EVERYDAY BORDERING, BELONGING AND THE REORIENTATION OF BRITISH IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION

Abstract

The paper argues that everyday bordering has become a major technology of control of both social diversity and discourses on diversity, in a way that threatens the convivial co-existence of pluralist societies, especially in metropolitan cities, as well as reconstructs everyday citizenship. The article begins with an outline of a theoretical and methodological framework, which explores bordering, the politics of belonging and a situated intersectional perspective for the study of the everyday. It then analyses the shift in focus of recent UK immigration legislation from the external, territorial border to the internal border, incorporating technologies of everyday bordering in which ordinary citizens are demanded to become either border-guards and/or suspected illegitimate border crossers. We illustrate our argument in the area of employment examining the impact of the requirements of the immigration legislation from the situated gazes of professional border officers, employers and employees in their bordering encounters.

Keywords: citizenship, discourses on diversity, everyday bordering, immigration legislation, politics of belonging, situated intersectionality.

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Introduction

This article is about everyday bordering in the UK and its relationships with contemporary politics of belonging. We view everyday bordering and the ways it has developed as a result of recent Immigration Acts in the UK (especially 2014 & 2016) as a major technology of control of diversity and discourses of diversity in the UK which has promoted as well as been affected by autochthonic political projects of belonging (Geschiere, 2009; Yuval-Davis, 2011) which, among others, have influenced the ‘Brexit’ results of the 2016 referendum.

Elsewhere (Yuval-Davis et al, forthcoming), we analyze the ways both everyday bordering and autochthonic politics of belonging have been developed out of neo-liberal globalisation’s double crisis of governability and governmentality (Yuval-Davis, 2012). In this article, however, we are focusing on the ways everyday bordering has affected social and political solidarity and in particular how it has reconstructed everyday citizenship rights and duties.

Our theoretical and methodological approach therefore differs from related current research into the legal and policy contexts of immigration law enforcement (e.g. Cherti, 2014a and b; Düvell, 2016) or the everyday creativity and resistances of migrants to immigration legislation (e.g. Hall, 2015) in that we are investigating the political and social implications of the increasing incorporation of technologies of everyday bordering into UK immigration legislation not only for irregular migrants but for all UK citizens and residents. We are also arguing that in order to understand the impact of everyday bordering we need to examine it in a situated intersectional way, considering the differential epistemological gazes of the different social actors who are taking part in everyday bordering social encounters.

The article begins with an outline of our theoretical and methodological framework. It continues with an analysis of the shift in focus of recent UK immigration legislation from the external, territorial border to the internal border, embedding technologies of everyday bordering into many social institutions of British life. We develop our analysis through the use of illustrative examples drawn from wide ranging narrative interviews, focusing on the field of employment, exploring the ways ordinary citizens and residents are differentially incorporated into everyday bordering practices by demands to become either border-guards and/or suspected illegitimate border-crossers. In the conclusion we consider how
these processes have affected and reconstructed social and political solidarity as well as individual citizenship rights and duties.

Theoretical frame: Everyday bordering and the politics of belonging

This article emanates from our work in the EUBorderscapes research project, in which bordering is defined as ‘the everyday construction of borders through ideology, cultural mediation, discourses, political institutions, attitudes and everyday forms of transnationalism’. It incorporates Van Houtum et al’s (2005) use of the term ‘b/ordering’ to refer to the interplay between (social) ordering and border-making. Everyday ‘bordering and ordering’ practices create and recreate new social-cultural boundaries and borders which are also spatial in nature. At the same time as processes of globalisation were being operationalized to support claims surrounding the emergence of a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1999), we also saw the emergence of counter-narratives highlighting the proliferation of borders.

As has happened in Britain and elsewhere de- and re-bordering processes involve the territorial displacement and relocation of borders and border controls that are, in principle, being carried out by anyone anywhere – government agencies, private companies and individual citizens. The UK 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts discussed below expand and potentially criminalize failures in border-guarding as well as unsanctioned border-crossing. Borderings are thereby conceptualised as practices that are situated and constituted in the specificity of political negotiations as well as the everyday life performance of them, being shifting and contested between individuals, groupings and states as well as in the constructions of individual subjectivities. Such bordering constructions are intimately linked to specific political projects of belonging, which are at the heart of contemporary political agendas. Their contestations are closely related to different constructions of identity, belonging and citizenship.

It is important to differentiate between belonging and the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Belonging relates to emotional (or even ontological) attachment, about feeling ‘at home’. While ‘home is a material and an affective space, shaped by everyday practices, lived experiences, social relations, memories and emotions’ (Blunt, 2005: 506), part of feeling ‘at home’ has been described as being in a ‘safe’ space (Ignatieff, 2001). This construction of home is linked to views regarding who has a right to share the home and who does not
belong there. Technologies of everyday bordering which are supposedly aimed at making people feel safe by keeping those who do not belong out, can undermine feelings of safety for everyone through raising a sense of precarity.

Belonging tends to be naturalized and to be part of everyday practices. It becomes articulated, formally structured and politicized only when it is perceived to be threatened. The politics of belonging comprise specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging to particular collectivity/ies, which are themselves being assembled in these projects, within specified boundaries. These boundaries are often spatial and relate to a specific locality/territoriality and not just to constructions of social collectivities (Antonisch, 2010). This is particularly true when we relate to the most common political project of belonging which is that of state citizenship. While regional, ethnic, racial and religious differences might be crucial signifiers of belonging, when people travel abroad they are usually identified both formally and informally, by their nationality/state citizenship – or, since ‘the global war on terrorism’ - by their presumed religious affiliation.

There are different approaches to citizenship\(^1\). The most influential one in the UK is that of T.H. Marshall who defined citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community,’ with its associated ‘rights and duties’ (1950:14). As Hall and Held commented (1989), such a definition allows the notion of citizenship to be applied to political communities other than a nation-state. For our use, examining the impact of everyday bordering, we expand the boundaries of citizenship to all those residing in the UK, no matter their legal status or length of stay.

Processes of bordering always differentiate between ‘us’ and ‘them’, those who are in and those who are out, those who are allowed to cross the borders and those who are not. Rumford (2008) has likened borders to computer firewalls in performing intelligent filtering of immigrants, being open for the attractive and closed for the unwanted. Agents of the state make decisions about who to check as they cross the border and who not to, so some people might be aware of a bordering process and others oblivious to it. Mezzadra and Neilson have shown, how the proliferating external and internal borders are differentially inclusive in ways that ‘are no less violent or discriminating’ than more traditional forms of bordering (2012:70). Bordering, thus, is not only about who moves and who does not but also about who is in a position of control of movement. Particular constructions of bordering constitute specific forms of political projects of belonging. They construct borders
as more or less permeable, view those who want to cross the border as more or less of a threat and construct borders around different criteria for participation and entitlement for those who do cross them. We contend that in Britain and elsewhere the hegemonic political project has been gradually shifting towards what Geschiere (2009) described as autochthonic politics. ‘Autochthony’ is an ‘emptier’ and more elastic notion than ethnicity that states no more than ‘I was here before you’ and, as such, can be applied in any situation, in different scales of ‘the local’ and can be constantly redefined. It combines elements of naturalization of belonging with vagueness as to what constitutes the essence of belonging, and thus can be pursued by groups which would not necessarily be thought to be autochthone by others. The boundaries of belonging are crucial to any autochthonic political project on whatever scale. Thus we have entered a period in which bordering has come to play a much more central role in everyday life.

Sarah Pink has claimed (2012: 143) that the everyday is ‘at the centre of human existence, the essence of who we are and our location in the world’. We argue that the definition of ‘who we are’ and ‘what is our location in the world’ are both constructed by discourses of particular political projects of belonging and affected by the specific social agents taking part in these ‘everyday’ social dynamics. Consideration of these factors has thus informed our methodology and research methods.

**Methodological frame: The everyday and situated intersectional perspectives.**

Neal and Murji (2015: 817) characterise the everyday as co-constituted ‘as a site of resistance and/or a site of normativity’. However, we argue that notions of normativity and resistance depend on the different discourses of belonging of the participants in these everyday situations and therefore ‘everyday life’ cannot be studied unless we employ a multi-epistemological situated intersectional analysis. Rather than accepting the everyday as a ‘babble of multiple tongues’ (Featherstone, 1995), the arena of ‘doxa’ (Heller, 1984) or of ‘what is left over’ after all distinct, superior, specialized, structured activities have been singled out by analysis, everyday life must be defined as a totality (Lefebvre, 1991: 97).

Although we agree that the everyday needs to be looked at as a totality, we argue that there is no way to carry out ‘an objective’ analysis of any everyday social situation. Rather, any epistemological attempt ‘to approach the truth’ (Hill-Collins, 1990) necessitates a dialogical process encompassing the situated knowledge and imaginations of the social
agents involved, in which their social positionings, their emotional attachments and identifications as well as their normative value systems are included but not collapsed into each other. A situated intersectionality analysis, therefore, avoids both homogenizing members of collectivities and differentiating among them along a unidimensional social division, such as class, or gender, or race. Rather, it recognizes the more complex and mutually constituted (but not reducible) different facets of hierarchies of power and situated positionalities. (Yuval-Davis, 2014; see also Crenshaw, 1989; Hill-Collins & Bilge, 2015; Amelina, 2016).

As mentioned above, this article arises from research carried out as part of a wide-reaching, European project. The data collected for this paper is informed by the British team and their fieldwork in London, exploring bordering processes from differentially situated social positionings within everyday life. It was carried out from May 2013 to June 2015, during the period the Immigration Bill 2014 was being drafted and debated inside and outside Parliament as well as when the legislative requirements of the Act were introduced. The timing enabled participants to draw on their earlier experiences of everyday bordering as well as their understandings of how their lives were being affected by the recent legislation. The ethnographic methodology of this study (which encompassed observations, individual and collective interviews as well as contextual analysis of policy documents and relevant media) aimed to capture the multilevel complexities of different bordering processes through focusing on a range of everyday situated intersectional encounters at the ‘internal border’. Through analysing the situated individual perspectives on these internal bordering processes we are able to see how they construct and reconstruct the border as well as their own identities and claims of belonging through the creation of socio-cultural, political and geographical distinctions.

In order to accommodate what Stanley (2015: 839) describes as the unique ‘patchy, non-linear, cumulative dynamics’ of the economic, political and cultural transitions’ that were the context of the specific legislation in its encounter with everyday life, we tracked diverse media coverage of the contests over the Bill, observed Home Affairs Committee meetings and attended meetings of pressure groups and local government where the legislation was discussed. We analysed the contesting political and media discourses emanating from these events as constitutive of the everyday bordering differently experienced by those we interviewed (Yuval-Davis et al, forthcoming).
In order to capture a diversity of situated gazes and experiences of everyday bordering, we observed, during our fieldwork in London, seven meetings relating to new immigration laws and carried out in depth interviews with sixty-six people including students with EEA and non-EEA citizenship, managers and teachers in state and non-state funded post-16 education, landlords, a housing activist, private tenants from EEA and non-EEA backgrounds, local government employees, small business employers and employees and immigration enforcement officers. In addition we held conversations as part of our ethnographic fieldwork with a range of locally resident people and employees. The lives of many of the people we interviewed crossed several of these categories (e.g. a non EEA student who is also a tenant, a local government employee who is also a landlord). Interviewees were asked to talk in detail about their past and current experiences of external and internal borders. An analysis of early interviews led to us selecting cases relating to specific requirements of the Act where differently situated individuals reflected on their perspective of the extending internal border. We used snowballing since interviewees involved in specific bordering encounters, such as an enforcement raid on an employer, led to others who had experienced the same operation. To ensure an intersectional analysis of bordering we endeavoured, as far as possible, to interview women and men from a range of ethnic, religious and socio-economic backgrounds, as well as with different personal and professional positionings.

**Everyday bordering in Britain: constructing the ‘hostile environment’.**

The internal reach of the UK border has been extending in complex ways since World War II via the interplay of immigration policy, the privatisation and deregulation of state roles and the British welfare system. A significant transfer of everyday border guarding in the UK was embedded in the 1971 Immigration Act which required agents or captains of ships and aircraft to show immigration officers the names and citizenship of all passengers and to detain and return those who were refused entry. The 1987 Immigration (Carrier’s Liability) Act imposed penalties for non-compliance with these requirements (Scholten, 2015: 72-76). Since 1996, the Conservative government’s Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act and subsequent amendments imposed fines of up to £5,000 on employers who took on migrants who were not authorised to work. Successive Acts passed by Labour governments (including the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and
the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006) tightened the regulations relating to the border-guard roles of employers and widened the reach of everyday bordering. For example, the 1999 Act introduced fines of £2,000 per illegal passenger on vehicles coming into Britain and increased restrictions on marriage for immigration purposes. Furthermore, the 2006 Act introduced requirements for employers to carry out more rigorous and annual document checks of employees, increased fines to £10,000 per irregular worker and made it a custodial offence to knowingly employ unauthorised migrants (Webber, 2012: 156). Between 1998 and 2004 these laws were rarely enforced. However, this changed after the 2006 Act came into force. In 2007-8 immigration enforcement carried out 15,500 raids and made 10,750 arrests (ibid). After 2010, the government identified that most irregular migrants are people already living within the UK, having overstayed their visas. Government discourses focused on the necessity of extending the ‘hostile environment’ that would not only discourage them and others who might plan to overstay, but also further inhibit their ability to work and live in the UK.³ The 2014 Immigration Act aimed to achieve that through extending bordering processes more deeply into everyday life, sub-contracting and extending border-guard roles to employees of private and public organisations including banks, the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) and hospitals as well as private landlords, so that irregular migrants would find it harder to find work and accommodation or to access healthcare and education. While aspects of earlier bordering legislations have been contested, Webber (2012) has shown how successful challenges to both the external and internal borders, have led to further legislation of which those from 2014 and 2016 are the most recent.

In this article we are focusing on employment as an illustrative example of how everyday bordering is experienced and viewed differently by individuals of differential positionings, identifications and normative value systems. We show how this ‘hostile environment’ has a deep impact on the lives of irregular migrants. However, we also show how it affects other migrants, members of racialized minority groups as well as all other members of the society.

**Everyday employment bordering**

*Perspectives from professional enforcers*

In 2013, as the 2014 Immigration Act was being drafted, the Home Office launched Operation Valken in which vans displaying large posters demanding those ‘in the UK
illegally’ to ‘Go home or face arrest’ circled the streets of some neighbourhoods in London. The ‘Go Home’ vans triggered mass protests and were eventually withdrawn from the streets (Jones et al, 2017). However, our interviews with border enforcement officers illustrate that the contestations to the ‘Go Home Vans’ came from inside as well as outside the Border Force contributing to more targeted, less publicly visible bordering processes, such as Operation Skybreaker, run by the Home Office Immigration, Compliance and Enforcement (ICE) team, introduced in July 2014.4 We interviewed KD and AD, both White English female border enforcement officers from the ICE team. They considered the ‘Go Home’ vans campaign as ineffective ‘macho’ gesture politics in contrast to Operation Skybreaker’s ‘community engagement’ strategy whereby they and their colleagues visited every business in designated wards in five London boroughs which, they claimed, were identified as having the largest numbers of ‘illegal migrants’.5 In contrast to the ostentatious mobile posters of Valken, they showed us their modest visiting cards, which they and their colleagues gave out to employers on visits that were ostensibly to explain the legislation to the business owners and to see the files that it was their duty to keep regarding the immigration status of all their employees. However, the border officers told us that on each visit they also noted whether their visit created panic among the employees, in which case their ICE team colleagues may return and carry out an ‘enforcement operation’.6

In contrast to the expressed view of their more senior colleagues, BD and LD, Asian and white male junior enforcement officers whom we spoke with during a ‘community engagement’ operation viewed the out-sourcing of border work to businesses and the ICE teams’ resultant ‘engagement work’ as cost cutting and ineffective because it gave ‘illegals’ the opportunity to ‘escape’.

Whilst Home Office records indicate that about 70% of the raids target businesses in ethnic minority neighbourhoods, giving rise to the claim that this immigration policy is racist,7 the Border Force officers we interviewed did not see it as such. BD referred to his positioning as a member of a religious minority, oppressed in many parts of the world, giving an example of how his community was protected by UK anti-discrimination laws. He believed in enforcing the UK border against people who want to deny the right of his community to belong in his ancestral country and in the UK. He emphasized that an ‘acceptance of diversity is different to an acceptance of when people are here illegally.’ KD told us that
whilst she enjoyed living in pluralist multi-cultural London ‘everyone should prove their right to work’.

*Perspectives from the ethnic enclave economy*

In contrast to the situated gaze of the border officers who perceive a supposedly solid and simple differentiation between the ‘legal’ and the ‘illegal’, employers and employees from ethnic minority backgrounds whom we interviewed experienced the everyday border as confused and with potentially destructive consequences on people’s lives. The complexities of recruitment and employee relations of businesses within London’s ‘ethnic enclave economy’ including the values of social networks, kinship obligations, language and cultural knowledge have been well documented by Bloch and McKay (2013 and 2015) and Bloch, Kumaruppan and McKay (2015). They argue that whilst the traditional informality of recruitment processes, including the casual employment of kin and co-nationals without permission to work, has been challenged by the increased penalties that employers face, social ties and practical needs of the business mean that many continue to risk large fines. We found that the terrain that ethnic enclave employers experience in being legally obliged to become untrained unpaid border guards is complicated by the multiple relationships that they may be embedded in where they have to demonstrate to ICE teams that their employees, to whom they may possess familial, social or political obligations, are not illegal border crossers.

Ethnic minority employers found it unfair, as well as impossible without any professional training, to distinguish migrants with the right to work from those who presented false papers to them, their failure resulting in fines of up to £20,000 for each staff member illegally employed. According to the 2016 Act multiple offences could lead to a prison sentence of up to five years.

DC, a South Asian grocery shop owner would not recruit someone if he was not sure of their status:

> I was going to employ a European guy who comes from Italy but he had no passport, he had his ID card and his medical card, he showed me this and I refused him as I had no idea about it because [I thought] he has to have a passport with a visa ... so many countries’ people coming here, so how do I know who has the right to work?
Although an Italian ID card is sufficient for employment purposes, experiences of the devastating effect of the raids on the business led to ethnic minority employers feeling targeted. In everyday bordering, informal constructions of boundaries, built on assumptions about the citizenship status of minority group members, contribute to the formation of, and are structured by, the formal ones.

A British-Bangladeshi owner of several restaurants, complained about the targeting of ethnic minority businesses through immigration enforcement raids:

[The Home Office] are making life hell for all the owners of the businesses as they are targeting the owners. I find that they do not really want illegal immigrants’ problem to be sorted out. They are actually targeting all the owners so that if they find anyone there they can fine them. It is a kind of revenue collection, which is not true Britishness.

He, like others we interviewed, pointed out the destructive effect on businesses of these raids:

They raided on the Friday night. Friday and Saturday evening are the busiest in the whole week. They actually target your restaurant, they don’t care about your reputation or damage to business ... they just lock the door and they always treat everybody like a criminal. [...] You build a reputation for years and years, that way your 30 years of work, your twenty years of work is down the drain.

And as DC pointed out:

Because if any customer goes into a shop and faces any trouble by the police or immigration officer will they come again in the shop? Never!

Of course, it is not only businesses which are being destroyed by such raids, but relationships between employers and employees as well. BJ, a male British-Bangladeshi, small business manager, reflected on the impact of these everyday policies:

It is creating divisions in the society. Not only between the white indigenous people and the immigrant people. It could just be one of my friends who has fallen out with me. If he knows that I somehow employ one person, just to harass me ... so the Home Office are trying their best not to make a cohesive society although they preach for this ... they are trying to employ people as police against each other they are creating a situation of chaos in this society.
The precarity and damaging collateral effects of everyday bordering can sometimes reach absurd extremities. For example, in spite of his caution, and keeping files on five legal employees, DC was given a £15,000 fine (which he was fighting in court) for two assumed-to-be illegally employed men arrested during the raid on his shop. According to DC one was a customer and the other a pedestrian who stood next to the fruit stall on the pavement outside and ‘looked like’ the people who worked in his shop.

Stereotypes of racialized minorities as ‘not belonging’ are common in the work of everyday bordering. However, everyday bordering legislation and practices affect all kinds of migrants and, as we’ll see below, everyone in society.

**Perspectives from EU residents in London**

Migrants from the margins of the EU often feel helpless in the face of immigration legislation complexity. Often the only way employees can prove their right to work legally is by using support networks of family and friends who’ve had similar experiences in the past.

TB, a student from Bulgaria, who had moved to London with her mother in 2011, explained that one of her mother’s friends, married to a British national, had encountered problems with her employer due to confusion surrounding the rules on Bulgarian nationals living and working in the UK:

> When she started working, the people in the office upstairs were asking for her blue card. But you don’t have to get a blue card. [...] And she said it is taking a long time to get an appointment. She comes to my mum asking her what to do [...]. I went to the government website and I printed the information for her and she took her marriage certificate and passport to the office. [...] But I had to tell them the rules! Then maybe one year later, she calls my mother again and tells her that there is a new boss and they are asking again for blue card!

British employers are required to play the roles of the border-guards, deciding whether TB mother’s friend is a legitimate border crosser employee. Since they are untrained they choose the easy route of demanding official papers which are not required. The intervention of TB proves the importance of informal ethnic networks in facilitating successful border crossings.

The rules surrounding work in the UK also placed stresses on Romanian and Bulgarian workers, who were often concerned about not complying. MR, a seamstress from Romania,
who had lived in London since 2008, was initially self-employed and held a yellow registration certificate, but felt she lacked understanding of what was required of her:

> When I worked for the agency and [her husband], he lost his [driving] licence, I was frightened about the authorities. I was frightened about the tax and not doing something correctly. I don’t know.

And indeed, she had grounds for fear. The non-EEA national husband of LB, a female Czech citizen, had initially been refused leave to remain because there was a short period when the Home Office said that LB didn’t have the private health insurance required by non-working partners. However, she didn’t need it because she had been working and paying National Insurance throughout.

This confusion is often exploited by agencies who force their workers into precarious work under the minimum wage and also affects everyone in the workplace. We interviewed PB, a White British middle manager of a branch of a FTSE-250 company which had a diverse workforce typical of many in the capital. In 2013 his frustration with his company’s use of a particular employment agency and difficulties with the paperwork to employ workers directly led him to leave his post. He was angry as he knew that the agency his company had a contract with was paying workers below the minimum wage:

> Why do you think I have spent the last few months trying to get us out of this contract with him? I know what he does and I know that if we were found to be involved in this we would be in trouble. This is a legacy that I inherited and I’m trying to resolve it with the help of head office, but it has been difficult and I have had to fight for my own job in this.

Many of the agency workers had worked at the branch for a year or more and PB was keen to employ them directly, which would enable him to make savings on his wage bill. This had been happening at another nearby branch, as one agency worker explained:

> No, no, I spoke to one of the bosses there, you know? I asked if they had a job for me. All the Romanians were doing it...well the ones who had the blue card. And they gave me a contract. I work 39 hours a week. Packing on the afternoon shift.

However gathering the correct paper work to satisfy senior managers in his branch and from head office was often problematic. He suspected a senior manager of receiving kick-backs from the agency owner and using the legislation to prevent workers from being employed directly. One of the workers confirmed that this was the case when a senior manager was
removed from his post after an investigation by head office. In this case a senior employee within a large UK company was able to exploit the demands of immigration legislation not only to de-fraud his own company but also to ensure many workers with the right to live and work in the UK were denied direct employment and continued to be exploited by the agency boss.

The immigration regulations have spread a sense of anxiety and precarity far beyond the realm of low paid agency workers or people with questionable rights to work. The sheer volume of paper work and its complexity can put people off.

For example, although LB is now entitled to British citizenship, she said she will not apply until she has been with a single employer for five years because it is ‘exhausting getting together so many pieces of paper to prove employment and residence’ in order to apply (her friend who is also Eastern European married to Middle eastern man had experienced this negatively). Moreover, while applying for her husband’s leave to remain when she was working for a married couple, she had to ask for her employer’s marriage certificate to give to the Home Office who did not believe her because her employers had different surnames and one had signed her contract and the other the payslips. She felt terrible about asking them, even though they said it wasn’t a problem.

**Gendered effects of everyday bordering**

We found that everyday employment bordering can have a greater impact on women with limited opportunities. JK, a British-Chinese woman who came to Britain as a child reflected on the exploitation she encountered in society as a result of immigration policies:

> If you don’t have your papers you can’t do anything. Obviously there is a black market but it is getting increasingly hard now while there are always employers who are willing to take people on for cash in hand - the type of job - the type of salary ... we were chatting to a Bangladeshi waitress and she gets £40 a day for a 12 hour day, and you have very little rights and I think that instead of [the law] protecting, it is ensuring you don't have the right to work. If you are here, you still need a roof over your head.

She was referring to the vulnerability to economic and sexual exploitation that we had encountered in other interviews, especially in relation to the accommodation border.¹¹
However, everyday borderings affect everyone’s lives in the UK, not just migrants or even members of vulnerable gendered racialized minorities.

**Perspectives from metropolitan professionals**

Whilst the border officers perceived no problem in requiring everyone’s passports to be checked in places of employment we heard shocked reactions by employees of an academic institution in London which amalgamated with another. All employees, with no regard to seniority or length of employment, had to show their passports to prove that they are legally working in the UK. Nowadays academics employed on permanent contracts in one academic institution have to prove their legal right to work in the UK before they can be paid as guest lecturers or external examiners in another UK academic institution. Similar practices exist in all other fields of employment.

We found that the effect of such policies in a global metropolitan city, in the years preceding Brexit, has been to sensitize people to who carries a British passport and who does not. In this way citizenship status became a salient feature of ascribed identity, making those who do not carry such passports potentially guilty of illegal work until otherwise proven and overall making the racialized boundaries between those who ‘belong’ and those who ‘do not’ a more central feature of everyday life in London and elsewhere.

The immigration legislation requirements thus have generic effect on the economy and society. NW, a member of ‘London First’, a lobby group aimed at promoting London’s business interests told us:

> Many businesses in the City find it hard to attract talented global people to come and work here because of the visa requirements. There has been damage done. I’ve seen it on the ground.

Owning £200,000 of ‘investment funds’ is enough, however, to gain the right to work in your own business in the UK. As we found when interviewing City employees, even people with fewer financial resources, but with the ability to hire the right legal expertise, the path to legal employment and long term residency and citizenship is being smoothed out. Thus, although the impact of bordering was not limited to lower-paid workers and those in specific sectors, those with higher incomes could pay for legal services to ensure they remained in employment. OB was a professional woman from a non-EU former Soviet
republic, who had moved to London whilst a student, 13 years prior to when we interviewed her in April 2015.

Yes, [....] I became British about 2-3 years ago, after I spent 10 years in the country. I think I’ve been in every single working visa available in the UK for sure. Because at the time I was getting my passport, my immigration lawyer, he was taking out my file and he said, ‘[OB] you actually have eight cases with me and I’ve never had eight cases on individual ever before. It’s usually companies’.

Being able to ‘get away with it’, does not mean that everyday bordering has not affected the lives of all migrants and, as we’ve seen above, also of the rest of population.

Conclusion: everyday bordering and everyday citizenship

Bordering has come to be increasingly a part of the everyday experience of British people. The expansion of the EU and the growing destabilization of large parts of the post-colonial world due to natural and political/military factors, have increased the number of migrants across Europe, while in the post 9/11 era bordering practices are sites of ever-increasing securitisation. The UK has experienced these pressures in specific ways, due to historical/political and cultural/linguistic factors. While anti-immigration discourses and the extreme Right have gained momentum all over the world, the UK, outside the Schengen agreement, and with a growing ambivalent relationship with the EU, has been developing more extreme measures of de-territorialized border controls. These technologies work to control both the number of migrants, and more so, the discourse of the UK as a desired space for immigration.

We argue that the intensification and growing hegemony of this everyday/everywhere bordering technology threatens to destabilize the conviviality of multiethnic metropolitan London, the rest of the UK and other European societies. As we have shown through illustrative examples, it undermines a naturalized sense of entitlement to citizenship rights to a growing section of the population – especially, but not only, the racialized and vulnerable ones. They constantly have to prove that they’re legally entitled to public sector services as well as housing and employment in the private sphere, thus creating (contested and shifting) hierarchies of belonging which only partially related to people’s formal citizenship status but profoundly affect their citizenship rights. More and more members of society are being required to act as border-guards and check (to their peril if they fail to
carry out these duties for which they are not paid or trained) that they do not allow anyone ‘who does not belong’ access to these arenas. As we have shown, the situated gazes of those everyday border-guards concerning the practical and ethical issues involved in everyday bordering differ sharply from that of the professional ICE team border officers we interviewed. However, in order to fully understand everyday bordering we need to encompass, in an epistemological dialogical way, as many situated gazes as possible. We have used the situated intersectional methodology to show how different citizenship status, ethnicity, race, gender, educational/professional positionings and other social hierarchies work together and mutually constitute each other through diverse categorisations and selected signs. The experiences of everyday borderings are, therefore, differentiated, based on social positioning and a particular situated gaze. Within employment, we have seen the difficulties not only of different kinds of employees or those wanting to work but also of employers in checking the rights of migrants to work. Even large companies find it difficult to understand their role and some non-British nationals are missing out on equal access to the labour market as a result. Evident throughout is the divisive nature of these processes both for those who find themselves unable to access employment but also for those employers who feel uncertain about the border-guard role which is punitively being forced upon them. Where this uncertainty exists, less scrupulous agency owners have been able to step in and profit from the fears of employers surrounding the fines related to upholding this legislation. Moreover, as many of our interviewees commented, this situation brings uncertainty, confusion and probably most importantly a divisive atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust.

While citizenship in the UK and other parts of Europe in the post World War II era has tended to be social democratic, this technology of everyday bordering constructs citizenship as an individualized social/legal contract between the person and the state and potentially between the person and all the other people whose access to social rights are being threatened by her/him. It is a political project of belonging that does not relate only to the agenda of securitisation but also to that of the extreme Right, which calls to keep jobs, housing, education, health care, and generally being part of ‘the community’, exclusively to those who ‘belong’, and construct an exclusionary ‘hostile environment’ to those who do not. Although this paper focuses on the employment arena, we have found in our research
similar picture in the realms of accommodation, health, education and even marriages. Since the time of our fieldwork, the UK has voted to exit the EU in a national referendum. In a way, the strengthening of the political project of belonging that was one of the major factors in the Brexit vote can be seen as one outcome of the divisive effects of everyday bordering technology. It has become very easy to shift responsibility to those who ‘do not belong’ – the migrants or anyone else who has different looks, accents, cultures and religions. This is the context in which those of us who have been working on issues of racism, nationalism and ethnic relations, find ourselves with new challenges. The combined emergence of everyday bordering as a technology of control of diversity and discourses on diversity and autochthonic populist politics of belonging in a growing number of places on the globe are producing new forms of intersectional racist practices.

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For an overview of the literature see, for example Barbalet 1988, Turner and Hamilton 1994 and Lister 1997.

We also carried out fieldwork on the Dover/Calais border (see the special issues edited by Yuval-Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy in Ethnic and Racial Studies and Political Geography).

In 2012, in an interview with The Daily Telegraph, Home Secretary, Theresa May confirmed that the aim of the immigration legislation ‘is to create a hostile environment for illegal immigration’ (Kirkup and Winnett, 2012).

Operation Skybreaker was a Home Office immigration enforcement initiative that operated through the final six months of 2014. Its aim was to target and deport illegal workers and prosecute businesses employing migrants without permission to work. Operation Skybreaker also worked with civil and faith organizations. Similar approaches were taken in relation to social services and Metropolitan Police Services (‘Operation Nexus’) [https://www.gov.uk/government/news/operation-nexus-results-in-more-than-175-removals] [Accessed 1st April 2016]
The Operation targeted every business in specific wards in Tower Hamlets, Newham, Ealing, Brent and Greenwich.

Related technologies used by successive governments which aimed to reduce ‘illegal working’ since 1996, have seen increases in penalties targeted at employers. The 2014 Act doubled to £20,000 the fine for employers of migrants without the ‘right to work’.

The figure of seventy percent is calculated by the Migrants Rights Network from Home Office regional records of civil penalties issued and arrests made: http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/2016/03/exploitation-ethnic-enclaves-why-immigration-enforcement-not-answer [Accessed 1st April 2016]

The 2015/16 Bill proposed that the ‘maximum custodial sentence on indictment for an offence of employing an illegal worker will also be increased from two years to five years’. http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/offices/commons/commonslibrary/commons-library-news/immigration-bill-2015/[Accessed 1st April 2016]

Bulgarian and Romanian citizens did not have full EU free movement rights until 2014.

Worker registration certificate issued to Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, who do not need permission to work in the UK. Students and self-employed from these countries receive a yellow card which restricts, but does not cancel, their right to work.

Please see our film ‘Everyday Borders’: https://vimeo.com/126315982


Since the referendum high profile bordering interventions have been initiated by the Home Office in partnership with private and public organisations. In July 2016, the multi-million pound Byron Hamburgers chain partnered with the Home Office in a ‘sting’ operation to deport its own employees. In October 2016 St George’s Hospital announced plans to check the passports of pregnant ‘non-urgent’ patients.
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