The discovery of a peculiar good - towards a reading of Nell Stroud's
Josser: Days and Nights in the Circus.

Ron Beadle
Division of HRM & D
University of Northumbria at Newcastle
Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 8ST
England
ron.beadle@unn.ac.uk

Abstract

This paper draws on the author's experiences as a member of a circus family to give
attention to a neglected area of research. The paper draws on a range of readings and
published accounts of circus life and in particular it examines Nell Stroud's book, Josser:
Days and Nights in the Circus and weaves them together with personal experiences and
reminiscences. In doing so, Beadle seeks to develop an understanding of the localised
meaning of goodness.

Introduction

As I write this I have Edward Wray Bliss's admonitions (in the present volume) ringing in
my head. So I will start by locating myself in relation to this text. This is the first time I
have written about circus, the home of my mother, her brother and sister, my brother, his
family and seven preceding generations¹. I wasn't raised a circus child but I was raised
around it and as time has progressed I have become convinced that aspects of circus
life and in particular its marginality², have coloured my own. As Little puts is:

'The circus and the circus artist, like the marginals that Foucault discusses, are positioned literally
and figuratively, on the periphery, placed beyond the immediate comprehesion of the "normal"
person on the street, in this sense invisible to, or outside the bounds of the normal.' (18)

This location of circus as 'other' is also reflected in the almost complete absence of
academic literature and research on circus. This can be juxtaposed against a circus
literature which is itself performative and reifies circus through its separation from the
wider social and institutional order. It becomes an ideological construction both
'distanced and inaccessible' (Carmeli, 1995: 215). In its emphasis on the difference
between circus life and 'normal' life, Stroud's book may well be seen as falling within this
kind of literature of invented tradition. I shall argue however that there is more to this
book than that.

A second point of introduction. The last time I wrote anything that resembled a book
review² my attempt was returned by the Review's Editor with the instruction that I rewrite
it to better distinguish between description and evaluation. At the time I didn't question
the rectitude of this distinction, its relevance to this type of text and the critique of my

¹ The history of my maternal family can be found in Konyot, A. & Reichmann, W., 1961.
² For the development of circus marginality see Carmeli, 1987.
³ This became Beadle, 1997.
work. I now begin writing from a place and for a Journal in which this proposition would be rejected – rather to describe is always to select and to select is always to evaluate.

For me this text sits precariously between the book review as a frame of reference and a paper. I want to proselytise for a text that I believe provides significant resources for teachers of organisation theory. Second I want to use this text to illustrate some points about the social construction of ‘goodness’ and I have read it in part with such an ambition in mind. Third I want to use the text to reflect on some ideas, not yet fully formed, about circus as an environment in which (using MacIntyre’s terminology) internal goods dominate external goods. Finally, I want to contribute to an issue of a journal which I am co-editing and this position gives me a power over inclusion which this text mercilessly exploits.

**Josser**

‘Josser’ is one of many terms that readers of Nell Stroud’s book will learn is specific to the language of circus, a ‘Josser’ is an outsider and even an entire adulthood working within circus does not remove the label:

‘Josser is a circus word for outsider, and I think that the boundary between the josser and the legitimate – that is, born and bred circus person is permanent. You can’t step over that divide and claim the place that blood would have granted’ (Stroud:10)

In the same way as one has to be born in the United States to become President so you have to born into circus to be accorded recognition as an insider. The sobriquet indicates through their perceived absence in the joccer of a number of virtues prized by circus people and which they take as markers of their identity, even of their superiority. I can recall hearing many a bad review of a circus ending with the words: ‘Well what do you expect, the owner’s a joccer’ or, even worse ‘a joss-pot’. Stroud’s book eloquently conveys this. The first time she rides an elephant she is told that ‘Only jossers bleed when they ride elephants’ (ibid: 100) by a young woman whose childhood included the experience of soaking her hands in urine in order to harden them (ibid: 61).

To have your hands bleed when using rope or riding elephants is but one example of a joccer’s failure to exhibit the set of virtues (which include strength, agility, perseverance, tenacity and courage) integral to a circus person’s understanding of the good. This is one of the lessons that Stroud learns and illustrates throughout the book. The fact that such distinctions cannot be understood without recognising their dependence on an interpretation of aesthetics, in this case that bleeding skin resulting from the friction caused by riding an elephant is a sign of personal weakness and an indicator of social distinction reinforces many of the points made by theorists writing on aesthetics of organisation.

The distinction between circus people and jossers thus captures both a notion of the good related to particular virtues and an understanding that the development of such goods requires membership of a circus family (see also Carmeli 1987):

‘For circus people there are no relationships more important than ties to family. Perhaps it is why outsiders – jossers are never really on the inside when they work for a circus. They are not family.’ (Stroud: xiii)

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4 See for example Strati and Guillet de Montoux, 2002.
Later however another reason for this distinction is suggested, and that is the relationship between the performer and their act. Recalling an encounter with a circus trainer from whom she sought advice as to her choice of act Stroud writes the following:

‘As I spoke she sized me up and watched how I moved, the length of my limbs and my posture, the length of my spine and my height. She was looking for balance within, spring in the joints, strength in the arms. This is how circus people come to do their particular act. The elders watch the children play and see where their inner talent lies. The act has to come from the physiognomy of a person: it cannot be superimposed on an unsuitable canvas. I suggested I could learn the trapeze, ‘I don’t think so. You will always be too big. You look like a horse girl to me.’ ‘(Ibid: 109-110)

Circus children train for and participate in acts from an early age, in my mother’s case from four years of age. Whether this is technically a requirement for the successful performance of acts in adulthood, a feature of the bleak economics of circus or a manipulative socialisation into a totalized organizational environment is not the point, though I have heard all three expressed by circus people. The point is that the circus organisation is based around families (sometimes nuclear but more traditionally extended) working and living together and the requirement of a long apprenticeship often at the hands of family elders is largely unquestioned in this context.

This environment reminds me of nothing more than Alasdair Macintyre’s argument as to the relationship between the understanding and development of the virtues required of practitioners in socially constituted practices and a particular type of education:

‘Moreover, all of them require the same kind of disciplined apprenticeship in which, because we initially lack important qualities of mind, body, and character necessary both for excellent performance and for informed and accurate judgement about excellence in performance, we have to put ourselves into the hands of those competent to transform us into the kind of people who will be able to perform well and to judge well.’ (Macintyre 1988: 30)

As I grew up ‘josser’ was a term I knew and used. Though being brought up outside of circus I inhabited a kind of circus nether world, as a non-performer I am a josser but as a member of a circus family I am not. Even today circus people to whom I am known will speak to me of people, shows, acts, props, tricks and so on in a distinctive language – much of which I fail to understand. Nell Stroud starts from the opposite position. As a josser, her book is a recounting of her experience working in three circuses and her education into the practice and shared beliefs of them all, it a story of a gradual introduction. The book is a retrospective and if I have a criticism it is that a contemporaneous account (perhaps from the diary from which she occasionally quotes) would have given greater insight into the process of interpretation of this ‘peculiar culture’ (Ibid: 270).

The text can be described as ethnographic inasmuch as its material is qualitative and confessional, moreover the text is alive to itself as a construction and each new interpretation, each new facet of life in a circus which is made available begins in the recounting of observed incidents or in conversation. This is by no means an academic

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5 In reflecting on this I have come to wonder whether my own interest in and proselytising for the work of Macintyre reflects a certain familiarity with the type of productive communal living he upholds as virtuous. See for example my 2002 paper in Reason in Practice.
book – while it draws on circus literature there are no Journal references here but, and here is a suspicion, there is a post-modern sensibility at work. As I will try to demonstrate, the conceptual frame in operation employs distinctions around issues of authenticity, truth and whether or not the various shows described are ‘doing themselves for real’ (ibid: 288) that indicate such awareness.

**Borders and The Ring**

Drawing on some of the literature of organizational aesthetics Myers (2002) argues that organizational analysis should look for the repetition of themes in three contexts: behaviours, narratives and the socio-physical environment. In my view Stroud not only attempts to do this but also largely succeeds. And the central theme conveyed by all three is that of the border between the true and the false, exemplified and part-constituted by the physical boundary of the circus ring. If Gaglardi is right to suggest that:

‘The world view that the physical setting offers daily and uninterruptedly to the unconscious perception of members constitutes at the same time indelible testimony about the past and a guide for the future.’ (Gaglardi in Clegg & Hardy, 1999: 317)

then the circus tent and its ring marks the world-view of circus people more than anything else, capturing both the separation between performer and audience and the space inhabited by traditions of circus people. Stroud says:

‘The tent is the hardest taskmaster of all, a mobile building site and a theatre of art and work. All the cabs, the lorries and the caravans in the show are the different rooms of a big house, and the tent is the great hall, the cathedral. Birthday parties and christenings are celebrated in the tent. People sit around the ring and the ring fence. They don’t carouse in the ring – it is too respected, the ring is almost sacred.’ (Stroud: 146)

The use of the religious metaphors here is to my mind, absolutely appropriate. The point however is that I can only say this because I share with Stroud an experience of the narratives, behaviours and interpretations of setting that attribute meaning in this way. To outsiders the circus ring may mean nothing, may mean a site of cruelty (Carmelli 1997), an association of childhood, a link to the past or anything else but circus people cannot be understood and their culture cannot be conveyed, without recognising this core belief. This is not to say that some circus people critique this view, hate the circus, their own lives within it and so on⁶, but that they cannot do any of these things and remain intelligible within the context of circus narrative without an appreciation of what circus is taken to mean for those who work and live within it.

The idea of the sacred is captured in many of the narrative encounters Stroud reports. In one of many conversations about the decline of circus and in particular the decline of animal circuses she recounts that:

‘Roger said to me that he hated the circus without that smell. He says he thought there was magic in the circus in the smell of the circus, if there were animals. If there are no animals he said, more as a question that a statement, there is no magic.’ (xvii)

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⁶ At the time of writing my brother, working for a circus in Italy, is expressing some of these misgivings.
The location of the border between what is and what is not true in the ongoing narrative of circus is reflected elsewhere in the (albeit limited) academic circus literature. Carmeli (1996) picks up the same issue in his consideration of reactions within a 1970s circus to the presence of a particular ‘fakir’ act in which the performer (Billy) presented his feats of endurance (walking on a sword, lying on a bed of nails etc) with deliberate ironic intent:

‘his performance from its beginning involved a paradoxical and delicate balancing between a presentation and exhibition on the one hand and discreditation and play on the other. Rather than bracketing the real and assuming pretense (as, for instance, in theater), this performance assumed the real fakir, but through circus constraint, through irony, through an overflow of fragmented citations and references was geared to a disclosure of a human performer, that is, to the disclosure of its own pretense.’ (4-15)

For other circus performers this disturbed understood distinctions between ‘straight acts’ – animal acts and acrobatic acts (including strong-man and fakir acts) and clowning acts which are allowed to mimic straight acts in a way which maintains the circus illusion. Many of the artists resented the fakir act as threatening the integrity, the truth, of their own performance. As Carmeli puts it:

‘what Billy was doing was not just playing the fakir through circus framing … Rather, through the fakir’s belonging to a circus and through playing and derealizing the fakir, Billy was playing and deconstructing ‘traditional circus’ itself … Billy destroyed significances, conveying what Kristeva called ‘a weight of meaningless.’’ (22)

In interpreting this threat, Carmeli reports that other circus performers criticised the act as rightfully belonging in the ‘dirty old fairground’ and associating this with accusations of Billy’s personal dirtiness contrasted with their own cleanliness (ibid: 25). Carmeli notes that Billy’s act preceded by 15 years the ‘post modern production of Circus Archaoas’ (ibid: 26 and see also Little 1995), one of a string of circuses including the internationally known ‘Cirque du Soleil’ which I have witnessed being referred to as not being real circuses by members of my own family and other circus performers.

The stringent defence of a sense of identity related to both a set of discursive relations and social distinctions by circus performers marks an ongoing struggle for a space for legitimate, real circus which ties together collective and individual notions of identity. Such a totalizing environment is, as Carmeli points out, sustained among other practices by the discursive ‘in the circus talk itself’ (2001:157).

That a defence of such talk and the distinctions it tries so hard to maintain is needed is clear from many of the reported conversations in Stroud’s text. Circus is seen is in a parlous state both in terms of finance, legitimacy, and demonstrated opposition from a society in which its marginality is increasing but also from a crisis of interpretation evident to circus performers. She reports one as saying:

‘One of these days, circus will be a word that doesn’t mean anything any more.’ (86)

**Authenticity**

Stroud’s book is for me perhaps captured best by the metaphor of a journey, both in the tales of journeying essential to travelling circuses but also in a journey through which she comes to appreciate distinctions between true circus and various types of both poor circuses and simulacra of true circus.
In regard to the former she writes of an encounter in a home of a true circus family:

'There is no genuine circus culture left in England, it is an art largely disregarded. Since the circus fell on hard times it has pandered to a naive understanding of popular taste and in so doing has further downgraded and eroded itself. What I was encountering in that house was something different. It was true circus culture, not mediocre acts dressed up with black lights and day-glo and strobes but an unequivocal and obsessive focus on perfection. A real circus person will not rate a hardworking second class artist, or cheap costumes, or incorrect detail. Circus is a discipline. Like any other art it has its rules and boundaries that can be challenged only with understanding and skill.' (111)

And of one of the circuses in which she worked she writes:

'It was the most genuine circus I had seen in England. It was not an imitation of a circus, or an executed idea about a circus. It was just a circus, doing itself for real.' (116)

What marks out this distinction, what is the good around which such distinctions come to be framed? Using the terms eluded to earlier it can be described in terms of narrative, behaviours and interpretation of the physical environment. The narratives focus on the skills exhibited by the circus performers themselves in a range of 'recognised disciplines' (ibid, 283). This is an understanding intelligible only to those whose eyes are trained (see also Gagliardi on this point) to recognise distinctions in the difficulty of the tricks, the originality of acts, the consistency of and the commitment to performance which distinguishes an artist from someone 'walking through' their act. For those whose eyes are so trained quality is seen as being possible only to those exercising a range of relevant virtues. Stroud records the view of a French owner of a British travelling circus (Circus Santos) for whom the emotional response to most of his competitors was disgust:

'I remember Ernest's disgust when he spoke about the contemporary English clown, a silly figure running around in the ring making noises. His understanding of a clown was someone who could juggle, tumble, play an instrument, improvise, mime. Clowning to him was a meticulous, complicated form of artistic expression, not an icon on a perpetual loop of hamburger sales.' (185)

Much of Stroud's text points to but does not directly discuss how the training of the eye capable of defining quality in the act and the show emerges. The notion of the trained eye is present both in the aesthetics of production which influence owners choice of acts, their ordering, the presentation of the show and on and an aesthetic of consumption which renders audiences capable of appreciating at least some of the distinctions apparent to the fully trained eye. The decline of both the quality of circus and in the appreciation of audiences in Britain are inextricably linked. An untrained eye fails to distinguish between the quality of acts and as the quality of acts in British circuses has declined so has the ability of audiences to make such distinctions or even to have access to a language appropriate to such a process. Stroud contrasts the state

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7 This review does not discuss the economics of circus, its relation to family and the dynamics created by this relation but points interested readers to Carmeli 1987 for a good and in my experience still valid discussion of this.

8 Carmeli, 1987: 762 discusses the effect of the public's ignorance, not least on removing the economic return to 'improving a performer's act unless the performer were to work away from Britain.
of British circus with those in her 'ideal' circus, the great European shows which
demonstrate:

'ideal carpentry, lighting, vintage vehicles, athleticism. Such things don't exist on the shows in
England any more, and the real sadness is that nobody cares.' (ibid: 184)

Her experience of the European Circus Roncalli, where many of these ideals are
displayed, sees her faced with a Circus deliberately conveying circus tradition by the use
of circus acts, decoration, lighting, vehicles and so on representing a pre-war circus. For
Stroud however this was also open to criticism on grounds of authenticity:

'Circus Roncalli is the most brilliantly contrived place in the world, a perfect re-creation of a circus.
Santos Circus is the most unselfconscious place in the world, doing itself for real, just a circus.'
(288)

How does the understanding of authenticity conveyed by such remarks differ from that in
conventional organisations?

Internal Goods and the Practice Based Community

Höpfli (in Höpfli and Kostera 2003,) argues that the commonly held idea of organisation is
that of 'a purposive entity with a trajectory towards a desired future' (3), in which
decision-making is based at least rhetorically around orderly and rational processes
designed to achieve common if abstract purposes. The formal rhetoric here emphasises
instrumental rationality in which ends (desired futures) are pre-determined only means
are available for discussion by participants in production. Such is a logic of straight lines
from moving from an imperfect present to a supposedly perfected future.

Using different terminology, MacIntyre argues that modern economic institutions are
constructed around the pursuit of external goods (1985). These, like Höpfli's desired
futures are purely instrumental goods, tied to the idea of effectiveness (indeed MacIntyre
refers to them as goods of effectiveness (1988)) and a rhetoric designed to mask
manipulative intent.

Both argue that one paradox of such organizations is that productive activity is
experienced by subjects in process but rhetorically and politically organised around
the production of objects by people who come to be regarded as objects and subjected to
power derived from 'the ability to define, to authorise and regulate the site of production.'
(Höpfli: 6).

What is lost in such rhetoric includes the physicality of the body itself for Höpfli, and for
MacIntyre the notion of 'internal goods'. These are goods experienced by the participant
in productive activity as the result of engagement in ongoing social practices - a good
for example, like the successful performance of an acrobatic feat in circus or the
execution of a well placed pass in a game of ice hockey (MacIntyre 1988:140). Such
goods are not those of effectiveness, means towards ends but are goods of excellence,
ends in themselves reliant on virtues without which their achievement is not possible.
MacIntyre elucidates on this distinction as follows:

'What qualities of body, mind and character are generally required to achieve such goods as
those of riches, power, status and prestige? They are those which, in the circumstance in which
a given person finds him or herself, enable that person to identify which means will be effective in
securing such goods and to be effective in utilizing those means to secure them. Let us call these qualities of body, mind and character the qualities of effectiveness, and the goods which provide these qualities with their goal and their justification the goods of excellence." (Macintyre 1988: 32)

The goods of excellence are experienced in the present by subjects-in-process. Such is not a logic of straight lines, of abstract reasoning over means, but may rather be described as a logic of ends, of completion, perhaps even the logic of a ring. Much of the distinction Stroud makes between circus life and that of other organisations reflects the view that the over-riding purpose of circus performance is the achievement of internal goods and the continuation of the tradition of which they form a part. The good in circus is not understood in terms of organisational objectives and purposive logic but rather the maintenance of identity rooted in the continuation of a traditional practice. This is suggested in her citing of a conversation with a trapeze artiste, Eva who:

'doesn't compromise her art to move with the times -- moving with the times is not important to her .... Eva said to me that they were like prisoners in reverse. The rest of the world is moving forward. They are fighting to stay the same' (xl and xliii)

Similarly, Stroud’s conversation with a horse trainer and presenter is recalled in these terms:

"Do you like working?" I asked her referring specifically to time in the ring. She said she did, she said she liked the feeling of it -- which is exactly the point. All that sacrifice, all that work, practice, practice, practice, thousands of hours of practice, for the feeling of it. There, in the middle of the ring, surrounded by lights and music and people and applause, laughs, admiration, amazement, is the place where freedom can be experienced." (Ibid: 295)

The ring, the context for the body and its production of goods that cannot be experienced in any other place, once again assumes centrality and the maintenance of the ring, the continuation of the circus life within which such goods can be created and enjoyed becomes the purpose of its management. Macintyre is clear that only in particular types of community can internal goods flourish. He argues:

'The only form of community which could provide itself with such a standard would be one whose members structured their common life in terms of a form of activity whose specific goal was to integrate within itself, so far as possible, all those other forms of activity practised by its members and so to create and sustain as its goal that form of life in which to the greatest possible degree the goods of each practice could be enjoyed as well as those goods which are the external rewards of excellence' (Macintyre, 1988: 34)

This is not to say that circuses are such communities but the distinctions Stroud makes between the three circuses with which she tours are largely distinctions based on internal goods -- the quality of acts, of their presentation, the carpentry, lighting and so on pertaining to the experience of the show. Not the profitability of the circus.

The distinction between practice-based communities and organisations motivated around the pursuit of external goods is profound inasmuch as it involves not only what counts as a good but also how reasons given in support of action are understood within the community. In conventional modern organisations:

'co-operation with others demands recognition of their reasons for action as good reasons for them not as good reasons as such, and such co-operation requires the creation of frameworks for
bargaining, within which each may offer to the others considerations designed simultaneously both to appeal to the other in virtue of what he or she wants or is aiming at and to promote one's own goals' (45).

However in practice-based communities:

'what gives point and purpose to the co-operation of individuals on a given occasion is a good dependably of and antecedently to the co-operation of those particular individuals; it is for the sake of that good that they come together.' (Ibid)

In my experience of the conversation of circus performers about acts and shows there is often a large measure of agreement about quality. Circus performers offer the same reasons to suggest that a particular act is better than another with each type of act, take juggling for example, having defined criteria by which judgement comes to be made. Reasons proffered for preferring one juggler to another have always to do with the difficulty of tricks performed, their variety, their presentation and the virtues (or their absence) required for the achievement of such internal goods.

Stroud's book provides evidence to suggest that for some circus people at least, the good is defined in just such a way, and the following excerpt demonstrates that she has developed just such an understanding of the good. In Circus Roncali she saw that:

'the best artists are those who have given over their whole lives to the circus. I see that an artist is someone who has worked out a complete number for themselves. They are not simply participating in a circus. They are creating and inventing it by their work ... An artist is someone whose life corresponds to the moment of their act and does not go in other directions. I saw that there was only one freedom in the circus and that was the freedom experienced by a true artist while working in the ring. All the rest was confinement.' (291).

The good here is other than that found in conventional organisations, a good rooted in a particular form of life with its own standards of excellence, its own reasons which have less to do with a purposive rationality than to the maintenance of a way of life. The idea of the ring as both aesthetic representation of such a notion and as a guide to a way of thinking within such communities is perhaps best captured by one of the most lyrical passages in Stroud's book. This describes the first act in a French circus she visited:

'The curtain drew back and a man walked into the ring with a huge grey shire horse wearing a plain brown leather harness and pulling a chain harrow. Slowly they harrowed the ring, leaving circles in the sawdust. When they had finished everyone clapped. You see, in England you wouldn't see that. It was a wonderful piece of showmanship, and at the same time poetic, intellectually complicated. The harrowing of the ring prepared it for the show. The act of harrowing the ring crossed the clear boundary that lies between itinerant showman's culture and the static agricultural community. The pulling horse, the plough, heavy harness: they are unequivocal tools and symbols of graft, a working and reworking of the same piece of land. The circus turns over minds, lives in the air between the artists and the audience but is graft none the less, and the image of the chair harrow in the ring seemed to me to be a showman's hand reaching out to shake that of a farmer to verify the mutual understanding of hard work.' (281)

This image of repeated working and re-working is powerful for me inasmuch as it captures an essential feature of circus life. That is that a circus performer's act is repeated over and over, twice or three times daily, normally every day for travelling seasons that can span anything up to ten months. While some changes may be made, new tricks developed, audience reactions used (particularly in clowning), the basic work
is the same. The acts that are booked by a circus owner for a season are normally the same on day one as on closing day. Such an environment is not one in which the idea of continuous change and improvement, so overwhelming in conventional management literature, can play much of a role. For both participants and observers it is 'always the same circus' (Carmeli, 2001: 160). Even the best circus acts are limited by the times and spaces in which they operate (albeit that these reflect social constructions through which the notion of the traditional circus has developed (Carmeli 1995)), and by physical capability. Only very rare trapeze artists can throw a triple summersault today, only very few could throw one in 1900.

Stroud has much to say on relationships in circus organisations (not least between human performers and animals), the politics of circus, the experience of driving half asleep with little knowledge of route or destination and so on. However the focus here has been on the idea of the good within an organisational environment little researched.

As I have thought about Stroud's book, my own experience of circus and some critical management literatures, I am left with the conclusion that circus may be a type of productive community which accords closely to both MacIntyre's practice-based communities and to Höpfli's maternal organisation. In such communities reasons for action reflect not a rhetoric of future ambitions and the manipulation of power but rather convey an open-ended journey in which the good emerges from performance and is one of its many products and meanings. It is notable in such an argument that both MacIntyre and Höpfli see such communities as exceptions within the modern institutional and social order. They are always at the margins. So is circus.

However to the people who inhabit such communities the distinction between their own lives and those of the community are not sharply drawn. Circus is not marginal to the performer's life, it defines it. 'It is a mode of survival which is a mode of existence' (Carmeli, 1987: 770). The histories of circus performers are those of their communities as are their standards. The circus is a totalizing environment (Carmeli, 1996) in which even:

'in the local pub or in the laundry, or when exchanging a word with the fish and chips lady, travelling performers were expected to flaunt their presence, always playing ‘circus’, always distanced and depersonalized, being displayed and objectified by ‘their own’ play'(18)

Perhaps it is the case that the protection of their and other marginal practice-based communities (think for example of monasteries) from the surrounding institutional and social order requires such a totalizing play. This final possibility is something that Stroud captures:

'There can be no greater dedication to art than the lives of circus people. Think about it. They do not go to and from offices or galleries to home or to studios. Their entire existence, forever, is their family life, their upbringing, their relationship with their children, husbands, wives, in-laws, animals, and all these things are an expression and a result of their dedication to their work, their art, and their own particular, peculiar, precious culture.' (270)

References


