite, rigid, fixed system with everything (and everyone) fitting into place. Although a fall from grace had delayed the project, now the great taxonomic enterprise could be completed: ‘Not only was Nature created for man, but its recording, analysis and investigation represented the highest goal of all human activities’. (Schulz, 1990:205) This hierarchical thinking formed the critical dimension of the conclusion of my essay. I pictured the taxonomic structuring of the world from Ancient Greece to the late eighteenth century as a political enforcement of, as Arthur Lovejoy says, a "Great Chain of Being" which was composed of an immense, or...infinite, number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents...through "every possible" grade up to the ens perfectissumum. (Lovejoy, 1976: xx)

My essay theme was built on Lovejoy’s assertion that the great chain of being was the dominant worldview of nature. The point was that a European worldview is not the same thing as an actual world worldview and the historical context described in my essay was certainly meant as a critique of the Eurocentric frame that decided how nature was divided up and how those parts were named.

If my essay theme was a critique of the great chain of being, then my practice was focused on the collaging of visual material that linked scientific curiosity to territorial gain. Here I was very influenced by the Rhizome concept proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1972-1980). For artists who like
collage, Rhizome was a particularly attractive and seductive idea, not only for its non-hierarchical ‘stance’ embracing multiple entry and exit points, but also because it gave a theoretical identity to the subterranean interests that I felt motivated my decisions I made as a creative practitioner.\textsuperscript{5} The Rhizome concept, in giving priority to a botanical model (plants that spread underground in all directions [e.g. a potato or iris] rather than follow linear extensions [a tap root system]) suggested flexibility in relation to the bifurcating models that dominate taxonomic systems.

In the context of this thesis, collage has been described as ‘indecency, paradox and perplexity- as impurity by any other name.’(Taylor, 2004:8) an echo of Geoff Dyer’s ‘seepage or traffic between categories’ mentioned above in 1.1.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Africanus_perseco_collage_1990.png}
\caption{Africanus perseco, collage, 1990}
\end{figure}

Note in the image illustrated above, the visual comparison of a bisected frog with a map of Africa. Both have been ‘opened up’ in the application of knowledge as an exercise of power. The thoughts that led me to make this juxtaposition were both political and aesthetic. My oppositional stance as an artist identifies this kind of collage with the ‘academic left’ described by Paul

\textsuperscript{5} Collage has been described as the ‘…bringing into association unrelated images and objects to form a different expressive identity …a unique means of picture-making which has left an indelible mark on art.’(Wolfram,1975:14) For an overview of this influential and pervasive art form see: Wolfram, 1975, Taylor, 2004, Flood et al, 2007, Craig, 2008.
Gross and Norman Levitt, *Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science* (1997), wherein the criticism levelled at this way of thinking is ‘buoyed by a “stance” on science’. (Gross & Levitt, 1997:6) When I was producing this image I assumed that intellectual tools such as feminist theory, postmodern philosophy, deconstruction and deep ecology were ‘sufficient to guarantee the validity of the critique.’ (Gross & Levitt, 1997:6) My own attitudes as an artist clearly reflect this assumption.\(^6\) The power of the collage is the power of my critique. Furthermore, the power of my critique appears to be embodied in the material experience of the artwork as well as in the title: *Africanus perseco*. However, on reflection I am not so sure that the juxtaposition has much life beyond the over-literal reference to the ‘opening up’ of nature. Here we have my first attempt at defining the core concern of my research that originally came into view through the production of collages like *Africanus perseco*. The more experienced I become as a practitioner, the more aware I become of the separation of the work itself from the contextual ideas that appear to inform the artist’s actions.

\(^6\) Eddie Chambers, artist, writer and founder of the *African and Asian Visual Artist’s Archive* was a visiting lecturer in 1990 and gave me a tutorial. The discussion was dominated by politics and concerns about these assumptions and how to ‘escape’ the inherent historicism of my work. His essay: *Keith Piper, Donald Rodney and the Artists’ Response to the Archive* reflects on artists and events in the 1980s.
The problematic politicization of my interests

The song lyrics available above (from an album often heard in the studios at Northumbria at the time) neatly encapsulate the historical narrative that attracted my generation of art student.⁷ The words express anger and indignation in relation to the ‘civilized plans for wild hinterlands’ that seemed to characterize all attempts at cultural authority. The historical dimension of my essay writing certainly used the long-standing European curiosity for the natural world as a sign of political aggression. As the discoveries made within the natural sciences were disseminated and utilized the process of dissemination was simultaneously infiltrating and subjugating other values and other cultural understandings. Natural science was a vehicle for colonial expansion. It was no surprise to an art student like myself that the agents of discovery were, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, ‘gentlemen scientists’ whose expertise dominated their field of knowledge in the same way that the upper classes dominated the social system. In my writing I framed the ‘naturalist’ as a promoter of symbiotic connoisseurship, a biological analogy that described how a pioneer of scientific knowledge slipped between the natural and social worlds in order to ‘establish not only the expertise of the naturalists over the natural, but also the dominance of the natural over the social’. (Spary, 1999:125)

The classifying lens of the naturalist was not only turned on the animal kingdom but also on society and the place of social beings within it. Analogies were drawn between the natural world and society and much of the writing by naturalists possessed a morally instructive flavour: for example, the beehive was often cited as an example of productive and

⁷ This seemingly dual political and ego driven desire to subjugate and control everything was perceived as having a ‘legacy’ in the (80s) present. As with the Africanus perseco collage both specimen and continent are to be carved up ‘These dismemberings tie in with our impulse to link our own curiosity to what seems to be man’s insatiable need to take things apart to find out how they work, the endless quest to get inside things and reduce them to their component parts in order to get to the bottom of their mysteries.’ (Cronin, 2008:25)
structured monarchical order in which society worked well by following the
‘natural rule’. The so-called founder of entomology, William Kirby (1759 –
1850), published his Monograph on the Bees of England (1802) with the
stated theological purpose of demonstrating that the ‘author of Scripture is
also the author of Nature.’ Later publications by this Suffolk clergyman
clearly illustrate his project: On the Power Wisdom and Goodness of God. As
Manifested in the Creation of Animals and in Their History, Habits and
Instincts (1835). Kirby was a member of The Linnean Society of London,
founded in 1778, to study natural history and disseminate the taxonomic
systems required to catalogue it. To this day, the theological driver of this
naturalist’s curiosity suggests a hidden socio-political landscape to me. I
have to accept that my critical awareness is infused by the cultural climate
that prevailed when I began to situate my own potential as an artist within the
larger community of art practitioners in the 1980s. The decision to act on this
potential in the following two decades shapes the contents of this thesis. As
a practice-led researcher I have investigated how one’s theoretical world (a
domain of reading, personal reflection, communal debate and essay writing)
impacts on my creative actions as an artist. It is this relationship (perhaps
also a form of symbiotic connoisseurship) that still concerns me today. This
concern first struck me when I was an undergraduate student and this
introduction has been designed to launch my basic theme: the power
acquired by naming things. Back in the eighties I was worried by the
unvoiced political ambitions of the taxonomic enterprise. As an artist setting
out in life I was anxious about my cultural legacy and wanted to make
artworks that contributed to an oppositional agenda. My critique was a
necessary part of an art student’s rebellious creativity (I was railing against
the constraints of definition and description) but, until I began this PhD

8 Ursula Le Guin’s influential A Wizard of Earthsea (1968) a book I first read in the eighties,
has naming as the basis for all magic power and the main protagonist Ged studies ‘true
names’ in isolation for a year ‘this dusty and fathomless matter of learning the true name of
each place, thing, and being, the power he wanted lay like a jewel at the bottom of a dry
well. For magic consists in this, the true naming of a thing.’(LeGuin,1984:50) In addition to
this magical aspect of names, the title of this thesis (linking fact and fancy) was inspired by
Madison Smartt Bell describing the activities of the scientist and chemist Antoine-Laurent de
Lavoisier (1743 –1794) as ‘An extraordinary exercise in the power of naming’ in his book
Lavoisier in the Year One (2005).
project, I did not know what benefits, or indeed what problems, had arisen through the politicization of my interests in relation to my practice. Twenty years later I am writing a doctoral thesis on the power of naming and, in many ways, I am still rehearsing many of the ineffable interactions between an artist’s thoughts and the resulting artworks. What follows is a thesis on this inexpressible relationship between the contents of an exhibited piece and the names that the artist gives to this object. This thesis describes the journey I have taken since graduating with a BA in fine art and the questions generated by this journey culminate in the research questions posed in my PhD project.

1.6 An outline of the structure of my thesis

This Introduction has floated the idea that the roots of my research lie in my early interests as an undergraduate art student. In order to study the development of this interest in the power of naming, my thesis will follow the timeline of change that unfolded since the 1980s. At each stage a terrain of interests opens out around my creative practices as an artist and the ideas associated with these intellectual interests will be explored through the tension between what I make and how I name it.

This thesis describes the three stages of my career that have engaged me in the interpenetration of theoretical interest and intense practical activity. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 address my experiences as an undergraduate, master’s, and doctoral student. These periods of immersion in an educational setting are marked by the expansion of certain terrains of interest:

Firstly, I explore a taxonomic terrain in which I pursue an interest in natural history classification and the political interpretations that have critiqued the history of these systems and ideas.

Secondly, I study a criminological terrain in which my interest in the taxonomic enterprise, seen as an exercise in imperial expansion, mutates into an engagement with the naming of ‘the criminal’. Here
‘soft’ behavioural inferences are based upon ‘hard’ morphological characteristics; that is, the material evidence that supplies physical signs that can be interpreted as indicators of criminality.

Thirdly, I investigate a forensic terrain in which the methods, systems and applications of forensic science become a vehicle for the further development of my interest in the interpretation of criminal actions. Here naming someone as the perpetrator of a crime is a matter of highly creative interpretative processes.

Fourthly, I conclude my research with an exploration of a semiotic terrain in which the notion of a meaningful trace, and the trans-temporality that the physical trace of a past action, becomes my method for understanding the relationship between my life in the studio, with its continuously unfolding realms of interest, and the separate life of my artworks on display, with the freedom of interpretation that accompanies the process of fine art reception.

It is clear that these terrains of interest overlap and each chapter also represents the transitional stages in my development that led to my return to art school and further periods of thinking about fine art practice.\(^9\) Finally, I close the thesis with a chapter (Chapter 5) on the state of play within my practice at the end of this period of doctoral research.

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\(^9\) The decision to employ the term terrain instead of landscape for example, is to cast this journey and its ‘transitional stages’ as an (ongoing) active encounter. As Peter Doyle & Matthew Bennett suggest in *Fields of battle: terrain in military history* (2002) ‘As a concept terrain is…something that encompases both the physical aspects of the earth’s surface, as well as the human interaction with them.’ (Doyle & Bennett, 2002:1)

This relational aspect in turn is manifested in the skills of a military commander (discussed in more detail in the following chapter) where the interpretation of terrain is within the context of its strategic value or ‘its military value.’ If this context is ignored then the ‘terrain text’ to the commander may as well be simply landscape or scenery. (Madsen, 2009:3)
Chapter 2. The undergraduate art school background to my research project.

2.1 The cabinet of curiosities and art students in the 1980s

This Chapter will journey further into the taxonomic terrain described above. This will involve a somewhat closer, more detailed examination of systems of identification, classification, labelling, and the resulting tables, lists, glossaries and taxonomies that shape a specific historical form of collecting and display: the cabinet of curiosities or *Wunderkammer*. These highly visual examples of taxonomic display, the 16th and 17th century forerunners of all European collection-holding institutions, were developed using modes of thinking that emphasised the role of similarity and resemblance in the process of organizing material culture and natural history specimens. The classificatory boundaries that characterize scientific displays in nineteenth-century collections such as the Natural History Museum in London were not yet in place. The cabinet of curiosities brings together objects that represent the natural and cultural worlds in all their complexity. To stand in the midst of a *Wunderkammer* collection is to place oneself in a microcosm of the world at large. In this enclosed and limited space of display, a collector could begin to note similarities and differences. Here taxonomy plays a significant part in the conceptual origins of museum display and fine art exhibiting. As such, the cabinet of curiosities was a perfect model for my concerns as an artist. It was a system of display that referenced the European taxonomic enterprise whilst also allowing a great deal of play with the naming and collecting of nature. From my perspective, the *Wunderkammer* reinforced the ambiguity of scientific classification: the material in a cabinet of curiosities remained an exciting puzzle in need of investigation. As the contemporary researcher and writer on objects and collections, Peter Mason says: ‘the poetics of the cabinet of curiosities offer a form of resistance to the totalising ambitions of reason, a place where the human mind can play instead of working.’ (Mason, 2000:28). The idea of playful resistance informed both the structure and format of my final degree exhibition and, in recent years, I have come to
recognize many of the ideas discussed in histories of the museum as being intuitively present in my undergraduate work as an artist. In *The Origins of Museums: The Cabinets of Curiosities in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Europe* (1985), Oliver Impey and Arthur MacGregor, build a picture of the history of the museum from their perspective as curators at the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford. Many of the interesting essays in this book describe the eclectic and often idiosyncratic nature of *Wunderkammer* collections in which even the most basic classificatory distinctions such as *naturalia* (objects from nature) and *artificialia* (man-made objects) are confused. One chapter, *His Majesty’s Cabinet and Peter I’s Kunstkammer* by Oleg Neverov, describes collections of nautilus shells, coral branches and ostrich eggs elaborately encased in gold or covered in gems in such a way that they merged the natural and the artificial. (Neverov, 1985: 60) These early museums have something of the lateral unconventional divisions seen in Borges’ Chinese encyclopaedia. For example, Impey & MacGregor cite an English collector, Sir Walter Cope (circa 1553 –1614) whose treasures included:

Virginian fire-flies, an Indian canoe, an African amulet made of teeth, cloaks and coats from Arabia, an Egyptian mummy, clothing, porcelain and other items from China, and a Javanese costume...weapons...saddles, musical instruments, holy relics and heathen idols...a hairy caterpillar, a sea mouse, and the horn and tail of a rhinoceros...a unicorn’s tail, a remora and a torpedo...

(Impey & MacGregor, 1985: 148)

To this contemporary artist-reader there is a fascinating combination of order and mystery in the eccentric parameters of this kind of curiosity-driven collecting. Furthermore many other artists seem to enjoy the miscellaneous character and heterogeneity of such undirected forms of collecting. For example, the art historian Alexandra Noble’s essay to the catalogue of the *Worlds in a Box* (1994) exhibition refers to the enduring attractiveness of the contradiction of placing eclectic assemblages of objects within confined spaces. Noble’s text introduces an exhibition that includes in work of artists
such as Marcel Duchamp, Joseph Cornell, Susan Hiller, Rebecca Horn and Yoko Ono. As Noble says:

The construction and juxtaposition of unlikely elements points to a fluid, experimental understanding of the nature of art, whereas the box is a particularly controlled and self-referential structure. However, it is perhaps this contradiction, or tension of opposites that makes for so many successful experiments. (Noble, 1994: 5)

The artworks featured in the Worlds in a Box exhibition seem to echo a moment in the history of the museum when the ‘universe was imagined to be a vast network of symbolic correspondences.’ (Ruthven, 1969: 9) At this time ‘[a]nalogue modes of thought were at least as familiar as the logical, with the result that what we now think of as being specifically ‘poetic’ approaches to experience were the common property of divines and professional men as well as poets.’ (Ruthven, 1969:8) This extraordinary stage in the development of the European taxonomic venture formed the basis for my practices as an artist. At this point I found myself studying sources such as Samuel Quiccheberg (1529-1567) who collected material in order to display the ‘gentle transition from natural forms to human creations.’ (Bredekamp, 1995: 39) Quiccheberg was artistic consultant to Duke Albrecht V (1550-79) at which time he wrote Inscriptiones vel tituli theatri amplissimi (1565) which is considered the earliest guidelines for producing a ‘handbook for all collectors of materials of the universe’. (Schulz, 1990: 208) This treatise was intended as a guide for the arrangement of encyclopaedic princely collections and involves a taxonomic arrangement in five classes:

1. Religious art and history, the genealogy of the founder and portraits of the ruling house, as well as topographical representations of the country, of military operations and ceremonies, of architecture, together with models of machinery.
2. Sculptures and numismatica, and art forms related thereto.
3. Natural specimens, natural historical collections, art objects and ethnographica.
4. Scientific and mechanical instruments.
5. Paintings and graphic works, precious stones, games and entertainment, heraldry, textiles and objects from the local region. (Gundestrup, 1985 & 2001: 176)
The entire taxonomic enterprise was, as mentioned above, densely layered with analogy; a universal book to be read, a cosmic lock to be opened with appropriate keys, a theatre where the microcosm of collecting mirrored the macrocosm. However, in the context of the politicization of my interests, the Wunderkammer was also an early instrument of exclusivity, control and power: it was a ‘form of propaganda.’ (Thomas, 1977: 201) There was a relatively straightforward connection to be made between these forms of what Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann called ‘imperial self representation’ and the terrain of interest that was expanding around me when I was an undergraduate. (Kaufmann, 1978:22)

To my politicized viewpoint the power to classify and name was a form of connoisseurship because I could equate the erudition required to collect and display with the dominating expertise of the naturalist as described above. The writer and critic K.K. Ruthven says that the universe of knowledge was ‘enigmatically impenetrable to undistinguished minds but an immensely rich hieroglyph to connoisseurs of the recondite’. (Ruthven, 1969: 9) Here the collector, like the naturalist, was the possessor of an elite mind which demonstrated a level of natural superiority which, for Europeans, justified the power their culture exercised over the world at large. The historian Eva Schulz has also described the ambitions of the scholar during the expansion of European colonial power as an intellectual ruler, a ruler who ‘should occupy a special position in society on account of his pursuits.’ (Schulz, 1990: 209).

The role of connoisseurship within European expansion has, in recent years, been extensively discussed (see Brewer, 1997; Friedlander, 2008). As an artist interested in the formal and structural implications of the cabinet of curiosities I find the literature on the connoisseur-collector both stimulating and repellent. In relation to my politicized interests, the thinking that inspired my practice as a undergraduate was curiously embedded in the predilections of an exclusive and privileged elite: my boxed collections of miscellaneous objects were, whether I liked it or not, ‘guided by singular taste and general
notions of connoisseurship’. (Holubizky, 1989: 1) Schulz sees the connoisseur-collector as a man who cultivates and artistically reproduces nature using both his natural aptitudes and the tools he has developed: this kind of expert is marked by a desire to amuse himself. (Schulz, 1990:206) The image of the privileged and powerful amusing themselves as they collect small and insignificant things evokes a type of wonderment that the Italian museologist Adalgisa Lugli thinks of as ‘childlike’. (Lugli, 1986: 109)

For an artist undertaking practice-led research, there is an immediate link to the creative practices of contemporary artists. For example, Cornelia Parker’s installations are often driven by a fascination with childlike methods of quantifying the physical environment in which she is placed as a socio-cultural being. The critic John Slyee has noted that Parker creates artworks that tell us how many structures the size and shape of St. Paul’s Cathedral is equal to the height of Everest. (Slyee, 1997:1) Here the desire to measure and classify is guided by the founding experiences of life, the adventures of a child trying to understand the world in which she lives. This is the kind of mix of irresponsible rule-breaking and innocent receptiveness that, during my years as an undergraduate student, drew me closer and closer to the Wunderkammer as a model of practice. Later, Kieran Egan’s book on child development, entitled The Educated Mind (1997), has established that the collectors of the Late Renaissance and early Enlightenment were driven by a state of mind that can be analogized with a child becoming an avid sorter and ranker of collected things in order to assimilate the world. (Egan, 1997: 87) As a result, I continue to archive information that supports the idea that contemporary fine art practice is influenced by the notion of a Wunderkammer. For example, Ben Luke (art critic of the London Evening Standard) offers a recent example of the Wunderkammer model in a review of an exhibition by the Turner prize-winner Rachel Whiteread:

Among the show’s biggest highlights is a cabinet of curiosities featuring the found objects and sculptural doodles that surround Whiteread in her studio. As well as cast galoshes and light switches,
there are deeply personal objects, such as a fossil she found with her
geographer father when four years old, and peculiar discoveries,
including the strange, visceral residue from a candle factory. (Luke,
2010)

Whiteread is not necessarily being child-like when she ‘ranks and sorts’ the
material that accumulates in her studio, nor is she evoking the kind of
paradoxical political frame that shaped my 80s practices. However, Luke’s
review makes it clear that the cabinet of curiosities continues to provide a
stimulating visual template for the creative mind at work. This example
demonstrates the pervasive influence of the topics discussed in this section
of my thesis. Indeed there are contemporary responses to the
Wunderkammer – the work of Mark Dion, for example – that have political
ramifications of the kind I explored when I was a student. Dion’s early work
Artful History: A Restoration Comedy (1986) is, according to the art critic
Martha Schwendener, informed by ‘Foucauldian archaeology’.
(Schwendener, 2003:1) This artist’s very successful career has been shaped
by a prolonged fascination with what Schwendener calls ‘the fatigue of
Western history: the headlong rush to conquer, acquire, accumulate,
consume, collect, classify, arrange, display, reconfigure, reconstruct, restore,
preserve, and represent.’ (Schwendener, 2003:1) Here the mechanisms of
consolidating knowledge about the world is, as Foucault would have it, would
have it – a form of power. Perhaps Dion’s ‘fatigue’ is the contemporary
version of the stimulating repellence I felt towards the connoisseur-collector
when I was an undergraduate student.

Dion’s recent projects include a celebration of the 300th anniversary of the
birth of an archetypal collector, the eighteenth century botanist Carl Linnaeus
who will feature in the next section of this chapter. For Schwendener, this
exhibition, entitled Systema Metropolis - Mark Dion At The Natural History
Museum (2007), demonstrates how Dion’s ideas have become a wide-
ranging investigation into the Western systems of classification that overlay
the relationship between animals, humans and their environments.
(Schwendener, 2003:1) Clearly, the interest I took in the European
taxonomic enterprise, and its early manifestations in the *Wunderkammer*, are related to this ongoing model of fine art practice. Within my version of this approach, the process of exploring the systems of classification used by connoisseur-collectors would undergo a process of metamorphosis as I searched for resemblance, analogies and parallels in the materials I was assembling.\(^{10}\) I was playing at being a connoisseur-collector (perhaps the artist’s version of ‘amusing myself’) by treating the entire world as a single field of interest. As John V. Pickstone has put it, our world was available for comparison and analysis for the first time once examples of its many artefacts, organisms and inorganic substances were placed ‘in parallel’ in the early European museums. (Pickstone, 1994: 123) \(^{11}\)

Later in the thesis we will discuss the relationship between ‘soft’ behavioural inferences and ‘hard’ morphological characteristics in forensic science. However, at this early stage in my discussion, I wish to briefly touch on the concepts of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ as studio intuitions derived from the experience of working in the mode of the *Wunderkammer* collector. As an undergraduate art student I saw my creative play with resemblance, analogy and visual parallels as a soft, fluid, and dynamic process rather than a hard and static exercise in classification and I here wish to evoke the sense of wonderment that has been reconfigured as a manifestation of the collector’s ‘curiosity’ in the English term for a *Wunderkammer*.\(^ {12}\) It seems to me that a ‘cabinet of

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\(^{10}\) For Michael Kimmelman, the art critic of the *New York Times*, the connoisseur-collector is a key cultural agent who is responsible for the kind of museums we enjoy today. In an article about collectors, Kimmelman observed that connoisseurship is about ‘making distinctions through slow, comparative observation’ (he thinks this is as true of collecting wooden ducks as it is of purchasing historic paintings) and that it was this desire to be patiently methodical that ushered in ‘a new age of museums two centuries ago’. (Kimmelman, 1988: 1)

\(^{11}\) Throughout this chapter, the sources of my ideas about *Wunderkammers* are many and various. For example, Pickstone’s perspective on the early European collectors who spawned the great nineteenth century museum collections is that of an historian working in the medical humanities. The truly diverse range of scholars who study the cabinet of curiosities (in this thesis I draw on the work of criminologists, philosophers, art theorists, sociologists and semioticians) is, perhaps, a reflection of the truly ‘undisciplined’ interests of early collectors.

\(^{12}\) The scope of a collector’s curiosity could be both ambitiously concentrated and imaginatively broad. For this artist-researcher the combination of ‘hard’ focused inquiry and ‘soft’ open-ended inquisitiveness is a big part of the appeal of early museums. It interests me that, according to William Mueller, mathematicians were also caught up in the ‘giddy
curiosities’ is the product of wonder because, as the visual historian Marion Endt has noted, ‘curiosities acted as points of intersection between different realms’. (Endt, 2007: 7) Endt tells us that the early connoisseur-collectors believed that ‘nature shines best through her cracks’ and that the most highly treasured objects were those that revealed irregularities or were situated at the interstice of different fields of knowledge. (Endt, 2007: 7) In this way Endt is able to pinpoint the allure felt by artists (she is writing about Dion) for the anomalies of nature, for the freaks and monsters, for the specimens that resist classification and for the objects that oscillate between art and nature and art and science. (Endt, 2007: 7) Here we have a good representation of the serendipitous nature of pursuing knowledge and the sense of creative achievement that follows in the wake of these kinds of intellectual journeys whether you are an eighteenth century connoisseur-collector or a contemporary artist.

Thus, in working creatively in the mode of the Wunderkammer collector, my ‘soft’ sense of curiosity was aligned with a foundational idea about the history of museum collecting, perhaps with the evolution of collecting in general. For example, in The Museum: Its Classical Etymology and Renaissance Genealogy (1989), the historian Paula Findlen discusses the origin of the term ‘musaeum’ suggesting that it was far more than a static description, rather it was a dynamic bridge-like concept that both crossed and confused:

…the intellectual and philosophical categories of the bibliotheca, thesaurus, and pandechion with visual constructs such as cornucopia and gazophylacium, and spatial constructs such as studio, casino, cabinet/gabinetto, galleria and theatro, creating a rich and complex terminology that described significant aspects of the intellectual and cultural life of early modern Europe. (Findlen, 1989:59)

Findlen is describing the cultural importance of a type of collecting that allowed curiosity to operate at the intersections between different realms of knowledge. This description seems to deny Said’s critique of Western
craze’ for assembling ‘wonder’ cabinets with even Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) not objecting to his adding machine being exhibited ‘among the crocodile skins of many wunderkammern’. (Mueller, 2001: 788)
taxonomy as a frame for the suppression and concealment of social opposition or disruption (see section 1.3 above). The paradoxical nature of my undergraduate interest in the creative basis of ‘soft’ curiosity employed by connoisseur-collectors is that it is difficult to reconcile with the political implications of European colonial expansion. Here the creative fluidity that confuses different realms of knowledge, or transforms borders into permeable membranes so that there is no barrier to osmotic passage (the type of metaphorical language used by the critic Peter Gallo when discussing the Canadian artist known as ‘General Idea’ [Gallo, 2005:1]) is also the pioneering spirit that ignores sovereign nations in order to invade borders and conquer new territories and enslave their inhabitants.

And so, when contemporary performance artists such as Bernadette Cronin explore theatro as a rupturing of our ‘sense of boundary between inside and outside’, they are not only referencing the interpretive multiplicities of Findlin’s ‘musaeum’, they are also responding to the political ambiguities of the taxonomic project that forcibly filled European collections with ‘wonders’. (Cronin, 2008: 24) For Cronin the bounded entity or container that we call the cabinet of curiosities is ‘full of gaps and holes, unmarked spaces, and this circumstance allows [my performance] piece to resonate with the spectator’s inner landscape’. (Cronin, 2008: 29) In engaging with the many fractures in stable meaning within Cronin’s theatro-wunderkammer, the audience often encounters the troubling interaction of ethical and aesthetic feelings which hold ‘the circle of knowing open’ and create spaces ‘across which the familiar and the strange can gaze upon each other’. (Cronin, 2008: 29) This tension between the familiar and the strange can involve, in Cronin’s hands, an uncomfortable degree of violent narrative and ethically challenging material.\(^{13}\)

As a result, it is possible to detect an oppositional interest in taxonomy that remains as active today as it was when I was an undergraduate art student.

\(^{13}\) In relation to Cronin’s interest in violence, the performance artist has noted the influence of the drama theorist Julie Salverson, who has written extensively of ethics and performance.
in the 1980s. Indeed, a state of internal conflict seems to be embedded in the etymology of the term. Patrick Lambe’s current online definition explains that:

Taxis, broadly, means the arrangement or ordering of things, but it is used in ancient Greek quite flexibly to encompass the disposition of soldiers in military formation, a battle array, a body of soldiers, the arrangement, order or disposition of objects, order or regularity in general, ordinances, prescriptions or recipes, assessment of tributes or assigned rations (whence comes taxation), political order or constitution, rank, position or station in society, an order or class of men, lists, registers, accounts, payments, and land types, a treatise, a fixed point of time, or a term of office. (Lambe, 2009)

Here mention of the military roots of taxonomy reminds us that eighteenth century botany had its self-styled ‘General Linnaeus’ who had drawn up ‘flora’s army-list’. (Blunt, 2002: 121) Before we turn to the Linnaean development of the Wunderkammer, we must discuss another kind of agent of European expansionism: the skilful general who can assess a battlefield and understand rapidly and efficiently what action is required. In influential books about military strategy such as Carl Von Clausewitz’s On War (1832), the commander’s ‘coup d’oeuil’ (or ‘cast of the eye’) is a synthesis of both factual and intuitive knowledge. Here the ability to achieve effective ‘situational awareness’ at precisely the right moment unites the three levels of Clausewitz’s theory of military conflict. (Caraccilo & Pothin, 2000: 1) As the military historian, Tim Stevens, has written: firstly, a Calusewitzian commander has to engage with the irrational ‘primordial violence, hatred and enmity’ that characterizes all warfare; secondly, this commander must also negotiate the non-rational; that is, ‘the play of chance and probability’ across the whole theatre of war (this level includes the notion of managing ‘friction’ which so crucial to Clausewitz); and thirdly, Clausewitz’s commander must gain mastery of military action as an ‘instrument of policy’ that has been subordinated to human reason. (Stevens, 2009: 1) Therefore, a strong situational awareness involves comprehending and accepting the unpredictable and non-repeatable ways in which these three levels interact. With this kind of synthesis of the factual and the intuitive in place, Clausewitz
thinks that a commander is much less likely to make crude predictions that increase the chaotic interplay between opposing forces. (Stevens, 2009: 1)

This ability to reconcile analytical and intuitive methods leads to the assimilation of factors ‘that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.’ (Clausewitz, 1997: 102) In military theory an interest in the role of intuition on the battlefield continues in the work of authors such as William Duggan (a strategy advisor, consultant and lecturer at the U.S. Army War College) who argues that military planning is both a science and an art (Duggan, 2005: 6) Here the commander’s strategic intuition involves the ‘selective projection of past elements into the future … as a course of action that might or might not fit your previous goals.’ (Duggan, 2005:4) In recognizing the military effectiveness of inspired guesswork and risk-taking, Duggan is confirming Clausewitz’s original theory that combative determination has to act in concert with the genius of a leader’s intuition. (Caraccilo & Pothin, 2000: 1)

Therefore it seems that the methods and motives of collecting and display, like the strategic thinking of a military commander, involve, on the one hand, flights of the creative imagination and, on the other, acts of practical organization. Whilst the creativity of our ‘soft’, open-ended curiosity is certainly a vital ingredient in the development of the European taxonomic project, for museum curators such as Ken Arnold, there was also a moment when the museum world had to develop a ‘hard’ organizational approach in order to ‘transform knowledge from a cavalcade of surprising wonders into a disciplined order of useful facts’. (Arnold, 2006:53) Indeed a number of museological sources support this opposition: for example, James Delbourgo has recently described how connoisseur-collectors ‘enmeshed their objects in webs of tale telling and anecdote’ whilst ‘naturalists strove to make philosophical order out of [their] seemingly desultory accumulations’.
Further back in time, the art critic Michael Kimmelman had noted that it took the concept of 'disciplined order' to propel the cabinet of curiosities on its journey from 'delight toward instruction'.

Throughout this section we have identified the 'hard' organizational approach with what Schwendener has called the headlong rush to conquer, acquire, accumulate, consume, collect, classify, arrange, display, reconfigure, reconstruct, restore, preserve, and represent."

My position as an undergraduate art student was that the creativity of Wunderkammer could be used to subvert the taxonomic rigidity of the museum. In the next section I will explore this idea further in relation to history of taxonomic display.

Figure 4: Repetitio creta, assemblage, 1991
2.2 Linnaeus and the development of taxonomic display

*Deus creavit, Linnaeus disposit*

God created, Linnaeus organized
Motto attributed to Carl Linnaeus (Blunt, 2002: 180)

Carl Linnaeus (1707–1778), the Swedish botanist, physician and zoologist, is famous for refining the hierarchical structure of classification that originated with Aristotle. Here nature was divided into: kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus and species. The category of kingdom was the broadest class of being and species the most specific. These categories were expounded and developed by the Swede in several volumes and editions that began with *Species Plantarum* in 1753 and concluded in his tenth edition of *Systema Naturae* published in 1759.

Linnaeus either 'brought order to nature's blooming, buzzing confusion' (Warne, 2007:1) or introduced a system of naming 'to tame the wild profusion of existing things'. (Foucault, 2003: xvi) It is impossible to discuss taxonomy and classification without reference to Linnaeus who has been, like many in the history of natural history, called the father of taxonomy. The Swedish botanist was styled as a ‘second Adam’ complete with an illustration on the front sheet of his *Systema Naturae* (1760) that pictured him naming the natural environment. The expression attributed to Linnaeus above certainly supports this self-image. Linnaeus’ activities have been vilified as Eurocentric and egotistical, (see Schiebinger, 2004) before and as an attempt to bring everything and everyone under the control of a universal labelling system that provided a comprehensive ‘excuse for talking to himself’ (Harland, 1987: i)

A hierarchical system using categories such as ‘kingdom’ and ‘class’ is surely unavoidably political. Such a view seems to be supported by the fact that Linnaeus would collect specimens of a particular plant quickly discarding any that deviated from an optimum model. The results were a manual of plant species that avoids ‘worm-eaten leaves, malformations, and obscured
or underdeveloped features’. (Gaukroger, 2008:23) These highly idealized paragons of nature took their place in a botanical cabinet of curiosities that had been elevated to a museum of peerless perfection. Michon Scott, a writer who champions popular science, has described how Linnaeus’ method for determining plant species was developed using garden specimens which were dried, mounted on paper, illustrated and described fully in writing. Later he collected additional examples in order to represent each species as a whole. Finally, he discarded all the ‘deviants’ in order to determine ‘constant’ characteristics. (Scott, 2010: 1) This technique, once established, encouraged not just close observation but also highly systemized processes of normalization as exponents of the Linnaean approach travelled to North and South America, Arabia, China, the Arctic and Japan.¹⁴

Londa Schiebinger (an historian who writes for the Natural Science journal) in her 2004 book Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World likens this exploratory migration as an insidious ‘bio-invasion’ of foreign places in which a non-native species aggressively encroaches, stifles and eventually replaces local varieties referring to the widespread adoption of the Linnaean system as ‘linguistic imperialism’, a process that entails the ‘loss and rebuilding of cultural identities through naming’. (Schiebinger, 2004:195) Here the binomial process is an activity that furthers ‘civilisation’, apparently rewarding new knowledge and prosperity as it progresses from continent to continent.

This politicized analogy certainly fits with the recorded history. Two of Linnaeus’ students accompanied James Cook on his circumnavigation of the globe and, given the subsequent British colonization of Australasia, it is not too fanciful to see botanical taxonomy as an expansionist and imperialistic enterprise. Certainly, Staffan Müller-Wille, whose work on the philosophy of biology involves researching the intellectual impact of Linnaean taxonomy,

¹⁴ It is worth noting that viable alternatives to the Linnaean system were developed in the eighteenth century. For example, Scott tells us that the French biologist Michel Adanson (1727–1806) developed a workable taxonomic system using indigenous names. Linnaeus scoffed at his rival’s use of terms that ‘can scarcely be pronounced by our tongues’. (Scott, 2010: 1)
has considered Linnaeus' preoccupation with ‘constant' characteristics within
the market-oriented approach of the European economies of the eighteenth
century. (Müller-Wille, 2006: 64)

Linnaeus also created his own private ‘plantations’ of imported plants such
as bananas, rice, tea and coffee to see if they could become productive
crops in Sweden. However, most of these exotic plants found the cold
climate inhospitable and perished which, in many ways, parallels other
European transplanting enterprises linked to economics, commerce and
productivity.

Figure 5: *Homo diurnus*, assemblage, 1991
2.3 The relevance of binomial nomenclature to taxonomic display

The system of giving names to the natural world was based on observable characteristics. As the word binomial suggests, this process involves a two part naming system that not only identifies and labels flora and fauna but also imparts information about taxonomic position within each designated kingdom. The first name (capitalized) gives the genus and the second the specific name or epithet; the combination defines the species: for example, *Quercus robur* is the binomial nomenclature for the English oak; *Quercus aliena*, the Oriental oak; *Canis lupus*, the grey wolf; *Canis domesticus*, the domestic dog; and so on. By grouping organisms according to similarity it was possible to classify ‘up’ (into the kingdom) and ‘down’ (into the species category).

The nomenclature used would indicate descriptive characteristics such as *roseus* (spotted) or *robur* (strong) or *saxatilis* (found amongst rocks).

Furthermore, Linnaean nomenclature reflected the relationship between the 'named' and the 'named after'. On the pages of Alberto Masi’s *Scriggiolo* website, Heinrich C. Kuhn and Prof. Eckhard Keßer have published an interesting paper on Linnaeus that notes the high degree of resemblance which, in the pioneering botanist’s mind, a plant shares with it’s name-giver. For example, Linnaeus says that the Magnolia has handsome leaves recalling the splendid botanist Magnol whereas Dorstenia has insignificant flowers like the works of Dorsten. (Kuhn & Keßer, 2010) This idea provided opportunities both for humility (*Linnaea borealis* was described by Linnaeus as a ‘lowly’ and ‘disregarded’ plant that reflects its cataloguer ‘who resembles it’ [Warne, 2007: 3]) and the slighting of opponents (when the German academician Johann Georg Siegesbeck [1686-1755] called the sexual identification system ‘loathsome harlotry’, Linnaeus retorted by cataloguing his *Siegesbeckia orientalis* as an ‘ugly little weed’ [Blunt, 2002: 121; Scott, 2010: 1]).

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Linnaeus devised his system with the intention that the shorter name would act as an aide-memoire for the full name. As a proponent of undertaking research in the field and an enthusiast of ‘field trips’, Linnaeus wanted his theories and methods to be rooted in the real world: ‘At a time when taxonomists were largely an indoor species, inhabiting lecture halls and libraries and scrutinizing pressed flowers, pinned insects and pickled vertebrates, Linnaeus was a dirt-under-the-fingernails scientist.’ (Warne, 2007: 2) This appears to be one of the reasons for the eventual dominance of the binomial system. It provided a shorthand that was both practical and convenient and which gradually superseded the long and unwieldy polynomial Latin names favoured since the Middle Ages.\footnote{For example, Linnaeus pruned down \textit{Physalis annua ramosissima, ramis angulosis glabris, foliis dentato-serratis} (Winter Cherry) to \textit{Physalis angulata}. (McGavin, 2010)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image6.png}
\caption{\textit{Nautilus pompilius}, collage, 1988}
\end{figure}
2.4 An art student’s interest in the *Species Plantarum*

In his two volumes publication, *Species Plantarum* (1753), Linnaeus applied his integrated system of classifying, naming and describing plants to all the plants then known to European science. Although Gaspard Bauhin (1560-1624) had introduced a double name convention into botanical taxonomy in *Pinax theatri botanici* (1623) Linnaeus was the first to make a comprehensive application of binomial nomenclature; he made it his method more effectively than any previous botanist. As an artist, this influential system was bound to affect my practical and theoretical enquiries into classification and labelling and, as a result, Linnaeus became a key figure in my interest in making tables, lists, glossaries and taxonomies. *Species Plantarum* represented nothing less than the ‘universal handbook’ indicating, through the binomial system, a way to name everything, a taxonomic grid locking everything into place. By naming twice, the named would be doubly classified, doubly shackled to the great chain of being. The binomial system could be seen as an Adam-like return to a time when ‘language was an absolutely certain and transparent sign for things [in which the] names for things were lodged in the things they designated.’ (Foucault, 2003: 40)\(^{17}\) If the *Species Plantarum* provided the model for the network of branching conduits by which botanists now map the flora, then it also helped to create opportunities for slippage as described by Spary above in 1.5. Indeed ‘the goal of absolute nomenclatural stability is illusory and misguided. The primary strength of the Linnaean system is its ability to portray hierarchical relationships; stability is secondary’. (Schuh, 2003: 59)

\(^{17}\) Müller-Wille (2006) has given Michel Foucault an influential role in our contemporary view of Linnaeus as the ‘prototypical protagonist’ of a ‘static and tendentiously conservative’ approach to natural history. (Müller-Wille, 2006: 64) According to Müller-Wille, in the *Order of Things* (2003), Foucault claimed that natural history cabinets, in presenting specimens to the public without ‘commentary and surrounding language’, allowed the viewing of ‘common traits’ to dominate the process of interpretation, a development that elevated ‘order and stability above diversity and variation’. (Müller-Wille, 2006: 64) As a result, science was seen to prefer measurement rather than experiment. For further discussion on this topic see Lesch (1990).
As discussed in section 2.1 above, in the tenth edition of *Systema Naturae* (1758) Linnaeus turned a binomial Adam’s eye on the animal kingdom and lengthened the Linnaean taxonomic grasp. For the first time four categories of *Homo sapiens* are suggested: European, American, Asian and African. Linnaeus also included in his system *Homo ferus* (wild men) and *Homo monstrosus* (monsters). The historian, Julia Douthwaite, has written extensively on the complex history of these latter classifications pointing out that, although Linnaeus included ‘monstrous’ designations, his taxonomy does not describe the genesis of these creatures, nor discuss the potential reproduction of such aberrant traits. In fact, Linnaeus’ central aim was to record the way in which all species had been effectively fixed in a viable state that reflected the moment in which God created the universe.

(Douthwaite, 1997: 1–2) As Douthwaite explains, the nomenclature developed by Linnaeus was designed in such a way that no civilizing project (taming or education) would ever allow the borders between species to become permeable membranes: there would be no osmotic passage by which *Hominens feri* could enter the normative territory of *Homo europeus*. (Douthwaite, 1997:1-2)

The study and classification of humans (and in later research into monsters) would become of increasing interest and importance to the botanist making his entire enterprise (from the perspective of an 1980s art student) a contentious matter in relation to racial, ethnic and cultural identity. The later examples of ‘scientific racism’, in which a biological justification is made for racial superiority or colonial ambition, could only make Linnaeus a prime topic for a creative exploration of the ‘dark history’. I will give more detail to this development at the end of this chapter.
2.5 Visual display: the importance of resemblance and difference

John Ray (1627–1705) is, like so many other naturalists discussed in this chapter, a so-called father of natural history, this time it is English natural history that is given a paternal progenitor. Ray is ranked alongside more famous seventeenth-century names such as Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton and Christopher Wren (see Crowther 1960). Ray’s output includes not only his influential *Historia generalis plantarum* (published in three volumes in 1686, 1688, and 1704) but also publications infused with natural theology: for example, *The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation* (1691) endorsed, from the perspective of divine inspiration, the Newtonian view of a harmonious, revolving, rotating fixity in the universe. Ray undoubtedly made important contributions to the method of naming by providing the specifics for the term *species*. (Hered, 1931: 98) Here the English botanist questioned the use of dichotomy within binomial nomenclature, which expressed an oversimplistic either-or approach that ignored the similarities and differences of the whole organism, which were revealed through close observation. This elaboration of the concept of a *species* was possible because Ray had collected plants both nationally and internationally for many years (like Linnaeus, he was an enthusiastic maker of field trips) and had gathered together an extensive collection of specimens, illustrations and descriptions. As with Linnaeus, Ray is the perfect naturalist; he never speaks about a plant unless he has had it ‘before his eyes and examined it’. (Ugglä, 1953: 60) Here the scientific observer is, despite being part of that natural world, curiously detached from everyday existence; he is a transformer of the world who turns the re-occurring presence of resemblance and juxtaposition into a powerful classificatory order that transcends our human relationship with the natural environment. This was a truly Adamic enterprise.

The role of observation in the work of Ray and Linnaeus suggests a specifically visual orientation to the taxonomic project. Here the themes of books such as Martin Jay’s *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (1994) come into view. Despite Jay’s
interest in the political critique of spectacle and surveillance in modern French art and philosophy, his survey of ocularcentrism in European culture makes it clear that the visual arts are as complicit in the ‘dark history’ as the sciences. Here the history of visuality, particularly the exploitation of resemblance and similarity (the idea that seeing is believing), is as much an issue for artists as it is for scientists. We seem to share a legacy.  

From a collector's viewpoint, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was no categorical distinction between beautiful objects. An attractive natural specimen and an exquisite work of art were similarly collectable in relation to the contents of a *Wunderkammer*: Here the artifice of nature (e.g. the beauty of flowers or butterflies) was admired in much the same way as the artistry of antique coins or sculpture. Museologists have commented on the way that art and nature was combined in order to extend our admiration of the diversity of creation to the works of human creation giving the early museum a totalizing aspect. (Lugli, 1986: 109; Schulz, 1990: 217) Thus the wondrousness of artefact and artifice, natural or otherwise, was the basis for philosophical analysis and theological reflection made possible through the visual display of material evidence, firstly in cabinets of curiosities, and then in museums.

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18 Here we can cite artists such as Christine Borland as examples of how contemporary creative practitioners continue to negotiate the idea that ‘seeing is believing’. Borland explores the use of visual evidence in the arts and in science. In the context of this thesis, it is also of interest that this artist often references the cabinet of curiosities. The writer and critic Trevor Pateman has described how Borland employs the *Wunderkammer* as a throwback to a period in which our understanding of both science and art had not yet stabilised. (Pateman, 1997: 1)
As an art student in the 1980s I was immersed in the Foucauldian discourse on vision that saw Western civilization as the product of powerful ‘scopic regimes’ of social control and political suppression. In many ways, Jay’s *Downcast Eyes* describes the politicized climate in the arts that resulted from the antimodernist and counter-enlightenment writing of the French thinkers of the second half of the twentieth century. As Nick Mount says: ‘they got to art school and they got Foucault and Derrida’ (see section 1.2 above). The only course open to art students at that time was to parody the scopic regimes that dominated our visual culture and then frame the resulting artworks with Foucauldian discussions about the exercising of power within institutional systems controlled by invasive uses of observation (for example, Jeremy Bentham’s model of the panoptican prison [1785]).

The collages reproduced in this chapter were made for exhibition purposes. In order to be awarded a degree I had to present the practical work I had undertaken on the undergraduate fine art course at Northumbria in the form of a public exhibition, a degree show. As a result, these works were made for display

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19 Simon Robertshaw’s exhibition *The Observatory* (1993) is an example of an artist (of roughly the same age as myself) responding to the panoptic notion of a ‘scopic regime’. A catalogue essay by Steven Bode (the curator of the exhibition), describes Robertshaw’s work as being ‘pervaded by a sense of history’ that references Foucault, Bentham, Galton and Nazi eugenic experiments. (Bode, 1993: 2)
and my exploration of taxonomic practices was a critique of both the scientific and artistic legacies of European visual culture.

The degree show of 1991 was an opportunity to extend my experience as an exhibiting artist (degree shows are always presented by art school tutors as a student's first important professional encounter). However, my first 'professional' exhibition was also a chance to explore the unequal gaze of the exhibition visitor. After reading Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (1977) I had theoretical reasons for treating the degree show as part of a dystopian world continually monitored by powerful scopic regimes. My response to the power of the spectator involved combining visual analogy (the content of my collages) with titles (the content of my exhibition labels). As Schulz says the juxtaposition of object and text within the *Wunderkammer* had allowed museums to express the universality of the collected material through the act of naming. (Schulz, 1990: 208) Now I made ‘naming’ the central idea of my degree exhibition.

![Image](image_url)

Figure 8: *Religare acanthias*, collage, 1990
In the resulting exhibition each artwork was given a Latin nomenclature. In following this version of the Linnaean system I was parodying the mechanisms of display used in the natural sciences. This interaction of practice and theory earned me my degree in 1991 but I was worried by my lack of engagement with visual poetics. The technique of parody placed me in an entirely ironic relationship with my art works. Furthermore, the Foucauldian essay I had submitted as the written component of the assessment seemed to turn my collages into illustrations of my political and theoretical interests. Perhaps this is a problem I share with other artists? The critic Trevor Pateman (see footnote 18) has expressed concern that artists like Christine Borland come close to illustrating the theoretical themes of influential intellectuals such as Michel Foucault. After all, writes Pateman, Borland is not ‘in the running for a prize in archaeology or history; nor is she submitting a PhD exploring the language of forensic science’. (Pateman, 1997: 1)

If the naturalist-collector used display as a cognitive process that transferred information from an expert mind to a receptive non-expert mind, then I was surely doing the same thing with my own displays about the political implications of visual resemblance and similarity. As an artist I was perpetuating the ‘privileged point’ (Foucault, 2003:24) of the European elite. This was disconcerting and the next chapter will explore the new terrain of interest that opened up as a result of the experience of exhibiting in the 1991 degree show at Northumbria University.
2.6 Homo europaeanus and the mission civilisatrice

Linnaeus included humans in his taxonomic scheme and, although it is debatable if he held views that today we would call ‘racist’, nevertheless he classified Homo sapiens in four taxa using location and the morphological criteria of skin colour in the 1767 edition of Systema Naturae:

*Homo europaeanus*: white, gentle, and inventive.
*Homo americanus*: reddish, stubborn, merry, and angered easily.
*Homo asiaticus*: sallow, avaricious, and easily distracted.
*Homo africanus*: black, relaxed, crafty, and negligent.

(Linnaeus, 1767:29)

Such a blatantly Eurocentric assessment was, in the late 1980s, a good enough reason for subverting the taxonomic enterprise. It seemed as though the naturalist’s classifying eye could only perpetuate a connoisseur’s elitist system by selecting some examples as admirable and others as less worthy. However, Linnaeus attempted to build a complete taxonomy in which man was placed alongside the associated categories of ‘manlike’, ‘resembling man’, and ‘related to man’. Here there was an interesting blurring of distinctions and definitions built on traveller’s tales, fanciful illustrations, and a mix of fact and fiction. After all, as Douthwaite has explained, given Linnaeus’ historical context, the system he developed could not help but mix old myths with contemporary evidence. (Douthwaite, 1997: 2) Working on an intellectual platform established by the medieval and renaissance mind, all eighteenth century attempts at fitting mankind in the ‘great chain of being’ generated, according to Marie-Helene Huet, a ‘classificatory impurity’ that could only blur genres. (Huet, 1993: 4) In attempting to classify Homo sapiens, Linnaeus clearly encountered a powerful disruption to his taxonomic enterprise in the many reports he heard of remote man-like beings. This

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20 Douthwaite is interested in the ‘paradigm shift’ present in Systema Naturae when Linnaeus uses ‘legend and hearsay’ to give names to apes (Satyr, Trogloidyte, etc.) whilst, simultaneously, employing the morphological exactitude of science to demystify ‘monsters of yore’ as ordinary animals. (Douthwaite, 1997: 176)
introduced a sense of ‘multiple marginality’ into the Linnaean system and it became increasingly difficult for the naturalist to make these labels stick. (Star, 1991: 26)

A similar labelling project to that explored by Linnaeus was used by François Bernier (1625–1688), a French physician who published *Nouvelle division de la terre par les différentes espèces ou races qui l’habitent* (1684). Bernier also attempted a classification of ‘manlike’, ‘resembling man’, ‘related to man’ beings based on morphological criteria using skin colour. Indeed, this approach seems to have been a pan-European project. As Edward Said has written:

…the enterprise of empire depends upon the idea of having an empire. France had a “mission civilisatrice,” that it was there to civilize the natives. It was a very powerful idea. Obviously, not so many of the natives believed it, but the French believed that that was what they were doing. The vocabulary of classic nineteenth century imperial culture in places like England and France is plentiful with words and concepts like “inferior” or “subject races.” Notions of “subordinate people,” of “dependency,” of “expansion” and “authority.” Out of the imperial experiences, notions about culture were clarified, reinforced, criticized or rejected. (Said, 1993)

![Figure 9: Back on the chain gang, assemblage, 1991](image-url)
2.7 Written on the body: criminology and natural history classification

If seventeenth century morphological criteria used skin colour, then medico-anatomical considerations dominated eighteenth-century natural history and the development of medical anthropology. By the 1750s, Phillip Sloan says that ‘natural historical anthropology' begins to establish a human science that focuses on the ‘zoological history' of the human species. (Fox et al, 1995: 117) Unlike the emphasis on morphological difference in Linnaeus, this new science — inspired by the work of Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon (1707–1788) — characterized organisms in relation to their behavioural, biological, geographical, and relational properties. Morality remained an important criterion, but it now operated as a scientific benchmark in the distinction between ‘normal' and ‘pathological' conditions. (Douthwaite, 1997: 184) In this context, we see the development of the notion of a ‘born criminal'. Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909) was convinced that there was a propensity for criminality throughout the natural world.\(^\text{21}\) Plants were as capable of morally exploitative behaviour as Homo americanus, Homo asiaticus and Homo africanus, Lombroso identified Homo delinquens. (Bartol 1999: 49) This idea is built on a concept that is similar to the morphological criteria that used skin colour: namely, that criminality can be identified in particular physiognomic attributes or deformities. During the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, a science of physiognomy developed that attempted to estimate character and personality traits in physical features of the face or body. Here we are still considering a permeable boundary between the visual arts and science, a topic at the centre of this chapter. For example, the artist and theorist of photography, Alan Sekula, has described physiognomy as 'a discursive terrain' in which 'art and the emerging bio-social sciences met’. (Sekula, 1992: 23) Sekula cites a number of pioneering experts who, in one way or another, fused (what we now call) visual culture with criminological theory: Johann Kaspar

\(^{21}\) Indeed, in a letter to the L’Echo de Paris in 1859, Lombroso is accused of initiating a ‘criminal botany'. The anonymous correspondent claimed that, in talking about ‘the crimes perpetrated by carnivorous plants', Lombroso seems to believe ‘every animated being subsists only by murder’. (France, 1895: 26)
Lavater (1741–1801) (who was an early advocate of a morphological link between unpleasant facial features and crime); Jacob Fries (1773–1843) (who published *Handbuch der psychischen Anthropologie* [1820-1], an early handbook of the facial deformities found amongst criminals); and the Belgian polymath Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874) (who compared his statistical analysis of the human head to the aesthetic studies of facial proportions undertaken by the renaissance artist, Albrecht Durer).

Thus by the second half of the nineteenth century, criminology had become heavily influenced by the apparent efficacy of visual perception. With the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859, and the new scientific model provided by his theory of evolution, this trend became even more pronounced. The superiority of *Homo europeanus* was not only visually evident in physiognomic and cranial signs, it was also theoretically explained by the survival of the fittest species: taxonomy was distorted by the lens of the Social Darwinian. From this point evolutionary theory shaped the thinking of many criminologists through into the twentieth century: for example, in the 1930s, the Eugenics movement proposed that certain physiological flaws identified the strands of the human race that should be removed. It has become a commonplace of history that these views were as prevalent in the United States of America as they were in Germany during the Third Reich where, for example, 250,000 mentally disabled Germans were killed. (Sparkes, 1999:1)

From the perspective of this thesis, the significant factors here are the visual roots of the taxonomic process and the emphasis on visual signs that enables the interpretation, not only the characteristics of being ‘manlike’, ‘resembling man’, and ‘related to man’, but also of the recognition of criminal deformities that license political action and repression. Thus, as Sekula says, ‘physiognomy and phrenology contributed to the ideological hegemony of capitalism’. (Sekula, 1992:12) As a result, during the nineteenth century, a period of unprecedented industrialized commerce, a new object was defined:
'the criminal body'. (Sekula, 1992: 6) For the physiognomists, this particular type of body could be recorded and classified using the new medium of photography. Here, the process of analysis, comparison and classification necessitated an extensive process of what Sekula calls *inscription*, a transformation of the body’s visual signs into an interpretive ‘text’. (Sekula, 1992: 33) An example of the kind of codification that resulted is the biometric criminal classification system developed by French police officer Alphonse Bertillon (1853–1914) where the measuring and careful indexing of offender’s bodies was intended to narrow down the pool of suspects. Later forms of Bertillon’s approach to bodily *inscription* include Francis Galton’s (1822–1911) invention of fingerprinting, a process that was adopted throughout Europe and North America.22

In chapter 3 my discussion of the development of the inscribed criminal body will be continued in relation to the developing genre of crime fiction and the inauguration of forensic science. At this point, it is worth mentioning that Bertillon’s approach is featured in classic detective stories such as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s *The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes* (1894) and *The Naval Treaty*, where he is referred to as the ‘French savant’.

![Figure 10: Back on the chain gang (detail) assemblage 1991](image)

22 Galton’s publications include: *Fingerprints* (1892), *Decipherment of Blurred Finger Prints* (1893), and *Fingerprint Directories* (1895).
Chapter 3. The master’s level background to my research

3.1 Working in Japan and the power of naming

The previous sections discussed my engagement with the ideas, systems and activities of the taxonomist that shaped my undergraduate studies as an art student at Northumbria University. In particular I have discussed the impact of my interest in the political legacy of the European taxonomic tradition on the essay and final exhibition that earned me my BA in fine art. Both the writing process and the activities of the studio were placed at the service of a politicized disruption and undermining of the systems of classification. By reading my essay, my examiners knew that my collages parodied the collecting and naming process used by naturalists. After graduating from Northumbria I spent six of the following twelve years (1991-2003) living and working in Japan. This was a rich and rewarding experience. I had been long fascinated by Japanese culture and so the opportunity to experience this country first hand was exciting. Some of my encounters challenged the certainty of my views on the power of naming resulting in a re-examination of my relationship with the terrain of interests that had served as a context for my art up until that time. Further reflection on some of these experiences can be found in the appendices. The purpose of this Chapter is to describe, and reflect upon, a transitional period in my development as an artist. This period of intellectual and emotional transition led to a significant change of emphasis in my interests and the decision to return to the UK and enrol on a full-time master’s degree in fine art. I am going to address the experiences that provoked this change by describing my encounter with the poetics of Kendo, a form of Japanese fencing in which rigid systems of practice (waza) find their fullest expression in free practice (keiko), a mode of fencing that requires the student to ban all thought of technique and to respond intuitively and flexibly.\footnote{Whilst in Japan I also studied Kyudo, a traditional form of archery in which the archer is required to embark on a continuous search for correct technique. This is a philosophical as well as practical journey in which the student is expected to gain guidance by reading poetic texts.}
3.2 Japanese (en) counters

Like most visitors to a foreign country, many of my initial cultural confusions were linked to my inability to comprehend local forms of numeracy. My initial awareness of the complexities of the Japanese counting system was through the study of *kendo* (Japanese fencing). Group warm-up exercises (*suburi*) are coordinated with loud counting drills. Although a drill can be led by the senior teacher (*sensei*), more often, the exercises are shared between seniors (*sempai*) and (*kohei*) juniors (Ozawa, 1997) After a morning session (*asa renshu*) in the school in which I was working, one of my *sempai*, a Japanese member of staff, politely corrected me by explaining that ‘*shi*’ rather than ‘*yon*’ (both meaning four) was the appropriate option when enumerating in drills. So began a series of fascinating discussions on the subtleties of circumstantial and classificatory counting in Japan.

Japanese numbering uses a symbol or pictogram (*Kanji*) although the familiar 1, 2, 3 numerical system is also used in train stations, banks, and schools. However, the conventional name for the counting unit is often changed to count dates, days, months, time and certain objects or sets of objects for example: When counting people use: *hitori, futari, san-nin*

When counting small animals like cats or dogs use: *ip-piki, ni-hiki, san-biki*

When counting thin objects such as paper or shirts use: *ichi-mai, ni-mai, san-mai*.

There are also specialized counting units for scrolled paintings, swords, helmets and other traditional artefacts. The point here is not to provide an in depth examination of this complex and fascinating system. Rather, I wish to point out the resonance with the classification system of animals described by Borges, a sense of naming system that is unfamiliar, evocative and poetic. During my undergraduate studies I had engaged critically with the Linnaean binomial nomenclature used to divide and control the natural world. However, in Japan I began to reflect on the old English collective nouns that evoke similarly poetic group identities: a mischief of rats, an exaltation of
larks, a deceit of lapwings, and so on. Here I found a numbering process that was as mysterious and perplexing to my Japanese students as their system was to me. For the first time I was beginning to think about the naming process as a form of poetic designation that actually changes our perception of the physical world: to think of 20 living things as either a ‘mischief’ or an ‘exaltation’ fills the world with feeling and resists the emptying out of meaning by the power of a system. Here we have a very different power of naming.

The poetic power of the highly flexible Japanese numbering conventions led me to reflect on the tension between repetitive drill and free practice that is found throughout the traditional martial arts in Japan. I began to rethink my undergraduate involvement with the relationship between theory and practice. In Chapter 2, I described an approach to fine art in which a terrain of interest, my term for the theoretical underpinning of my activities as an artist, was actualized in artworks that parodied the cabinet of curiosities and the taxonomic systems used by naturalists. As I absorbed the Japanese attitude to waza and keiko I was in a position to redefine my approach to riai, a concept that approximates our word ‘practice’ but which carries a strong sense of the balance between rigour and flexibility. (Ozawa, 1997)

The Japanese martial arts are full of balancing acts that demand the application of rigorous technique and the surrendering of the self to its most intuitive state. In Kendo, rigour is acquired through strictly repetitive drills, and flexibility only becomes possible when the fencer is proficient enough to ban all thought of rigorous technique and respond intuitively. The paradox of this highly aesthetic achievement is that the fencer fosters an enlightened sense of the self through the act of striking another person. (Ozawa, 1997) When the two fencers are proficient enough to use the keiko mode of engagement, one or the other will deliberately leave an opening (suki) so that the opponent has an opportunity to revert to the appropriate technique and achieve a strike. Here it seemed to me that the sudden return of a rule based system had a productive role in the open-ended processes of free practice and I became very interested in the reciprocal nature of theory and practice.
The cooperative uncooperativeness of two Kendo opponents suggests that, to the Japanese mind, defence and attack are equally effective and this made me reconsider how I related my terrain of interest to my activities as an artist. If my interests provided rules for my practice, my practice provided new opportunities for my interests.

Another related aspect of Kendo is Nihon Kendo Kata, a form of fencing drill (an essential element for exam grading as well as developing correct attitude) that is carried out with a wooden sword (bokken), in which a set routine of movements requires the more senior opponent (uchidachi) to take the defending role and the junior (shidachi) to undertake each attack. At the moment of striking the shidachi shouts ‘toh’ and the uchidachi responds immediately with the cry ‘yah’ to complete the action. This form of practice helps to develop maai, an all-important awareness of the space or distance between opponents (physically, mentally and spiritually) in which the aesthetic dimension of Kendo is manifest. After the intense repetitive drills in Kendo there usually follows a free practice session were everyone has a chance to fence. The opponents must give their full attention to an awareness of posture (kamae), space (maai) and spirit (kokoro) as well as act as unselfconsciously as possible (sutemi). In this seemingly contradictory state the Japanese believe that spiritual growth can take place. Furthermore, it is also considered important that a fencer should experience a sense of moving forward (Kuraizume) in body, mind and spirit. Each gesture (whether in attack or defence) should attempt to ‘pierce’ the opponent mentally and spiritually. This feeling of piercing or passing through another fencer is part of an overall fighting spirit central to Kendo. A colleague on the practice-led doctoral research programme at Northumbria University, the Japanese artist Sachiyo Goda (2010), has been writing about the aesthetic awareness of space that fencers bring to the practice of Kendo as part her research into the space-time concept ma, which is the root word from which maai is

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24 These shouts (kiai) are said to correspond to the exhalation of the breath of attack and the inhalation of the breath of defence. (Budden, 2000: 33-4)
formed. Goda describes the field of swordsmanship as an area in which *ma* is traditionally seen as a product of:

…bodily, spatial and intersubjective relationships. Dueling is more than an interaction between two combatants: it is an interaction between a dueling body and a hostile environment that includes a deadly opponent. (Goda, 2010: 60-61)

Here Goda discusses the engagement of the duelist in the bodily project of either killing or being killed. This dangerous interaction takes place in an active environmental space that is psychologically linked to the notion of safety and the need to keep a certain distance in order to preserve your life. As Goda explains:

In *The Kendo Reader*, Hisashi Noma describes a special martial arts term *ma-ai* (literally a combination of *ma* and the verb ‘to meet’) that refers to the spatio-temporal ‘theatre of action’ in which each combatant adjusts the timing of his attack (Noma, 2003: 46-48). The word *ma-ai* is usually translated into English as ‘interval’ but the complexity of the concept is well described in a Wikipedia entry that gives the definition as both the spatial distance between the opponents and also the time it takes to cross that distance. Importantly *ma-ai* refers to the changing angle and rhythm of attack as it takes account of the opponent’s height, reach (including his weapon) and speed of movement … Indeed, *ma-ai* is even used to describe the momentary lapses of awareness that are manifested in the opponent’s loss of advantage, the *kokoro-no-maai* or mental interval in which the duel is either won or lost. (Goda, 2010: 60-61)

It seems that the moment of striking in which ‘*toh*’ and ‘*yah*’ complete the physical action with verbal exclamation mark the *kokoro-no-maai* interval in which a duel is won or lost. As I became more proficient in *Nihon Kendo Kata* I was aware that the exclamatory cries of ‘*toh*’ and ‘*yah*’ are a form of naming, they represent the kind of linguistic device that the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) called an ‘index’, a type of sign that, ‘like a pronoun demonstrative or relative, forces the attention to the particular object’. (Peirce, 1885: 243) Later we shall explore other dimensions of what is, to say the least, a complex semiotic concept taking into account secondary literature on the topic. Given the importance of semiotics as a
means of studying and theorizing the relationship between signs and meaning in the visual arts, particularly in the theory and criticism of photography (for example, in the writing of Roland Barthes), we will, as this thesis proceeds, build our understanding of Peirce’s notion of the index, which has a long association with the concept of forensic science (introduced below in this chapter), using published sources that have, on the one hand, influenced artists (Rosalind Krauss and Mary Ann Doane) and, on the other, contributed to philosophical debates on Peirce’s legacy (Thomas Short and Helmut Pape).

However, the point here is that to yell ‘toh’ at the moment of an attack intuitively executed, gave that action added lexical meaning. As a result, I had reason to believe that the process of applying words to experiences relied on a curious mix of conventional systems and highly intuitive feelings. In Japan there seemed to be forms of designation that actually changed our perception of the physical world by slipping free of the ‘naming’ rules used by European taxonomists. Needless to say, it will be obvious from the above discussion that this freedom was, in the frame of the rigid rules of Nihon Kendo Kata, experienced as a form of poetic beauty that appeared in the midst of violent combat. Here I gained a great deal by studying Kendo in the actual environment where the aesthetics of traditional combat were still held in high esteem. This aesthetic was personified in the Samurai’s code of Bushido that advises a combatant to compose poetry in the face of death.25

(Nitobe, 2001: 33)

In this section I have described my immersion in Japanese culture through the practices of Kendo. In effect, I have also been describing the moments in which I started to enrich and question the interaction of theory and practice in the production of my artworks. Having lived in Japan I was now in a position to understand how naming could be a powerfully poetic process. I knew that this power was not fixed on the theoretical side of the equation; it moved

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back and forth within the interaction between my terrain of interests and my creative practices. As a result I developed a more sympathetic view of the poetry of the taxonomic enterprise. I no longer wanted to simply parody European science; I wanted to get to the heart of its appeal. On these terms I applied to the master’s course in fine art at Northumbria University and returned to the UK to study at postgraduate level in 2003.

3.3 Returning from Japan with an interest in forensics

When I returned to the UK and became a student on the master’s course, the one thing that immediately felt familiar were the studios at Northumbria. It was not so much the fact that the art school environment had not changed – I found myself working in the same building and the same studios I had worked in as an undergraduate student – but more that I had returned to the location in which my interest in natural history classification had been turned into artworks. In the twelve years since I was last working in these studios my attitude had changed and now I was once again faced with the challenge of practicing fine art full time. How would the experience of working in Japan, the kinds of encounters described above in my discussion of practicing Kendo, form a new terrain of interest in support of my studio activities. Certainly, I had two ideas to work with that were not present when I was an undergraduate. Firstly, I now wanted my practice to be an interaction of waza and keiko, I wanted my interest in naming systems (making of lists, glossaries and taxonomies) to reach its fullest expression in my intuitive relationship with creative production. Secondly, I knew that the most intuitive level of what I now thought of as the ‘waza of naming’ was achieved by the keiko of poetic action. This new Japanese terrain of interest reflects the traditional path of Kendo that takes the fencer on a spiritual and bodily
journey through a landscape of opposites which include ‘soft and hard, seen and unseen’. (Budden, 2000: 25)

At this time I also read *The Big Nowhere* (1988) by the American crime writer James Ellroy. This novel features an aspiring detective called Danny Upshaw who is disliked for his studious approach. He is given ‘the fisheye’ every time he picked up a criminology textbook. (Ellroy, 1988: 28) In this context, Ellroy refers to Locard’s Exchange Principle, the notion that every contact leaves a trace, an axiom derived from the theories of the pioneering French criminologist, Edmond Locard (1877–1966). On becoming aware of this famous idea, I began to explore and absorb a concept that has been described as ‘the cornerstone of forensic science’. (Saferstein, 1998; Turvey, 1999) Initially, my interest was in the link between a process that classified the traces of criminal behaviour and the scientific developments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Forensic science was clearly a product of the taxonomic projects of Lavater, Fries, and Gall described in Section 2.7 above. Very quickly, the construction of forensic facts became my new ‘waza of naming’, my new terrain of interest. A big part of the appeal was that this science was closely related to, if not partly dependent on, the writing of crime novels. Here I wondered if I had found a taxonomic process that had an inbuilt relationship with creative freedom, with the *keiko* of poetic action. As the cultural theorist David Frank Schmid has written:

fiction about serial murder shares several features with serial killer non-fiction: its history goes back a lot further than one might think; the

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26 There has been a long debate about what Locard actually proposed (Kirk, 1953; Turvey, 1999; Chisum & Turvey, 2000) The Influential forensic scientist Paul Kirk (1902–1970) has provided a much quoted summary:

*Wherever he steps, whatever he touches, whatever he leaves, even unconsciously, will serve as a silent witness against him. Not only his fingerprints or his footprints, but his hair, the fibers from his clothes, the glass he breaks, the tool mark he leaves, the paint he scratches, the blood or semen he deposits or collects. All of these and more, bear mute witness against him. This is evidence that does not forget. It is not confused by the excitement of the moment. It is not absent because human witnesses are. It is factual evidence. Physical evidence cannot be wrong, it cannot perjure itself, it cannot be wholly absent. Only human failure to find it, study and understand it, can diminish its value.* (Kirk, 1974: 4)
lines between fiction and non-fiction often blur in examples of this genre; it owes a considerable debt to law enforcement discourses about serial murder; and examples of it can be found on both sides of the high/low culture divide. (Schmid, 2005a: 1)

In this passage Schmid is discussing the pioneering work of two agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Robert Ressler and John Douglas, who were responsible for formulating new investigative methodologies and system of classification for crime scene analysis. In the 1970's, Ressler and Douglas had become increasingly interested in the types of repetitive criminal acts associated with arson, rape and murder. ‘Bob and John’, as we shall refer to them from now on, were particularly interested in the latter and contributed to Sexual Homicide, Pattern and Motives, John E. Douglas, Ann W. Burgess, Robert K. Ressler (1988) and the award winning Crime Classification Manual, a Standard System for Investigating and Classifying Violent Crimes, John Douglas, Ann W. Burgess, Allen G. Burgess, Robert K. Ressler (1992).

As we shall see, the highly speculative work of Bob and John was interestingly interwoven with the development of fiction about serial killers in North American culture. Indeed the symbiotic relationship between the developing ‘science’ of forensics and the literary genre of the detective story has been discussed in Ronald R. Thomas' Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science (2000). For Thomas, the investigatory processes of fingerprinting and crime-scene photography are as much a product of literary texts as they are developments in criminological forensic practice.27 This approach was influentially foreshadowed in the essays that comprise Umberto Eco’s & Thomas Sebeok’s The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce (1983). Here nineteenth century fictional characters such as Edgar

27 In relation to the use of fingerprints as a means of recording individual identity there is a connection with the plastic, rather than the literary, arts. The Scottish physician Henry Faulds (1843–1930) claims to have stumbled upon the idea of establishing a fingerprint archive whilst in Japan where he had noticed the ‘signature’ impressions left by Japanese potters in the body of their pots. The story of Faulds’ role in the development of fingerprinting is explained in Colin Beavan’s Fingerprints: The Origins of Crime Detection and the Murder Case that Launched Forensic Science (2002).
Allan Poe’s C. Auguste Dupin (in ‘The Murders in the Rue Morgue’ [1841], The Mystery of Marie Rogêt [1842] and The Purloined Letter [1844]) and Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes (for example, in The Sign of Four [1890] and A Scandal in Bohemia [1891]) are pioneering interpreters of crime-scene clues that, once analysed using the frame of semiotics, place Peircian concepts such as indexicality and abduction (another of Peirce’s terms to which we will turn below) at the heart of the ‘real life’ criminal investigator’s project.

More specifically, in the essay Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock Holmes: clues and scientific method (1983), Carlo Ginzburg compares the interpretative-diagnostic activities of Sherlock Holmes (looking for an intruder’s footprints outside a window) with those of Sigmund Freud (seeking the contents of the unconscious mind in slips of the tongue). (Pape, 2008: 3) Both are seen as forms of indexical sign-reading comparable to that of a medical doctor interpreting red marks on the skin as a symptom of measles or (Ginsburg’s key interest as an art historian) Giovanni Morelli (1816–1891) studying the formal characteristics of the tiny peripheral details in a painting in order to establish the specific ‘style’ of a particular artist. (Pape, 2008: 3) In an interesting article on the nature of Peirce’s thinking on the index, Searching For Traces: How to Connect the Science and the Humanities by a Peircian Theory of Indexicality (2008), the philosopher Helmut Pape writes:

From an even wider historical perspective Ginzburg claims that the neolithic hunter’s skill of reading traces has evolved culturally into the invention of writing. His thesis is that there is what he calls an ‘indexical paradigm’ at work behind the scene: Morelli, the art historian, Freud, the inventor of psychoanalysis and Sherlock Holmes’ author Conan Doyle all shared a knowledge of medical semiotics, the art of interpreting symptoms reliably. (Pape, 2008: 4)

Thus the ‘indexical paradigm’ that apparently shapes all our encounters with a physical world is, when it comes to interpreting the traces of criminal activity, represented by the fictional detective Holmes who provides the
model for the actual process of finding hidden meaning in anything that, for
the novice, looks like an insignificant detail. The degree to which this
suggests that fact and fiction are embedded in the development of forensic
science makes Ginzburg recognize that criminal investigations and detective
stories are a ‘meeting place of the rational and irrational’. (Ginzburg 1983:
197) In a similar vein, my study of Bob and John suggests that their
pioneering partnership, if seen as a single theorizing entity, mirrors the
double nature of speculative irrationality and cool reason that features in the
fictional writing by novelists such as James Ellroy. Here Ginzburg writes of a
double face and this Janus-like persona of forensic science will be discussed
in more detail in 4.1. Indeed the interaction of imaginative Bob and rational
John so evokes Alison Young’s description of the divided self of the detective
that the highly productive dividedness of the two agents will become, as this
chapter unfolds, a sub-theme of my research. As Young says:

   The detective can be characterized as an individual, but is better
understood as a kind of divided unity: both rational and imaginative
one who manages the play of meaning and meaninglessness... border
between the extraordinary and the ordinary. (Young, 1996:86)

The two publications to which Bob and John made major contributions have
become manuals in the field of crime investigation and are regarded and
cited by many in the investigative field as the authoritative key texts.28
of the esteem in which both books are held is that they are often described
as a criminologist's answer to the American Psychiatric Association’s
indispensable handbook on the diagnostic criteria for mental disorders:
*Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.* (Douglas, 1995:347)
However, during the period in which this important theoretical work was
being published, Bob and John were also developing their idea in populist

28 David Frank Schmid is certain that these publications are the ‘most influential example of
“technical” serial killer non-fiction’. (Schmid, 2005a: 1) In particular, *Sexual Homicide*
cemented the FBI’s reputation in political and public policy circles helping the Bureau attract
significant amounts of new funding and establish a broader sphere of influence. (Schmid,
2005a: 1)

http://openlibrary.org/works/OL15211795W/Sexual_Homicide


Simply by comparing the covers and titles of these four publications it is clear that, in the minds of the FBI agents there is a blurring of academic and fiction-like identities. Indeed it seems highly possible that the fluid forms of narratives and stories are the ‘fullest expression’ of the theoretical dimensions of forensic science as practiced by Bob and John. In both aspects of their literary activities, the two agents claim authority on the basis of first-hand experience. Bob and John’s knowledge is said to be indisputable because they report on what they have done in much the same way that a serial killer gives the ‘authoritative’ interview about their involvement with the crime. Furthermore, all four books take the reader on a novel-like journey that begins with informal and highly speculative research and concludes at the threshold moment when a systematic classification is established and available for others to use. This journey is the story of two ‘characters’ pioneering a new approach to forensic science that exhibits three points closely related to my new terrain of interest:

1) They named as they went along as had the early naturalists
2) They thought of serial killers as artists and of forensics as an art form
3) They tirelessly mythologize themselves and the criminals they investigate

Of course, the claims made by Bob and John in their publications remain contentious. For example, the ‘organized’ and ‘disorganized’ typologies they developed are in still in use but hotly disputed by other forensic practitioners. The significant contribution made by Bob and John to the technique of offender profiling was a strong factor in establishing the new terrain of interest that began to hold my attention when I returned from Japan. Whilst Bob and John had generated and refined an investigative system that has had a considerable influence on the way that police investigators portray the
behavioural traits of unknown criminals, it is particularly interesting that they considered their profiling process an art form. It is an indication of the porous border between the arts and forensic science that the two agents thought of their methodological effectiveness as less important than their creative identity. This is, in good part, because the naming process originated by Bob and John has been, over and over again, expanded and reshaped by the creative impact of popular literature and films. In making these two FBI criminal investigators the centre of the terrain of interest, I was hoping to establish my own creative interaction between waza and keiko in order to drive forward a new body of fine art activity in my studio.

http://openlibrary.org/books/OL9849832M/Whoever_Fights_Monsters
http://openlibrary.org/books/OL23271936M/Mind_hunter

3.4 On the road with the FBI

The courses that Bob and John attended at the FBI Academy (in Quantico, Virginia) included classes run by instructors from the Behavioral Science Unit (BSU) and many agents felt that this material was too academic in its sources. From a professional perspective, the syllabus had only a ‘limited applicability to the field of law enforcement and crime detection’. (Douglas, 1996: 101) Indeed, it is the pursuit of practicality that distinguishes the approach developed by Bob and John. Of the two agents, Bob was the most senior in age and Bureau ‘time in’. (Ressler, 1992:53) For John ‘going out with a seasoned instructor and watching him perform … was a quick way of picking up what it was you were supposed to be doing. (Douglas, 1996:104) This is where the partnership began.

29 In relation to this point, Hantke notes that, through the agency of fiction writers, filmmakers, journalists, and scholars, the serial killer narrative has become part of a widespread public conversation that allows self-reflexivity and boundary transgressions to abound. (Hantke, 2003: 17)
It was on the road, rather than in the Academy, that the two agents began to develop their theories. In these situations they were often not taken seriously simply because much of their theorizing focused on the traces of sexually motivated practices such as bondage, auto-asphyxiation, and cross-dressing. Nevertheless, this was an area of criminal investigation that dominated the interests of the two agents. For example, John co-authored *The Lust Murderer* (1980) with another senior agent, Roy Hazelwood, using this publication as an opportunity to discuss the difficulties of ‘The Maligned Investigator of Criminal Sexuality’ and the lack of professionalism in this aspect of murder investigations.

In John’s mind, the lack of professional knowledge in theoretical texts was due to the low level of practical investigative experience amongst academics. As a result, Bob and John proposed to answer the problem by writing about the need to meticulously prepare for an investigation using actual case notes and other relevant documents. They believed that the Academy’s classes should begin with the instructor asking if anyone present had worked the case under discussion (‘case studies’ were often based on actual incidents that the officers attending the session might well have investigated). This was important because the Academy’s instructors had been known to engage in self-defeating disputes with trainees who had first-hand knowledge of the case in question. Here we could describe Bob and John as champions of the Linnaean approach: they thought that theorists should not speak about a case unless it has been before their eyes. However, they are also promoting the naturalist’s ambition of bringing copious amounts of first-hand experience under systematic control. In this sense, they conform to the characteristics of the European taxonomist. There is another parallel in the plethora of terminology and classification characteristics used by murder investigators (for example, Schmid [2005] routinely interchanges the terms ‘multicide’, ‘spree killer’, and ‘stranger murder’). For Bob and John, such confusing nomenclature must have been rather like the unsystematic indigenous plant names that Linnaeus strove to comprehensively pin down.
However, there is a difference between the two characters in the Bob and John story. Schmid tells us that in *Natural Born Celebrities: Serial Killers in American Culture* that ‘one of the most entertaining features of Douglas’s and Ressler’s work is their obvious dislike for each other’. (Schmid, 2005a: 96) To a certain extent it is possible to see this antimony as a manifestation of the tension between the ‘waza of naming’ and the *keiko* of action. The two agents, once busy promoting themselves as experts in offender profiling, create a duality within their practices that comes across as a necessary attribute of a good investigator. Here I want to describe the *waza* and *keiko* of Bob and John as a productive conflict between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ qualities. (Turvey, 1999: 433-451) Here a successful criminal investigator is able to blend factual evidence with intuition.³⁰ It could be argued that Bob and John actively promote themselves within this duality: Bob is ‘soft’ (theoretical) and John ‘hard’ (operational). There is even a historical precedent for this two-sided approach: two early pioneers of forensic science, Locard (whose Exchange Principle was discussed above in section 3.3) and Dr. Johann Gross (1847–1925) are often described as representations of the practical and theoretical dimensions that constitute the successful whole of good criminal investigation. (Chisum & Turvey, 2007: 16–25) Perhaps this dualism is expressed in Bob and John’s characterization of two members of the FBI’s Behavioural Science Unit (BSU) quiet, low key and methodical (Howard Teten) and quick and energetic (Pat Mullany). (Ressler, 1992: 31-32) The point is that Teten and Mullany were seen as being successfully complementary. In fact, this researcher is inclined to see Bob and John’s binary thinking as an echo of the ‘good cop, bad cop’ motif so familiar in popular crime fiction, cinema, and television. (*Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual*, 1983: 26-27) I suggest that the productive combination of soft Bob and hard John can be understood as a form of *riai*, a balanced form of practice in which *keiko* arises within *waza*.

³⁰ Acting upon intuitions is one of Bob and John’s most pervasive themes. An interesting example of this pervasiveness is revealed in the work of the novelist Thomas Harris who, in consultation with the two agents, has developed plots that leave space for ‘the working out of the intuitive hunch that often cannot be accommodated within the bureaucratic structure of an organization like the FBI’. (Schmid, 2005b:1)
Throughout Bob and John’s writing there is continuing reference to clarity in practice that I take to mean the perfect balance of soft theory and hard intuitive freedom. For the two agents field experience is the central experience of the criminal investigative process, it is here that soft and hard interact. At a crime scene the investigator develops the ability, skill and discernment to turn the hard visual signs of criminal activity into interpretations of the soft inferences of criminal behaviour. Success is achieved by blending these skills. Here the investigator develops their riai practice in ‘the cold crucible of the field’. (Douglas, 1996:92)

For Bob and John, the taxonomic process is always in danger of falling into confusion if scientific naming becomes over complex: they were worried about the escalation of jargon-like terms in crime-scene investigations. (Ressler, 1992: 129) It seems that Bob and John sought a naming process that would provide working concepts ‘that would be of use to law enforcement personnel’. (Douglas, 1996: 131–2) Like a naturalist undertaking botanical fieldwork, the two FBI agents promoted first-hand contact and observation that, through the productive blurring of intuition and taxonomic knowledge, achieved scientific understandings. However, in contrast to the practitioners of European taxonomic tradition, Bob and John emphasise rebellious and unorthodox actions. Here the creativity of a populist novel writer is a stronger role model. For example, a central aspect of the two agents’ method is to interview offenders in prison, to learn from the authorities themselves, to experience ‘experts’ first hand. (Holmes& Holmes 1996, Hickey 1997, Berry-Dee 2003, Morrison 2005) The interrogation room in which Bob and John would come face-to-face with embodied criminality is, for the crime writer David Simon, a site of complex theatrical engagement in which ‘the illusion is profound, distorting as it does the natural hostility between hunter and hunted, transforming it until it resembles a relationship more symbiotic than adversarial’. (Quoted in Nordquist, 2010: 1) For Simon, when the roles of the interviewer and the interviewee are perfectly performed ‘deceit surpasses itself, becoming manipulation on a grand scale’ making the activities of the interrogation room little more than ‘a carefully staged drama,
a choreographed performance that allows a detective and his suspect to find common ground where none exists’. (Quoted in Nordquist, 2010: 1)

These interviews are opportunities for passages of writing that can only be described as novelistic; Bob and John litter their books with atmospheric dark cells and tawdry police interview rooms, with narratives that involve cocktail lounges and gossiping criminals: ‘let’s see if we can talk to them; ask them why they did it’, writes John using dialogue like a fiction writer, let’s ‘find out what it was like through their eyes.’ (Douglas, 1996: 105)

Here we have the fluidity of story-telling at the service of the rigid ambition ‘of doing in-depth research that would lead to a greater understanding of violent offenders.’ (Ressler, 1992: 40) If Bob and John ‘wanted very much to talk to the people about whom [they had] been lecturing, the killers themselves’, then this radical approach perhaps also required radical methods of dissemination (Ressler, 1992: 40) From the perspective of this research, this ‘crazy idea’, this way of getting things done by the ‘soft’ guile and ‘hard’ gall of interviewing and fieldwork practices, was a creative project of the kind any fiction writer would be interested in. (Douglas, 1996: 105) Perhaps this is why Bob and John mythologize themselves in the role of outsiders or mavericks. It could be argued that the prevailing attitude towards investigation and research in this area (then, and perhaps still) encourages an ‘outsider’ mindset. The celebrated FBI profiler Roy Hazelwood, who was not convinced by the two agents’ romantic self-portrayal, dismissed their approach as nothing more than ‘garbage collection’. (Hazelwood et al, 2001: 244) Accordingly, the FBI exhibits ‘stodginess and inflexibility’, something they will continue to fight until their retirement. (Ressler, 1992: 30) Mavericks see themselves as special, different, gifted, misunderstood, mysterious, creative and heroic and the two agents make it clear that they dislike the ‘do it “by the book” attitude’. (Ressler, 1992: 30)

If, on my return from Japan, I wanted my practice to be an interaction of waza and keiko, in the writing of Bob and John I found a terrain of interest
that allowed new engagements with naming systems whilst embracing ideas about creative production that, I believe, had been difficult to achieve during my undergraduate studies when my collages were the product of my theoretical deliberations. In the mode of forensic science I encountered through Bob and John, the ‘waza of naming’ was manifest as ‘soft’ theory and the keiko of poetic action was realized in the ‘hard’ experience of practice.

3.5 Bob and John and action research methodology

The ‘crazy idea’ of interviewing the ‘killers themselves’ did not involve great rigour in terms of research methods. Nothing was written down and no documentation was made. Furthermore, the ethical dimensions of the interviews were suspect. No attempt was made to explain to the relevant authorities why the chosen offenders were being interviewed. The whole venture entailed very informal arrangements. On the other hand, Bob and John wanted to act upon their intuitions and had very negative feelings about academic processes. Their idea of a systematic investigation was not really comparable to research in the sense that it is undertaken in the University sector. Bob and John were creating an ‘art’ of interviewing convicted murderers. (Ressler, 1992: 57) As a result, the process was both informal and unconventional: today the kind of criminal-personality study they undertook would be much more difficult to put together. (Douglas, 1996: 129) However, in this section I am going to cross-reference the pioneering activities of the two FBI agents with a particular aspect of the master’s course at Northumbria University: that is, the module in practice-led research methodology (called Contextual Practice) that introduces master’s students to the relationship between theory and practice in the context of postgraduate research.
As my practice got under way at Northumbria, and it became clear that I had a new terrain of interest to explore, the master’s helped me explore Bob and John’s approach by referring to the methods used by fine art researchers. Despite their claims about ‘art’, Bob and John are using conventional qualitative research methods. They interviewed thirty-six high-profile offenders including eight of the most dangerous and notorious murderers ever apprehended in the United States: Charles Manson, Sirhan Sirhan, Tex Watson (a Manson associate), Juan Corona (killer of migrant workers), Herbert Mullin (who had killed fourteen people), John Frazier (who had killed six) Jerome Brudos and Edmund Kemper. (Ressler, 1992: 41) The choice of these particular offenders is probably linked to wider cultural notions of the murderer as a type of celebrity. (Schmid, 2005a) Bob and John always had their eyes on the popular culture.

It certainly could be argued that the rather melodramatic tone of the interviews as reported by the two agents is somewhat sensationalistic. The decision to ‘interview convicted killers ‘had never been done before and was a breakthrough of rare proportions.’ (Ressler, 1992: 41) A mythologizing process is continually employed to heighten Bob and John’s story and that of the criminals they investigate. An uncomfortable association with fan worship has been noted by the criminologist Katherine Ramsland who writes about the relationship between Bob and serial murderer William Heirens, dubbed ‘The Lipstick Killer’ by the press, a case Bob had avidly followed as a child:31

When Ressler was scheduled to give instruction in southern Illinois, he recalled that Heirens was in Vienna Men's Correctional Facility not far from there, so he got permission to interview him. "It was weird," he recalls, "because many kids have sports heroes and that sort of thing, and I wanted to meet this serial killer. I told him that I'd followed his case. He was about nine years older than me and he was kind of taken aback that, in a sense, he had a fan. (Ramsland, 2001a: 3)

31'We had cap guns and cameras,' Bob reminisces, 'and we'd follow neighbors around and conduct crime scene examinations to find “The Lipstick Killer”. We got old tubes of lipstick from our mothers and wrote things on walls. We did this every day and at the end of the day we'd meet together to compare notes'. (Ramsland, 2001a: 3)
Other examples of interviews are also cast in a sensationalist mode of narration. One interview with Ed Kemper places Bob in a ‘claustrophobic locked cell for four hours, dealing with matters that entail behaviour at the extreme edge of depravity. (Ressler, 1992: 53–54) At one point Kemper told his lone visitor that he could ‘screw [Bob’s] head off and place it on the table to greet the guard’. (Ressler, 1992: 54) The story continues with Bob employing hostage negotiation skills to keep the dangerous prisoner talking. On reflection Bob decided that the rapport he formed with Kemper was a form of Stockholm syndrome (see Bejerot, 1974) where a hostage develops positive feelings for their captor. (Ressler, 1992: 55) The two agents had been misled into thinking that it would be safe to undertake solo interviews. Following the Kemper experience, Bob and John did their interviews in pairs. (Ressler, 1992: 56) Bob and John see themselves as doers (with or without permission). When it comes to interviewing convicted killers, being practical is the interviewer’s route to the insightful qualities that foster an ability to improvise and creatively exploit situations. Practice is a key concept for Bob and John that related to my activities as a master fine art student.

Here there is an echo of the process of action research which I learned about on the Contextual Practice module. The founder of social psychology, Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), coined the term ‘action research’ in a 1946 paper entitled Action Research and Minority Problems. Lewin describes ‘a spiral of steps, each of which is composed of a circle of planning, action and fact-finding about the result of the action’. (Lewin, 1946: 34-46) I wondered if I could describe Bob and John’s approach in these terms. Certainly the agents’ desire to develop theoretical systems and classificatory systems as they went along fits with a basic principle of action research. For Ronald M. Holmes, writing in the preface to Profiling Violent Crimes (2002), there has always been a lack of factual information in the training of criminal profilers and most investigators learn their skills, first hand, in the atmosphere of mystery that surrounds a violent crime. Reason & Bradbury describe the

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32 John relates the same episode in his book The Anatomy of Motive (2000) but couches it in terms that suggest he was present when it occurred. (Douglas, 2000:29-30)
researcher undertaking action research in similar terms, the investigator cannot stand back and absorb information in a neutral and abstract manner, their personal involvement in the context of the research will influence the way the information is gathered and the resulting material is interpreted. An action research inquiry is 'participative, grounded in experience, and action-oriented'. (Reason & Bradbury, 2001: xxiv) This aspect makes action research methods very relevant to the activities of Bob and John in the same way that this methodology is well suited to investigations undertaken by fine art postgraduate students. The fact that Bob and John thought of serial killers as artists and of forensics as an art form reinforces the parallel.

One of the most interesting aspects of Bob and John’s approach is that they are aware of the ‘thin line’ that separates the offenders from the personnel who ‘hunt’ them down. This is not an entirely new idea. There is the old adage ‘it takes a thief to catch a thief’ and Bob and John’s philosophy seems to be ‘it takes one to know one’. The history of criminology offers some prominent examples that can be quoted here: for example, the professional criminal Eugène François Vidcoq (1775-1857) founded and became the first and highly successful director of the Sûreté Nationale (criminal investigative bureau) of France. Not unsurprisingly, Foucault described Vidcoq as a ‘great criminal’ used ‘as a criminal by the apparatus of power’. (Foucault, 1980: 45) Vidcoq’s story inspired writers of the calibre of Victor Hugo and Honoré de Balzac. I propose that this aspect of criminology relates to Reason & Bradbury’s description of action research as participative and grounded in experience. The thin, fragile, even porous, boundary separating violent offenders and those that attempt to help catch them enhances the ability of the investigator.33 The only way to catch a serial offender, according to Bob and John, is to ‘learn how to think like they do’ (Douglas, 1996: 31) ‘The first thing I try to do is visualize what they must have looked like and sounded like when they were doing the crimes’. (Douglas, 1996: 130) An empathic approach is promoted that allows the investigator to put himself ‘mentally and

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33 Similarly, in Fire Investigation (1969), Kirk reports that ‘the investigator of crime is most effective when he can place himself in the role of the criminal; the best investigators are those who can do this most effectively. They can learn to think as the criminal thinks, react as he reacts and from this he can estimate how he operates’. (Quoted in Turvey, 2002: 13)
emotionally in the head of the offender.' (Douglas, 1996: 151) The unique perspective that is required places Bob and John ‘inside of that [killers] mind, looking out’. (Ressler, 1992: 44) Perhaps most tellingly in relation to the parallel between Bob and John’s methods and the participative nature of action research is a statement like this: ‘my own actions could be called ‘serial’ - I now hoped to perfect my crimes by doing still more interviews’ (Ressler, 1992: 45). Or this: ‘we refined our techniques … allowing us to start walking in their shoes’. (Douglas, 1996: 117)

From the perspective of a fine art master’s student, this desire to put oneself mentally and emotionally in the head of the offender, to try to think as he does, sounds like an informed gallery visitor trying to understand what goes on in the head of an artist at work in a studio. I wondered if the parallel I was trying to make actually placed the artist action researcher in the shoes of the criminal rather than the investigator. Certainly Bob and John regard both sides of the criminological experience as a ‘realm of creative thinking’. (Douglas, 1996:151) According to the Australian informatics theorist Peter Marshall, an awareness of personal action gives the action researcher a distinctive characteristic – others cannot replicate their research. (Marshall, 2001: 433) There is an individualistic and idiosyncratic aspect to action research that is also the hallmark of practice-led research by artists. Here the emphasis is on the unique experience of the researcher and with Bob and John we have an interesting variant on the practice-led method. The two agents need to generate a myth of themselves as mavericks in order to project, in the midst of a science that continually has to struggle to maintain its scientific status, an investigatory approach that is difficult for other investigators to replicate. Bob and John present their interaction with celebrated serial killers as a mysterious, almost heroic identification with the creative criminal mind. An episode in the film Red Dragon (2002) clearly illustrates this disturbing form of dialogic encounter. The serial killer Hannibal Lector taunts his profiler Will Graham (who is increasingly unbalanced by his empathy for Lector) with the idea that he has been caught because the two
of them are very much alike. Bob and John are clearly aware of the dangers of the participative dimension of their investigation techniques. ‘Whoever fights monsters’, writes Bob (quoting Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good and Evil*), ‘should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster’. The eloquence of this statement mirrors the drama of Bob and John’s project and they used these words in lectures and presentations. (Ressler, 1992: 39) The two agents felt that it was important to keep such sobering thoughts in mind when dealing with the depths of human criminality. (Ressler, 1992: 39) However, it should be remembered that there was a need to lend a certain philosophical weight to Bob and John’s presentations because the audience often included police and FBI agents who were highly sceptical about their approach.

Nevertheless, the participative nature of action research is the key attribute of practice-led investigations and Bob and John are at pains to point out that they learn a great deal as they go along. ‘We were learning more and more with each new prison encounter, but there had to be a way to organize the informal research into a systematized, usable framework.’ (Douglas, 1996:123) This statement recalls Lewin’s notion of action research as a spiral of steps that takes the research on a journey through planning, action, 

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34 It has been argued that, during the 1980s, the FBI was not just fighting monsters, but also creating them. In *The Big Idea* (an Australian Broadcasting Corporation radio programme that included interviews with Patricia Cornwell [the novelist] and Louis Schlesinger [a forensic psychologist]), Philip Jenkins (a professor of History and Religious Studies at Pennsylvania State University who has published on the social construction of serial Homicide) comments:

There's no doubt, if you look at the media in 1983 and 1984, initially in the United States but subsequently around the world, literally every new story about this new menace of serial murder can be tracked back to a tiny group of people, a tiny group of experts working at Quantico in Virginia, the headquarters of the Behavioural Science Unit. A tiny handful of people shaped this subject, declared what the limits of the subject would be; declared, for example, that they were interested in wandering killers as opposed to killers who killed in one place; men, as opposed to women; a particular kind of Ripper stereotype. They formulated the idea, they created the statistics, and there's no doubt about that -- the whole mythology of serial murder was created by them. And there was a strong reason for that, which was that the mythology also came complete with a solution, which was the solution they were offering in terms of their profiling skills and emphasis on technology as a means of linking together serial murders. So, if you've ever been to Quantico, if you've ever been to the Behavioural Science Unit, it's a very small set of offices but it shaped opinion around the world. (*The Big Idea*, 2002:1)
and fact-finding based on the result of the action. Indeed, the ambition to arrive at some level of categorisation of, or new classificatory framework for, serial offences represents Bob and John’s version of the full cycle of the action research process. By reducing the space between themselves and their criminal respondents to no more than a thin, fragile, porous boundary the investigators were able to see characteristics that allowed them to become name-givers and provide an appropriate nomenclature accordingly. Thus, Bob’s first use of the term ‘serial killer’, or John’s coining of ‘signature’ for any sustained element in an offenders behaviour, were referred to as ‘naming events’ that formed ‘part of an overall effort in trying to get a handle on these monstrous crimes, of seeking ways of comprehending them’. (Ressler, 1992: 33; Douglas, 1996: 69)

From the perspective of the action researcher, Bob and John’s ‘naming events’ were like the practice of writing in the fullest creative meaning of this word. As Bob and John say ‘you can give a computer all the rules of grammar and syntax and style, but it still can’t write a book’. (Douglas, 1996: 151) The process of profiling requires an overlapping range of narrative techniques to arrive at the point where they are dealing with abstract systems such as tables, lists, glossaries and taxonomies. According to Torbert & Reason (2001) an action researcher will be using a combination of the following three investigatory strategies:

1) First-person strategies foster an awareness of personal action in order to stimulate personal understanding.
2) Second-person strategies involve encounters with communities of inquiry that solve mutual problems.
3) Third-person strategies seek to extend communities of inquiry beyond second-person encounters to an impersonal, generalized or abstract level.

In other words, there has to be a first-person awareness of personal action so that, in turn, a second-person encounter can be applied to shared
problems which, in order to resolve an investigation at an impersonal level, must embrace third-person generalizations. Richard Badcock, a British profiler, who attended an FBI course in 1993 at Dundee University, seems to think of offender profiling in terms of textual strategies that an action researcher would recognize:

‘The sky is blue’ and ‘The sky’s the limit’ – you can only see the difference in meaning when you see the whole sentence. Science, if you like is about understanding the dictionary definitions of words. Profiling has a relationship with science, but is an art in the same way that medicine is an art. (Cook, 2002: 20-21)

The interaction of first-person, second-person and third-person strategies suggested in the notion of a ‘whole sentence’ means that offender profiling requires both science and art to give full expression to the waza of naming. My own engagement with the work of Bob and John, initially introduced to me within the fictional writing of James Ellroy, shaped my new terrain of interest. Here forensics functioned like a dramatic story, it uncovered and inscribed what the Italian literary scholar Franco Moretti (1988) called the ‘narrative function of crime’ and, in this section, I have attempted to frame that interest within the context of action research methodology, the mode of investigation most favoured by fine art researchers. (Moretti, 1988: 141)
3.6 Bob and John as interpreters of signs

An important component of Bob and John’s refusal of ‘do it “by the book” attitude’ is the first-hand experience of reading signs, the traces of past activity, at a crime scene. The all-important practical dimension of offender profiling is, in fact, a semiotic activity that resonates with the concept of indexicality, the type of sign introduced above in relation to the theories of Peirce. In Section 3.2 we referred to the Japanese speech acts ‘toh’ and ‘yah’ as operating like a pronoun demonstrative or relative that forces ones attention to an object or event. (Peirce, 1885: 243) In section 3.2 (Japanese (en) counters) above, ‘toh’ and ‘yah’ allowed me to introduce Peirce.

According to the contemporary philosopher Thomas Short, in his essay *The Development of Peirce’s Theory of Signs* (2004), Peirce first adopted the semiotic term index in 1885 following his work in mathematics (undertaken with a student, O. H. Mitchell). Within this research a need had arisen to relate the generality of the formal logic algebra to specific, individual cases. Mitchell had begun to employ pronoun-like quantifiers that directed attention to individual variables and this aroused Peirce’s semiotic interest in the process of cognition. (Short, 2004: 218)

…generality is essential to reasoning…. But [general terms] alone do not state what is the subject of the discourse, and this can, in fact, not be described in general terms, it can only be indicated. The actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any description. Hence the need of pronouns and indices. (Peirce, 1982-: 163-4)

Therefore certain kinds of semiotic experience ‘can only be indicated’— for example, by a pointing finger. Here Peirce had discovered a type of sign that ‘asserts nothing, it only says “There!”’ (Peirce 1982: 163) For Short, particularly in his extensive survey *Peirce’s Theory of Signs* (2007), this discovery had many implications for the development of Peirce’s thinking on semiosis – he began to explore the possibility that physical reactions are as
much signs as linguistic codes and visual representations – and Short’s interesting work on the history of Peirce’s expanding definition of signification is an important vehicle for understanding the unique position of the American philosopher in relation to his near contemporary, the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). Saussure and Peirce are unlikely to have known of each other’s activities but both founded semiotic disciplines with contrasting results and distinctive intellectual legacies. (Short, 2007: 17)

No introduction to Peircian indexicality can avoid mentioning the tensions between the American and European approaches to the science of signs: in other words, between Peirce and Saussure. Broadly speaking, Peirce’s alignment to logic and mathematics made him seek within sign processes an understanding of the nature of thought and the fundamental levels at which cognition is generated (both individually and communally). In contrast, Saussure stressed the linguistic arbitrariness of signs within the social, cultural, and historical contexts in which meaning circulates. Most basic introductions to the two schools describe their difference in this way (see, for example, De Waal, 2001: 69 and Colapietro, 1993: 174) It is widely understood that Saussure’s approach was the ‘inspiration of structuralism’ in the twentieth century. (Short, 2007: 16) Without Saussure, and his interest in the way that meaning is created by the systems of mutual exclusion that shape the conventions of written and spoken language, we would not have the critique of naturalism and realism that dominated the arts in second half of the twentieth century. Certainly, the excitement generated by writers such as Barthes owes a great deal to the role of social and cultural consensus in Saussure’s thinking. In Barthes’ hands all sign systems, the visual as well as the linguistic, can be understood as being ideologically driven, especially systems of codification that define and classify the ‘natural’. Barthes’ classic book ‘Mythologies’ (1957, 1972) was an important part of the intellectual background of ‘interest’ that informed my activities as an undergraduate art student as described above in the first chapter of this thesis.
However, from the 1970s, art critics such as Rosalind Krauss (particularly in her essay ‘Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America’ (1977), began to re-evaluate our understanding of visual signs using Peirce rather than Saussure. Her primary reason for doing this was the scope offered by the indexical sign in understanding the impact of photography on Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968) whilst he was working on his seminal ‘Large Glass or Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even’ in the years between 1915 and 1923, the point at which he abandoned the retinal function of artworks (pictures, images) and pioneered the conceptual basis of artistic action. In ‘Notes on the Index: Part 1 and 2’ Krauss explores Duchamp’s influence on the development of conceptual art during the 1960s and 1970s. Here the mechanical-chemical basis of the photographic process is identified as an indexical form of signification and Duchamp seems to recognise the implications of Peirce’s idea in his decision to subtitle *The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even*, an object that resembles a large glass photographic plate, a ‘delay in glass’. (Duchamp, 1960: 2) Unlike the textualism of Barthes, Krauss’ essay addresses the ‘stuff’ of our material encounters with process and technique. In the same way that the development of high quality oil paint or the availability of Carrara marble stimulated an expanding sense of aesthetic value amongst Renaissance artists, so the mysterious chemistry of mechanized reproduction encouraged creative practitioners in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to imagine new fields of radical art. On this basis, in the 1980s, an essay like ‘Notes on the Index’ spoke as much to practicing artists as to art theorists.

An important feature of an indexical sign is that it draws attention to both contemporary and past events. As Pape puts it: ‘for some sign to count as an index, there has to be a direct, factual connection, consisting in a two-place relation between sign and object’. (Pape, 2008: 12) The indexical sign is a trace of a past object or event. Thus indexicality is achieved by virtue of a real connection that has left its trace in the present. (Peirce, 1909: 460-461) Here Pierce’s thinking is typically complicated. Mary Ann Doane, the media theorist, finds the definition of the index provided by the American
philosopher confusing. ‘Given the fact that Peirce applied the term ‘index’ to such diverse signs as a footprint, a weather vane, thunder, the word ‘this’, a pointing finger, and a photographic image, it is not difficult to see why the concept has occasioned confusion’. (Doane, 2007: 2)

For Bob and John 'criminal profiling was a relatively young science (or art)’ that involved arriving at a description of an unknown criminal by ‘evaluating minute details of the crime scene, the victim, and other evidentiary factors.’ (Ressler, 1992: 3) Here ‘evaluating minute details’ is an indexical action and, to be a good profiler, ‘you have to be able evaluate a wide range evidence and data.’ (Douglas, 1996: 173) Using indexical signs at a crime scene, an investigator can deduce information related to the four stages of homicidal incident. According to the FBI's profiling process these stages are as follows:

a) Antecedent factors: What fantasy or plan, or both, did the murderer have in place before the act? What triggered the murderer to act some days and not others?

b) Method and manner: What type of victim or victims did the murderer select? What was the method and manner of murder: shooting, stabbing, strangulation or something else?

c) Body disposal: Did the murder and body disposal take place all at one scene, or multiple scenes?

d) Post offence behaviour: Is the murderer trying to inject himself into the investigation by reacting to media reports or contacting investigators? (Winerman, 2004:67-8)

35 De Forest, Gaenslen & Lee (1983) and Chisum & Turvey (2007) debate the oppositional role of generalists (‘big picture’ people) and specialists (‘small picture’ people) in the forensic field. However, Bob and John's directive to pay attention to detail requires that neither big nor small pictures dominate an investigation: for this researcher, this way of looking at the world is highly reminiscent of the perceptual-cognitive discipline of enzan no metsuke (fixing your eyes on the distant mountain) in Kendo.
As a master’s student exploring the concept of practice-led research methodology it seemed to me that, in relation to the indexical evidence that provides clues for each of these stages, a profiler could adopt Torbert & Reason’s investigatory strategies. A first-person profiler would keep an open mind about the signs they discovered at the crime scene. A second-person profiler would engage with and debate other investigator’s interpretative suggestions. A third-person profiler would rise above personal and shared feelings about a crime in order to form a theoretical position. In the end, a profiler has to reason like a criminal. (Ramsland, 2002: 1a) To reason in this way is also an indexical act. As Peirce says of the index: ‘the interpreting mind has nothing to do with [the physical] connection [to the past], except remarking it, after it is established.’ (Peirce, 1894: 9) In other words, an index is a sign that is activated by, rather than created by, an interpreter. Pape tells us that, with indexicality, ‘[n]ot just any two-place relation between a sign and its object will do’, an indexical sign process needs the ‘cognitive activity of a sign-user’. (Pape, 2008: 12) In other words, there are always an indefinite number of physical connections between different objects and events in the semiotic environment but for one instance of this multitude of two-place relations to become an index, the sign needs to be caught within the ‘epistemic reach’ of the interpreter. (Pape, 2008: 13-14) For example, a space of attention needs to be created at a crime scene by a profiler who wants to, on the basis of the identification of trace-like evidence, reason like a criminal. Thus Bob and John are emphatic interpreters of, rather than creators of, signs: ‘it was clear to any reasonably intelligent observer that we were onto something. For the first time, we were able to correlate what was going on in an offender’s mind with the evidence he left at a crime scene.’ (Douglas, 1996: 122)

Everything we see at a crime scene tells us something about the unknown subject – or UNSUB, in police jargon – who committed the crime. By studying as many crimes as we could and through talking to the experts – the perpetrators themselves – we have learned to interpret those clues in much the same way a doctor evaluates various symptoms to diagnose a particular disease or condition. And just as a doctor can begin forming a diagnosis after recognising
several aspects of disease presentation he or she has seen before, we can make various conclusions when we see patterns start to emerge. (Douglas, 1996: 26)

Clearly, a medical diagnosis is a form of indexical interpretation. Doctors are also investigators who continue to learn through an immersion in clinical practices, a participatory and empathetic process that requires the investigator to embrace the same kind of first-person, second-person and third-person strategies used by action researchers. The process used by the profiler is quite similar to that employed by clinicians to make a diagnosis and treatment plan: data is collected, the situation reconstructed, hypotheses are formulated, a profile developed and tested, and the results reported back. Indeed, Frank Davidoff, in his essay *Mystery, murder and medicine: reading the clues* (1995), describes the resemblance of diagnosis in medicine to detection in murder mysteries: he observes that ‘both neutralize the malevolent, guilty quality associated with “unknown causes”’ and whilst ‘the way this works is itself a bit mysterious … both diagnosis and detection depend for their effect on at least three major acts: naming, predicting and explaining’. (Davidoff, 1995: 1) Without a doubt, profilers and doctors combine intuition and educated guesswork with prior experience in similar scenarios in order to arrive at a hypothetical formulation that includes a name, a prediction and an explanation. (Geberth, 1996: 722)

The third-person level of Bob and John’s thinking produced the two agents most significant hypothetical formulation: that of the ‘organized’ and ‘disorganized’ types of offender. A messy crime scene, with lots of indexical evidence, is typical of a disorganized psychotic offender. In contrast, a tidy scene, with very little indexical evidence, is typical of an organized psychopathic offender. This typology is now largely discredited and widely thought to be an overly simplistic ‘conceptual division’, a ‘false dichotomy’. (Turvey, 1999: 145) In fact, cross-analysis of crime scenes seems to indicate

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36 Davidoff also appreciates the inherent creativity of this clinical process of ‘naming, predicting and explaining’: he cites Dorothy L Sayers’ essay *The Problem Picture* (1987) in which a doctor is said to be ‘performing a delicate, adventurous and experimental creative act, of which the patient’s body is the material, and to which the creative co-operation of the patient’s will is necessary’. (Davidoff, 1995: 1)
that offenders are always positioned somewhere between the two polarities, making the distinction unworkable. Bob and John later added the ‘mixed’ offender category to their classificatory system in an attempt to address this problem. (Ressler, 1992: 129) This is especially relevant because some offenders develop skills over periods of reoffending, termed ‘precautionary acts’, which result in a reduction of indexical evidence. Recent interviews with serial killers have tended to validate this and criminologists now recognize that ‘the amount of evidence left behind must be viewed in the context of a dynamic series of events. It cannot be interpreted at a glance through an isolating construct.’ (Turvey, 1999:148) No crime is a ‘frozen moment of time,’ it is constantly subject to change. (Chisum & Turvey, 2006: xviii)

Here there is a tension between the role of indexical signs at a crime scene and the ability of a criminal to manipulate, or reduce, the traces of their actions. In a sense, we are now considering a battle between two kinds of highly creative action researchers: the profiler becomes increasingly adept at reading subtle traces of the past; the criminal continually explores ways in which the past can be rendered empty of signs. The dynamics of both forms of practice require the practitioner to think ‘outside the box’ in a manner that recalls my description of the interaction of waza and keiko where a system only reaches its fullest expression within intuitive action. Perhaps this is why the word ‘art’ is repeatedly employed to describe the process of offender profiling and the expanding abilities of the criminal. Here intuition and practical experience are transformed into an empirically tested system measured against success and failure, a reflection of the action researcher’s ‘spiral of steps’. If Bob and John and their criminal counterparts are involved in action research, then this is how they move forward using fact-finding in conjunction with highly intuitive actions. Thanks to the genre of crime fiction, we are all aware of the celebrated ‘hunch’ that leads a detective to a successful resolution of a case. In such situations indexicality is as much a matter of intuition as accrued knowledge. The most famous fictional interpreter of indexical signs, Sherlock Holmes, often follows hunches. The
routine rigour of fact-finding is suddenly emancipated by a ‘hunch’ reinforcing the perception that, when it comes to detection, those who rely on intuition fare better than figures of authority using rigid explanatory and classificatory models. (Hantke, 2003: 13) The effect has a great deal of narratological power: ‘Watson insists that I am the dramatist in real life,’ claims Holmes in *The Valley of Fear* (1915), ‘some touch of the artist wells up within me, and calls insistently for a well-staged performance’. (Doyle, 2003: 283) Here Bob and John are, on their own account, artists in a story that has literary ambitions as well scientific goals.\(^{37}\) In fact, John has been very clear about his orientation towards the novelistic describing the antecedents of the two agent’s procedures as crime fiction rather than crime fact. (Douglas, 1996: 32) Further associations with detective stories include John’s delight at being referred to as the FBI’s Sherlock Holmes and his recognition that, as a school pupil, he had a flair for was telling stories that could have ‘contributed to [him] becoming a crime investigator’. (Douglas, 1996: 33–37)

The blurring of forensic science and crime literature is also discussed in Turvey & Chisum’s *Crime Reconstruction* (2007), a book that clearly aims at the professional needs of police and FBI investigators. The authors note that many of their readers will probably regard the inclusion of writers such as Conan Doyle in the history of crime reconstruction as an error of judgment but, nevertheless, maintain that the Sherlock Holmes stories are carefully crafted lessons in the application of science and deductive reasoning. (Chisum & Turvey, 2007: 5) Chisum & Turvey also praise the now forgotten *Handbuch fur Untersuchungsrichter, als System der Kriminalistik* (*Criminal Investigation, a Practical Textbook for Magistrates, Police Officers, and Lawyers*) (1893) by the Austrian magistrate Johann Gross who, in promoting a meticulous approach to investigatory methods and an alertness to the potential of new technologies such as telegraphic communication, seems to

\(^{37}\) Roy Hazelwood, who was a senior colleague of Bob and John in the FBI (see section 3.4 above), may have fostered the literary interests of the two agents. When Hazelwood was in charge of police scholarship training he provided a reading list that included *Crime and Punishment, The Angel of Darkness, The Alienist, and An Instance of the Fingerpost*. Hazelwood reported: ‘We put in novels … because you can learn from reading those’ (Ramsland, 2001b: 1)
have been influenced by the writing of Conan Doyle. (Chisum & Turvey, 2007: 20)

If Bob and John aspired to a Holmes-like role in pioneering criminal profiling, then their opponents, like the fictional Professor Moriarty or Irene Adler, must be similarly gifted and credited with the status of an artist. The two agents use Picasso (not unsurprisingly, given the post-war period in which their seminal work was undertaken) to model the semiotic nature of a crime scene. ‘You can’t claim to understand or appreciate Picasso without studying his paintings. Here there is an echo of an art historian like Morelli studying the details of a painting in order to identify an artist’s ‘style’, an idea that was central to Ginzburg’s exploration of the interpretative-diagnostic activities of Sherlock Holmes (see section 3. 3 above). Thus there is an influential idea at work in Bob and John’s thinking that imagines successful serial killers planning their violent work as carefully as a painter plans a canvas.\(^{38}\)

A case in point is the American serial killer Ed Kemper (see 3. 5 above) who, in the eyes of criminal investigators, seemed to be refining his techniques like an artist reworking a drawing, painting or sculpture in order to arrive at a perfect result. For these investigators, if Kemper was repeatedly getting away with crimes, then it meant he was doing something ‘right’, that he was successfully analyzing what was happening and learning to perfect his technique.\(^{39}\) (Douglas, 1996: 112-13) In considering crime as an art, murderers such as Kemper appear to link the apparent purposelessness of cold-blooded killing to ‘late-eighteenth-century accounts of aesthetic

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\(^{38}\) Without any apparent reference to Bob and John, David Thomson has elaborated this ‘Picasso’ analogy in his review of *Exquisite Corpse: Surrealism and the Black Dahlia Murder* (2006), a book by Mark Nelson & Sarah Hudson Bayliss about the murder of Elizabeth Short (the famous unsolved *Black Dahlia* homicide perpetrated in Los Angeles in 1947). Picking up Nelson and Bayliss’ theme of violence imitating art, Thomson suggests that the *Black Dahlia* murderer may have been ‘entranced by the morbid dislocation of body parts that had begun with Picasso and Cubism’. (Thomson, 2006) The basis of this idea is Nelson and Bayliss’ view of Short’s gruesome but precisely executed murder as a deranged attempt to imitate surrealistic art.

\(^{39}\) A number of publications refer to interviews with serial murderers that reveal an obsessive interest in the continuous refinement of the homicidal act. For example, see: Holmes & Holmes *Profiling Violent Crimes* [1996 & 2002], *Contemporary Perspectives on Serial Murder* [1998], *Serial Murder* [1998] and *Sex Crimes: Patterns and Behavior* [2001].
disinterestedness (especially those by Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller), which recognized that contemplation of the beautiful entailed the imagination’s free play and the individual’s temporary suspension from cognitive rules and moral-rational laws’. (Black, 1998: 783-4) The cultural historian Joel Black has described how this disturbing resemblance led Thomas de Quincey (1785-1859) to formulate his outrageous but prophetic essay *On Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts* (1827). (Black, 1998; Ruggof, 1997: 70) With this uncomfortable thought in mind, we are in a position to begin exploring my particular response to the reverse association – that of the artist with the serial offender. At this point we can start to consider the impact of this new terrain of interest on my studio activities as a master’s student at Northumbria University.

### 3.7 Bob and John in the studio

In the final section of this chapter I will relate the action research of Bob and John to my practice as a master’s art student. During my undergraduate studies in fine art, the political legacy of the European taxonomic tradition had been the terrain of interest that had informed my activities of the studio. After living in Japan I began to revise my thinking as a creative practitioner. I now thought that my practice had been placed at the service of a politicized view of scientific taxonomy. I was unhappy that the content of this approach was only fully realised in the writing of my essay, that my examiners only knew that my collages parodied the collecting and naming process used by naturalists by cross referencing my titles to my writing. When I returned from Japan, I decided that my artworks should have a greater degree of independence from my interests; they needed to stand alone when they were on exhibition. I thus strove to reverse my approach; I now sought ways of
making the systems of practice (waza) find their fullest expression in free creative practice (keiko).

The question arising out of the discussion in this chapter is: how can Bob and John help? In Section 3.3 above I introduce the three points that shape my new terrain of interest. Here Bob and John proceed in the following manner:

1) they name as they go along
2) they think of serial killers as artists and of forensics as an art form
3) they tirelessly mythologize themselves and the criminals they investigate

In relation to point 1, I now wanted to treat the experiential dimension of practice as a form of action research on the model provided by Bob and John. My fine art work would be measured against the successes and failures of studio experimentation. I would follow the action researcher’s spiral of steps and move forward by re-planning my work in the light of previous discoveries. This would place my practice in the action research cycle of planning, action, and fact-finding about the result of the action to move from one new piece to another. In this way I would avoid producing artworks that illustrated, or embodied, my new terrain of interest. I would place myself in a position to allow a rule-based system (waza) to develop an intuitive dimension (keiko) as I moved through the cycle of actions.

In relation to point 2, my new terrain of interest defined serial killers as artists and forensic science as a form of interpretation that, in itself, was an art form. Here Peircian semiotics, in particular the concept of the indexical sign, would be the basis of my waza of naming. Once again we return to Eco’s and Sebeok’s seminal collection of essays, *The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce (Advances in Semiotics)* (1983) in order to place my interest in the shift from waza to keiko in a semiotic frame. The ninth chapter of Eco’s and Sebeok’s book is Nancy Harrowitz’s *The Body of the Detective Model: Charles S. Peirce and Edgar Allan Poe* (1983) which discusses indexical signs as an opportunity for interpretative reasoning that is not deductive, in
the sense that this term is loosely used to describe Conan Doyle’s method of reasoning the solution to a crime, but abductive. The aim of Harrowitz’s essay is to explore the primacy of *Murders in the Rue Morgue* in the development of detective fiction through Poe’s use of the technique that Peirce would later call abduction.

In Peirce’s own words ‘abduction is nothing but guessing’. (Peirce, 1906: 319-320) As the philosopher explains:

> A mass of facts is before us. We go through them. We examine them. We find them a confused snarl, an impenetrable jungle. We are unable to hold them in our minds. We endeavor to set them down upon paper; but they seem so multiplex intricate that we can neither satisfy ourselves that what we have set down represents the facts, nor can we get any clear idea of what it is that we have set down. But suddenly, while we are poring over our digest of the facts and are endeavoring to set them into order, it occurs to us that if we were to assume something to be true that we do not know to be true, these facts would arrange themselves luminously. That is abduction. (Peirce, 1906: 282-283)

Harrowitz explores this concept, the assumption that something is true which we do not know to be true, as the utilization of logic for the purposes of introducing entirely new ideas. For Peirce this contrasts with the inductive and deductive methods that use logic to, on the one hand, determine value (induction) or, on the other, discover the necessary consequences of a hypothesis (deduction). Harrowitz’s essay utilizes Ginzburg’s research on Morelli, Freud and Holmes (Ginzburg, 1983: 81–118) as a platform of semiotic analysis on which various episodes from Poe’s fiction are examined and theorized. Most specifically, Harrowitz draws our attention to the particular form of reasoning employed by Poe’s character C. Auguste Dupin in the *Murders in the Rue Morgue* in order to establish that a Peircian notion of abduction is operant in Dupin’s methods as a detective. (Harrowitz, 1983: 189) According to Harrowitz, Dupin continually builds his interpretative narratives by, firstly, noticing an observed fact and, secondly, allowing a series of improvised hypotheses to illuminate the possible origin of the
observed fact without recourse to assumptions or preconceived ideas. As Harrowitz explains:

Dupin’s principles are these: never assume anything, the nature of the object under scrutiny must dictate the nature of the enquiry, it is necessary to keep sight of the matter as a whole, one must prove that crucial ‘apparent impossibilities’ are possible (if, indeed, they are so). (Harrowitz, 1983: 193)

By utilizing a logic that allows for ‘apparent impossibilities’ to become possible, Dupin is able to solve crimes whilst the police remain unsuccessful. (Harrowitz, 1983: 193) As a result Peirce’s abductive method of reasoning challenges the myopic vision and insistence upon preconceived notions and assumptions that limit rigid systems of practice, the systems that I have identified above with the Japanese concept of waza. Indeed, the free practice of keiko that require students of fencing to ban all thoughts of technique and to respond intuitively and flexibly seems to be closely allied to Peirce’s concept of abduction.

Once I had absorbed this understanding of the abductive dimension of Bob and John’s theories I began to develop a practice that was purposely focussed on the creation of indexical signs. In my studio at Northumbria University I began to emboss large sheets of paper with grid-like patterns, the traces of hammer blows or awl piercings, actions that left the mark of an artist in the same way that a fingerprint leaves the mark of a criminal. To begin with I was attracted to the idea of exploring the formal proposition of abstract art using a highly charged method of production, a technique of mark-making that was explicitly violent in its execution but quietly poetic in its effect. However, as I became more accomplished with this technique I began to enjoy the way that my trace-making activity was paradoxical both for myself as an artist working in a studio and for my audience who viewed the completed artwork in an exhibition. On the one hand, when it comes to the minimalist aesthetics I was pursuing (absolutely clean white sheets of paper, precisely executed rows of incisions and indentations) the creative practitioner is driven by a fundamental drive to leave no traces of production,
to achieve a flawless surface that carries as little indexical ‘expressivity’ as possible – the equivalent of getting away with the ‘perfect crime’. On the other hand there is – as the champion of automatic drawing, the surrealist artist Henri Michaux (1899–1984), pointed out – an interpretive desire on the part of art audiences to celebrate the artist’s dislike of effortlessness, the artist’s self-confident need to resist, with all his might, the skilful craftsman’s requirement to conceal all traces of their actions (quoted in Jean Baudrillard’s [1929–2007] publication *The Perfect Crime* [1996]). Thus, to all intents and purposes, my new artworks were produced precisely as pristine works on paper in the well-established tradition of minimalist abstraction, whilst also indicating the uncomfortably violent past presence of an artist. In making art in this way, I was making my artistic self the semiotic referent of an investigatory exhibition viewer who would respond to my indexical signs using the process of abduction, a process that, as Peirce writes: ‘consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. (Peirce, 1903b: 144-145) My position, as I shall elaborate throughout chapter 4, is that an art audience’s need to devise an interpretation is, from the perspective of the studio practitioner, an abductive engagement with relationship between an indexical sign and its object that often parallels the guessing process utilized by detectives, both in the actual practices of investigators such as Bob and John and also in the fictional worlds of Sherlock Holmes and C. Auguste Dupin.
Chapter 4. Doctoral research and my forensic terrain of interest

In this chapter I will discuss the terrain of interest that, through my methodological studies within the master’s Contextual Practice module at Northumbria University, transformed my master’s studio work into a practice-led doctoral research project. Bob and John, and the forensic interests that came into existence as I read their books, provided the starting point for a research project that would explore the interaction of theory and practice, of systematic and intuitive practices, of waza and keiko. This chapter is divided into six points of interest that survey the contents of the new terrain. These points represent the kind of information that informed my studio practice as I began my doctoral research in 2005. Given my concerns about the illustrative nature of my undergraduate work, these six points also represent the body of theoretical knowledge that I want to avoid turning into an explanation of my artworks when they are placed on exhibition. They are presented here as short sections entitled Interest One, Interest Two, and so on. The contents are based on the notes I assembled in the first years of my PhD.

4.1 Interest one: a Janus-faced word

In Mechanisms: New Media and the Forensic Imagination (2008), Matthew G Kirschenbaum describes forensics is a ‘Janus-faced word’ that embraces both scientific evidence and rhetorical argument. (Kirschenbaum, 2008: 21) I think it is fair to say that we are most familiar with the term ‘forensic’ as an adjective relating to or denoting the application of scientific methods to the investigation of crime. This understanding has been shaped by the mainstream media where countless films and television programmes have narratives that unfold in relation to crime scenes and their contents and the criminal investigations that take place in order to resolve the mysteries suggested by the evidence. However, the root of the word ‘forensic’ is the Latin forensis, a term that refers to anything that takes place ‘in an open
court’ or ‘in public’. The cultural analyst Barbara Hollendonner has suggested that Anthony E. Zuiker’s television series *CSI: Crime Scene Investigation* presents the abject effects of criminal violence to TV viewers as a contemporary refiguring of this traditional act of public witnessing. (Hollendonner, et al, 2008:4) Indeed, a cognate term still in use today, *forum* (that which is out of doors), seems to capture the exact sense of public engagement that originally embedded the term ‘forensic’ in the need to openly testify to the truth about a crime. Thus the practice of forensics gets its name by belonging to, or being used in, the courts of judicature. Here, the term carries the second aspect noted by Kirschenbaum. If we usually think of forensics as the scientific interpretation of criminal evidence, it is also a word associated with the skills of placing persuasive or rhetorical material before a jury in a court of law. As a result, a forensic investigator (or crime scene investigator) is Janus-faced because they have the intelligence and skill necessary to offer evidentiary answers to unanswered past criminal events. This involves transforming interpreted information into convincing evidence. When it succeeds in being convincing, the work of forensic investigator seems to place the ‘truth’ before a jury.

However, by ignoring the ‘open court’ dimension of forensics, our popular view of crime scene investigations is distorted. We see the forensic project as an entirely scientific matter with no recourse to public witnessing. This issue is at its most extreme in the much-disputed phenomena of the ‘CSI effect’. (Ramsland 2006, Shelton et al 2006) Here the impact of the popular television series mentioned above is said to have influenced the expectations of juries in relation to crime scene evidence; it has encouraged an overconfidence in the interpretive techniques of forensic scientists and ignored the rhetorical requirement to openly testify to the truth.40

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40 For more on the dramatization of forensic science in television programmes such as *CSI*, see Jules Odendahl-James online summary of ‘the forensic imagination’ at work in reality shows on TruTV (formerly Court TV), The Learning Channel, The Discovery Channel, and The History Channel. (Odendahl-James, 2008)
As a result, the ‘Janus-faced’ crime investigator has to bridge the gap between the process of scientific interpretation and the rhetorical dimension of offering up evidence for public scrutiny. At the heart of this issue is the growing status of physical evidence as an indicator of past criminal activity. Without a doubt, the primary object of forensic investigation is the indexical sign and, as a result, the most time-consuming aspect crime scene investigation has become the organized and systematic documenting of significant (or signifying) evidence that can be presented in a court as an index of past criminality. The criminologist, David Miller, has remarked that this apparently straightforward task also needs ‘innovation and originality’ on the part of the investigator. (Miller, 2003: 121) In the next section we will explore the interaction between creative interpretation and the indexical sign in the context of forensic investigations.

4.2 Interest two: a crime scene

Every physical component of a crime scene is potentially an index of the crime that took place in that environment. When an investigator succeeds in reading one of these signs, an interpretive process resurrects and recreates past events through the examination of the past’s remains. The eminent forensic scientist J. J. Nordby is conscious of the blending of skill and intuition that is required when an investigator uses the traces of a crime to reason backward and arrive at a hypothesis. (Nordby, 2000: 22) One can think of this skill as the imaginative ability to replay history in order to pinpoint a particular moment in a series of unfolding events. The semiotician, Pavel Buchler, was worried by this aspect of indexical interpretation, he said that ‘cumulatively at least the enterprise of renewing the past inevitably succeeds only in undoing it’. (Buchler, 1999: 80) With this warning in mind the notion of a crime scene as an indexical construct needs to be explored carefully.

At a crime scene the forensic investigator uses scientific method in order to achieve a ‘reconstruction’, ‘re-creation’ or ‘re-enactment’ of what happened.
These practices involve evidence being replaced at a crime scene, or a victim being asked to ‘walk through’ the events as they remember them. Here the investigator cannot help but hypothetically reconstruct the actions that led to an offence. As Buchler says fragmentary traces of past events and memories can never be the past event itself – an indexical sign is a trace, not the cause of the trace – and so re-enactment techniques have been developed (involving concepts such as ‘negative documentation’ and ‘non-physical evidence’) in order to extend the interpretive limitations of hard scientific facts such as the blood stains and tissue samples actually present at the crime scene. In the gathering of evidence there is invariably a range of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of explanation that need to be taken into consideration. Here I am reminded of the theoretical model (outlined in section 3.4) provided by the Japanese concept of waza and keiko, the productive conflict created within the tension between ‘hard’ rules and ‘soft’ intuitions. It seems to be generally recognised that criminal investigations are solved using a similar synthesis of different and contrasting methods (see Geberth, 1996; Fisher, 1997; Turvey, 1999 & 2002; Lee, 2001; and Nordby, 2003). Many professional forensic investigators voice grave doubts about the absolute nature of a crime scene. The indexical nature of a crime scene is a notional totality of time and space. ‘[F]orensic science is bottomed on a combination of rest and motion’. (Nordby & James 2003: vii) The physical material that is interpreted is apparently static evidence left behind by the criminal. However the crime scene was not frozen immediately following the crime – things keep changing (see Gaensslen et al 2008, Jackson & Jackson, 2008, White, 2004) In relation to the concept of a stable crime scene, the investigator must understand the constant movement between states, the tensions inherent in forensic practice and profiling, the attempts to reconstruct a whole within an endlessly fascinating oscillation of fragmentary detail and a notional totality. (Thompson, 1999:25)

A special tension stems from the ambition of fixing time, or more specifically, of providing time dating. The problem is not unlike that of the archaeologist
trying to sort layers of Roman and Saxon occupation in the excavation of site that has remained in use for centuries. The celebrated archaeologist Michael Shanks is very much aware of the significance of this problem. Whilst there is always a wish to dig deeper in search of ‘authentic meaning’, what really are the edges, the ‘moments of discontinuity’ when one layer becomes another. (Shanks, 2009: 1) Shanks believes that these discontinuities are the proper focus of the archaeologist’s project, an idea that could be equally applied to the criminal investigator standing in the midst of a crime scene. As Shanks has suggested before, the fragile ‘moments of discontinuity’ are key to both archaeological and forensic investigations.

For a police investigation, the time of death is often the crux of a murder case and there is intense pressure to state exactly when the victim’s death occurred (see Sachs, 2002). Establishing a convincing sequence of events could lead to a conviction or eliminate a suspect. As with archaeological procedures, a forensic investigation is rarely carried out quickly; the investigator moves patiently over the terrain of indexical signs. Here much depends on the investigator’s previous experience. For example, it may turn out to be important to understanding the effect of air currents, of certain kinds of clothing or the impact of insect activity in order to arrive at what is, at best, an approximation or ‘guesstimate’ of the timing of events. (Turvey, 1999) A great deal can hang on approximations that attempt to establish whether a wound was inflicted before, just before or just after death. The terms used (ante-mortem, post-mortem, peri-mortem) include the inevitable role of uncertainty: the third term, ‘peri-mortem’ (peri means around or about) basically means ‘not sure’. It is, of course, impossible to state with certainty what has occurred at a specific point in time, regardless of the claims of science.42

41 See De Forest, Gaensslen, & Lee (1983) and Chisum & Turvey (2007) for descriptions of impressive cross-disciplinary applications of entomology, toxicology, dentistry, graphology, limnology and meteorology in forensic science.

42 To nuance this remark further: the ‘claims of science’ in question reflect the ‘highly localised application of scientific methods’ that the Handbook of Forensic Science says is ‘one of the distinctive features of forensic practice’, a distinctiveness that may be contrasted
4.3 Interest three: wound pattern analysis

As described in point 4.2, it is not possible to provide a chronological order for multiple stab wounds so that there is a clear distinction between the first and last moments of a fatal attack. Nevertheless, the technique of Wound Pattern Analysis attempts just that, it tries to identify, catalogue and document physical injuries with the aim of reconstructing where, when, why and how they occurred. In forensics wounds are seen as a ‘physical manifestation of both behaviour and motive … a tangible record of intention and therefore a form of behavioural evidence’. (Turvey, 1999: 87) The wound is an indexical trace that can be analyzed to determine the offender’s activity and interpret what he or she intended. This is a key point of interest in my research. To use the reading of indexical signs as a method of interpreting internal mental states such as personal intentions is an extraordinary project. I am reminded of the notion of the ‘intentional fallacy’. From the perspective of the arts, it has long been understood that artistic intention is not necessarily decipherable from the artistic object that is enjoyed by arts audiences. The influential pioneers of the concept of the ‘intentional fallacy’, Wimsatt & Beardsley, say the following:

How is one to find out what the poet tried to do? If the poet succeeded in doing it, then the poem itself shows what he was trying to do. And if the poet did not succeed, then the poem is not adequate evidence, and the critic must go outside the poem – for evidence of an intention that did not become effective in the poem. (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1954: 21)

The ideas in this passage from Wimsatt & Beardsley’s *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry* (1954) do not really help me understand forensic practices. Everything about Wound Pattern Analysis is built on indexical certainty, on Peirce’s concept of a sign that refers to a referent by

with the “‘universality” of science as applied in other domains such as medicine’. (Fraser & Williams, 2009: 23)
virtue of a real connection. There is no room here for the intentional fallacy. As a result, criminally inflicted wounds are specifically categorized through a reference to the 'real' object that caused the 'real' physical damage. For example, investigators talk of a Sharp Force Injury, which is divided into characteristics such as: stab or pierced wounds made with a pointed instrument (in which the depth of the injury to the tissue is usually greater than its width); incised wounds made by sharp instruments being drawn across the skin (theses are always longer than they are deep); chop wounds made with heavy instruments that have a sharp edge (here the injury goes deep into tissue and is sometimes associated with bone fractures). However, even with this amount of analytical detail, the police guidelines for Wound Pattern Analysis recognize the limitations of indexical interpretations: 'certain conclusions regarding origin, intent, and motivation may not always be possible'. (Turvey, 1999: 88)

The scientific authority of the forensic investigators decisions about the chronological order for multiple stab wounds creates a tension between the descriptions of wounds, which carry the status of a form of medical terminology, and the uncertainty of the abductive process. Once again, when dealing with questions about events that could have happened either before or after death (the main analytical delineation in Wound Pattern Analysis), forensic manuals warn that injuries should be subject to Equivocal Wound Analysis: that is, in accordance with the principle that the precise nature and timing of a wound cannot ever be fully determined. Thus examinations should take into account of the fact that a wound is part of a particular history, environment, and sequence of events. (Turvey 1999: 88)

Here indexicality is confused with intention and the analysis of indexical signs is continually qualified by the guardians of police and legal procedure to ensure that interpretations are never considered absolute. It seems incredible to this researcher that, when it comes to interpreting a crime scene, indexical signs could ever be mistaken for indicators of emotions such
as rage, hate, love, or fear. As Nordby has warned: when an investigator's hypotheses depend on psychological theory, profiling slips from the realm of scientific explanation to the realm of unfounded speculation. (Nordby, 2000: 134-135) Nevertheless, profilers such as Bob and John have sought to extend indexical interpretations to include evidence of the irrational intentions of an offender. Even though irrationality is clearly important dimension of a crime, it is a dimension that leaves no interpretable trace. (Turvey 1999: 152)

4.4 Interest four: Locard's exchange principle

In the early nineteenth century a series of crimes were solved by the French criminologist Dr. Edmond Locard introduced in the first chapter of this thesis. Famously, Locard proved the success of forensic analysis by identifying incriminating dust particles under a microscope. The theories that this pioneering criminologist developed are now one of the cornerstones of evidence collection. Locard's influential Exchange Principle says that when two objects come into contact a transfer occurs. From this principle it is possible to categorize two types of evidence: a trace transfer and a pattern transfer. The evidence generated by trace transfers is derived from contact with soil, blood, fibres, and so on; whilst the evidence created by pattern transfer is derived from contact with woven cloth, fingers, tyre treads, and so on. A third category, trace evidence, combines both types of transfer: for example, a bloody footprint.

According to Turvey, it was by examining the 'nature and extent of various kinds of 'transferred' evidence at crime scenes that Locard was able to

43 Many would disagree. For example, whilst reviewing Jack Katz's *Seductions of Crime* (1990), the criminologist David Greenberg notes:

Katz focuses not only on cognition, but [also] on such emotions as humiliation, rage and existential dizziness. Here Katz makes a contribution that is valuable and original. Once one reads his book, it seems remarkable how little attention has been paid to emotions in criminological theory. (Greenberg, 2006: 175)
postulate that criminals could be identified and apprehended. (Turvey, 2008: 157) For Locard an interest in examining traces was both ‘obvious and ancient’ and linked to hunting ‘behavior as old as mankind’. (Turvey, 2008: 157) Thus the indexical dimension of Locard’s Principle becomes obvious. As we have seen above Peirce used the term ‘index’ to categorize signs such as footprints (bloody or otherwise). In Ginsburg’s essay on Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock Holmes the Peircian notion of an index recalls, amidst all the talk of a science of diagnostic-interpretation, the ‘crouched hunter’ of prehistory. As Ginzburg writes:

For thousands of years mankind lived by hunting. In the course of endless pursuits hunters learned to construct the appearance and movements of an unseen quarry through its tracks - prints in soft ground, snapped twigs, droppings, snagged hairs or feathers, smells, puddles, threads of saliva. They learnt to sniff, to observe, to give meaning and context to the slightest trace. They learnt to make complex calculations in an instant, in shadowy wood or treacherous clearing. (Ginsburg, 1980:12)

Thus the index is a matter of biological inheritance. However, Locard’s criminological interests add extra characteristics to Peirce’s profound sense of the semiotic dimension of human evolution. A fingerprint can be, for example, latent (invisible) or visible and this offers a modification to the definition of an index as a sign that draws attention to past events. Here latent prints have to be suspected before they become available for interpretation. The techniques employed to make the invisible visible include the application of powders and stains as well as lasers. At a crime scene, the process of uncovering latent indexicality facilitates the tracking, collecting and cataloguing of past actions. The forensic techniques that expose that which was hidden reveal the trace of a passing moment, or capture the fleeting contact of one object with another, in order to achieve a ‘sense of wholeness out of experiences that can only be received piecemeal.’ (Thompson, 1999: 24) As a result, a forensic investigation could be described as a ‘collage of disparate times, an imbrication of shifting and
contested spaces’. (Boyne, 2001: 150) Once again we are considering doubts about the ability of indexicality to render anything other than fragments of disembodied information. All users of forensics processes operate in these kinds of haunted, and therefore contested, spaces. If I was concerned about the conflation of indexicality and intention in the above section, here I am worried by the assumption that a whole story can be inferred from disparate pieces of evidence. Taken together, the issues of intention and imbrication are bound to create a great deal of suspicion and scepticism for the kind of offender profiling that Bob and John developed from their forensic practices. In the wider community of detectives, police, and scientists relying on forensic evidence, profiling cannot really be presented as a science. But then, is it an art? Or something in-between? This confusion is not helped by the way in which profiling has been popularized and mythologized in books, films and television shows, often with the endorsement of profilers such as Bob and John who have been eager to promote their field. The highly successful film The Silence of The Lambs (1991) is a particularly interesting example of this popularizing process in that both the forensic and profiling methods portrayed do not actually exist even though the film was made with advice from FBI profiling experts. One is left with the impression that, when it comes to Kirschenbaum’s rhetorical side of the Janus-faced forensic investigator, mythology is a key factor in the skill of persuading juries to accept the authority of indexical interpretations. Indeed forensics is supported by a very rich visual culture that relies on the emotional impact of striking images. Glancing through any forensic manual shows the very wide variety of techniques and processes used to document evidence. Much of this ‘proof’

44 A key aspect of these kinds of contested space is certainly the haunted nature of indexical signs. In The Index and the Uncanny: Life and Death in the Photograph, the third chapter of Laura Mulvey’s book Death 24X a Second (2006), the media theorist tells us that the development of photography ‘marks a point where [the] indexical sign of Piercian semiotic theory overlaps with [the] uncanny of Freudian psychoanalytic theory’. Mulvey cites Andre Bazin’s The Ontology of the Photographic Image (1945) in her discussion of the photographic ‘uncanny’. Like all indexical signs, the photograph seems to carry the presence of the referent within itself and for Bazin, this strange afterlife – one thinks of the Turin Shroud – is evocatively present in ‘the fashion of a fingerprint’. (Mulvey, 2006: 54)
gathering involves photography and other lens-based media (e.g. instant Polaroid, large format cameras, digital, video, scanning and imaging techniques involving ultra-violet light treatments, vapour, smoke and chemical applications) but use is also made of traditional skills that are shared with the arts: hand-drawn sketches, plaster casts of surface details and clay reconstructions of decomposed human remains. The artworks of Christine Borland (discussed in section 2.5 above) often explore the indexical implications of the many technical processes that artists share with forensic investigators. The art critic Adrian Searle has described the installation piece *The Dead Teach the Living* (1997) as forensic in its approach. Searle is interested in the way that Borland has used computer-assisted laser imaging to reproduce a set of human heads in the form of death masks that evoke bad histories, lost identities, and untold stories. (Searle, 1997: 1) Here the technologically-enhanced processes that have been used to increase the range of latent indexical signs we encounter in our contemporary environment leave this researcher interestingly poised somewhere between the poetic imagination of the artist and the analytical curiosity of the forensic scientist. In the next section I will explore in greater detail the semiotic implications of this uncertain, but highly creative position.

### 4.5 Interest five: dead reckoning

In the introduction of *Dead Reckoning: the Art of Forensic Detection* (1999), Nordby describes the image he had in mind when he was selecting a title for his influential book. The term ‘dead reckoning’ comes from a historic maritime tradition whereby, in adverse conditions, sailors would consult their ship’s log and compass and, in conjunction with their experience of interpreting the actions of seabirds and the colour of the sea, determine a ship’s position. As the source of his title, Nordby quotes the words of the American poet J. R. Lowell (1819–1891): ‘The mind, when it sails by dead reckoning … will sometimes bring up in strange latitudes’ (*Witchcraft Prose* [1890]). (Nordby, 2000: vii)
experiential knowledge capture my interest in forensics. In fact, Nordby’s engagement with the forensic interpreter’s version of dead reckoning is a treatise on the semiotic nature of crime scene interpretation. One knows where Nordby references are when he describes going to meet Merle Zeigler who has on his office shelf Peirce’s *Collected Papers* next to a copy of Dr. Lester Adleson’s *The Pathology of Homicide.* (Nordby, 2000: 82)

This is the point of focus in my forensic terrain of interest in which I want to reconsider the semiotic dimension of my research. Throughout this thesis we referred to the philosopher’s concept of an index sign but here I want to return to the role of indexicality’s place within Peirce’s trichotomy of semiotic signification. In comparison to the linguistic-orientation of Saussure’s semiotics, an important distinguishing feature of Peirce’s theory is the famous triadic relationship between types of signs of which the index is the second term: icon, index and symbol. This triad encompasses the linguistic function of signification at one end (the symbol), the physical domain of cause and effect in the middle (the index), and the pervasive nature of likeness and similarity at the other end (the icon). Thus an icon represents its object by resemblance; an index by virtue of a real connection; and a symbol by the conventions of interpreters. (Peirce, 1909: 460–461) For example, the pictorial images that artists create are constructed using iconic resemblances and the language used by writers is built on rule systems that are always conventions that have to be learnt, it is a symbolic sign system.

It follows that indexical proximity is framed by iconic resemblance and symbolic convention. In relation to the habits of seabirds and the characteristics of changing sea colour, we have a form of semiotic interpretation that involves iconic readings of the resemblance between these environmental effects and other occasions when the sailors have known the position of their ship. And the sailor’s decoding of their ship’s log and their reading of a compass, we have interpretive processes that rely on conventionalized representations in which indexical pronouns such as ‘this’, ‘now’ and ‘here’ partake, as Doane says, ‘of the symbolic’: indeed, there is
good reason to think of the index as the meeting point of the iconic and symbolic forms of semiotic experience. (Doane, 2007: 2) This makes the index of special interest in my research. I see at as the pivotal point around which visual and codified meanings rotate.

Furthermore, the methods of reasoning that develop in relation to indexical evidence, the deductive and inductive, are surely part of the contested nature of the space in which forensics operate. Deductive reasoning involves conclusions that flow logically from the evidence. If the evidence is actually evidence, then a deductive conclusion must be true. With inductive reasoning the conclusions are based on generalized or statistical information. Here it is possible for the evidence to be genuine evidence but the conclusion to be false. Forensic investigators rightly worry that ‘deduction does not discriminate among its premises, it represents pure tolerance, a diversity-embracing logical blindness that allows anything, no matter how repugnant from another point of view, as a starting point’. (Nordby, 2000: 136) However as we saw in chapter 3, there is a third term abduction, a form of reasoning that provides:

…a method of reasoning from presented signs to their probable explanations. A cloak of interpretive uncertainty shadows both the method and its results. As in navigating by dead reckoning, correctly reading the signs forms the heart of the process. (Nordby, 2000: ix-x)

Nordby discusses the powers of observation that are required, not just in reading signs, but also in the identifying of signs as clues. This aspect of the dead reckoning of forensic investigators is linked to the waza of naming, it is a matter of systematic rigour. It would, for example, defeat the necessary rigour of the interpretative process to hold that intention is directly represented in indexical evidence. However the reasoning from an index to the best explanation, a skill that develops slowly through the exercise of both
experience and training, is dominated by the \textit{keiko} of the abductive imagination.\footnote{In relation to an experienced investigator's capacity to reason his or her way to the 'best explanation', in \textit{The Big Idea} radio programme (see footnote 25 above) Bob argued that: over a period of time you begin to develop a certain ability to understand, more so than a lay-person, that there are patterns and motives that follow certain types of crimes, and it links back to a certain type of individual. (\textit{The Big Idea}, 2002)} Here intuition takes over:

The ability to determine the number of blows striking a bludgeoning victim from blood spatter or to estimate time of death from decomposition and ambient conditions cannot be learned from treatises on fluid mechanics, biochemistry, or microbiology. Such abilities come from paying attention to the details, from seeing and doing while thinking, from learning when and how to trust one's eyes through the fog of subterfuge, deceit, and coincidence. (Nordby, 2000: x)

Since the 1890s, when Dr. Eduard Piotrowski (from the Polish Institute for Forensic Medicine) proposed that the scattered patterns of blood loss following a murder would (if analyzed correctly) yield important information about the nature of the crime committed, Blood Splatter Analysis (BSA) has become a useful instrument in the toolbox of forensic techniques. However, even with the development of computer simulations, this particular method of indexical interpretation still relies on the observational skills and first-hand experience of the scientist undertaking the investigation. (Fraser & Williams, 2009: 23) Because a sign will always, in some sense, resemble the object it signifies, crime investigators will, year after year, learn to read latent likenesses, however obscure. (Nordby, 2000: 38). This is, perhaps, the founding nature of iconic resemblance on which the entire superstructure of Peircian semiotics was built: it is the platform of semiotic experience that makes indexical and symbolic sign possible. Thus the detective use of deduction employs resemblance like hindsight, to locate similarity. However, for Nordby, the investigator's pursuit of scientific method has always been directed by his or her intuitions about what we hoped to learn (the pointing finger of indexicality). Here abduction picks up the challenge of our intuitions as a form of foresight. The effect is cloudier than hindsight and carries a
great deal more risk than deduction, but the results, when successful, amplify areas of significance that are not immediately present in the original sign. (Nordby, 2000: 38) Therefore, we conclude this section with the efficacy of guessing firmly in mind and move to the next section in which I turn to one of the most abductive ideas used by crime scene investigators.

4.6 Interest six: a lovemap

The term ‘lovemap’ originates in the work of the sexologist John William Money (1921 – 2006) and refers to the sexual-erotic experience of projecting onto a partner a highly idiosyncratic image of an idealized lover. This projection becomes a template. Forensic agents have adapted this concept to describe the serial offender’s template-like idea of how their behaviour affects a crime scene. A lovemap can be a very useful investigative tool in assessing offender characteristics and predicting their future criminal actions. The Map can encompass ‘hard’ details related to an offender’s age, sex and blood-type as well as less easily identified ‘soft’ categorizations such as self-esteem, hobbies, even charm. The map includes a list of details that have to be interpreted when investigating a crime that may have been perpetrated by a known serial offender. (See Money, 1988; Geberth, 1996: 756–757; Turvey, 2008: 324–325)

From the offender’s perspective, when an opportunity to act occurs a range of actions come into sight that can be followed like a script or storyboard. For an investigator, the examination of indexical signs within the frame of a lovemap can help divide the behaviour that has left its trace at the crime scene into two categories: the ‘modus operandi’ (fluid) and the ‘signature behaviour’ (static).47 The modus operandi is any action that allows the

47 For Bob and John the distinction between ‘modus operandi’ and ‘signature behaviour’ is an abiding interest. John has dedicated a good part of his career to studying behavioural
offender to commit a crime. If successful, it has been suggested that offenders are in a position to replay their actions in an engram or after-image that extends their success serially; that is, beyond the time and space of the initial offence: this creates a ‘signature’ or ‘calling card’. (Geberth, 1996: 728) As successful criminal actions become routine, the way the offender succeeds provides the modus operandi part of their lovemap. The signature behaviour concerns an offender’s actions in relation to their victim. Serial murderers often force victims to repeat phrases or perform actions that have significant meaning for the offender. Therefore, signature behaviour can involve either ‘verbal scripting’ or ‘behavioural scripting’.

With serial killing, the result of the actions represented on the lovemap is, of course, the death of the victim. Here, death is the fulfilment of a scripted fantasy. It seems odd, then, that this kind of murderer continues to kill. Nordby & James propose that the death of a victim actually operates as a goad, a provocation to kill again and refine the fantasy. On this account, serial killers are continually pressing on to the next murder in order to improve the script they are working to. It is impossible not to see this iterative engagement with murder as a form of action research that takes advantage of ‘the repetitive nature of the thinking pattern’. (Nordby & James, 2003: 536) With this in mind, I find the notion of a lovemap of motivations and behaviour an interesting topic for consideration within my research as a visual arts practitioner.  

In the next and final chapter of this thesis I will describe the traits that reoccur within the contingent nature of each crime and has published and lectured widely on the topic. In an online article written with Corrine Munn, an intern at the FBI Academy, John describes the murderer’s ‘signature’ or ‘calling card’ as conduct that, whilst having a unique and integral role within the offender’s actions, goes beyond the needs of a particular crime at the moment it is committed. (Douglas & Munn, 2009) In many ways this notion of going beyond the actions of the moment was built in to Bob’s original ‘serial killer’ concept. When Bob coined the term he had in mind the weekly adventures he watched at Saturday morning cinema sessions as a child. Each week, ‘cliff-hanger’ endings to the films would fill the audience with a desire to return. As Bob has written:

‘The very act of killing leaves the murderer hanging because it isn’t as perfect as his fantasy ... his mind jumps ahead to how he can kill more nearly perfectly the next time; there’s an improvement continuum.’ (Ressler, 1992: 32–33)

48 In Appendix XV of this thesis, the lyrics to This Is Hardcore (1998) by the influential Sheffield band Pulp have been presented as a studio practitioner’s Lovemap. I listen to this
studio work I have undertaken whilst developing the terrain of interest described in the six points above.

Before moving on to the creation of artworks in chapter 5, I want to explore one more time the important dialogue between fact and fiction that shapes my terrain of interest. Forensic science, crime scenes, wound analysis, Locard’s Exchange Principle, forensic dead reckoning, and the concept of a criminal loovmap all become of interest to an artist because they slip so easily between science and art. The fictional profiler Will Graham, featured in the Richard Harris novel *Red Dragon* (1981) perhaps better known through its film adaptation *Manhunter* (1986), is seen by the criminology community as an effective representation of offender profiling at work: ‘A blend of forensic science, investigative ability and intuitive but ultimately self-destructive empathy.’ (Turvey, 1999: 13) Given the literary excesses of Bob and John’s accounts, it is interesting to note that fiction-like narratives are considered by some to be better at conveying how a profiler functions than in nonfiction accounts. This idea has been well argued in Ronald R. Thomas’ *Detective Fiction and The Rise of Forensic Science* (2000). Here fiction is given a determining role in the development of the investigative practices and processes of the police and other agencies of law enforcement. The fiction in question includes novels by Edgar Allan Poe, Charles Dickens, Mark Twain, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Chandler and Agatha Christie. It seems that in the fields of literary criticism and cultural studies the drift is in the opposite direction of that of popular culture: the inclination is to see forensics as an art rather than a science. In the next chapter I will follow this drift and consider the determining role of forensics on my art. With a love map the profiler seems to end up knowing more about the

_recording regularly whilst producing artworks and my idea here is to reveal a reoccurring interest that operates as ‘signature behaviour’ within my studio activities. I cannot say that the contents of these lyrics emerge as a ‘trait’ in any particular artwork but the prospect of listening to this song keeps me returning to the routines of creative production and, thus, reflects the eclectic enthusiasms at work in studio life. In a similar fashion, the Kate Bush lyrics that feature in the conclusion of this thesis represent the elusive significance of what artists often opaquely refer to as ‘source material’.*
perpetrator of the crime than the criminal. Profiling gets ‘inside the head’ of a murderer in order to try and make sense of their actions.

In order to conclude this discussion of the terrain of interest that is informing the practical work I create within my practice-led doctoral research I want to set up the idea that artworks are also treated as indexical traces of studio practices. Once offered to exhibition viewers, these interpreters need to ‘get inside my head’ to make sense of my activities (if we refer to Bob and John’s methods). In this sense the exhibition viewer creates a profile-like articulation of the artworks they view, they draw inferences and extrapolate meanings from the evidence I provide: it is as if I were an offender. This point recognises the tension between interpreting indexical signs and the ability of a criminal to take advantage of the interpretable traces their actions leave behind. The iterative learning process that occurs within the action research cycle supports the progress of both the forensic investigator and the serial offender. In my studio I am aware of the battle between two kinds of highly creative action researchers. As I said above, if the profiler becomes increasingly adept at reading subtle traces of the past, then the criminal such (for example, Kemper) will continually explore ways in which the past can be rendered empty of signs, ways in which each crime can become ‘less detectable’. (The Big Idea, 2002: 1)

In chapter five I want to explore my studio and exhibition practices within the frame of this battle.
Figure 16: Scanned image (ii)
Chapter 5. Doctoral research practice: ‘Blunt Force Trauma’

5.1 My practice-led research methods

In this chapter I will provide a detailed look at the production of one artwork that will be displayed in the exhibition of practical work that accompanies the examination of my doctoral submission. This work, entitled, *Blunt Force Trauma* is clearly a manifestation of the ongoing impact, within my studio activities, of my current terrain of interests. Indeed, the title of the artwork in question is derived from my reading of forensic manuals as discussed in Section 4.3 above. However, in contrast to the theoretical considerations that shape my terrain of interest, my practical activities seek to embody the intuitive actions that arise within routine or rule-governed activities, the *keiko* in the *waza*. The sudden departure into intuitive action is, from the position of my studio routine, estranging or distancing: it creates new and unfamiliar standpoints. The aim of this fifth and final chapter of my thesis is to explore what happens when my interests inform the movement from *waza* to *keiko* in the active space of my studio.

Before discussing the practice-led methods that have helped me undertake my research, let us remind ourselves of the terrain, and the points of interest within it, that arose in my discussion of forensic science above. Chapter four I described six representative interests: the Janus-faced word ‘forensics’; a crime scene; wound pattern analysis; Locard’s exchange principle; forensic dead reckoning; and forensic lovemaps. This list is a demonstration of my ongoing interest in the systems of identification, classification, and labelling. The six points of interest are a personal taxonomy. The reader of this thesis will know that the process of giving names and the production of lists of names has been guiding my activities as an artist since I was an undergraduate student. As a postgraduate researcher, the key theoretical component of my research is a form of taxonomic glossary that has been assembled in order to shape my ambitions as both a studio practitioner and a fine art exhibitor.
The movement from waza to *keiko* represents a significant change of emphasis in the way I utilize my interests within my studio practice. When I returned to the UK and enrolled on the master’s degree, a change had occurred that was provoked by my encounter with the poetics of *Kendo*. The rigid systems of practice (*waza*) that constitute the basic skills of the fencer find their fullest expression, not in the superb technique, but in the free practices (*keiko*) that suddenly take over and make the fencer lose sight of his or her proficiency with the bamboo *shinai* or wooden *bokken*. There is a powerful tension between being systematic and being free: you cannot move smoothly from one state to the other, one leaves behind the conditions from which one moves – *keiko* makes you forget *waza*, and vice versa. This consideration made me reject Torbert & Reason’s method. The action research spiral that these two theorists promote is a system of smooth transitions that flow, progressively, across the first-person, second-person and third-person strategies that build up a body of researched knowledge. A process like this seems to describe the sorts of learning experiences I had whilst developing my technical skill in *Kendo*. The goal of *keiko* demands a methodological framework that accommodates abrupt states of estrangement within the heart of one’s routine practices.

In *Key Concepts in the Philosophy of Education* (1999), the educational theorists, Winch & Gingell say that an action researcher has to ‘identify an issue that needs to be resolved [then] design an intervention and record the effects of its implementation [then] review the outcomes and disseminate her results’. (Winch & Gingell, 1999: 8) If I am going to reject action research methodology, then I will have to find way of describing the impact of the terrain of interests that has been established whilst reading of Bob and John. In my studio routines, these interests certainly constitute an intervention into my ideas as a practitioner. Similarly, the freedom of intuitive action that occurs whilst I create artworks also intervenes in the way I think about my terrain of interests. The iterative structure of action research suggests that these shifts would progressively support one another and become part of a forward-rolling body of knowledge. The dynamic I am after needs a more
obvious recognition of the role of conflict, the kind of rupture of progress that is unlikely to gain much clarity through the cycle of planning, action, and fact-finding. The iterative nature of the spiral of steps is too much about cultivating momentum. I seek a method in which the rigour of my studio routines is genuinely lost at the point I discover the freedom of intuitive action. The Australian educational theorist Stephen Kemmis (1995) has produced a widely used diagram of the iterative action research cycles. Each involves four steps: plan, act, observe, and reflect as follows:

![Diagram of action research cycles](image)

Figure 17: Action research cycles (from Maclissac, 1995)

In addition the British educationalist Jack Whitehead improved this design by taking into account the personal incentives that drive a researcher to engage with their interests. Whitehead replaces the neutral ‘plan, act, observe, and reflect’ steps proposed by Kemmis with value-laden decision-making:
1) I experience problems when my values are contradicted in my practice.
2) I imagine ways of overcoming my problems.
3) I act on a solution.
4) I evaluate the outcomes of my actions.
5) I modify my problems, ideas and actions in the light of my evaluations.
(Whitehead, 1989)

For Whitehead the key methodological concept is the experience of being a ‘living contradiction’. Here a researcher feels a strong sense of personal dissonance because they cannot act in accordance with their values. For example, a day of work in the studio is likely to involve me following the rigid systems of practice (waza) that produce my artworks. In accordance with my values as an artist, there should be a point at which the intuitive practices (keiko) take over. At this point, I am meant to find myself to be a ‘living contradiction’ and, as a result, feel a need to do something about it, to plan an improved form of practice that will lead to the state of keiko more often and more effectively. The notion of ‘living contradiction’ is certainly conflictual enough for my purposes but the momentum of the Whitehead’s scheme is about eradicating contradictions and conflicts, it does not address the powerful role keiko has in deepening a creative practitioner’s sustained experience of waza.

The purpose of Whitehead’s five steps, like all the methodologies offered under the banner of action research, is to provide researchers who are participators in their own research context with a conscious investigatory system that will transform first-person, second-person and third-person experiences into explicit forms of evaluation. Throughout my research I have been searching for a way of making explicit the discontinuity of an artist’s interests and practices. This was the gist of my rejection of the illustrative subservience of my undergraduate artworks to the critical theory that was shaping my interests at the time. However, a breakthrough came when I completed my first written draft of chapter four. After selecting and naming six points of interests to represent the entire span of my library research into
forensics, I started to consider the more radical form of naming and listing that had appealed to me when I was an undergraduate. I recalled the splendidly digressive and wayward Chinese taxonomy in Borges’ *The Analytical Language of John Wilkins*. In seminar debates with my colleagues on the fine art practice-led programme at Northumbria University, we discussed the disruptive and errant nature of the taxonomic process. As Foucault had remarked, the actual process of listing named things could, by itself, ‘disturb and threaten’. (Foucault, 2003: xvi) It was suggested that I create my own methodological concept that was based on a highly intuitive variant of the power of naming. As a result, I chose the concept of ‘co-optive naming’, a term that is defined as the action of taking or assuming a name for one's own tactical use. Here the power of naming that comes into view is that in which a name is appropriated in order to embrace a dangerous opposite, one co-opts a name to neutralize or win over one's enemies. The term carries the implication of persuasion that fits with my research into the Janus-faced character of forensics. My method recognizes that a creative practitioner might lure a disruptive, even threatening, idea into their research by co-opting apparently uncooperative terminology. Methodologically speaking, co-optive naming allowed me to embrace conflict.

I would argue that co-option is a commonplace practice amongst fine artists. A studio practitioner assigns associative explanations, or motivations to artworks in order to make them accessible to exhibition viewers. For example, a painter will explicitly describe his work as ‘archaeological’ because his technique involves scratching back through layers of paint to reveal earlier versions of the painting.49 Or a sculptor speaks of her works as

49 As an illustration of this kind of co-option narrative, I here offer an example drawn randomly from an artist's websites:

I dig into the surface to carve out the image and then brush layers of paint over the dried gesso imprint to unveil the etched surface ground. The carving is uncovered by rubbing paint into the surface grooves. Multiple layers of paint are brushed lightly over the beveled edges unearthing the image. (Giampa, 2010)
‘architectural’ because they have structural associations that dominate all figurative or poetic interpretations.

In these cases, we are not really talking about artistic intentions. Artists have co-opted nomenclature from disciplines or practices outside fine art in order to describe the possibility of associative interests or interpretations. It would be incorrect to call these intentions and that is why the discussion on the intentional fallacy introduced in Section 4.3 above is an important part of this final chapter. Terms such as ‘archaeological’ and ‘architectural’ are likely to have played no role in the artist’s thinking whilst their work was produced. The co-opted names they use are suggestive rather than definitive; they provoke ideas or lines of enquiry for those who want to engage interpretively with an artwork on display in an exhibition.50

In 2006 I began work in my Northumbria University studio on the practical work that would be the basis of my doctoral research. I laid a large sheet of plain white paper on a piece of chipboard. Over this, using masking tape, I fixed a slightly smaller sheet of graph paper that would act as a guide for the repetitive actions I was about to perform. Using two ball-peen hammers, one to place, rounded-head down, on the surface of the graph paper, the other to strike the head of the first hammer so that it was driven into the layers of paper to create an indentation that marked both the graph and the white sheets of paper with a small bowl-shaped dent. For the next forty minutes I

50 The function of ‘suggestion’ for fine art practitioners is, perhaps, evident in a discussion between Ina Cole and the sculptor Rachel Whiteread in Mapping Traces: A Conversation with Rachel Whiteread (2004). In the following exchange, Whiteread makes it clear that the associative nature of an artwork is a reflective ability to explore interesting connotations.

Cole: You have called what you do ‘mapping, a process of making traces solid.’ You are in a sense immortalizing the spaces that you, and all those before you, have entered. Do you actually think of your casts as tombs, containing the ghosts of previous inhabitants, as well as traces of yourself?

Whiteread: Yes, that’s a very rounded way of looking at it… Ghost, for instance, didn’t feel very tomb-like because it didn’t have a ceiling. I never try to make something look like a tomb: I make it as I want the object to be and then it will have these other associations and connotations. (Cole, 2004)
systematically and repetitively indented the sheets leaving behind rows of more-or-less identical contusions.

When I finished covering the sheet of paper with rows of indentations, I consulted the notebook in which I had sketched out the points of interest described above in chapter 4. I decided to give this artwork the title of *Blunt Force Trauma*. The term has medical origins and is used in criminal forensics to refer to a non-penetrating injury caused to a body part by a physical attack. The term trauma derives from the Greek word for a wound. In the context of contemporary medical terminology, the term can refer to both the physical and psychological impact of aggression. It interested me that, in co-opting these names from the terminology of forensic medicine, I was immediately able to imagine further works that might have titles related to the categories of blunt force trauma: that is, ‘abrasion, contusion, laceration and fracture.’ (Turvey, 1999: 434) In effect, what had been produced was a sheet of paper with visible and classifiable indications of a blunt instrument being used repetitively to create rows of indentations that display the characteristics of ‘non-penetrating impact’. I had made a ‘physical attack’ upon the paper and I could, as a result, co-opt a forensic term to complete the indexical status of the artwork I was creating.

On the other hand, nothing about what I had done in my studio was intentionally about aggressive behaviour. Many forms of creative production involve actions, instruments and procedures that have violent implications if interpreted within a criminological frame of reference (printmakers burn away surfaces with acid, and so on) And so, I asked myself, in what sense can this sheet of paper be said to have undergone a trauma? If we accept the definition of trauma in this context as being a ‘body altering physical injury’ then the ‘body’ of the paper has certainly been ‘altered’. These indexical signs do not exhibit the kinds of injuries that occur when an object aggressively pierces the skin. The artwork does not display open wounds. The co-opted title is accurate in that non-penetrating trauma has occurred. There is evidence of forty minutes of sustained action that, if you follow the
guidelines provided in forensic manuals, deserves to be named *Blunt Force Trauma*.

Having established that this co-opted name is accurate, I start to imagine other studio processes that would fit with a naming process that refers to injuries described in the forensic manuals. For example, I could use sharp piercing tools such as awls to create surface in which an object enters and passes all the way through. These works would co-opt the concept of perforating trauma. The co-opted title of Perforating Trauma would suggest a new range of indexical actions that make larger entrance holes than the exit holes on the back of the paper. For a criminologist, I would be co-opting associated meanings linked to violent crime involving gunshots or stabbings.

In the studio, as I follow the routines of my practice, I systematically build up a glossary-like list of actions and marks that must, if you use a forensics manual, result in indexical interpretations. My practical activities as a doctoral researcher now produce workbooks that seem to function in the same way as a forensic textbook: they illustrate and name indexical traces on the surface of a victim’s body.
5.2 Co-opting names

As described in Section 5.1 of this chapter, the activity of naming can be transformed into a highly creative and intuitive linking of forensic science and fine art practice. The co-opted names I am using are derived from the terrain of interest listed in chapter four which, I later realized, operates like an interdisciplinary glossary for the naming of artworks. As I described above, once this co-optive method was in place I found myself considering new works that arose within the process. The creative freedom of this aspect of co-option was, in many ways, the equivalent to the free practice of keiko in Kendo, it arose within the rule-bound waza of my studio work. At this point in my practical research, I began to ask myself what new studio ideas could be said to inhabit the names that were now being made available through my terrain of interest, through my study of forensic science. As I planned new forms of indexical activity on sheets of paper, I wondered what abductive interpretations would arise for exhibition viewers faced with a title based on criminology manuals. Although my research is about the power of the process of co-opting names from forensic science, I am now fully aware of the key role of the indexical sign in my investigation. It is the pivotal point around which the visual and codified meanings of both art and science rotate.

Doane gives a great deal of theoretical importance to the notion that an indexical sign, unlike an icon or a symbol, is empty of content. The cultural theorist writes that: ‘the index … implies an emptiness, a hollowness that can only be filled in specific, contingent, always mutating situations’. (Doane, 2007: 2) Similarly Krauss see indexical signs as ‘shifters’, a term derived from Roman Jakobson’s (1896–1982) theory of language that denotes forms of linguistic signification that ‘shift’ out attention towards referents by being, in themselves, empty of content. (Krauss, 1986: 197) This notion of the empty index is also supported by Short in his discussion of the development of Peirce’s theory of signs. In the 1880s the philosopher was expanding his understanding of the scope of signification by incorporating the experience of
being directed to a particular object by a ‘real causal connection’. (Short, 2007: 49) Peirce’s semiotic environment was, at that moment in the philosopher’s intellectual career, transformed through his recognition of signs that drew attention first ‘here’ and then ‘there’. As we have quoted above (in section 3.6) Peirce realized that this kind of sign ‘asserts nothing’, it simply ‘takes hold of the eyes’ and guides our interest in a particular direction. (Peirce 1982-163) Both Short and Pape explain that this breakthrough allowed Peirce to understand that abstractions and generalizations (such as those that form the content of linguistic signs) can ‘be employed in relation to an “avenue of sense” or other “real relation” to particular referents’ (Short, 2007: 49) ‘translating every abstractly expressed proposition into its precise meaning in reference to an individual experience’. (Peirce quoted in Pape, 2008: 5)

In *Notes on the Index: Part 1*, Krauss discusses the extensive archive of textual material that Duchamp provided as an ‘extended caption’ to the *Large Glass* (discussed above in section 3.6). (Krauss, 1986: 205) According to Krauss the ‘preservation and publication’ of Duchamp’s notes and diagrams is ‘absolutely necessary’ for the ‘intelligibility’ of the artwork and Walter Benjamin is quoted as describing the way that captions were used in photographic magazines to put up signposts for the viewer. (Krauss, 1986: 205) Here it is possible to see the naming of artworks as an indexical signposting of my studio activities.

Chapter 4 was a summary of a glossary-like list of interests that I arrived at through reading the literature provided by criminologists and offender profilers such as Bob and John. Within this literature it is clear that criminal investigators use the terms I describe in chapter 4 to name, identify and explain specific phenomena connected with offender behaviour. As I started to utilize these terms in my interdisciplinary glossary, the terms began to lose their allegiance to forensic science and became open-ended references: they were mutating to a new situation: that of fine art research. The appeal for this
researcher is that this interdisciplinary glossary, in co-opting names that were created to classify indexical traces of criminal behaviour, became a repository of empty, hollow terms waiting to be reactivated as the titles of artworks. My terrain of interest had, in providing me with names for artworks rather than explanations of artistic content, ceased to control my intentions as a creative practitioner. Theory and practice were now engaged in a battle between two kinds of highly creative activity: the artist continually explores new ways in which their actions can render signs that are open to rich veins of poetic interpretation, and the exhibition viewer becomes increasingly adept at reading subtle traces of the artist’s past actions into the practices that made the artwork possible.

![Interdisciplinary glossary](image)

Figure 19: Interdisciplinary glossary

What follows is a series of extracts from my studio notebook. Each passage offers a small-scale record of the interior dialogue that I used to reflect on the interdisciplinary glossary in action whilst I was undertaking my practical research. Each passage adds a studio narrative to the theoretical discussion that has, up to this point, introduced the co-option process to the reader of this thesis. My reflective narration documents the shift from rigid systems of naming (waza) to the opportunity of creative expression provided by the free practice of co-option (keiko). In each case, I am guided by a level of internal
conflict that goes beyond the methodological notion of ‘living contradiction’ promoted in Whitehead’s version of action research.

(09/10/08) I am standing in my studio looking at the ball-peen hammer work I did this morning. If I was a forensic investigator I would surely be interested in the serial nature of this activity. But artworks are not evidence of intention. My future interpreters can only make tentative ‘educated guesses’ as to the pattern of my actions and my motives.

(17/10/08) I have an idea and image of what I want to achieve. The question is how to go about it. There are technical and practical obstacles to overcome. Perhaps by repetitively rehearsing the events I can adapt to changing circumstances. Am I co-opting the identity of a serial offender?

(16/11/08) It is now possible to establish an MO (modus operandi) for this co-opted offender-artist. There are emerging ‘signature aspects’ (repetitive actions associated with my offences). A future interpreter might see today’s
work in the studio as an escalation of my creative ‘offences’ – a sign associated with serial criminality.

(12/11/08) It is proving very useful to refer to the methods of a forensics investigator. I am looking for ways of leaving indexical traces that require interpretation by exhibition audiences. I find that, as I document my practical work, several areas of interest change the way I look at the piercings and hammer marks. I have started making field notes to record the routines of my studio. The field notes contain general observations, details of initial ideas or plans, and accounts of the final outcomes of periods of sustained production. This feels very close to keeping a reflective studio journal. I want to resist this as I am uncomfortable about the action research approach.

(13/11/08) I feel that things are going well today. The more I do, the more certain things about the work on paper feel. I am getting better at the routines. I am able to indent a whole sheet of paper in an hour now. Just think of the skill involved in working efficiently in this manner so quickly over such a large sheet of paper – I am operating in serial-offender mode – I am an experienced serial practitioner.

(25/02/09) It would appear that my technique is becoming more sophisticated. I have been able to record evidence of ‘learned behaviour’. A serial offender analyses what he does and tries to perfect his technique. This is what I have been doing this week in the studio.

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51 As a studio practitioner I have looked to the recording methods employed by crime scene investigators to support my approach as a practice-led researcher. A range of technological procedures for documenting evidence have been available since the mid-twentieth century (and this range has expanded dramatically with the arrival of digital technology) but, nevertheless, Gaensslen’s seminal *Sourcebook in Forensic Serology* (first published in 1983) continues to recommend that investigators should not consider photography or videotaping as a substitute for good note-taking. (Gaensslen et al, 2008: 67)
(30/02/09) I am learning as I go along and it’s very interesting that the techniques I use often have a strong parallel with investigative/serial behaviour. Today I donned rubber gloves to protect the surface of the paper. This has obvious associations with crime scene practices. Later I realised that white cotton archive gloves are more comfortable because my hands don’t sweat. Bob and John (and most of the serial killers they interviewed) would call this ‘on the ground’ training.

(31/02/09) I wasn’t happy with the outcome of my work today. I kept making mistakes. Errors kept reoccurring over and over again. The problems kept building up and started to interfere with my overall expectations for my new piece. Sometimes certain types of error or problems can be ‘fixed’ repaired in some ways, but I am usually unhappy with that process and result. It just wasn’t good enough and so I decided to start again.

(14/03/09) There is definitely a change in my behaviour as a studio practitioner. I am now conscious of my ‘precautionary acts’. I scrupulously
clean all the surfaces of the studio that I come into contact with. No trace is left of what I do with my tools, except the indexical dent that I inflict on the surface of the paper with my hammers – the trace of my actions that I intend to leave. I erase anything that will leave traces of the process of making the artworks. Only the hammer blows count.

(12/03/09) Today I am framing a piece of work for a competition. It struck me that the process was entirely focused on the cleaning of surfaces. Each surface requires a different technique and suitable cleaning materials for satisfactory results. I was busy removing graph-paper fragments with tweezers, or wiping the glass so that smudges disappeared.

(21/03/09) The routine that I follow to produce my new work is very satisfying. I like immersing myself in the rhythm of practice, the process of losing oneself in one’s work. But it is also very gratifying to remove all traces
of this routine. In relation to the future interpreting of this artwork, it feels so powerful to present an unsolvable puzzle.

(22/06/09) I decided to employ a professional photographer to document my recent activities in the studio. I ask him to photograph the piercing pieces I have made on A4 sheets of white paper. The rows of tiny holes look like exit/entry wounds. I use the language of forensics to describe each work to the photographer. As I speak I notice that each hole has a little abrasion collar that suggests that the injury was caused by high velocity entry. Perhaps one could study these artworks in order to understand the nature of exit/entry wounds.

(11/06/09) Today I am assigning names to some recent works. It really seems to help me get to grips with what I do in the studio. I continually see all kinds of connections between the field of forensic science and my studio practice. But these names must not be explanations. That is the key.
difference between the current work and the collages I made as an undergraduate.

(08/06/09) last week I spent a long time taking photographs of new works. I had to position myself so that the light in the studio would reveal the traces of my actions. I had not considered this forensic engagement with my own artworks as part of my practice as an artist. In contrast, Bob and John would have thought of this photographic process as a core component in the art of offender profiling.

(14/04/09) I am now experiencing an escalation in my skills. Each week my hammering skills continue to develop. My technique is becoming more intricate. Ritualised even. I feel confident and empowered and therefore spend a lot of time on my studio activities. However, an offender would know that overconfidence leads to mistakes being made.
(21/04/09) Today I spent a lot of time preparing my sheet of paper so that it wouldn’t slip. I have arranged things so that my hands do not even touch the surface. There will be no sweat marks or fingerprints. What I hadn’t taken into account was the intensity of piercing holes. As I worked, the paper began to ‘drift’ off-register. This caused errors and I will describe this phenomenon as ‘paper drift’. In the spirit of action research, I will try to work out how to prevent it next time.

(21/04/09) My planning has been good. I thought the opportunity to concentrate on my practical work would lead to a richer experience. I had covered all the angles. I reduced the amount of indexical evidence on the surface of my paper. I also found ways to act intuitively as I followed the routine of work. But I hadn’t counted on passive resistance, the changes my activities would produce, stuff I hadn’t considered that thwarted every effort I made to continue. I will get it right next time.

Photograph: Christina Kolaiti

Figure 25: Studio activity (v)
5.3 Poetics and indexicality

http://www.elyrics.net/read/k/kate-bush-lyrics/under-ice-lyrics.html

This section concludes the final chapter of my thesis with a discussion of the relationship between, what Kate Bush calls, the ‘lines on the ice’ and the submerged self who is seen through the frozen surface of the river: that is, the artist whose traces form a significant part of the artwork on exhibition. The conclusion of my research addresses the pivotal role of indexicality in fine art practice and the parallel role of the power of naming artworks in the construction of interpretable meanings in exhibitions.

To this end my thesis has documented a journey: following an introduction, the second chapter of my thesis described my undergraduate interest the taxonomic process; my third chapter detailed my trip to Japan and the resulting reorientation of interests in the direction of forensic processes and introduced the semiotic dimension of interpreting past criminal actions; my fourth chapter offered a survey of six points of interest derived from the material discussed in chapter 3. In this final chapter I have applied this terrain of interest to my current activities as a practice-led artist-researcher. An important dimension of this journey was my rejection of the politicization of my interests as an undergraduate student in the 1980s, which generated artworks about taxonomic display and submerged the creative independence of my studio practices, leaving my exhibited works looking like illustrations of my theoretical enthusiasms and, on occasions, prejudices. In Japan, particularly in my training in Kendo, I learnt to appreciate the oppositional interaction of practice and theory in the tension between waza and keiko. This change of heart led me back to art school and to the master’s and doctoral phases of my development as an artist.

During the period in which I was undertaking practice-led doctoral research at Northumbria University I rethought my creative ambitions and considered different ways in which my interests, now dedicated to the study of forensic
science, interact with my studio life (now exploring the indexicality of fine art production). At this point, as I complete my research, my artworks seem to me like Bush’s ice-like surface covered with traces of past actions. Beneath, almost out of sight, is the person who feeds the creative process with a life full of interests. The division between the interpreted surface and the agent of creative production are worlds apart. This contradicts the indexical assumption that drives forensic investigators and exhibition viewers alike. For example, gallery audiences assume that the physical unity of studio actions and artworks on display are an invitation to interpret the artist’s intentions, emotions and other interior experiences. My experience is that I leave no interpretable trace. Here I concur with Turvey who observed that the feelings of rage, hate, love, or fear that almost certainly lay behind the physical clues found at a crime scene do not lend themselves to the interpretive techniques of crime scene investigators. (Turvey, 1999: 152)

The final part of this investigation concerns the contested relationship between the unavailable state of my actual practices as an artist and the unavoidable connection of action and effect that is made visible in the indexical nature of artworks. I will now introduce a final term that will help me
draw this study to a close: this is the concept of ‘poetics’. Here I am adopting a term that has been widely devolved from its use in literary theory. I think most contemporary artists would agree that ‘poetics’ is now a familiar concept in studio discussions. The roots of the term are in the long philosophical tradition arising from the work of Aristotle, and the related discussion in literary criticism is wide ranging and beyond the scope of this research. It suffices to say that, in fine art, the use of ‘poetics’ owes a great deal to the French phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962). This author’s *The Poetics of Space* (1964) is certainly one of the most widely read books in art schools. The appeal of this influential text is the way that it gives the everyday environment added value (extra presence and uplifted aesthetic resonance) by describing how different kinds of space attract and concentrate the poetic imagination. The principle here is that, as Bachelard claims, ‘it is always more enriching to imagine than to experience’. (Bachelard, 1994:88) With this phenomenologist as your guide, the texture of everyday life comes alive to the imagination. I am going to propose that, in wishing to avoid illustrative artworks, my aim during this doctoral project has been to create exhibits that give imaginative poetic freedom to their exhibition audiences. In order to achieve this goal I have to deny the indexical reality that chains the exhibit to the artist in the studio. The poetics I have in mind contest the possibility of a sign that refers to any actual connection or real relation. For Bachelard, a truly poetic image ‘is not subject to verification by reality’. (Bachelard, 1994:86)

In this respect, Peirce’s indices are seen to be empty of content when the effect is found to be poetic. Because indices exist irrespective of the presence of an interpreter, unless something happens to compel human attention, this type of sign remains outside the semiotic frame: there is no reason to take any notice. In Doane (2007), the index is seen as an intermediary that ‘partakes of both iconicity and symbolism’. (Doane, 2007: 2) In relation to iconicity, the index provides the material bond that embodies (underpins) the truest form of resemblance (for example, the likeness shared by a parent and her offspring). On the symbolic side, the index brings a
material dimension to the abstract nature of an encoded meaning. Here the
index functions as a performative act, say that of a speaker, in which
pronouns such as ‘this’ and ‘here’, ‘forces language to adhere to the
spatiotemporal frame of its articulation’. (Doane, 2007: 2)

I am often told that when my artworks are displayed they have an ambiguous
presence. In placing on exhibition unframed sheets of paper that I have
embossed with ball-peen hammer blows or awl pierces, I am making public
traces of past violent actions as well as attempting a poetic project. Moretti
says that criminals leave behind clues which generate ‘semantic ambiguities’
making a crime seem like an audacious piece of poetry. (Moretti, 1988: 146)
With this idea in mind, viewing my exhibited ‘clues’ is to suspect me of past
aggressions but also like following the traces of a skater on an ice-covered
river. The overall effect is curiously sotto voce: something like Cornelia
Parker’s installation Heart of Darkness (2004) in which, according to the
exhibition publicity, countless bits of burnt timber from a forest fire hover in ‘a
quiet resurrection’ that is ‘at odds with the violent event that created it’.
(IKON Exhibition Guide, 2007: 2) And so the quietness of my work is
undermined by the violence of the actions that dented or pierced the surface

52 The discussion of my work in this section was developed within critical dialogues with my
supervisor, Chris Dorsett, who has commented on my research in Things and Theories: the
unstable presence of exhibited objects, a chapter in the forthcoming Routledge publication
Material Worlds.
of the paper. This would go unnoticed without the exhibition titles I give to each work, titles that are derived from my current terrain of interest. If the exhibition viewer reads the title, then the hammer blows become indexical traces of an artist in the same way that finger prints at a crime scene become indicators of the past presence of a criminal once we know that an offence has occurred. When I exhibit a work and name it *Blunt Force Trauma* perhaps my studio practices are transformed into a sublimated criminal compulsion.

In my critical discussions with my principal supervisor, I have discussed the various ways in which contemporary art criticism engages in theoretical speculation about the nature of artistic production. Of particular interest here is the work of the American critic Hal Foster. In *The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the End of the Century* (1996), Foster writes about artworks that have repetition built into their compositional structures implying a compulsive practice on the part of the authoring artists that may have a basis in psychological trauma. If, as Mulvey has described in *Death 24x a second: stillness and the moving image*, trauma is defined (following Freud) as the continual re-enactment of an event or experience that arouses ‘too much psychic excitement for the subject to translate its significance into words’, then an artist’s practice may be seen as an ‘index of the psyche’ which, for Mulvey, is endlessly reproduced like the traces of the past captured in a photographic image. (Mulvey, 2006: 65)

In these formulations, repetitive creative practices are said to be beyond the ‘insistence of signs’ (Foster, 1996: 132) For example, Foster sees the repetitions of photographs of an electric chair by Andy Warhol as a traumatic fixation: each repeat is an emotional enactment which is not mediated by signs, an effect that has the ‘abrupt and striking meaninglessness’ that Krauss has associated with the nature of the indexical trace. As Krauss says (quoted in Doane), the sole proposition of an index is that of “‘thereness”, irrefutable presence’ (Doane, 2007: 3) Thus, for many contemporary critics
certain kinds of art practices insist that the artist’s intentions are not available for interpretation and the central argument in this thesis is that this effect can be said to be a feature of my exhibited work. The object named *Blunt Force Trauma* is displayed on its own terms and exhibition viewers have to negotiate the material presence of the sheet of paper with its subtle surface alterations but this presence seems to neutralize the evidence of production. One goes to galleries to be in the actual presence of these kinds of aesthetic objects; however, once the title has been read a conflict arises because it is difficult not to be inquisitive about indexical signs. The exhibition viewer takes on the aspirations of a forensic investigator. This conflict is the point. In moving from the poetic effect to the forensic interest, the exhibition viewer moves from one state to another and, as with the sudden shift from *waza* to *keiko*, one mode of perception is exchanged for another: the two states are mutually exclusive. In the middle is an ‘empty’ object called an artwork.

As a practice-led researcher I have employed an investigatory process that juxtaposes my version of ‘systems art’ (a form of artistic practice in which the rules of production are allowed to playfully over-rule the act of interpretation) with a thesis on the interpretative enthusiasm of forensic science and offender profiling. It will be clear by now that I am trying to understand how, for fine art practitioners, theory and practice can interact but remain separate. In following this theme I have been engaging with the concept of the ‘intentional fallacy’, an idea introduced in Section 4.3 above. This idea has cast a long shadow over all forms of contemporary creativity. Influential literary theorists such as W. K. Wimsatt (1954) decided, long before Roland Barthes’ famous ‘death of the author’, that very few meaning-giving intentions can be ascribed to the historical creator of a poem. Throughout the arts the connection between production and consumption has been severed for more than fifty years. It is an idea that is not going to go away.
My doctoral exhibition will perform an equivalent role to this thesis. Neither should be subservient. This is what I have been aiming for since I decided that my undergraduate exhibition was too illustrative. The conflict between poetics and indexicality in my current exhibited artworks represents my contribution to knowledge. At the theoretical pole of this opposition, the fallibility of forensic science and the creativity of the criminal mind are an elaboration of the exhibition labels rather than the artworks. This terrain of interest would, more-or-less, go un-noticed without the power of naming. Once an exhibition viewer has read the labels, this thesis is there to provide the full theoretical journey. In contrast, at the practice-led pole, the viewer’s acts of reception no longer needs the support of my studio interests with their inconclusive digressions through the literature of criminology and forensic science. My point here is that the factors that contribute to the creative process do not need to show up in the completed artwork. Different routes of thinking will have been pursued that seemed important: an interest in taxonomy, a fascination for Japanese martial arts, and an obsession with forensic science, have all played their part but, in the end, these interests are just ‘interests’, they count for very little when it comes to the poetry of an artwork on display. The theoretical imperatives that have propelled forward these works do not need to survive the journey that takes an artwork from its
inception on my studio table to the site of exhibition. This is the point of being an artist-researcher. A practice-led researcher tries to investigate this journey in its own terms. Whilst my sheets of paper remain in my studio they embody a range of associations that could, if revealed, shape the act of reception but, in terms of interpretative analysis (a dissolving of the process), I can just as significantly withhold these associative thoughts, let them remain outside the process of aesthetic judgement. In doing this I am allowing the realm of poetics its free rein.

My interests are not necessarily symmetrical with those of my audience and, as Doane and Krauss state, indexical signs are empty. In my formulation, the artworks on display as my doctoral submission are ‘perched precariously on the very edge of semiosis’. (Doane, 2007: 2) Despite the presence of these extremely provocative kinds of signs, once the poetics of display are in operation, the past is not necessarily the preparation of the present. There is no longer a desire to investigate a meaningful trace, and the trans-temporality that is interpreted in the physical contact of one object with another seems to disappear. Poetics destroys the representational dynamic of indexical signs and eclipses the kinds of interests that Peter Wollen discusses in *Vectors of Melancholy* (1997). Here the British film critic describes the scene of a crime as ‘a fertile site for fantasy – morbid, fetishistic, and obsessive.’ (Wollen, 1997: 24) Perhaps I consider the artist’s studio interests to work in this way. Certainly, my research has interrogated my studio world and tried to study possibility as pure possibility, tried to capture the improvisatory nature of creative practice. For this researcher, the realm of practice-led research is situated on the shadowy side of the act of reception. My artworks are not indexical traces of this thesis topic. Once objects such as *Blunt Force Trauma* or *Exit Wound* are on display the exhibition environment becomes a context in which fine art practice becomes an investigatory tool for pursuing research into fine art.
Appendices
Kyudo

“The sharp sound of arrow penetrating paper will awaken us from the dream of life.”
So began my first lesson in Kyudo; Japanese Archery. Kyudo is considered by many to be the purest of martial arts, its origins reaching back into Japanese mythology. The legendary first emperor Jimmu is always depicted holding a long bow, a symbol of his authority. Modern Kyudo is the pursuit of truth, goodness and beauty. Where attitude, movement and technique blend in harmony. Its practice peels away the layers of ego to reveal our true nature where the intellectual mind is quieted and intuition takes over, “Kyudo is not something you learn, it melts into your bones.” Miki Sensei would say. It is often referred to as ‘Standing Zen’. Its goal is to attain Mushin-no-mind. There is only this moment, “One shot, one life.”
The shooting has eight stages, Hassetsu, but they should never be considered separate rather a continuous flowing process: “Shooting should be like flowing water.”
I soon discovered that each stage attracts its own sayings or expressions, often poetic, mysterious revealing little “The arrow that is not aimed never misses its target.”
Ashibumi (footing) the basis for correct shooting. The feet one arrows length apart. “Stand as naturally as a tree.” The bow and arrows held at the hip, bow towards the centre line, ten centimetres off the floor.
Dozukuri (correcting the posture) once the footing is set the upper body must be aligned “Imagine three crosses at the forehead, chest and stomach and a string through the top of your head pulled taut through the body.” A perfect puppet gesture follows.
Yugamae (readying the bow) is divided into three parts. Torikake (setting the glove) “Like holding a bird.” Tenouchi (grip control) “Imagine an egg in your palm and a glass of water balanced on top.” Yamaguchi Sensei gestures with his hand. Monomi (viewing the target) “You’re not aiming; you are sending your spirit to the target.” I try my best.
Uchiokoshi (raising the bow) “It should rise like smoke.” At last an easy one.
Hikiwake (drawing the bow) Daisan, (big three) “Pull one third, push two thirds, you don’t pull the string you push it out.” The 15-kilogram pull bow doesn’t feel like it wants to be pushed.
Kai (completing the draw) “Hikiwake is the physical draw, kai is the spiritual one, it means ‘meeting’. I strive to comply.

Hanare (the release) “like a ripe plum falling from a tree.” A slight shrug, “when snow falls from a leaf under its own weight.” Much clearer. “Kai is the essence, Hanare its mystery”

Zanshin (continuation) “Means both remaining body and remaining spirit.” I try to hold my position and continue sending my spirit, not easy. The closing movement of Zanshin is Yudaoshi (lowering of the bow) maintaining visual and spiritual contact with the target. “Like the reverberation after the striking of a bell.”

“The arrow should be thought of as existing in the target before you release it.” Apparently my three foot wide shot is a lack of spiritual imagination. “Sometimes we will hit the target but miss the self. At other times we will miss the target but hit the self. Our purpose, though, is to hit the target as the self and hope that…” Onuma Sensei brings me back full circle to the beginning of the lesson.

I spend the rest of the lesson trying to pierce the paper target, the sharp thwoking of enlightenment a repetitive and meditative counterpoint to my continued misses.
In Japan I was very fortunate to be invited to the first tea ceremony of a new teahouse built in a friend’s garden. This was a great honour as her sister and aunt are both tea masters and in modern Japan a somewhat rare occasion. I was told that the full tea ceremony with a meal *Chaji* could last up to four hours. The preparations had been going on for days with every aspect being scrutinized by the host so that the ceremony will be perfect. One of the key points of the philosophy, heavily influenced by Zen Buddhism, being that every encounter is a singular occasion never to be repeated, that the moment is everything; to live in this moment.

The teahouse was a little distance from the house, the stepping stone path had been sprinkled with water to create *Roji* ‘dew ground’, and here the guests symbolically wash the dust of the material world from themselves leaving it behind to enter the spiritual world of tea. Before entering I was asked to wash my hands and rinse my mouth in a *tsukubai* a stone basin with a bamboo ladle. The door was incredibly low, everyone must enter on his or her knees, (I discovered later thirty-six inches high) to emphasize that everyone is equal in this world.

The inside the teahouse was bare of any decoration except for the *Tokonoma* an alcove. Hanging there was a calligraphy scroll revealing the theme of the ceremony; this is called *bokuseki* ‘ink traces’. Usually by a Buddhist master, sometimes it is a small vase of seasonal flowers. Each guest then complimented the choice of scroll and admired the kettle on the hearth. As it was winter the fire had already been lit for warmth. I was told that the water and fire represented *Yin* and *Yang*, from the Chinese philosophy of passive and active.

We were then served exquisitely presented food signifying *Umimono* and *Yamanomono*: abundance from the sea and mountain, deriving from Shinto and its reverence of nature. *Omagashi*, the last course, a very sweet cake or sweet was served by our host. We left briefly so that the host could tidy and sweep the room in preparation for the tea.

On re-entering I noticed the beautifully laid out utensils for the ceremony; tea bowl, container, whisk, cloth and scoop next to the water jar, symbolic of the sun to the tea bowls moon. As the host folded and wiped the container and scoop with a small silk cloth I could feel an intensification of concentration. The cloth represents the spirit of the host I was told, the rhythmic motions, inspection, folding and handling is
to put all present into a heightened awareness of the moment. The tea was whisked in the bowl and passed to the main guest who after bowing in thanks rotated it with precise movements so as to be admired. The guest then drank some of the tea, wiping the rim before passing it on to the next guest who repeated the movements. In this way all of us became briefly hosts and guests in a symbolic unity. The elegant repetition a profound and calming influence.

After cleaning the bowl and utensils the mood became more relaxed and I was able to ask questions about the ceremony. I discovered echoes of other traditional arts with emphasis on learning with the body; that it is the process that counts. There is no course of study to finish only the gradual fine-tuning of the sensibilities, only now.
Excerpt of John Douglas interview with David Bowman of Salon.com (1999)

The real-life model for Thomas Harris' serial-killer expert psychs out the O.J., Ramsey and Dahmer cases -- and David Byrne, too.

Available at: http://www.salon.com/books/feature/1999/07/08/profiler/index.html
Transcription of interview conducted by research colleague Sulien Hsieh (2009)

Q. What ideas linking to criminology influenced you in the making of the images?

A. Initially there was an interest in how things are viewed by science particularly the way things are put into classification systems, taxonomies, ordered and labelled.

I thought it would be interesting to look at another area obviously connected to science but with another outcome of the activity. I was struck by the dominance of the visual in some areas of crime scene investigation and how this field of often extreme, seemingly random behaviour is catalogued, documented and interpreted. I felt there was a similarity with studio practice behaviour. The more I looked at the field the more analogies or similarities seemed to occur. Then when studying criminal profiling and coming into contact with notions surrounding serial, repetitive offending I felt I had found a potentially very interesting intersection of ideas.

Q. Is this why your work is so repetitive?

A. Yes, but also the original idea was to collect my own ‘evidence’ as a form of trying to interfere with the systems in much the same way as my earlier work tried to undermine scientific authority. However as I collected marks, punctures, hole etc I realised that by repeating, let’s say a knife wound several times, your holding it up for comparison, in much the same way a manual of forensics would give examples of a particular wound with a term for that particular type.

By repeating it 10,000 times or more I thought it would become a sort of useless document or field book (manual) that perhaps would lead to questioning the classifications involved. The other interesting element for me here was documented interviews with serial killers who talked about their activities as a repetitive, learning and refining process that keeps driving them on to the next act.

Q. So in the work do you try to control completely the marks you are making so that they appear to be the same?

A. My intention is to repeat the mark, control the pressure, angle, depth etc but there is always something that interferes with what I am trying to do. There are sections when things are going smoothly; I suppose you could say getting into a rhythm and the marks ‘settle’ into a similarity.

Q. Do you think of the marks as the same?

A. No, not really, it’s impossible for me to see them that way anyway. The most ‘alike’ marks are always different and a lot of them are very different indeed. In fact as I far as I am concerned they are all different.

Q. Do you have a sense of what you want to create? each mark? Are you clear conscious and precise?

A. Yes and no. I have a very clear idea of the overall image I want to make in that I make formal decisions about balance, composition and density of mark making. I want to make attractive, beautiful intriguing objects, so that is a conscious decision. I might intend to do the same mark but I know that it is impossible, I am not a
machine and there are all sorts of influences at work; posture, mindset, materials the chance happening, accidents.

Sometimes it feels very meditative or I’m not conscious of working. Other times I’m listening to music on my iPod

Q. In what sense an accident?

A. There are ‘accidents’ I can live with, different pressure or angle of needle or even a rotation of tool so it is a clearly opposite mark or back to front. I can even manage a change in thickness of cardboard under the paper which causes a ragged type mark.

However marks in the wrong place, out of sequence or tears or rips I just throw the piece away I never try to repair an accident.

Q. How do you feel when working on a piece?

A. As I mentioned before it depends on lots of things. I think what is nearly always on my mind is that if I finish without making the ‘big mistakes’ I will be pleased with the end result. So although I am not meditating on the moment by moment event of piercing or whatever there is a certain discipline involved. Also there are stages where I have to pull myself back to what I am doing in case I force an accident, forget to move the paper for example or the backing sheet of cardboard which usually results in a rip or tear. Sometimes I think ‘oh well only 20,000 to go’ or something like that. One very significant event that occurs is the halfway point when for some reason things seem to be much closer to a finish than another 50% if you see what I mean? Things seem to speed up. Maybe because I can see a significant result or pattern or confirmation that it will look like I planned or composed.

Q. Does your relationship change with the work as you progress and complete it?

A. Again as I said before halfway is definitely a milestone for reasons I mentioned. Perhaps there is a mental reason why halfway is a big deal for the human mind.

Of course I do get bored or frustrated but I couldn’t really say at what point. Naturally I would rather know something is wrong, or for something to go wrong earlier rather than later but I have made mistakes at the 50,000 mark stage and not thrown myself out the window about it.

What I find interesting is the smaller, inevitable mistakes are perhaps an element of what makes these pieces (to me anyway) very beautiful. You could tie in all kinds of serial criminal behaviour analogies to this way of thinking or ways in which forensics can operate, you know things like the fragmentary experience becoming a whole, piecing together evidence, identifying marks and wounds by their ‘signature’ the similarities and dissimilarities.
Glossary

Abrasions: An excoriation, or circumscribed removal of the superficial layers of skin, indicates an abraded wound.

Ante-mortem: Refers to wounds that occur during the period before death.

A-priori Investigative Bias: A phenomenon that occurs when investigators, detectives or crime-scene personnel come up with theories uninformed by the facts.

Arranged Crime Scene: A disposal site where an offender has arranged the body and the items within the scene in such a manner as to serve ritual or fantasy purposes.

Behavioural Evidence: Any type of forensic evidence that is representative or suggestive of behaviour.

Behaviour-Motivational Typology: A motivational typology that infers the motivation of behaviour from the convergence of other concurrent behaviours.

Blunt Force Trauma: Divided into categories of Abrasions, Contusions, Lacerations and Fractures.

Case-Linkage: The process of demonstrating discrete connections between two or more previously unrelated cases.

Control-Oriented Force: Physically aggressive offender behaviour that is intended to manipulate, regulate, restrain and subdue victim behaviour.

Contusions: Injuries in which blood vessels are broken, but the skin is not.

Corrective Force: Physically aggressive offender behaviour that is intended to admonish a victim for noncompliance.

Crime Reconstruction: The determination of the actions surrounding the commission of a crime. The scene is not being put back together in a rebuilding process it is only the actions that are being reconstructed.

Crime-Scene Characteristics: The discrete physical and behavioural features of a crime scene.
Crime-Scene Staging: A term that refers to any conscious action taken by an offender to misdirect an investigation by altering the physical evidence of a crime scene.

Deductive Criminal Profile: A set of offender characteristics that are reasoned from the convergence of physical and behavioral evidence patterns within a crime or series of crimes.

Deductive Reasoning: An argument where if the premises are true, then the conclusions must also be true.

Diagnostic Wound: An injury inflicted by any emergency or medical personnel during treatment.

Equivocal Forensic Analysis: A review of the entire body of physical evidence in a given case that questions all related assumptions and conclusions.

Equivocal Wound Patterns: Injuries whose source is disputed or where there is more than one potential source.

Experimental Force: Behaviours involving force that fulfill non-aggressive, curiosity driven or psychological and fantasy oriented needs.

Hard Characteristics: Offender attributes that are a matter of verifiable, uninterpreted fact.

Incise (cut): Injury as a result of a sharp instrument being drawn across the skin, longer than it is deep.

Inductive Criminal Profile: A criminal profile that refers to the characteristics of typical offenders derived from broad generalizations, statistical analysis, or intuition and experience.

Inductive Reasoning: Involves broad generalizations or statistical reasoning, where it is possible for the premises to be true while the subsequent conclusion is false.

Linkage Blindness: The failure to recognize a pattern that links one crime with another crime in a series of related cases.

Love Map: An idealized scene, person, and/or program of activities that satisfy the particular emotional and psychological needs of an offender.

Motivational Typology: Any classification system based on the general emotional, psychological, or material need that is satisfied by an offence or act.
**Negative Documentation:** The recording of what is not present, or what did not happen.

**Offender Characteristics:** An offender’s discrete physical, personality, lifestyle, and behavioural features.

**Peri-mortem:** Injuries inflicted in the time interval just before or just after death.

**Post-mortem:** Wounds that occurred during the time after death.

**Psychological Autopsy:** The process that death investigators and mental health experts use in collaboration with each other, to determine the state of mind of a person before they died.

**Sharp Force Injury:** Divided into categories of; *stab* wounds, *incise* wounds (cuts) and *chop* wounds.

**Signature Aspects:** The emotional or psychological themes or needs that an offender satisfies when they commit offense behaviours.

**Signature Behaviours:** Acts committed that are not necessary to complete the offense.

**Soft Characteristics:** The offender attributes that are a matter of opinion.

**Stab Wound:** Injury of being pierced with a pointed instrument. Depth of the injury is usually greater than it’s width in the skin.

**Verbal Script:** Language used by an offender during an offence, as well as the language that they command the victim to use.

**Victim Selection:** The process or criteria by which an offender chooses or targets a victim.

**Victimology:** A thorough study of all the available victim information.

**Wound Pattern Analysis:** The recognition, preservation, documentation, examination and reconstruction of the nature, origin, motivation and intent of physical injuries.

**X-Factor:** Any unknown or unplanned influence that can affect crime-scene behaviour during an offense.

(Turvey, 1999:443-451)
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