The Quest for Atlanticism:

German-American Elite Networking,
the Atlantik-Brücke and
the American Council on Germany,
1952-1974

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PhD

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The Quest for Atlanticism: German-American Elite Networking, the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany, 1952-1974

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Abstract

This work examines the role of private elites in addition to public actors in West German-American relations in the post-World War II era and thus joins the ranks of the “new diplomatic history” field. It studies the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany (ACG) from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s – a history that has hitherto been neglected. The focus on private elites and their contributions to fledgling public-private networks within each country and across the Atlantic helps to shed light on the ways hostilities between West Germany and the US were addressed.

Based on original archival research and applying tools of Social Network Analysis (SNA), this thesis starts from the assumption that international relations are conducted by elites. These elites are not only composed of democratically legitimized politicians and diplomats. Private actors representing business, industry, media, and academia are also involved, albeit hidden from public scrutiny. Private actors are enabled to do so because they are integral parts of dense state-private networks. The state-private network concept is innovatively transferred to the transnational level. The network term emphasises the fact that those connections are neither limited in quantitative terms nor are they confined to national boundaries.

The analysis illuminates three sustainable achievements of the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke. Firstly, they contributed to forging a bipartisan foreign policy consensus at whose core has been a strong West-German-American relationship. Key in achieving this was the redirection of West German Social Democracy away from anti-militarism, neutralism, and socialism. Secondly, in fulfilling an elite coordination function, the organisations helped to secure the transatlantic partnership consensus by conveying it into business, trade and
industry circles in the US as well as in West Germany. Thirdly, by utilizing their manifold links to media and academia they assisted in manifesting this consensus in public discourse.
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<tr>
<td>ACG</td>
<td>American Council on Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACUSE</td>
<td>Action Committee for the United States of Europe</td>
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<td>ACUE</td>
<td>American Committee on United Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFCN</td>
<td>American Friends of the Captive Nations</td>
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<td>AFVN</td>
<td>American Friends of Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDI</td>
<td>Federation of German Industry (<em>Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPA</td>
<td>Federal Press and Information Office (<em>Bundespresse- und Informationsamt</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Congress for Cultural Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDG</td>
<td>Council for a Democratic Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (<em>Christlich Demokratische Union</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christian Social Union (<em>Christlich-Soziale Union</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGAP</td>
<td>German Council on Foreign Relations (<em>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGB</td>
<td>Federation of German Trade Unions (<em>Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party (<em>Freie Demokratische Partei</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLP</td>
<td>Foreign Leader Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany (<em>Bundesrepublik Deutschland</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic (<em>Deutsche Demokratische Republik</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hapag</td>
<td>Hamburg America Line (<em>Hamburg-Amerikanische Paketfahrt Aktiengesellschaft</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HICOG</td>
<td>High Commission of Occupied Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAB</td>
<td>International Acceptance Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IACF</td>
<td>International Association of Cultural Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>International Business Machines Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Jewish Claims Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLF</td>
<td>Multilateral Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-proliferation treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDAP</td>
<td>National Socialist German Workers’ Party (<em>Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMGUS</td>
<td>Office of Military Government, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office for Strategic Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVA</td>
<td>Tennessee Valley Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Sturmbteilung</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Social Network Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany (<em>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDA</td>
<td>University of Notre Dame Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Information Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCI</td>
<td>German federal association of the chemical industry (Verband der Chemischen Industrie)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDF</td>
<td>Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen</td>
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Acknowledgements

My curiosity and interest in transatlantic elite networks was initially ignited in 2009. Back then, I came across a book about the RAF and its victims among the West German bourgeoisie – many of whom were members of the Atlantik-Brücke. This first encounter with this German elite organisation has led to a years-long research project that demanded not only endurance and patience but often times as much investigative skills. By no means do I intend to encourage any kind of conspiracy theory about elite networks. Yet, at times, directors and members of elite organisations like the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany, in my mind, could do more to defuse the air of secrecy surrounding their activities. Having said this I want to extend my appreciation, however, to Beate Lindemann, Helena Kane Finn, and Evelyn Y. Metzen for meeting with me, sharing their knowledge about the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany and for helping to open doors.

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indebted to my parents, my children, and my husband. I am so grateful to you for enriching my life beyond words.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents and to Hannah, Alja, and Dieter.

Berlin, 25 August 2016
Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges opinions, ideas and contributions from the work of others.

Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this thesis has been approved. Approval has been sought and granted by the Faculty Ethics Committee on 2 October 2014.

I declare that the word count of this thesis is 78,827 words.

Name: Anne Zetsche

Signature:
Introduction

What are the connections between the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, the German media coverage, and transatlantic elite networks? These connections are not necessarily visible at first sight. Yet viewers of the German political satire TV show *Die Anstalt*, comparable to *The Daily Show* in the US, got a glimpse of these links in spring 2014. The show revealed a dense network of transatlantic elite organisations – associations, think tanks, and councils, among them the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany (ACG) – which all have in common that they bring together journalists, academics, politicians, and business people. In the episode of *Die Anstalt*, these organisations were dubbed “local branches of NATO’s press office” and “transatlantic lobby organisations”, which, accordingly, helped to portray the crisis in Cold War terms. The portrayal showcases, on the one side, Ukraine desperately longing to be associated with the European Union and thus becoming a partner of the US, and on the other side, Russia playing an aggressive and anti-Western role. Journalists of leading German media outlets feature prominently within these transatlantic networks.¹ Kai Diekmann, for example, was editor-in-chief of Germany’s highest-circulation tabloid *Bild* at the time and still is a board member of the Atlantik-Brücke.²

For most viewers, this was probably the first time they had heard about these organisations. The Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG have rarely been subject to media coverage in the course of their more than 60-year-history. Seldom did they actively seek public or media attention. Therefore, little is known about these organisations – among the broader

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¹ The close interconnectedness of leading media representatives in Germany with transatlantic elite networks is the main focus in Uwe Krüger, *Meinungsmacht: Der Einfluss von Eliten auf Leitmedien und Alpha-Journalisten - Eine Kritische Netzwerkanalyse* (Cologne: Herber von Halem Verlag, 2013).
public as well as in academia. In the higher echelons of US and German politics, however, the two organisations are well known. In December 2011, Minister of State Werner Hoyer, for example, praised the ACG as having “always been a strong actor in [Germany’s] relations with the United States”.³ Former president George H. W. Bush lauded the Atlantik-Brücke in turn for having “stood the test of hard times and rough weather”, standing “fast during the difficult years of the Cold War”, and being instrumental in bringing about “the peaceful unification of Germany”.⁴

The intertwined history of these two organisations, going back to the early 1950s, has hitherto remained untold. Yet, both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke promote a strong transatlantic partnership to this very day, albeit in a changed global setting. This dissertation argues that the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG evolved to become central civil society pillars, essential in underpinning German-American rapprochement, and have become important actors helping to build and maintain an unlikely partnership between the US and West Germany as an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance. In doing so, this thesis examines whether the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke have indeed functioned as “local branches of NATO’s press office”, and “transatlantic lobby organisations” as Die Anstalt claimed.

The beginnings of an unlikely alliance

In the early years after World War II, the life of most people in war-ridden Europe was dominated by hardship and distress. More than 32 million people had been killed in Europe alone, military and civilian alike. Tens of thousands were still held as prisoners of war, most

of whom were Germans imprisoned in the Soviet Union.\(^5\) In the immediate aftermath of the war, until September 1945, there were approximately six to seven million displaced persons.\(^6\) Urgent needs such as hunger and finding a place to live had to be met. Widespread bombardments of German cities by the Allied Air Forces left an equal number of people homeless with approximately 20 percent of the total housing stock nationwide destroyed or damaged. In Hamburg, for example, the extent of destruction reached 75 percent.\(^7\) For those who had lived through the war, paralysing memories of flight, persecution, and imprisonment often conflicted with the necessity to manage everyday life. Germany’s reputation was damaged greatly as more and more transpired about war crimes committed by Germans.

Thus, looking back at the impact of World War II two central aspects come into view: first, the exceedingly high numbers of human losses coupled with the catastrophic degree of physical destruction, and “the division of the world into victors and defeated”.\(^8\) With regard to both aspects, Germans and Americans belonged in opposite camps. German military losses had amounted to approximately 5.3 million dead soldiers – “almost three times … than in World War I”; by contrast, the US army had suffered the considerably smaller number of 405,000 military deaths during the Second World War.\(^9\) While Germany surrendered to the Allies in 1945 and was divided into four zones of occupation, the US emerged as the mightiest Western power establishing an “empire by invitation”.\(^10\)

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Against this background, as early as in 1949, four people – unlikely friends at the time – Americans and Germans, began developing a plan to found the American Council on Germany (ACG) in New York and a sister organization, the Atlantik-Brücke, in Hamburg. One of the founders was Eric M. Warburg, a Jewish banker originally from Hamburg where his ancestors had founded the family’s banking house in 1798. Due to Nazi Aryanisation and expropriation policies, the Warburg family had lost its banking house in 1938 and emigrated to the United States, settling in New York. Eric Warburg, who was very attached to Hamburg despite the terror of the Nazi regime, became a transatlantic commuter after World War II, living both in Hamburg and in New York. In the early 1940s, Warburg met Christopher Emmet, a wealthy publicist and political activist who shared Warburg’s strong anti-communist stance and an attachment to pre-Nazi Germany. On the German side of this transatlantic relationship, Marion Countess Dönhoff, a journalist at the liberal West German weekly Die ZEIT, and Erik Blumenfeld, a Christian Democratic politician and businessperson joined Warburg and Emmet. Their plan was to use the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG as vehicles to foster amicable relations between the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Yet, what role did these private organisations play in West German-American relations during the first half of the Cold War (1950s to mid-1970s)? In answering this, this thesis will examine the role of private elite networks on the stage of international relations.

from the losses sustained in carrying a major burden together with their allies to end Hitler’s planning for German rule beyond Europe. West Germany was confronted with a deeply divided population suffering from economic, military and moral devastation. Many Germans blamed capitalism along with the Nazis for their ordeal. Certainly, Social Democrats, Communists, and trade unionists were not immediately convinced of economic liberalism and re-armament under the umbrella of NATO. Germany’s propertied class suffered from dispossession of overseas properties, from the disruption of former trade routes, and not least from a negative image tainted by the nation’s Nazi past. These obstacles on the way to a reliable West German-American partnership were serious.

How did West German and American leaders overcome objections to rapprochement and how did they achieve reconciliation? Hostile sentiments and prejudices held on both sides should not be underestimated. Most Germans, and in particular the industrial elite, had persistent anti-American sentiments. The American public and a considerable part of the political elite were deeply sceptical as to whether the Germans were ready for democracy. Furthermore, the political battle between the isolationist and the internationalist camp in US politics was still ongoing. Beyond public and private opinion, West Germany and the US had conflicting interests: German and American companies were competitors in major markets; and any war between the US and the Soviet Union would have been likely to play out on German soil. Keeping all this in mind, friendly relations between the victorious US and the defeated Germany do not appear predestined.\(^\text{12}\)

General geopolitical explanations for German-American reconciliation are well known: the US needed a strong West Germany in the face of post-war Soviet expansion and consolidation of the Eastern bloc. West Germany sought military protection and security guarantees from the US as well as the restoration of its economic prospects. Post-war history might have to be written quite differently if the Western allies, along with West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, had not dismissed the Stalin notes of March and April 1952 – a proposal for the reunification and neutralisation of Germany as well as for free elections – as bluff.\textsuperscript{13} The Germans’ desire for unification along with a neutral status for the country was as strong as the opposition to the rearmament of West Germany. In March 1950, 52 percent of West Germans were neither in favour of being invited to the Atlantic Treaty nor of belonging to a framework for a European Army. In July 1952, 23 percent saw the issue of reunification as most important and more significant than economic questions. In May 1955, 45 percent were opposed to a West German army. From August 1957 until January 1965, more than 60 percent of West Germans ranked the wish for unification as the top priority of the country’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{14}

This thesis examines the role and relevance of private elites in addition to public actors and their contributions to enable fledgling public-private networks within each country and across the Atlantic. Along with other studies committed to new diplomatic history, this dissertation argues that it is necessary to unveil the anonymous structures of diplomacy within the nation state and beyond.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, it helps to shed light on the ways hostilities between the US and


\textsuperscript{15} The broadest definition of the field or subject in a traditional sense specifies diplomatic history as the study of international relations with a strong focus on power and the state combined with a methodological conservatism and the primacy of political history. The cultural turn in diplomatic history opened the field to cultural studies and the social sciences and is manifested in works focusing on the role of ideas, ideologies, knowledge and cultural goods at large as well as a focus on private actors and transnational entanglements transcending national borders and thus opening up to larger geographical spaces. See among others Akira
West Germany were addressed and how the diverse obstacles to German-American reconciliation have been tackled. Considering the activities and achievements of organizations like the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke hence contributes to a fuller understanding of how and why West Germany recovered so swiftly, economically and politically, and how and why Americans came to see West Germany as a friendly nation again rather than a barbarian enemy.

A closer look at the group of people who helped steer the decisive shift on the American side helps to solve the puzzle. This group consisted of staunch anti-communist political realists, mainly comprised of internationalist-minded members of the US East Coast establishment. This included New York lawyers and bankers, who, by using the revolving door, held high state or military posts exerted much influence on US foreign policy, especially with regard to Germany. Therefore, US policies aimed at Germany came to reflect the specific ideological and economic interests of these circles. A number of these men were to play a significant role in the story of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. Among them were John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner to Germany (1949-1952); Shepard Stone, director of the Ford Foundation’s international programme (1954-1968); Lucius D. Clay, Military Governor of the US Occupation Zone in Germany (1947-49); and Eric M. Warburg and Christopher Emmet, co-founders of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke.


In Chapter 1 Christopher Emmet and Eric M. Warburg are introduced as two of the four original founders of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. John J. McCloy and Lucius D. Clay were members of the ACG both holding official positions in the organisation and thus are introduced in Chapter 2. Shepard Stone’s relationship to the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG as well as personal relationships to a number of the original founders is attended to in Chapter 3.
The role of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG in the quest for Atlanticism

This thesis focuses on the early years of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, tracing their history up to 1974. Both bodies were founded in 1952. Christopher Emmet, one of the four core founding members of both organisations, died in 1974. This marked the end of an era in more than one respect. Emmet’s death coincided with an overhaul in terms of the leadership and membership of the West German and the American groups, reflecting their attempt to rejuvenate the transatlantic elite network. Only one year prior to Emmet’s death, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke had introduced their Young Leaders’ programme. The latter sought to ensure that the younger generation would help to maintain the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, the year 1974 not only marked the start of a new era in the history of both organisations; it was also characterised by major political changes in both countries. In terms of domestic politics, it was marked by the resignations of both Willy Brandt and Richard Nixon. And, at a more general level, the mid-1970s constitute the end of the “Golden Age”, the crisis of industrial society and the breakdown of consensus liberalism of the Cold War period. The sum of these developments means that 1974 is a fitting end point for the timeframe of this thesis.

The analysis of the intertwined history of the two bodies starts from the assumption that elites shape international politics and bilateral relations. These elites, however, are not only composed of democratically legitimized politicians and diplomats. Private actors representing business, industry, media, and academia are also involved in this process, albeit hidden from public scrutiny. They are able to do so because they are integral parts of dense state-private networks. Inderjeet Parmar deserves credit for shaping our understanding of state-private networks and their conceptual underpinnings. 18 According to this concept, actors of both the public and private realm interact in a cooperative and “state-spirited” mode, personally

identifying with the problems of the state. In using the concept of “state spirit”, I follow Inderjeet Parmar, who defines the latter as a central aspect of private elites’ motivation as they “take personally the concerns” of the nation-state. In his defining of the term, Parmar refers to two texts in Antonio Gramsci’s *Prisonbooks*, “The Different Position of Urban and Rural-Type Intellectuals” and “Elements of Politics”. As Parmar points out, “state spirit” allows leaders to “subordinate narrow economic and political interests to the broader, long-term interests of the state/nation as a whole. According to Gramsci, such leaders may even come to believe “that they are the State”.

By studying the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, this thesis makes an original contribution to the study of state-private networks as it transfers the study of the latter the transnational level. The “network” term is important in this context: it emphasises the fact that those connections are neither limited in quantitative terms nor are they confined to national boundaries. On the contrary, networks are highly flexible structures that easily transcend national boundaries and allow for multidirectional transfers and exchanges of resources, ideas and values.

In this thesis, the founders and officers of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG are shown as key agents in initiating and facilitating state-private networks. At the same time, this study seeks to illustrate to what ends founders and officers have used these networks. It argues that the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG were essential actors in the process of developing and maintaining an unlikely partnership between the US and West Germany. Key in achieving this aim was to convince both West German and American elites to embrace liberal internationalism – “the other great postwar ideology”, which was the antagonist of


Communism.\textsuperscript{21} Concepts and theories of liberalism are highly controversial and contested, not least the transferral of liberalism into the international sphere.\textsuperscript{22} Liberal internationalism was a political project that aimed to establish individual freedom through private property internationally following the American model. Realising this project, however, required a willingness and ability to protect and extend this freedom through government by consent, hence consensus liberalism. Yet, in doing so, liberal internationalism produced and reproduced unequal power relations. According to Beate Jahn, this political project ultimately provided a justification for American hegemony.\textsuperscript{23}

**Historiography**

Historical assessment of the intertwined histories of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke is overdue. A number of scholars have pointed to the relevance of both organisations, most prominently the contributors to Detlef Junker’s handbook *The United States and Germany in the era of the Cold War, 1945-1990*.\textsuperscript{24} These cite the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke as examples of private organisations taking over tasks from US government agencies in the 1950s, particularly programmes, implemented during the first post-war decade focusing on the de-nazification, re-education, and democratisation of the German people. In the process of rebuilding Western Europe and Germany, US government institutions played a major role at least in the first decade after the end of World War II. This explains the longevity of historians’ concentration on the governmental level of relations and hitherto neglect of private actors.\textsuperscript{25} A number of historians, however, suggest studying precisely and comprehensively

\textsuperscript{22} Beate Jahn’s work demonstrates that impressively see *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
\textsuperscript{25} Examples for the focus on institutions and official diplomacy in the historiography of post-1945 German-American relations: Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign*
organisations such as the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, emphasising the relevance of informal contacts in international relations. These scholars stress the role of private groups in enhancing West-German-American relations by bringing together elites from both countries and thus promoting dialogue and a better mutual understanding of both societies. According to Konrad Jarausch, the Atlantik-Brücke’s assumed task was to reduce the “still widely held reservations toward the Federal Republic” in the United States and to cultivate “sympathy for the ‘American way of life’ in Germany”. However, aside from two in-house histories, both published on the occasion of their fiftieth anniversary in 2002, a comprehensive scholarly study on the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke is still missing.

While this doctoral dissertation seeks to fill a scholarly gap with regard to these two organisations, it is very much inspired by Kees van der Pijl’s work on the formation processes of the transatlantic bourgeoisie in the 20th century. The thesis can draw on scholarship analysing elite groups and networks active in a transnational sphere. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, historians became increasingly interested in the cultural dimensions of the Cold War confrontation and hence probed deeper into private and informal connections transcending national borders. The well-studied Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a

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transnational elite network of anti-Stalinist left intellectuals and artists in Western Europe, features overlaps in personnel with the network of the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke; among them, for example, Christopher Emmet, Marion Dönhoff, and Shepard Stone.\textsuperscript{31} The CCF attracted particular controversy when it was revealed, in the late 1960s, that it had received covert CIA funding. Shepard Stone, the networker par-excellence, is at the centre of Volker Berghahn’s path-breaking book on the sociology of West German-American post-war relations.\textsuperscript{32} Stone also played an influential role in the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s history as director of the international programme of the Ford Foundation, the main external source of funding in the US.\textsuperscript{33}

While Berghahn used the biography of an individual to analyse transatlantic entanglements in the cultural realm of the Cold War, other scholars have helped to narrow the research gap with regard to crucial transatlantic elite networks and institutions. Valerie Aubourg’s research contributes to making visible the manifold interconnections between different elite coordinating efforts such as the Bilderberg conferences and the Atlantic Institute in Paris.\textsuperscript{34} Aubourg attends to the transnational character by pointing to a number of individual West Germans integrated in these West European-American networks; she neglects, however, the role of the Atlantik-Brücke, and the ACG in furthering the Atlantic


\textsuperscript{33} On his personal relationships to the founders of the ACG and the AB, see Chapter 1. On the more institutional relationship between the Ford Foundation which Stone served for many years as director of the international programme, see Chapter 3. On his role in the German-American conferences, see Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{34} Valerie Aubourg, “Organizing Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute, 1952-1963”, \textit{Intelligence and National Security} vol. 18, no. 2 (2003): 92-105. For a first in-depth account of the history and role of the Bilderberg group and the conference series of the same name in forming a transatlantic consensus see Thomas Gijswijt, “Uniting the West. The Bilderberg Group, the Cold War and European Integration, 1952-1966” (PhD, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, 2007).
Community project. The Bilderberg conferences organised by group of the same from 1954 onwards, served as models for the German-American conferences established by the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke in 1959.

Another highly influential template for the conference scheme initiated by the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG were the annual English-German Königswinter Conferences. Christian Haase’s extensive work on British-German relations sheds light on this initiative. His research is tremendously helpful for research on West-German-American elite networks as Haase depicts the conference scheme as a catalyst for the reestablishment of a transnational civil society network. Furthermore, his work helps to prove the more comprehensive character of these informal elite contexts as members and officers of the Atlantik-Brücke belonged to the core of the Königswinter network. While all of the aforementioned elite networks may be subsumed under the label “liberal internationalist” or “consensus liberal” in the political spectrum, others have expanded the transnational approach to neoliberal elite networks, namely the Mont Pèlerin Society. Johannes Großmann deserves credit for eventually illuminating transnational conservative elite networks partly overlapping with the neoliberal ones.

37 See in particular chapter 5 in this thesis.
Primary sources and methodology

Research on the history of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke poses challenges with regard to primary source material. Both groups’ officers claim that no archives exist of the two organisations. Therefore a number of different archives have been visited to obtain necessary primary source material. Abridged versions of minutes of the Atlantik-Brücke were available at the official registry of associations in Berlin. In addition, the thesis utilizes official documents of the German Foreign Office and Federal Press Office and the Chancellery, of the US Department of State and of the Ford Foundation. However, given the absence of official institutional archives for the ACG or the Atlantik-Brücke, the thesis particularly draws upon the personal papers of founders and members. Compared to well-maintained organisational archives, working with personal papers raises issues of its own. At the same time, the use of personal papers is particularly important as this thesis stresses the significance of private contacts that sustained (and were sustained) by the involvement in these organisations. Certainly, none of the personal papers offer a comprehensive record of the Atlantik-Brücke or the AGC. However, in several instances, they did contain detailed minutes of membership and board meetings. The papers of Marcia Kahn, Carl Joachim Friedrich, and Eric Warburg proved particularly rewarding in this context.

I have complemented my use of archival material by conducting interviews with a number of eyewitnesses. The meeting with Sara Ann Fagin, former secretary of Christopher Emmet, proved particularly instructive. She provided invaluable insight into Emmet’s personality and his family background. Given the significant time that has lapsed since the

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40 German Foreign Office, Federal Press and Information Agency, Federal Chancellery; for a complete list of all archives and papers consulted see appendix.
41 Personal papers of: Eric M. Warburg, Ernst Friedlaender, Kurt Birrenbach, Marcia Kahn, Christopher Emmet, George N. Shuster, John J. McCloy, Carl J. Friedrich, Heinz Krekeler, Shepard Stone and Marion Dönhoff. However, the personal papers of the longtime executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke, Walter Stahl, could not be tracked down.
42 Interview with Sara Ann Fagin, who served Christopher Emmet and the ACG as secretary from 1963 to 1979, conducted in New York Jun.6, 2012.
developments covered in this thesis, I have been careful not to rely solely on oral testimony when seeking to verify specific facts. In this respect, most interviewees primarily helped me to consider the wider context of the activities covered in this thesis.

While the overall methodological focus is on historical source analysis, the thesis also employs prosopographical approaches. Chapter One provides biographical sketches of the four core founders of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. These individuals bore characteristics that applied to the larger group of members in both bodies. The latter point is demonstrated by the subsequent chapter, which features substantial material on the profile and background of the two organisations’ membership. By studying collective biographies – using auto- and biographies of the major players – it has been possible to gain insights about relationships and activities within the larger historical group.

As has been noted earlier on, the term “network” features prominently in this study. Conceiving of the relationships between individuals, organisations, and institutions as a network structure helps to further move away from a state and nation-centred approach to diplomatic history by overcoming the simple dichotomy between the public and the private sector. If nodes in a network illustrate people in different functions, both public and private, and edges depict relations between them, the term describes social structures. In Chapter Five, the thesis therefore uses the methods of Social Network Analysis (SNA) to complement its historical and biographical approaches. In that chapter, SNA tools serve to visualise the transatlantic network by drawing on the key activities of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke – the German-American conferences from 1959 to 1974. Visualisation helps to reveal hidden patterns and structures: “Who attended the conferences with whom and how many times?”

More specifically, these tools serve to verify the central location of the founders in the

developing elite network and help to underscore functions of central figures in the network. In this respect, the analysis of the core group and membership in the first two chapters provide the framework for the application of SNA in Chapter Five.

**Outline of thesis**

“The Quest for Atlanticism” begins by exploring the history of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG on the micro level. Chapter One, “Unlikely Friends: the founders of an unfolding transatlantic elite network”, introduces the four founding figures: two Germans, Marion Dönhoff and Erik Blumenfeld; one American citizen, Christopher Emmet; and the Jewish German-American, Eric Warburg. The chapter traces the stories of their lives to the beginning of the twentieth century. Their biographies offer four perspectives of the first half of the 20th century: one of a German Jew émigré returning, one of a Germanophile American, one of an East-Prussian aristocratic woman, and one of a Hamburg merchant with Jewish roots. Their depiction is driven by the question why so shortly after the end of World War II, these four personalities came together to found the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke as vehicles to foster amicable relations between the US and Germany. While their differences are stressed, the chapter examines their common elite character. It argues that they formed the nucleus of the transatlantic elite network that survived a tumultuous half-century continuing to grow to this very day.

Chapter Two, “The ‘good’ Germans and their American friends”, moves on to the organisational level and investigates the founding of the Atlantik-Brücke in Hamburg and the ACG in New York in the early 1950s. The focus is on the membership profile of both organisations; hence, it questions whether the members in the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke constituted the “power elite” of West German-American relations. Furthermore, the chapter seeks to draw conclusions about the specific function of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG in
their respective home countries, but also their contribution to West-German-American relations.

Chapter Three, “Mastering a tainted past: The funders of German-American public diplomacy efforts”, illustrates the multifaceted links to public agencies, private institutions, and corporate money that funded the activities of the two groups. It argues that the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were drivers of a transatlantically coordinated public diplomacy effort seeking to improve both countries’ images.

Chapter Four, “Off the record: the informal diplomacy of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke” showcases the state-private network in action. It follows the officers of the two groups behind the scenes of West German-American relations illuminating their private diplomacy activities. It illustrates, for example, how the groups’ contributed to Social Democrats changing their mind with regard to neutrality and instead welcoming rearmament of West Germany in the 1950s. Furthermore, the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s role in implementing the preamble to the German-French friendship treaty of 1963 is illuminated.

Chapter Five, “Promoting transatlantic identity formation: the German-American conferences, 1959-1974 – a public-private project” is dedicated to the groups’ key activity. By studying this series of transatlantic elite meetings, the central role and function of such private endeavours in the realm of international politics is carved out. Hence, the chapter explores the complex selection process of the delegates, the resulting transatlantic elite network featuring diplomats, parliamentarians, business-people, media representatives and scholars from the US and West Germany as well as the cultural setting and the debates taking place at these informal meetings. The chapter demonstrates how this conference scheme has contributed to the socialisation of West German elites in the spirit of the Atlantic Community under US-American leadership over approximately 25 years.
As a whole, this thesis studies for the first time the entangled history of two transatlantic elite organisations, namely the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. It thus contributes to scholarship on German-American post-war relations and transnational elite research.
Chapter 1:

Unlikely friends: the founders of an unfolding transatlantic elite network

Four unique people – Eric M. Warburg, Christopher Emmet, Marion Dönhoff, and Erik Blumenfeld – are the focus of this chapter. They formed the nucleus of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. They differed in important ways yet they all were born into a social milieu entrenched with the spirit and values of the “(western) civilization of the 19th century” – a civilization that Eric Hobsbawm associated with a capitalist economic system, with liberalism regarding “its legal and constitutional structure”; with the bourgeoisie as the “characteristic hegemonic class”; with “glorying in the advance of science, knowledge and education, material and moral progress”; and the conviction “of the centrality of Europe...”. Maybe even more importantly, this was a civilization that broke down in 1914. The societies of Europe, in particular, then entered the “Age of Catastrophe” reaching well into the aftermath of World War II.¹

Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld witnessed, to different degrees, and first-hand, the unfolding catastrophes of the first half of the 20th century and the restructuring of the world after 1945. Yet they did so from considerably different perspectives. They were, at least partly, citizens of the opposing warring countries of World War II – Germany and the United States. However, against all odds, not least the fact that one of them was Jewish, a group that undoubtedly had suffered most under Nazi rule, by as early as 1949 these four began to make plans for the founding of the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany – two central pillars of the German-American relationship during the second half of the twentieth century. In doing so, they carried at least a hint of the spirit and values of the lost western civilisation of the 19th century into the second half of the 20th century.

The biographies of the founders serve as point of departure for the larger story to be told here. Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld lend their faces to the history of the two organisations against the background of the post-war relationship of West Germany and the United States of America. These four have been identified as the nucleus of the unfolding transnational elite network transcending the artificial boundaries of the public and the private. Following their life paths, thus, illustrates the idiom “the private is political and the political is private” with regard to a transatlantic elite milieu.

The biographical approach chosen for this chapter is also based on the premise that the personal networks and professional connections, which in turn derive from the individual’s elite position, provided the basis for establishing the two private organisations in question. The founders’ position in Germany and the United States and their numerous connections across the Atlantic allowed the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke to firstly, attract an elite membership, and, secondly, for their activities to transcend national borders crossing the Atlantic.

Hence, this chapter pursues goals on two levels; the first being the individual biographical one and the second a more analytical conceptual one. On the biographical level, the chapter addresses questions regarding the founders’ social and familial backgrounds. Here it is of particular interest to highlight parallels and commonalities. Striking, for example, are the shared strong anti-communist sentiments amongst the four founders. Moreover, all four have ties to Hamburg or New York, in the case of Warburg even to both, Hamburg and New York. These two cities have a lot in common. By being harbour cities of global importance they also stand for a cosmopolitan and internationalist minded bourgeoisie. Ultimately, the goal is to answer the question about their motivation to embark on a long-term project to promote

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transatlantic unity. What nurtured their “state spirit”, their feeling of being called upon to serve the rapprochement of Germans and Americans after World War II? Furthermore, by looking at the biographies of Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff and Blumenfeld special attention is paid to their personal networks pinpointing central nodes relevant for the later evolution of the ACG, the Atlantik-Brücke and their joint transatlantic network in formation. The goal pursued on the conceptual level is to trace the elite character of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG back to their founders. Therefore, the chapter aims at carving out how the different functions of each founder representing a distinct elite segment complemented each other especially with regard to the evolving organisations and their connected networks.

The elite concept

According to Vilfredo Pareto, members of elites generally occupy leading positions in a given society and are clearly in a minority vis-à-vis the masses. Each of the four founders belonged to one functional segment of society – political, economic, scholarly-intellectual, media – or even more than one simultaneously. C. Wright Mills, however, qualifies this distinction by stressing that neither functional areas nor the respective elites can be set apart from one another in a clear cut way. Rather, he points to a concentration of influences on elites through frequent interaction between them. Organising frequent interaction and exchange between different elites was central to the activities of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke during the period in question here. However, segmentation represents only one focus of scholarly inquiry into the nature of elites. Another is the social composition of elites.

Different schools of elite theory see different principles at work in selecting or recruiting elites. The mainstream functional elite school argues that selection processes are driven by a merits system. Others see the social background as having the greatest influence on whether

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3 For definition of term, see Introduction pp. 22, 23.
someone can access elite positions or not.\textsuperscript{6} When looking at German elites, Michael Hartmann notes that they are disproportionately recruited from among the bourgeoisie. Further, he explains the latter’s disproportionate representation with different patterns of participation in education depending on which social strata one is looking at; with the upper and middle classes having privileged access to higher education.\textsuperscript{7} Hartmann’s contentions can be sustained with regard to the four personalities studied here.

When examining the Americans, however, another concept comes to the fore. It is broadly agreed that “the foreign policy establishment” of the United States is a twentieth-century phenomenon. The term describes a body of individuals committed to “internationalist” policies, a body that was most decisive in driving out isolationism within the first four decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{8} The establishment was comprised almost exclusively of men from leading financial and business institutions, law firms, Ivy League universities, major philanthropic foundations, and communications media of the East coast. These men shared a particular interest in, and substantial impact upon, the direction American foreign policy affairs took from at least the 1920s until the mid-1970s. Furthermore, most scholars of the US establishment agree that the members and staff of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) embody the purest form of the establishment.\textsuperscript{9} The CFR was founded in the aftermath of World War I by “a group of wealthy and influential Americans ... designed to equip the United States of America for an imperial role on the world scene.”\textsuperscript{10} The CFR contributed to this grand aim by bringing together people representing the official sphere, politicians and diplomats with representatives of the private sphere, businessmen and academics. In study

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{8} Priscilla Roberts, “‘All the Right People’: The Historiography of the American Foreign Policy Establishment”, \textit{Journal of American Studies} vol. 26, no. 3 (1992): 409-34.
groups members of the CFR analysed the role of the United States in the world and the nature of its relations with foreign countries. Results of the different study group projects were made available to the public and government agencies with the ultimate goal of influencing the foreign policy making.\textsuperscript{11} Given this task and in particular given the special composition of CFR membership, it is hardly surprising to find numerous connections between founders of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke to the CFR.

**A transatlantic commuter: Eric Moritz Warburg, 1900–1990**

“Eric Warburg personifies the bridge over the Atlantic.”\textsuperscript{12} This is how Richard von Weizsäcker, former federal president of Germany (1984-1994), praised Warburg at the occasion of the first Eric M. Warburg award ceremony in 1988.\textsuperscript{13} For the enterprise that Warburg embarked on together with Emmet, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld he resumed the role of a cultural mediator and conciliator being both German and American as well as being Jewish. An additional role, equally if not at times more important than the former, was the one as successful fundraiser on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Formally, however, Eric M. Warburg only served the ACG as treasurer for several decades.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11} See Parmar, “The Issue of State Power”, 79.
\textsuperscript{12} Atlantik-Brücke e. V., “Eric M. Warburg: A Bridge over the Atlantic” (Dumont, 2009), 7.
\textsuperscript{13} The Atlantik-Brücke established this prize to honour individuals for their commitment to German-American relations. Eric Warburg was its namesake as well as its first recipient. Other recipients include Henry A. Kissinger, Helmut Kohl, George H. W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and Angela Merkel.
\textsuperscript{14} Warburg served as treasurer from 1952-1976 and afterwards for another two years as vice-chairman of the ACG.
The Warburg dynasty

Eric Warburg was a German-born Jew; a descendant of an old Jewish banking dynasty originating in the German town of Warburg located in eastern North Rhine-Westphalia. Born in April 1900 in Hamburg, Warburg was the first son of his parents Max and Alice Warburg, to be followed by four sisters. He was born in the middle of the Wilhelmine era, when Germany was still a monarchy. Warburg grew up witnessing the astounding success of his father, Max Warburg, and the family’s long-established bank, M. M. Warburg & Co..

Besides being a successful banker, Max Warburg was also politically active as member of the Hamburger Bürgerschaft (the city’s parliament). The Warburgs counted among their business partners and friends illustrious figures such as Albert Ballin, father of modern cruise ship travel and general director of the famous Hamburg-America Line, and Prince von Bülow, former Reich Chancellor of the German empire. Moreover, Max Warburg advised the German emperor, Wilhelm II. This earned him the label “Kaiser-Jude [Kaiser Jew]” ascribed by Chaim Weizmann, Zionist leader and Israeli politician, “more German than the Germans, obsequious, superpatriotic, eagerly anticipating the wishes and plans of the masters of Germany”.

The Warburgs’ continuing ascendance prior to the Nazi era was also reflected in the steadily rising number of corporate board seats that Max Warburg held until the 1930s. By the mid-1920s, he served on 27 boards, at Blohm & Voss, Germany’s biggest shipyard at the time and I.G. Farben, a German chemical industry conglomerate, for example. Most beneficial, however, was Max Warburg’s membership of the general council of the German Reichsbank. At least during the early years of the Nazi era, this position provided some protection to the

17 Ibid., 275.
Warburg bank. While Warburg was forced to forfeit those seats after the Nazi seizure of power, they were nevertheless an expression of M.M. Warburg & Co.’s excellent standing in business and industry. This provided a foundation for his son Eric’s successful reestablishment of business networks after World War II.

Furthermore, Max Warburg also devoted time and money to fostering international understanding. In an attempt to smooth Anglo-German relations in the period leading up to World War I, Max Warburg together with Albert Ballin had founded the “King Edward VII Anglo-German Foundation”. After the war, in 1922, Max initiated the establishment of the Hamburg Übersee Club. Modelled after English Gentlemen’s Clubs, the Übersee Club served as a meeting place for business and scientific communities in support of the recovery of the German economy. As is shown later, Eric Warburg would not only follow into his father’s footsteps with regard to the banking business but also with regard to enhancing international relations in an unofficial manner.

Furthermore, the Warburg family had established a significant branch of the family in the US around the turn of the century, through the marriages of two of Eric’s uncles, Paul and Felix Warburg. Both married into the Wall Street banking house Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the second biggest private investment bank in the United States prior to World War I. Kuhn, Loeb had earned this status by financing America’s expanding railway and other companies in fast growing industries. Eventually, Paul and Felix Warburg joined as partners in the Wall Street bank. Yet, the Warburg brothers’ ascendance into the highest echelons of the New York establishment was not only illustrated by professional success. Social advancement and

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21 ibid., 33. On Jacob Schiff’s role and standing in American society and business and in New York in particular, see Naomi Wiener Cohen, Jacob H. Schiff: A Study in American Jewish Leadership, Brandeis Series in American Jewish History, Culture, and Life (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 1999).
growing acceptance of the Warburgs within influential circles was manifested, for example, in
the membership in the CFR and seats in numerous supervisory boards of universities and
museums and by the numerous ties of the Warburgs to the Roosevelts. By the late 19th and
early 20th century the name Warburg became associated with international banking having
established important branches in Hamburg and in New York. Thus, the Warburgs were
surely members of the haute bourgeoisie and a transatlantic cosmopolitan elite.

New York apprenticeship in the 1920s

Since Eric Warburg was the only son, his career was predestined. He had to take over the
family’s bank, eventually. Yet before he entered the banking business, Warburg volunteered
for military service in 1918. After the war, he apprenticed with banks in Frankfurt and Berlin
and subsequently with N.M. Rothschild & Son in the City of London and with his uncle Paul
Kohn-Speyer’s company Brandeis, Goldschmidt & Co, the largest non-ferrous metals dealer
in England. His training as an international banker then got its finishing touches when he
spent three years, from 1923 to 1926, in the US. For the most part Warburg lived with his
New York relatives, Felix and Frieda Schiff Warburg, in Woodlands near White Plains, NY
and worked at the International Acceptance Bank (IAB). Paul Warburg had established IAB
after his service at the Federal Reserve Board. The bank’s main business was selling
commercial papers to finance reconstruction of European countries after World War I.

Since Eric was close to his cousin Frederick M. Warburg, his uncle Felix Warburg’s oldest
son, Frederick’s circle of friends soon became Eric’s too as he reminisced in Times and Tides:
“among them were the McCloys, the Garrisons, the Parkers, Frank Hatch, George Brownell”,
a crowd of young ambitious Wall Street lawyers and bankers; and this despite the “upper-
class anti-Semitism” that certain milieus of US society were imbued with in the period prior

22 Paul Warburg had even been a co-founder of the CFR and had acted as director in the 1920s and 1930s.
23 Warburg, Times and Tides: A Log-Book, 56-74. See also David Farrer, The Warburgs: The Story of a Family
(accessed May 31, 2016).
to World War II.\textsuperscript{24} While working on Wall Street, Eric Warburg also did business with Sullivan & Cromwell, which was, according to Warburg “one of the most prestigious international law firms in New York”. At the time, both Dulles brothers, Allen – later head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – and John Foster – later Secretary of State – worked at Sullivan & Cromwell and “taught [Warburg] a thing or two about the value of the contracts we were about to sign”.\textsuperscript{25}

\textit{Brief return to Germany, a country in upheaval}

Upon his return from the US, Warburg was reintegrated into the Warburg Bank in Hamburg. Ultimately, in 1929, he was made a partner in his family’s banking firm – not for a long time though. For, political developments in the Weimar Republic made conducting business increasingly difficult. With the Nazi rise to power, the Warburg’s success story came to a dramatic halt as the number of clients decreased considerably from 5,241 in 1930 to 1,875 by the end of 1933.\textsuperscript{26} The process of organised “de-Jewing” of German society had already set in during the early months of 1933. Jewish personalities such as Max Warburg, who held particularly exposed positions, were ousted from supervisory boards as early as 1933.\textsuperscript{27} Step by step the imposition of anti-Jewish measures took effect. The Nazi regime excluded Jews from the cultural sphere, from educational institutions, from bureaucracy and the state apparatus, as well as from businesses. Eventually they were deprived of their citizenship rights. In early 1938 the concerted economic expropriation of Jewish businesses began and thus like thousands of other Jewish-owned businesses, the Warburg bank fell prey to


\textsuperscript{25} Warburg, \textit{Times and Tides}, 80. Sullivan & Cromwell continued with American-German business deals also after Hitler’s ascent to power. In 1947, Jewish organisations (United Jewish Appeal, UJA) demanded that John Foster Dulles was barred from the delegation to the four-power foreign minister conference. Furthermore, it was demanded that US American citizens and those of other nations with economic and financial interests in Germany should be barred from all positions in the military government. Shlomo Shafir, \textit{Ambiguous Relations: The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945} (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999), 67.


\textsuperscript{27} Saul Friedländer, \textit{Das Dritte Reich und die Juden. Die Jahre der Verfolgung 1933-1939} (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000), 38.
“Aryanisation”. After the November pogrom of the same year, “the legalised robbery” of all Jewish property escalated even further.\(^{28}\) The Warburg family, however, was still well-connected enough to be able to determine who would take over the bank. Hence, a group of limited partners, friendly shareholders, among them Siemens, the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft and the Gutehoffnungshütte took over M.M. Warburg & Co. In 1938, Max Warburg officially handed the bank over to the new management. For years to come the bank would operate under the name Brinckmann, Wirtz & Co.\(^{29}\)

*Starting anew in the US*

When life in Germany became unbearable for the Warburgs, they departed for the United States. All the measures taken by the Nazi leadership before January 1939 had crushed any hope of Jewish life in Germany.\(^{30}\) Until the final prohibition of emigration in 1941, roughly 250,000 Jews managed to leave Germany, that is about half of the Jewish population that lived in Germany in 1933. During the first emigration wave, most people had left for neighbouring European countries and Palestine. Later, the United States was the preferred destination.\(^{31}\) In 1938 there were 300,000 German citizens waiting to immigrate to the US. The entry quota, however, was as low as 27,000 per annum. Fortunately, Eric already held the status of permanent resident which allowed him to quickly become naturalized. As an American citizen he could then in turn obtain permission for his parents, Max and Alice Warburg, to stay as well.\(^{32}\)

The Warburg’s wealth and existing family ties to the United States allowed for a relatively smooth transition compared to the experience of many other exiles. Unlike many émigrés,

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\(^{29}\) Further limited partners were: Bank für deutsche Industrie-Obligationen (Bafio), the shipping company Laeisz, Hamburg, Lederwerke AG, Berlin, the firm Theodor Wille, Hamburg, and a number of individuals: consul August Dubbers, Bremen, Hermann August Meywald, Maracaibo, Franz Schütte, Bremen; On further details relating to the acquisition of the Warburg bank, see Klessmann, *M.M. Warburg & Co.: Die Geschichte eines Bankhauses*; Warburg, *Times and Tides: A Log-Book*, 109-10.


Eric Warburg felt very much at home in the United States. Even before his actual departure from Nazi Germany, Warburg had chosen the US as his preferred country of resettlement. He later said that since he “had spent three of the happiest years of my youth there” that he “would probably feel far more at home there than in, say, England, Holland or Sweden.”

Thus, socially well-connected in New York and accustomed to American ways, Warburg quickly established a new life. He started his own banking business, E. M. Warburg & Co. Among its clients “were the fortunate few who had managed to take some capital out of Europe, especially Germany”. Besides conducting business, Warburg joined several assistance committees trying “to help refugees stranded in New York to find homes and some sort of work else-where in the country”.

Warburg’s military service was the ultimate proof of his loyalty to his new home country. At the age of 42, he enlisted with the U.S. Army Air Force to fight his native country. Like many other German-Jewish émigrés, Warburg was assigned to intelligence work. As an international banker Eric Warburg possessed the necessary language skills, intimate knowledge of foreign countries, and the ability to think strategically and exercise discretion. Hence, Warburg became chief interrogator and liaison officer between American and British military intelligence. According to Ron Chernow, Eric Warburg’s wartime service secured him “entrée in both Washington and Whitehall, where he collected powerful friends who would help to advance his post-war career.”

33 ibid., 100-01.
34 ibid., 131.
35 ibid., 139. Warburg, as chairman of the National Committee for the Resettlement of Foreign Physicians (part of the National Refugees Service, NRS), for example, assisted several hundred German and Austrian doctors to settle in the US. In 1941, he deposited money with the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee’s Transmigration Bureau to have three people immigrate to the United States. See http://names.jdc.org/search-results.php?q=Eric+Warburg (Jan. 8, 2014).
37 Chernow, The Warburgs, 520.
38 Farrer, The Warburgs, 188-89.
A transatlantic commuter’s life

Warburg successfully reactivated and expanded his pre-war and wartime networks after the end of World War II. However, Warburg did not intend to join the US military government and refused to officially participate in the Nuremberg trials beginning in November 1945. Instead, he resigned from active duty and returned to New York.40

In the immediate post-war years, Warburg’s priority was to revive his New York firm, E. M. Warburg & Co. Although he had re-established contact with the family’s old banking firm in Hamburg, it took several years to create the basis for limited participation of the Warburgs in the bank. Nonetheless, E. M. Warburg & Co. became the New York representative of Brinckmann, Wirtz. The latter, was the first West German bank, able to re-establish a business connection with the United States. As a result, Volkswagen became the bank’s most important client by the late 1940s.41 Besides Volkswagen, Warburg also assisted, among others, Ferrostaal Overseas Corporation, belonging to the Gutehoffnungshütte to get a foothold on the American market.42

Although Eric Warburg returned to his civilian live as a banker, he remained loyal to the Air Force Intelligence community. Throughout the 1950s, Warburg, as a reserve officer, gave lectures training future CIA interrogators. And since he was very much interested in international relations, particularly in German-American relations, he joined the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) - proving his credentials among the New York establishment as the CFR expanded membership by-invitation-only. At a CFR meeting in the late 1940s, Warburg met Christopher Emmet, with whom he shared an almost romantic nostalgia for Germany.43

“... [W]e both considered the hard course vis-à-vis Germany after 1945 and later on the so

41 Volkswagen was in urgent need of Pennsylvania coal to operate. Chernow, *The Warburgs*, 571.
42 The *Gutehoffnungshütte* for many years had been led by the Reusch family, long-time friends of the Warburgs. See Reinhard Neebe, “German Big Business and the Return to the World Market after World War II” in *Quest for Economic Empire: European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Volker R. Berghahn (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996), 114.
called ‘Morgenthau Plan’... We telephoned with one another on these matters for weeks before actually meeting, and then we became the closest of friends”, wrote Warburg in his condolence card to Emmet’s brother in February 1974.44

In 1946, Warburg married Dorothea Thorsch, daughter of a prominent Viennese banking family. In quick succession, the couple then had three children. For the time being they lived on the Warburgs’ estate in Woodlands, New York where Eric had already spent much time during his apprentice years.45 In 1949, however, Warburg finally achieved limited participation in Brinckmann, Wirtz & Co. Hence, he had good reason to travel on a regular basis to West Germany and Hamburg, thus becoming a transatlantic commuter.46

From 1952 onwards, Eric and Dorothea would spend the summers together with the children on Kösterberg, the family’s old estate on the banks of the river Elbe just outside Hamburg. It was also during the 1950s, when Marion Dönhoff, with whom Warburg maintained a “lifelong friendship”, lived in a guesthouse on the Warburg estate.47 When a few years later, Warburg again became personally liable partner in Brinckmann, Wirtz & Co. he moved the entire family to Hamburg for good and the children attended German schools. Though surely not an easy decision to make, Warburg could do so as he perceived of the Nazi regime and the atrocities committed as an aberration in German history.48 Beyond emotional attachment to Hamburg and legitimate business interests that motivated Warburg’s move, the encouragement of John J. McCloy’s, US High Commissioner at the time and Warburg’s friend since the 1920s, was an important factor.49 McCloy perceived Warburg as an important

44 Letter from Eric M. Warburg to Thomas A. Emmet, Feb. 13, 1974, Marcia Kahn papers (ED 364), IfZ.
46 Warburg, Times and Tides, 224. Farrer, The Warburgs, 188.
49 See the section on Eric Warburg’s apprenticeship in New York City, 1923-1926, in this chapter. In Times and Tides Warburg refers to his “old friend John McCloy”. Warburg, Times and Tides, 256.
figure in bringing about German-American rapprochement and, to a certain degree, reconciliation between the Jewish community and Germany.\textsuperscript{50}

Yet, the return of a prominent emigrant German-Jewish family from either the United Kingdom or the United States to post-war Germany was an exceptional case. Of all those who had managed to emigrate before the deportations began, less than two percent returned to Germany after the war.\textsuperscript{51} Shortly after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the High Commission of Occupied Germany (HICOG) concluded that anti-Semitism “as a social problem was of minor significance”. At the same time, authors of the survey had to acknowledge that anti-Semitism pervaded German life particularly in the middle and upper classes. After the Shoah, Jews all over the world, and in particular those living in Israel, boycotted all things German. Jews returning to Germany after 1945 felt the consequences thereof.\textsuperscript{52} After World War II, it was inconceivable to revive any meaningful Jewish communal life in Europe. Jewish communities in countries across Europe previously occupied by the Nazis suffered more than 80 percent losses; in Germany an astounding 81 percent of the former Jewish population was gone either through emigration or extinction.\textsuperscript{53}

“Well, we don’t descend from Herman the Cherusker”, Eric Warburg used to say when his Jewishness came up.\textsuperscript{54} Consistent with this kind of attitude, Warburg explicitly wished to be buried on the non-Jewish part of the cemetery in Hamburg. In fact his grave is near the baptized members of the Warburg family, who perished in the Holocaust. Not living an active Jewish religious life, however, did not mean that Warburg shied away from commitments to the Jewish community. He helped to establish the \textit{Israelitische Krankenhaus} (Israelite

\textsuperscript{50} Farrer, \textit{The Warburgs}, 191-92; Chernow, \textit{The Warburgs}, 577.
\textsuperscript{53} Zweig, \textit{German Reparations and the Jewish World: A History of the Claims Conference}, 45, 47, 56.
\textsuperscript{54} Helmut Schmidt, \textit{Weggeführten. Erinnerungen und Reflexionen} (Berlin: Siedler, 1996), 162.
hospital) in Hamburg and served as its chairman. Furthermore, he rendered services as negotiator to the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany (or Jewish Claims Conference, JCC).

A German-born Jew with an American passport reviving West German industry

Eric Warburg’s multiple identities coupled with loyalties to different communities and nations often put him in situations in which he was caught between stools.

In August 1949, Eric had a meeting with his old friend John J. McCloy, who had just started his term as US High Commissioner for Occupied Germany. Warburg was a fierce opponent of the Morgenthau Plan and observed in horror the dismantling of industrial plants and facilities in Germany. Warburg was convinced that a de-industrialized Germany would be extremely vulnerable to a communist take-over. Moreover, he was witness to how resentment against the Allies grew while business and industrial leaders had to watch the destruction of the basis for any kind of economic recovery. Thus, Warburg argued heatedly with McCloy about the Allied dismantling programme, which Warburg wanted to be stopped immediately. He was convinced that “[w]ithout a solid economy the German people … would fall prey to Communism”.

Although they had a difference of opinion on the issue, McCloy eventually gave in and asked Warburg to produce a list of plants to be saved from dismantling. Among the names listed were the steel works of August Thyssen – representatives of which would

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55 For several letters by Eric M. Warburg to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in New York, see American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee Archives, 1945-1954 New York Collection, folder: Germany, Israelitisches Krankenhaus Hamburg, 1948-1949 (http://archives.jdc.org/archives-search/).

56 Warburg was also a member of the executive committee of the International Trust Corporation, founded through the efforts of the Jewish Agency and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee to provide assistance to Jews receiving restitution and indemnification payments in dealing with blocked funds. See The Jewish Telegraphic Agency JTA – the global Jewish news source: http://www.jta.org/1950/10/27/archive/corporation-to-aid-in-utilization-of-jewish-restitution-funds-formed-in-germany (accessed Jan. 8, 2014). Moreover, Warburg joined the American Jewish Committee (AJC) before returning to Germany and served as its media watchdog paying special attention to anti-Semitism. See Chernow, The Warburgs: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of a Remarkable Jewish Family, 76, 593, 94. For more detail on the AJC, see Marianne Rachel Sanua, Let Us Prove Strong: The American Jewish Committee, 1945-2006, (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2007), xii-xiii; Shafir, Ambiguous Relations: The American Jewish Community and Germany since 1945, 94.

57 Warburg, Times and Tides, 232-33.
later become members of the Atlantik-Brücke - and the Krupp synthetic gas works.\textsuperscript{58} Warburg’s conviction that only a revived and strong West German industry would sufficiently equip the country against Communism also prompted him to put in a good word for such highly controversial figures as Alfried Krupp, who was tried at Nuremberg for using slave labour.\textsuperscript{59}

Knowing of Warburg’s extensive networks, the Claims Conference asked him to act as honest broker, when they entered negotiations with German companies to compensate former concentration camp inmates for forced labour. Claims conference officials sought Warburg’s intervention since he was acquainted with a number of the negotiators representing the successor firms to I.G. Farben, Krupp, Siemens and Flick.\textsuperscript{60} Among these representatives was Fabian von Schlabrendorff, whom Warburg had known since the armistice in 1945 and had developed a friendship with. Warburg’s “old friend Allen Dulles”, after the war in charge of the American intelligence service for Germany as head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland and later in occupied Germany, had introduced Warburg to von Schlabrendorff, a survivor of the German resistance plot of 20 July 1944.\textsuperscript{61} In the 1960s then, the two friends found each other on opposite sides of the bargaining table – Warburg representing the Claims Conference and von Schlabrendorff the Dynamite Nobel AG, a

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{60}ibid.
\bibitem{61}Idem, \textit{Less Than Slaves: Jewish Forced Labor and the Quest for Compensation}.
\bibitem{62}Warburg, \textit{Times and Tides}, 176-78. For an overview and appraisal of existing literature on July 20, 1944 resistance, see D. Orbach, “Criticism Reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship”, \textit{Journal of Military History} vol. 75, no. 2 (2011): 565-590. Armed resistance inside the \textit{Wehrmacht}, has been a subject of lively debate. Public and scholarly opinion has been divided over assessment of the “20 July 1944 Conspiracy,” the failed attempt to assassinate Hitler and the abortive coup d'état that followed. Some consider this attempted overthrow as the greatest moral achievement of the German resistance to Hitler, while others regard it mainly as an effort by opportunistic officers to save their own skins when Germany’s defeat was looming on the horizon.
\end{thebibliography}
munitions producer of which Friedrich Flick held 82% of the shares. Irrespective of von Schlabrendorff’s role in these negotiations, Warburg referred to him as “one of the most heroic and courageous resisters against National Socialism”.

Unofficial service to the cause of German-American relations

Christopher Emmet praised Warburg as “a successful business man, a good pater familias, and a constructive philanthropist, both in the sense of giving and organizing the raising of funds.” Emmet, moreover, considered him as “so much more politically intelligent and knowledgeable than most other business men”, acknowledging Warburg’s influence on “important individuals in key positions, like Jack McCloy”. Despite his diplomatic and political talents Warburg never pursued a political post or a career in politics. Yet, he kept close to the influential and powerful. Following Emmet’s advice of cultivating “[Helmut Schmidt’s] acquaintance ... as I think he might be a future social Democratic Chancellor, or he might become Defense Minister in a Social Democratic or coalition cabinet”, Schmidt and Warburg became close friends sailing many times on Warburg’s ship “Atalanta”. Later on, Schmidt not only became board member of the Atlantik-Brücke but Warburg also his unofficial adviser on foreign affairs and German-American relations in particular.

However, Warburg did not single out West German-American relations in his unofficial efforts of fostering bilateral relations of the FRG. Owing to the Warburg family links and Hamburg’s traditional orientation and cultural affinity to England, Warburg also committed...

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62 Stiftung Warburg Archiv.
64 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Eric Warburg, Apr. 2, 1963, SWA.
65 Ibid.
66 See Eric Warburg’s correspondence with Heinz Krekeler in the early 1950s when the latter was chargé d’affaires of the Federal Republic of Germany in the US: Letter from Eric Warburg to Heinz Krekeler, undated, and enclosed reports with comments by Christopher Emmet, Krekeler’s reply, Jun. 26, 1953, Heinz Krekeler Papers, Vol. 110, II Z.
time to Anglo-German reconciliation after World War II by participating in the British-
German Königswinter Conferences. Eric Warburg’s most tangible commitment in this
regard was, however, realised in the founding of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG and his
continuing dedication to them. For, he was not only co-founder of the organisations but also
served as the ACG’s treasurer for many years. Atlantik-Brücke and ACG became the vehicle
for realizing his hope to be able to “take part in building a bridge between the old world and
the new, in particular Germany and the United States, since I had spent so many years on both
sides of the Atlantic.”

Warburg’s extensive contacts in political, business and intelligence circles in the United
States as well as in West Germany (and elsewhere for that matter), coupled with the social
and cultural capital that he accumulated during his youth, enabled him to assume a role as
transatlantic translator and mediator in the post-1945 period. This role in turn was a
prerequisite for the development of a transnational elite network across the Atlantic Ocean
facilitated by the two private organisations, the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. Warburg’s
post-war involvement in transatlantic elite networking was underpinned by his conviction that
reconciliation and cooperation between the US and Germany after the war was of vital
importance for international understanding – the key prerequisite to determinedly counter
Communism. This conviction had been facilitated by his elite upbringing and his intimate
knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon world and the US in particular.

68 Letter from Eric Warburg to Christopher Emmet, March 2, 1962, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 103, HIA.
69 Warburg, Times and Tides, 238.
While Warburg took care of financial issues, Christopher Emmet was “the heart” of the ACG, “the American pillar of a strong connection crossing the Atlantic Ocean”.70 Christopher Emmet, however, considered himself and Eric Warburg to “have basically precisely the same political attitude and point of view. We even have, in different ways, the same personal involvement with America and Germany”, the same lifetime experience and involvement in world crises. They were both concurrently anti-Nazi and anti-Communist for the same basic reasons and at the same time they were “pro-German” even while fighting Nazi Germany. Moreover, Warburg and Emmet had both “inherited a degree of financial security” and family traditions of which “we can be proud”. Yet, neither of them had “personal political ambition” nor held “narrow political ideologies”, according to Emmet.71 Just the same, Emmet acted as the political mind of the joint enterprise – the Atlantik-Brücke and ACG – and as political adviser in the interest of strong West German-American relations.

70 “Er wurde das Herz dieser Organisation…. Den amerikanischen Pfeiler einer festen Verbindung über den atlantischen Ozean gebildet hat.” Kurt Birrenbach, “Christopher Emmet” (obituary), Rheinischer Merkur, March 1, 1974, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
71 Christopher Emmet to Eric Warburg, Apr. 2, 1963, SWA.
The “bourgeoisie” of the United States: Emmet’s family background

Born in March 1900 in Port Chester, New York into a Protestant family, Christopher Emmet established a lifelong relationship with Germany for the most curious of reasons. The Emmet family was an upper-class family of German origin settled on the East Coast of the US.\textsuperscript{72} Christopher’s mother, Alida Chanler Emmet, was once even portrayed as one of America’s last “Grande Dames” by \textit{Life} magazine, being a grandniece of Mrs William B. Astor; Caroline Astor being the socialite of “New York’s old-guard mercantile elite” that still dominated the city’s social life during the last third of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{73} Accordingly, the family could afford to travel frequently to Europe. And thus, when Mrs Alida Chanler Emmet heard of something called “twilight sleep” being used by German doctors to minimise women’s pain giving birth, she decided to temporarily move to Germany. “She packed up all her servants and her family ... to travel on boat” to Europe and farther on to “some college town” in Imperial Germany. Sara Fagin, Emmet’s secretary for many years explained that Emmet’s mother crossed the Atlantic “three months before she had a child and stayed for two months after.”\textsuperscript{74} According to Fagin, thus, five of Emmet’s siblings were born in Germany. As a result Emmet spent much of his childhood in Germany being taught by private tutors and attending private schools there.\textsuperscript{75}

In the US, Emmet attended St. Paul’s School in Concord, New Hampshire, a private college preparatory boarding school, before going on to Harvard. Yet after only one year, he dropped out and returned to Europe instead.\textsuperscript{76} In Germany, Emmet attended the University in Freiburg/Breisgau.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{72} Christopher Emmet’s lineage can be traced back to John Jacob Astor who immigrated to the US in the late 18\textsuperscript{th} century; John D. Gates, \textit{The Astor Family}, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981).
\textsuperscript{74} Interview with Sara Fagin, Jun. 6, 2012
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
Emmet’s political activism

The years spent in Europe, during the 1920s and early 1930s, were decisive ones in forming young Emmet’s world view. During those years, Emmet watched Hitler’s and National Socialism’s rise to power. He witnessed first-hand the brutal clashes of Brownshirts of the Sturmabteilung (SA), the paramilitary branch of the NSDAP, with the Communists of the Red Front Fighter’s League. However, Emmet also remembered “good and exciting times in Berlin during the 1920s – exciting political events, wonderful theatres and night clubs...”

In 1933, however, Emmet returned to the US being equally opposed to Soviet Communism and Nazism. Only a few years later, Emmet turned intellectual opposition into action by cofounding the Christian Committee to Boycott Nazi Germany. This was, however, only the beginning of Emmet’s committee activism that would determine the rest of his life.

With the beginning of World War II, Emmet became involved in a plethora of causes. He was chairman of the Committee to Aid Britain by Reciprocal Trade, vice-president of France Forever, executive committee member of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, and treasurer of the Committee for American Irish Defense. According to Thomas A. Mahl, a number of these organisations were British intelligence front groups active in fighting isolationism in the US. In addition to his committee activism, Emmet was a vocal foreign policy expert on air. For decades, Emmet anchored the bi-weekly Foreign Affairs Round Table on WEVD, New York.

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78 Christopher Emmett to Marion Dönhoff, Dec. 19, 1962, SWA.
81 Christopher Emmet’s papers held at the Hoover Institution in Stanford include transcripts and phonotapes covering the years 1939 to 1973, see [http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf20n98f/].
Emmet and the CFR

Christopher Emmet’s daily routine was that of an independent scholar – packed with reading and writing. He wrote articles and letters to the editors of newspapers, in the US and West Germany alike, and not least important he wrote numerous confidential reports and memoranda on international relations issues.\(^{82}\)

The perfect place to obtain latest analysis of international events and US foreign policy was, therefore, the CFR, only a block and a half away from Emmet’s apartment.\(^{83}\) There he tested and discussed his ideas. Yet, most importantly, this was the venue for networking in US foreign policy establishment circles. As a matter of fact, a number of people who were to play a role in the ACG participated in CFR study groups or served as CFR directors; among them were George N. Shuster, ACG president from 1954 onwards; John J. McCloy, ACG chairman from 1972 onwards; and Shepard Stone, director of the Ford Foundation’s international programme, the ACG’s key funding institution.\(^{84}\) The CFR’s study and discussion groups drew participants and members from public agencies, first and foremost the US Department of State, private organisations, foundations, universities, and corporations. Considering the Council’s membership policy of predominantly inviting individuals after they had distinguished themselves as business leaders, in the executive branch of government, or as scholars, Emmet’s membership stands out.\(^{85}\) Emmet never even pursued a career in any of these fields. He said about himself, however, that he had the “peculiar combination of talents [and] experience”, which have “produced an exceptional political judgment.” Furthermore, he

\(^{82}\) In his correspondence he often pointed to articles that Marion Dönhoff, for example, had translated and were subsequently published in \textit{Die Zeit}.

\(^{83}\) Interview with Sara Fagin, New York, Jun. 6, 2012. Christopher Emmet’s membership in the CFR, for the years 1946-1974, was confirmed by the Council’s Library and Research Services.

\(^{84}\) John J. McCloy was director of the CFR from 1953-1972. Others were Shepard Stone, Karl Brandt, and George N. Shuster. McCloy, Stone, and Shuster were members of the CFR study group on “The Problem of Germany”, 1946-1950. The CFR library and research service, moreover, said it found “hints” that Christopher Emmet had been a participant in this study group in 1949-1950. See also Wala, \textit{The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War}.

identified not only “a total arrogant independence but the ability to change [his] own mind in response to the course of events” as part of his talent.\textsuperscript{86} This self-assessment underlines his social background and upbringing as a child of a privileged class.

The CFR’s overriding objective of promoting internationalism definitely fitted Emmet’s political convictions. Moreover, the CFR’s central function – brokering a consensus among the different groups represented and thus shaping US foreign policy certainly served as template for the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke and the later German-American conferences.\textsuperscript{87}

\textit{The “Committee” Cold Warrior}

Emmet’s privileged background allowed him to shift, very shortly after the end of World War II, from fighting Nazism and isolationism to fighting Communism and promoting pro-German policies, again in a private capacity. During his entire life Emmet never needed to pursue a paid job. Instead he lived off his family’s allowance from the time he dropped out of Harvard in 1920. The most valuable asset was his huge apartment on Lexington Avenue in New York’s Upper East Side. There he sat in the midst of his “open filing system”, smoking “big cigars”, reading a wide range of newspapers, “revis[ing ] his ideas” on foreign policy, and “refin[ing] his letters”. Emmet corresponded with a truly astonishing number of political decision-makers, intellectuals, activists, and industrialists in the US, Germany, and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{88}

After World War II, and as during the war years, Emmet became active in a myriad of committees. He served as chairman of the non-profit organisation Common Cause, Inc., an organisation founded by the socialite widow Natalie Wales Paine in January 1947 to combat

\textsuperscript{86} Letter from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, May 10, 1963, Box 81, HIA.
\textsuperscript{87} On the conferences, see in particular chapter 5, and Parmar, “The Issue of State Power: The Council on Foreign Relations as a Case Study”, 94-95; Wala, \textit{The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War}.
\textsuperscript{88} Interview Fagin. Her description of Emmet’s rather chaotic work environment matches Marion Dönhoff’s in \textit{ Amerikanische Wechselbäder: Beobachtungen und Kommentare aus vier Jahrzehnten} (Stuttgart: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983), 49. Proof of the high quantity of letters written by Emmet are the 45 boxes (out of a total of 126) of his papers filled with correspondence. See http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf209n98fj/.
the influence of Communism. On the board of the organisation Emmet was joined by State Department officials, diplomats as well as academics.89 One of the earliest successes of Common Cause was its role in the Oksana Kasenkina case of 1948. Kasenkina, a Russian citizen, worked as schoolteacher for children of Russian delegates to the United Nations in New York. In 1948 she tried to evade repatriation seeking refuge in the US. The quarrels pertaining to her case caused a consular breach between the United States and the Soviet Union.90

Moreover, Emmet served as trustee for Freedom House, an organisation that acted primarily as a clearing house for information on human rights. On the board of Freedom House Emmet rubbed shoulders with a number of prominent personalities. The first honorary co-chairpersons were Wendell Willkie, the Republican presidential nominee in 1940 and Eleanor Roosevelt.91 Furthermore, Emmet was an active organiser of the Committee for a Just Peace with Italy, director of International Rescue Committee (IRC), the American Council on NATO, the American Friends of Vietnam (AFVN), and chief-spokesperson of the American Friends of the Captive Nations (AFCN). A number of these organisations, particularly the IRC, the AFVN and AFCN, linked Emmet to a covert network of organisations which at times helped the US intelligence community “to implement a variety of clandestine operations” in the Soviet Union itself and in countries belonging to the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. It also seems that in 1951, Emmet attended meetings of the Congress for Cultural


Freedom. These activities provided him, like Warburg, with “solid connections within the intelligence community”.

**Fighting Communism by opposing US foreign policy in occupied Germany**

Saving post-war Germany from Communism was a matter of deep concern to Emmet. His commitment to this cause led him to criticise US foreign policy toward Germany in the early post-war years. Emmet was “violently against the Morgenthau Plan” accordingly his first comprehensive campaign after 1945 focused on the allied dismantling programme in occupied Germany. According to Eric Warburg, this shared concern about dismantling incidentally marked the beginning of Emmet’s and Warburg’s friendship.

In November 1947, Emmet released an “Appeal Against Dismantling German Factories Now” which was undersigned by trade union representatives, journalists, and educators. In response to the new level-of-industry directive which called for the removal of 682 plants Emmet’s appeal to British and American military authorities in Germany, pursued two main lines of reasoning. The first was directed at US financial interests, that is the American taxpayer who was “called upon to appropriate another fifteen to twenty billion dollars to restore Western Europe to economic health and political stability.” The second line of argument pointed to the dangers of Communism into whose arms “Germany’s starving workers” were pushed by destroying factories. With reference to the Soviet zone of

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92 Letter from Marcia Kahn to Ellen McCloy, June 2, 1952, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 87, HIA.
93 Emmet was director of the International Rescue Committee as he told Heinz Krekel, first West German ambassador to the United States (Letter from Christopher Emmet to Heinz Krekel, Oct. 21, 1953, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 84, HIA); Eric Thomas Chester, *Covert Network: Progressives, the International Rescue Committee, and the CIA* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 1, 15. In a letter to Marcia Kahn, July 1, 1953, he told her that he “would fly straight to Copenhagen as a representative of the American Council on NATO”. The letter is contained in Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 81, HIA.
94 Quote by Sara Fagin.
95 Letter from Eric Warburg to Thomas A. Emmet, Feb. 13, 1974, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
96 Christopher Emmet, “Appeal Against Dismantling German Factories Now”, November 13, 1947, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ. Among the signatories were: Reinhold Niebuhr (Union Theological Seminary), Matthew Woll (Vice president, American Federation of Labor), Harry Gideonse (President Brooklyn College), George N. Shuster (President Hunter College), Natalie Wales Paine (President Common Cause, Inc.), Frank R. Crosswaith (Chairman Negro Labor Committee), Sidney Hook (Professor of Philosophy, New York University).
occupation, the appeal points out that “with glee” the Russians had already announced the end of dismantling in their zone. Emmet concluded the appeal by making the gloomy prediction that no policy would be “better designed to make converts to Communism in the industrial heart of Europe and thus to defeat the objectives of our entire foreign policy than the policy of dismantling”.97

Emmet continued refining his argument against dismantling and subsequently published a pamphlet with the title _Destruction at Our Expense: How Dismantling Factories in Germany Helps Inflation in the United States and Sabotages the Marshall Plan_.98 The facts underpinning Emmet’s analysis were gathered by Karl Brandt. Brandt was a German-born and educated agronomist who had immigrated to the US in 1933. Before Brandt was appointed Professor of Agricultural Economics at Stanford University, California in 1938, he had been a researcher at New School for Social Research in New York. In the late 1940s, however, Brandt was drafted as food adviser for the US occupation forces in Germany.99 During this service, Brandt collected material documenting the implementation of US occupation policies as well as the operations in the French and British zones. Brandt was motivated to help bringing about “the correction and reshaping of our foreign policy under the program of foreign aid” by his fear that “Communism is just around the corner everywhere.”100

97 Christopher Emmet, “Appeal Against Dismantling German Factories Now”, November 13, 1947, Marcia Kahn Papers, IZ.
100 Letters from Karl Brandt to Christopher Emmet, Jun. 30 and Jul. 13, 1948 both Christopher Emmet Papers, HIA.
Fear of and opposition to Communism united Brandt and Emmet in this campaign and later on. For, Brandt joined the ACG as early as 1954. Christopher Emmet and like-minded friends, Warburg, Blumenfeld, and Dönhoff among them, were deeply convinced that only an economically and politically strong West German state could withstand Communism.

Despite his status of independent scholar, Emmet was enthused with “state spirit”. He had a respected and influential voice when it came to US foreign relations, particularly German-American relations. He was an extremely well-connected figure in establishment circles both in the US and in West Germany, before and after the war; moreover he was a very prolific author of political articles and books. Although he never held a paid position, he was a professional in the non-profit political activist scene. Emmet continued much of his correspondence and travelled until the early 1970s despite his deteriorating health. In 1974, he died in New York and thus the first major epoch of the ACG came to an end.

The East Prussian countess: Marion Dönhoff, 1909–2002

Marion Dönhoff had an upper-class upbringing and came to share attitudes and convictions with Eric Warburg and Christopher Emmet. According to Emmet, she only differed with regard to her sex and “ancient aristocratic lineage”. The fact that Dönhoff was a woman deserves special attention particularly against the background of the membership of the Atlantik-Brücke. Until 1974, she was the only female member. Regardless, Emmet continued

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101 Interview with Fagin, Jun. 6, 2012. Kurt Birrenbach, “Christopher Emmet” (obituary), Rheinischer Merkur, March 1, 1974; letter from Helmut Schmidt to John J. McCloy, Febr. 19, 1974, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
102 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Eric Warburg, Apr. 2, 1963, SWA.
in his appraisal of Dönhoff by stating that she had a “vital handicap of not knowing America.” Moreover, “she cannot ... see the essential similarities between the Communist and Nazi evils as well as we can” because she was younger than Emmet and Warburg. Here Emmet alluded to Dönhoff’s early promotion of Ostpolitik. Yet despite this claim, she nevertheless promoted the West integration of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance under American hegemony by joining forces with Warburg, Emmet and Blumenfeld in founding the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. Dönhoff contributed to their joined cause in two respects. Firstly, she was an instrumental link to the reawakened media landscape in West Germany and in her capacity as a leading journalist a crucial voice and multiplier. Moreover, she played a crucial role in the larger process of reintegrating West German elites, for she was well-connected within aristocratic circle in Germany and beyond. One of her greatest merits thus was to help to improve German aristocracy’s image. This in turn helped boosting West German elites’ reputation amongst American elites.

“Ancient aristocratic lineage”: Dönhoff’s family background

Marion Dönhoff was born in December 1909 on Schloss Friedrichstein near Königsberg, East Prussia (nowadays Kaliningrad, Russia), the Dönhoff family’s home for centuries. Her mother used to be in the service of Empress Auguste Viktoria and her father was a widely-travelled diplomat, descendent to the counts von Dönhoff who belonged to one of the most important families among the landed Prussian aristocracy. Marion Dönhoff grew up amongst her many siblings in a rural semi-feudal world with horse riding and hunting as common pastimes. She received little formal education until the age of 13 or 14.

103 Ibid.
104 See, for example, her early articles on Ostpolitik in Marion Dönhoff, Deutsche Außenpolitik von Adenauer bis Brandt, (Hamburg: Wegner, 1970).
105 Her role as contact and access point to West German media outlets, particularly Die Zeit allowed her for example to place op-eds of friendly authors and control the timing of publishing press releases.
The first proper school Dönhoff attended was a secondary school in Königsberg. She continued secondary education at a boy’s school in Potsdam to earn a qualification allowing entry into university. Dönhoff started travelling widely early in her life. After finishing school, her first journey brought her to the United States. For two months she toured from the East Coast to the West Coast together with her friend Beatrice von Riedemann, whose father was a director of Standard Oil & Co.\textsuperscript{107} This was quite an unusual journey at the time, particularly for a young Prussian Countess, given the anti-American sentiments pervasive among German aristocracy at least since the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century driven by feelings of cultural superiority, dismissal of mass society and democracy as well as imperialist rivalry.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{The countess’ educational career}

In 1932, Dönhoff began her studies of economics at Frankfurt University. In 1933, the Nazis came to power. Initially Dönhoff showed her strong opposition to the Nazis by attempting to remove their flag from the university building, tearing down Nazi posters, and handing out anti-Nazi flyers on campus not least because many of her professors had been expelled.\textsuperscript{109} Her opposition, however, was not directed at her family; albeit two of her brothers joined the Nazi party, NSDAP.\textsuperscript{110} Despite her hostile attitude to the Nazis she continued her studies and graduated from Frankfurt University in 1934. Afterwards she continued postgraduate studies outside of Germany, enrolling at the University Basel. There she began her doctorate supervised by Edgar Salin, a distinguished economist descending from a Jewish manufacturing and banking family. After she had been awarded the doctorate Dönhoff

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Harprecht, \textit{Die Gräfin Marion Dönhoff: Eine Biographie}, 116.}
\footnote{Alice Schwarzer, \textit{Marion Dönhoff: Ein widerständiges Leben} (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 2002), 95.}
\end{footnotes}
returned to East Prussia. The better part of the later 1930s, however, Dönhoff spent travelling in Europe, to places in England, France, Southeast Europe, and Africa.

In September 1939, when Germany attacked Poland marking the beginning of World War Two, Dönhoff’s oldest brother was drafted. Thus, she had to resume the responsibility to administer the family’s estates in East Prussia. Yet despite the war in the east and the estate related duties, Marion Dönhoff still found time to travel widely in the early war years, among other places to Russia and Persia.\textsuperscript{111}

\textit{The countess’ 20 July connection}

On 20 July in 1944, a group of aristocrats attempted to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Dönhoff knew a number of members of the \textit{Kreisauer Kreis} and the \textit{Goerdeler-Gruppe}, which were two separate groups with overlapping membership forming the civilian branches of the anti-Hitler group; her friends were Axel von dem Bussche, Adam von Trott zu Solz, Heini Graf Lehndorff, and Counts von Moltke and Yorck.\textsuperscript{112} However, Dönhoff’s actual role in the plot to kill Hitler remains controversial.\textsuperscript{113} While she was not directly involved in developing the plan for the assassination, according to Eckart Conze, Dönhoff did act as conduit to keep the various members in Berlin and East Prussia in contact. Occasionally, Dönhoff travelled to Switzerland to meet with Carl Jacob Burckhardt, a Swiss diplomat and former high commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig/Gdansk. There she passed on information from the anti-Hitler conspirators for Burckhardt to transfer to other foreign diplomats.\textsuperscript{114}

After the war, Dönhoff contributed to presenting a positive image of the aristocratic opposition to Hitler, seeking to shape the Federal Republic of Germany’s historical memory.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Harprecht, \textit{Die Gräfin Marion Dönhoff: Eine Biographie}, 227. See also Schwarzer, \textit{Marion Dönhoff}.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Eckart Conze, “Aufstand des preußischen Adels: Marion Gräfin Dönhoff und das Bild des Widerstands gegen den Nationalsozialismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, \textit{Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte} vol. 51, no. 4 (2003). On Albrecht Graf Bernstorff, Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg also belonging to the groups, see Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, \textit{”Um der Ehre Willen”: Erinnerungen an die Freunde vom 20. Juli} (Berlin: btb Verlag, 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{113} Joachim Fest does not mention her at all in his study of the 20 July resistance plot; see Joachim C. Fest, \textit{Staatsstreich: Der lange Weg zum 20. Juli}, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Siedler, 1994).
\item \textsuperscript{114} Conze, “Aufstand des preußischen Adels”; 488-89.
\end{itemize}
As journalist and author, Dönhoff tirelessly worked towards a broader acknowledgement of the deeds of the conspirators.\textsuperscript{115} According to her biographer and fellow journalist Klaus Harpprecht, she was quite successful in anchoring the memory of German resistance into the founding myth of the Federal Republic of Germany and thus considerably contributed to a shift in the Germans’ historical awareness.\textsuperscript{116} This in turn helped to rehabilitate German aristocracy at large after its involvement in the National Socialist dictatorship.

During the early post-war years, 20 July resistance was by many associated with an alliance between National Socialism and traditional elites, with the reactionary efforts of the “generals” and especially with a very negative view on the East Prussian Junkers in the US as well as in the UK. Resistance and opposition to Hitler within Germany was a taboo. Only when the Cold War confrontation intensified in the late 1940s, the 20 July conspirators’ staunch anti-Bolshevist attitudes were discussed. Now it seemed opportune to exploit the resistance by evaluating it more positively and thus stabilising the Germans’ collective psyche; a necessity since Germany should join the Western alliance.\textsuperscript{117} Acknowledging the fact that there had been opposition to Hitler allowed for a differentiation between Nazis and anti-Nazis, which in turn weakened the idea of collective guilt. Christopher Emmet later applied the criterion of affiliation with the resistance movement of 20 July to distinguish “good” and “bad” Germans and thus selected from amongst the “good” individuals to be invited to join a Committee of German-American understanding.\textsuperscript{118}


\textsuperscript{116} For many years after the end of WWII, members of the resistance as well as their surviving families were considered traitors by fellow Germans. See, for example, D. von Meding, \textit{Courageous Hearts: Women and the Anti-Hitler Plot of 1944} (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), xxii-xxiii.

\textsuperscript{117} Harpprecht, \textit{Die Gräfin Marion Dönhoff: Eine Biographie}, 514. For a comprehensive analysis of Marion Dönhoff’s part in forming, stabilizing, conserving and defending the image of resistance in the Third Reich in general and the opposition of “20 July 1944” held by West German public opinion, see Conze, “Aufstand des preußischen Adels”, particularly 492-493.

\textsuperscript{118} For more details see Chapter 2.
Starting anew: the countess turned journalist

In January 1945, with the Soviet army approaching from the East, Marion Dönhoff departed from Friedrichstein on horseback. Seven weeks later, she arrived in Schloss Vinsebeck, a small place in Westphalia more than 1,000 kilometres west of Königsberg.\textsuperscript{119} The first part of Dönhoff’s life ended with a double loss; the loss of her friends in the resistance, who were executed after the failed assassination and the loss of home and native land. After World War II, East Prussia was no longer part of Germany. Instead it was divided; the southern part became Polish and the north eastern part an official province of the Soviet Union.

When Germany surrendered to the Allies in May she was reunited with family members and friends such as Axel von dem Bussche and Richard von Weizsäcker in Brunkensen. There she drafted two memoranda addressed to the British occupation forces. In one of them she explained to the British “how the Nazis came about, why the Germans venerated the Führer the way they did, and what was to be done now”.\textsuperscript{120} The other memorandum was a first tribute to the “20\textsuperscript{th} of July” group of conspirators in which Dönhoff set forth the members’ motivations and their post-war plans.\textsuperscript{121} The memoranda got into the hands of officers of the British occupation forces and through them they eventually reached Gerd Bucerius who was about to launch a new weekly newspaper in Hamburg. The memoranda written by a woman with apparent strong opinions and a sense of mission impressed Bucerius deeply.\textsuperscript{122} Hence he invited Marion Dönhoff to Hamburg. Soon afterwards she began working for Die Zeit. Thus, the Countess from East Prussia started a new life as citoyen.\textsuperscript{123} She had a job, if quite an unusual one considering her professional and social background. Soon she also

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{119} Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, “Ritt gen Westen”, Die Zeit, Mar. 21, 1946.
\bibitem{120} Quote translated from Schwarzer, Marion Dönhoff, 161 where Schwarzer quotes Dönhoff.
\bibitem{121} In 1946 this paper was published under the title: In Memoriam 20. Juli 1944: Den Freunden zum Gedächtnis, (Hamburg: Privatdruck).
\bibitem{122} Harpprecht, Die Gräfin Marion Dönhoff; Schwarzer, Marion Dönhoff.
\bibitem{123} Conze, “Der Edelmann als Bürger? Standesbewusstsein und Wertewandel im Adel der frühen Bundesrepublik.”, 347-371.
\end{thebibliography}
had a place to stay, which Erik Blumenfeld offered since he lived just around the corner of the offices of Die Zeit.

The founders of Die Zeit had initially intended to place Dönhoff in the economics section of the paper which would have been much closer to her actual academic background. Soon, however, it turned out that she was much more interested in politics. In 1950 she officially took over responsibility for the politics section. In 1968 she became editor in chief and in 1973 even publisher of Die Zeit. Thus, according to Klaus Harpprecht, within 20 years after the end of World War II, Marion Dönhoff managed to become West Germany’s “most famous female journalist”.\textsuperscript{124}

Dönhoff demonstrated in her op-eds that she meant to have an impact on domestic as well as foreign politics. As early as in March 1947, when the allied dismantling policy was still in full swing, she opined: “In the long run Germany will, without a doubt, only survive and be able to contribute significantly to world economy as a capital intensive and highly industrialised state”.\textsuperscript{125} Therefore, dismantling German industrial assets had to be stopped. In this she was in full agreement with her friend Eric Warburg, whom she knew through Erik Blumenfeld. While rhetorically attacking the British for being “insensitive” with regard to their attitudes towards Germany which were, in Dönhoff’s opinion, still driven by a punitive mode, Dönhoff praised the Americans for their role in ending dismantling.\textsuperscript{126} John J. McCloy, US high commissioner at the time, whom she knew personally through Eric Warburg, was a real hero of German-American relations to Dönhoff.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{124} Harpprecht, Die Gräfin Marion Dönhoff, 474.
\textsuperscript{126} Marion Dönhoff, “Schluß mit Demontagen?”, Die Zeit, Aug. 11, 1949.
\textsuperscript{127} In John J. McCloy’s office journal for the years 1949-1951 a number of meetings and diners are listed with Marion Countess and Eric Warburg, see Fischer and Fischer, John J. McCloy, 146-147; 208-228.
Crossing the Atlantic again

In 1951, Dönhoff travelled to the US for the second time. In the meantime the Federal Republic had been founded and the US Department of State spent millions of dollars on cultural diplomacy through numerous exchange programmes. The US government invited more than 12,000 Germans to visit the United States for stays, lasting from one month to two years, between 1948 and 1955. Though these exchange programmes targeted varied groups, the focus was on the “future democratic elites”. By 1955, 25 percent of the Bundestag members had been guests of the Foreign Leader Program (FLP), among them many future leaders such as Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt.\textsuperscript{128}

Under the auspices of such a programme, Dönhoff visited the United States. This first post-war trip was, however, overshadowed by a certain alienation between the American government and its European counterparts. The relationship then was marked by a general feeling of disappointment on the part of the Americans with a view on the Europeans’ standing on the issue of war in Korea. This at least was how Marion Dönhoff sensed the atmosphere when she arrived in New York in mid-January.\textsuperscript{129} While politicians across Europe and particularly in West Germany had entered a heated debate concerning the question of rearming the Germans in the face of the communist threat now so tangible, Marion Dönhoff had already taken a stance in late 1950, a half year after the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula: “Shall we resign to fate without putting up a fight in the face of this impending threat of war ... or are we prepared, if need be, to fight for our freedom with arms in hand?”\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{128} Oliver Matthias Arnold Schmidt, “Civil Empire by Co-Optation: German-American Exchange Programs as Cultural Diplomacy, 1945-1961” (PhD, Harvard University, 1999), V. For a comparative study on the impact of these programmes in the Netherlands, France and Britain see Giles Scott-Smith, \textit{Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950-1970} (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008).

\textsuperscript{129} Marion Dönhoff, “Ist Amerika zur Weltherrschaft bereit?”, \textit{Die Zeit}, Feb. 15, 1951.

\textsuperscript{130} “Wollen wir uns angesichts der drohenden Kriegsgefahr kampflos dem Schicksal ergeben .... Oder sind wir bereit, wenn es nötig wird, mit der Waffe in der Hand für unsere Freiheit zu kämpfen?” Marion Dönhoff, “Wir müssen wissen, was wir wollen!”, \textit{Die Zeit}, Dec. 7, 1950.
Irrespective of the discord between the US and the Federal Republic over the war in Korea, Dönhoff used this trip to the US to establish important contacts benefitting from relationships dating back to her pre-war life. Christa von Tippelskirch, for example, had first met Marion at the Dönhoff family’s estate where the young Tippelskirch had been instructed in aristocratic housekeeping. Tippelskirch, who was a translator and photographer by profession, had immigrated to the US and had married Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of the influential journal *Foreign Affairs*. Subsequently, the Armstrongs’ residence in New York City became the first contact point for Dönhoff whenever she was in town. Beyond providing a place to stay Hamilton Fish Armstrong was an ideal contact for Dönhoff. He knew the right people to talk to for Marion to get an idea about American planning for Europe and particularly for the Federal Republic. Among them was Henry Kissinger, who at the time was still a graduate student at Harvard University but would later enter the Nixon administration as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. Eric Warburg also offered a hand in getting her in touch with influential people from US business and banking circles as well as politicians. Another meeting, among the most significant, had been arranged by Ernst Kantorowicz, Dönhoff’s professorial friend whom she knew from Frankfurt University. The German medievalist Kantorowicz had immigrated to the United States in 1938. In 1951, he was professor at the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton University where George F. Kennan was among his colleagues. Thus he introduced Marion Dönhoff to Kennan. They developed a life-long friendship.\(^{131}\) When travelling onward to Washington, DC, Dönhoff even managed to attend the weekly press conference of the US secretary of state, Dean Acheson at the time.\(^{132}\)

Dönhoff’s close exchange with the US establishment, however, did not turn her into a mere mouthpiece for US policies. Quite to the contrary, she spoke her mind and took a stance on controversial issues. In July 1952, for example, she commented rather bitingly on the opening

\(^{131}\) Harpprecht, *Die Gräfin Marion Dönhoff*, 359-360; 421-424.

of the West German embassy in a “brand-new” building provided by the US Senate as a “symbol of friendship” after the “dubious liquidation of the old embassy”. She interpreted this as a hopeful sign for a potential shift in attitude of the US administration regarding confiscated German property in the United States, an issue that the Atlantik-Brücke would be concerned with in the late 1950s.133

Her next trip to the US was sponsored by the Atlantik-Brücke.134 In 1955, she spent two months in the United States travelling through the southern states as well as the Midwest meeting with people in Washington, New York, and Chicago. She wrote a number of reportages about her encounters and experiences which then were published in West German newspapers.135 Though foreign affairs were her passion, three of the four pieces written during her 1955 US trip dealt with American domestic issues. With a mix of enthusiasm and critical distance she reported and educated her German readership about, for example, the migration movement within the United States into the South and West of the country alongside a progressing industrialisation of rural regions and American attitudes to world affairs ranging from isolationism to “Sabre-Rattling”.136

While Dönhoff was definitely fascinated by certain technological achievements, for example by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), she simultaneously reinvigorated stereotypes of American characteristics held by Germans.137 One was the American as a parochial, disinterested and shallow being. Dönhoff borrowed this cliché when referring to a local newspaper in Knoxville. This paper had 88 pages and “started with 24 pages of comics in gay colours” followed by “a few articles about local politics... a lot of sports news as well

134 Summary of protocol of general meeting Transatlantik Brücke, Sept. 25, 1954 (district court Berlin-Charlottenburg, VR 20196).
135 Later she republished them in Dönhoff, Amerikanische Wechselbäder: Beobachtungen und Kommentare aus vier Jahrzehnten, 41-82.
136 ibid., 62.
137 ibid., 56-57.
as a very thick supplement for women with beauty tips... Not a word about Formosa...” And Adlai Stevenson, whom Dönhoff met in Chicago, she described as the “sophisticated, sensitive, intellectual, kind” which in her mind was “unlike many Americans”.  

Dönhoff’s networks

While reiterating anti-American stereotypes in the pieces about her US experience in the mid-1950s, Dönhoff was nevertheless a strong proponent of the Atlantic Alliance as well as strong German-American relations. This she proved first and foremost in her role as co-founder of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG and in regularly attending the German-American conferences from 1959 onwards. Moreover, Dönhoff was active in a number of informal elite networks and served on boards of the German Council on Foreign Relations, and the Steuben-Schurz society. The transatlantic, multinational approach of the Bilderberg group to forging and maintaining a strong Atlantic Alliance was neither alien to her, although she was not a regular there. Dönhoff attended the 1972 Bilderberg conference in Knokke, Belgium. From then on, however, another representative of Die Zeit became a constant at Bilderberg meetings.

Despite Emmet accusing her of not seeing the similarities between Communism and Nazism and despite her leading role in promoting Ostpolitik, Dönhoff was not a communist fellow-traveller. Her association with the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) proved her liberal anti-communist credentials. When Shepard Stone took over the CCF’s successor organisation International Association of Cultural Freedom (IACF) in the late 1960s, Dönhoff

139 Harpprecht, Die Gräfin Marion Dönhoff, 518.
141 Hochgeschwender, Freiheit in der Offensive: Der Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen, 528, 75.
even became board member together with Richard von Weizsäcker, another friend of hers.\textsuperscript{142}

At this point, Shepard Stone and Marion Dönhoff had already known each other for more than twenty years. Back then Stone had worked for the US High Commissioner in West Germany and had helped to re-establish the West German press.\textsuperscript{143} From the mid-1950s onwards, Stone had directed the Ford Foundation’s International Division. In 1974, Stone established the Aspen Institute Berlin serving as founding director.\textsuperscript{144} Marion Dönhoff was member of the board of Aspen Berlin together with Willy Brandt, Richard von Weizsäcker, and Lord Allan Bullock. It was the time of West Germany’s controversial Ostpolitik, which was carefully watched abroad particularly in the United States. The government of the city of Berlin supported the founding process since Aspen Berlin was hoped to be “one way of keeping German-American relations on an even keel” in the face of Brandt’ ambitious outreach to the Eastern bloc.\textsuperscript{145}

Dönhoff did not only focus on German-American relations. She was also a regular member of the German-English Königswinter conferences from the late 1950s onwards.\textsuperscript{146} When in 1952/53 a regional section of the German-English society was founded in Hamburg, Marion Dönhoff, Helmut Schmidt and Ralf Dahrendorf served as honorary presidents of this section.\textsuperscript{147} Schmidt and Dönhoff, however, shared deeper bonds beyond a purely professional relationship between a supportive journalist and a politician. Schmidt joined the Atlantik-Brücke in the 1960s. Dönhoff and Schmidt had a number of mutual friends, among them Eric Warburg. Last but not least, they both enjoyed informal and open debates about current issues

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} ibid., 345. Letter from Shepard Stone to Marion Dönhoff, Oct. 3, 1972, Shepard Stone Papers, Dartmouth. Berghahn, \textit{America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy}, 263.
\item \textsuperscript{143} America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy, 36. Marion Dönhoff, “Großes Herz, souveräner Sinn”, \textit{Die Zeit}, May 11, 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{145} Berghahn, \textit{America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe}, 278-79.
\item \textsuperscript{146} Dönhoff attended the Königswinter conferences regularly from 1951 onwards. See Ralph Uhlig, \textit{Die Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, 1949-1983} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), 69.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Frank Bajohr, \textit{Hanseat und Grenzgänger: Erik Blumenfeld, eine politische Biographie}, Hamburger Beiträge zur Sozial- und Zeitgeschichte (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 98.
\end{itemize}
of concern. Thus, from the mid-1960s onward, Dönhoff regularly invited the “Blankeneser Kreis” for meetings at her home in Hamburg Blankenese. Apart from Schmidt, regular participants included the Weizsäcker brothers, Carl Friedrich and Richard (the future federal president); the industrialist Otto A. Friedrich, and the bankers Karl Klasen (later president of the Federal Bank of Germany) and Alwin Münchmeyer; and Professor Karl Schiller (senator in Hamburg and later federal minister).\(^{148}\) Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Otto A. Friedrich, and Karl Schiller were also members of the Atlantik-Brücke.\(^{149}\)

![Image 4: Woman in a men’s world: Marion Dönhoff together with Henry Kissinger (to her right) and Shepard Stone (to her left). Undated photograph, Shepard Stone Papers, Dartmouth.](image)

**The most unlikely Atlanticist**

Marion Dönhoff might have been the most unlikely of the four founders to embark on the endeavour to foster German-American relations in the early 1950s, given her aristocratic background and the noble class’s entanglements with the Nazi state. The East Prussian Countess not only left but lost her native land fleeing the approaching Soviets. In her opinion, however, history could have taken a different turn had the allies, the Americans and the British, been willing to cooperate with the resistance movement. Instead they demanded unconditional surrender and vilified the resistance or even denied its existence: “The allies


\(^{149}\) See chapter 2.
weren’t concerned about right or wrong. All they sought was power! They wanted Germany’s total humiliation and subjugation and therefore there could not be a German resistance movement.”

Yet, despite this negative and almost hostile attitude towards the allies, Dönhoff did reinvent herself as a citoyen living a bourgeois life, from 1949 onwards. Moreover, she advanced to become one of West Germany’s most influential female journalists. Her career was closely connected with the ascendance of the Hamburg weekly Die Zeit. This liberal West German weekly newspaper was, according to Philipp Gassert, itself part of a transatlantic elite network. Its journalists were transatlantic actors and agents of Germany’s western integration rather than mere observers of US life and politics. This definitely includes Dönhoff. As a citizen of the FRG she endorsed the state’s political integration into the Western Alliance under American hegemony. It was worth to contribute to shaping the Federal Republic of Germany, according to Dönhoff, as it offered an “open society in which it was possible to live humanly and fairly free”.

Thus, apart from being a woman, Dönhoff had a lot in common with the male co-founders. Like Warburg and Emmet, she had a privileged background with regard to education as much as in terms of financial security. Furthermore she was well and widely connected with the main actors in politics, journalism, academia, the business community and the cultural scene, inside and outside West Germany as Klaus Harpprecht confirms. Yet, for the transatlantic project of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, Dönhoff’s standing in West German journalism was most beneficial determining her role and influence within these circles.

150 Quote translated from Schwarzer, Marion Dönhoff, 136.
153 Harpprecht, Die Gräfin Marion Dönhoff, 474.
Moreover, Dönhoff shared with them a strong anti-Communism. To her, Communism definitely ranked high among potential threats to liberal, democratic societies, on this side of the Atlantic as well as on the other side. However, Dönhoff did not align with hawkish Cold Warriors. She vehemently opposed Adenauer’s stance towards the East following the Americans’ doctrine that “the Russians could only brought to their knees, if the West was stronger.” Adenauer was firmly convinced “that the West should be shut off and should not have any relations with the East.”\textsuperscript{154} Dönhoff, on the other hand, felt that entering dialogue with the people in the Eastern bloc countries was a much more promising way to pursue.\textsuperscript{155} Hence she was an outspoken proponent of an active Ostpolitik from 1956 onwards.\textsuperscript{156} While this stance was a source of conflict in her relationship with Warburg and Emmet, her neighbour in Hamburg, Blankenese, Erik Blumenfeld, was rather susceptible to an opening to the East.

**Hanseatic merchant and politician: Erik Blumenfeld, 1915–1997**

In 1950, Christopher Emmet told Erik Blumenfeld “you are one of the comparatively few influential people in Germany who have a full and sympathetic understanding of the problems both of American and British relations with Germany”.\textsuperscript{157} Blumenfeld’s political biography by Frank Bajohr sees him as a dignitary politician, who did not define himself as a

\textsuperscript{154} Marion Dönhoff in an interview with Alice Schwarzer, *Marion Dönhoff*, 233.
\textsuperscript{155} ibid.
\textsuperscript{157} Letter from Christopher Emmet to Erik Blumenfeld, Apr. 23, 1950, Christopher Emmet Papers, HIA.
professional political decision-maker. Rather, Blumenfeld derived from his business success the natural right to participate in shaping the “res publica” and thus personified the classic Hanseat. In Christopher Emmet’s eyes, Blumenfeld was thus well-equipped to join in with him, Warburg and Dönhoff on this transatlantic endeavour. With regard to Bajohr’s assessment of Blumenfeld, it should be added that not only Blumenfeld’s successful business enterprises qualified him for politics. His involvement in private elite circles and organizations also provided him with fruitful contacts, both at home and abroad.

Like his fellow founders of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, Blumenfeld was driven by a strong sense of mission. Although Blumenfeld was apolitical as a young man, he decided “[d]uring the darkest hours of my young life, on the parade-grounds of the concentration camps enduring the blows of the Nazi thugs [that] … [I]f I was to escape this hell, I wanted to play a part in making sure that never again should so much shame, disgrace and crime be committed in Germany or on the hands of Germans.” Hence, Blumenfeld not only entered politics as early as 1945 but also joined forces with Warburg, Emmet, and Dönhoff to “foster relationships and friendship between individuals in the United States and Germany as well as to defuse enemy stereotypes and to thwart misunderstandings”. Blumenfeld served this course for more than a quarter of a century as treasurer of the Atlantik-Brücke. Moreover, due to his standing in the West German business community and being an insider of West German party politics with access to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and later Ludwig Erhard, Blumenfeld functioned as central go-between among the different spheres.

Hamburg merchants and Danish gentry

Erik Blumenfeld was born in March 1915 as first son of Ernst Blumenfeld, a converted Jew, and Ebba Möller, a Protestant daughter of a Danish landed gentry family, followed by a sister.

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158 Bajohr, Hanseat und Grenzgänger, 277.
Sonja Blumenfeld. 161 Erik’s grandfather, Bernhard Blumenfeld laid the foundations for his grandson’s carefree childhood and youth in terms of financial security. Bernhard Blumenfeld had moved to Hamburg in the early 1870s and established himself as commercial agent for mining products, iron, steel, and coke. Steadily he expanded his business opening branches in Amsterdam, Paris and London. Around the turn of the century Blumenfeld got a small steamer fleet and hence was able to provide the Russian, British and German merchant marine and navy alike with bunker coal. By the mid-1910s, Blumenfeld’s company had developed into a regionally significant player on the market with several hundred employees.

Blumenfeld had worked his way up into the Hamburg bourgeoisie, also documented in the castle-like mansion that Blumenfeld had acquired on Elbchaussee. Representatives of the leading German-Jewish mercantile classes got together regularly at the Blumenfelds; among them Albert Ballin, authors like Gerhard Hauptmann, and painters like Max Liebermann. 162 Though 15 years apart, Erik Blumenfeld and Eric Warburg grew up in a similar social milieu in Hamburg.

Born in the midst of the First World War, Erik soon had to part from his father. Ernst Blumenfeld was drafted and his mother moved with the two children to her parents’ in Denmark. While British, French, and German soldiers died on the battle fields of World War I, Erik spent a carefree childhood in the bosom of his family in neutral Denmark. He grew up with his first language being Danish and, thanks to a British nanny with English as his second language. He only really learned German after his family had moved back to Hamburg. Early the seeds were sown for a cosmopolitan spirit that marked Blumenfeld’s life in the second half of the twentieth century.


162 Bajohr, Hanseat und Grenzgänger, 18-19.
From bourgeois dandy life to the “parade grounds of concentration camps”

During his Hamburg school days in the 1920s, however, Blumenfeld was mainly interested in sports, including horseback riding (Erik’s uncle owned a racing stable), cycle polo, soccer, hockey and athletics. To forestall a total educational failure of her son, Ebba Blumenfeld sent him off to the prestigious private boarding school Salem at the shore of Lake Constance. The School of Salem Castle in 1920 founded by Kurt Hahn, Eric Warburg’s brother-in-law, is still considered one of the most elite schools Europe. In Hamburg Blumenfeld had been exposed to the local bourgeois circles making friends for life among the ruling class offspring, for instance with the future publisher Axel Springer and Karl Klasen, the future president of the Federal Bank. His years at Salem provided many opportunities for sustainable networking among future leaders on a national and international scale. Many of the Salem alumni advanced, after World War II, to leading positions in politics, diplomacy, and academia.

After graduating from Salem, Blumenfeld went abroad for professional training in banking and ship trading. The Hamburg ruling class traditionally had a cultural affinity to England nurtured by dense business contacts with the kingdom across the North Sea. Sons of merchant families were professionally trained in England as was Erik Blumenfeld in the first half of the 1930s. Integrated in upper class circles, Blumenfeld absorbed both the English language and English culture. In addition he was trained in France and Scandinavia. In 1935, Blumenfeld enrolled at the Technical University in Berlin-Charlottenburg to study geology and metallurgy.

Blumenfeld enjoyed his student years in Berlin to the fullest. He maintained “an elegant and affluent lifestyle”. He drove a BMW sports car and immersed into the artist scene of 1930s Berlin socialising with actors and actresses. Yet he was also familiar with diplomatic circles of the Reich’s capital, most importantly he was acquainted with the US diplomatic representative. In June 1939 at a party of the US chargé d’affaires in Berlin, Blumenfeld met Gerd Bucerius on the occasion of Blumenfeld’s 75th birthday, “Dem Freunde”, Die Zeit, Mar. 23, 1990.
the Kennedy brothers, Joseph Patrick (1915-1944) and John Fitzgerald (1917-1963). Born in the same year, Joe Kennedy and Erik Blumenfeld spent some time together both in Berlin and in Hamburg.\textsuperscript{164} This connection to the Kennedys was to endure and would prove very beneficial for Blumenfeld’s post-war career in politics, particularly as special emissary to the United States.

Despite the notorious Nuremberg Laws effective from 1935 onward, according to which Erik Blumenfeld was a “first-degree half breed”, Blumenfeld entered the board of the family’s business Norddeutsche Kohle & Cokes Werke (NKCW), coal and cokes works in 1938. Only one year later, his studies at the Technical University in Berlin were disrupted by the draft into the Wehrmacht, the German army. In December 1940, however, he was dismissed. Blumenfeld himself claimed “for racial political reasons”.\textsuperscript{165} Blumenfeld’s wording described precisely the intentions of the fanatics at the NSDAP party political offices. “Half breeds” by Nazi standards hoped that in return for military service they would receive equal civil rights and could end professional and private discrimination. In April 1940, the Nazis issued a decree to remove all “half breeds” from the armed forces to prevent a potential softening of the Nuremberg laws.\textsuperscript{166} After his dismissal, Blumenfeld initially was allowed to return to business. In December 1942, he was arrested by the Gestapo, however. According to Blumenfeld, he had been charged with “subversion of national defence”. Travelling on business, Blumenfeld later conceded he had “conspired with Englishmen, Swedes, Danes and Germans against Hitler”.\textsuperscript{167} In January 1943, Blumenfeld was deported to Auschwitz and from there in October 1943 to Buchenwald. Thanks to his mother, Erik survived the horrors

\textsuperscript{165} Blumenfeld, Profile, 9.
\textsuperscript{166} Bajohr, Hanseat und Grenzgänger, 33.
\textsuperscript{167} Ben Witter, “Meine Härte habe ich in Auschwitz verbraucht“ – Erik Blumenfeld ein Politiker mit Drang zur Unabhängigkeit, Die Zeit, April 6, 1979. Frank Bajohr states however that the reasons for Blumenfeld’s arrest could not be reconstructed completely. See Bajohr, Hanseat und Grenzgänger, 37.
of the concentration camps and was set free just a few weeks prior to armistice. In her fight
to save Erik, Ebba Möller Blumenfeld was supported by the young lawyer Gerd Bucerius
from Hamburg. This provided the basis for a lifelong friendship between Blumenfeld and
Bucerius, who was among the founders and later publisher of the newly established weekly
_Die Zeit_. Hence Erik witnessed the end of World War II and the arrival of the allies as a free
man in Hamburg.

**Reviving business in Hamburg**

In the immediate post-war period until the summer of 1946, Erik Blumenfeld focused on his
family’s businesses. One of the first important business meetings took place in Essen, central
part of the Ruhr area in June 1945. The Krupp family had invited Blumenfeld. Prior to World
War II, Krupp had acquired the company Bd. Blumenfeld in the context of the general
aryanization of Jewish businesses in 1938. Now that Alfried Krupp had been arrested by
American forces facing charges of crimes against humanity and the Krupp’s industrial empire
was threatened by total dismantling, Krupp sought to re-establish a joint company. Yet, this
offer should not be mistaken as genuine act of generous voluntary restitution. The Krupps
were eager to win potential advocates for the coming war crime trials in Nuremberg. And
indeed after Alfried Krupp had been sentenced to 12 years in prison in 1948, Blumenfeld
contacted US High Commissioner John J. McCloy petitioning him alongside Eric Warburg to
release Krupp. The arrangement was, however, to the benefit of Blumenfeld as well. The
Bd. Blumenfeld GmbH under Erik Blumenfeld’s leadership emerged as the biggest coal
importer in West Germany during the 1950s. Reviving the Blumenfeld businesses included,
besides re-establishing old business contacts in the United Kingdom, to make new ones across
the Atlantic. On his first trips to the US in the late 1940s, Blumenfeld was quite successful in

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168 Ebba Möller Blumenfeld used an old acquaintance, the medical counselor Felix Kersten who was Heinrich
Himmler’s personal masseur to intervene on Erik’s behalf. Thus, she sent him food packages as well as
money to Auschwitz. See ibid., 42-43.
169 See ibid., 40-55.
170 See ibid., 57-58. See also section on Eric Warburg in this chapter.
pursuing business partners and soon Bd. Blumenfeld could import large amounts of coal from the US. The possibility to exploit new business opportunities secured Blumenfeld’s financial independence after the war. Unlike his friends Warburg and Emmet, he did, however, pursue a political career.

**Entering politics speaking out on economic issues**

Soon Erik Blumenfeld added official posts to his private business responsibilities. In 1946, he became vice president of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce and assumed leadership of Hamburg’s traffic and transport authority, joined the city’s industry committee, and chaired the traffic and transport committee. Thus Blumenfeld held key positions for the economic reconstruction of Hamburg only twelve months after the end of war. At this point Erik could no longer avoid joining a political party. The SPD and the Communist party, however, were out of question for Blumenfeld, although in Buchenwald he had met and come to appreciate a number of Social Democrats and Communists. Blumenfeld was a much too “status-conscious entrepreneur”, however, to become member of one of the left parties. Another reason was his total disagreement regarding questions of foreign policy in which the Communists in the Western and the Eastern zone of occupation uncritically followed the Soviet leadership. The SPD scared him off with its leader’s nationalistic overtones. Konrad Adenauer’s ideas of opening up to the West and to Europe, however, were more in accordance with Blumenfeld’s own convictions. Yet, the decision to eventually join the Christian Democratic Union in June 1946 was not an easy one for Blumenfeld as ‘the Christian’ in CDU did not appeal to him. In the end however, it was Konrad Adenauer’s personality that tipped the scale in favour of the Christian Democrats. In 1946, Hamburger politicians, among them the young Blumenfeld warmly welcomed Konrad Adenauer, Governing Mayor of the city of Cologne and CDU chairman of the British zone of occupation at the time. Blumenfeld reminisced the first times

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171 ibid., 58.
172 ibid., 65.
he saw Adenauer. “He [Konrad Adenauer] talks for a long time very forcefully, without any pathos, drawing a picture of the foreign policy forces and Germany’s future position. Straight as a die, just like when he arrived, does the then 71 years old man leave after several hours of talk and debate...”173 Two months later, Blumenfeld was a member of the Hamburg CDU’s executive committee. In October, he was nominated candidate for the Hamburg parliamentary elections and designated for the post of Senator for trade, crafts and shipping. Traditionally, Hamburg was a stronghold of Social Democracy. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), founded in 1945, was a newcomer in Hamburg. Membership of the Hamburg CDU reflected this as well. In 1946, the CDU had only 3,500 members, the SPD twenty times more. Together this explains the rapid rise of the young Blumenfeld in politics of post-war Hamburg.174 In 1946, Blumenfeld was elected to Hamburg’s city parliament, joining the opposition benches in the Hamburg Bürgerschaft.175

At this time, Germany was still under allied control. Therefore a central issue during debates in the Bürgerschaft were allied plans for dismantling German industry. Most members opposed this vehemently. Whilst contributing to parliamentary debates on the issue, Blumenfeld preferred behind-the-scenes, quiet and steady negotiations with the Allies over loud and aggressive voices expressing dismay in view of progressing dismantling in public. This attitude and approach were in complete accordance with Emmet’s and Warburg’s. Blumenfeld proposed to develop trustful relationships with the occupying forces by demonstrating willingness to European cooperation.176

Unsurprisingly, Blumenfeld as a Hamburg merchant and ship-owner distinguished himself, at least in the early years of his parliamentary career, as a frequent speaker on economic issues. Early on, prior to the founding of the Federal Republic, when it was still uncertain

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173 See Blumenfeld, Profile, 92-93.
175 Frank Bajohr, Erik Blumenfeld (Hamburg: Ellert & Richter Verlag, 2010), 123.
which path the German economic system would take, Erik Blumenfeld took a clear stance on the issue. He explicitly preferred “the private initiative of entrepreneurs” since this was “the best functioning engine of economic life”.\textsuperscript{177} Blumenfeld’s thinking on the preferred relationship between state and economy was influenced by Wilhelm Röpke’s and other Freiburg School intellectuals.\textsuperscript{178}

Calling upon his fellow entrepreneurs in West Germany, Blumenfeld reminded them that they could not fulfil their responsibility as promoter and supporter of social change when staying aloof of politics. In his opinion entrepreneurs had a political responsibility and had to assume a leading role in West German society.\textsuperscript{179} Blumenfeld’s biographer rightly characterised him as an ordoliberal.\textsuperscript{180} In the late 1940s, Blumenfeld was, hence, among those in Hamburg who enthusiastically supported Ludwig Erhard, then Director of Economics of the Bizonal Economics Council, from 1949 first economics minister of the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany and future chancellor (1963-1966).\textsuperscript{181}

\textit{Adenauer’s unofficial foreign policy adviser}

If Erhard was to Blumenfeld the icon of Germany’s post-war economic order, Adenauer represented bourgeois civil society in the German post-war society and thus was a role model he could look up to. As early as in the late 1940s, Blumenfeld had risen to unofficial emissary to Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first post-war chancellor. He reported back to

\textsuperscript{179} Blumenfeld, \textit{Profile}, 17.
\textsuperscript{180} Ptak, “Neoliberalism in Germany”, 98-138.
\textsuperscript{181} Moreover Erhard was the economic politician whose name is most closely associated with the West German economic miracle and the implementation of the so called social market economy (\textit{Soziale Marktwirtschaft}). See, for example, Arne Käthner, “The Making of a Normative Order. Concepts and Strategies of Liberal Networks in Post-War Germany” (Master thesis, Aarhus University, 2013), 42.
Adenauer after his frequent trips to England where he renewed pre-war contacts.\textsuperscript{182} Adenauer relied on Blumenfeld as well with regard to the US due to his well-established contacts there. Thus, Blumenfeld was significantly involved in the organisation of the West German chancellor’s first visit to the US in 1953.\textsuperscript{183} In 1960, Adenauer engaged Blumenfeld to officially observe the US presidential campaigns of John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in 1960; an appointment for which Blumenfeld’s personal relationship with the Kennedy family dating back to the late 1930s certainly played a decisive role. Blumenfeld clearly sympathised with the young Kennedy due to “his self-confidence, his persuasive power, and his enormously sure instinct”. In November 1960, he was more than enthused when JFK won the presidential election as he was convinced he would: “be a strong president” and felt “new dynamic forces and refreshing initiatives” would “be visible in Washington”.\textsuperscript{184} In the following year, Blumenfeld officially entered the federal stage of West German politics when he was elected to the Bundestag. Though a novice to federal parliament he immediately joined the prestigious Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committees of International Trade and Development Aid. These choices illustrated precisely where his political interests lay.\textsuperscript{185}

\textit{The Atlanticist looking East}

When Blumenfeld entered the federal arena of politics, he and Adenauer increasingly grew apart. Blumenfeld disagreed with the Chancellor’s foreign policy course steering ever closer to de Gaulle’s France, fearing the negative repercussions this could imply for German-American relations. As a Hamburg merchant, Blumenfeld belonged to the Anglophile and

\textsuperscript{182} Bajohr, \textit{Hanseat und Grenzgänger}, 149, 97.
\textsuperscript{183} For more details on Blumenfeld’s role in organising Adenauer’s trip see chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
Atlanticist faction within the CDU/CSU in which economics minister Ludwig Erhard and foreign affairs minister Gerhard Schröder were central figures.\(^{186}\)

With Hamburg’s preference for free trade and worldwide business, entrepreneurs and politicians alike trusted exclusively the US to protect those interests. Blumenfeld advocated a close alliance with the Anglo-Saxon powers over the German-French alliance, which would focus almost exclusively on Western Europe. In addition, US efforts for détente suited Hamburg interests in trading with the East much better. Thus Blumenfeld also advocated a more flexible Ostpolitik, which found an early expression in the Politik der Elbe, Hamburg’s independent foreign trade policy towards the East centring on the economic interests of the city’s port in place since the mid-1950s.\(^ {187}\) Blumenfeld was affiliated with the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations, a joint organisation of the leading associations representing West German business founded in 1952. He cooperated particularly close with two members, Ernst-Wolff Mommsen and Otto Wolff von Amerongen, who were members of the Atlantik-Brücke as well.\(^ {188}\)

Due to his staunch Atlanticism, Blumenfeld welcomed Ludwig Erhard succeeding Adenauer as chancellor at the end of 1963. Long before Adenauer finally resigned, Blumenfeld, Marion Dönhoff and Gerd Bucerius of Die Zeit had promoted Erhard’s claim to leadership. When Erhard finally did become West Germany’s second chancellor he and Blumenfeld had long been bound by a personal trust-based relationship. Thus again Blumenfeld advised the West German chancellor on foreign policy issues, and acted as interpreter of German politics and representative of the Federal Republic abroad. During the 1960s, Blumenfeld travelled extensively to the United States. At least once a year he visited

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\(^ {188}\) Ibid., 167.
the US either in consultation with the German foreign office or on behalf of Erhard. In December of 1964, for example, Blumenfeld met with vice president Hubert Humphrey, Lyndon B Johnson’s foreign policy advisor and a number of senators to discuss the multilateral force (MLF) and West Germany’s involvement therein.\textsuperscript{189} After Erhard’s downfall and with the incoming Great Coalition under Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Blumenfeld was pushed to the margins of Bonn’s political establishment.\textsuperscript{190} Subsequently Blumenfeld reoriented towards European politics. He was a member of the European Parliament for 16 years and joined the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe as well as the parliamentary assembly of NATO.\textsuperscript{191}

Born into a Hamburg merchant family active in shipping and trade, and politically socialized in the city’s parliament, Blumenfeld was also a typical representative of the port city, Hamburg. Since at least the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, this city has been associated with internationalism and liberal trade capitalism.\textsuperscript{192} Unsurprisingly, Hamburg politicians like Blumenfeld perceived of the US as the only power capable of guarantying global free trade and hence the economic recovery of Europe after the devastation of World War II.

Blumenfeld had not only a similar outlook upon the world situation after 1945 as his three co-founders of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG: he had also shared with them a privileged upbringing symbolized among other things in his multilingual education and schooling at Salem. Blumenfeld’s transatlantic leanings and his “state spirit” found expression in his activities in the Übersee-Club, the Atlantik-Brücke, and his regular participation in the

\textsuperscript{189} ibid., 159-176.


\textsuperscript{191} Bajohr, Erik Blumenfeld, 123.

Königswinter conferences of the German-English Society from 1950 onwards and Anglo-German Club in Hamburg.193

Conclusion

The four individuals forming the nucleus of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG had a lot in common. They shared a privileged background, bourgeois or aristocratic, that translated into privileged access to education as well as into a cosmopolitan upbringing. This facilitated their post-war devotion to liberal internationalism and staunch opposition to Communism. Moreover, Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld were imbued with “state spirit”. They all felt called to do good for their nation and their countries’ relationship after 1945. In doing so, they all were well-equipped with transatlantic links predating World War II. The ensuing activities in this regard were, however, not formally legitimated. Warburg, Emmet, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld acted as private diplomats instead.

They also differed, however. It was, obviously crucial that the four founders had different nationalities, German and American. Eric Warburg was citizen of both, the United States and West Germany. What is more, he was Jewish and thus assumed the role of cultural mediator and conciliator. Status and reputation of the Warburg name in international banking and business in Germany as well as in the US perfectly facilitated Eric Warburg’s role as fundraiser for the joint transatlantic endeavour. Christopher Emmet was the intellectual and political mind in the group of founders. His far-reaching connections into the US foreign policy establishment as well as into West German politics served the cause of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG for 20 years. Marion Dönhoff, the only woman among the founders as among the members of the Atlantik-Brücke for many years contributed to the cause in two ways. As East Prussian countess, she linked the transatlantic network to the old European aristocratic elite. As journalist and editor of Die Zeit, Dönhoff facilitated access to the West

German media landscape and acted as crucial multiplier reaching out to a broader public. Erik Blumenfeld, the youngest among the founders, was portrayed as go-between of business and politics. Blumenfeld as a rising star in the young Christian Democratic Union was instrumental for the aims of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke as he had access to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his successor Ludwig Erhard. Furthermore, as successful businessman he linked the growing transatlantic elite network to West German industry and business circles. These differences were not antagonistic but rather complementary and thus beneficial for establishing the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG and the developing transnational elite network. While Emmet and Warburg were opposed to Ostpolitik, Dönhoff and Blumenfeld welcomed the rapprochement, illustrating particular interests of parts of the West German bourgeoisie. Differences among the founders in this regard foreshadowed some of the conflicts and controversies the transatlantic network had to deal with. Furthermore, the lives of Dönhoff and Blumenfeld provide us with insight into the debates surrounding the orientation of the FRG in the 1950s and 1960s.

194 See in particular Chapter 5 of this dissertation – debates at the German-American conferences pertaining to the issue of East-West trade.
Chapter 2:

The “good” Germans and their American friends: the Atlantik-Brücke’s and the ACG’s membership

The four founders Eric Warburg, Christopher Emmet, Marion Dönhoff, and Erik Blumenfeld were at the centre of the previous chapter. This chapter focuses on the organisations that they founded, the Atlantik-Brücke in Hamburg and the ACG in New York and on the members of these organisations. According to Christopher Emmet, the members were “the best German survivors” and the best example for American “liberals in the good old-fashioned sense”.¹

While Chapter One established the elite status of the founders and their complementary function with regard to establishing two transatlantic organisations, chapter two analyses if and how the functional pattern of the founders was reproduced with regard to the membership of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. Hence, this chapter discusses the special composition of both organisations in order to draw conclusions about the specific function of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke in the context of West German-American post-war relations and the Cold War.

Ultimately, the chapter aims at characterising the membership of both the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, thus demonstrating how the founders were able to reproduce and maintain the elite character of their core group. They were particularly successful in expanding and fostering their numerous links to state institutions over the course of twenty odd years. This, in turn, enabled both groups to play an important role in the bilateral relations of the US and West Germany during the Cold War as is discussed below.² Following this assumption, the chapter examines if the membership of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG represented the

¹ Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Dec. 11, 1962, SWA.
² Chapter 3 focuses on the groups’ public diplomacy activities, chapter 4 on informal diplomacy, political consulting, and chapter 5 on the two organizations’ transatlantic networking ultimately aiming at promoting a common identity.
“power elite” of West Germany and United States or rather a “foreign policy establishment”. According to C. Wright Mills, key features of the “power elite” concept include an overlap and exchange within the “triangle of power” of politics, economy, and military facilitated by a “considerable traffic of personnel” within and between politics, economy, and military and by “specialized go-betweens”. In explaining the unity of this power elite, Mills attends to the social background of the members of this elite establishing a similarity of “origin and education ... career and style of life”. The term “foreign policy establishment” is first and foremost associated with the United States and furthermore intimately linked to the 20th century. It refers to individuals drawn from the corporate world, banking and law firms, Ivy League universities, leading philanthropic foundations, and media with privileged access to politics. Members of this establishment take a particular interest in American foreign affairs propagating active and interventionist role for the United States in world politics.

The chapter is divided into three main sections following up on the above raised questions. The first considers the prelude to the actual founding of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG in 1954 with a special focus on Christopher Emmet’s initial plans for an Ausschuss fuer deutsch-amerikanische Verstaendigung against the background of the Western world facing the challenges and repercussions of the Korean War starting in 1950. The following two sections concentrate on the development of the composition of membership of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG with a sociological view on the groups’ profile.

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5 Roberts, “‘All the Right People’”, 409.
Prelude: 1950–1954

Christopher Emmet resumed his visits to Germany in 1949, the year of the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany.⁶ A year later, in the spring of 1950, Erik Blumenfeld and Marion Dönhoff together with the office of Max Brauer, mayor of Hamburg, organised a lecture tour targeting a mixed audience of businessmen and Social Democrats in Hamburg. Among the key issues identified by the organisers to be addressed by Emmet in his lectures were “American Public Opinion Toward Germany” and “Rearmament of Germany”.⁷

By the early 1950s, the Cold War was already in full swing. Tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western bloc had flared up a few times; in 1948 the Soviets blockaded all access routes to West Berlin initiating the Berlin airlift. In 1949 the so called “fall of China” – the creation of the People’s Republic of China marking the victory of the Communists over the nationalists in China – seemed to prove to the West the aggressive expansionist nature of Communism. In the summer of 1950, this perception was further fuelled by the conflict between North Korea and South Korea and the ensuing intervention of the United States. In sum, according to Volker Berghahn, these events reaffirmed the conviction of leading US decision-makers that the circumstances made it necessary for West Germany to share the burden of fighting Soviet Communism – financially and militarily. Furthermore, from an American perspective it was difficult to perceive why West Germany should use its economic growth exclusively to enhance the standard of living and further strengthen export instead of investing into defence.⁸

⁶ Letter from Hans Karl von Borries to Christopher Emmet, Mar. 10, 1970, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 64, HIA.
⁷ Letter from Christopher Emmet to Erik Blumenfeld, Apr. 23, 1950, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 63, HIA.
⁸ Berghahn, Unternehmer und Politik in der Bundesrepublik, 266.
Yet serious hurdles on both sides of the Atlantic challenged West German involvement. US public opinion was more than sceptical towards Germans and West Germany so shortly after the victory over the Nazi regime. Doubts about the Germans’ renunciation of Nazism were widespread. Even HICOG staff worried about a “trend toward nationalism and a yearning for authoritarian rule” in West Germany coinciding with an increasing impatience with US occupation. West German public opinion and that of the political elites posed further problems. An opinion poll conducted in March 1950, showed that 52 percent of West Germans were opposed to establishing an army in the Federal Republic. In 1955, still 45 percent said they would disapprove of an army. From an American perspective, the oppositional Social Democrats aggravated this situation by complaining that rearmament of West Germany would threaten prospects for a peaceful reunification of Germany. In the early 1950s, industrial elites in particular still held strong resentments against Allied de-nazification and de-militarising policies. At the time, when the US began voicing demands for West, Germans to share the burden of defending the West former officers and arms industrialists still served sentences as convicted war criminals. Moreover, in terms of public opinion, both West Germany and the US faced image problems. The former suffered from the prejudice that all Germans were incorrigible Nazis. The latter faced, according to Volker Berghahn, a deep-seated cultural anti-Americanism nurtured by the Europeans’ superiority complex. This was prevalent not only among people leaning towards Socialism and Communism but was as

9 Domestic opposition to rearmament, for example, the French Assembly’s of the EDC, and Moscow’s offer of free all-German elections in 1955, see David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 86, 205, 222.
11 HICOG papers (Record Group 84), National Archives quoted from James G. Hershberg, “‘Explosion in the Offing’”: German Rearmament and American Diplomacy, 1953–1955”, *Diplomatic History* vol. 16, no. 4 (1992): 519.
15 Berghahn *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe*, xv.
strong among the Christian conservative right and applied in particular to the economic and intellectual elite.\(^{16}\) It was, therefore, a strategically smart move by Christopher Emmet to especially target the business community during his early trips to West Germany. The next section of this chapter examines the particular role of businessmen within the Atlantik-Brücke in greater depth.

The rebuttal of mutual prejudices, German anti-Americanism and American prejudices against Germans, thus fuelled Emmet’s, Warburg’s, Blumenfeld’s and Dönhoff’s motivation to promote better bilateral relations between the Federal Republic and the United States by founding two cooperating private organisations. According to Christopher Emmet, the “Korean defeat, the revival of American isolationism and continued difficulties of a German participation in the defense of Europe” made it necessary to establish a German committee, which would have to cooperate with American groups determined to support the building of “a democratic, anti-Communist Germany”. At this point, Emmet had already drafted an elaborate plan for an *Ausschuss fuer deutsch-amerikanische Verstaendigung* (Committee for German-American understanding), which he laid out in a letter to Colonel Byraode of the State Department’s German Desk in early 1951. In this letter, Emmet also set forth which criteria German members would have to meet in order to join this committee. They would have to prove a positive anti-Nazi record and they would have to be anti-Communist and pro-American. Emmet supplemented his letter with a list of over sixty people who he considered suitable to join the *Ausschuss*. Emmet’s selection featured Christian and Social Democrats (CDU and SPD) as well as Free Democrats (FDP), trade unionists, journalists, politicians, academicians and a good number of members of the so called July 20 resistance movement, a group of predominantly noble officers in the *Wehrmacht* unsuccessfully plotting against Hitler in 1944\(^{17}\) – thus foreshadowing the composition of membership of the German

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\(^{16}\) Ibid., 94, 211-212.

\(^{17}\) See footnote 61 in Chapter 1 and Orbach, “Criticism Reconsidered: The German Resistance to Hitler in Critical German Scholarship”, 565-590.
organisation to be founded only a few months later that year. In fact, a number of those mentioned on Emmet’s list later would have a decisive part in the story of the Atlantik-Brücke. Among them were Erik Blumenfeld, Ernst Friedlaender, and Marion Countess Dönhoff, Max Brauer, Ernst Reuter, Otto A. Friedrich, Hellmut Becker, and Fabian von Schlabrendorff18 – a mix of journalists, businessmen, Social Democratic politicians, academics and former members of the resistance movement, an assembly that was to become characteristic of Atlantik-Brücke’s membership.

In March 1951, following their initial meetings, the West Germans proceeded quickly with the plan to establish an organisation by forming first of all a committee by the name Transatlantik-Brücke. The committee set up office in Hamburg, not Bonn – the seat of West Germany’s government – and hired an executive director. The trained lawyer, Dr Walter Stahl, had already gathered considerable experience in the political committee sector as deputy secretary of the German Council of the European Movement prior to his employment with the Atlantik-Brücke.19 He was to remain with the Atlantik-Brücke for the coming decades being mainly responsible for the organisation’s correspondence and publication work.

In the early 1950s, American public opinion toward Germany remained controversial to say the least. “Dangerous belligerence in the political attitude in large sections of German opinion” was seen by the New York Times correspondent Jack Raymond as well as a failure of the Germans “to accept the lessons of the Nuremberg trials”.20 In another New York Times article, author Friedrich T. H. Tetens went even further claiming that seven years of occupation and re-education on the side of the occupying forces had been a total failure and was convinced that “German militarists ... will make a deal again with their Red counterparts

19 “IV. Deutsch-Amerikanische Konferenz, 12.-15. November in Berlin, Kurzbiographien der Teilnehmer”, Marcia Kahn papers (ED 364 Vol. 7), IfZ.
whenever an opportune moment will arise.” Therefore, the ACG set up by Emmet in the spring of 1952 initially focused on providing American newspapers with information pertaining to developments in West Germany in order to balance media reports. Emmet and his assistant Marcia Kahn sent around reports written by Walter Stahl commenting, for example, on the reparation negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the new state of Israel, and the debt relief negotiations in London taking place during 1952. However, unlike the Transatlantik-Brücke, the ACG could not afford to set up an office. Instead Christopher Emmet provided space in his family’s apartment in New York’s Upper West Side.

The composition of both groups reflected characteristic features that the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG would further develop during the 1950s and 1960s. As table 1 indicates, the group of founders of the Transatlantik-Brücke featured a mix of representatives of business and industry, media, and politics with the first category clearly in the majority. With a view to the composition of the ACG’s first executive committee in table 2 one feature is particularly noteworthy – the fact that half of the committee’s members were émigrés born in Germany. The other half also had significant links to Germany. Emmet, for instance, had spent much of his childhood, youth and young adulthood in Germany. George N. Shuster and Theodore Knauth had served HICOG and the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) respectively. In terms of committee members’ professions we see a mix of bankers, lawyers, academics, and authors. However, it is noteworthy that the category representing business was in quantitative terms small, especially in comparison with the German counterpart organisation. Hence, the fact that the German group included so many business

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22 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Joseph Kaskell, Jun. 10, 1952, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 82, HIA.
23 Interview with Fagin, Jun. 6, 2012.
24 See chapter 1 in this dissertation.
representatives whereas the ACG lacked them points to a characteristic feature in the relationship of these two formally independent organisations.
Table 1: Founders of the Transatlantik-Brücke, 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function/ Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Erik Blumenfeld</td>
<td>Member of the Hamburg Bürgerschaft (CDU); businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Karl von Borries</td>
<td>President Ruhr Stickstoff AG (Ruhr nitrogen corporation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marion Dönhoff</td>
<td>Journalist Die Zeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernst Friedlaender</td>
<td>Journalist and activist for European unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gotthart von Falkenhausen</td>
<td>Banker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Günter Henle</td>
<td>Chairman Klöckner concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Schäfer</td>
<td>President Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce; chairman Phoenix Gummiwerke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich Spennrath</td>
<td>Chairman of AEG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Advisory board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function/ Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Max Brauer</td>
<td>1st Mayor of Hamburg (SPD), 1946-1953 and 1957-1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Arnold</td>
<td>2nd minister president of the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (CDU), 1947-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernst Reuter</td>
<td>1st Mayor of West Berlin (SPD), 1946-1953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the 1950s, 1960s, and well into the 1970s, their relationship involved a certain financial dependence on the part of the ACG. This, however, seemed to have been intended, as Emmet saw the Atlantik-Brücke as being responsible for raising the necessary funds through “American friends of our German friends”. He believed such an arrangement to be ideal as it prevented funders trying “to change or hamper” their “present discreet plan of operation”. Moreover, it would spare Emmet and the ACG from going “out and risk selling ourselves to American business men” who had, according to Emmet, “much less political understanding than the German counterparts.”

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25 “Transatlantik-Brücke” letter from Walter Stahl to Marcia Kahn, Dec. 1, 1952, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 14, HIA.
26 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, Oct. 4, 1952, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 81, HIA. See also letters from Emmet to Jospeh Kaskell, Jul. 12, 1952, Box 82, Marcia Kahn to Christopher Emmet, undated, Box 81, Eric Warburg to Christopher Emmet, Oct. 3, 1952, Box 103, Christopher Emmet Papers, HIA. The financial situation of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke is attended to in greater detail in chapter 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function/Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Emmet</td>
<td>Activist/publicist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George N. Shuster</td>
<td>Former Land Commissioner for Bavaria (1950/51); president Hunter College, NYC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric M. Warburg*</td>
<td>Banker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kaskell*</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norbert Muhlen*</td>
<td>Journalist and author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodor M. Knauth</td>
<td>Former member of Religious Division of Military Government in Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fritz Oppenheimer*</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold Wolfers*</td>
<td>Prof. of International Relations, Yale University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*German-born and emigrated, except for Wolfers who was born in Switzerland;

**The Atlantik-Brücke**

*The 1950s: Establishing a white-washing agency for West German industry*

The next step in strengthening the Atlantik-Brücke’s position as a transatlantic public relations agency came in September 1954, when the group registered as a non-profit association with the Municipal Court in Hamburg. The members were fully aware that in the mid-1950s, there existed “a number of organisations and institutes in Germany that are concerned with political, economic, social and cultural conditions in the U.S.A. and thus contribute to a better understanding of U.S. positions in the Federal Republic of Germany. In contrast, however, there was no notable organisation that attempts to work into the other direction.” They intended to fill that void. 27

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27 See Summary Record of the general meeting of the Transatlantik-Brücke, Sep. 25, 1954.
Table 3: Signatories of articles of association of *Transatlantik-Brücke*

Signed Sept. 25, 1954 in Hamburg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function/ Position</th>
<th>Sector/ Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hans Karl von Borries</td>
<td>President <em>Ruhr Stickstoff AG</em></td>
<td>Chemical industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marion Dönhoff</td>
<td>Journalist <em>Die Zeit</em></td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gotthard von Falkenhausen</td>
<td>Personally liable partner <em>Burkhardt &amp; Co.</em>, Essen</td>
<td>Private banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernst Friedlaender</td>
<td>Publicist and activist for European unity</td>
<td>Media, politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerhard Geyer</td>
<td>CEO <em>Esso AG</em>, Hamburg</td>
<td>Petroleum industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Christoph von Tucher</td>
<td>Board member <em>Bayerische Vereinsbank</em>, Munich</td>
<td>Banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich Wilhelm Ziervogel</td>
<td>CEO, <em>Ruhrgas, AG</em></td>
<td>Gas trading</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The young organisation’s prime field of activity was directed towards US public opinion intending to explain West German policies to Americans. Bonn might, therefore, have been the more appropriate place for the planned enterprise. Yet, the geographical remoteness to the seat of government in Bonn may also be interpreted as an expression of symbolic distance to official politics. In view of Hamburg’s image as home of Germany’s cosmopolitan liberal merchant elite the choice appears, however, less surprising. At the end of the 19th century, Hamburg had emerged as commercial metropolis only second to London and New York. Early in the 20th century the Hamburg America Line (Hapag) ascended to become the world’s largest shipping company and thus established the international reputation for Hamburg’s shipbuilding industry. Merchants definitely contributed further to the city’s rapid economic growth. Banks and insurance companies naturally concentrated in a centre of trade and world traffic, industrial and technical growth. The bourgeois elite of Hamburg was rooted in a mindset originating in the Wilhelmine era, characterised by power consciousness, knowledge of the world and rich experience in dealing with the political and economic powerful of the world. Moreover this mindset featured a critical distance towards the conservative elites

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28 *Articles of Association of Transatlantik-Brücke (Satzung der Transatlantik-Brücke) held at Municipal Court Berlin-Charlottenburg (Vereinsregister beim Amtsgericht Berlin Charlottenburg).*
subsumed as liberal political understanding. A touch of this attitude and outlook of the Hamburg upper class survived the Second World War and the ensuing occupation period to be revived by the founders of the Atlantik-Brücke and its members.

The articles of association – a prerequisite for registering as non-profit organisation – set forth that new members could be admitted by co-optation only. Potential members had to be invited and approved by vote of the existing members of the Atlantik-Brücke. Once admitted to membership, members were eligible to regularly vote for the executive board of the group. Thus, a careful selection process for members was ensured, maintaining the elite character of the Atlantik-Brücke as envisioned by the original founders; the more so as German business and industrial elites were traditionally acquainted with the gatekeeper function of older representatives. Hence cooptation into the Atlantik-Brücke was a broadly accepted proof of prestige of the newly founded organisation. In addition, the new official status of a non-profit organisation implied an additional built-in advantage. The Atlantik-Brücke was exempt from income and business tax. This in turn meant that membership fees and financial donations to the organisation were tax-deductible – an incentive, no doubt, in attracting financially strong industry and business representatives to the cause of contributing to a better understanding of West Germany in the US, who in turn were expected to pay annual membership fees of a few thousand deutschmarks.

Selecting potential members was therefore a key issue on the agenda of the first annual meeting of the Atlantik-Brücke upon registration in September 1954. Inviting managers of top-class companies and prominent journalists and academicians served two aims. Firstly, big names enhanced the organisation’s appeal by offering membership in an exclusive and

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29 Loose, Hamburg: Geschichte der Stadt und ihrer Bewohner: Vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart, 21-25; 378-386.
30 Articles of Association Transatlantik-Brücke signed Sept. 25, 1954 in Hamburg now Municipal Court Berlin-Charlottenburg (Vereinsregister beim Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg), paragraph 5 “membership”.
32 This is attended to in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
prestigious club. Secondly, and more importantly, it was essential to attract financially strong members to ensure further development of the organisation’s programmes and activities. The attendees at this September meeting, hence, explicitly stressed the desirability of inviting a representative of the Norddeutsche Bank, Bremen as well as of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, and of the Munich reinsurance or of the insurance company Allianz. Besides the financial industry the members also wanted to co-opt a representative of the long-established shipping company Hapag, the Hamburg-Amerikanische Paketfahrt Aktiengesellschaft, and the even older electrical engineering company Siemens.33 And indeed this strategy proved to be very successful. Only three years later, the Atlantik-Brücke had co-opted representatives of six more companies, among them Siemens and the Norddeutsche Kreditbank. Siemens’ company interest in the development of stable and friendly relations with the United States, however, was not merely justified by its business strategies to access the US as export market. Rather the Siemens & Halske AG and other major German firms used their newly established branches in the US to prepare and negotiate deals in South America. According to Reinhard Neebe, American banks made available the necessary funds for the realisation of such projects.34 Membership in the Atlantik-Brücke helped opening doors across the Atlantic given Eric Warburg’s broad and far-reaching networks particularly on New York’s Wall Street.

By 1960 total membership in the Atlantik-Brücke had increased to 39. Of those almost 80 per cent (see table 4) were corporate members. The most striking feature of the Atlantik-Brücke membership – the predominance of business and industrial circles – had hence fully developed at this point. In the course of the late 1950s, the pharmaceutical giant Schering, the automotive company Daimler Benz AG, and finally Hapag had joined. Hence, within less than a decade after its founding, the Atlantik-Brücke had managed to co-opt top-class

33 Summary record of the general meeting of the Transatlantik-Brücke, Sep. 25, 1954.
managers from basically all industrial sectors of the resurgent West German economy including the banking sector, chemical and oil industry, gas trading business, rubber, mechanical engineering, metal and food industries as well as the automotive sector.\(^{35}\) Despite this evident success in attracting the business elite, Eric Warburg suggested to additionally approach German subsidiaries of American companies, such as Ford and Opel. The majority of the members, however, did not only oppose this suggestion. They even seemed offended and hence argued that “personalities represented in the Atlantik-Brücke were determined to make a purely German contribution to German-American friendship”\(^{36}\) This attitude appears quite out of place in an organisation promoting “German-American friendship”. It offers, however, a glimpse of the confident self-perception of West German industrial elites nurtured by national pride alongside a denial of accepting “total destruction of Germany’s power position in Europe” as well as fear of superior business competitors.\(^{37}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Business/industry</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>politics</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>media</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>academia</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>other</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>3*+ 3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>4*+ 4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>3*+ 8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*double counting: the person categorized as politician was also counted as businessman

It is, moreover, noteworthy that by 1960, Atlantik-Brücke corporate membership featured companies from six different federal states plus West Berlin indicative of the elite clubs trans-regional appeal and unique selling point nation-wide. Likewise, it is striking that companies

\(^{35}\) For a detailed membership list see appendix.  
\(^{36}\) Summary protocol of annual meeting of Atlantik-Brücke e.V., Mar. 4, 1959 in Düsseldorf, Municipal Court Berlin-Charlottenburg (VR 20196, Vol. 1).  
from the *Ruhr* featured so prominently throughout the period under consideration (see table 5). The Ruhr district located in the federal state of North-Rhine-Westphalia had been the German Reich’s industrial heartland and was one of Europe’s most significant industrial concentrations and one of its largest coal-producing areas. The history of the district during the Third Reich was closely associated with the big conglomerates of Flick and Krupp. During World War II, the Ruhr district was particularly affected by the allied bombings and after the war by allied de-industrialisation and de-nazification measures. Thus, anti-Americanism was exceptionally vigorous among Ruhr industrialists.

Against this background, we can establish a twofold reason for the high number of industrialists especially from the Ruhr district, among the Atlantik-Brücke membership. On the one hand, the perspective of the founders and officers of the Atlantik-Brücke may be considered. Given their well-connected background and intimate knowledge of German industrial circles it can be assumed that Dönhoff, Warburg, Blumenfeld and Emmet were quite aware of the widespread and strong anti-American sentiments in German industry and thus deliberately sought to co-opt influential industrialists. In the long run, the overarching objective of integrating West Germany into the Atlantic Community could only be accomplished by strategically assimilating conservatives as well into transatlantic elite networks with certain individuals serving as multipliers in countering anti-Americanism.

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Table 5: Regional breakdown of Atlantik-Brücke members representing business and industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRW</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRW-Ruhr</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, it is important to remember that Germany’s reputation and image had been substantially damaged abroad. The industrial elites felt the repercussions thereof especially hard. Hence, the motivation to improve German industry’s image by casting off the Nazi past should not be underestimated. To this end, joining the Atlantik-Brücke proved to be beneficial as this automatically associated members with Eric Warburg, an influential returning German Jew, and with former members of the resistance movement against Hitler. These two categories were central for Americans in order to distinguish the “good” Germans from Nazis. Concluding membership in the Atlantik-Brücke undergirded, at least for a number of corporate members, broader whitewashing strategies. Among the more tangible reasons for businessmen and industrialists to join the Atlantik-Brücke might as well have been the long-term objective of seeking restitution for confiscated property in the United States.⁴¹

The large share of business and industry representatives among Atlantik-Brücke members was starkly contrasted by the personalities chairing the organisation from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. With Ernst Friedlaender and Arnold Bergstraesser, two men lent their faces

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⁴⁰ BW= Baden Wurttemberg; HH= Hamburg; LS= Lower Saxony; NRW=North Rhine Westphalia; RP=Rhineland Palatine; SH=Schleswig Holstein.
⁴¹ This aspect is attended to in greater detail in chapter 4 of this thesis.
to the Atlantik-Brücke who were untainted by Germany’s Nazi past. Friedlaender was originally banker and merchant by profession. In the 1920s, he was acting director of the Agfa-Anilinfabrikation, a US subsidiary of IG-Farben. In the face of the political developments in the Weimar Republic, however, he abandoned this position in 1931 and returned to Europe. Friedlaender spent the Nazi-era in neutral Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Only one year after the end of World War II, he returned to Germany and began writing for Die Zeit. At the same time, Friedlaender started a political career becoming, according to Christopher Emmet, “one of the most active German members of the European movement.”

The European Movement was founded in 1948. All the different national member organisation of the European Movement had the overarching common aim of rapidly unifying Europe. Renowned European politicians such as Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Konrad Adenauer supported this transnational undertaking by acting as Presidents of Honour for the movement. However, it was not a purely European project. The financial malaise of the European Movement was cured by US government funds, which were covertly transferred using the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE) as a conduit. ACUE was formed in the 1940s with the aim of promoting European integration as a means of solving the German question and was run by senior figures from the US intelligence community such as Allen Welsh Dulles and William J. Donovan. The European Movement and its different national branches were central to organising mass support among the European population at large as well as among political and economic elites for the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community and a European Assembly.

Friedlaender’s crucial position in the European Movement was particularly important to the Atlantik-Brücke as he rubbed shoulders with

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42 “Friedlaender, Ernst” in Munzinger Online/Personen – Internationales Biographisches Archiv (www.munizinger.de/documents/00000007812 May, 5, 2013). Working as freelance columnist Friedlaender wrote a “weekly column in three leading newspapers of Germany and also a monthly article for the London Spectator.” Letter from Christopher Emmet to CJ Friedrich, Jan. 27, 1953, CJF, HUGFP 17.12, Correspondence and other papers, CA 1940-1964, Box 11.

world leaders and the internationalist-minded US foreign policy establishment.\textsuperscript{44} Moreover, he had gained a reputation as political columnist and vice executive editor of the German weekly \textit{Die Zeit}. He turned to freelancing, though, when in the early 1950s, the weekly moved too far to the right for his taste. Yet, to Christopher Emmet, Friedlaender was “one of the foremost German political writers” of post-war Germany.\textsuperscript{45}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|p{18cm}|}
\hline
\textbf{Years} & \textbf{Name} & \textbf{Profession/ function} \\
\hline
1954-1959 & Ernst Friedlaender & Journalist, activist European Movement \\
\hline
1959-1962 & Arnold Bergstraesser & Professor of Sociology and Political Science \textit{Albert-Ludwigs-Universität}, Freiburg; director German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), 1955-1959 \\
\hline
1962-1972 & Gotthard von Falkenhausen & Personally liable partner of the bank \textit{Burkhardt & Co.}, Essen; president of European Banking Federation; president of Association of German private banks \\
\hline
1972-1978 & Casimir Prinz Wittgenstein & CEO \textit{Metallgesellschaft AG}, Frankfurt/ M. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Chairmen of the Atlantik-Brücke, 1954 -1974}
\end{table}

Friedlaender was succeeded by Arnold Bergstraesser, the eminent founder of political science in post-war West Germany. Like his predecessor, Bergstraesser was a re-migrant. He had fled the Nazi regime and immigrated to the United States. There he taught at Claremont Colleges, California and the University of Chicago. After serving guest professorships at the universities in Frankfurt and Erlangen, Bergstraesser was appointed chair of political and social science at the University of Freiburg. Just prior to his presidency over the Atlantik-Brücke he had also been director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and hence established long-lasting connections to West Germany’s central foreign policy think tank.\textsuperscript{46} The history of the Atlantik-Brücke during the second half of the 1950s, thus, was characterised by organisational links to the evolving academic and intellectual sphere in West Germany via the Atlantik-Brücke’s chairmen. During the early phase of establishing the


\textsuperscript{45} Letter from Christopher Emmet to CJ Friedrich, Jan. 27, 1953, CJF, HUGFP 17.12, Correspondence and other papers, CA 1940-1964, Box 11.

Atlantik-Brücke domestically and in the US, Friedlaender and Bergstraesser had served well the Atlantik-Brücke and its predominant business membership in giving the organisation an untainted and innocuous image.

By the early 1960s, representatives of industry and business dominated the membership of the Atlantik-Brücke insisting on a chairman from among their own ranks. Hence, in 1962, Gotthard von Falkenhausen was elected chairman serving for the coming ten years until 1972. The banker, who also held a doctorate in law, was indeed a heavyweight of the real and financial economy of the young republic. Falkenhausen held a number of prestigious and influential positions in the 1960s. He was personal liable partner of the private bank Burkhardt & Co., prior to Aryanization Hirschland bank. Furthermore, he presided over the German-French chamber of commerce founded in 1955 as well as the chamber of industry and commerce of Essen in the Ruhr district. Furthermore, Falkenhausen was chief lobbyist for the private banking sector, both on the national and on the European level heading the federal association of German private bank trade and the Banking Federation of the European Economic Community (EEC). His local and regional standing was further enhanced by his political function within the municipal councillor of the city of Essen in which he represented the Christian Democratic Party. According to a portrayal in Die Zeit, he was clearly a man “with roots in the universal traditions of the haute bourgeoisie” which found expression “in the harmonious connection of culture and money” and international thinking linked with local political commitment.47 Altogether, the sum of these functions and characteristics distinguished Falkenhausen as key networker and multiplier within the industrial Ruhr district and beyond and thus made him so valuable for the Atlantik-Brücke. In contrast, Christopher Emmet – who organised a dinner for von Falkenhausen in May 1963 at the Harvard Club to introduce the Atlantik-Brücke chairman to the ACG’s New York network – considered him

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“not highly intelligent” but admitted that he was “very respected, well-connected, well-informed and level-headed”.

*The 1960s: The politicisation of a private elite club*

The 1960s were a decade of dramatic change in the political arena of West Germany. The post-war period of great political stability symbolised by consecutive Christian Democratic-led cabinets ended with Konrad Adenauer’s resignation in 1963. This marked a change of generations in politics. At the same time, it marked social changes with a relative descending of conservatism and the rise of liberalism. As the Christian Democrats lost ground, the Social Democrats gained and eventually entered a coalition government in 1966. Those developments on the national scene were foreshadowed by structural changes of the Atlantik-Brücke which allowed for a more prominent role of active politicians in the organisation. The basic pattern in the composition of membership, however, did not change. On the contrary, the strong base of business and industry representatives was further expanded.

In 1961, the Atlantik-Brücke members co-opted, for example, Otto A. Friedrich, at the time CEO of Phoenix rubber works in Hamburg-Harburg and according to Christopher Emmet “the most politically intelligent German business man I have ever met”. Emmet’s assessment of Friedrich corresponded well with the role Friedrich envisioned for West German entrepreneurs in the world as “business diplomats” – a telling example for Friedrich’s “state spirit”. In many ways Friedrich epitomised the key characteristics of the Atlantik-Brücke membership, namely a concentration of economic and social power combined with privileged access to politics. Despite having joined the NSDAP in 1941, he resumed his

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48 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Carl Joachim Friedrich, Apr. 9, 1963, CJF, HUGFP 17.12, Correspondence and other Papers, CA 1940-1964, Box 12, HUA.
50 Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Jan. 24, 1963, Carl Joachim Friedrich Papers, HUGFP 17.12, Correspondence and other Papers, CA 1940-1964, Box 12, HUA.
management position at the Phoenix AG immediately after the end of World War II and even became government advisor for commodities. From 1969 to 1973, Friedrich was, moreover, president of the Confederation of German Employer’s Associations (BDA). This powerful umbrella organisation represents the interest of the entire private sector in the West German economy. The fact that Friedrich’s career hardly suffered despite his entanglements with the Nazi regime might be explained by his professional US contacts as well as his family ties. In the 1920s, Friedrich had worked for the US tire company B.F. Goodrich in Akron, Ohio. His brother, the well-known political scientist Carl Joachim Friedrich had immigrated to the US in the 1920s and subsequently became professor at Harvard University in Cambridge, MA.\(^{52}\) Incidentally, Carl Joachim Friedrich joined the ACG in the early 1950s.\(^{53}\)

In the course of the 1960s, however, the Atlantik-Brücke paved the way for more overt access to West German politics. In 1964, the members elected three parliamentarians to serve on the Atlantik-Brücke’s executive board: Kurt Birrenbach, CDU; Fritz Erler, SPD; and W. Alexander Menne, FDP.

\(^{52}\) ibid.

\(^{53}\) See section on the ACG in this chapter.
Table 7: Board Members of the Atlantik-Brücke, 1954-1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-1992</td>
<td>Erik Blumenfeld, CDU</td>
<td>Politics/business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1959</td>
<td>Helmut Kuhn</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1972</td>
<td>Gotthard von Falkenhausen</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1965</td>
<td>Arnold Bergstraesser</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-?</td>
<td>Kurt Birrenbach, CDU</td>
<td>Politics/business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1967</td>
<td>Fritz Erler, SPD</td>
<td>Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-?</td>
<td>Alexander Menne, FDP</td>
<td>Politics/business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-?</td>
<td>Walter Stahl</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1971</td>
<td>Helmut Schmidt, SPD</td>
<td>Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1974</td>
<td>Hans Apel, SPD</td>
<td>Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-?</td>
<td>Friedrich Bechtle</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-?</td>
<td>Peter Corterier, SPD</td>
<td>Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1978</td>
<td>Casimir Prinz Wittgenstein</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cooptation of active parliamentarians necessitated, however, a change of internal rules. Until 1961, the Atlantik-Brücke would not accept active politicians as members “to prevent politicization of this private organisation” as Erik Blumenfeld explained at the annual meeting in 1961 irrespective of the fact that he was an active politician in the Hamburg CDU. After the general elections in 1961, this principle was abandoned, however. A key reason was that Erik Blumenfeld himself was elected to the German Bundestag. Thereupon Kurt Birrenbach, W. Alexander Menne, and Fritz Erler were co-opted.

When Birrenbach joined the Atlantik-Brücke, he had already served one parliamentary term in the Bundestag. As member of the prestigious Foreign Policy Committee, Birrenbach quickly advanced to become one of the leading US experts within the CDU/CSU parliamentary group and rose to be an intimate of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. During the Berlin crisis (1958-1961), for example, Adenauer sent Birrenbach to Washington to have talks.

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about the US-European Multilateral Force (MLF).\textsuperscript{55} Birrenbach’s international network was not limited to the US, however. He had also important links to the influential Monnet Action Committee, a private transnational organisation established by the Frenchman Jean Monnet in support of a strong transatlantic alliance.\textsuperscript{56} Chapter Four of this dissertation analyses the strategic value of Birrenbach’s multinational connections for the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG tangibly exerting influence on West German policy in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{57} Birrenbach’s professional background in import and export business of the iron-making industry would rather have suited a career as economic policy expert. His biography was untainted by Germany’s Nazi past; even more importantly Birrenbach had left Germany in 1939 to marry his wife, who was a “half-Jew” according to the Nazi’s Nuremberg Laws. This background characterised him as “good” German. Hence, in addition to his political career, Birrenbach was able to revive his previous line of work in the iron and steel business by acting as plenipotentiary for Anita Countess Zichy-Thyssen and chairman of the supervisory board of Thyssen Aktiengesellschaft für Beteiligungen.\textsuperscript{58}

The second politician on the Atlantik-Brücke’s executive board pursued a dual career as well. Yet, in the case of W. Alexander Menne, the concentration of power was even more striking than in Birrenbach’s. In the immediate post-war period, Menne contributed significantly to the re-organisation of Germany’s economy and society. As early as in the fall of 1945, Menne initiated the founding of the first association of the chemical industry, marking the beginning of tripartite corporatism in West Germany. Corporatism is characterised by a social partnership between organised interests of capital and labour

\textsuperscript{55} Kurt Birrenbach, Meine Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf 2 Jahrzehnte bundesdt. Außenpolitik (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1984), 15-82.
\textsuperscript{56} Matthias Schulz, “Die Politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet - Kurt Birrenbach, die Einheit des Westens und die ‘Präambel’ zum Elysée-Vertrag von 1963”, in Interessen verbinden, Jean Monnet und die Europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 300.
\textsuperscript{57} In Chapter 4 the subsection “The French-German friendship treaty 1963” provides more in-depth detail on Birrenbach’s role.
\textsuperscript{58} Hans-Peter Ernst Hinrichsen, “Der Ratgeber: Kurt Birrenbach und die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, (doctoral, VWF, Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung, Universität Bonn, 2002), 16-18. CV finding aid Birrenbach Papers (01-433), ACDP.
mediated by government. Industry associations have been a central component of this structure. From 1946 until 1956, Menne presided over one of the most powerful associations, the German federal Association of the Chemical Industry (VCI). From 1949 onwards, he was also vice-president of the Federation of German Industry (BDI) even more increasing his structural power as the BDI has been the umbrella organisation of the major industrial association in the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, in 1952 after the restructuring of IG-Farben, Menne became executive director of the Farbwerke Hoechst AG. His extra-parliamentary activities were meanwhile not limited to his post on the Atlantik-Brücke board. Menne was also president of the German-American Society and Steuben-Schurz-Society, private organisations also fostering German-American relations.  

With regard to the long-term impact of the Atlantik-Brücke, the co-optation of the Social Democrat Fritz Erler was most significant. As the SPD’s eminent expert on defence and foreign policy issues, Erler had already earned a notable reputation in West German politics prior to joining the Atlantik-Brücke. Even before the general elections in 1957, the German press already called him “Chancellor of the day after tomorrow” and eventually even “man of tomorrow”. Thus considered a respectable and suitable candidate, Erler had been invited to the first German-American conference in October 1959. The conference scheme was to become the Atlantik-Brücke’s and ACG’s central activity (see below chapter five on the German-American conferences). Fritz Erler – along with Herbert Wehner, Carlo Schmid, and Willy Brandt – spearheaded a fundamental reform of West German Social Democracy from the late 1950s onwards. This reform encompassed a generational change of the party leadership as well as a readjustment of the party’s political orientation. Most noteworthy in this regard was the SPD’s shift towards embracing Germany’s west integration and the

expressed commitment to NATO, affirming rearmament including the establishment of the Bundeswehr, endorsing of the social market economy, and last but not least emphasizing fundamental and growing distance from Communism. Erler’s receptiveness for the attitudes of the transatlantic bourgeoisie had contributed to this shift. When Erler first participated in the German-American conference in 1959, he was already familiar with formats of transatlantic elite meetings. Since 1955, Erler had regularly attended the Bilderberg conferences. The Bilderberg Group founded by Joseph Retinger, Paul van Zeeland and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands organised this transatlantic multinational conference scheme. Bilderberg was critical in paving the way for continental European integration by providing time and space for top level American and Western European representatives of government, business and media to have frank off-the-record debates. In 1955, Erler was not the only Social Democrat present. He was accompanied by Carlo Schmid and Max Brauer, the latter also being a member of the Atlantik-Brücke. By participating in such international elite conference formats Erler seized the opportunity to introduce his political concepts to an exclusive international western audience as well as connecting with influential US foreign policy figures. At the 1957 Bilderberg conference on St. Simons Island, United States, for example, Erler met the Rockefeller brothers Nelson and David, both belonging to the liberal wing of the Republican Party, and a number of intellectuals closer to the Democratic Party like Dean Rusk. All of them held influential positions in the Rockefeller, Ford or Carnegie foundations. Rusk even served as Secretary of State under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Erler’s involvement in such transatlantic elite networks was driven by his intention to convince especially American politicians of Social Democracy’s concept for German reunification. Another important reason was to disperse American fears of Social Democrats withdrawing from NATO once in government. Erler’s participation in transatlantic foreign

61 Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 372-78.
62 On the history of the Bilderberg conferences, see Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”.
63 Soell, Fritz Erler, 368-370.
policy conference schemes and his numerous trips to the United States during 1950s must be seen in the larger context of German Social Democracy’s strategy of establishing an image of a trustworthy alternative to the governing Christian Democrats that was simultaneously supported by elite organisations as the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG.

Thus, admitting members of the Social and Christian Democratic parties to the executive board of the Atlantik-Brücke was, on the one hand, an expression of the organisation’s growing political significance and, on the other it was a means to increase the group’s ability to exert influence on US political opinion and decision making. According to Gotthard von Falkenhausen, Atlantik-Brücke chairman “... it has always been the Atlantik-Brücke’s aim to influence US decision-making – indirectly by way of publications as well as directly”.

Undoubtedly, Erler’s and Birrenbach’s contacts to the highest echelons of Western power were part of the equation. According to Erler’s biographer Hartmut Soell, Erler had become one of the most favoured European politicians in Washington during the Kennedy administration. Many referred to Erler most enthusiastically and some even wondered whether he would become the next German ambassador to the United States. Likewise, Birrenbach had impressed Christopher Emmet with “his many close friendships with influential people in Washington.” Moreover, the integration and assimilation of active politicians into such informal elite contexts illustrates the blurry border between the state and private business circles.

Despite the growing number of active politicians among the members – by 1974 politicians accounted for 16.9 per cent of the membership – and politicians’ more prominent position on the board, business representatives remained in the preponderance since 1954 (table 4). While Atlantik-Brücke members sought to include all parties represented in the Bundestag – Social

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64 Summary record of the annual meeting of Atlantik-Brücke members, Feb. 20, 1964 in Bonn, municipal court Berlin-Charlottenburg (VR 20196).
65 Soell, Fritz Erler, 457.
66 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Walther Leisler Kiep, Feb. 23, 1968, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 82, HIA.
Democrats, Christian Democrats and the liberals of the Free Democrats – the transatlantic elite organisation’s membership did not include a single representative of West Germany’s strong labour organisations until the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{67} Central figures of the Atlantik-Brücke like Gotthard von Falkenhausen, Otto A. Friedrich, and W. Alexander Menne did, however, function as nodes linking the financial industry, commerce, industry and the public sphere and thus illustrated well the organisation’s position within West German society and the state.

**The American Council on Germany**

*The American friends of the “good” Germans*

Establishing the ACG as a pro-German lobby and public relations organisation required two steps. The first was taken in November 1952 when the ACG was finally incorporated pursuant to the membership corporation law of the State of New York. The relevant certificate was signed by George N. Shuster, Eric M. Warburg, Ellen McCloy, Joseph Kaskell, and Christopher Emmet.\textsuperscript{68} The City of New York seemed the right place for such a committee not only because of the fact that the key personnel lived there. Like the German counterpart choosing Hamburg and not Bonn as location for its operation the ACG set up office in New York City and not in Washington, potentially as a deliberate symbol for the organisation’s distance to official politics and diplomacy. New York might not have been the seat of government of the global superpower USA. It was, however, considered world class after the end of World War II with all the major European cities devastated and emerged as the world’s preeminent city with the United Nations setting up their headquarters there. Moreover, New York established its reputation as the world’s centre of finance, culture, and communications during the post-war era with the city’s economic prominence reaching new

\textsuperscript{67} In the late 1970s, Heinz Oskar Vetter and Erwin Kristoffersen of the Confederation of West German trade unions (DGB) were co-opted.

\textsuperscript{68} Certificate of Incorporation of American Council on Germany, Inc., Kaskell & Schlesinger, RAC, FFA, Grant Files, *(microfilm reel number 0496), (grantee: American Council on Germany, grant number: 05500109 )*(1955).
heights. New York City had the greatest population within the United States, had the most factories, the busiest port, and the largest markets. On top it became “headquarters city” being home to 136 of the nation’s top 500 industrial companies in the period between 1945 and 1969. Historians Sven Beckert and Joanne Reitano have shown how this World City became both cradle of liberalism and centre of capitalism.⁶⁹

Table 8: Subscribers of certificate of incorporation of
American Council on Germany, Inc. Nov. 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function/ Profession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ellen McCloy</td>
<td>Wife of former HICOG John J. McCloy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George N. Shuster</td>
<td>President Hunter College, NYC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric M. Warburg</td>
<td>Banker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Emmet</td>
<td>Publicist, activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kaskell</td>
<td>Attorney, NY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After incorporation, however, there were still a number of legal details to be clarified; among them the question whether the ACG had to register with the State Department and whether it would be granted tax-exempt status. This status was supposed to help raising funds, the real hurdle of setting up a functioning “political or charitable” group. In 1953, Christopher Emmet regarded this as much harder than two years earlier because “every political or relief crisis connected with any country which has a large number of immigrants in America is already competing for every charitable dollar left over from taxation”. And this came only on top of the fact that “German-American understanding is more important to more individual German businessmen than vice versa”. 70 Thus, it was of utmost importance that the US Treasury Department decided in favour of the ACG granting tax-exempt status. To ensure this, Emmet tapped his contact, Geoffrey Lewis, at the German Desk of the State Department. In March 1954, Emmet asked him to put in a word to the treasury staff for the ACG on the grounds that it was going to be very helpful “in promoting the overall aims of the American Government”. 71

Emmet’s intervention had the desired effect. A few weeks later, in April 1954, the Treasury Department granted tax-exempt status given the group was “organized and operated

70 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Erik Blumenfeld, Mar. 26, 1953, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 63, HIA.
71 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Geoffrey Lewis, Mar. 27, 1954 (811.46/3-2754), NARA, RG 59, CDF, 1950-54, Box 4455.
exclusively for educational purposes.” At least officially this ruling contradicted Emmet’s vision for the ACG, whose “whole usefulness” he saw in the political aspects of its work, like “making constructive political recommendations” with the aim of promoting “closer understanding between the American people and Democratic elements in Germany.” So the ACG started off to continuously perform a balancing act in not jeopardizing its tax-exempt status. Emmet faced this challenge in that he contacted key political and diplomatic decision-makers officially in a private capacity. He was not willing to give up on the ACG’s larger aim of exerting political influence. Emmet was determined to try to convince the political responsible of his views on issues pertaining to the western alliance and its strategies to counter Soviet Communism. And indeed officially, the certificate of incorporation stated that the ACG was to focus on educating and informing the American people with regard “to political, economic and cultural developments in Germany and her integration in the community of free nations”. Further, the ACG was said “to procure and transmit appropriate informative material to organizations in Germany” that studied the United States. In short, legally speaking, the ACG’s purpose was to explain Germany to the Americans and the United States to the Germans. The ACG and more specifically Christopher Emmet were to transgress these narrow limits of the group’s educational purposes from early on as chapter four of this dissertation illustrates in more detail.

Despite the favourable ruling by the Treasury Department regarding the ACG’s tax-exempt status, the American group did not, unlike the Atlantik-Brücke, establish formal membership with specific rules as to the admission of new members and mandatory membership dues. Hence, at least during the 1950s and 1960s, as a New York-based enterprise the ACG’s affiliates and directors were mostly comprised of Emmet’s circle of friends and acquaintances.

72 Letter from Norman A. Sugarman to American Council on Germany, Inc., Apr. 21, 1954, RAC, FF, Grant Files (0496), (ACG, 05500109), (1955).
73 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Joseph Kaskell, Jul. 12, 1952 and to Erik Blumenfeld, Mar. 26, 1953 Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 82, and Box 63, HIA.
who shared an interest in US-German relations and Germany itself; many of whom Emmet knew from his visits to the “Council on Foreign Relations a block and a half away every single day”.\textsuperscript{75} To a certain extent this explains the specific composition of the ACG membership with academicians being in the majority and journalists playing a greater role than in the Hamburg-based Atlantik-Brücke until the late 1960s (see table 10). In this respect the membership of the ACG was a perfect supplement to its German counterpart organisation in Hamburg with a much stronger representation of businesspeople.

The preponderance of intellectuals in contrast to businessmen in the ACG was also symbolised in choosing George N. Shuster as president of the new ACG, a position he was to hold for more than 20 years until 1974. Emmet considered Shuster a “big shot” and particularly influential due to his “access to Eisenhower” and hoped the ACG could benefit from Shuster’s name and reputation in exerting influence on US politics.\textsuperscript{76} Shuster had earned this reputation especially through his numerous appointments to public service. The most recent was his service as Land Commissioner for Bavaria under John J. McCloy in 1950-51. Transnationally he had contributed to establishing the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1945-46 and acted as US representative on the Executive Board of UNESCO until 1963. Shuster’s main occupation, however, was in the educational sphere. Since 1939 he had been president of Hunter College in New York City and was to move to the catholic University of Notre Dame as assistant to the president.\textsuperscript{77} In terms of collaboration between Christopher Emmet as executive vice-president of the ACG and George N. Shuster as president it perhaps more important that there was a “close general agreement on policies” between them and that, according to Emmet, Shuster had “a great deal

\textsuperscript{75} Interview with Fagin, Jun. 6, 2012.
\textsuperscript{76} Letters from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, Sep. 20 and Oct. 5, 1953, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 81, HIA.
\textsuperscript{77} “Biographical Sketch. Georgie N. Shuster”, George N. Shuster Papers, Personal Correspondence, (hereafter CSHU), 10/13, University of Notre Dame Archives (hereafter UNDA).
of tolerance and wisdom” granting “a certain amount of freedom” to Emmet “to function effectively at all”. 78

Another central exponent of academics among ACG members was Carl Joachim Friedrich. Emmet highly appreciated Friedrich’s opinion and sought his advice frequently. 79 He was particularly valuable to the ACG’s cause due to his personal and professional ties to Germany as well as due to his status in the US Ivy League. The famous political scientist born in 1901 in Leipzig, Germany was the brother of the aforementioned West German manager, Otto A. Friedrich, member of the Atlantik-Brücke. Carl Joachim Friedrich first came to the United States during his student years in the 1920s. A few years later he accepted the position of Lecturer in the Government Department of Harvard University where he later also held the chair of Science of Government. In the post-war period, he became one of the most influential scholars of totalitarianism, law and constitutionalism. The scope of his career reached beyond Harvard. In the late 1940s, Friedrich served as advisor to the US Military Governor of Germany, Lucius D. Clay and furthermore participated in the process leading to the drafting of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. 80

Eric Warburg, who like Friedrich had been born in Germany, served the ACG as treasurer for more than 25 years until 1976. More important than his formal involvement in the ACG was his role as liaison between the American organisation and its West German counterpart. Warburg also played a decisive role in the latter, regularly attending meetings in Hamburg and moreover always nurturing his friendship with Christopher Emmet as well as with Erik Blumenfeld and Marion Dönhoff. The business category on the ACG’s board as well as among the members was complemented by Joseph Kaskell, the fourth signatory of the ACG’s certificate of incorporation. The German born international lawyer was not only equipped

78 Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Feb. 13, 1963, SWA.
79 See Carl Joachim Friedrich Papers at Harvard University Archive (HUA).
with legal expertise but had also experience in committee work. During World War Two, he was active in the Council for a Democratic Germany (CDG), which had attempted to bring together all pro-democracy German exiles in the US. The organisation aimed at influencing Allied policies toward Germany as to promote or at least not to restrict the revival of post-war German economy.\textsuperscript{81} In this sense his service as the ACG’s legal counsel for more than 20 years was a coherent continuation of his earlier commitments.\textsuperscript{82}

Ellen McCloy was the only women on the board. But Eric Warburg had urgently recommended inviting her as she could serve as liaison to her husband John J. McCloy, who, according to Emmet, promised to support the ACG’s cause.\textsuperscript{83} Indeed McCloy kept his promise and became chairman of the ACG in 1972.\textsuperscript{84} In the meantime, his wife followed Emmet’s and Warburg’s invitation and served as director until 1968 when she officially resigned due to overstretched with other commitments.\textsuperscript{85} She was tremendously valuable to the ACG not least due to her very recent two-year experience in public service as her husband’s “spokeswoman” – of German descent she was fluent in German – and “first lady” so to speak during John McCloy’s appointment to High Commissioner of Occupied Germany. On the US East Coast and especially in New York, Ellen McCloy was a well-known society woman with an upper-class upbringing – a standing she used in various organisations of volunteer and charitable nature as well as in the representative role she assumed as John J. McCloy’s wife throughout her life. The higher her husband climbed on the career ladder the more powerful people belonged to the couple’s circle of friends and acquaintances; a fact from which the ACG benefited – if only in the long run.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{81} Petra Liebner, \textit{Paul Tillich und der Council for a Democratic Germany (1933 bis 1945)} (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2001).
\textsuperscript{83} Letter from Christopher Emmet to Walter Stahl, Jan. 29, 1953, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ; letter from Christopher Emmet to Carl J. Friedrich, Jan. 31, 1953, CFJ, HUGFP 17.12, Correspondence and other papers, CA 1940-1964, Box 11, HUA.
\textsuperscript{84} See next section of this chapter.
\textsuperscript{85} Letter from Ellen McCloy to Christopher Emmet, May 13, 1968, \textit{Christopher Emmet Papers}, Box 87, HIA.
\textsuperscript{86} Bird, \textit{The Chairman}, 74, 315 and 386.
In terms of the ACG’s core purpose of educating and informing the American public on developments in West Germany, authors and journalists among the ACG membership were of utmost importance. The most prolific author among ACG members was Norbert Muhlen. Born in Fürth, Bavaria, he studied in Munich in the late 1920s and early 1930s. There he had played a decisive role in organising student protest against the National Socialists. After being detained by the Nazis for a number of years, Muhlen then succeeded to immigrate to the US in 1941. In post-war Europe, Muhlen was also active in aligning anti-communist left intellectuals with the Western cause by co-organising the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Furthermore he wrote for Der Monat in Germany and for American periodicals such as Commentary, The New Leader and National Review. Muhlen published widely on post-war Germany, for example, in 1953 Return of Germany: A Tale of Two Countries. In the early 1960s, he co-authored the book with Dr Walter Stahl, executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke and The Vanishing Swastika: Facts and Figures on Nazism in West Germany together with Christopher Emmet.87

With regard to Christopher Emmet’s networks in the US as well as in West Germany granting him access to politicians and information alike a further German born émigré played a key role in establishing the ACG’s influence. Klaus Dohrn, a German born journalist was a driving force in founding the “Deutsche Front gegen das Hitlerregime”, an alliance of German conservatives in exile in Austria and the Czech Republic. In 1942, Dohrn managed to leave Europe and immigrated to the US. After the World War II, he became advisor on European affairs for Henry Luce’s influential magazines Time and Life. More important than his journalistic work, however, was his ability to “open doors” to the politically influential in Europe and West Germany in particular and hence his intimate knowledge of the political as

Access to and knowledge about politicians, however, did not pay the bills and thus, in the early 1960s, the ACG sought ways to attract more businesspeople. Emmet considered it, therefore, a great success when Lucius D. Clay agreed to become honorary chairman of the ACG in 1963 as he was hoped “to conjure with in the business world”. When Clay was appointed to military governor of the US zone in occupied Germany in spring of 1945, he “was a recognized fixture in Washington” who had earned the lasting respect of Henry Stimson, Robert Patterson, and John J. McCloy, the civilian leadership of the War Department. In 1949, he was succeeded by John J. McCloy, who became the first US High Commissioner while Clay returned to the United States entering the business world. For 12 years the former general then headed the Continental Can Company with headquarters in New York City as chairman of the board and chief executive officer. Under Lucius D. Clay’s leadership, Continental Can rose to become one of America’s largest corporations. And by the end of the 1950s “Wall Street touted Clay as one of America’s leading industrialists”. Merits earned in business, however, did not preclude him from special appointments by the federal government in Washington. In the late summer of 1961, following the building of the Berlin Wall, Clay was called and subsequently sent to Berlin by President Kennedy as his “personal representative with the rank of ambassador” to “re-establish Western resolve” and “confidence of West Berlin that it would not be forsaken”. Not long after this special assignment Clay was approached by the investment bank Lehman Brothers asking him to

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89 Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Jan. 24, 1963, CJF Papers, HUGFP 17.12, Correspondence and other Papers, CA 1940-1964, Box 12, HUA.


91 ibid., 573.

92 ibid., 651,654, 665.
become senior partner, which he did, though he had just reached retirement age. And thus in February of 1963, Lucius D. Clay started his third career as investment banker. Hence to get him on board of the ACG was a first step in diversifying the organisation’s membership and thereby its network to be utilised for fund-raising matters.

Table 9: Membership categories of the ACG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>Business/industry</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Academia</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>1* + 2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>2+1*</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>7*+1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the early to mid-1960s, membership growth of the ACG was comparable to the Atlantik-Brücke. Yet in terms of specific composition of member categories both organisations differed significantly. Whereas Atlantik-Brücke membership was predominantly characterised by the preponderance of businessmen – which confirmed Emmet’s assessment that US-German relations were so much more important to Germans than to Americans – the ACG suffered from a lack of business people. Yet, the membership profiles of the two organisations complemented each other as academics and media people figured so much higher in the American group (compare tables 4 and 8). The original founders thus succeeded in reproducing the special composition of their core group: business and industry, politics, academia and media. Another characteristic of members in the ACG was the so called “revolving door” many have gone through several times changing from military and government positions into the private sector, taking academic or business appointments; a feature typical of the US establishment.
The early 1960s were a period of upheavals. In early 1963, Chancellor Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle signed the so called German-French friendship treaty, a serious challenge to close German-American relations, also keeping the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke busy (see Chapter 4). Later that same year Adenauer resigned and US president John F. Kennedy was assassinated. Thus, a new era in German-American post-war relations began against the background of a growing and strengthened civil rights movement in the US and increasing tensions in Southeast Asia. For the ACG, however, hiring of Lucius D. Clay had the desired effect. In the course of 1963/4, the business front among the ACG members was strengthened.

John Bugas, vice-president of the International Group of the Ford Motor Company and J. E. Trainer joined the ACG’s board of directors. The latter was vice president of Firestone & Tire company, which had a “big minority interest in the great German rubber company, Phoenix-Werke run by Friedrich”, the brother of C. J. Friedrich. In addition Herman Georg Kaiser, an oil producer from Tulsa, Oklahoma and Stephen M. Kellen joined as ordinary members. The former was still a very young man being born in 1942 to a Jewish family that had fled Germany due to Nazi persecution. A devoted businessman, Kaiser nevertheless took an interest in US foreign policy and in particular in relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. Kaiser had been directed to the ACG by Senator Mike Monroney from Oklahoma and thus initially participated as a delegate in the third German-American conference in 1962. As a result of this involvement, Kaiser became member of the ACG. Stephen Kellen represented, besides Eric Warburg, the first strong link to the New York Wall Street banking scene. A native of Berlin, Kellen had immigrated to the United States via

93 Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Jan. 24, 1963, Carl Joachim Friedrich Papers, HUGFP 17.12, Correspondence and other Papers, CA 1949-1964, Box 12, HUA. See also Berghahn and Friedrich, Otto A. Friedrich, ein politischer Unternehmer.
95 Chapter 5 in this dissertations attends in great detail to the German-American conferences as key activity of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke from 1959 onwards.
96 Emmet’s ‘Comments on the Minutes of the Minutes of the Meeting of the American Council on Germany Board of Directors’, May 8, 1962, SWA.
London in 1936. In New York he had helped his father-in-law to re-establish his bank, the investment bank Arnhold & S. Bleichroeder, which had been moved from Germany with the rise of Nazi persecution. Though a comparatively small banking firm, it nevertheless engaged in international trade in the post-war period striking deals with companies like Siemens and Mannesmann – both members of the Atlantik-Brücke – and other leading German industrial firms and advising them in their expansion to US markets. Besides his membership in the ACG, Kellen nourished his interest in world affairs as member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).  

Finally the ACG had achieved a greater diversification of membership. Towards the end of the 1960s, however, criticism directed at the New York-based transatlantic elite organisation grew louder. Personal friends as well as government officials on both sides of the Atlantic worried about Emmet’s health and the future of the ACG. Hence, in January 1968 Gotthard von Falkenhausen and Erik Blumenfeld discussed with the members of the Atlantik-Brücke the need to find a younger, qualified assistant for Emmet with excellent knowledge of contemporary Germany.

More significantly however, was that even Atlantik-Brücke and ACG officers, namely Eric Warburg, Walter Stahl and Kurt Birrenbach considered Emmet as one of the last “Cold Warriors” and his core political ideas – “militant anti-Communism” – as outdated by 1969. As long as this had been the official policy of the United States and the Federal Republic, it had been much easier to spark interest and gain support for the ACG’s activities. By 1969 Willy Brandt was the first Social Democratic foreign minister preparing the ground for his Ostpolitik once he became chancellor in the fall of 1969. The Cold War zeitgeist shifted

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decidedly from politics of strength to careful rapprochement of East and West leading to superpower détente under Richard Nixon.

In the late 1960s, the Ford Foundation was one of the most crucial voices criticising the ACG, at the same time being the group’s most important institutional source of funding. In May 1969, Ford Foundation staff consulted Shepard Stone, the former director of the foundation’s international programme and hence intimately familiar with the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. Stone considered the latter as competent. By contrast, he regarded the ACG as being in desperate need of new leadership. Shepard Stone clearly had a deep-seated interest in German-American post-war relations. He had studied in Berlin of the Weimar era and had returned to Germany after World War Two as John J. McCloy’s public affairs officer in the High Commission. In the 1950s, Stone joined the Ford Foundation and thus continuously fought for a strong transatlantic alliance by promoting a firm anti-communist left in Europe. So it is little surprising that even after he had left the Foundation in 1967, he maintained interest in his old projects such as the German-American conferences organised by the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. Thus Stone contacted the US embassy in Bonn to be informed about the embassy’s assessment of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke in the late 1960s. Since the first secretary of the embassy, Robert Gerald Livingston himself had had no association with the ACG he discussed the matter with Jack McCloy and with Rudi von Wechmar, the former head of the Federal Republic’s Information Office in New York. After his conversation with von Wechmar and McCloy, Livingston suggested that the focus of its activities, methods, and membership “should perhaps be changed” as well as the group’s leadership although the primary aim of the ACG, “to foster better understanding between the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany”, has remained the same since its inception in the

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99 Chapter 3 in this dissertation attends in greater detail to the institutional relationship between the Ford Foundation and the ACG as well as to Shepard Stone’s personal relations to a number of ACG and Atlantik-Brücke officers. See also Ann Zetsche, “The Ford Foundation's Role in Promoting German-American Elite Networking During the Cold War”, Journal of Transatlantic Studies vol. 13, no. 1 (2015): 76-95.

100 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0695), (ACG & 06700160), (letter from Shepard Stone to Wilfried Kohl, May 8, 1969), (interoffice memo, May 19, 1969).
early 1950s. Furthermore, he thought it advisable to keep a close link to the Jewish community in New York and attempting to attract more “first-rank industrial executives and bankers whose companies have substantial interests in the Federal Republic...and all former U.S. Ambassadors” to West Germany.\(^{101}\) In comparison, the Atlantik-Brücke was considered to be “vigorou\(s\)” and “less for us [Stone and Livingston] to think about”. However, Livingston reminded Stone that in the face of declining official US presence and activities in West Germany “we will have to rely more on private organizations such as the Atlantik-Brücke.”

He went on proposing to make the Atlantik-Brücke “a chosen instrument” trying “to establish it as a leader of the several German-American friendship societies.” Russ Fessenden (deputy chief of mission), and Gordon Ewing of the United States Information Service agreed and supported Livingston’s suggestions.\(^{102}\)

At the end of 1969, the Ford Foundation hence hired Richard Hunt as consultant to assist Christopher Emmet with the preparations of the next German-American conference. Hunt, at the time associate dean of Harvard University, became personally committed to the ACG’s cause and thus joined the organisation. And indeed the ACG responded to the harsh criticism and description of its membership being “a rather moribund group” lacking “new blood” and took first steps in rejuvenating its leadership.\(^{103}\) In February 1972, Christopher Emmet attended the Atlantik-Brücke’s annual meeting in Bonn. There he informed the participants personally about the reorganisation of the ACG’s board. Most significant in his remarks was definitely the piece of information regarding John J. McCloy who would, accordingly, chair the board for one year; a decisive step in the reorganisation process of the 20 year old committee, one that would definitely change the course of the ACG for the coming decades.

At the same time it demonstrated that the US foreign policy establishment considered the

\(^{101}\) Dartmouth College, Rauner Special Collections Library, Shepard Stone Papers (ML-99), (memorandum on future of the American Council on Germany and the Atlantik-Brücke, Feb. 6, 1970 by Robert Gerald Livingston).

\(^{102}\) Ibid. and letter from Livingston to Shepard Stone, Feb. 17, 1970.

\(^{103}\) RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (1688), (ACG & 07000054), (interoffice memo from William B. Bader to Mr. Swearer, Feb. 19, 1970 and interoffice memo from Moselle Kimbler to Mr. Goodwin, April 7, 1971.
group as crucial actor in German-American relations – worth supporting. By the early 1970s, John J. McCloy was known as “the Chairman” epitomising the “making of the American establishment” in the *American Century* according to Henry Luce. By the time McCloy officially joined the ACG, he was probably one of the best linked men in the US and beyond, with contacts into the military, business – oil as well as Wall Street – philanthropy, and politics; a man truly filled with “state spirit”. Throughout the course of his career McCloy was a staunch advocate of internationalism, promoting an active role of the US in world affairs by taking a stance against totalitarianism, both fascism and Communism. In the early 1940s, for example, he joined the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, “an avowedly pro-war propaganda group”. Later when McCloy chaired the Ford Foundation’s board of trustees, he could prove his state spiritedness even more pronouncedly, using the Foundation “as a quasi extension of the U.S. government.”

McCloy had started his career in the 1920s in a law firm on Wall Street. During World War II, he had entered US administration as Assistant Secretary of War, and afterwards became president of the newly established World Bank. From 1949-1952, he served as US High Commissioner for Occupied Germany. Upon his return to the US, McCloy chaired Chase Manhattan Bank as well as the CFR. In addition he was trustee of the Ford Foundation, and later chairman, and director of the Rockefeller Foundation. What is more, he was “one of the president’s most valued private advisers.” And he continued to be a sought-after adviser on foreign and security policy issues for all the presidents to come, from John F. Kennedy to Gerald Ford.

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104 To date the most comprehensive biography is by Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment.*


107 ibid., 519.

108 ibid., 416.
Ever since the ACG’s inception in the early 1950s, McCloy had been in touch and had been informed about the group’s business; first, by his wife, Ellen McCloy and later by his son. John McCloy, Jr became member of the ACG in 1969 shortly after his mother had left the board. In addition he had always been kept updated through his friend Eric Warburg and Christopher Emmet. In numerous ways he had supported the cause, for example, by heading the American delegation to several of the German-American conferences jointly organised by the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke.

At the annual meeting of the Atlantik-Brücke in February 1972, Emmet furthermore announced that Richard Hunt would succeed the long-term ACG president, George N. Shuster. And while Emmet would continue to serve as executive vice-president, John Diebold, 48 year old businessman and engineer was named vice-president in addition to five “younger men, with wide knowledge of Germany [who] have been added to the Board of Directors” 109

**Table 10: Chairmen/presidents of the ACG, 1954–1974**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Profession/ function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-1971</td>
<td>George N. Shuster</td>
<td>President Hunter College; assistant to president University of Notre Dame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1987</td>
<td>Richard Hunt</td>
<td>Lawyer, banker, presidential advisor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite these efforts on the part of the ACG, Dr Joseph J. Thomas, head of the foreign department of the Federal Press and Information Office expressed concerns of his agency as well as of the Chancellor Willy Brandt in a letter and memorandum to Kurt Birrenbach. He was deeply worried in view of Christopher Emmet’s state of health – “the actual inspiration and soul of the committee”– to lose their “political lobby group” in the US. Since the “ACG

109 Summary record of annual meeting of Atlantik-Brücke, Feb. 28, 1972 in Bonn, municipal court Berlin-Charlottenburg (VR 20196); Frank Barnett, president - National Strategy Information Center; Harold van B. Cleveland - vice-president, First National City Bank; Joseph E. Slater, president – the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; Frederick S. Wyle, attorney – former deputy assistant secretary of Defence for NATO; and William Griffith – Professor of Political Sciences, MIT; see ACG – Report of Activities 1971/1972, Oct. 6, 1972, Kurt Birrenbach Papers (I-433-166/2), ACDP.
had always assumed that the Federal Republic was the most important and reliable ally of the US in Europe”. In the face of the decreasing interest in Germany resulting from global detente policies of the US and increasing activities of the US in other regions of the world, the ACG was considered of utmost importance to West German diplomacy. Hence, West German authorities got actively involved in supporting the ACG’s efforts in expanding and stabilising the group’s membership.\textsuperscript{110} In the course of the 1970s, the West German government supported the ACG furthermore with considerable funds.\textsuperscript{111}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-1971</td>
<td>George N. Shuster</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1968</td>
<td>Ellen McCloy</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1974</td>
<td>Christopher Emmet</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1978</td>
<td>Eric M. Warburg</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1977</td>
<td>Joseph Kaskell</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1975</td>
<td>Lucius D. Clay</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1987</td>
<td>John J. McCloy</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1973</td>
<td>Richard Hunt</td>
<td>Academia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-?</td>
<td>John Diebold</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In February 1974, Christopher Emmet died. The ACG continued to operate, however, to this very day. After John J. McCloy had resumed chairmanship the share of businessmen increased significantly with 40.4 per cent reaching the greatest share in the history of the ACG.

**Conclusion**

This chapter set out to analyse the special composition of the Atlantik-Brücke’s and ACG’s membership to shed light on the two organisations’ specific function in the context of West-

\textsuperscript{110} Memo on American Council on Germany, Inc. by Dr Joseph Thomas, head of foreign department Federal Press and Information Office, and letter from Thomas to Kurt Birrenbach, Jan. 29, 1974, Kurt Birrenbach Papers (I-433-166/2), ACDP.

\textsuperscript{111} For details see chapter 3 in this thesis.
German-American post-war relations and the Cold War. Were the original founders, Emmet, Warburg, Dönhoff, and Blumenfeld successful in reproducing the functional pattern of their group? Did the membership in the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke resemble a “power elite” in line with C. Wright Mills’ definition or a foreign policy establishment, an American and a West German one?

Indeed, when viewing the membership of the West German and the American group as a whole, it appears as a successful reproduction of the core functional pattern of the four original founders, bringing together the transatlantic financial sector, US liberal political activism fighting isolationism and world Communism and simultaneously promoting a strong Atlantic Alliance, the media in West Germany and in the US, as well as business and politics. The profile of the “good” Germans and their liberal American friends in the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG indeed corresponded with C. Wright Mills’ definition of the “power elite” albeit transferred to a transnational level. The membership of the two groups definitely present a “triangle” consisting of representatives of politics, the state, diplomacy or the military for that matter, and the business world supplemented by a cultural component – the media and academia. A second feature of Mills’ “power elite” – the revolving door between the public and the private – is evident as well. Maybe even more importantly are the so called “go betweens” simultaneously active in politics and business who were numerously represented in the ACG as well as the Atlantik-Brücke; persuasively demonstrating the accumulation of power in these transatlantic elite organisations. While both membership profiles show features of the foreign policy establishment, the concept remains limited to the national context. Yet, both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were active on the domestic as well as the international scene. Ultimately, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke functioned as hinge groups between official diplomacy, politics of the state and the private sector, particularly because they were successful in attracting valuable multipliers connecting many subsections of both the American and the West German elites. Thus, they assumed a role in the large
transnational process of transatlantic integration of elites during the Cold War by initially countering anti-Americanism and promoting a new, positive image for West Germany.
Chapter 3:

Mastering a tainted past:

The funders of German-American public diplomacy efforts

The previous chapter analysed how the “good” Germans and their American partners were identified and thus formed the membership for the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. The previous chapter illustrated as well how densely linked both groups were with state structures. In the West German case, the many active parliamentarians represented these links most obviously. In the American case, this part was played by those members who had either served in OMGUS or HICOG.

This chapter investigates three dimensions of the intertwined history of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. Firstly, the chapter sheds light on the sources of funding – public and private in nature – of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke over the course of roughly two decades from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. Secondly, the chapter offers an insight into the two organisations’ relationship with one another as well as into the mode of cooperation with West German public agencies and the Ford Foundation. And thirdly, the activities of this transatlantic elite project are introduced as a transnationally coordinated public diplomacy effort to improve West Germany’s image tainted by the Nazi past.

The funding of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke constitutes a vital component of our understanding of German-American elite networks during the Cold War. By investigating the funding sources of the two groups, we will be able to assess the extent to which they were supported by political and social power-brokers on both sides of the Atlantic. Examining the extent to which support came from higher echelons of US and West German political societies, will further demonstrate the network’s interconnectedness with the state and core strands of civil society.
The activities and programmes of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke, sponsored by political and social power-brokers presented in this chapter, concentrated on fostering mutual understanding and countering prejudices between West Germans and Americans and thus are clearly located in the realm of public diplomacy. Yet, as is documented in the course of this chapter, there was a significant preponderance on improving West Germany’s and the Germans’ image in the eyes of the American public at large and the foreign policy elite in particular. By investigating the Atlantik-Brücke’s and the ACG’s cooperation with the West German federal agencies – Press Office, Chancellery, Foreign Office – and the Ford Foundation, we get an intimate glimpse at the overall cooperative, yet at times conflicting relationships between private and public partners in a joint transatlantic public diplomacy effort. This is a welcome addition to possible explanatory models of the relationship between private entities and the state in which the state either dominates private efforts or is merely accommodating private interests.

Transnationally coordinated public diplomacy effort

The term “public diplomacy” has been in use for decades, first by government agencies and later also by academia. Yet, there is no one universally agreed definition available. Rather, the term is often used interchangeably with “cultural diplomacy”, “cultural exchange” and even “propaganda”. It may also entail “political advocacy” and “intercultural communication”. Scholars are still searching for a commonly agreed definition of “cultural diplomacy”. There is, however, general agreement that public diplomacy is part of a country’s foreign policy. By communicating with foreign audiences, governments try to influence public attitudes and opinions and thus create an understanding for the nation’s

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3 Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy.
culture and policies: “Public diplomacy is a term that describes ways and means by which states, associations of states, and nonstate actors understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour; build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance their interests and values.”

What kind of role, then, can private organisations like the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG play? Authors disagree when it comes to the role of private individuals and groups being involved. Whereas early scholars on the subject such as Hans Tuch restricted public diplomacy activities to the state, others like Giles Scott-Smith explicitly include private actors, individuals and groups alike. So does Jessica Gienow-Hecht in introducing a new concept for modelling, improving and selling an image of a state, nation, empire – **nation branding**. She opened the activity of branding an image for a nation deliberately to all kinds of actors, irrespective of their nature – public, private, individual, institution – focusing instead on method and achievements. The concept can thus be applied to a broad range of epochs in human history. For the 20th century, however, Gienow-Hecht limits the range of actors to official ones. During the Cold War, Gienow-Hecht argues, **nation branding** became a priority of national policy with which only legitimate representatives of the state could be trusted. Scholarship assessing international relations in the 21st century concludes, however, that public diplomacy “has emerged as a routine feature of international relations” being “conducted by states and private actors alike.”

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7 ibid., 80-81.
This chapter argues that in the case of the young Federal Republic’s public diplomacy efforts, particularly during the late 1950s and 1960s, it was not a question of either/or with regard to the active players. Quite to the contrary, private and public actors cooperated and had an interdependent relationship. The propaganda of the Third Reich had left its mark. After the war, official German bodies were not regarded as trustworthy abroad. The West German state needed groups like the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG to brand a new German image. The ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke, on the other hand, needed access to the financial resources of the state.

Moreover, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke as private actors and integral part of a state-private network cooperating across national borders represent a new dimension of public diplomacy or nation branding for that matter. First, theirs was a transnationally coordinated effort. And secondly, in addition to promoting West Germany in the United States, the Atlantik-Brücke also engaged in activities aimed at informing West German audiences about American perspectives and policies. Vice versa, the ACG was even more active in the promotion of West Germany within the United States. In the 1950s in particular, the ACG was preoccupied with proving to the US foreign policy elite and to the wider American public West Germany’s progress in the democratisation process and its steadfast stand against Communism.

This endeavour, a large-scale campaign promoting a “new” democratic Germany, could only be successfully realised because of the particular composition of sources of funding available to the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. Thus, this chapter argues that this transatlantic elite project entailed advantages for all parties involved – German or American, public, private, business or philanthropy. The chapter is organised along the three major categories of funding. The first section investigates corporate contributions from American and West German donors and thereby sheds light on the two groups’ financial relationship with one

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another. Next, West German public agencies and their relationship with the Atlantik-Brücke are explored. The last section introduces the Ford Foundation as key grant-giving entity on the American side. It portrays a dense triangular relationship with the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG.

**The financial backbone: corporate donors**

*Inversed roles during the 1950s and 1960s: the ACG on financial life support from West German industrial circles*

Contrary to intuition, it was the West German group, the Atlantik-Brücke that was able to operate on a secure financial footing from the outset. The ACG, located in New York, the financial heart of the United States, struggled financially up until the early 1970s. Only then was the private group able to attract more corporate donations for its cause of strengthening German-American relations. In the meantime, the joint transatlantic endeavour of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke was kept alive through genuine transnational cooperation as is illustrated below.

The Atlantik-Brücke was incorporated as a non-profit organization in September 1954. All financial means had to be raised from membership fees or donations. In order to have sufficient funds at the organization’s disposal, the question of selecting and electing new members was of utmost importance from the very beginning.10 Already in the early and mid-1950s, the Atlantik-Brücke directors focused on “top-class” representatives of the business world, whom they expected to be willing and able to pay a set membership fee of annually DM 3,000 to 5,000 (equivalent of approx. $6,475 to $10,793).11 An invitation-only

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10 This issue is dealt with in-depth in chapter 2.
11 I have use the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ inflation calculator to indicate the equivalent buying power of today whenever I give figures of budgets and grants (http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm). I also check the exchange rates from DM to US dollars for the given year.
membership policy added a sense of elitism and desirability to it. In the 1950s, the membership lists of the Atlantik-Brücke resembled a selection of the German industry’s who’s who. Membership grew steadily with business representatives always comprising the largest group. In 1952, there were ten members, by 1972, there were 65 and in 1977, 79 with 42 and 51 paying members respectively, i.e. corporate and business representatives. Non-paying members tended to be scholars and journalists. Such elitism proved highly worthwhile. Between 1958 and 1973, the organization’s annual revenues increased form DM 76,000 to DM 217,000 (equivalent of approx. $148,000 to $331,132 today). Given this sound financial base, the West German group was able to establish a permanent secretariat and hire Dr Walter Stahl as its executive director.

The American counterpart was not able to secure this kind of funding from business circles until well into the 1970s. Incorporated at the end of 1952, the ACG had only very limited funds at its disposal during the first years of its activities. Despite the lack of adequate funds, the ACG got off the ground owing first and foremost to Christopher Emmet, the ACG’s executive vice-president. He worked without salary and at times even donated to the group. In addition, he provided his apartment in the Upper East Side of New York as office space to this transatlantic enterprise.

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12 Leaflet “Atlantik-Brücke e.V.” (SWA “Atlantik-Brücke”). It is interesting that this leaflet suggests that members had to pay a certain fee although the organization’s articles of association of Sept. 1954 state that members are not obliged to pay membership fees. See “Satzung der Transatlantik-Brücke §5 ‘Mitgliedschaft’” (VR 20196, vol. 2). Also consulting the Atlantik-Brücke’s financial reports shows that a number of members did indeed repeatedly pay less than DM 3,000 sometimes as little as DM 1,000.

13 See Chapter 2.

14 “Mitgliederbewegung der Atlantik-Brücke” (membership growth of the Atlantik-Brücke) (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, I-433-110/1).


16 The certificate of incorporation of the American Council on Germany was issued in November 1952. The certificate was signed by Ellen McCloy, George N. Shuster, Eric M. Warburg, Christopher Emmet and Joseph Kaskell. See “Certificate of Incorporation of American Council on Germany, Inc. (Pursuant to the Membership Corporation Law)”.

In light of the ACG’s membership profile, very prominently featuring academics (see table 9) without considerable funds at their disposal, fundraising was the measure of choice for the young organisation.\textsuperscript{18} Christopher Emmet, however, delayed “concentrated fundraising ... until tax deductibility could be definitely promised”.\textsuperscript{19} He considered the tax-exempt, i.e. non-profit status as crucial prerequisite to attract potential donors who prefer tax-deductible donations to a legitimate body. In the spring of 1954, the US Treasury Department did grant the newly-formed group exemption from federal income tax on the grounds that the ACG was formed “exclusively for educational purposes”.\textsuperscript{20} Nevertheless, raising sufficient funds remained a challenge that the ACG was not to master without the assistance of the Atlantik-Brücke in the 1950s and 1960s. Table 12 illustrates well that almost 50 percent of corporate donations to the ACG between 1953 and 1965 came from German companies.

In the spring of 1953, the ACG received its first, and, for many years, only corporate donation. The Sprague Warner Corporation, a groceries food company based in Chicago, donated $2,500 (equivalent of approx. $22,183 today). The ACG, however, owed this to Erik Blumenfeld, the Atlantik-Brücke’s treasurer, who was able to successfully tap transatlantic business contacts of his own.\textsuperscript{21} Time and again, the ACG depended on its West German friends and their business connections in Germany as well as in the US. German business circles had much greater incentives to financially support both the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG as they needed to re-establish business connections and re-enter markets in the US as much as elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{18} For details on ACG membership development and profile see chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{19} Report on the Activities of the American Council on Germany, October 15, 1953 (HIA, Christopher Emmet Papers 74105, Box 4) and Report on the Activities of the American Council on Germany, January 1, 1954 (NARA, RG 59, CDF, 1950-1954, Box 4455).
\textsuperscript{20} Norman A. Sugarman (Assistant Commissioner U.S. Treasury Department) to American Council on Germany, April 21, 1954 (FFA, Grant Number 05500109).
\textsuperscript{21} Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Jun. 5, 1952 (HIA, Christopher Emmet Papers 74105, Box 98, Correspondence with George N. Shuster) and Eric Warburg to Mr Holland (Sprague Warner Corporation), Apr. 15, 1953 (HIA, Christopher Emmet Papers 74105, Box 4, ACG financial records).
Table 12: Sources of corporate and other private contributions to the ACG, 1950s/1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sprague Warner Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix Gummiwerke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hapag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Kaiser, independent oil producer, Tulsa, Oklahoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daimler Benz of North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Hanseatic Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Alan Scaife (Sarah Mellon)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Industry | Home country | Year(s) of donation |
----------|--------------|---------------------|
Wholesale groceries | US | 1953 |
Rubber | GER | 1962, 1963 |
Logistics | GER | 1962, 1964 |
Oil | US | 1962 |
Automotive | GER | 1959, 1962 |
Bond trading | US | 1959, 1962 |
Philanthropy | US | 1965 |

At the end of the 1950s, the weak financial situation of the ACG had not changed fundamentally. A fundraising campaign conducted in the summer of 1960 did not help either. Christopher Emmet, however, considered the turnout of $2,400 a “very high” sum.\(^{23}\) ACG officers assessed the overall financial situation as seriously troubling. They discussed the option of raising substantial funds through German sources. Emmet argued, “[i]f it is a choice of accepting more than 50% of our funds from German sources, on the one hand, or being practically immobilized from doing any useful work, on the other, it seems then that on practical as well as moral grounds we would be justified in taking more than 50% from our German friends”.\(^{24}\) The lack of financial support from American business to the ACG had several reasons. Christopher Emmet’s was not a fundraising mission but a political one. Other key officers of the ACG such as the president, George N. Shuster, and the treasurer, Eric Warburg were not on site; the former living in Indiana acting as assistant to the president of the University of Notre Dame since 1961 and the latter spending more time in Hamburg than in New York. This constellation did not allow for closely coordinated and strategically focused fundraising activities within the United States. More importantly even was, however,

\(^{22}\) Misc.
\(^{23}\) Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Apr. 7, 1961 (CSHU 6/27, UNDA).
\(^{24}\) Letter from Christopher Emmet to Eric Warburg, Jul. 5, 1962, SWA.
the fact that the American business community did not deem it necessary to contribute to one organisation in particular focusing on the relations with one country of so many within the American sphere of influence. Therefore, it was necessary for ACG officers to direct their fundraising at people with established or potential business links with Germany.

Among the very few corporate donors of the ACG in the 1950s and 1960s was Daimler of North America. Daimler was a special case donating to the ACG in 1959 and 1962 while the German mother, the Daimler-Benz AG, joined the Atlantik-Brücke only in 1967. In the spring of 1962, it was up to Eric Warburg to implement the plan of approaching companies in West Germany. Despite being a gifted fundraiser, Warburg’s requests were not all answered in the affirmative. Helmuth Wohlthat, for example, member of the supervisory boards of two companies represented in the Atlantik-Brücke, Mannesmann AG and Henkel & Cie, replied in the negative to Warburg’s request. Wohlthat explained that the aforementioned companies did not intend to contribute to the same effort twice, paying membership fees to the Atlantik-Brücke and donating to the ACG. The Hamburg-based Hapag, on the other hand, generously supported both the West German and the American group. On top of the annual membership fee of DM 3,000 (equivalent of approximately $5,900 today), Hapag donated $2,500 (equivalent of approx. $19,612 today) to the ACG in 1962. This was, however, even surpassed by a contribution from Otto A. Friedrich, CEO of Phoenix Gummiwerke (rubber works). Friedrich made available DM 80,000 (equivalent of approx. $154,000 today) to the ACG over a period of two years (1962 and 1963). As generous as these donations were, they

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25 “ACG Fundraising Prospects 6-17-64”, SWA.
26 Letter from Helmuth Wohlthat to Eric Warburg, Sep. 10, 1962, SWA. In the 1930s, Wohlthat first worked in the economics ministry of the Third Reich heading the department for currency control. Then he changed to the Prussian State ministry where he was directly subordinated to Herman Göring. In 1939, he negotiated with the US the Rublee-Wohlthat treaty regulating emigration of Jews. After the war he held numerous chairs in supervisory boards in the private sector. Among others he was affiliated with WASAG-Chemie AG, Essen (formerly part of IG Farben) of the Krupp family.
27 Eric Warburg mentions this $2,500 gift from Hapag in a letter to Wohlthat, Sep. 19, 1962 and it is also mentioned in a letter from Ruth B. Muhlen to Eric Warburg, Jun. 18, 1964, both SWA.
28 On Friedrich’s US connections see chapter 2.
29 Er “habe es erreichen können, dass aus einem ohnedies diesen Zwecken gestifteten Fonds dem Schatzmeister des American Council on Germany…” Gelder “zur Verfügung gestellt worden sind.” Otto A. Friedrich to
did not change the ACG’s financial situation sustainably. Most of the funds were needed to fund the German-American conferences.\textsuperscript{30}

Despite its desperate need to secure sufficient funds, the ACG rejected a tempting offer by the Carl Schurz Association in 1963. Hans-Werner Deeken, executive president of the Carl Schurz Association approached the Council suggesting a merger of the two organizations. The Association was originally established in 1930 in honour of Carl Schurz, a German emigrant who, in 1869, became the first German-born American elected to the US Senate.\textsuperscript{31} The Carl Schurz Association’s aims were rather cultural in nature, though the founders also wished to foster friendly relations of the United States with German-speaking countries. The focus, however, was on promoting and improving the teaching of the German language and culture in the United States.\textsuperscript{32} It appealed to the ACG because it was “practically the only German-American group, which was never directly or indirectly contaminated by Nazi influence or personnel during the Hitler period”. Moreover, it was a vibrant group: in the early 1960s, the Carl Schurz Association had some 500 members and 2,500 subscribers to its publication \textit{The German-American Review}. An affiliation or merger would have granted the ACG access to a far larger group of people across the United States in addition to solving its financial problems.\textsuperscript{33} The heirs to one of the founders of the Carl Schurz Association, the German-American textile manufacturer Ferdinand Thun, had offered to donate $50,000 immediately and $10,000 annually over a period of five years, conditional on a formal merger of the Carl Schurz Association with the ACG.\textsuperscript{34} ACG officers seriously considered this offer.

\textsuperscript{30} See Chapter 5 in this dissertation.
\textsuperscript{31} Carl Schurz was born in Germany and later was among the Forty-Eighters revolutionaries. In the early 1850s, he emigrated to the United States where he became a diplomat and army general and later US senator and secretary of the interior.
\textsuperscript{32} Finding aid to National Carl Schurz Association Records at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania with the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies, Philadelphia (http://hsp.org/sites/default/files/legacy_files/migrated/findingaidmss167ncsa.pdf)
\textsuperscript{33} Memorandum on \textit{The Proposal For an Affiliation or Possible Merger Between The American Council on Germany and The Carl Schurz Association} by Christopher Emmet, May 30, 1963 (SWA „ACG-Emmet).\textsuperscript{34} See “Ferdinand Thun & Heinrich Janssen” http://www.barmen-200-jahre.de/index.php/home/item/42-thun.
In the end, they turned it down, however. Christopher Emmet and ACG board members feared that this arrangement could only be realised at the “cost of handicapping [their] basic objective” of combating “ignorance and misunderstanding of Germany” that was “in the most exposed geographical position and therefore is the key political area in the struggle between Freedom and Communism.” The ACG had a comparatively small membership base, this Emmet in particular considered as an advantage because the organisations’ scarce human resources were not tied up with administrative work. Instead, Emmet could focus on his behind the scene political work.

For the remainder of the 1960s, the ACG was not able to change the situation considerably. By the summer of 1965 it was “not only broke, but in debt”. Plans for a joint appeal signed by John J. McCloy and Lucius D. Clay failed, which doubtless added to the severity of the situation. McCloy had been involved with the ACG’s cause from the very beginning not least through his wife, Ellen McCloy who had officially served on the board since 1952. According to Emmet, John McCloy felt his hands tied to do more for the ACG particularly in terms of fundraising as long as he was on the Ford Foundation board, the sole US based source of funding for the German-American conferences. This situation even forced the ACG to postpone plans for another German-American conference in spring of 1966.

Therefore, Christopher Emmet insistenty urged George N. Shuster to sign a letter, which the ACG intended to send out to past contributors.

At this point, rescue came in form of a $10,000 contribution from a Mrs Alan Scaife (Sarah Mellon), scion of the Mellons – one of the richest families of philanthropists in the United

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35 Memorandum on The Proposal For an Affiliation or Possible Merger Between The American Council on Germany and The Carl Schurz Association by Christopher Emmet, May 30, 1963, SWA. See also Memorandum (Second Summary of a Possible Proposal to Establish a Strong Private American German Institution in the U.S.A.) by Hans-Werner Deeken, executive director National Carl Schurz Association, Inc. Mar. 20, 1963; Observations by Joseph Kaskell on Mr. Deeken’s Memorandum of Mar. 20, 1962, and letter from Christopher Emmet to Mr Deeken, May 31, 1963, SWA.

36 See chapter 2.

37 On the ACG’s relationship with the Ford Foundation see the last section in this chapter.

38 See Letter from Christopher Emmet to Adolph Schmidt, Sept. 9, 1965 (UPAS 16/05, UNDA) and letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, June 2, 1965, SWA.
The gift from Mrs Scaife allowed the ACG to resume routine activities and pay off debt. Shepard Stone, director of International Affairs at the Ford Foundation, had a great part in bringing about this arrangement with Adolph Schmidt, who was married to one of the Mellon family. Moreover, Schmidt was a Council on Foreign Relations acquaintance of Christopher Emmet’s and knew of the work of the ACG quite well. Back in 1962, Schmidt had purchased huge quantities of Kurt Birrenbach’s book *The Future of the Atlantic Community*, financed by the ACG. “This present arrangement”, Emmet wrote to Shuster, was some kind of “substitute” for a rejected plea by the ACG to the Old Dominion Foundation, whose treasurer Adolph Schmidt was.

*Coming of age in the 1970s: “The chairman” turns the tide*

In the early 1970s the number of donations, particularly by American companies, to the ACG literally mushroomed as table 13 indicates. Yet, what had caused this development?

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39 The founder of this superrich US family was Andrew Mellon, who was, along with Henry Frick, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, Sr, and J.P. Morgan, an industrial titan in post-Civil War United States. See Nathaniel Burt, “[Untitled],” *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 102, no. 4 (1978): 527-29.

40 See more detailed information on Shepard Stone in the section The Ford Foundation.

41 Birrenbach joined the Atlantik-Brücke in 1962 and was elected to its board in 1965. For more detail on Birrenbach see chapter 2.

42 Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Sept. 24, 1965 (UPAS 16/05, UNDA).
Table 13: Sources of corporate and other private contributions to the ACG, 1970s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Home country</th>
<th>Year of donation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoechst</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASF</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayer</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lehman Bros.</td>
<td>Banking/financial services</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford Motor Company</td>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobil Oil Company</td>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Lead Industries</td>
<td>Heavy industry</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa)</td>
<td>Heavy industry</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archer-Daniels-Midland Corp.</td>
<td>Food industry</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Telephone &amp; Electrics Corp.</td>
<td>Telecommunication</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chase Manhattan Bank National Association</td>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler Corporation</td>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental Can International Corp.</td>
<td>Packaging</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corning Glass Works</td>
<td>Glass manufacturing</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Diebold Group</td>
<td>Consulting/services</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric Company</td>
<td>Conglomerate</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merrill, Lynch International</td>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Telephone &amp; Electronics Corp.</td>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occidental Petroleum Corporation</td>
<td>Oil and gas</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of N.Y.</td>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olin</td>
<td>Chemicals and manufacturing (ammunition i.a.)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siemens</td>
<td>Conglomerate</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>1972</td>
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</table>

Initially, the pattern of transatlantic cooperation in which the Atlantik-Brücke board members assisted the ACG in raising funds persisted. Big West German chemical and pharmaceutical

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43 1972 Corporate Contributors to ACG, Oct. 4, 1972, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
companies supported the ACG.\textsuperscript{44} Hoechst, BASF and Bayer agreed to contribute financially in preparation of the Seventh German-American conference in 1971; thus the Atlantik-Brücke sent $3,000 (approx. equivalent of $17,560 today) donated by Hoechst, BASF, and Bayer to the ACG.\textsuperscript{45}

In 1972, John J. McCloy finally joined the ACG board after he had left the Ford Foundation board of trustees.\textsuperscript{46} Hence, the ACG raised funds successfully by way of a personal fundraising letter signed by John J. McCloy. ACG staff sent these letters to more than one hundred corporations doing business in West Germany. In the “Report on Activities – 1971/72”, the results of this campaign were considered so positive “that, for the time being at least, our financial position is greatly improved...”.\textsuperscript{47} Twenty American corporations responded positively to this fundraising letter contributing between $100 and $3,000 each totalling $25,100 (equivalent of approx. $142,300 today). They represented the big industries such as finance, automotive, petroleum and oil, chemical, metal, food, and telecommunications.\textsuperscript{48} In addition to corporate contributions, the ACG received funds between $25 and $750 totalling $3,250 (equivalent of approx. $18,420) from 13 individuals; the majority of which were either members or directors of the ACG.\textsuperscript{49} The ACG’s financial situation stabilized further in the course of the 1970s, due to new board members and to the more widely known chairman, John J. McCloy.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{44} In the letter Stahl mentioned Messrs. from “BASF und Leverkusen”. I am assuming Leverkusen refers to Bayer. Letter from Walter Stahl to Eric Warburg, Apr. 9, 1969 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, 1-433-112/1).

\textsuperscript{45} Letter from Christopher Emmet to Walter Stahl, Jul. 28, 1971 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, 1-433-166/2).

\textsuperscript{46} Brown, “A Proud Past and a Bright Future” – the First Fifty Years of the American Council on Germany, 32.

\textsuperscript{47} “American Council on Germany, Inc. Report on Activities – 1971/72”, p. 4, Oct. 6, 1972 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, 1-433-166/2). This is supported by a letter from Walter Stahl to Shepard Stone in which he informs Stone about a conversation he had with Christopher Emmet. Hence, Emmet said he was confident the ACG had fairly sufficient means. Letter from Walter Stahl to Shepard Stone, Nov. 19, 1970 (Rauner Special Collections Library, Shepard Stone Papers, ML-99).

\textsuperscript{48} See table 13 and “1972 Corporate Contributors to ACG”, Oct. 4, 1972 (ACDP, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, 1-433-166/2).


\textsuperscript{50} For more details on the change on the board of directors see chapter 2.
In terms of the general financial situation, the relationship of the transatlantic partner organisations was an inverse reflection of the relation between Germany under occupation, later the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Post-war relations between the two were characterised by immense economic support from the latter to the former, in the form of the Marshall Plan.\textsuperscript{51} Further, it was characterised by massive military assistance and security guarantees. The genuine transnational cooperation between the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG was only realized because the former proved to be much more successful in tapping solvent industrial sources. The West German business community could expect much greater benefits from sponsoring the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. It was the West Germans who sought to rebuild companies, re-enter the world market, and get confiscated property back. The American business community on the other hand held a hegemonic position with business interest all over the world not limited to one country. Hence, US business had fewer incentives to actively engage in a transatlantic endeavour as envisioned by the officers of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG.

**Boosting the German image: Atlantik-Brücke, ACG and West German public agencies**

The Atlantik-Brücke operated on a secure financial footing. Yet for a number of activities, it nevertheless tapped public funds. West German public agencies contributed financially to its activities mainly by purchasing or funding publications of the organisation. US agencies, on the other hand, never funded any kind of activity of the ACG. Yet, they were not completely ignorant of the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s transnationally coordinated effort on behalf of strong West German-American post-war relations. Especially in the early years of the ACG, staff of the Bureau of German Affairs at the Department of State (DoS) and HICOG frequently corresponded with Christopher Emmet. Yet, his connections to HICOG did not

translate into any kind of institutionalised long-term collaboration as was evident on the German side of the story. 

The only tangible cooperation took place in 1954. The State Department provided copies of a report by HICOG on the Neo-Nazi movement in Germany, which ACG staff then mailed to Americans interested in German affairs, for example, congressmen, scholars, and former HICOG staff. In the early 1970s, the US Foreign Service internally dealt with the two private organisations. The Embassy of the United States of America in Bonn/ Bad Godesberg was concerned about the situation of the ACG – a situation clearly documented in the correspondence of Robert Gerald Livingston and Shepard Stone. The former was First Secretary of the US Embassy in Germany at the time and drafted a memorandum on the future of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke in 1970. He consulted Stone who intimately knew the ACG. As director of the Ford Foundation’s international programme, Stone had closely cooperated with the American organisation for many years. Livingston’s memo did not suggest any financial support on behalf of the State Department or the Embassy, however. American agencies whose core task was public diplomacy, the United States Information Agency (USIA) along with the United States Information Services (USIS) abroad did not cooperate with the ACG.

West German public agencies concerned with public diplomacy relied on private actors and thus developed close relationships with them by providing the necessary funds. From the

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52 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Dr Kellerman (German Public Affairs Division) on the distribution of HICOG report No. 167, Feb. 28, 1953; Richard Straus (Office of the Public Affairs Advisor, Bureau of German Affairs) to Emmet, Mar. 9, 1953 (NARA, RG 59, CDF, 1950-1954, Box 2442) and Report on the Activities of the American Council on Germany, Jan. 1, 1954 (NARA, RG 59, CDF, 1950-1954, Box 4455).
53 The section on the Ford Foundation in this chapter looks more closely at Shepard Stone’s relationship with the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke or individual members for that matter.
1950s onwards, the Federal Press and Information Office (*Bundesinformations- und Presseamt* – BPA), the Federal Chancellery (*Bundeskanzleramt*) and the Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtige Amt*) supported and funded various activities and programmes of the Atlantik-Brücke.

**The Federal Press Office**

Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic’s first chancellor, personally issued an instruction to establish a press and information office in 1949. Ever since, the office’s functions have been twofold: firstly, to inform the West German government and president about global developments; secondly to inform the domestic population as well as peoples abroad about the politics and policies of the German state and more generally to inform about the country, its society and the development thereof. In terms of the latter task, the BPA played the same role as the USIA. Yet unlike its American counterpart, it relied much more on external partners for promoting a new image of the people and the country. Germany’s Nazi past cast long shadows which officials of the newly founded Federal Republic had to deal with.

Memories of the aggressive Nazi propaganda machinery constrained the scope of action for public agencies despite having been established for the very reason of conducting public diplomacy as in the case of the BPA. The Federal Republic’s Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, acknowledged this fact when he stated in 1956 that cultural (i.e. public) diplomacy was most effective when the government remained in the background. The best way to achieve this goal was to employ private organisations such as the Atlantik-Brücke, which were, at least on the surface, distanced from the state. Improving the image of Germany in the eyes of foreign audiences, in particular in the United States, was a central goal of public diplomacy efforts of the Federal Republic. Another aim of German as well as American

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56 Walter Kordes and Hans Pollmann, *Das Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1983).
public diplomacy efforts in terms of information policy was to counter Soviet propaganda. In this regard, the German section of the Comité International pour la Défense de la Civilisation Chrétienne (CIDCC), an international anti-communist propaganda agency with sections in Western Europe, the US, and Latin America, maintained a close relationship with the West German government.\footnote{Johannes Großmann, “The Comité International De Défense De La Civilisation Chrétienne and the Transnationalization of Anti-Communist Propaganda in Western Europe after the Second World War”, in Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Actions, and Networks, ed. Stéphanie Roulin, Giles Scott-Smith and Luc van Dongen (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 251.} During the second half of the 1950s the BPA funded the CIDCC’s German section with approx. DM 18,000 annually in addition to special funds frequently made available for lecture tours, publications, and campaigns to counter the influence of communist ideas in the West German public.\footnote{Großmann, Die Internationale der Konservativen, 101, 02.} While the CIDCC assumed the role of a domestic anti-communist communicator, the Atlantik-Brücke’s publications were directed at an US audience. The following section takes a closer look at the relationship between Atlantik-Brücke officers and the BPA.

In the early years, the agency relied quite heavily on the expertise of the Atlantik-Brücke in producing information material about the Federal Republic of Germany for English-speaking countries, first and foremost the United States. For over 20 years, from the mid-1950s to the 1970s, the BPA was the main purchaser of publications by the Atlantik-Brücke. The bulk orders of the federal agency allowed for the production of Atlantik-Brücke publications in high quantities. Furthermore, the BPA organized the distribution of 50 to 80 per cent of a given edition of Atlantik-Brücke publications in the English-speaking world.\footnote{Atlantik-Brücke memo written by Walter Stahl, Sep. 18, 1970 (BArch B 145/9762).} Thus, Walter Stahl, executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke, referred to their cooperation as an exceptionally successful example of public-private collaboration.\footnote{“Ich glaube, diese Zusammenarbeit, die nun schon fast zwanzig Jahre dauert, kann man ohne Übertreibung als ein ungewöhnlich gelungenes Beispiel für Kooperation zwischen offiziellen und privaten Institutionen bezeichnen.” Walter Stahl to Rüdiger Freiherr von Wechmar (head of BPA), Feb. 1, 1973 (BArch B145/9762, Vol. 4).} In quantitative terms of published books and booklets produced by the Atlantik-Brücke and funded by the BPA,
Stahl’s assessment might be correct. But the relationship between the Atlantik-Brücke and the BPA was by no means free of conflict.

The first publication purchased by the BPA was *Meet Germany*. This booklet, produced and published by the Atlantik-Brücke since 1953, served as a sort of introductory handbook to the Federal Republic of Germany, its political system, relations with Europe and the world, the economy, its people and culture. It was aimed at an English-speaking, especially US audience. In this regard, *Meet Germany* resembled the brochure *Wissenswertes über die USA* (What is important to know about the USA) produced by the USIS in Bonn.

In the late 1950s, the BPA purchased 47,000 copies of the booklet for a total of DM 101,250 (equal to approx. $210,953 today). During the 1960s and well into the 1970s, BPA officials were satisfied with the quality of this publication and hence continued funding thereof. While the BPA purchased *Meet Germany*, in the United States it was the German Information Center (GIC) in New York which used the booklet for its political public relations efforts. Formally, the GIC came under the authority of the German Embassy in the US, yet its main task was the conduct of public diplomacy, hence informing the American public about German policies.

In 1957, the Atlantik-Brücke started an illustrated paper called *The Bridge* for the American Forces stationed in West Germany with a monthly circulation varying from 60,000 to 70,000. This paper was highly regarded by American troops “by both officer and men” as Colonel Carter reported to Walter Stahl in a letter in February 1959. He went on to state that “[*The Bridge*] serves many good purposes. It is used by travel clubs, by schools, by adult

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63 Aguilar, *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, 199.


evening class instructors, and by several other groups. ... The only complaint we have with *The Bridge* at the moment is that there is not enough of it."66 The Atlantik-Brücke’s activities aimed at American troops stationed in West Germany concurred with the Federal Republic’s as well as American concerns about the relationship between military personnel and civilians in the late 1950s.67 Hence, throughout the 1960s, the BPA supported *The Bridge* with at least DM 324,000 (equal to approx. $609,715 today).68 Atlantik-Brücke officers considered every single US soldier as a potential multiplier of a positive and friendly attitude towards West Germany upon his return to the US.69 Moreover, the Atlantik-Brücke was an active member of the government task force on improving the relations between US troops stationed in Germany and the civilian population of which the Foreign Office was in charge.70

Towards the end of the 1960s, the BPA planned to cease its support for the monthly in favour of other publications for French and Flemish-speaking troops in Germany. For a number of years, BPA officials attempted to discontinue the agency’s financial support for *The Bridge*. Yet whenever, the Atlantik-Brücke was informed to this end, Atlantik-Brücke officers protested not shying away from verbally threatening, if implicitly, BPA staff. In October and November 1969, the conflict over the intended termination of support to *The Bridge* climaxed. At the end of October, Count Schweinitz informed Walter Stahl about the BPA’s decision to discontinue funding for the paper. In response, Stahl first stressed the importance of *The Bridge* for good relations with the American troops stationed in Germany – at the end of the 1960s numbering 257,000 – and for German-American relations in general.71

66 George A. Carter (Colonel, USAF, Director, Info Service) to Walter Stahl, Feb. 12, 1959 (PA AA, B32 Vol. 101)

67 Aguilar, *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, 70 and 201.

68 “Atlantik-Brücke Jahresabrechnungen” (financial reports) 1962, 1963, and 1965, SWA. Dr Count Schweinitz (BPA) to Walter Stahl (informing Stahl that BPA grants DM 45,000 for publication of *The Bridge* in first half year of 1969), Jan. 7, 1969 and internal BPA memo stating annual grant for *The Bridge* of DM 90,000, Oct. 31, 1969 (both BArch B145/976).


70 See annual report of Atlantik-Brücke 1958.

71 This number combines Army with US Air force figures. In the immediate post-war years, US troops were occupation forces. The permanent stationing of troops in Germany had to do with the perceived threat by
In this letter, Stahl sharpened his arguments edging on threat. He referred to the new federal government under Willy Brandt, which was well known in the US armed forces headquarters in Germany. Stahl further argued that if the publication of *The Bridge* had to be discontinued due to a lack of financial backing from the BPA, this could have serious ramifications for the relations of the new German government with the United States. He suggested that representatives of the US armed forces could interpret this as indifference towards the American troops stationed in West Germany. Stahl concluded by threatening to notify Helmut Schmidt, Federal Minister of Defence and a known Atlanticist and member of the Atlantik-Brücke, about this issue.  

When Schweinitz did not answer in the expected way, Erik Blumenfeld, MP and vice president as well as treasurer of the Atlantik-Brücke intervened personally. He addressed the head of the Federal Press and Information Office, Conrad Ahlers. In his letter, he basically repeated the same arguments, suggesting the compromise to at least provide partial funds for continued publication. Furthermore, Blumenfeld recommended talking with the Defence Minister, Helmut Schmidt, not without mentioning that Schmidt had been a member of the board of the Atlantik-Brücke for years. Yet, to no avail. In 1970, the BPA rejected all requests by the Atlantik-Brücke for further funding. Internal BPA documents illustrate Count Schweinitz’s line of argument against continued funding. The strongest and at the same time most telling argument was that the BPA did not have any influence on the editorial design and content of the publication. Therefore, the BPA rather planned its own publication for English-speaking troops called *Focus on Germany* and mentioned other publications by the BPA that

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Soviet Communism, which was exacerbated by the Korean War in the early 1950s. Large-scale stationing of American and British forces in West Germany seemed to be the only way to solve the security problem vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. See Hubert Zimmermann, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment”, *Journal of Cold War Studies* vol. 11, no. 1 (2009): 3-27.


73 Letter from Erik Blumenfeld to Conrad Ahlers, Nov. 5, 1969 (BArch B145/9763).
needed funding. Schweinitz’s attitude is telling evidence for the maturation process of West German bureaucracy under way during the 1950s and 1960s. By the late 1960s, West Germany’s relations to neighbouring countries as well as to the United States had improved significantly and a new image of the young republic had successfully been installed. Hence, agencies like the BPA were not willing anymore to leave public diplomacy work to organisations like the Atlantik-Brücke, particularly if control over these activities was not granted.

Notwithstanding, in retrospect the 1960s appear as the decade of closest cooperation between the Atlantik-Brücke and the Federal Press and Information Office and also the beginning of conflict. The BPA funded a number of other publications by the Atlantik-Brücke in addition to *The Bridge* and *Meet Germany*. In 1961, the Atlantik-Brücke sold 10,000 copies of the booklet *Education for Democracy in West Germany*, published by Frederick A. Praeger of New York for DM 30,000 (approx. equivalent $59,476 today). The booklet was a compilation of a number of articles informing about the organisation’s efforts, difficulties and successes with regard to political education of youth and adults in the Federal Republic of Germany at schools and universities, youth associations and within the West German armed forces, as well. Furthermore, the authors studied the role of the mass media in educating and democratising the people. A few years later, the BPA purchased all 5,000 copies of a print run of a booklet, *The Politics of Postwar Germany*. In January 1964, Count Schweinitz noted dislike of the design of the booklet’s cover in an internal BPA memorandum. The cover

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showed coloured maps of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Occupation. Schweinitz criticized the fact that the former eastern territories of the German Reich (the provinces East Prussia, Silesia, and Eastern Pomerania, all east of the Oder-Neisse line) were not included. Therefore, the BPA decided that in the US the booklets were to be distributed without the cover. This decision was preceded by the intervention of the Foreign Office. In February 1963, Foreign Office staff had contacted the BPA and requested a review of the Atlantik-Brücke’s publication assessing the general suitability of the booklet to be distributed for the purpose of political public relations by German diplomatic missions abroad. Yet, this intervention went even further, demanding that the covers of the booklet be removed by the publishing house from the copies already delivered as well. The issue of the accurate portrayal of the German borders had concerned the BPA before. In 1959, the BPA invited the American geographer, Arthur L. Burt, to discuss with him the many American maps of Germany with incorrect borders.

These Strange German Ways, an entertaining introduction to German manners and customs featuring many cartoons also produced by the Atlantik-Brücke did not get approval of BPA staff, however. Even Walter Stahl’s rather unconventional methods of promoting this publication were unsuccessful among BPA staff. In November 1963 Stahl wrote to Emil C. Privat, the head of the North America department of the BPA, to inform him that he had sent display copies to German diplomatic missions and consulates in English-speaking countries, notifying them that orders of the brochure should be directed to Privat’s department. In doing so, Stahl assumed the BPA would buy high quantities. However, additional attempts on the

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78 The Allied Forces agreed at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 that these areas were placed under the jurisdiction of other countries and thus not longer belonged to Germany.
80 Interagency memo Foreign Office to BPA, Feb. 8, 1963 (BArch B 145/5273).
81 Aguilar, Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, 189.
part of Stahl at convincing colleagues of Privat yielded no positive response.\textsuperscript{84} The Atlantik-Brücke still was able to produce the brochure. \textit{These Strange German Ways} was first published in 1963. Altogether 21 editions with a total of 573,620 copies were published.\textsuperscript{85} Boing and IBM purchased high quantities. From the late 1960s onward the latter was a member company of the Atlantik-Brücke. Furthermore, \textit{These Strange German Ways} was distributed to American schools and universities and was sold at \textit{Stars and Stripes} newsstands, the authorised news outlet of the US Department of Defence to inform the US military community.\textsuperscript{86}

By the early 1970s, the BPA’s interest and willingness to financially support the Atlantik-Brücke by purchasing publications ceased. The Atlantik-Brücke had outlived its usefulness to the Press and Information Office. This is nicely illustrated by the correspondence between Walter Stahl and Martin Schött of the Federal Press and Information Office. Stahl informed Schött about plans for new publications inquiring whether the BPA would purchase a bulk of copies. Stahl interpreted the general interest uttered by Schött with regard to these projects as agreement to indeed place an order. Schött in turn, however, was merely in general interested in the matter of German-American relations. They also disagreed about whether those publications could be used for the Federal Republic’s political public relations efforts. Schött considered them not suitable for distribution abroad and thus did not approve financial support. Schött did not dare telling Stahl straight in the face what he really thought about the Atlantik-Brücke. In marginalia he essentially stated that, even though this initiative was generally praiseworthy, the support of it must be limited considering the BPA’s budget,

\textsuperscript{84} Letter from Walter Stahl to Count Schweinitz, May 11, 1964; Stahl to Winfried Bose, Nov. 19, 1964 (BArch B145/9762, Vol. 4).
\textsuperscript{85} Letter from Walter Stahl to Count Schweinitz, May 11, 1964 (BArch B 145/9762, Vol. 4).
adding that “many representatives of this initiative are getting terribly old and therefore they hold opinions accordingly”.87

Those internal memos show that staff of the Foreign Office and the BPA did not blindly trust the Atlantik-Brücke. They preferred to control and check the publications, particularly those intended to be distributed abroad. The relationship of the Atlantik-Brücke and the BPA illustrated above gives an indication of the maturation process of the agency. In the early years of its existence, the BPA was quite dependent on private organisations to reach out to the world and recreate a new image for Germany. Yet over the years, the agency along with its staff acquired expertise and standing of their own. By the mid- to late 1960s, West German public servants in the BPA as well as in the Foreign Office were not content anymore with leaving core tasks of their offices to external actors over which they had only limited control.

*The Foreign Office and the Federal Chancellery*

Support for Atlantik-Brücke activities was not limited to its publications. The BPA also granted partial support of the German-American conferences. These exclusive meetings were modelled after the English-German Königswinter conferences, and the multinational transatlantic Bilderberg meetings.88 Between 1959 and 1974, the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke organized eight biennial German-American conferences. These conferences provided forums for intensive and confidential discussions about issues of common concern in the US and West Germany, covering security, politics, and economy – mostly under the label “East-West tensions”.89 In 1961 and 1970, the BPA covered the cost for accommodation and airfare for a


89 The first conference’s title was East-West relations, the following five (II-VI) were entitled “East-West tensions” and the 7th and 8th “East-West issues” each carrying a more specific subtitle.
number of participants of the conference. At the occasion of the Eighth German-American conference, the BPA offered to take over accommodation costs for the American delegation. BPA officers as well as those of the German diplomatic mission in Washington, DC were interested in getting certain American congressional representatives to come to Germany who attended the NATO parliamentarian meeting in London prior to the planned German-American conference in Germany.

Two other German federal agencies supported German-American conferences. The Foreign Office funded them regularly, with DM 20,000 (equivalent of approx. $24,000-40,000 today), covering the costs of the conferences to a large extent. The Federal Chancellery and thus a number of chancellors, contributed to those German-American conferences taking place in Germany by inviting a number of participants and in later years the entire delegation to a luncheon or dinner.

In April 1959, the executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke formally approached the Foreign Office on behalf of the Atlantik-Brücke’s board members to inquire about a possible grant of DM 20,000 (equivalent of approx. $40,000 today) for the first German-American conference to be held in Bonn, Bad Godesberg. The grant was supposed to cover mainly accommodation, board and travel expenses of the delegates. Total costs were estimated to be DM 30,000 (equivalent of approx. $61,000). Initially, financial means of support for the conference were meant to be allocated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which served as main sponsor of the German section of the Comité Since 1956, the ministry provided the

90 In 1961, the BPA funded the airfare to the US for seven journalists to take part in the second German-American conference with total costs of DM 12,516. See von Jordan to Atlantik-Brücke, Jan. 20, 1961 (BArch B 145/9763). In 1969, the BPA agreed to pay for accommodation of the American delegation on their trip to Berlin following the 6th German-American conference in Bonn in 1970–total of funds DM 3,000. See BPA internal memo Oct. 7, 1969 (BArch B145/9763).
91 Interagency correspondence: Dr Schött (BPA) to Foreign Office, Jan. 30, 1974 and German Embassy Washington, DC to Foreign Office, Bonn, Mar. 13, 1974 (BArch B 136/6355). Considering the available source material, it is not completely clear whether the BPA indeed funded as proposed, though.
92 The total costs of the first German-American conference were indicated with DM 27,473.95 (approx. $6,868.50) in the Atlantik-Brücke’s annual report of 1959 (SWA “Atlantik-Brücke e.V.”)
93 Letter from Walter Stahl to Dr Fredo Dannenbring (Foreign Office), Feb. 28, 1974 (BArch B 136/6355). See also financial reports of the Atlantik-Brücke, SWA.
Comité with an annual budget of DM 49,000.94 When the Atlantik-Brücke’s request was put forward, however, the ministry’s ordinary budget was already exhausted; as was the case with the Foreign Office’s ordinary budget, which also regularly funded the Comité starting in 1957. The Foreign Office began funding the Comité with DM 8200. Two years later, this sum had increased to DM 33,600 and in 1960 to DM 40,000.95 Hence, at first sight the Comités explicit anti-communist effort was worth much more than Atlantik-Brücke activities.

Contrary to Manuela Aguilar’s finding that “there was little private involvement in German information efforts”, this shows that the German state even engaged different organizations for different addressees of information policy.96

Yet, the planned German-American meeting’s aim, rank and expected effects were considered so important that the requested grant was recommended for support from a special budget of the Foreign Office.97 This special budget had been set up, according to Christian Haase, especially for the Anglo-German Königswinter conferences as well as for Franco-German and German-American conferences and thus “firmly established them as informal instruments of West German foreign policy.”98

The Federal Chancellery also had a part in the conference scheme. In July 1959, in preparation of the first German-American conference, Walter Stahl met with Dr Hans Globke, state secretary at the Federal Chancellery. Globke and Stahl discussed the luncheon to be given by the chancellor at the occasion of the opening of this first conference. In addition to the American delegation, the Atlantik-Brücke’s chairman, Dr Bergstraesser, C.D. Eddleman, General, US Army Commander in Chief and Richard Tüngel, former editor at DIE ZEIT were to be invited by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Moreover, Adenauer received some especially

95 ibid.
96 Aguilar, *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy*, 99
high-ranking members of the American delegation separately prior to the luncheon. Senator Javits, Christopher Emmet, Klaus Dohrn and Norbert Muhlen, James Conant, John J. McCloy and Robert B. Meyner, governor of New Jersey hence enjoyed privileged access to the chancellor.99 Altogether, Adenauer hosted 26 people at Palais Schaumburg. Yet, the organisers envisioned an even greater role for the chancellor. They invited Adenauer to attend the opening session of the conference, which the chancellor did, grudgingly. Adenauer was concerned that otherwise Christian Democratic views and party politics would not be represented appropriately. That is why he ordered Globke to make sure that enough Christian Democrats participated.100

The second conference was held in Washington, DC. The chancellor was not expected to host an event, but his possible attendance was discussed internally. Initially, Adenauer had intended to combine participating in the conference and getting together with John F. Kennedy, the newly inaugurated American president. Yet, this plan failed and Adenauer merely sent a telex forwarding his best wishes and expressing his hope that the exchange of thought during the conference proceedings would contribute to the solution of issues challenging both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in their struggle for freedom and a lasting peace.101 On the occasion of the second and third conference, the Federal Chancellery and the Foreign Office even expanded their involvement. In cooperation with the Atlantik-Brücke, they organised a separate ladies’ luncheon for the wives accompanying their spouses on the American delegation.102 By the end of the 1960s, when the sixth German-American conference took place, this segregation of gender during social

101 Telex from Chancellor Adenauer to George N. Shuster, Feb. 15, 1961 (BArch B 136/6355).
102 Letter from Walter Stahl to Count Welckeck (Foreign Office) (BArch B136/ 6355).
events was ended with the Chancellery inviting the American delegates along with their spouses.\textsuperscript{103}

Besides corresponding and meeting with officers of agencies directly involved in the conference’s funding and procedure, Walter Stahl also consulted with officers of the German Information Center in New York.\textsuperscript{104} In February 1962, Stahl asked legation councillor, Dr Joseph J. Thomas to comment on plans to hold the third German-American conference in Berlin – an idea mainly expressed on the American side. On these matters, Walter Stahl was also in touch with officers of the Foreign Office, which also consulted with the Federal Chancellery on the matter.

After a few years, it seems it was almost expected on the part of the Atlantik-Brücke that the chancellor would participate in the opening session of the German-American conferences. This expectation might have been nourished by one of the board members’ privileged access to the chancellor. For many years, Erik Blumenfeld, chairman of the Hamburg Christian Democrats and member of the Bundestag, was so close to Konrad Adenauer that he described their connection as a “grandfather-grandson-relation”\textsuperscript{105}. In the spring of 1962, Erik Blumenfeld met with Konrad Adenauer to inform the chancellor about the plans for the third German-American conference. During this conversation, Adenauer agreed to attend the opening session of the conference and to host a meal for the delegates on the next day.\textsuperscript{106} The chancellor’s decision to support the event by inviting the American delegation had not been made by Adenauer alone. On the contrary, the Foreign Office full-heartedly backed and welcomed the chancellor’s contribution.\textsuperscript{107} All successors of Adenauer – Erhard, Kiesinger,
Brandt, and Schmidt – continued the thus established tradition of hosting a meal and attending at least the opening session of those German-American conferences held in Germany.\textsuperscript{108}

In the Federal Republic, the Foreign Ministry was the main external source of funding for the conference scheme, regularly granting DM 20,000 (in 1959 the approx. equivalent today $38,000 in 1974 $37,000) for the fifth conference. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the German Embassy in Washington, DC was keen on supporting the organizers in managing the conference and taking care of German participants. Prior to the third conference, the embassy in Washington received a number of requests from German participants to arrange meetings with leading American personalities of the current administration and Congress, who apparently would not be delegates to the conference. Ambassador Knappstein cautioned the Federal Office in Bonn that probably not all requests could be met.\textsuperscript{109} Also in preparation of the fifth conference, Baron von Falkenhausen, chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke 1967 until 1972, travelled to Washington to meet with potential American delegates to the upcoming conference. Furthermore, Falkenhausen expressed his desire to meet with the Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder to inform him in detail about the plans for the conference.\textsuperscript{110} During the conference ambassador Knappstein was eyes and ears for the grant-giving West German institution at home. He sent a detailed report to the Foreign Office in Bonn about the discussions and procedures of the conference. The general assessment of the fifth German-American conference was quite positive. Knappstein described the meeting as catalyst in easing misunderstandings between the United States and the Federal Republic. Knappstein went on about the climate of trust having been established at the conference, which

\textsuperscript{108} Letter from Erik Blumenfeld to Helmut Schmidt, Jun. 20, 1974 (BArch B 136/17446).
\textsuperscript{109} Telex from officer of German Embassy Washington, DC, Lilienfeld to Foreign Office Bonn, April 6, 1967 (PA AA B32, Vol. 253). Dr Eitzel (Foreign Office) informing Walter Stahl about the DM 20,000 grant for the fifth German-American conference to be held in May 1967 in Washington and the money to be used to cover airfare of the German participants, Apr. 20, 1967 (PA AA B32, Vol. 253). Interoffice telex from ambassador Knappstein to Foreign Office Bonn, May 2, 1967 (PA AA B 32, Vol. 253).
\textsuperscript{110} To this effect Walter Stahl informs the minister in his letter of Sep. 7, 1966 (PA AA B32, Vol. 253).
contributed significantly to open and frank discussions and the particularly high level of the debates.\textsuperscript{111}

On the West German side, a good number of public agencies were involved with the Atlantik-Brücke’s activities, particularly with the German-American conferences. Yet, their support was not a pure benevolent giving to the cause of improving German-American relations. The Foreign Office, much like the BPA, wished to have a say and monitored closely the proceedings of the conferences. The next section focuses on the American side of the story.

**Boosting transatlantic elite networking: the ACG and the Ford Foundation**

As we have seen above, the Atlantik-Brücke focused much of its activities on informing American audiences about the “new” Germany and in this way attempting to master the tainted past. Another central goal of both, the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, was to further mutual understanding between West Germans and Americans by means of arranging personal meetings and talks of representatives from both countries’ business, political, academic, and media elites.\textsuperscript{112} One way to do so was the aforementioned conference format. The conference scheme and other activities of the West German group were funded by federal public agencies. The following section focuses on the main source of funding on the American side and the ACG’s activities in the realm of public diplomacy. In the United States, the Ford Foundation served as most important grant-giving entity.

Cold War historians have long been interested in the role of US funds in supporting anti-communist activities in Europe. Probably the best-researched subject in this regard is the Congress for Cultural Freedom.\textsuperscript{113} Within this broader research context, Volker Berghahn has


\textsuperscript{112} Articles of Association of Transatlantik-Brücke signed Sept. 25, 1954 in Hamburg now Municipal Court Berlin-Charlottenburg (Vereinsregister beim Amtsgericht Berlin-Charlottenburg).

drawn specific attention to the Ford Foundation’s involvement in the cultural Cold War.\footnote{114} The organisation’s activities in West Germany – namely its German-American exchange programmes – have been examined by Oliver Schmidt, who acknowledges the Foundation’s role in re-establishing West German-American relations in the post-war era. He particularly highlights the Ford Foundation’s role in forming a democratic, Atlanticist elite in West Germany. Yet, although the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were key players in bringing together representatives of political, business, media and academic elites from the US and the Federal Republic with Ford money, they have not been subject to scholarly analysis.\footnote{115}

Established in 1936, the Foundation entered the international stage in the 1950s. It quickly ascended to become one of the key organisations well placed to partake in a new era of transnational relations that emerged after 1945. During the early 1950s the Ford Foundation underwent a comprehensive internal reorganisation, which preceded its expansion abroad. The accompanying professionalisation of the philanthropic organisation served to secure close ties between the Foundation and the likewise expanded American federal state, which increasingly relied on the private sector to support its activities overseas.\footnote{116}

*An institutional relationship underpinned by transatlantic friendships*

The institutional relationship between the ACG and the Ford Foundation began in 1955 with a grant for a survey and subsequent report on the development of democratic institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany.\footnote{117} The closer institutional cooperation was, however, predated by personal relationships between founders of the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke and key figures in the Foundation hierarchy. Marion Countess Dönhoff and Shepard Stone, for example, had


\footnotetext[115]{Oliver Schmidt, *Civil Empire by Co-Optation: German-American Exchange Programs as Cultural Diplomacy, 1945-1961*”, Chapter 5 in Schmidt’s thesis, “The Government Nexus (II)” to the Ford Foundation’s role in creating an Atlanticist elite in Germany does, however, neglect the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG.}


\footnotetext[117]{RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0496), *(ACG & 05300109) (1955).*}
known each other since Stone’s service for the American Military Government, when he helped establish the press in the American zone of occupation. Ever since, they were close friends who frequently corresponded with one another. John J. McCloy was personally affiliated with the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke not least due to his friendship with Eric Warburg which dated back to the 1920s. Organisation insiders even circulate the story that the founding of the two organisations was initiated by McCloy himself. In addition, transatlantic commuter Eric Warburg linked both continents and organisations. The institutionalized relationship between the two organisations and the Ford Foundation was underpinned by a dense network of friendships.

John J. McCloy and Shepard Stone illustrate particularly well the intersection of different sectors – government, philanthropy, media, and the corporate world characteristic of US foreign policy circles of the time. When McCloy became Ford Foundation trustee in 1953, he simultaneously chaired Chase National Bank in New York. Prior to these appointments, he had been the highest representative of the US in the semi-autonomous Federal Republic of Germany, serving as US representative on HICOG from 1949 to 1952, superseding the Office of Military Government (OMGUS). Shepard Stone in turn had been McCloy’s public affairs officer during his service in Germany. Both of them had been involved with the American war effort – the former in the intelligence branch of the First Army and the latter in a leading position in the War Department. Stone had intimate knowledge of pre-war Germany as he had earned a doctoral degree in history at the University of Berlin before he accepted a position with the New York Times.

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118 Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe. See also Shepard Stone papers (ML-99) at Dartmouth College, Rauner’s Special Collections Library, which showcases their friendship with extensive correspondence. Furthermore the papers include a number of speeches and articles by Countess Dönhoff and include several photographs showing Dönhoff and Stone together at diverse events.

119 Warburg, Times and Tides.

120 Shepard Stone’s papers include correspondence with all four founders. Shepard Stone Papers (ML-99), Rauner Special Collections Library, Dartmouth College.

121 Bird, The Chairman.

122 Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe.
By ideological background and experience, Stone was an internationalist and liberal Democrat, whereas McCloy was a Republican. Both men belonged to a powerful faction in post-war American philanthropy and diplomacy that prioritized the struggle against Communism and the reconstruction of Germany within a larger Western European union over maintaining the war alliance with the Soviet Union.\(^{123}\) Both, Stone’s and McCloy’s professional careers exemplify and illustrate the effects of the revolving door phenomenon. This phenomenon surely facilitated installing a sense of “state spirit” in these men, the personal identification with the problems of their state.\(^{124}\)

\textit{Ford Foundation money and activities of the ACG}

In the early 1950s, internal Ford Foundation discussions were concerned with the direction its international programme should take. The question was raised whether Europe should be given greater attention next to the predominant focus on issues relating to US-Soviet Union relations and the so-called developing world. McCloy pushed his colleagues on the board of trustees and the president to expand the Foundation’s effort in Europe. In 1956, the European programme of the Ford Foundation was formally established and two years later, Stone was promoted to Director of the International Affairs Division that covered the European programme.\(^{125}\) During the internal decision-making processes in preparation for this programme, Stone had provided a number of reports based on trips he had taken through Europe in the early 1950s.\(^{126}\) Stone opined that the world was facing a long Cold War period in which the US would have to act wisely and maturely in order to hold the free peoples of the world together. Stone’s conviction that the Ford Foundation and other private organisations


could make a special contribution as they were able to take action where the US government was not, illustrates well his ‘state spirit’. Stone’s call for a more active role of US philanthropy echoed what Lucius D. Clay, military governor of US occupied Germany, had suggested already in 1946, namely inviting American foundations to help rebuild shattered Germany.\textsuperscript{127} Although the economic recovery of Western Europe was satisfactory to American decision-makers, domestic politics in several European countries were not. In West Germany, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer faced vocal Social Democratic opposition, particularly with regard to the contested and linked issues of rearmament and the Federal Republic’s integration into the Western defence alliance.\textsuperscript{128} Moreover, the Christian Democratic led government had to cope with a number of volatile right-wing splinter parties in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{129}

It is against this background that the institutional relationship between the Ford Foundation and the ACG has to be seen. Between 1955 and 1974, the ACG received funds from the Ford Foundation roughly totalling 200,000 (approx. equivalent of $1mill today).\textsuperscript{130} The projects funded during this period illustrate the range of activities the ACG was engaged in. Publications on Germany-related issues were one aspect. The first grant request the ACG issued in 1955 was to fund a survey and subsequent report on the development of democratic institutions in West Germany conducted and written by Norbert Muhlen.\textsuperscript{131} During the latter part of the 1950s, the ACG acted as fund mediating entity in a number of cases. Foundation policies ruled out granting funds directly to foreign grantees such as the German Council on

\textsuperscript{127} Schmidt, “Civil Empire by Co-optation”: German-American Exchange Programs as Cultural Diplomacy, 1945-1961”, 165-166.

\textsuperscript{128} Large, \textit{Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era}; Hershberg, “‘Explosion in the Offing’: German Rearmament and American Diplomacy, 1953–1955”, 511-49.

\textsuperscript{129} Berghahn, “Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the ‘American Century’”, 406.

\textsuperscript{130} Own calculations based on program action forms of the Ford Foundation, Ford Foundation Archives New York. $11,600 grant (No. 700-0054) from FF for 6\textsuperscript{th} American-German conference, see: Howard R. Dressner to Shuster, Nov. 3, 1969 (UPAS 41/27, UNDA) formal request for grant by Shuster to Howard R. Swearer, Apr. 22, 1969 (HIA, 74105, Box 4/ACG-fund-raising) and $15,000 grant (No. 710-0504) from Ford Foundation for 7\textsuperscript{th} American-German conference, see: Shuster to Howard R. Dressner (secretary FF), Sep. 17, 1971 and Dressner to Shuster, Sept. 9, 1971 (UPAS 47/63, UNDA).

\textsuperscript{131} RAC, FFA, Grant Files (0496), (ACG, 05500109), (1955).
East European Studies or the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich. The latter organization received $23,000 (equivalent of approx. $194,000 today) through the ACG from the Ford Foundation for hosting a summer seminar for young scholars from the US and Western Europe. In 1957, the Ford Foundation made available a grant to the ACG to sponsor the visit of Willy Brandt, then Mayor of Berlin, to the US. Though privately funded and sponsored, the US Department of State considered this trip “highly desirable” and wished to be part of the planning process of Brandt’s visit to the US. Thus, the arrangements for Brandt’s visit were an early example for the cooperative mode of the relationship between the US state and private entities. Despite the fact that the ACG was officially responsible for the arrangements, it was Shepard Stone of the Ford Foundation who pulled the strings.

Sponsoring and organizing visits of German personalities, mainly politicians, was to become another central area of activity of the ACG. It was funded to a great extent by the Ford Foundation. Hence, in the years to come, the ACG would host Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Fritz Erler, and other members of the West German Cabinet and Parliament. By funding tours of German leaders, the Ford Foundation emphasised “the specific importance of Germany and Berlin”. Furthermore, it was important to the Foundation to maintain “continuing and close interchange of ideas between American and German leaders” to serve the “objective of strengthening ties between Europe and the US”. In line with such

132 In 1956, $7,500 were channeled through the ACG to the German Council on East European Studies to sponsor a conference on Russian and East European problems (FFA, Grant Number 05600119). In 1957, the ACG received $1,000 to co-sponsor the Triennial Congress of the German Philosophical Society (FFA, Grant Number 05700344).
133 RAC, FFA, Grant Files (0535), (ACG, 05800056) (1958). In the years to come the ACG acted as host to prominent Germans visiting the US. These included Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Fritz Erler, and other members of the German Cabinet and Parliament (FFA, “Facts about the American Council on Germany, Inc.”, PA 67-160).
134 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0535), (ACG, 05800056), (FF internal, Dec. 19, 1957), (letter from Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Office of German Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. Dec. 10, 1957).
135 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0535), (ACG & 05800056), (letters from Hans E. Hirschfeld to Shepard Stone, Nov. 23, 29 and Dec. 12, 1957).
136 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0535), (ACG & 05800056), (1958), (0695) (ACG & 06700160), (“Facts about the American Council on Germany, Inc.”), (1967).
137 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0535), (ACG & 05800056), (FF internal memorandum, Dec. 19, 1957).
arguments, the Ford Foundation sponsored an impressive number of conference activities on both sides of the Atlantic. International conferences served to provide space for informal networking and off-the-record exchange of thought among “leading thinkers and public opinion leaders in various fields”.138 A truly transnational meeting point for political, business and media elites from Western Europe and the US, funded by the Ford Foundation, were the annual Bilderberg conferences, “one of the most important transatlantic networks of the West”.139

The Ford Foundation contributed approximately $135,000 to the German-American version of such transatlantic elite meetings in a 15-year-period (1959–1974). This sum is comparable to the $200,000 (1956-1968) granted to the Bilderberg group for their transatlantic conferences.140 Ford Foundation recommendations for repeated financial support of the German-American conferences were based on the positive assessment of the “private meeting of American-German foreign policy leaders”. They were regarded as “important means of increasing understanding between Germany and the U.S.”, significantly contributing to the development of the Atlantic Community. Furthermore, Ford staff emphasised the importance of personal relationships and acquaintances especially between “rising young U.S. and German leaders”, which were fostered on the conferences.141

Given this assessment, it is hardly surprising that Ford Foundation staff was actively involved in the selection of delegates to the German-American conferences. Extensive correspondence between executives of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke and officers of the Ford Foundation illustrate that the latter and Shepard Stone in particular took an active role in the organisation of the conferences. Stone was deeply involved, especially in terms of delegation composition, but also in terms of developing conference agendas. ACG executives

138 Ibid.
139 Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 1.
140 Own calculations based on Ford Foundation grant files from 1955 to 1974. On the Bilderberg Group, see Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 63.
141 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & 05800305), (FF internal, International Affairs – American Council on Germany, Inc., Sep. 29, 1960).
informed Ford staff about each change in the American delegation. Internal Ford Foundation files show that the ACG consulted “with Mr. Shepard Stone in connection with development of plans for the conference and selection of participants”.\footnote{RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & 05800305), (Ford Foundation International Affairs Program Action form, PA No. 58-305C, Jul. 31, 1962).} And indeed, especially the executive president of the ACG, Christopher Emmet, and the Atlantik-Brücke’s executive director, Walter Stahl informed Stone and sought his advice most frequently and thoroughly on all developments regarding the conferences.\footnote{See, for example, RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & 05800305), (Christopher Emmet to Shepard Stone, Mar. 11, 1958).} Stone’s involvement, however, was not limited to written advice. He also regularly met with ACG executives in New York and whenever in Germany he tried to see representatives of the Atlantik-Brücke.\footnote{See ibid., (Emmet to Mr Gordon, Mar. 31, 1958), (Walter Stahl to Christopher Emmet, Jun. 24, 1958) and RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0695), (ACG & 67-160), (Walter Stahl to Shepard Stone and to Moselle Kimbler, Mar. 3 and 7, 1967).} Furthermore, Shepard Stone also participated regularly in the conference steering committee meetings and in the conference proceedings. After the fourth German-American conference in 1964, Christopher Emmet thus thanked Shepard Stone not only “for helping us to obtain the grant, but for your help in planning the conference, getting some of the delegates, and for your personal contribution to the meeting’s success both during the conference sessions and outside them”.\footnote{RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0684), (ACG & 06400094), (letter from Christopher Emmet to Shepard Stone, Dec. 14, 1964).}

People further up in Foundation hierarchy were involved in shaping delegations to the conferences as well. John J. McCloy was regularly asked for advice and support aside from the fact that he also repeatedly headed the American delegation.\footnote{RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & 05800305), (letter from Ruth Berenson to Shepard Stone, Dec. 9, 1960); (FF internal from Shepard Stone to John J. McCloy, Feb. 1, 1962); (Christopher Emmet to John J. McCloy, Oct. 10, 1963).} Furthermore, McCloy tapped his good contacts into the highest echelons of US politics to support the German-American conferences. In February 1964, John J. McCloy, for example, met with President Lyndon B. Johnson. During this meeting McCloy “discussed with [him] the importance of a
good congressional representation at the American-German conference to be held in Germany in mid-April”. The pledge for support of the conferences by the President was another manifestation of the state-private network at work here.\footnote{RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0684), (ACG & 06400094), (letter from John J. McCloy to Lyndon B. Johnson, Mar. 17, 1964).}

Despite the Ford Foundation’s initial strong endorsement of the German-American conferences and its close cooperation with the grant-receiving organisation, internal criticism and scepticism regarding the ongoing support thereof grew louder from the late 1960s onwards. Concerns were voiced regarding the composition of the delegations, both American and German, with special reference to age and generation. Those concerns mirrored the fact that from the 1960s onwards, “new generations would be entering positions of power and influence with no personal experience of binding issues such as World War II or the Marshall Plan”.\footnote{ibid.} Beyond this, transatlantically minded elites in the US as well as in Western Europe worried about the effects on transatlantic relations resulting from the US image abroad being increasingly tainted by the Vietnam War and Watergate. To complicate the matter, potential alternatives to the Atlantic Community such as de Gaulle’s proposal for a unified Europe under French leadership and the West German’s Ostpolitik were gaining recognition. The way out of this dilemma was to ensure that future leaders, both in Western Europe and in the US, would maintain the transatlantic alliance. Hence, younger generations had to be socialised in this manner.\footnote{Giles Scott-Smith, “Maintaining Transatlantic Community: US Public Diplomacy, the Ford Foundation and the Successor Generation Concept in US Foreign Affairs, 1960s–1980s”, \textit{Global Society} vol. 28, no. 1 (2014): 91.}

Erik Blumenfeld thus assured McGeorge Bundy, then president of the Ford Foundation, that he was “able to recruit the younger generation of politicians from the Bundestag.”\footnote{ibid.} Christopher Emmet, himself member of the generation of die-hard Cold Warriors having experienced both world wars and the rise of totalitarianism in Europe, was of the opinion that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0695), (ACG & 06700160), (letter from Erik Blumenfeld to McGeorge Bundy, Mar. 21, 1967).}
\end{itemize}
“the supreme necessity for this particular Conference is the wisdom and prestige in Germany of some of their old friends”, namely John J. McCloy, Dean Acheson, and Lucius D. Clay. The Foundation was clearly in favour of carrying this German-American elite network into the future. This desire, however, could only be met if younger people would be incorporated.\[151\]

Shepard Stone, who was positively inclined towards the basic idea of these transatlantic off-the-record meetings, left the Foundation in 1967. Subsequently he became president of the International Association of Cultural Freedom, the successor organisation of the Congress of Cultural Freedom.\[152\] Stone’s departure was preceded by the arrival of a new Ford Foundation president. The beginning of McGeorge Bundy’s term at Ford coincided with further internal reorganisation and the decision to lower the rate of spending.\[153\] Hence, others within the Foundation assumed responsibility for ACG and conference related matters. After Stone’s departure, unfavourable judgment of the German-American conferences increased noticeably. In an internal memorandum of the European International Affairs (EIA) division, criticism was widened beyond the issue of generation to include critique of an insufficient “range of interest” and “points of view” represented on the part of the proposed American delegation. Moreover, in the memorandum, concerns were expressed regarding “the organisation of the meeting, particularly the slowness in preparing an adequate agenda”. Yet, EIA was not content with verbalising its annoyance. The Foundation hired Professor Richard Hunt, then Associate Dean of Harvard University as a consultant to help the ACG “with final preparations for the Conference”.\[154\] Thus, Hunt attended the 1970 German-American conference as an observer with the special task to assist the ACG with organisational issues. Afterwards he assessed the conference quite positively and recommended continuation of the

\[151\] RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0695), (ACG & 06700160), (letter from Christopher Emmet to Shepard Stone, Oct. 19, 1966).
\[152\] RAC, FFA, FF Oral Histories, Box 3, folder: Shepard Stone.
\[154\] RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (1688), (ACG & 07000054), (Internal FF memo from David E. Bell to McGeorge Bundy, Oct. 6, 1969).
German-American meetings sponsored by the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke.\textsuperscript{155} In a personal note to the responsible programme officer, however, Richard Hunt voiced much stronger criticism, especially directed at the ACG. In this note, Hunt referred to the ACG as “a rather moribund group [which] needs youth, wider horizons, and money”. Here he recommended that the Foundation “exercise more control over the Council and the Delegation Chairman; ... assist in the prior reorganisation of the Council which is certainly needed.”\textsuperscript{156}

However, concerns voiced by government officials as well as private citizens of both countries indicated that this particular manifestation of public-private cooperation in the context of West-German-American relations had proven useful in the past. Just now, it was in need of an overhaul to adapt to the changing global settings now more inclined to détente. The ongoing calls for rejuvenation were thus indeed answered by the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke. In 1973, they introduced their own Young Leaders Program. In June of the same year, they jointly organised the first American-German Youth conference in Hamburg with partial support of the Ford Foundation.\textsuperscript{157}

Though the steady flow of funding from the Ford Foundation to the ACG subsided slowly and eventually ceased completely, efforts to strengthen German-American relations by the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were not discontinued.\textsuperscript{158} The Ford Foundation was, however, superseded by the German Marshall Fund (GMF) as main benefactor to the activities of the ACG from the mid-1970s onwards. Through the GMF, transnational public-private interconnections of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG were even strengthened. In 1972, it was the West German government that initiated the fund and endowed it with DM 252 million

\textsuperscript{155} RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (1688), (ACG & 07000054), ('Report on the Sixth American-German Conference at Bad Godesberg’ submitted by Richard M. Hunt, Feb. 10, 1970).
\textsuperscript{156} RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (1688), (ACG & 07000054), (interoffice memo from William B. Bader to Mr. Swearer, Feb. 19, 1970).
\textsuperscript{157} RAC, FFA, Grant Files (1239), (ACG & 7300512), (Program Action Form and Agenda of the First American-German Youth Conference, Jun. 27-30, 1973).
\textsuperscript{158} And indeed during the 1970s and 1980s, the Ford Foundation co-funded only three more projects: the US-German Nuclear Energy Policy Conferences and in 1985 the project to produce the memoirs of John J. McCloy. RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (1270, 1340, 4850), (Program Action Forms 775-474, 785-197, 855-0040).
($78 mill in 1972) as a grateful gesture to the US in remembrance to the Marshall Plan.\footnote{Brown, “A Proud Past and a Bright Future” – the First Fifty Years of the American Council on Germany, , 35.}

Maybe even more importantly, in 1975, the Federal Republic presented a $1 million grant to the ACG in recognition of John J. McCloy’s contributions to German-American relations in the second half of the 20th century.\footnote{ibid., 40 and “A Brief History on the American Council on Germany” http://www.acgusa.org/index.php?section=about-us-history (accessed Sep. 30, 2013).}

**Conclusion**

This chapter set out to investigate the intertwined history of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke in three dimensions; the first being the different sources of funding to the transatlantically coordinated elite effort. The second dimension is that of relationships between the American and the West German partner organisations on the one hand and the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke with their grant-giving entities on the other. The third one is concerned with the activities of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. In the course of this chapter we have learned that the transatlantic partner organisations have funded their transnationally coordinated public diplomacy effort with a mix of corporate and public money and grants from the influential Ford Foundation.

In terms of the general financial situation, the relationship between the West German Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG was an inverse reflection of the relation between Germany under occupation, later the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Only due to the genuine transnational cooperation between the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG in which the former proved to be much more successful in tapping solvent industrial sources, this partnership was realised. The West German business community could expect much greater benefits from sponsoring the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke than US businesses.

The relationships of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke with grant-giving entities, whether public or philanthropic in nature, may be described as mutually beneficial, yet not free of
conflict. In close cooperation, the Atlantik-Brücke, the BPA, the Foreign Office, and the Federal Chancellery pursued a common goal – improving and strengthening the relationship with the United States. The first step was to create a new image for the Germans and Germany and hence overcoming its tainted past. By outsourcing crucial public diplomacy work to external actors, the BPA could achieve this goal without being directly involved. It took time for West German public agencies to free themselves from association with the Nazi regime. US occupation forces as well as HICOG knew of this beneficial arrangement, therefore opting for a strong role of US philanthropy in foreign policy as was shown for the case of the Ford Foundation’s support for the ACG. The regular flows of funding from West German public agencies as well as from the Ford Foundation were a most tangible manifestation of a transatlantic state-private network allowing for a quite successful transnationally coordinated public diplomacy effort. This was a most important effort in the Cold War era of West German-American relations, as suspicion of Germany in the United States was the “Achilles Heel of the NATO alliance”, according to Christopher Emmet.  

Chapter 4:
Off the record: the informal diplomacy of
the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke

In the previous chapters we have learned about the motives driving the original core founders of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG: firstly, the conviction that there was no alternative to a close transatlantic cooperation; and secondly, at least on the part of Emmet and Warburg, a genuine attachment to Germany. With a growing membership, however, the interests represented in these private organisations diversified. This was manifested in the public-private structure of the two organisations’ funding, as Chapter 3 demonstrated. While in the previous chapter the focus was on the organisations’ classic public diplomacy repertoire, this chapter examines how the specific composition of membership of the two elite organisations translated into their activities beyond public diplomacy, into a realm that can more precisely be labelled as private or informal diplomacy.¹ In its online Diplomatic Dictionary the U.S. Department of States defines ‘informal diplomacy’ simply as umbrella term for public diplomacy.² Proponents of the New Diplomatic History, however, focus on the actors conducting ‘informal diplomacy’ in defining their understanding thereof. The focus is on individuals, private citizens, and non-governmental institutions. In doing so “the very nature of diplomatic practice and the role of the diplomat” is transformed. In this sense diplomats increasingly serve as “facilitators and social entrepreneurs between domestic and foreign civil society groups”. The practice of informal diplomacy encompasses therefore “mobilizing and linking ‘networks’ of private actors to promote particular causes”.³

organisations active in international or transnational relations thus expand the field of diplomacy. 4

According to this definition, the chapter shows how the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s efforts as “unofficial diplomats” relate to the official dimension of German-American relations. To put it differently, the nexus between private diplomacy of West German and American elites and “traditional” diplomacy is studied. 5 Main prisms for this analysis are the two groups’ private or informal diplomacy activities commencing in the early 1950s and progressing through the 1960s until the mid-1970s. More specifically, this chapter aims at clarifying what role the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke played in West German-American relations in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. The analysis starts from the assumption that both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke not only significantly contributed to their respective country’s public diplomacy efforts but moreover attempted to influence other diplomatic activities such as state visits and negotiations of treaties. This was accomplished mainly through their mission to inform the public and the foreign policy elite about West Germany and the United States with their various publications. 6 Scholars studying public diplomacy point to the overall objective of this communication with foreign audiences as being the fostering of mutual understanding. Yet, in the case of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, this should not be overly emphasised as has been done elsewhere. 7 Interpreting these two organisations’ efforts as purely promoting friendship and mutual understanding between the United States and the Federal Republic and their peoples would trivialise what they did, reducing their role in German-American relations to a rather superficial one.

Thus this chapter demonstrates that the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s activities did overlap with official public diplomacy efforts. Yet, at times, they went way beyond the

5 Hans Tuch defines *traditional diplomacy* as the conduct of relations among nations through the interaction of governments, foreign ministries. Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*, 3.
6 For more detail on their classic public diplomacy activities see Chapter 3.
7 Kühnhardt, *Atlantik-Brücke*. 
promotion of a positive image of the United States and the Federal Republic. In a number of instances, directors and officers of the two organisations acted as political consultants, lobbyists or as private diplomats without an official mandate and thus at least attempted to exert influence without being democratically legitimized to do so.

The formative years during “the Golden Age” of German-American post-war relations, 1952–1959

The 1950s are, by some scholars, regarded as the golden age of West-German-American post-war relations. Coining this decade in such terms has much to do with the very close personal relationships between the top-level diplomats of the two countries. In particular, this refers to the relationship of Konrad Adenauer, first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Dean Acheson and even more so John Foster Dulles, successive US secretaries of state.8 Yet despite the fact that this period is indeed characterised by an unusual degree of agreement in attitudes and perceptions among the political elites in West Germany and the United States, historians are less inclined to overemphasise the degree of harmony between the two.9 Rather they like to point to sentiments and attitudes that Americans and West Germans held on the respective other that were much less sympathetic. Americans were persistently pessimistic about the Germans ability to truly change and abdicate from nationalism, militarism, and anti-Semitism. What is more, it was feared that driven by their nationalism and for the sake of unification they might seek a neutral status between the Soviet and the Western bloc in the Cold War.10 The broad mistrust against West Germany and Germans was illustrated in the great success of Tete Harens Teten’s book Germany Plots with the Kremlin published in

10 Ibid.
1953.\textsuperscript{11} Many Germans on the other side despised American de-nazification policies in particular and American culture in general.\textsuperscript{12}

However, a number of Cold War crises, such as the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the uprisings in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and in Hungary in 1953 and 1956 respectively, as well as the so called Sputnik shock in 1957, helped to consolidate West-German-American alliance within the Western bloc. West Germany’s incorporation into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its gaining of semi-sovereign status in 1955, only 10 years after Germany’s defeat and the end of World War II, proved this quite persuasively. Yet, what appears, with hindsight, as a logical development of international relations was in truth the result of great struggles; in the United States between proponents of isolationism and those promoting internationalism; and in West Germany between neutralism on the one side and Western integration and rearment on the other. Although private organisations like the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG were not spared from those differences – Ernst Friedlaender and Walter Stahl of the West German group, for example, had been too soft on Communism and what is more propagated neutralist views at least according to Christopher Emmet – they still did play a role in these struggles functioning as mediator and cushion between the frontlines.\textsuperscript{13} Mediating and cushioning was particularly necessary after the end of occupation. Educational and information programmes funded by the US State Department ended in the mid-1950s and the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke among others filled

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Saul Padover, “A Question of Policy”, \textit{New York Times}, Mar. 22, 1953. Although the author of this book review criticizes Teten’s work harshly, Padover nevertheless agrees with Teten’s “main conviction that our German policy is hazardous and fundamentally ill-conceived; that a powerful Germany will almost certainly seek an alliance with the Soviet Union, or at least cynically play off the Kremlin against Washington, and vice versa…”
\item \textsuperscript{12} In December 1957, for example, a public opinion survey yielded the result that 24 percent of the questioned Germans did not like the Americans particularly. Of those 42 percent said they “don’t like them as an occupying force; they are costing us money; their conduct during the war and as victors was not good”. See Noelle-Neumann and Neumann, \textit{The Germans: Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966}, 545.
\item \textsuperscript{13} See letter from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, Jan. 17, 1958, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 81, HIA and from Eric Warburg to Christopher Emmet, Feb. 8, 1958, SWA.
\end{itemize}
that gap.\textsuperscript{14} They promoted German-American cooperation in the all-encompassing conflict between the East and the West; at times with a real hands-on attitude clearly exceeding their educational mandate as confirmed in their founding documents and thus threatening the organisations’ tax-deductible status.\textsuperscript{15}

\textit{Adenauer’s trips to the United States}

Public diplomacy in its most narrow meaning, informing foreign audiences about domestic issues as well as about the country’s foreign policies, definitely ranked high among the ACG’s and Atlantik-Brücke’s activities in the early 1950s. Infused with “state spirit” Christopher Emmet in particular travelled quite regularly to West Germany to meet with old acquaintances and make new ones among the political, industrial and media elites. In doing so Emmet laid the groundwork for the network to come of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG. In the summer of 1952, for example, Emmet gave a talk about the upcoming presidential elections, the race between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, Emmet met with Johnny von Herwarth, at the time with the office of Federal President Theodor Heuss, Theodor Kordt, at the time head of the Foreign Office department, and Alexander Boeker, in the office of Chancellor Adenauer. Hans Karl von Borries and Günter Henle were central contacts for Emmet into West Germany’s business community. The former was a high-ranking senior figure of the Ruhr industries before and after World War II and the latter was one of the most powerful West German steel magnates of the post-war era. Prominent media figures, whom Emmet was in touch with, were, among others, Gerd Bucerius, publisher of \textit{Die Zeit}, and Richard Löwenthal, at the time correspondent of \textit{The Observer} and


\textsuperscript{16} Letter from Erik Blumenfeld to Christopher Emmet, Jul. 18, 1952, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 63, HIA.
a Social Democrat by political conviction. Hence it is not surprising that Emmet not only met with politicians of the governing Christian Democrats but also sought contact with leaders of German Social Democracy such as Erich Ollenhauer, Fritz Heine and Willy Brandt. This is particularly noteworthy since at the time SPD leaders openly favoured neutralism for West Germany and thus vehemently opposed Germany’s West integration and joining of NATO.17

Some of Christopher Emmet’s early activities, however, clearly deviated from clear-cut public diplomacy tasks. While travelling in West Germany, Emmet acted as a private diplomat on behalf of the US, as political consultant and lobbyist for the NATO project. He played these roles without an official mandate but infused with “state spirit”. In the late summer of 1952, for example, Emmet wrote to Max Brauer of the SPD – whom he knew from one of his earliest trips to West Germany in the summer of 1950.18 With a watchful eye on congressional power struggles between those who favoured isolationism and those who supported the United States’ NATO policy, Emmet almost begged Brauer to try to soften attacks against that very policy by his party colleagues. In June 1952, Kurt Schumacher, the Social Democratic opposition leader, for example, warned explicitly against ratifying the General Treaty and announced that the opposition “would make every effort to revoke the treaties” in case that they were indeed going to be ratified. In his attempt to convince Brauer of the importance that the SPD did support the NATO project, Emmet used quite threatening arguments. He created a scenario in which West Germany indeed was neutral and outside of NATO. If in this setting the Russians attacked Germany, the West would “then be compelled perhaps to use the atom bomb on the Ruhr itself, to prevent its vast industrial potential from falling into Soviet hands.”19 Yet, there was more to come from the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke then merely writing letters.

17 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, July 10, 1952, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 81, HIA. For more detailed biographical information on von Borries and Henle, see Chapter 2.
18 See Chapter 2 “Prelude”.
19 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Max Brauer, Aug. 25, 1952. For quote by Schumacher, see “Vorgefechte zur Ratifizierung”, Die Zeit, Jun. 12, 1952. On the SPD’s position in regard to Westbindung, see Talbot C.
In April of 1953, the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was to make his first visit to the United States; one of the most important and highly symbolic events in post-war German history. Only two months earlier, the new US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, had extended the invitation to the German head of government. Almost immediately preparations commenced in West Germany and the United States alike. While Herbert Blankenhorn, Adenauer’s personal adviser and head of the political department within the Foreign Office, met with John J. McCloy presenting Adenauer’s political agenda for the trip, Christopher Emmet and Erik Blumenfeld were also eager to have a say in shaping the chancellor’s trip. During the preparatory phase of this visit, the Eisenhower administration, however, dismissed any attempts on the part of the German diplomats, official or unofficial, to get politically tangible issues on the agenda. For example, the German delegation was keen to talk about aid to Berlin in connection with the steadily increasing numbers of refugees from the German Democratic Republic. Emmet was also well-aware of this problem and sent a memorandum summarising “the highlights of the German Expellee problem in relation to the great new influx of refugees into Berlin” to McCloy knowing that the latter informally negotiated the political agenda for the visit. In the memorandum Emmet pointed out that 22 percent of the German population were refugees; the “largest single group” being “the expellees” accounting for more than eight million people. Beyond pure education about numbers the central aim of Emmet’s memo was to link the issue to West Germany’s economic recovery and its political future. With regard to the former, Emmet argued that “the burden of the refugees is the key factor in determining the amount which Western Germany is able to pay for the occupation costs of the allied armies or for prospective German...
rearmament”. With regard to the latter, Emmet warned of the effects the unresolved refugee problem would have on the upcoming elections. According to Emmet, it endangered not only the re-election of the Adenauer Government but “the whole policy of integrating Germany with the West” on top of the “rise of neo-Nazism and Nationalism in Germany”. The official US economics negotiators for the German-American talks during the Adenauer visit, however, refused to discuss concrete numbers for aid to Berlin at all.

Hence, even before the trip commenced, it was reduced to more or less a pure PR exercise. Thus, in preparing the trip the ultimate goal was to make the most of it with one eye on public opinion in the US and the other on the effect on German voters. In terms of West Germany’s self-image the mere fact that the German chancellor was received with full honours was a great boost. After the conclusion of talks in Washington, Adenauer and the delegation accompanying the chancellor toured the country – San Francisco, Chicago, New York and Boston – demonstrating that this was not a pure state visit focused on high-level diplomacy but reaching out to the American public as well as the German one. Christopher Emmet and Erik Blumenfeld had been involved in the making of the chancellor’s voyage since mid-March 1953. Although Blumenfeld, at the time a close confident of the chancellor, Emmet provided Adenauer with information and guidance in public relations questions – advice that was much appreciated by the chancellor according to Blumenfeld. One piece of advice was to exploit the opportunity to press the issues related to the “priceless asset Berlin” as the city and its current mayor, Ernst Reuter (SPD) “have become a symbol of Freedom and anti-Communism” and are “no longer thought of as Germans”. Emmet in particular hoped that mentioning the German expellee problem in connection with Berlin would yield some concrete results in terms of American aid. Interestingly enough, Emmet had given the exact

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21 Letter from Christopher Emmet to John J. McCloy and confidential memorandum drafted by Emmet, Mar. 19, 1953, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 87, HIA.
22 Maulucci, “Konrad Adenauer's April 1953 Visit to the United States and the Limits of the German-American Relationship in the Early 1950s”, 582.
23 ibid.
same advice to Berlin’s mayor, Ernst Reuter during a meeting when the latter had visited New York just a few weeks prior to the chancellor’s trip to the US. More importantly even, Emmet as an attentive observer of the US media, feared that Adenauer would not “receive as much or as universally favourable publicity as Reuter”. In his assessment of the Reuter visit – “a spectacular success” – Emmet went as far as comparing it to Churchill’s just after the end of World War II in terms of press coverage: “Churchill never had so many front-page stories and photographs so many different days on any of his visits to America.”

One of the more visible and tangible results of Emmet and Blumenfeld pulling the strings in the background was Konrad Adenauer’s acceptance of an invitation from General William Joseph Donovan, chairman of the American Committee on United Europe (ACUE). This was even more so a success on the part of Blumenfeld and Emmet in light of the fact that ACUE had wanted to invite the chancellor as early as 1950 and the fact that the chancellor’s itinerary included only one more comparable item. The day before the meeting with the ACUE, the chancellor addressed an audience of approximately 150 to 200 participants at the Council on Foreign Relations. In arranging for the Adenauer address to the ACUE, Emmet could build on contacts to people in the West German diplomatic hierarchy. There was, for example, Johnnie von Herwarth, chief of protocol of the German Foreign Office, whom Emmet was acquainted with since his earliest trips to Germany after the war. Felix von Eckardt, head of the Press and Information Office was also helpful and vice versa as he got in touch with Emmet upon arrival in New York preparing Adenauer’s trip. A third German diplomat who on behalf of Emmet made sure that the Chancellor attended a lunch given by ACUE in honour of Konrad Adenauer was Heinz Krekeler, chargé d’affaires.

24 On the relationship Blumenfeld-Adenauer, see Bajohr, Hanseat und Grenzgänger. Letter from Erik Blumenfeld to Christopher Emmet, Mar. 11, 1953 and letter from Christopher Emmet to Erik Blumenfeld, Mar. 26, 1953, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 63, HIA.  
26 Letter from Erik Blumenfeld to Christopher Emmet, Mar. 11, 1953 and letter from Christopher Emmet to Erik Blumenfeld, Mar. 26, 1953, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 63, HIA.
ACUE was an important conduit for US covert support for the European Movement, as has been explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis. US officials and the US foreign policy establishment at large promoted an internationalist agenda for the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. Unification and integration of Western Europe ranked high on the internationalists’ agenda as an end in itself but even more importantly because this very process entailed a solution to the German problem. People working for ACUE were bestowed with a sense of mission viewing American federalism as a political model to be transferred to other parts of the world along with its values and political culture. Given ACUE’s staunch anti-Communist orientation and thus providing to a large extent help to the non-Communist left in Europe, Christopher Emmet’s affiliation with Committee is not particularly surprising. And Adenauer addressing these American promoters of European federalism emphasised the chancellor’s commitment to the European integration process.

In the end Konrad Adenauer’s first trip to the United States was considered a great success. The German delegation’s expectations regarding American public reactions to Adenauer were exceeded as he was warmly welcomed. Contrary to Emmet’s fears, other observers of the American press considered media attention to the German chancellor’s visit as very strong and quite consistent over the course of his voyage. The New York Times alone carried 19 news stories over the course of Adenauer’s stay in the US the headlines carrying his name and the Washington Post anticipated that Adenauer’s arrival in the capital was “Heralded”.

However, in terms of acquiring American aid for the German expellee and refugee problem the trip was a failure. Thus, Christopher Emmet and Erik Blumenfeld seized the opportunity when, approximately one and a half years later, in October 1954, Adenauer came to the US again to put the issue on the agenda. This time Emmet arranged for an invitation to

the chancellor by the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The IRC was initially founded at the request of Albert Einstein in the endeavour to assist refugees from Nazi Germany.\footnote{Eric T. Chester, \textit{Covert Networks: Progressives, the International Rescue Committee, and the CIA}, (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995).}

To this very day, the IRC remains an international humanitarian aid organisation. Reinhold Niebuhr and John Dewey were two prominent figures influential in establishing the IRC in the 1930s. In addition, a number of scholars, senior trade union representatives and former communists supported its foundation. With the onset of the Cold War, the IRC’s main focus was on Communist countries in Eastern Europe. Its first major campaign was raising funds for relief of West Berlin’s population during the Berlin blockade in 1948. William J. Donovan, also a crucial figure in ACUE, was the leading figure in this US fund-raising campaign.\footnote{Ernst Reuter during WWII, IRC representative in Turkey Andrew F. Smith, \textit{Rescuing the World: The Life and Times of Leo Cherne} (Albany, NY2002), 45-46.} In the 1950s, Christopher Emmet was a director of this relief organisation. Therefore, he was in a good position to advise Adenauer to use the stage of this distinguished organisation to “give a major speech about the expellees and refugees from the Communist areas”. Emmet argued, first of all that “this story has never been told with sufficient prominence in America to stick to anybody’s mind”. Secondly, Emmet considered this issue a good one to demonstrate to American elites and the public alike Germans’ steadfast standing against Communism: talking about the expellee and refugee problem provided feasible arguments showing “why the Germans would not turn towards a deal with Russia or even towards a neutral position”. Furthermore, Emmet again pointed to Berlin in this connection providing Blumenfeld with a long list of arguments to be forwarded to the chancellor, “the leaders of government, and CDU Party” why referring to the city of Berlin – “a great potential good-will asset for German propaganda” (emphasis added) – would be so beneficial to CDU politicians in particular.\footnote{Letters from Christopher Emmet to Erik Blumenfeld, Aug. 7 and 10, Sep. 13, 1954, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 63, HIA.} One argument ran along the lines that Ernst Reuter and Berlin had been very popular especially among groups that tend to be rather “sceptical about Western
Germany as a whole” – liberals, labour, Democrats and Jews. Emmet suggested that if Adenauer and government officials identified “themselves to the American public with appeals for Berlin” they could win some of “the American friends ... and the SPD as friends of ... the CDU”. Moreover, this could “strengthen the Chancellor’s popularity and that of the CDU, among these groups in Germany” as well.  

During the summer of 1954, preceding Adenauer’s second visit to the US, Emmet perceived American media reports on the situation in Germany as “exaggeratedly pessimistic” and as voicing “suspicions about the stability of German anti-Communism”. Indeed US media outlets such as the New York Times, the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times featured prominently the so called Dr. Otto John affair. Dr. Otto John, the head of the Federal Domestic Intelligence Agency, allegedly defected to the East. John justified his flight to East Berlin on July 20, 1954 with his opposition to Adenauer’s Politik der Stärke towards the East as this was manifesting the division of Germany. Moreover, John protested the re-integration of ex-Nazis into public service. This affair prompted headlines in American newspapers such as “New Doubts about German Reliability”, “Uproar Caused in Bonn”, “Defectors Play A Key Role Now: Their Secrets Are Big Prizes in ‘Cold War’ Between Communists and West”. In June 1954, Heinrich Bruening, the former Reich Chancellor (1930-1932) announced his return to West German politics at the Rhein-Rhur Club of the West German industrial magnates. He sharply criticized Chancellor Adenauer’s foreign policy and called for a neutral stance of Germany between East and West. Bruening’s announcement and his opinionated stance on West Germany’s foreign policy, did not paint the picture brighter in Emmet’s eyes. Thus, Emmet intended to make use of Adenauer’s

33 Ibid.
35 See ibid., 103.
“unparalleled publicity ... in America” to counter those trends. With the same intention
Emmet reported to officials of the State Department’s German desk upon returning from a trip
to West Germany that very summer giving them a summary of his “excellent impression of
the situation in Germany”. Bearing these developments in mind, this was a crucial phase for
post-war West Germany during which the Adenauer government was still negotiating the
post-occupation status for the Federal Republic. At this point, gaining sovereignty was by no
means certain. The more so as the prospective granting of a sovereign status was intimately
linked to question of the European Community (EDC) and West German rearmament.

Confiscated German property in the US

Atlantik-Brücke representatives returned the frequent visits of Christopher Emmet and thus
acted as West German public diplomacy agents without an official mandate. In 1955, Marion
Dönhoff, for example, toured the United States for several weeks. One of her tasks was to
explain West Germany’s viewpoint on central political and economic issues in the many
meetings arranged by Ellen McCloy and Eric Warburg. She not only talked to journalists and
scholars but also to government officials and political leaders such as Adlai Stevenson,
Senator William F. Knowland and General Lucius D. Clay.

When a few years later in 1958, the executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke, Walter Stahl
travelled to the US, he followed up on a much more concrete and delicate issue: “The issue of
restitution of German assets confiscated in the United States”, which according to Stahl,
“remains the only controversial subject between the Federal Republic and the United States in
their post-war relations.”

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38 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Erik Blumenfeld, Aug. 7, 1954, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 63, HIA.
39 Dr. Otto John affair; Brüning speaking out for neutrality
report of activities, 1955” to the members of the American Council on Germany, Inc. (Marcia Kahn),
Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 4, HIA.
40 “Die Frage der Rückerstattung von den in den USA konfiszierten Vermögenswerten deutscher privater
Eigentümer ist als einziger Streitpunkt der Nachkriegszeit zwischen der Bundesrepublik und den USA übrig
confiscated German property in the United States. Affected by this seizure were mostly owners of small assets but also big companies such as Farbwerke Höchst, Schering and Volkswagen. The issue of compensation or restitution of the assets had not been settled in the post-war period up to the late 1950s. In 1958, however, the US Congress announced that it would prepare a bill allowing the confiscated assets to be used to compensate damage caused by Germans during the war.41

West German private interests had hoped that a solution could be found as accommodating as the one for the dismantling issue. This turned out to be a false hope; partly due to discord on the American side of the bargaining table and also due to the fact that, according to Hans Dieter Kreikamp, this matter did not rank particularly high on the West German government’s foreign policy agenda. The Adenauer administration was not willing to sacrifice its larger foreign policy goal of West integration and gaining of sovereignty for narrow interests of the business community.42 To gain greater leverage in international relations, West Germany needed an untainted image of a young democracy. Thus it was out of the question that the West German government publicly advocated the restitution of such companies. Therefore, as early as 1948, private interests in Germany organised and formed a pressure group. Among the founders of the Studiengesellschaft für privatrechtliche Auslandsinteressen e.V. were influential bankers and industrialists like Herman Josef Abs of Deutsche Bank and Wilhelm Borner of Schering AG and members of the Bundestag like Paul Leverkuehn (CDU), Hans Wellhausen (FDP) and Fritz Baade (SPD). In the ongoing contestation it was thus, according

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42 ibid.
to Jähnicke, representatives of private interest who stepped into the breach in lieu of official bodies.  

Thus, unsurprisingly, the issue of confiscated German property in the US had drawn Christopher Emmet’s attention. Always the attentive observer of political developments particularly with regard to Germany, he drafted a memorandum on this very question. In September 1954, he sent the memorandum to John J. McCloy. He expressed his hope that the latter would give him some tangible advice as to what could be done after it had been “hopelessly mismanaged at the last session in Congress”. What Emmet envisioned and also conveyed to Heinz Krekeler, West German charge d’affaires to the United States, was “a new bill for the return of German property which had the blessing of the administration and the wide support of public opinion”. Emmet approached McCloy with the underlying intention to make McCloy, the most influential figure on all matters German, to secretly pull some strings – yet to no avail. Until the latter part of 1958, no solution acceptable to all parties concerned had been found, despite the fact that question of German property had been brought up in Congress every year ever since 1954. A few years later, however, when Emmet’s West German friends proposed to discuss the issue of “Release of German Property” on the agenda of the German-American conferences, the New Yorkers rejected this downright.

Walter Stahl, executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke, therefore, occupied himself at length with the question of “whether the Atlantik-Brücke should try to help coming to a solution satisfyingly to both sides” on the occasion of his forthcoming voyage to the United States in the autumn of 1958. On behalf of the Atlantik-Brücke Stahl expressed the view that


44 On Dirksen-Bill, see ibid., 74-81. Letters from Christopher Emmet to John J. McCloy, Sep. 23 and 30, 1954, and to Heinz Krekeler, Sep. 23, 1954, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 87, 84 HIA.

45 Letter from Joseph Kaskell to Christopher Emmet, May 6, 1958, Christopher Emmet Papers, HIA.
the US treatment of this issue was “discriminating against the Federal Republic of Germany”.

The basic reason for this discrimination was, according to Henry A. Abt, head of the German-American trade promotion office in New York, that American business encountered German competition around the world. Indeed, according to Reinhard Neebe, the Federal Republic was in terms of foreign trade remarkably successful during the 1950s. In 1950 the Federal Republic’s external trade balance stated a deficit of three billion deutschmark. Only three years later, in 1953, however, the trade balance already yielded a surplus of 2.5 billion deutschmark. Bolstering Abt’s view, West German exporters named US and British companies as their main competitors on the different markets around the globe. This fact also caused the “anti-German curve” to increase lately, according to Henry A. Abt. Together with the strong congressional opposition representing domestic business interests this posed a great obstacle to a solution acceptable to German owners of property confiscated in the US.

Therefore, given that the Atlantik-Brücke’s membership had been dominated by business and industry representatives since the mid-1950s the organisation had an imperative to become active on behalf of its most powerful constituency. By the end of 1956, German property confiscated in the US totalled $395 million, approximately 90 per cent of which were allotted to 2,500 owners, among them big companies, such as Farbwerke Hoechst, Schering AG, Bayer AG, and Volkswagen. These companies were either already represented in the Atlantik-Brücke at the end of the 1950s or joined during the 1960s and 1970s.


48 See confidential report by executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke; Kreikamp, Deutsches Vermögen in den Vereinigten Staaten, 80.

49 For membership development see chapter 2.
Yet, after Stahl had “several conversations in Washington and New York with American and German experts ... senators, congressmen, diplomats, attorneys, business journalists, specialist on international law and bankers” he concluded that “at the moment it would neither advance the issue nor be beneficial to the Atlantik-Brücke to become more active in this matter”.50 Christian Haase explains the Atlantik-Brücke’s inactivity concerning this so tangible issue, at least for the industrialists among its membership, by pointing to the role of the Foreign Ministry. According to Haase, the American Desk within the ministry had basically used the Atlantik-Brücke for its links into the West German business community to “suppress another unwanted debate on the German past in the capital cities of Western countries...”51 Abstaining from active lobbying in the US, however, did not mean to stay silent on the subject altogether. As indicated above, Walter Stahl investigated the issue quite thoroughly during his trip to the US in November and December of 1958. Using the acquired information and insights, Stahl then, upon his return to Germany drafted a comprehensive report on German property in the USA. Though officially this report was written for the sole purpose of informing Atlantik-Brücke members, the underlying aim was to stir the West German administration’s actions into a certain direction. This direction was to be followed in the form of a “new approach”. Stahl’s proposed approach would not only help to solve this “awkward” issue but would also very tangibly satisfy German industries’ demands with regard to their assets in the US. More importantly a satisfying solution in this case could be used as precedent for handling the issue of confiscated German property in other western nations.52

At the heart of Stahl’s proposition was the founding of a German-American mutual fund which would jointly implement a technical programme in underdeveloped countries. Hence in

51 Haase, Pragmatic Peacemakers. Institutes of International Affairs and the Liberalization of West Germany 1945-73, 113-115.
52 Confidential report by Walter Stahl.
the guise of a development programme, this proposal offered German owners of confiscated property the opportunity to acquire shares in this fund equal to their claims with the incentive of potential profits. To insure success of the endeavour, Stahl felt “for psychological reasons”, it was crucial that economics minister Ludwig Erhard personally forwarded this proposal to the Americans. Furthermore, Stahl counselled, it should be pointed out to the Americans “that the security of US foreign investments was closely linked to the security of foreign investments in the United States”. This was considered a plan that had the potential to create “good will” in the United States particularly with regard to the issue of German property. The main selling point was that it “served common non-material and practical goals, namely the betterment of the standard of living of impoverished peoples, and the containment of Communism”. Stahl’s proposed “new approach” was not altogether novel. Arguments linking foreign aid and the issue of foreign investment security had been brought forward before. Neither was the Atlantik-Brücke the first private entity to get involved in this issue. The Studiengesellschaft had been around for 10 years and individual corporate claimants had hired lawyers in the US to handle their case. The specific idea of a mutual fund for development aid, however, was innovative even though Stahl’s plan like so many others before did not yield the expected result either. Yet, it helped the Atlantik-Brücke to establish itself as promoter of West German business interests and of German-American relations alike. In particular, the former was essential for the long-term goal of the organisation to attract more business and industry representatives.

The Kennan-Acheson controversy

Towards the close of the so called “golden age” of German-American post-war relations, a long-standing controversy over fundamental questions regarding Cold War strategies attracted

53 Confidential report by executive director of the Atlantik-Brücke, pp. 13, 14, 15.
54 Further consultation of the Political Archive of the Foreign Office (PAAA) revealed that Foreign Office staff apparently did not follow up on Stahl’s “new approach”. See, for instance, J. White, “West German Aid to Developing Countries”, International Affairs vol. 41, no. 1 (1965): 74-88.
broad international public attention. On the whole, foreign policy elites in the United States and in the Western European NATO partner countries were proponents of the containment policy. For the better part of the 1950s, the Cold War foreign policy consensus among the Western powers was to act from a position of strength, in a military sense. Yet Western technological and military strength was seriously challenged in October and November of 1957 when the Soviets launched Sputnik I and II, the latter carrying the Soviet space dog Laika. This tremendous technological success of the Soviets sent shock waves through the Atlantic Alliance. “U.S. Missile Experts Shaken by Sputnik” headlined the New York Times in October 1957. US defence officials were not so much disturbed by the fact that the Soviet Union placed the first earth satellite in space. What seriously concerned them was the strength of the Soviet rocket engines calling Soviet rocketry superior. The launch of Sputnik also made, in Western eyes, the Soviet’s diplomatic offensive from earlier the same year even less trustworthy. During an appearance on the US broadcasting system CBS, June 2, 1957 Khrushchev had toyed with the idea of withdrawing all Soviet troops from Eastern Europe on the condition that American and British troops would also be removed from the Western part of Europe. Western officials declined to consider Khrushchev’s offers altogether. They were rather inclined to agree on deploying tactical nuclear weapons to the Western European arsenal during the Paris NATO summit in December 1957.

Against this background George F. Kennan, former US diplomat and professor, delivered his contribution to the BBC’s Reith lecture series in November and December 1957 which had the reputation of giving a forum to controversial issues. In the course of six successive talks on Sunday nights, Kennan’s views on the Cold War and proposals for mutual disengagement and a nuclear free zone in Europe were aired. Kennan had earned a reputation as the expert on Soviet Russia with the long telegram and the X article in Foreign Affairs. In

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1947, thus, being the father of containment so to speak. Yet, Kennan’s suggestions regarding military disengagement in Europe were by no means breathtakingly new. Others before him had brought forward arguments in favour of a pull back of British and American troops from Germany implying a neutralization of Germany. More prominent advocates of this way forward were Walter Lippmann, eminent US columnist and Denis Healey, British foreign affairs expert and soon to be shadow foreign secretary of the Labour Party. Thomas Gijswijt even suggests that Kennan had been infused with at least some of his ideas during a Bilderberg meeting early in 1957. This had been the venue where Denis Healey, for the first time, presented his proposal on disengagement in Central Europe.

Kennan’s views, however, caused some uproar in the international circles of informed opinion. Christopher Emmet worried most that Kennan might have “bewitched ... British and German intellectuals and newspapers, like a new Pied Piper of Hamelin” since they fell victim to the “illusion ... that Kennan is some kind of unofficial spokesman and brain truster for the Democratic Party”, as he expressed in a letter to Vice President Richard Nixon.

Emmet’s assessment of the effects of Kennan’s contribution to the Reith lecture was right and wrong at the same time. The British newspaper The Times indeed covered widely Kennan’s on-air remarks and their repercussions in British policy circles. Yet, in the many articles referring to Kennan’s suggestions, he was never introduced as representative of the Democratic Party but correctly so as professor, visiting scholar and former US ambassador to Moscow. However, The Times also reported on Labour MPs positively responding to Kennan’s ideas. For example, left-wing politician Konni Zilliacus during parliamentary debate called NATO a “useless anachronism” and proposed to seek a settlement as

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59 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Richard Nixon, Jan. 8, 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
“advocated by the Opposition and responsible American opinion, such as Mr George F. Kennan and Mr Walter Lippmann”.

In Emmet’s eyes an article by Fritz Rene Allemann in *Die Zeit* had caused the spread of the false impression regarding Kennan being an unofficial spokesman of the Democratic Party. In this article entitled “Kennans Kettenreaktion” (Kennan’s chain reaction), Allemann had criticised the Adenauer government for brushing aside Kennan’s arguments by pointing out his status as private citizen. Furthermore, he had elevated Kennan’s status in American politics by claiming that Kennan was a “foreign policy adviser – some even suggest: a future secretary of state – of the Democratic presidential candidate and party leader Adlai Stevenson”. Allemann had gone on to stress that other politicians and opinion moulders in a good number of other countries had taken up the lead provided by Kennan. This was, as Emmet told Marion Dönhoff, “misinformation ... and was key to the false build-up of Kennan’s political influence for German readers”. Besides *Die Zeit*, *Der Spiegel* also reported quite sympathetically on Kennan and his disengagement proposals. Yet, what Emmet considered most disturbing about the coverage of the 1957 Reith Lectures was the potential or real impact this had on political decision-makers in West Germany. Although advocates of some kind of disengagement were mainly to be found in the ranks of British Labour and West Germany’s Social Democracy, Emmet was convinced that Allemann’s article had significantly “contributed to the mistake the Chancellor made yesterday in Paris” at the NATO summit where Adenauer had favoured the delay of “the setting of IRBM missile

60 “House of Commons: No Time to End Alliances. All Europe Plan Opposed”, *The Times*, Nov. 28, 1957.
62 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Marion Dönhoff, Dec. 17, 1957, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
63 Jens Daniel, “NATO, und was weiter?”, *Der Spiegel*, Dec. 11, 1957.
basis”, which “was psychologically disastrous”. If Allemann “and DIE ZEIT took Kennan’s blueprint for surrender so seriously, naturally the Chancellor... felt he must yield.”\textsuperscript{64}

This was the background to Christopher Emmet’s decision, who was a staunch proponent of the “position of strength” himself, to design and concert a full-fledged public relations campaign aiming to counter Kennan’s ideas about disengagement in particular and isolationist and neutralist tendencies in general. Moreover, the campaign aimed at mitigating media impact of the Reith lectures in the United States as well as in Germany.

*The Washington Post* opined “Peril of neutralism in the new phase of the Cold War... cannot lightly be dismissed” prominently featuring George Kennan, who “in his Reith lectures in London, and Lester Pearson, in his Nobel Peace Prize address, advocated with profound conviction and intelligence the need to continue negotiations with the Soviet Union at every level short of the showy summit conference”.\textsuperscript{65} *The Wall Street Journal* showcased Kennan’s positions headlining “Kennan on Germany: The Proposal to Withdraw All Foreign Troops Is tempting”.\textsuperscript{66} *The New York Times* titled “Solution for Europe as Kennan Sees Them: Troop Withdrawals, Withholding Of Nuclear Weapons Proposed”.\textsuperscript{67}

Centre-piece of the ACG’s campaign was the successful launch of a statement by Dean Acheson, former Democratic US Secretary of State. Though retired from public duty, Acheson was still an influential figure chairing the party’s Advisory Committee on Foreign Affairs. Acheson’s statement was a harsh attack on his former subordinate George F. Kennan reflecting a controversy within the Democratic Party over the principles of US defence policy.\textsuperscript{68} Acheson emphatically replied to Kennan, explaining that the proposal for the

\textsuperscript{64} On supporters for disengagement, see Gijswijt, “The Bilderberg Group and the End of the Cold War. The Disengagement Debates of the 1950s”, 30-43. Quotes see letter from Christoper Emmett to Marion Dönhoff, Dec. 17, 1957, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.


\textsuperscript{66} “Kennan on Germany”, *Wall Street Journal*, Dec. 6, 1957.


\textsuperscript{68} Hixson, George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast, 182.
“withdrawal of American, British and Russian troops from Europe” was not in accordance with the position of the Democratic Party in the United States.\(^6^9\)

Indeed, Kennan’s radio talks were widely discussed and also reprinted in British, American, and European media such as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.\(^7^0\) The latter picked up on The Times’ coverage of the Reith Lectures with a short piece entitled “Kennan’s big success” (*Kennans großer Erfolg*), quoting the British newspaper opining that Kennan had been extremely successful in shaking up people and starting a debate.\(^7^1\) In January 1958, Kennan’s lectures were furthermore broadcasted on CBS and the North German Radio. At roughly the same time, Emmet introduced Dean Acheson to his detailed plans for his counter campaign, which on New Year’s Day had gotten even more urgent. German federal president Theodor Heuss “gave Kennan a flattering reference in his New Year’s message, which was wrongly interpreted by much of the German press as an endorsement of Kennan’s proposal”.\(^7^2\) And so Emmet’s campaign preparations gathered considerable speed over the course of one week in January. And on the day before January 12 “all the domestic and foreign news agencies” and “the New York and Washington City Desks” were provided with Acheson’s statement. Newspapers in Europe, among them the *London Sunday Times* and the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, received advance copies. Interestingly enough, Emmet deliberately circumvented the Atlantik-Brücke, Marion Dönhoff and *Die Zeit.*

“[T]he Atlantik Brücke is not to be relied on politically in Germany anymore”, Emmet told his confident, Klaus Dohrn. Emmet decided he would spare the Atlantik-Brücke embarrassment by excluding it from the ACG’s counter-campaign because the latter’s current chairman, Ernst Friedlaender was a supporter of George Kennan.\(^7^3\) Thus it can be argued that the ACG’s PR campaign accompanying the Acheson statement had several intended impacts;

\(^{69}\) “Reply to Kennan” by Dean Acheson for release Saturday, Jan. 12, 1958, SWA.
\(^{72}\) ACG “Memorandum on Acheson’s Reply to Kennan”, Jan. 6, 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
\(^{73}\) Letters from Christopher Emmet to Klaus Dohrn, Jan. 4 and 12, 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
one of them to exert influence on the Atlantik-Brücke and the elites it represented. Emmet believed that West German businessmen needed some guidance on political issues: “They’re torn between respect for the Chancellor and realization of the necessity for German-American unity on the one hand, and the influence of the German press and intellectuals on the other.”

And thus, towards the end of the 1950s, a simmering internal conflict came to a head in which quite plainly neutralist views held by Friedlaender and Stahl, whom Emmet considered intellectuals, clashed with Emmet’s, which were in accordance with official US foreign policy. Yet, to ensure the desired impact on the political scene in Bonn, Emmet informed the West German ambassador to the United States, Heinz Krekeler, in great detail about the planned campaign not without urgently suggesting that the ambassador put the Chancellor and the foreign minister into the picture prior to release of the statement. The latter was clearly motivated by Emmet’s hope that both would make timely comments on the issue.

The release of Acheson’s statement on Sunday, January 12, was then accompanied by a speech the former Secretary of State gave at a luncheon organised by the Herald Tribune, chief rival to the New York Times. One week later, the campaign was topped off with the release of a joint statement entitled “Should Germany be neutralized? – A Reply to Kennan”, drafted by Christopher Emmet and signed by 16 “leading experts on Germany” headed by James B. Conant, former High Commissioner and first US ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. Among the other under signers were the imminent Carl J. Friedrich, George N. Shuster and Hans Wallenberg. By wholeheartedly supporting Acheson’s position and agreeing to the arguments put forward therein, this joint statement constituted an

74 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Eric Warburg, Jan. 19, 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
75 See, for example, letters from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, Jan. 17, 1958, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 81, HIA; from Eric Warburg to Christopher Emmet, Feb. 8, 1958, SWA. For Stahl’s perspective see his letter to Christopher Emmet, Jan. 14, 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
76 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Heinz L. Krekeler, Jan. 8, 1958, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 84, HIA. Originally Eric Warburg had also intended to sign the statement. Yet, in the end business partners forced him to abstain from being linked to the effort.
additional counter attack on George Kennan’s views. 78 Indeed, in terms of press coverage, this campaign was an outright success considering all the big names on the global news market that either carried or at least reported on the Acheson statement or the ACG’s joint statement or both – *Time, The Times, La Stampa, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, New York Times.* 79 Yet, Emmet was particularly delighted about the fact that this comprehensive effort had had a real impact on the Chancellor. For, he considered a speech by Adenauer broadcasted on West German home service “a triumph... for us”. 80 After Konrad Adenauer had displayed a certain openness to negotiations with the Soviets at the NATO Paris summit in December of the previous year, the Chancellor now publicly denounced any approaches by the Soviets as propaganda and clearly rejected any proposals for a neutral Germany. Adenauer’s attitude in December of 1957 Emmet had notoriously accounted to the negative influence of Kennan’s views on German press and intellectuals as explained above. 81

In the end, Emmet was tremendously pleased with his “one man operation” even though he had “to conceal it as much as possible in order to give the impression of a collective effort since that carries more weight politically...”. Yet, “a good many important people here knew I had a great deal to do with this”. 82 He had achieved all this using the ACG as a means towards the ends he had envisioned all along for this private group despite the ACG’s tax-deductible status. At least in theory this status foreclosed any such political activism as it was granted to organisations with purely educational purposes.

It is interesting to note that those proposing disengagement within transatlantic foreign affairs elite circle never overcame their minority status. Yet, their ideas and the potential power of them were taken very seriously. In this Christopher Emmet was not an exception. In

78 “Should Germany be neutralized? – A Reply to Kennan”, Carl Joachim Friedrich Papers, HUGFP 17.12, Correspondence and other papers, CA 1940-1964, Box 11, HUA.
80 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Klaus Dohrn, Jan. 17, 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
82 Letters from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, Jan. 30, and to Joseph Kaskell, Feb. 6, 1958, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 81 and 82, HIA.
the spring of 1958, the organizers of the Bilderberg meetings arranged a steering committee meeting to which they invited for the first time NATO General Secretary Paul-Henri Spaak and *New York Times* columnist Cyrus Sulzberger. Inviting the former was a sign of support for NATO. Inviting the latter was an indication that transatlantic foreign affairs elites wished to influence public debate on the issue.83

**Times of change: the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke facing challenges to the close transatlantic relationship, 1960–1967**

If the 1950s were considered the “golden age” of post-war West-German-American relations, then the 1960s definitely presented a much rougher period in the two countries’ relations. Vociferous protest movements in both countries added to the challenges that politicians faced during that decade. In the United States a shift of generations in the highest political office, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to John F. Kennedy (January 1961), took place almost three years earlier than in the Federal Republic of Germany, from Konrad Adenauer to Ludwig Erhard (October 1963). The youthful President Kennedy and Konrad Adenauer did not only differ considerably in terms of age but also in their outlook on the world and in political style. Yet, the conflicts in the international arena in general, and in West-German-American relations in particular, can by no means be ascribed to deteriorated relations on the personal level of the highest diplomats of the US and West Germany alone. West Germany’s position in terms of economic performance had strengthened substantially through the 1950s and 1960s. This is illustrated, for example, by a comparison of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States and the Federal Republic. From 1949 to 1968 West Germany’s GDP rose from $3,600 to $10,800 whereas that of the US only rose from $9,000 to $14,700.

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The balance of trade between the US and West Germany reached parity in the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{84} Thus West Germany’s economic strength translated increasingly into the country claiming a greater say and greater room for manoeuvre in international affairs. Furthermore, the advancing economic integration of Western Europe as well as security issues in the Cold War context led to a clash of interests within the Western Alliance. All this coupled with the aforementioned West German demand for a greater say that partly found expression in the signing of the French-German Treaty in 1963.\textsuperscript{85}

The signing of the Elysee Treaty or French German friendship treaty in January of 1963 by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer was a great historical achievement, albeit with ambiguous impact. This achievement was twofold. Firstly, it helped to overcome the old French-German divide – within the past 70 years Germany had invaded France three times. Secondly, it was conducive to advancing the integration of West Europe. Yet, simultaneously it represented a grand challenge to America’s hegemonic position in Western Europe as well as to the relationship between the United States with West Germany and France alike. Therefore, it is not surprising that officers of both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke felt called to intervene on behalf of strong West-German-American relations.

During the 1960s, there was no lack of controversial issues and a number of conflicts came to a dangerous head – Diane Kunz dubbed this decade “the crucial decade” with regard to US foreign policy and diplomacy – and the range of ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke activities was considerably less broad than in the previous decade.\textsuperscript{86} In particular, the ACG’s energies and resources were bound to a great extent in organising the German-American


conferences, first launched in 1959. This is not to say, however, that the two sister organisations indulged in idleness when not preparing for the next conference. In the 1960s as well, the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke acted as promoters of close West-German American relations; on the one hand, they sought to refocus US attention on the European economic powerhouse and Cold War front state FRG – isolationist voices calling for at least a reduction of US troops in Europe had not been muted. On the other hand, the two organisations sought to forestall the closing of ranks between France and West Germany or at least mitigating the effects of such a move as will be illustrated in the next section.

*The French-German friendship treaty of 1963*

During the 1960s, US and West German diplomats alike faced a number of challenges. On August 13, 1961 the Soviets and the East German government unilaterally ended the Berlin Crisis by erecting the Berlin Wall. Thus they established a status quo on the City of Berlin. One year later in October 1962, the world watched anxiously the Cuban missile crisis that was, after all, concluded without the two superpowers starting an all-out nuclear war. The year 1963 began with a bombshell dropped by Charles de Gaulle. At a press conference on January 14, the French president announced “the Common Market blow up”, the French veto to the British entry to the Common Market – just a week prior to Konrad Adenauer and de Gaulle signing the Elysee Treaty.

Atlanticists on both sides of the ocean, in the US as well as in France and West Germany, were thus concerned watching de Gaulle and Adenauer growing ever closer – a development that came to a climatic conclusion on January 22 when the German Chancellor and the French

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87 See Chapter 5 on German-American conferences.
90 Quoted from a letter from Christopher Emmet to Carl J. Friedrich, Febr. 4, 1963, Carl J. Friedrich Papers, HUGFP 17.12, Correspondence and other Papers, CA 1940-1964, Box 12, HUA.
president solemnly signed the French-German treaty of friendship. Proponents of a strong Atlantic Alliance under the leadership of the United States perceived the Elysee Treaty as a threat in two respects; firstly, in regard to the timing of the signing and secondly, with regard to its content. With the proximity in time of the French veto to the British Common Market entry and the closing of ranks with the West Germans de Gaulle demonstrated impressively that he was not accepting the American lead anymore. Instead, he sought to take over the reins. The French-German treaty, in addition, provided for close cooperation and frequent consultation between the Federal Republic and France in political, economic and most importantly security matters. To Washington decision makers this was a precursor to a critical modification to political configurations in Western Europe. Far-fetching ramifications of this new strong French-German partnership were discussed with regard to West Germany’s relation to the Soviet Union that could lead to a neutralization of the former. Not least, US decision-makers and West German Atlanticists worried that NATO could seriously be damaged or even crumble.91

Scholars writing about the Elysee treaty point to its preamble which softened the anti-American thrust of the treaty.92 Yet, the origin of the preamble has so far rarely been subject to inquiry. Authors refer to “pro-American figures in Adenauer’s administration” or “more Atlanticist-oriented German leaders” when explaining who was responsible for inserting a clause making clear that West Germany would not withdraw from any multilateral commitments.93 Matthias Schulz in turn has ascribed responsibility to Kurt Birrenbach’s friendship with Jean Monnet and his membership in the Monnet Action Committee for the United States of Europe (ACUSE) portraying the former as decisive force among German

91 Schwartz, “Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle: The United States and Western Europe in the 1960s”, 131.
92 Or even reversed it, see Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer: Epochenwechsel 1957-1963, vol 2, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1983), 296.
Atlanticists. Thus Schulz has acknowledged a crucial role played by transnational, state-private channels in international relations. However, Schulz neglects the transatlantic, German-American dimension in this story, namely Birrenbach’s close friendship with Christopher Emmet and the former’s membership in the Atlantik-Brücke. Only when considering those facts as well it is possible to present to full extent the influence of private forces linked with state structures. What unfolded within the months following the French veto and the signing of the French-German alliance was a concerted action of American, French and German individuals and organisations transcending not only national borders but also the divide between public and private.

At the end of January 1963, Emmet and Birrenbach almost concurrently became active in the attempt to calm tensions. In a letter to McCloy, Emmet provided the former with his viewpoint on the situation hoping it would be helpful “in anything you do or say in Washington or elsewhere”. The “important thing now” according to Emmet was “to gain time and restore perspective”. Furthermore, he advised that it was not enough on the part of the German chancellor to “reassure him [Kennedy] privately” in a “confidential letter to the President”. Rather, Emmet suggested, Adenauer make a public statement “in a way which shows his complete disagreement with de Gaulle on NATO and U.S. links to Europe”. This, Emmet also impressed on Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg – member of the Atlantik-Brücke as well as a parliamentary group colleague of the Chancellor – to intervene with Adenauer respectively.

Yet, ever attentive to the mood swings of the public, the media’s responsibility for the former and the effect on the Cold War power structure, Emmet worried most about the press playing “up controversies between the allies”. Partly following Emmet’s request for more

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95 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Klaus Dohnr, Feb. 1, 1963, Carl J. Friedrich Papers, Box 12, HUA.
96 Letters from Christopher Emmet to John J. McCloy and Klaus Dohnr, both on Jan. 28, 1963, Carl J. Friedrich Papers, Box 12, HUA. Emmet expressed the same view in an article entitled “The Common Market Crisis:
reassuring action on the part of the Germans, Kurt Birrenbach wrote to Dean Acheson and John McCloy explaining the West German dilemma: “...we cannot afford to choose between your country and France. We are practically condemned to be on the best possible terms with both countries.”

In the course of February, pro-Atlantic forces in France, West Germany and the United States put their heads together to develop a plan for real action propping up the Atlantic Alliance and strengthening the German-American partnership. Monnet and Birrenbach had several telephone conversations and a face-to-face meeting in Bonn. Their talks ended with a twofold conclusion. Firstly, fears and reservations on the part of the Americans and British would have to be allayed. Secondly, the Federal Republic needed to be pinned down on its hitherto followed transatlantically oriented foreign policy line. In the meantime the Atlantik-Brücke in consultation with the ACG had also come up with a publicity effective plan to reassure the US public as well as US political elites of their loyalty to the transatlantic alliance.

While Birrenbach and Monnet jointly worked on a parliamentary declaration to be made on the occasion of the ratification of the Elysee Treaty in the West German Bundestag, the Atlantik-Brücke drafted a statement for publication in US media signed by West German “public figures”. The Atlantik-Brücke could progress much faster with its plan particularly because for its implementation no parliamentary hurdles needed to be overcome. This is not to imply that West German public authorities were not privy to the two private elite organisations’ scheme for a public declaration. In a letter to Kurt Birrenbach, Christopher Emmet reflected on the issue. He informed Birrenbach about his conversation with staff of the

Britain’s immediate entry is not the most critical issue at the present moment” published in America –The National Catholic Review, Mar. 9, 1963, 333-335.


98 ibid., 318.

99 See note to members of the Atlantik-Brücke by Walter Stahl, Mar. 22, 1963, SWA.
German Information Center (GIC) in New York regarding the question whose signatures were desirable: “... Joe Thomas and Manfred Bauer had received the same inquiry from the Foreign Office also asking them to get in touch with me about it.” In the end, all the public figures mentioned in Emmet’s meeting with Thomas and Bauer actually signed the Atlantik-Brücke’s statement “affirming solidarity with America and Britain”. Theodor Heuss, the former Federal President of West Germany, signed as intellectual leader. Furthermore, they discussed political figures who should preferably sign: Heinrich von Brentano, Erich Mende and Mayor Willy Brandt. These three were considered the best because they “would give the balance between the three parties” and Heuss’ signature “would strengthen it.”

Although Emmet welcomed and supported Atlantik-Brücke efforts in this regard, he did not consider it as “terribly important” as he confided to Birrenbach. Emmet regarded proof of loyalty in deeds as much more important. What was needed on the part of the West Germans was to “show that the Franco-German alliance is a two-way street by which they influence de Gaulle as well as vice versa, and if they can demonstrate that the temporary rejection of Britain involves no danger of a trade war, confidence will be restored and the worst part of the crisis resolved”.

Yet despite Emmet’s reservations, the ACG’s honorary president General Lucius D. Clay presented the declaration of its West German sister organisation signed by 18 public figures to the American press on March 19. On the same day, the Washington Post carried an accompanying letter to the editor by Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen, chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke, entitled “Germany and the Alliance”. The Christian Science Monitor carried it as well and Associated Press (AP) distributed it across the country. Furthermore,

100 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Kurt Birrenbach, Feb. 27, 1963, CJF Papers, Box 12, HUA.
101 Press release by the Atlantik-Brücke presented to the American press on March 19, 1963, SWA.
102 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Kurt Birrenbach, Feb. 27, 1963, CJF Papers, Box 12, HUA.
103 Ibid.
Emmet sent the statement to some British correspondents, distributed it via the ACG’s mailing list to senators and congressmen. Even Eric Warburg was involved trying to get the statement placed in the *New York Times*. 106

In addition to the aforementioned politicians, the president of the Federation of German Industry (Fritz Berg), senior figures of the German Federation of Labour, businessmen (Peter von Siemens, Siemens-Schuckert Works AG and Egon Overbeck of Mannesmann AG) and bankers (Herman Joseph Abs of Deutsche Bank AG and Alwin Muenchmeyer) as well as scholars and intellectuals (Arnold Bergstraesser and Freiherr F.C. von Weizsäcker) signed the declaration. Seven of the 18 leading public figures were members of the Atlantik-Brücke. Three out of the seven signatories belonged to the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the *Bundestag*, including Kurt Birrenbach who was the liaison of this transatlantic effort to reassure the Americans. In their public statement, these West German public figures praised the “France-German pact” for burying “forever the feud which brought so much tragedy to our two countries for so many hundreds of years.” They also recognized that the coincidence of the signing of the pact with the “French refusal to admit Britain to the Common Market now has aroused misgivings.” Thus they pledged in the last paragraph of the statement that “the alliance with America has ... become an axiom in the post-war political philosophy of Germany”. Furthermore, they claimed to speak for all German politicians adding “Nobody, and certainly no responsible German politician would dare to weaken this cornerstone of our safety.” 107

In May 1963, the *Bundestag* approved the Franco-German treaty along with a preamble. Five sessions of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German parliament and additional ones in the Defence Committee had been necessary to organise the necessary votes. 108 Yet, the overall intention of the preamble had the same thrust as the Atlantik-Brücke’s public

106 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Kurt Birrenbach, Mar. 29, 1963, Carl J. Friedrich Papers, Box 12, HUA.
107 Press release by the Atlantik-Brücke presented to the American press on Mar. 19, 1963, SWA.
statement: mitigating the exclusivity of the Franco-German pact and taking away the anti-American edge.\textsuperscript{109}

This public relations campaign coupled with transnational efforts spearheaded by Atlantik-Brücke board member Birrenbach to add a preamble to the treaty remained the last of its kind at least until the mid-seventies. Albeit, there was no shortage of issues the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were concerned with during that time. The Mansfield Resolution brought up over and over again in the Senate, for example, did trigger some action on the part of the ACG yet by far not with such public impact. The Mansfield Resolution was introduced by Senator of the Democratic Party Mike Mansfield in December 1969. It called for a substantial reduction of US troops in Europe on the grounds that European partners in the Atlantic Alliance had continuously failed to contribute adequately to the burden-sharing of stationing US troops in Western Europe, first and foremost in Western Germany.\textsuperscript{110} Emmet, the ever prolific writer, drafted a memorandum warning of the dangerous implications of the “neoisolationist” call for troop reduction in Europe that the Mansfield Resolution demanded. Senator Mansfield’s suggestion for cuts in military spending particularly with an eye on Western Europe had been up for vote in the Senate every year in the late 1960s. Each time more senators voted for “substantial reductions of American forces in Europe.”\textsuperscript{111} Yet, ultimately the Mansfield Resolution never found the necessary majority and thus was never adopted.

In West Germany, the downfall of Christian Democratic Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, in November 1966 set in motion major shifts on the political scene. The cards were being

\textsuperscript{109} Hubert Zimmermann concedes that the Franco-German partnership treaty was important in terms of reconciliation between the European neighbours. However, he sees no negative ramifications for the Atlantic Alliance and German-American relations. Zimmermann substantiates this claim by pointing to the Strauß-Gilpatrick agreement of 1961/62. This offset agreement set the terms for West German weapons purchases in the USA paying in dollars and thus offsetting costs for US troop presence in the Federal Republic. According to Zimmermann, the Strauß-Gilpatrick agreement bound the two states much closer than the Elysee treaty could ever do regarding France and West Germany. “Franz Josef Strauß und der deutsch-amerikanische Währungskonflikt in den sechziger Jahren”, 57-85.

\textsuperscript{110} See also “Text of the Mansfield Resolution”, \textit{Survival} vol. 12, no. 8 (1970): 279.

\textsuperscript{111} Ninkovich, \textit{Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945}, 147. See ACG report of activities, 1966-67.
reshuffled. The reshuffling ended with the forming of the first Grand Coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats under a new Christian Democratic Chancellor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger. Yet the choice of Kiesinger was met with some considerable headwinds. This was reason enough for Germanophile Christopher Emmet to take sides with Kiesinger, a known fellow traveller of the Nazis.\footnote{Manfred Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart* (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004), 443.} In a memorandum he summarised why this was a critical moment in post-war West Germany and why it was Kiesinger who deserved support.\footnote{Memorandum Nov. 1966 and ACG report of activities, 1966/67.}

**Détente and the end of the era of the Cold Warrior Christopher Emmet, 1968–1974**

Towards the end of “the crucial decade” West Germany and the United States had both undergone profound changes. Not only had the era of Germany’s first post-war chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, come to an end in 1963. West German Social Democracy had entered government in 1966 when the first Grand Coalition was formed with Kurt Kiesinger as third chancellor of the Federal Republic. The *Spiegel* affair in 1963 had shaken the young democracy by putting to the test freedom of the press protected by the Basic Law. At the same time it had accelerated the downfall of Adenauer.

The United States had mourned the death of the hopeful young president John F. Kennedy who had been killed by bullets shot by a sniper in November 1963. Furthermore the country was shaken by ongoing race riots and a growing protest movement carried by students, civil rights and anti-war activists.\footnote{Alan Brinkley, “1968 and the Unraveling of Liberal America”, in *1968: The World Transformed*, eds. Carole Fink et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 219-236; John Dumbrell, *Vietnam and the Antiwar Movement: An International Perspective* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1989).} With regard to US foreign policy, a shift away from Europe toward Southeast Asia and Vietnam, in particular, became apparent. This shift was manifested through the escalation of war under Lyndon B. Johnson’s leadership and with the approval of Congress through the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of August 1964.\footnote{Robert J. McMahon and Thomas W. Zeiler, *Guide to U.S. Foreign Policy: A Diplomatic History*, 2 vols. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: CQ Press, 2012), 363-65; Francis J. Gavin and Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Beyond the
The growing US commitment to the war in Vietnam and concurrently maintaining a relatively high level of troops in Western Europe not only strained the US budget but was also cause for severe disagreements between the American administration and the West German government.116 From the West German perspective, the US modification of priorities in terms of its foreign policy nurtured West German fears to face unprotected or at least insufficiently protected an attack from the Warsaw Pact. The signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union was another case in point. Both the United States and the Federal Republic, from the late 1960s on, sought ways of coming to terms with the Soviet Union and the so called Eastern bloc countries. Concurrently West Germans and Americans alike watched each move of the other quite suspiciously.117 In Frank Ninkovich’s words, to restore “German-American harmony” and to “further progress on the German question ... double containment” needed to be “replaced by a system of double détente”.118

Christopher Emmet for his part, however, remained to the very end a staunch opponent of any rapprochement seemingly unable to keep up with the changing zeitgeist. This inflexibility proved to be a challenge to the very existence of the ACG endangering its achievements of the 1950s and early 1960s. Thus it is argued that the first decisive phase of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG drew to a close between the late sixties and the mid-seventies. This period was marked by internal struggles – struggles for control, a search for future directions and a fight against the threat of becoming superfluous and irrelevant in the international diplomatic arena and particularly in the field of German-American relations. The challenge was to adjust to new political realities and an overall change in the superpower relations: détente and Ostpolitik.

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118 Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945, 149.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty

Energies and personnel were to a large extent bound by the big events, most importantly the biannual German-American conferences. The relative inactivity of both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke in the latter part of the sixties and early seventies at least in terms of public diplomacy campaigns reflected this. However, the ACG did continue hosting West German public figures such as Ludwig Erhard in the spring of 1968. Nor was this to say that the Atlantik-Brücke neglected its routine work such as circulating its Newsletter or having a watchful eye on the media coverage regarding the Federal Republic’s image in the world and in the US in particular.

Thus, Emmet seized the occasion of Congressional hearings on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to by-pass the ACG’s purely educational purpose as a non-profit organisation and contacted senators and congressmen to inform them about “some of the German misgivings about the Treaty”. Indeed Emmet had intimate knowledge about the German’s position regarding the NPT because his friend Kurt Birrenbach had provided him with a very detailed statement on the issue in February of 1968. Moreover, later in the year Christopher Emmet even prepared a testimony and presented it to the Democratic Platform Committee in Chicago. In his statement, Emmet asked the Democrats to be more accommodating towards

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119 Letter from Ludwig Erhard to Christopher Emmet, Mar. 29, 1968, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 73, HIA.
120 In August 1968, Walter Stahl suggested to Gotthard von Falkenhausen to use his contacts into West German public broadcasting (Falkenhausen was member of the governing board of the WDR) to reduce German TV purchases of material from CBS in response to CBS film – damaging to German image; cf. Letters from Walter Stahl to Falkenhausen, Aug. 13, 1968 and from Falkenhausen to Stahl, Aug. 14, 1968 , Vol. 32, PAAA). Letter from Walter Stahl to members of the Atlantik-Brücke inquiring about their opinion regarding a public call of support for the United States in particular of US policy in Vietnam, Mar. 19, 1968, Kurt Birrenbach Papers, I-433-112/1, ACDP.
121 Memorandum on German and European Attitudes Toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty by Christopher Emmet, Mar. 21, 1968, Carl J. Friedrich Papers, HUG FP 17.14 Correspondence and other papers, CA 1962-1975, Box 9, HUA. See also letter from Sara Ann Fagin to Erik Blumenfeld, Mar. 22, 1968, and letter from Christopher Emmet to Kurt Birrenbach, Jul. 12, 1968 both Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 63, HIA.
122 “The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Federal Republic of Germany” by Kurt Birrenbach, MdB, Feb. 29, 1968, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box 63, HIA.
West Germans’ needs and requests pointing to “German feelings of isolation and insecurity” which “have also influenced their attitude toward the non-proliferation treaty”. 123

Negotiators representing the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on the draft text of the treaty in 1967. For the two superpowers the treaty was a great leap forward in achieving some stability in reducing the number of states in possession of nuclear weapons. The NPT was thus a first step on the long way to a broader détente between the US and the USSR. 124 Yet, the West Germans for their part had a number of misgivings particularly with regard to procedural issues. In the course of a few months, the United States and the Soviet Union, had mainly through secret negotiations, come to an agreement that would basically divide the globe in two camps, the nuclear haves and the have-nots, with the NPT seeing to it that the camps remained stable in the foreseeable future. The Federal Republic was a member of the nuclear have-nots camp, a fact that nobody seriously challenged. Yet, West German apprehensions and suspicions were nurtured by two things. Firstly, the Americans had only in part and quite belatedly informed its partner about the negotiations and the treaty’s implications for the West Germans. Nevertheless, the US expected the Federal Republic to sign it. Secondly, the West German government and large parts of the political elite feared that in the end the United States would prioritize her common interest with the other superpower over the needs of the Atlantic Alliance. Hence representatives of the West German government did not shy away from uttering their scruples frequently and emphatically in Washington and elsewhere. The most blatant statement came from former chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who spoke of a “remake of the Morgenthau plan”. 125 In view of the extent to which the NPT burdened and strained German-American relations towards the


124 Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945.

125 Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart, 468.
end of the sixties it is telling that neither ACG nor Atlantik-Brücke were able to pull off a comprehensive campaign comparable to the one in 1959 countering Kennan’s Reith Lectures.

_Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the first Young Leaders’ Conference_

In addition to Christopher Emmet’s advanced age and noticeably failing health, the new political configurations in the Federal Republic of Germany might have contributed to this failure on the part of Atlantik-Brücke and ACG in acting jointly. Since December 1966 the Grand Coalition consisting of Christian and Social Democrats had been in power in West Germany. With a vice-chancellor and Foreign Minister actively promoting rapprochement between West Germany and the Eastern bloc countries, frontlines in the Cold War were anything but clear. Although the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke significantly contributed to the German Social Democracy’s development as a politically acceptable force on the international stage as well as to Social Democracy’s acceptance of Germany’s western integration in the late 1950s and 1960s, Christopher Emmet for his part was vehemently opposed to Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.

In February 1970, meanwhile Willy Brandt had ascended from vice-chancellor to first Social Democratic chancellor leading a social-liberal coalition, Emmet warned of the negative impact on NATO “through over-emphasis on the Ost-Politik”. Moreover, he feared the successful wooing of German industrialists by the Soviets with lucrative deals. Such a move, he dreaded, would persuade “enough German industrialists to a) switch their support from the CDU to the FDP; or b) to pressure the CDU politicians not to make a basic and sustained opposition to the Ost-Politik or risk losing some of their financial support”. To Emmet’s mind it was not only likely that Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr were aware of the Soviets’ tactics but also hoped to gain from it politically. To effectively counter these developments, Emmet tentatively suggested to Walther Leisler Kiep, Christian Democratic member of the Bundestag, to organise a conference “between a few leading CDU politicians and a few
leading German industrialists to alert them to the potential dangers in this new Soviet tactic”. With this opposition Emmet was by no means isolated. To the contrary, according to Gottfried Niedhart, particularly the American right wing including wise men Dean Acheson, John J. McCloy, and Lucius D. Clay as well as the AFL-CIO vehemently defied West German style of détente. Furthermore, Niedhart points to the West German Christian Democratic opposition parties using their long-established contacts into the American capital to agitate against Ostpolitik. Unofficial contacts to private organisations and politically active individuals like Christopher Emmet are, however, neglected by Niedhart.

Emmet’s proposition concerning a conference of CDU politicians and business representatives was only one facet of a larger strategy to counter the German social democratic style détente. His overall aim was to strengthen the CDU’s position, now in opposition. In the attempt of doing so, Emmet used all kinds of channels into the Christian Democratic Party. Corresponding with Leisler Kiep was definitely part of the endeavour of manifesting new channels. Kiep had entered the Bundestag only in the mid-1960s and was soon to become member of the Atlantik-Brücke. At the time of Emmet’s and Kiep’s ensuing correspondence in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Kiep was still to ascend to federal treasurer of the CDU (1971) and chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke (1984). What Emmet did not know, when he took Kiep into confidence with regard to Ostpolitik, was that Kiep would vote in favour of the Eastern treaties in the Bundestag in 1972. Emmet even extended his well-intentioned advice to veteran politician and civil servant, Hans Globke, former state secretary in the Federal Chancellery, who had retired after Adenauer’s resignation in 1963. This,

126 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Walter Leisler Kiep, Feb. 13, 1970, also follow-letter from Emmet to Kiep, Feb. 20, 1970, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
128 Globke was, moreover, a very controversial figure in post-war West German politics with a significant Nazi past, having been the author of a commentary on the Nuremberg Race Law. See Daniel E. Rogers, “Restoring a German Career, 1945-1950: The Ambiguity of Being Hans Globke”, German Studies Review vol. 31 no. 2: 303-324.
however, did not discourage Emmet from impressing on him the need of establishing “a research and ghost-writing organisation... for party propaganda” which was “more necessary now than two years ago because the CDU is in opposition and because of the Ost-Politik.”

However, Emmet’s opposition to Ostpolitik was not merely motivated by mistrust vis-a-vis the United States’ toward Federal Republic. Rather Emmet’s stance toward the German version of détente derived from his understanding of tough power politics as they were custom at the height of Cold War tensions in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Faithful to this understanding and his conviction that the Soviet Union was as evil as the National Socialist Germany, Emmet opposed any relaxation of restrictions regarding trade with the Soviet Union on the part of the United States as vehemently as Brandt’s policy towards the East.

For years, Emmet had campaigned against all kinds of deals with the Soviet Union by the West Germans as well as the British. Yet, in the early 1970s, when the US foreign policy establishment and the Nixon administration became increasingly receptive to the advantages of trading with the USSR, Emmet was more or less fighting lost battles. He had asked John McCloy to see him to discuss with him the dangers of East-West trade. During their talk in February 1970, McCloy at the time served as chief negotiator on disarmament, Emmet learned that McCloy accredited some weight to arguments circulating in the foreign policy establishment. Dean Rusk, for example, his fellow committee member on the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, did not know “what’s wrong with increased East-West trade and with the U.S. getting in on it... it would help the U.S. dollar deficit.” Furthermore the Europeans “were trading increasingly with the East, so why shouldn’t American firms do it too?” This might be a “good way to relax tensions....” Rusk’s arguments were basically in line with what McCloy had reported about Khrushchev’s

129 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Hans Globke, Mar. 6, 1970, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ.
point of view. Towards the end of his report of his talk with McCloy, Emmet sounded much
gloomier. His fighting spirit seemingly wearing down, Emmet closed his report by saying
“unlikely they [the administration] will do anything to stop the bad drift which already taking
place in Europe.... The only thing we can do is to fight hard to hold the line Germany.... and
hope for something to turn up which will heat up American feelings against Khrushchev.”

Yet despite Emmet’s heartfelt opposition to rapprochement with the Communist world and
his drumming up of support for the opposition party in West Germany and encouraging CDU
politicians to use his arguments in criticising Ostpolitik, Emmet’s main allegiance was to
German-American relations within a strong Atlantic Alliance. Therefore it was important to
him not to be officially connected to criticism of the Brandt government fearing negative
impact on the ACG, whose main task was to foster trustful relations between the US and West
Germany. This, he proved when proudly telling Hans Karl von Borries, one of his oldest
acquaintances in West Germany, of his invitation to an off-the-record dinner for Helmut
Schmidt, Federal Minister of Defence at the time, in New York. He also had the “rare honor...
to attend a State dinner at the White House for Chancellor Brandt”.

Emmet further proved his prioritising for good German-American relations over forging die-hard Cold Warrior
alliances. In February 1972, Atlantik-Brücke members had elected a new president, Casimir
Prince Wittgenstein. A few months later, Wittgenstein travelled to the US to officially be
introduced to the foreign policy establishment. In a meeting with Emmet they discussed the
Eastern treaties. During their conversation, Wittgenstein “clearly implied that he thought
Brandt was probably a Soviet agent”. Christopher Emmet, however, “felt I had to differ with
him, because such views would have shocked McCloy and Clay, not to speak of the Atlantik-
Brücke.” Though Wittgenstein did not “repeat the extreme attitudes and expressions” during a

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132 Bird, *The Chairman*, 615. Notes on talk with McCloy by Christopher Emmet in which McCloy reports
among other things about a conversation with Dean Rusk, former secretary of State, Feb. 19, 1970, Marcia
Kahn Papers, IIZ.

133 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Hans Karl von Borries, Apr. 17, 1970, Christopher Emmet Papers, Box
64, HIA.
dinner for him given by Lucius D. Clay, honorary president of the ACG. Yet, “he did say that there would soon be a revelation of sensational secret agreements between Gromyko and Bahr...”  

Interestingly enough, Emmet’s attitude towards Brandt’s Ostpolitik barely paralleled the Nixon administration’s stance in this respect. Like Nixon and Kissinger, who despite unofficially favouring a Christian Democratic led government in the Federal Republic and despite being tremendously suspicious of Brandt’s rapprochement to the East, officially fostered a good working relationship with the social-liberal coalition in West Germany. And thus, Emmet continued his political agitation work in raising awareness of the dangers of Ostpolitik by, for example, drafting memoranda and reports on current political issues and further disseminating his arguments in his correspondence.

In the meantime, Atlantik-Brücke members and officers reflected on the organisation’s original mission. Fostering mutual understanding between the US and West Germany was still the group’s main task. Thus, in the early 1970s during an annual membership meeting they concluded to do something to counter the anti-American sentiments; spreading in public and publicised opinion. Hence, Walter Stahl informed Kurt Birrenbach in his position as member of the board about the members concerns. They feared that Americans could get the wrong impression that a majority of the Germans would harbour anti-American opinions. Walter Stahl set forth to Birrenbach that, “according to experts the most effective way of countering incorrectly presented facts and biased commentaries was to present real facts alongside a sufficient explanation thereof.”

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134 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Marcia Kahn, Aug. 25, 1972, Marcia Kahn Papers, IfZ. For the Atlantik-Brücke’s official position on the subject of Ostpolitik see the Atlantik-Brücke’s Newsletter of Feb. 1972, Marion Dönhoff Papers (F 1413).


136 For example, letter to Erik Blumenfeld, Mar. 15, 1972. For the Atlantik-Brücke’s official position on the subject of Ostpolitik, see the Atlantik-Brücke’s Newsletter of Feb. 1972, Marion Dönhoff Papers (F 1413).

137 Letter from Walter Stahl to Kurt Birrenbach, Aug. 13, 1970, Birrenbach Papers, I-433-112/1, ACDP.
represented in the Atlantik-Brücke did not present “reality” by publishing a reply. The intention was to mitigate the impact of “articles that in an objectionable manner generalise and present facts spitefully and unobjective.” Furthermore all members were asked to use their contacts in the newsrooms of media outlets across Germany to exert influence when deemed necessary.  

However, in the early 1970s, officers of the two private organisations grew increasingly concerned over the durability of their transatlantic networks. They wondered, for how much longer they could reach into media, politics, academia and business on the other side of the Atlantic as they faced a continuing shift of generations 30 years into the post-war era. Contacts into these areas were considered crucial to foster and direct German-American relations. This question did not only matter to Emmet, Warburg, and Birrenbach. Rather, it was a common concern among Western elites. In the endeavour of rejuvenating their transatlantic elite network, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke with financial support by the Ford Foundation organised the first German-American Young Leaders’s Conference in 1973. This was the first substantial change to the two groups’ programmes and a first step into a new era. On February 11 1974, this era came to a close when Christopher Emmet after prolonged illness died.

Conclusion

This chapter on the activities of the Atlantik-Brücke and its American counterpart organisation ACG set out to clarify how the two groups’ specific membership composition translated into their actions in the realm of German-American relations in the period from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. With regard to the West German organisation’s main constituency, the business and industry community, it can be stated that particular interests

138 Ibid.
only once came explicitly to the fore – namely when Walter Stahl investigated the issue of confiscated property in the United States and tried to sound out a mutually agreeable solution to the issue. Beyond this, their interests were best served when a relationship with the US was maintained that based on partnership and ensured the Federal Republic’s security and thus to do business unhindered. Hence, the ACG’s and Atlantik-Brücke’s most important function in German-American relations was that of mediators and cushion in times of misunderstanding and doubts. This role was best exemplified in the transatlantically concerted campaign to mitigate the negative impact on German-American relations caused by the signing of the Franco-German pact in 1963.

The defining feature of the ACG’s membership in this period was the strong representation of academics and intellectuals spearheaded by the organisation’s executive vice-president Christopher Emmet. This characteristic translated into activities in that Emmet could not be surpassed in voicing his thoughts on Cold War international relations and continually refining his arguments in his correspondence with innumerable friends and partners in the US and West Germany and beyond. He clearly had the aspiration of being the brain of this transatlantic elite network always striving to persuade the others of his point of view. Moreover Emmet’s and other ACG members’ long-standing ties to Germany contributed to a generally pro-German stance and belief in West Germany’s extraordinary importance within the Western alliance. Those convictions in turn translated into the ACG’s often played role of a mediator.

Furthermore the chapter looked at how the two elite groups’ efforts related to official dimension of German-American relations. It became quite clear that the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s efforts were none of some backbencher organisation. On the contrary, where and whenever they became active they were involved in dealings at the highest echelons of power and concerned with issues of utmost importance to the Atlantic Alliance and German-American relations; like persuading the SPD leadership of the necessity of
anchoring the Federal Republic in the West by agreeing to enter NATO and shaping Konrad Adenauer’s trips to the US in the 1950s.

The most important finding of this chapter, however, is that the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’ activities went far beyond public diplomacy. In the course of the chapter, it has been demonstrated that the groups’ officers engaged in transatlantic political consulting, lobbying, public relations and political activism, clearly intending to influence not only public opinion but political decision-makers as well. Having demonstrated the broad spectrum of activities in the course of these 20-odd years, it becomes clear that this does not match the image of purely private organisations independent and distanced from state structures. On the contrary, both groups made extensive use of their networks, particularly of their contacts into political decision-making and diplomatic circles at least trying to implement their ideas and arguments.
Chapter 5:

Promoting transatlantic identity formation:

The German-American Conferences, 1959-1974 – a public-private project

The Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG sought to have a say in West German-American relations, as has been demonstrated in previous chapters. The chosen means to accomplish this were selected from the public diplomacy tool box, for instance the publication of books and engagement in public relations work. Yet, ACG and Atlantik-Brücke officers and directors focused much of their resources on arranging personal meetings and talks between representatives of both countries’ business, political, academic, and media elites as well as engaging in informal diplomacy.¹ In the late 1950s the officers of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG sought ways to institutionalize personal encounters between key Americans and their West German counterparts. The conference format was a consequent and logic continuation of their previous efforts.

“Suspicion of Germany is the Achilles Heel of the NATO alliance; and as long as the Soviets keep their ambition to dominate the world, they will never rest in their efforts to poison the relations between Germany and her allies.”² This is how Christopher Emmet perceived the state of international affairs at the beginning of the 1960s. At the same time the quote entails a hint at the motivation and thinking of the initiators of the German-American conferences. These became the key activity visibly catapulting both, the ACG and Atlantik-Brücke on the stage of international informal diplomacy. From 1959 to 1974, eight German-American conferences took place alternating between venues in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Over the stretch of 25 years, 384 West Germans and Americans attended, representing the foreign policy elite of both countries, consisting of politicians, academics, journalists, and influential business people. Thus, a genuinely

¹ For more detail see chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis.
² RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & 58-305), (“Report on the second American-German conference by Christopher Emmet”).
transatlantic state-private network took shape. The public-private cooperation was reflected in the different sources of funding for those informal elite meetings. The most important external grant-givers were the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Ford Foundation. Their funds were supplemented by the Atlantik-Brücke’s budget.\(^3\) The public-private network concept conceives of the numerous “interconnections and consensus-building activities” between representatives of the modern state and civil society as blurring the border between the state and civil society. Actors of both – the public and the private sector – interact in a cooperative and “state-spirited” mode in the best interest of the nation.\(^4\) The network term emphasises the fact that those connections are neither limited in quantitative terms nor are they confined to national boundaries. On the contrary, networks are highly volatile structures that easily transcend national borders and allow for multidirectional transfer and exchange of ideas and values as is demonstrated in this chapter.\(^5\)

Forerunners and role models

“Transnational structures” characterized the Cold War. Frontlines did not necessarily run along national borders. Only a few years after the end of the Second World War, western liberals, therefore, sought transnational means to counter Soviet and communist propaganda in Western Europe.\(^6\) The instrument of choice was the organisation of elite meetings – transatlantic, multi- and bi-national in character. Thus, the biennial German-American conferences had manifold predecessors. The Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) was the

\(^3\) For more details on funding see chapter 2. For more in-depth analysis on the relationship between ACG and Atlantik-Brücke on the one side and the Ford Foundation as most important philanthropic grant-giver on the other see, Zetsche, “The Ford Foundation’s Role in Promoting German-American Elite Networking During the Cold War”, 76-95.


earliest of such attempts of Western anti-communist liberals to counter Soviet propaganda by encouraging a transnational closing of ranks among intellectuals, writers and artists. This was to be achieved by frank discussions and free exchange of thought during regular conferences.\(^7\)

In 1950, the first German-English talk at Königswinter took place, which developed into a crucial institution of exchange for bilateral relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. Other such regular conferences followed; among them the Franco-German talks, the Bilderberg conferences, the NATO parliamentarians’ conference, and the \textit{Wehrkunde Konferenz}, nowadays known as the Munich Security Conference. All these conferences differed in the composition of the participants and surely in particularities of the debates. However, they all contributed to establishing a transatlantic consensus liberalism with strong anti-communist underpinnings.\(^8\)

The German-English talks at Königswinter and the German-French talks were main points of reference for the organisers of the German-American format were. The Königswinter talks brought together English and West German elites and were organised by the German-English Society (later German-British Society).\(^9\) The Franco-German conferences were organised by the European Movement, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) on the West German side, and by the Centre d’ Étude de Politique Étrangère under the significant lead of Ernst Friedlaender.\(^10\)

However, unlike many of the forerunners of the German-American format, the latter has hitherto been neglected by scholars of the Cold War period. By studying the conferences’ culture, constituency and context in this chapter, a first step towards closing this gap can be taken. The recurring meetings between American and West German elites helped to create a

\(^7\) Idem, \textit{Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen}; Scott-Smith, \textit{The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and Post-War American Hegemony}.

\(^8\) For a definition of consensus liberalism, see the introduction of this thesis.


\(^10\) Idem, \textit{Pragmatic Peacemakers: Institutes of International Affairs and the Liberalization of West Germany 1945-73}, 163.
more visible transatlantic state-private network as more media outlets on both sides of the Atlantic reported about the conferences.

This chapter aims at demonstrating how this conference scheme contributed to the socialisation of West German elites in the spirit of the Atlantic Community under US-American leadership over the period of approximately 25 years. To achieve this, a number of favourable conditions had to be created; firstly, a framework and a certain atmosphere, secondly, the “right” people had to be brought together\(^{11}\), and thirdly, an environment for open and frank discussions of issues of common interest. The analysis of this chapter is organised on these three levels.

The first section of this chapter looks at cultural aspects such as the setting and the surrounding programme of the conferences with a particular focus on the city of Berlin as event location. Secondly, the conference series is approached from a sociological perspective. The constituency and specific composition of the evolving transatlantic elite network is analysed by applying instruments of Social Network Analysis (SNA). Yet, before this network is characterised in more depth, the selection process and the parties involved therein are studied. An analysis of the developing network then demonstrates that the German-American project of the ACG and its West German counterpart organisation was by no means an isolated one. On the contrary, it is carved out to what extent this specific bi-national effort overlapped in terms of participants with others of similar kind. The chapter shows that this particular network constituted merely one piece within the larger picture of a re-formation process of a West European-US American power elite.\(^{12}\)

Last but not least important are the debates at the conferences. What issues were discussed and did they indeed constitute the contentious issues of West-German-American relations?

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\(^{11}\) On who are the “right” people and what makes them the “right” people, see Roberts, “‘All the Right People’: The Historiography of the American Foreign Policy Establishment”, 409-34.

\(^{12}\) C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*. Referring to Kees van der Pijl the German-American effort may also be defined as part of a more comprehensive transatlantic class formation process. Van der Pijl, *The Making of the Atlantic Ruling Class.*
This section sets out to identify and carve out what function debates at these “semi-official conferences” had against the background of the east-west conflict. Ultimately, the question whether the conferences served to form a new, a common identity among the participants from West Germany and the United States is answered.

*In an era of international crisis – the first German-American conference*

Before diving deeper into these three levels, the international situation is explored that led ACG and Atlantik-Brücke staff to prepare for the first German-American Conference in 1959. The launch of the Soviet satellite *Sputnik* in October 1957 was a great success for the USSR with far-reaching implications for its adversary, the US in the Cold War. The Soviets preempted the US by four months in orbiting a satellite and moreover astonished the world with the sophistication of its rocketry. In fact, the Democratic-led US Senate acted swiftly by establishing an investigating committee to seek out those responsible for the perceived missile gap between the US and the USSR.\(^\text{13}\) The West German press thereupon implied that the US had lost leadership abroad and at home.\(^\text{14}\) The Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev did not help to defuse the strained international situation by confronting the Western powers with his Berlin Ultimatum in November 1958. Hence, the ACG concluded that “American prestige suffered throughout the world and with it confidence in the NATO nuclear shield in Germany.” This was manifested in “sincere differences of opinion ... over the problem of atomic arms in Germany”. Furthermore, George Kennan’s Reith Lectures, broadcasted widely at the end of 1957, had “sparked a movement in Germany and Britain for steps toward Disengagement and German neutralization.”\(^\text{15}\) Marion Countess Dönhoff reflected on crucial

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\(^{15}\) ACG Report of activities 1958/1959 and RAC, FFA, Grant Files (0543), (ACG & 0500305), (letter from George N. Shuster to Shepard Stone, May 26, 1958). On ACG counter campaign to Kennan’s Reith Lectures, see chapter 4. On British attitudes towards disengagement as perceived by West German journalists, see also “Eisenhower nimmt die Zügel fester in die Hand. Skeptische Stimmen zur Rolle der Außenminister/
differences between the two major parties in West Germany, the SPD and CDU, with regard to the question of equipping the young West German armed forces with tactical nuclear weapons. Clearly siding with Social Democrats opposing such weapons, Dönhoff questioned a statement by Chancellor Adenauer about the irresponsibility of those not willing to supply the armed forces with “the necessary weapons”, that is nuclear weapons.\(^\text{16}\) In the long run, the Adenauer government aimed at being included in the NATO policy of “nuclear sharing”. The underlying reasoning for this policy was offered by the Eisenhower administration who intended to deploy more densely nuclear weapons along the European front line in the larger context of a strategic shift from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response” in the late 1950s and early 1960s.\(^\text{17}\)

In the fall of 1959, officers of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG felt an “increasing pressure of events” leading them to arrange for an informal high-level meeting of West Germans and Americans. They felt this need although, in January 1958, the US and the Soviet Union had signed the Lacy-Zaroubin Agreement, a cultural exchange agreement, which seemed to have eased tensions between the two superpowers at least partially. They felt this need notwithstanding the close relationship of US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer.\(^\text{18}\)

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The culture of transatlantic elite networking

During the spring and summer of 1958, officers and directors of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke intensely corresponded with one another. They were about the crisis-ridden state of world affairs and in the face of domestic conflicts in the FRG. Hence, the idea of the first German-American conference took shape. It was proposed that over the stretch of one weekend a group of 50 to 60 “distinguished American and German leaders” should get together to discuss political and economic issues pertaining to West German-American relations as well as world politics and the world economy. Organisers on both sides of the Atlantic considered it key to secure in advance broad endorsement from public agencies, West German and American alike, proving the inherent public-private character of this transatlantic enterprise.

In doing so, they benefitted from the positive image of the Anglo-German conferences, which were supported by the West German Foreign Office and the chancellor. The latter used the Königswinter conferences, according to Christian Haase, to promote his foreign policy. The former appreciated this conference format as opportunity to boost West Germany’s image as a rehabilitated democratic republic with a number of former members of the German resistance participating regularly. In the late 1950s, thus certain of the positive effects of such conference schemes, the Foreign Office set up a special budget to provide funds to the Königswinter conferences as well as the Franco-German, and the German-American talks. In the course of preparations for the first German-American conference, the organisers, moreover, gained approval from the US Embassy in Mehlem, the USIA, the West German Embassy in Washington, DC, and the BPA.

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Atlantik-Brücke and ACG officers profited from the Königswinter model in other ways, too. Key members of the former regularly attended the informal Anglo-German talks. Ernst Friedlaender, the Atlantik-Brücke’s first chairman (1954-1959), for example, not only attended the Königswinter conferences frequently. He also acted as chairman of the Hamburg branch of the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, and was a leading figure in the German Council of the European Movement. Due to the many overlaps, Lilo Milchsack, one of the West German organisers of the Königswinter talks, volunteered advice on conference matters to Walter Stahl, the Atlantik-Brücke’s executive director.

The first German-American conference eventually took place under the banner “East-West Tensions: present status and future developments” in Bad Godesberg, a suburb of Bonn, in October 1959. Afterwards, the ACG confidentially concluded that the event “surpassed similar previous efforts [i.e. British-German and Franco-German meetings; addition by author] both in eminence of the delegations and in the fruitfulness of the discussions”. Therefore, the organisers stated that if funding could be secured, “the conference should be repeated every other year and possibly even on an annual basis.”

Setting and social events surrounding the transatlantic elite meetings

The intended frequency of the German-American conferences was fulfilled only partly between 1959 and 1974. An annual event proved impossible. Transatlantic travel at the time proved too expensive – a problem that the organisers of the Bilderberg conferences apparently did not encounter. The Bilderberg meeting took place at least every year if not twice a year.

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22 Haase, Pragmatic Peacemakers: Institutes of International Affairs and the Liberalization of West Germany 1945-73, 179.

23 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & PA 58_305, ACG report of first American-German conference).

24 Ibid., p. 1 and 6.
Despite the fact that some delegates had to cross the Atlantic to attend, West German and British delegates to the Königswinter conferences met exactly once a year. In addition to the challenges of transatlantic travel arrangements, according to Christopher Emmet...

... the personnel, program and arrangements for our conferences had to be reasonably satisfactory not only to ourselves, but to the Atlantik-Brücke, the Ford Foundation, and, less directly, to both the American and German government without whose friendly cooperation the meetings could hardly be held. In addition, the delegations and arrangements had to be acceptable to the German opposition parties as well as to the C.D.U. leaders—which is not always easy.

Thus, in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, at times almost three years lapsed before another German-American conference would take place. Yet, the German-American organising team invested undiminished energies in putting together a programme that would meet the aim of furthering understanding between US and West German elites. In this endeavour they put special emphasis on informal and private encounters between delegate members and government officials from both countries. In particular, meetings with officials had to be arranged outside the panel discussions because government officials and diplomats were officially barred from participating in the off-the-record panel discussions of the conferences. ACG and Ford Foundation officers indeed seized the opportunities the conferences offered to get access to the West German administration. In 1964, for example, Shepard Stone, John J. McCloy and Christopher Emmet privately met with Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to discuss international affairs such as the postponement of MLF and long-term credits to the Soviet Union. McCloy’s taking part in this meeting was probably the least surprising. Since his service as high commissioner, he frequently acted as informal adviser and special emissary to US presidents. Christopher Emmet and Shepard Stone, however, met with the chancellor as representatives of organisations of the private sector, the

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25 Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 2.
27 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & 58-305), (“Report on the second American-German conference by Christopher Emmet”).
29 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0684), (ACG & 06400094), (letter and enclosed report Christopher Emmet to William R. Kintner, Nov. 24, 1964).
ACG and the Ford Foundation. Such proceedings circumvented the aforementioned conference rule excluding politicians in leading positions from participating in the off-the-record sessions of the German-American meetings.

Therefore, each conference had a lavish programme, sprinkled with high-level personalities surrounding the panel discussions. Again Königswinter served as a model. The British-German conferences also differentiated between delegates and guests. Yet among the latter were a notably high number of government and administration officials. They, however, were not expected to contribute to the study groups. Therefore organisers ensured that there were enough occasions to get in touch irrespective of status, such as coffee breaks and dinner parties.\(^{30}\) The Bilderberg group approached this issue differently. All participants of Bilderberg conferences took part in a private capacity, no matter whether they were government officials or businessmen thus circumventing the somewhat artificial distinction between delegation, guests and observers.\(^{31}\)

At the first German-American meeting in 1959, the West German chancellor and other high-ranking officials addressed the public opening session of the conference, a practice that was continued over the years. In addition, the chancellor would invite the delegates to some social function, either to a luncheon, dinner or reception. Those were then reciprocated by an invitation by the acting US ambassador to the Federal Republic whenever the conference took place in West Germany. This reflects the relative lesser degree of importance West Germany enjoyed on the foreign policy agenda of the United States. The US President was never approached by the organisers and thus never attended or hosted a social function. The highest ranking member of a US administration ever attending any of the social events surrounding the conferences was Vice President Hubert Humphrey. In May 1967, during the fifth German-American conference, Humphrey “attended a cocktail party given by [the] Council at the

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30 Haase, *Pragmatic Peacemakers: Institutes of International Affairs and the Liberalization of West Germany 1945-73*, 159.
31 Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 293.
Hotel Mayflower and spent over an hour in animated private discussion with members of the German delegation.” Yet, at the occasions when the West German and US foreign policy elite met in Washington, DC, in February 1961, May 1967, and November 1971, delegates had to settle for receptions by the acting secretaries of state; at the first two instances this was Dean Rusk and at the third William P. Rogers.

On the German side, the importance of the German-American conferences to the federal government grew over the years. The sixth German-American conference, originally scheduled for October 1969, was postponed to January 1970 on the request of the Foreign Office. It argued that the new chancellor, Willy Brandt, favoured the delay as he wished to “entertain the American delegates” once he had fully settled into government business. Brandt, who knew the ACG since 1957 from a visit to the United States sponsored by the private organisation, was well aware of the benefits such informal gatherings could bring; not least because he had entertained American delegations to the German-American conference in the past when he was still governing mayor of West-Berlin. In 1970, Brandt, the first Social Democratic chancellor of the Federal Republic, profited from his familiarity with casual American-style socialising. Indeed, Willy Brandt “quite impressed” an American delegate “with the cordiality with which [he, the Chancellor], Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, and Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt received the members of the U.S. delegation”. Richard Hunt, author of the Report on the sixth German-American conference, particularly highlighted the fact that Chancellor Brandt stayed “two hours late in the evening in the bar of

35 For more details on Brandt’s previous encounters with the ACG, see chapter 3.
the Hotel am Tulpenfeld just to talk informally with the Americans”.\textsuperscript{36} In fact none of Brandt’s predecessors had ever done so although all of them did attend the opening sessions and hosted at least a reception to the delegations.

As a matter of fact, according to Joseph Kaskell, ACG counsel, “political, academic and business leaders from both countries” were “much more interested in the character of members from the other country ... than in the final results of the panel discussions; congeniality of the atmosphere seemed to them more important than the meeting of minds on particular points.”\textsuperscript{37} Hence, Kaskell concluded that “the fruitfulness of our conferences is to be found in the continuance of relationships between various members of the respective groups carried on by mutual visits and correspondence.”\textsuperscript{38}

Thus it is little surprising that Emmet and Stahl paid much careful attention to the organisation of smaller dinner parties at private homes and to the choice of hotels that could facilitate those much appreciated “tête à tête conversations, corridor contacts, and night-cap talks in the bar”.\textsuperscript{39} In this respect, participants of the German-American conferences and the Bilderberg conferences had much in common. Shepard Stone, for example, who was a frequent participant of such conference formats opined that the informal discussions over dinner or a drink were as important as the formal panel debates, if not more important.\textsuperscript{40} Hence, it was only consistent of Stone to vehemently advocate rather small-scale conference formats. In his memoirs, Otto Wolff von Amerongen, member of the Atlantik-Brücke since 1961, summarised the value of frequent participation in such informal conferences as follows: “Bilderberg was of the utmost importance to me. If the New York banker David Rockefeller,
for example, claimed he had made 70 percent of his most valuable contacts at Bilderberg conferences, so it was almost 100 percent for me”. ⁴¹

*Tribute to the frontline city: visiting tours to Berlin*

To make a difference and indeed influence governmental decision-making, it was essential to the organisers to be spatially close to officials in West Germany as well as in the United States. Similar thinking motivated the organisers of the Königswinter conferences. ⁴² Locations for the Bilderberg conferences, however, were chosen based on the special remoteness of the place. Unlike the organisers for Königswinter and the German-American talks, the Bilderberg group prioritized the fact that “the participants were forced to remain at the hotel for three full days”. ⁴³ Following the Königswinter model, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke organised most conferences between 1959 and 1974 in the capital cities Bonn and Washington, DC. Sole exception to this rule was the conference in 1964. The fourth German-American conference took place in West-Berlin. Two years prior, organisers had decided to split the locale of the conference. Thus, the third conference in 1962 was held in Bonn and in Berlin. Yet, this was not the only occasion for American delegates to visit Berlin. The programme of all conferences taking place in West Germany included a trip to West Berlin.

The high regard for the city of Berlin on the part of ACG and Atlantik-Brücke officers was a reflection of the great importance the city had gained in the course of the Second World War and particularly with the onset of the Cold War. The organisers were certainly very pleased when, on the occasion of the first conference in October 1959, the *New York Times* carried an article entitled “Javits Reassures Bonn over Berlin”. ⁴⁴ Senator Jacob K. Javits’ visit to Bonn attending the informal high level meeting of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG was, according to Arthur Olsen, author of the article, “another effort to abate West German concern that the

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⁴³ Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 39.
United States attitude on the Berlin question was softening.” Further, Javits assured the chancellor that United States troops would remain in West Berlin “as long as they are needed”.

In the eyes of the Americans, Berlin had become a “Bastion of Freedom” and “a City upon the Hill” in the unfolding Cold War. Andreas Daum captured this special meaning in the term “America’s Berlin”. John F. Kennedy’s visit of West Berlin in June 1963 was definitely the climax of this process of symbolic charging of the divided city in the context of the Cold War. Yet, it was the Berlin blockade and ensuing allied airlift of 1948/49 that represented a turning point in US-German relations and US attitudes toward the former enemy in the post-war period. These events aroused feelings of sympathy and empathy for the situation of Berliners. Following the Berlin blockade and airlift broad sections of American society felt connected and aligned against a common enemy – Soviet-style Communism. US policies pertaining to Berlin became part of American domestic politics. The city on the front line had become an urban symbol for US American society’s commitment in this global confrontation between “freedom and Communism”. Berlin was, moreover, a very tangible place for thousands of Americans who were based there either as member of the US military or civil personnel. After World War II and with the onset of the Cold War, the United States had become the main guarantor for the security of the Western part of the island at first in the Soviet sector and later in the GDR. The former capital of Nazi Germany had become a highly contested object of international politics, particularly between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union.

Yet “the special relationship” between Berlin and Americans had its origins in the 19th century. Even then, the city carried characteristics of an “American city”. These features included rapid demographic, industrial and commercial development. Furthermore, the dynamic expansion of Berlin, the increasing ethnic diversification, the eminence of scholarship, cultural institutions and concentration of avant-garde art as well as modern entertainment allowed for analogies with New York and other American cities.47

Key organisers of the conferences were personally strongly attached to Berlin. Shepard Stone and Erik Blumenfeld, for example, had studied at University of Berlin in the early 1930s. Christopher Emmet felt attached to Berlin, having spent much of his childhood and young adulthood in Germany prior to the Nazis ascendance to power. Furthermore, for years Emmet had his personal informant based in Berlin who hence was able to report to him first-hand observations.48 Other Americans, some of whom have played a vital role in post-war Germany, including John J. McCloy and Lucius D. Clay, Leo Cherne and Eleanore L. Dulles, to just name a few, even formed a “Berlin-Lobby”.49 Since a good number of Berlin ‘lobbyists’ were directly or indirectly connected to either one of the organising parties of the German-American conferences, it is little surprising that Berlin figured so high on the conference series programme.

48 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Marion Dönhoff, Dec. 19, 1962, SWA.
Shepard Stone, for example, proved his loyalty to the city and the cause of strong German-American relations well into the post-Ford Foundation part of his career. In 1974, he hosted a briefing for the American delegation at the Aspen Berlin. Christopher Emmet, who in 1953 advised the West German Chancellor Adenauer to exploit “the priceless asset Berlin”, being fully aware of Berlin’s valuable symbolism of freedom and anti-Communism. Given this background it appears as a logical consequence that Emmet and his co-organisers made sure Berlin had always a slot on the conference agenda.

The city’s currency – its symbolic value as a frontier city – definitely increased after the erection of the wall. Hence, the report to the third German-American conference in 1962 stated that “a number of social events contributed to the success of the conference.” In addition to the luncheon given by Mayor Brandt at “the picturesque Rathaus Schoeneberg”, the report highlighted the “tour along the Wall led by the mayor”. Furthermore, the “entire American delegation was invited to stay on in Berlin ... as guests of the city”. Willy Brandt, who spearheaded the pro-Western and pro-American wing of West German Social Democracy, also seized the opportunity the German-American conferences offered to encourage more Americans, especially those belonging to the foreign policy elite, to commit to the cause of Berlin.

The fourth German-American conference in 1964 was completely held in Berlin with the Kongresshalle serving as actual conference venue. This building in itself was symbol of US

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51 See Chapter 4.

52 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543) (ACG & PA 58-305, “Report on American-German Conference Bad Godesberg and Berlin, Germany, Nov. 16-19, 1962”)
American commitment to West Berlin. Eleanor Lansing Dulles – for many years responsible for Berlin affairs within the State Department hierarchy – had taken the lead in furthering this project. She had helped raising the necessary funds and installing the Benjamin-Franklin Foundation as official promoting institution. According to Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, realising this building project assembled the politics of Cold War, modern architecture, the myth of freedom, and the integration of West Berlin into modern urban planning.\textsuperscript{53}

By 1970 Berlin had not lost its appeal to American participants of the German-American conferences. The visit to Berlin as part of the sixth conference in January 1970 included as “high point” – at least to the author of the report to this conference – a tour through East Berlin, which entailed “a rather exciting time getting through Check Point ‘Charlie’”.\textsuperscript{54} In preparation for this trip, the US Mission Berlin “had sent a special petition to the Soviet authorities requesting that they ask the East German authorities to permit the U.S. delegation to pass through Check Point ‘Charlie’” without further ado. And indeed when the delegation’s bus arrived at the check point the People’s Police merely requested to see the passports through the windows of the bus “and then waved us through”.\textsuperscript{55} This deviated considerably from the usual procedure Sara Ann Fagin, Emmet’s secretary remembered: “everybody had to have their passports and we all had to file out of the bus while they goose-stepped around our bus before they let us into East Berlin.”\textsuperscript{56} In the mid-1970s, the special standing Berlin enjoyed in the ranks of ACG board members found expression in the appointment of David Klein, former US minister in Berlin to executive director of the ACG.\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{54} RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (1688), (ACG & PA 70-54, “Report on the sixth American-German Conference” by Richard M. Hunt).

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56} Interview with Fagin Jun. 6, 2012.

\textsuperscript{57} Brown, “A Proud Past and a Bright Future” – \textit{the First Fifty Years of the American Council on Germany}. 237
The organisers of the German-American conferences used the symbolic weight of the divided city on the frontline wisely. By bringing a selection of the US American foreign policy elite to Berlin on a regular basis, they certainly allowed to experience the Cold War from a new perspective. In that way the ACG, the Atlantik-Brücke and the German-American conferences significantly contributed to the development of sympathy if not identification on the part of the visiting Americans with the fate of West Germans in general and West Berliners in particular.

**A German-American elite network evolves – featuring the members of a “common Western parliament”?**

**The selection process**

As crucial as the right setting and atmosphere might have been, yet another central prerequisite had to be created to achieve the grand aim of fostering mutual understanding between Americans and West Germans. “All the right people” needed to be brought together.\(^{58}\) This section focuses on their selection.

The transnational elite network developed through a deliberate selection process. Main parties involved in this process were the ACG, the Atlantik-Brücke, and the Ford Foundation. Other agencies, particularly on the German side, such as the Foreign Office, the German Embassy and the Federal Chancellery were also kept informed. However, there is no evidence that they actively intervened in the selection process.\(^{59}\) Coordination between these organisations and agencies was preceded by internal decision making on the part of the main organising groups. The Atlantik-Brücke’s executive director, Walter Stahl, for example, did not only consult with the members of the board but at times even sought agreement with the ordinary members of the Atlantik-Brücke. Christopher Emmet likewise sought advice from

\(^{58}\) Expression once used by John J. McCloy, see Bird, *The Chairman*, 41. See also Roberts, ““All the Right People””.

friends and acquaintances. Carl Joachim Friedrich, Norbert Muhlen, Klaus Dohrn, and John Kaskell were among them. When in doubt he would in addition “consult with the Board members … before the invitation” went out. Yet, Emmet’s task of coordinating different preferences and demands was complicated by the fact that Shepard Stone and John J. McCloy of the grant-giving Ford Foundation also sought to have a saying. Regardless of an agreement to a division of labour in selecting delegates between the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke, by which the former was to choose American participants and the latter the West German ones, more often than not both sides tried to interfere with the counterpart’s compiled lists of potential invitees. The result was a rather complex and at times opaque procedure. Some of the conflicts the aforementioned parties encountered are highlighted in the following section.

Irrespective of the many voices having a say along the way, Christopher Emmet claimed that an automatic process was set in motion because of the purposes for which the Bruecke and the Council were founded. On the German side, the original nucleus of the Atlantik-Bruecke, which I selected with the help of Eric Warburg, was basically anti-Nazi as well as pro-American and anti-Communist. That in itself confined membership to the best German survivors, for there were many anti-Nazis who were neither pro-American nor anti-Communist. And on the American side also, it has taken people with moral sensitivity and imagination to maintain their enthusiasm for American-German understanding despite their special awareness of the horrors of the Nazi era, as liberals in the good old-fashioned sense. It is questionable how far being anti-communist and pro-American were genuine selection criteria. Indeed, the opposite might have been true; taking a US-critical stance and being too sympathetic towards Communism and the Soviet Union functioning as disqualifiers. Thus, being pro-American and anti-Communist at the same time was merely the smallest common denominator clearly marking an outer boundary for everyone to join this transatlantic elite network.

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60 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Eric Warburg, May 12, 1962, SWA.
61 On “special” relationship between ACG, Atlantik-Brücke, and Ford Foundation, see Zetsche, “The Ford Foundation's Role in Promoting German-American Elite Networking During the Cold War.”
62 Letter from Christopher Emmet to George N. Shuster, Dec. 11, 1962, SWA.
The overarching aim was to bring together elites from both countries with a genuine interest in German-American relations: “people of sufficient prominence ... sufficiently divided into the required categories – politicians, businessmen, publishers, and other leaders of public opinion of both parties – and with the desirable knowledge and variety in point of view to contribute something intellectually.”

Moreover, each national delegation was to be representative of its country, ideally presenting a positive image. The organisers of the German-American conferences, however, did not go as far as the Bilderberg group in basing the success of the meetings on bringing together a “cross-section of society – trade unionists and businessmen, socialists and conservatives alike”.

The British-German conferences also included trade unionists and the first 14 meetings were held at the Adam-Stegerwald-Haus, a trade union discussion centre in Königswinter. The German-American conferences invited the first trade union representative in 1971. Three years later two West German trade union secretaries attended the eighth conference, but no Americans.

Despite the fact that organisers of the German-American conference scheme deliberately excluded representatives of labour until the early 1970s, it was nevertheless their aim to compose representative delegations. In the German case this meant to assemble people mirroring public and political debates featuring different opinions but at the same time convincingly demonstrating how democratically mature the West Germans had already become. In the American case this meant first and foremost that the delegation’s needed to have the format to ably reassure West German elites and public of continuing American interest and support in uncertain times and of standing together in the face of the challenges the Cold War entailed. This was an ambitious aim. The question of how this could be accomplished gave rise to constant quarrelling among the parties involved. Hence many letters were exchanged, compromises sought and found.

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63 Letter from Christopher Emmet to Walter Stahl, Jul. 26, 1958, SWA.
64 Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 34.
The most prevalent issues causing recurrent disagreement were, firstly, the question of whether the selected group was really representative. Secondly, people in charge would argue over the absolute size of delegations and another interrelated third issue pertained to businessmen’s share of the total delegation. And finally, there was frequent disagreement as to the issue of old hands versus new faces. During the run-up to the first conference in 1958, for example, Emmet discussed the German selection with Klaus Dohrn, probably Emmet’s best informed and best connected adviser in all things German. Dohrn fumed at the sight of the “Stahl list” for the first German-American conference calling it “even worse than ... expected”. “The Press part” seemed “completely unacceptable”. Dohrn accused the Atlantik-Brücke directors of “shamelessly” inviting only “anti-government journalists” in addition to being “in favor of Northern Germany” with “4 people from Hamburg alone ...and two from one paper (Die Welt)”.

Therefore, Dohrn advised Emmet to “[e]nter into the details and try to get our friends in Hamburg to make some changes”. This Emmet did indeed and quite successfully in fact. For the final West German delegation included only one journalist from Hamburg, Marion Dönhoff, and none from Die Welt. Instead, it assembled a rather conservative pro-Adenauer selection of journalists.

Another issue was finding a political balance in the makeup of the delegation. More specifically, it was important to assemble an adequate representation of moderate foreign policy views on the part of the American delegation. Therefore Emmet once more sought advice by Dohrn when choosing US foreign policy experts for the first conference. The latter emphasised that it was “very important to get people like Kissinger and Teller to attend, perhaps ... also Alsop”. However, the organizers should avoid ending up “with only die-hards in regard to China...”. According to Dohrn, this was crucial, otherwise it could trigger the

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66 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & 58-0305), (Letter from Klaus Dohrn to Christopher Emmet, May 2, 1958).
short-circuit that all Americans were “crazy or war-mongers”. Edward Teller was a controversial figure indeed and definitely too contentious to be actually invited. For, the so-called “father of the H-bomb” was a fierce advocate of the notion of strength through nuclear weapons, easily lending the “mad scientist” stereotype a face. Joseph Alsop, syndicated Washington columnist, was far less controversial than Teller. He was known as a proponent of the United States containment policy and was a convinced adherent to the view that a dangerous missile gap had opened between the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1950s. However, Henry Kissinger, at the time director of the Harvard Defense Studies Program as well as of the Harvard International Seminar, was the only of the three men suggested by Dohrn who did attend the first German-American conference in 1959. Until 1967 Kissinger was party to the American delegation four more times.

Although religious affiliation was generally not considered a criterion and balancing of different denominations thus was not necessary, it became an issue on one occasion. In May 1962, prior to the third German-American conference, the ACG’s directors of the board discussed the tentative American delegation in controversial terms. Eric M. Warburg regarded the list of potential delegates as “unrepresentative of America”, specifying that there were “too many Jews” on the list. Louis Lochner and Joseph Kaskell, also members of the board, joined Warburg in expressing “special doubts” about the invitation issued to “Rabbi Prinz, President of the American Jewish Congress”. Warburg’s main argument opposing Prinz’s invitation was that the latter was a theologian and if a Jewish one were included, Protestant

68 See letter from Klaus Dohrn to Christopher Emmet, summer 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers (ED 364, Bd. 5), IfZ. Dohrn’s statement regarding US China policy hints at the difficult assessment thereof within the West German government and the Foreign Office in particular. The West Germans held reservations against US support for the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the latter’s conflict with the People’s ‘Republic of China over the islands in the Taiwan Strait. Bonn was concerned that the US would risk a Third World War waged with atomic weapons. Alexander Troche, “Berlin wird am Mekong verteidigt”: Die Ostasienpolitik der Bundesrepublik in China, Taiwan und Süd-Vietnam 1954-1966, (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2001), 98.

and Catholic clergymen would also have to be invited. Warburg’s objection is difficult to comprehend, particularly when considering the special relevance of the American Jewish community for “furthering American-German understanding”, as Christopher Emmet pointed out in his response. Moreover, Emmet reminded his colleagues on the board that all the important American Jewish organisations “have adopted a generous and helpful attitude towards West Germany... However, the rank and file of these groups are less well-informed and therefore naturally less friendly than their leaders.” In the end Emmet’s decision, firmly backed by Shepard Stone, outweighed the arguments ACG directors put forward. Rabbi Prinz attended the third German-American conference. In addition to the three Jewish businessmen “Messrs. Warburg, Blaustein and Kaiser” attended Irvin M. Engel, former president of the American Jewish Committee and Saul E. Joftes, secretary of B’nai B’rith, the oldest Jewish service organization; not counting Shepard Stone who was born into a Jewish family but did not practice his faith. Interestingly enough, the issue of including representatives of the Jewish community in the German delegations was never brought up. Only once, in 1962, the secretary general of the Central Council of the Jews in Germany, Dr Henrik George van Dam attended a German-American elite meeting.

Since both the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke were dedicated to promoting bipartisanship, this was also a criterion for selecting participants. Bipartisanship figured highly among considerations of the organising team because it was seen as the most crucial prerequisite for a strong and persuasive foreign policy, for which the United States functioned as role model. Attention was paid not only to parity between the different political parties represented in the West German Bundestag. It was also considered helpful to have a balance between opinions of the government and the opposition. With regard to the selection of members of the

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70 “American Council on Germany, Inc. Meeting of the Board of Directors”, May 3, 1962, Kurt Birrenbach Papers (I 433 124/2), ACDP.
71 Mr. Emmet’s comment on the Minutes of the Meeting of the American Council on Germany Board of Directors, May 8, 1962, Kurt Birrenbach Papers (I 433 124/2), ACDP.
72 Participants’ list of German-American conferences.
Bundestag, it is interesting to note that Atlantik-Brücke directors left the decision about which parliamentarians to invite to those of their members who represented the three main parties of the West German parliament, CSU/CDU, SPD and FDP: “… [T]hey were to agree with their party colleagues, which ladies and gentlemen should be invited as delegates to the conference.”73 This again demonstrates strikingly how tightly interwoven this conference series was with state structures of the Federal Republic of Germany whilst organised by actors of the “private sector”.74 Until the latter part of the 1960s, organisers on both sides of the Atlantic picked representatives from mainstream politics exclusively from parliamentarians, members of the Bundestag in West Germany and members of congress in the United States. Hitherto members of either government had been excluded. Yet on the occasion of the fifth German-American conference in Washington, DC in May 1967, the organising team broke with that rule. They broke with this tradition despite it having served “to increase the freedom of debate and promot[ing] the unofficial, or at least the merely semi-official, nature of the meetings”.75 Government officials had always been part of the conference proceedings. Thus far, their participation had been restricted to the opening or closing sessions, however. In May 1967 then, this rule was modified in that government officials were allowed to “informally” [emphasis added] address “the actual panel sessions”.76 Hence by the time of the fifth conference, private and public agendas had merged to such an extent that the conferences could not be described as a purely private elite affair.

As mentioned before, the question of how many business representatives were to participate in the conferences caused some disagreement. Dohrn, whom Emmet frequently took into confidence, for example, accused Stahl and Friedlaender of intending to merely

74 The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), West Germany’s big national center-right daily newspaper described the Atlantik-Brücke as an attempt by the private sector to reach into the political realm. Untitled, Jan. 24, 1970, FAZ.
stage a “big show” for their financial backers, the businessmen among the Atlantik-Brücke members. Such accusations were not unfounded. Stahl sincerely advocated inviting all members of the Atlantik-Brücke, admitting that most of them were businesspeople. Yet, Stahl argued “every one of them has the caliber to attend the conference”. Klaus Dohrn and Shepard Stone, however, were eager to keep the delegations and hence the conference as small as possible. To them the most important function of those meetings was to allow for “real person-to-person contacts”. The idea of having especially “all those business men sit around and either say nothing or indulge in commonplace” was rather appalling to Dohrn. Additionally, Atlantik-Brücke representatives, however, insisted on strong representation of the business side on the German delegation. They furthermore demanded that their American counterpart-organisation actually match their “top ranking German businessmen” by assuring “a good attendance of first-class American businessmen”. This illustrates well that many of the Atlantik-Brücke directors’ decisions were actually driven by the organisation’s internal logic. This group could only implement its agenda with enough financial resources at hand. Since representatives of the business world accounted for the majority of membership and hence covered most of the group’s expenses, they felt entitled to demand a reward. Meeting potential business partners from across the Atlantic was considered an adequate measure. Yet, the drive for prestige on part of businessmen should not be underestimated. Getting together with their successful counterparts from the US on top of dining with politicians and officials from the US and the Federal Republic definitely fulfilled their desire for recognition.

77 See Letter from Klaus Dohrn to Christopher Emmet, summer 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers (ED 364, Bd. 5), IfZ.
78 Letter from Walter Stahl to Christopher Emmet, Apr. 24, 1958, SWA.
79 “what Stone was really seeking was conference scheme such as Pugwash meetings” see Letter from Christopher Emmet to Walter Stahl, July 25, 1963, SWA.
80 See Letter from Klaus Dohrn to Christopher Emmet, summer 1958, Marcia Kahn Papers (ED 364, Bd. 5), IfZ.
81 Letter from Erik Blumenfeld, chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke, to David K. Bruce, US ambassador, May 15, 1958, SWA.
82 See Chapter 3.
The ACG, on the other hand, realised only later that inviting businessmen to their high-level conferences could be to the group’s benefit. This was the case if those businessmen could then be attracted to become paying members. The first example of following this strategy successfully was Herman George Kaiser, an oil producer from Tulsa, Oklahoma. Kaiser first attended the German-American conference in 1962 and subsequently become a paying ACG member.83

The fourth issue of contention, old hands versus new faces, was mostly fought over by Emmet and Stone. Shepard Stone was an early proponent of the “successor generation” concept advocating the infusion of “fresh blood”. Emmet clearly preferred strengthening the relationships between the old hands of German-American relations.84 The Atlantik-Brücke, responsible for assembling the German delegation, on the other hand, strategically invited newly elects to the Bundestag. In doing so the Atlantik-Brücke contributed to the continuation of the transnational elite network beyond the lifespan of the founders of German-American post-war relations and thus proved to be farsighted.85

The ACG, for that matter, could only report successful refreshing of the American delegation on the occasion of the eighth conference. The ACG’s report on this conference proudly remarked that a “significant effort was made to include new faces, and in fact among the 52 non-Congressional delegates, almost one-half (28) had never before attended an American-German conference in this series”.86 Stone’s attitude on this issue was consequent indeed. As frequent participant of the transatlantic elite meetings organised by the Bilderberg

83 See Mr. Emmet’s comment on the Minutes of the Meeting of the American Council on Germany Board of Directors, May 8, 1962, Kurt Birrenbach Papers (1433 124/2), ACDP.
85 A great example is Walter Leisler Kiep who was first elected to the Bundestag in the general elections of 1965 and was immediately named chairman of the Bundestag’s committee for economic development and first attended a German-American conference in 1967. Walther Leisler Kiep, Bridge Builder: An Insider’s Account of over Sixty Years in Post-War Reconstruction, International Diplomacy, and German-American Relations (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2012), 29-31.
86 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (1239), (ACG & PA 73-512, Report on the 8th American-German conference, Bonn, Germany, Nov. 17-19, 1974).
group he knew first hand of the advantages of the invitation procedure to those conferences. The Bilderberg steering committee invited many participants only once or twice to allow for a constant influx of new members and thus fostering the continuous growth of the elite network.\textsuperscript{87}

\textit{The transatlantic elite network}

This section focuses on the actual network resulting from the selection process studied before. A sociological approach has been chosen. More specifically, selected instruments of Social Network Analysis (SNA) are applied. SNA analyses social actors with special attention to the relationships those actors form and maintain amongst themselves. Social actors may be institutions as well as people that are linked through the exchange of information or material resources. They have some kind of relationship. In the case of the American and West German representatives of different elites, the relationship is first and foremost constituted through the recurring meetings at the German-American conferences. The network under consideration here can be understood as a social infrastructure visualising the relationships among the participants of the conferences as nodes and edges. Some actors (participants) might have quantitatively and substantially better links (relationships) within the network than others – in the case of the German-American conferences – depending on how often they attended a conference. From this might result quite different positions of influence and power within the network.\textsuperscript{88} Which individuals of the German-American elite network analysed here can be considered to be in an advantageous, hence central and influential position belonging

\textsuperscript{87} List of participants of Bilderberg conferences compiled by Thomas Gijswijt. See also Gijswijt, “Uniting the West.”, 2.

to an inner circle within the network are looked at in a second step.\textsuperscript{89} In a first step, the entire network and its specific characteristics are examined carefully. The total network is visualised in graph 1.


\textsuperscript{89} See section on Inner Circle in this subchapter.
The transatlantic elite network that evolved through eight German-American conferences during the course of 25 years consisted of 384 people, representing the political sphere, the business community, scholars and the media from both the United States and the Federal Republic. The German-American elite network under consideration here was considerably smaller than the multinational Bilderberg network that comprised 576 participants, who gathered, however, in a shorter period of time, from 1954 to 1966, in which, however, 15 conferences took place. The British-German network growing through the annual Königswinter conferences during the same time period was also considerably bigger.90

This total network includes not only the members of the two national delegations to all eight conferences but also guests and observers attending the meetings. Social network analysis emphasises social relations between actors in the particular case of the German-American conferences. The focus is therefore on potential real face-to-face contact between the people attending the transatlantic elite conferences irrespective of their official status in which they attend. In this respect, it is of lesser importance that guests were officially completely excluded from attending panel discussions and observers were excluded from actively participating in the discussions while being allowed to attend panel sessions. Only when taking into focus all individuals involved in those transatlantic elite meetings it is possible to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the composition of the network.

Table 14: Categories of participants and share of total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category / year</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Media</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20.37</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Politics: parliamentarians, government officials, federal and state level; diplomats
Business: managers, bankers, lawyers, consultants, entrepreneurs
Media: journalists, editors, publisher, authors
Civil Society: educational and research institutions, think tanks, philanthropic foundations, NGOs/ not-for-profit organisations

In the following, some of the most striking features of the network are presented. The first remarkable point is the particular composition of different societal segments represented within the network. They are essentially the same as within the membership of the Atlantik-Brücke, the West German organisation sponsoring the conference scheme: politics, business, media, and civil society. Yet, especially with regard to the conference network, it should be pointed out that there was considerable overlap between the four categories of participants. Especially Americans often switched from public positions to private business and back.

Irrespective of this overlap, both the membership of the Atlantik-Brücke and the transatlantic network of the German-American conferences showed the same feature of linking the public and the private with the latter comprising business, media, and civil society. Whilst Atlantik-Brücke membership featured a preponderance of businessmen, politicians and diplomats clearly dominated the conference network. Thus, one of the most striking aspects of this transatlantic elite network is the reinforced interweaving of the political sphere with

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91 Figures based on analysis of participation lists published in official conference reports “East-West Tensions/Issues”.
92 See table 1.
the business world. This finding is underlined by the organisers’ special emphasis on having parliamentarians, government officials, and diplomats from the US and the Federal Republic as well as strong representation of both countries’ business community.  

Yet with regard to the strong representation of parliamentarians, again the German-American conference series followed the model of the British-German Königswinter conferences.  

According to Christian Haase, Königswinter participation was characterised by such “parliamentarian dominance” that *The Times* even called them a “bilateral parliament”. 

With regard to the constant, and especially on the German side strong, participation of members of the West German *Bundestag* and members of Congress, these meetings can also be seen as functioning as an early precursor to the West German parliamentary group USA, established in 1981 and linked to it the regular exchange between congressmen and MPs in the context of the “Congress-Bundestag-Seminar”, which began two years later in 1983.

**Table 15: Parliamentary participation FRG and USA and by political party**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party/Year</th>
<th>Federal Republic of Germany</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>CDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

93 Misc. correspondence among conference organisers, first and foremost Christopher Emmet, Walter Stahl, Eric Warburg etc. (see Ford Foundation grant files, SWA, personal papers from various archives).
94 For more detailed info on participation by political party and the ratio thereof see table 2.
95 Haase, *Pragmatic Peacemakers*, 142.
96 Figures based on analysis of participants list published in the conference reports published as “East-West Tensions/Issues”.
When comparing the German-American network with the multinational Bilderberg network a number of commonalities as well as differences become apparent. First of all, 40 of the participants of the German-American conferences were also frequent participants of the Bilderberg conferences, among them George Ball and Shepard Stone on the American side and Kurt Birrenbach and Fritz Erler on the West German one. Furthermore, while basically the same segments of society were represented in the German-American network and the Bilderberg network – politics, business, media, academia – in the latter businessmen, bankers and lawyers constituted the biggest group in the former where politicians were in the majority.97

A notable and significant difference between the German-American network and the Bilderberg network is the fact that for the organisers of the Bilderberg conferences including labour had been an issue – at least rhetorically. People in charge of selecting the delegations to the German-American conferences, however, were never seriously concerned with this matter. This negligence was illustratively captured when Christopher Emmet wrote to Walter Stahl: “...delegations to conference [are] being too large already, we must definitely decide not to invite labor representatives aside from the difficulty of getting one man from each side who would be representative of German labor and of American labor.”98 Yet the outcome was quite similar in both, the German-American and the multinational case. Labour was definitely underrepresented in both instances. Until 1971, not a single labour representative from West Germany or the United States for that matter participated in one of the German-American conferences. In 1971, a West German labour representative was member to the delegation for the first time; Dr Heinz Markmann, director of the DGB’s (Federation of German Trade Unions) economics and social science research institute. Three years later, two staff members of the DGB’s international department attended; yet still none from the United States. The

97 Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 3. More on the overlap of personnel between Bilderberg, Königswinter and the German-American conferences in section “Inner Circle”.
98 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & 58-0305, letter from Christopher Emmet to Walter Stahl, Nov. 26, 1960).
picture of the Bilderberg conferences in terms of labour representation was not less bleak. In the years 1954 until 1969 not more than five trade unionists attended Bilderberg conferences and none of them more than once.99

Another underrepresented group in those transatlantic elite networks were women. Only 17 of the total of 384 participants of the German-American conferences were women, which equals meagre 4.4 percent. Moreover, besides Marion Dönhoff and Ellen Lauterbach, MP, none of them attended more than one conference. Yet, while Dönhoff was part of the inner circle, Lauterbach attended merely two conferences between 1959 and 1974. More of these women were US citizens than West Germans (10 compared to 7). Interestingly, the share of women in US Congress was comparable to participation in the German-American conferences for this period of time. In the West German Bundestag, however, the share was a bit higher even though it also stayed under 10 percent.100 In this respect the Bilderberg group fared even worse not including a single woman in the 1950s and 1960s. The German-American elite network was therefore a predominantly male and all white transatlantic get-together and thus in no way inferior to the Bilderberg conferences.

The elite character of this binational transatlantic network can be substantiated by a closer look at each category of its participants: politics, business, media and civil society.

Considering the representatives of politics from both the US and West Germany, it is noticeable that the majority were federal level MPs and members of Congress. To a much smaller degree they were state governors or mayors of big cities in the West German case. The business category was dominated by presidents, senior managing directors and partners in multinational corporations, joint stock companies and Wall Street law firms and

99 List of Bilderberg conference participants compiled by Thomas Gijswijt. Interestingly Gijswijt in his doctoral dissertation lumped together politicians and labour representatives as one category. By doing so, the reader gets the impression, intended or unintended, that labour has been a constant factor in the Bilderberg network. Gijswijt, “Uniting the West”, 3.

consultancies. Journalists representing leading media from both countries attended all
conferences working for among others Die Zeit, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, TimeLife,
New York Herald Tribune, Der Spiegel, ZDF (West German public television broadcasting
system). Finally, the civil society category was dominated by research and higher education
institutions. Most scholars within the network were affiliated with Ivy League universities in
the US and comprehensive universities in West Germany. Furthermore, the Council on
Foreign Relations and the Ford Foundation deserve mentioning as symbols of the US foreign
policy establishment. After describing and characterising the elite network at large in a next
step the analysis is refined by examining the so-called inner circle of the network.

*The inner circle of the conference network*

The majority of the 384 participants in the German-American conferences took part in fewer
than three meetings. Hence, people who attended more frequently may be assumed as having
benefited most from participating. The argument underlining this assumption is twofold.
Attending more frequently increased the opportunity of developing stronger and more
resilient relationships with those attending the same conferences; at the same time those
belonging to the inner circle profited from the general high turnover in participants granting
them broad access to various people and information. SNA termed this beneficial
arrangement the “strength of weak ties”. The argument that Marc Granovetter made in his
seminal paper of the same name refers to the advantage of having acquaintances, people
whom we are only weakly tied to. It assumes that these people will move in circles different
from our own and thus grant us access to information different from that we receive from
friends, people we are strongly tied to. The inner circle, consisting of 42 people, is at the centre of attention in the following
section (see graph 2, p. 257). These 42 people attended four or more of the eight conferences

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101 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties”.
102 Ibid.
under consideration. Condensing the total network to a group which has fairly often attended the German-American talks makes sense for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it can be assumed that those people attending quite frequently shaped the network as such more substantially and furthermore had greater influence on the debates, bringing to the fore their very own and their clientele’s perspectives. When it comes to those people who not only belonged to the inner circle but also assumed certain functions in the conference proceedings, such as panel chair and rapporteur, this becomes even more evident.103

Table 16: The inner circle of the conference network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Conferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Erik Blumenfeld</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol, bus</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gotthard v. Falkenhausen</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>finance bus</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norbert Muhlen</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>jou</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Birrenbach</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol, bus</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marion Gräfin Dönhoff</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>jou</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Emmet</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Menne</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol, bus</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry S. Reuss</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>pol</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shepard Stone</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Warburg</td>
<td>US/GER</td>
<td>finance, bus</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Diebold</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>aca</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Theodor Frhr. zu Guttenberg</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Stahl</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Kissinger</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>aca, pol</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmut Becker</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>aca</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kaskell</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>bus</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Karl v. Borries</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>bus</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zbigniew Brzezinski</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>aca, pol</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry D. Gideonse</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>aca</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johann Baptist Gradl</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernst Majonica</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

103 See table 17.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Conferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John J. McCloy</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>pol, bus</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Wallich</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>pol, bus</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>civil</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Ball</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>pol, finance bus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis M. Bator</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>aca, pol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Becker</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>jou</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Bowie</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>aca, pol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo Cherne</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>aca</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irving M. Engel</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>bus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fritz Erler</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob Javits</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>pol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellmut Jaesrich</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>jou</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman George Kaiser</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>bus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walther Leisler Kiep</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman Kopf</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Mattick</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>pol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus Mehnert</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>aca</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus Ritter</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>aca</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus H. Scheufelen</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>bus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curt E. Schwab</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>bus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard v. Weizsäcker</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>bus, pol</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42 people comprising the inner circle of the German-American conference network were extracted from the total network according to number of attended conferences in the period under consideration (at least four out of eight).

Moreover, it is interesting to observe that the four individuals whose centrality for the elite project has been discussed in Chapter 1 remained central within the larger conference network. As they were at the centre of the network, they proved worthy network brokers, continually pulling the strings, for instance introducing a good number of Atlantik-Brücke and ACG members to a broader transatlantic elite context. For, almost half of the people

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104 The original founders—Marion Dönhoff, Erik Blumenfeld, Christopher Emmet, and Eric Warburg (see Chapter 1) — belonged to the inner circle. Erik Blumenfeld attended all conferences from 1959 to 1974, Marion Dönhoff seven as well as Christopher Emmet and Eric Warburg.

105 See graph 1.
belonging to the inner circle were either members of the Atlantik-Brücke or the ACG.

Narrowing the total network down to the inner circle brings, at the same time, to the fore people representing other elite circles, institutions, and organizations. Organizers of the German-American elite gatherings were therefore quite successful in enlarging and broadening their transatlantic connections and hence the network.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that key figures of the inner circle were at the same time connected to other transnational conference formats such as Bilderberg and the Königswinter conferences. Particularly among the Americans in the inner circle, it is furthermore worth pointing to the large number of CFR members.

106 11 people belonging to the inner circle of the German-American conference network also attended meetings organised by the Bilderberg group. And 12 out of 42 not only attended the Königswinter conference once or more often and moreover were speakers at the later. 4 within this group were party to all three (Bilderberg, Königswinter, and the German-American conferences): Kurt Birrenbach, Alexander Menne, Kurt Becker, and Fritz Erler.

107 On membership in the CFR, see Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War; Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy.
Graph 2: Visualisation of inner circle using gephi showing 42 people (the Germans in yellow, the Americans in blue) in relation to conferences attended. The more central a node the more conferences attended.

The above findings can be further illustrated by taking a closer look at a number of people belonging to the inner circle; beginning with representatives of the American part of the network. Among the frequent participants on the American side were a number of prestigious figures such as Shepard Stone, William Diebold, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and John J. McCloy. Shepard Stone represented the Ford Foundation in his capacity as director of
the international department until 1967. Later, Stone participated in the conferences as president of the International Association for Cultural Freedom (the successor of the Congress for Cultural Freedom) and then as director of Aspen Institute Berlin. William Diebold deserves mentioning as long-time director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ economic studies. Henry Kissinger is a telling example of strategically incorporating people into the elite foreign policy context before a person actually ascends to a powerful position. Most of the six German-American conferences Kissinger attended as faculty member of Harvard University’s Department of Government and its Center for International Affairs. Only later was he to become the probably best known and most influential presidential advisor and secretary of state of the second half of the 20th century. The same applies to Zbigniew Brzezinski, who initially attended the conferences as director of the research institute for Communist Affairs of Columbia University before later joining the policy planning council of the State Department and co-founding the North American branch of the Trilateral Commission. Last but not least important, John J. McCloy needs to be mentioned as former US high commissioner to Germany and constant companion and proponent of the German-American cause. Over the course of the 25 years in which the German-American conferences under consideration took place, McCloy had quite an impressive career. He was chairman of Chase National Bank in New York, trustee of the Ford Foundation, and chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, not to speak of his service to numerous US presidents as advisor. This post gave McCloy privileged access to President Eisenhower in late

108 On the triangular relationship between the ACG, the Atlantik-Brücke and the Ford Foundation, see Zetsche, “The Ford Foundation’s Role in Promoting German-American Elite Networking During the Cold War”.
109 In founding the Aspen Institute Berlin Stone was supported by Marion Dönhoff, Willy Brandt, and Richard von Weizsäcker. On Shepard Stone’s impressive biography and his role in the cultural Cold Wars, see Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe. Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy.
113 Bird, The Chairman.
September 1959, right after the latter had met with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev at Camp David, Maryland to discuss the state of international affairs in general and relations between the two leaders’ countries in particular. A few days later, McCloy was “fully briefed by the President, Secretary Herter ... on the impressions of the Camp David meeting”. The fact that McCloy as head of the American delegation to the first German-American conference in October 1959 was able to share some of the newly acquired information elevated this meeting to a quasi-official level and thus placed it awkwardly between the public and the private.\textsuperscript{114}

On the German side there were also a few personalities worth mentioning, for example, Richard von Weizsäcker, Klaus Ritter, Fritz Erler, and Kurt Birrenbach.\textsuperscript{115} Weizsäcker, later governing mayor of West Berlin and adjoining sixth president of the Federal Republic of Germany, participated in four conferences. In the 1960s he was member of the management board of Boehringer Ingelheim, a chemical and pharmaceutical company that provided Dow Chemical with a central component of Agent Orange.\textsuperscript{116} Klaus Ritter represented the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), a think tank advising the West German government as well as the Bundestag on foreign and security policy. Fritz Erler, leader of the opposition against Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, has been introduced in Chapter 2 of this thesis. He was the most prominent Social Democrat among the inner circle. There was only one more representative of the SPD in this circle.\textsuperscript{117} The rest of the altogether 10 members of Bundestag were members of the Christian Democrats. Concluding, it can be stated that bringing together “all the right people” did mean first and foremost bringing together influential multipliers in key positions: parliamentarians, representatives of powerful foundations, journalists of leading


\textsuperscript{115} Kurt Birrenbach has been introduced in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis.


\textsuperscript{117} The other one was Kurt Mattick from 1953 until 1980 member of the Bundestag and from 1960 member of parliamentary group board. See http://archiv.spd-berlin.de/geschichte/personen/l-z/mattick-kurt/ (accessed June 26, 2015).
media outlets, business representatives and not to forget about those holding influential positions at institutions of higher education training the elite of tomorrow.

Table 17: People in inner circle with panel function: chair or rapporteur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function: panel chair, rapporteur;</th>
<th>Number of conferences attended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norbert Muhlen</td>
<td>rapporteur educational panel 1961</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Birrenbach</td>
<td>rapporteur economic panel 1962</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hellmut Becker</td>
<td>rapporteur educational panel 1962</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John J. McCloy</td>
<td>chairman of political panel 1964</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Wallich</td>
<td>rapporteur economic panel 1967, 1970</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Ball</td>
<td>panel chairman 1970, 1971</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis M. Bator</td>
<td>co-rapporteur panel A 1974</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurt Becker</td>
<td>rapporteur political panel 1967</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leo Cherne</td>
<td>rapporteur economic panel 1959</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fritz Erler</td>
<td>chairman of political panel 1962</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walther Leisler Kiep</td>
<td>co-rapporteur panel A 1974</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus Mehnert</td>
<td>rapporteur 1959, political panel 1964, 1961</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Debates amongst the German-American elite: Touching upon contentious issues?

Following the Chatham House rule, the panel sessions of the conferences were held off-the-record to allow for open and frank conversations. Hence, there exist no minutes or protocols of those debates. ACG and Atlantik-Brücke did, however, publish official conference reports entitled “East-West tensions” in the earlier period and later “East-West issues”, signalling the beginning of détente, but always maintaining a special focus on US-West German relations. Those conference reports also include the pre-determined agendas for the debates in the different panels. To Klaus Mehnert, a frequent participant of the conferences, the debates
serve as a substitute for the common Western parliament which we still do not have. These conferences provide an opportunity, in the intensive and concentrated discussions within and outside of the regular sessions, to bring opinions to a vote and, to a certain degree, to coordinate decisions not only between Germans and Americans but between Germans themselves.\footnote{Quote made by Klaus Mehnert at the fourth German-American conference in 1964 cited from “East-West Tensions IV – The United States and Germany in the Atlantic Alliance” published by American Council on Germany, Inc. New York, and Atlantik-Brücke e.V., Hamburg, Verlag Rombach, Freiburg, p. 64.}

Yet, the official conference reports tell a different story when looked at more closely. They portray the cordial atmosphere at the conference and in particular stress agreement among the discussants and downplay any real disagreement. During the preparatory phase of the first conference, however, West German and American organisers discussed the title of the conference in quite controversial terms. The leading members of the Atlantik-Brücke (Friedlaender, Kuhn, Blumenfeld, Dönhoff, Bergstraesser, and von Falkenhausen) rejected the original title “Freedom and Security: the Responsibility and Opportunity of the West”. Instead they suggested “Solidarity and Independence in the American-German Partnership”, reflecting upon the wish to meet Americans as their equals. Three years after regaining the rights of an almost sovereign state, Friedlaender, Dönhoff, Blumenfeld and others thought the time was right to grant the Federal Republic “independence of judgement, independence of opinion”. They expressed the desire of the FRG “to be consulted by her American friends on all questions” directly bearing upon West Germany’s “national interests as well as on questions of world politics” with “an indirect bearing on our country”. Moreover, they wished to “influence our American friends with regard to the planning and conduct of U.S. foreign policy.” To defuse worries on the part of their American sister-organisation that the West Germans’ aspiration for independence would go too far, they hastened to assure Christopher Emmet that this did not imply “independence of action”. By no means was the Federal Republic seeking as much independence as was needed, for example, “to make a separate deal with Russia...”.\footnote{Letter from Walter Stahl to Christopher Emmet, Aug. 12, 1958, SWA.} In the end, however, they settled for “East-West Tensions: Current Status – Future Developments”.

\footnote{Quote made by Klaus Mehnert at the fourth German-American conference in 1964 cited from “East-West Tensions IV – The United States and Germany in the Atlantic Alliance” published by American Council on Germany, Inc. New York, and Atlantik-Brücke e.V., Hamburg, Verlag Rombach, Freiburg, p. 64.}
\footnote{Letter from Walter Stahl to Christopher Emmet, Aug. 12, 1958, SWA.}
Themes on the agendas can be grouped in seven topical blocks, arranged according to their relevance or better in relation to which extent issues falling under a topical block were discussed: In terms of prominence and frequency, issues pertaining to NATO and the Western bloc were discussed; this was followed by the Eastern bloc, and matters concerning West Germany. Less frequently and less extensively, issues pertaining to European integration, transatlantic economic relations, and monetary politics were attended to. Questions of foreign aid and North-South relations were almost marginal.120

Disengagement

Within those clusters, a number of perennial subjects can be identified that particularly concerned participants in the conferences and more generally German-American relations recurrently over the years. At the first conference in 1959, for example, the Kennan-Acheson controversy reverberated as was mirrored in the agenda in which “disengagement”, “isolationism”, and “neutralisation of Germany” ranked highly.121 Yet most continuously recurring on the agendas over the years was Berlin and unification of Germany.122

Hence it was only consistent that the ACG’s report on the first conference to the Ford Foundation returned to the issue of disengagement in particular by emphasising the positive effects of the debates in this regard. According to this report, the debates had thus fostered “deeper understanding of American attitudes” and the softening of “some of the political divisions on NATO and on Disengagement between the German parties”.123 This had been made evident in a foreign policy debate in the West German Bundestag during which

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120 Later to be consulted in appendix.
121 Other elite meetings and networks such as those at Königswinter as well as the European Movement also were very much concerned with the issue of the neutralisation of West Germany. See Haase, Pragmatic Peacemakers, 142 -144. On how much Christopher Emmet was concerned with this question and his attempt to influence West German Social Democracy on the issue, see Chapter 4 (Emmet’s letters to Max Brauer).
122 See also report on first German-American conference by ACG to Ford Foundation (RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & PA 58_305)) in which is made reference to Eugen Gerstenmaier, President of the Bundestag, statement during the conference rejecting “Disengagement as an isolated proposition but” declaring that it could be accepted “in a package deal for reunification of Germany.”
123 RAC, FFA, Grant Files, (0543), (ACG & PA 58_305, ACG report of first American –German conference).
“repeated reference” had been made to the “Bad Godesberg conference”.\textsuperscript{124} To prove this claim, the ACG sent the Ford Foundation along with the report an excerpt of the transcript of the aforementioned “Foreign Policy Debate in the Bundestag, November 1959”.\textsuperscript{125} Interestingly enough, the excerpt the report referred to rather proved the opposite of what was claimed therein. For, the views of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats were still quite conflicting with regard to disengagement.

Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, who had not attended the conference, indeed referred to the German-American conference with the intention of underlining the CDU’s opposition to any kind of disengagement pointing out that “[t]o our American alliance partner” such plans were “unacceptable”. SPD politicians Karl Mommer and Fritz Erler, who for their part had attended the conference in question, however, voiced harsh criticism of Brentano’s presentation. For, to their mind, the American delegation to the conference had only represented one opinion, namely opposition to any kind of disengagement. Erler pointed out that there were US politicians with differing viewpoints indeed most prominently mentioning Senator Hubert Humphrey.\textsuperscript{126}

In disregard of these major differences, the ACG’s report stated confidentially that “it had surpassed similar previous efforts both in eminence of the delegations and in the fruitfulness of the discussions” not least because of a “... feeling of pride, happiness and optimism which prevailed at Bad Godesberg.”\textsuperscript{127}

\textit{Germany’s Nazi past}

Remarkable was, furthermore, how comparatively little attention organisers and participants paid to matters, which, not only with hindsight, appear hard to miss. The first of those subject matters pertains to Germany’s Nazi past. For, at merely two conferences, in 1961 and 1962,
this issue was part of the agenda. In 1964, however, Fabian von Schlabrendorff gave a brief report on the status of the war crime trials in West Germany before the political panel of this year’s German-American conference. From an American perspective, von Schlabrendorff definitely had the status to speak on such a delicate subject. At the time, von Schlabrendorff worked as a lawyer but was to become constitutional judge in 1967. Moreover, according to Emmet, von Schlabrendorff belonged to the “best German survivors” being anti-Nazi, anti-Communist and pro-American at the same time. In 1943, as a member of the so called German resistance, von Schlabrendorff had unsuccessfully attempted to kill Adolf Hitler. At the German-American conference, von Schlabrendorff reported in a neutral, objective manner on the issue, covering it in just seven subsections filling three and a half pages. Yet Schlabrendorff did not shy away from expressing quite controversial standpoints, at least from a contemporary point of view. On the one hand, he stated with regard to the term of limitation for murder – under German law being 20 years – that “the continuity of the legal basis is more important than the possibility of some of the war criminals slipping through the net of the limitation regulations.” On the other hand, he pointed to the at times rather obstructive role American officials have played in the prosecution of German war criminals as in the case of SS-Group Commander Karl Wolff. Yet these contentious issues were not further discussed. Rather the impression prevails that participants considered those matters not a priority and Americans voiced the opinion that “…neo-Nazism and anti-Semitism were problems for the Germans to solve…. The American delegates agreed that it was not America’s task to tell their German friends and colleagues what to do about these problems.” Another American justified this point of view by stating that the United States

“has also had experiences and problems with regard to questions of discrimination and integration, and that Americans rightfully insist on solving those problems by themselves…the Germans had the same right”.\textsuperscript{131} As those domestic questions did not touch upon more pressing subjects of international dimension the transatlantic elite gathered at the German-American conference handled them adhering to the motto “live and let live”.

\textit{The Vietnam War}

To much the same extent, one of the most pressing issues of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the war in Vietnam, was neglected. Vietnam and United States military involvement in the region was never officially included on the conference agenda. Attention paid to Vietnam by the organisers of the German-American conferences was disproportionate to the real influence the issue had on German-American relations in the 1960s.

Some scholars consider the war in Vietnam as prime influencing factor of German-American relations from 1964 until early 1968 and beyond, not least because of the transnational character of broad anti-Vietnam War protest movements.\textsuperscript{132} In 1964-65, the West German government faced a dilemma according to Arenth. On the one hand, government and diplomacy had elevated the domino theory and containment to a dogma of foreign policy and therefore had demanded US support during the second Berlin crisis, 1958-1961. On the other hand US intervention in Southeast Asia was perceived ambiguously. It was understood as honouring commitments as protecting power and at the same time as neglecting Europe and in particular West Germany.\textsuperscript{133}

Moreover, US military involvement entailed some more tangible implications for West Germany. Firstly, the Johnson administration demanded support from the West Germans, which they were willing to grant in political terms as well as in economic terms in the form of

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} Arenth, Johnson, Vietnam und der Westen, 192.
development aid. Yet, when it came to the issue of deploying personnel to Southeast Asia, this was a different story. For, West German public opinion was shored up against any kind of deployment of German personnel as captured in the “No, Sir” campaign of Bild, West Germany’s highest circulation newspaper. However, irrespective of the public mood, the West German government deployed a hospital ship, the Helgoland. Yet personnel on board were not to wear uniform. Secondly, as military demands for the Vietnamese theatre increased, the US withdrew troops from the Federal Republic in April 1966. And finally, the fall of Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s second chancellor, has been interpreted against the background of ever growing burdens, financial and otherwise on the part of the United States which they tried at least partly to pass on to their allies. The greatest conflict between Erhard and the Johnson administration in this regard was the fact that the former in 1966 did not see the Federal Republic fit to meet commitments made in off-set agreements.

Against this background, it is striking that except for the conference in 1967 the issue was at most mentioned in passing by a few speakers. In 1967, however, William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, unofficially addressed one panel session and “spoke on Vietnam”. Yet, during this session the subject was not so much one “of discussion as a subject of information”.

Until 1967, however, Vietnam was not alluded to at all, not even at the fourth conference in 1964, which took place in November a mere three months after the Gulf of Tonkin

137 Arenth, Johnson, Vietnam und der Westen, 185-90
138 Ibid.
Resolution was passed by US Congress. The basic nature of those few statements made in reference to the conflict in Vietnam was twofold. American speakers, on the one hand, emphasised US concern for European and West German security demands as being undiminished. West German speakers, on the other hand, hastened to praise US military involvement as “defending freedom” in a country divided just like Germany. Minister Georg Leber, federal minister of transportation, went on in his address during the opening session of the fifth German-American conference to warn his fellow country people that “[w]hoever in Germany criticizes the American engagement in Viet Nam and at the same time points to American pacifists and isolationists to justify his own stand should know that by so doing he supports those forces in the United States which tomorrow might turn against an American engagement in Germany or in Europe.”

East-West trade

A major and continuous cause for disagreement and conflict between the Federal Republic and the United States was the issue of trade with the communist bloc, another topic that never became part of the conference agendas. This tension had to do, first and foremost, with fundamentally differing understandings of the strategic importance of trading with the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union. Whereas the United States were eager to expand the Cold War to the economic sphere and hence fighting an economic war as well, Western European

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141 This resolution had special historical significance because it gave President Lyndon B. Johnson authorization for military action in Southeast Asia without having to declare war. See “Tonkin Gulf Resolution”; Public Law 88–408, 88th Congress, Aug. 7, 1964; General Records of the United States Government; Record Group 11; National Archives; Ezra Y. Siff, Why the Senate Slept: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Beginning of America's Vietnam War, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999).


143 Cold War trade relations in general have been studied considerably less than, for example, military and political issues. The impact of East-West trade on German-American relations during the Cold War has been subject to scholarly scrutiny even less. However, the few authors attending to the issue agree that it was quite contentious considering the issue as a problem of German-American relations or even the Atlantic Alliance. See Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen, Die Ost-West-Wirtschaftsbeziehungen als deutsch-amerikanisches Problem, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986); Claudia Wörmann, Osthandel als Problem der Atlantischen Allianz: Erfahrungen aus dem Erdgas-Röhren-Geschäft mit der UdSSR, (Bonn: Europe Union Verlag, 1986).
countries including the Federal Republic had very tangible interests in engaging in trade with Eastern European countries as they had done in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Those traditional trade relations were harshly disrupted by the two world wars. After the end of the Second World War, any hopes of business groups for a renewed expansion of markets were dearly disappointed. For, the onset of the ensuing Cold War with the communist USSR entailed the establishment of the foreign policy “containment” paradigm which was to include the economic sphere. Already in 1949, the Coordinating Committee on East-West Trade Policy (COCOM) was created. According to Jaqueline McGlade, COCOM imposed an impenetrable network of controls on members of the Western Alliance gripping the Cold War business world by the 1960s. Furthermore she maintains that various business communities in the West as well as Western governments were highly suspicious of the increased “intrusion of state regulation into world trade and economic affairs.”

Thus, it is little surprising that German-American relations were not spared disruptions in the 1960s due to differing viewpoints on the question of trading with the East in particular with the Soviet Union. In agreement with the domestic oil industry, the US government attempted to restrict oil exports from the Soviet Union. Western European countries, first and foremost, the Federal Republic, exported huge quantities of steel pipes to the USSR between 1959 and 1962. In the fall of 1962, just over a year after construction of the Berlin Wall, West German and Soviet Russian companies entered a new major contract on steel pipes. Thus, the West German steel industry contributed to a large part to the development of the Soviet’s oil pipeline infrastructure. Against the background of the recent Berlin crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis being in full swing in the fall of 1962, it is quite understandable that the

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Kennedy administration viewed any strategic strengthening of the Soviet Union as a threat. Therefore, it attempted to stop the pipe export using bilateral and multilateral channels. However, they failed to reregister steel tubes on the COCOM list. Next the US appealed to the NATO council arguing that Soviet pipelines would also serve to supply Soviet armed forces and thus the issue of steel pipe exports was a question of military strategic importance. In November of 1962, the NATO council indeed passed a resolution prompting member states to stop the delivery of large tubes and to pre-empt new contracts with the Soviet Union.146

According to George Ball, the US administration exerted considerable pressure coercing the Bonn government to cancel existing contracts with the Soviet Union.147 The Adenauer government did this against substantial opposition not only on the part of the West German steel industry – to some steel companies export to the Soviet Union equalled capacity utilisation rates of up to two thirds – but also against parliamentary opposition from amongst the governing coalition of FDP and CDU/CSU.148

Rapporteurs of the panel discussions at the conferences of 1962 and 1964 more or less neglected the enforced steel pipe embargo. Although, the embargo significantly interfered with West German business interests and caused considerable domestic conflicts. This is the more significant given the fact that influential figures of the West German steel industry directly affected by the embargo were members of the Atlantik-Brücke; among them managers of the Mannesmann AG and maybe even more importantly Kurt Birrenbach.149 Instead speakers who did address the issue of East-West trade pointed out that there was a general agreement among participants of the discussions that the subject had to be treated not


148 On how exactly the Adenauer government circumvented the Bundestag in upholding the cabinet resolution enforcing the pipe embargo, see “Röhren-Emargo: ‘Hat gut gegangen’” Der Spiegel 13/1963; Wörmann, Osthandel als Problem der Atlantischen Allianz: Erfahrungen aus dem Erdgas-Röhren-Geschäft mit der UdSSR.

149 For more detailed information on Mannesmann and Birrenbach, see Chapter 2.
as an exclusively economic problem but rather as a political one. This was another point of broad agreement on the issue of increased cooperation and coordination among Western countries with regard to trade with the Soviet Union, China and the so-called satellite countries. Only once an American speaker, Republican Senator Kenneth B. Keating, addressed the business community directly when he pointed out that NATO member states were often ineffective in their economic dealings with the Soviet Union. The reason therefor was, in Keating’s mind, that “sales of pipe-line, factories, techniques of production” offered “tempting short term profits to some manufacturers”. Furthermore, he urged the audience at the closing session of the third German-American conference to seize “the economic weapon” as it is “one of the strongest in the Western arsenal.” Further he blamed “individual businessmen in each NATO nation” for being responsible at least to some extent... “but the responsibility for leadership and guidance in this field lies with NATO governments.”\footnote{150}{Kenneth B. Keating in “East-West Tensions III: The United States and Germany in the Atlantic Alliance” published by American Council on Germany, Inc. New York, and Atlantikbrücke e.V., Hamburg, 49-50.}

Thereafter, participants of the German-American conferences concerned themselves only once more with questions pertaining to East-West trade at the fourth conference in 1964. As a result of the embargo the West German steel pipe export came to a complete standstill and iron and steel exports experienced great slumps.\footnote{151}{Wörmann, Osthandel als Problem der Atlantischen Allianz: Erfahrungen aus dem Erdgas-Röhren-Geschäft mit der UdSSR, 33.}

**Conclusion**

This chapter set out to show how this German-American conference scheme has contributed to the socialisation of West German elites in the spirit of the Atlantic Community under US-American leadership over the stretch of approximately 25 years. Ultimately, this chapter sought to answer the question whether the conferences serve to form a common identity among the participants. According to Aleida Assmann, social identity evolves through the
process of internalising certain values. Furthermore creating or developing a collective identity necessitates a common base, such as ethnicity, nation or culture.\footnote{Aleida Assmann, Introduction to Cultural Studies: Topics, Concepts, Issues, (Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 2012), 191-218.}

Participants of the German-American conferences only in part shared a nationality. Ethnicity, however, is already a different matter, as they were exclusively white and the large majority was Christian. And indeed already at the closing session of the second conference in 1961, one participant claimed: “‘We’ in the discussion did not mean ‘we Americans’ or ‘we Germans’ and it did not mean only ‘we Germans and Americans’ but it did mean ‘we, the members of the free world, the members of the Western alliance’.”\footnote{Report on political panel of Second German-American conference, Feb. 1961 by Klaus Mehnert in East West Tensions II. The Present Status – Future Developments published by American Council on Germany, Inc. New York, and Atlantik-Brücke e.V., Hamburg (Verlag Rombach: Freiburg, 1961), p. 50.}

Indeed, the organisers of the conference scheme were eager to create conducive conditions to achieve this. Firstly, they paid careful attention to the cultural settings of each conference, namely the location and the social programme framing the actual conference proceedings. Berlin played a special role in this regard. The organisers skilfully exploited the appeal of the city and its symbolic weight as frontline city of the Cold War.\footnote{See section “The culture of German-American elite networking” in this chapter.} Secondly, a quite complex selection process preceding each conference resulted in the formation of a transatlantic elite network representing politics, business, media and academia of both countries. Members of this network functioned as multipliers. Thus, the specific composition thereof speaks of the organisers’ understanding and conviction that a genuine foreign policy consensus – the foreign policy paradigm of a strong German-American partnership in the Cold War – needed to be forged not merely in the political realm. It must also reach into all segments of society in West Germany as well as in the United States.\footnote{See section “A German-American elite network evolves – featuring the members of a common western parliament?” in this chapter.} Thirdly, with regard to the function of the debates at the conferences, the conclusion is twofold. The off-the-record panels helped to build a consensus and have served mediating conflicts among the parties present and beyond,
through frank and controversial discussions. However, the way in which the conferences and debates were presented to the public was a complete different matter. For, the official conference reports rather served to gloss over conflicts. The authors of the reports emphasised agreement among the participants and stressed the cordial atmosphere on the expense of a realistic account of discussion including differing opinions. The aim of the published conference reports was to portray to the public and officials in both countries how close and friendly German-American relations were even in times of upheaval. Overall the conferences proved to be a mutually beneficial undertaking for all parties involved. As illustrated, the US and West-German public and private sectors were densely interconnected and cooperated successfully in the common aim of furthering mutual understanding through the German-American conferences. These recurring transnational elite meetings neatly complemented purely official channels in bilateral relations. Those channels were not intended to be used to contradict official diplomacy, but to create lasting and reliable relationships between individuals and institutions irrespective of party political affiliations and nationality.
Conclusion

This thesis has traced the intertwined history of two private elite organisations – the West German Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany – over the course of a quarter century. It started out by introducing the founders, four unlikely friends at the time: a German Jewish banker with an American passport, an independent scholar from New York, an East Prussian countess, and a Hamburg-born merchant. Only a few years after the end of World War II, Eric Warburg, Christopher Emmet, Marion Dönhoff, and Erik Blumenfeld came together making plans for two private groups cooperating across the Atlantic to further West German-American understanding and to foster friendship between Germans and Americans.

However, as this study has demonstrated, West German-American post-war friendship was not self-propelling. Scepticism as to whether to trust the Germans on the part of Americans was strong: “Did they really renounce Nazism and nationalism for good?” “Were they to be trusted not to turn to the Soviets?” And indeed, proponents of neutralism were not only in the ranks of West Germany’s Social Democrats but included some Atlantik-Brücke officers and members. In the US, proponents of isolationism and disengagement respectively were a force to be reckoned with. The analysis, hence, demonstrated that the two groups’ activities were not limited to organising friendly coffee parties. Both the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG proved to be successful in assembling a transatlantically oriented “power elite”. The special characteristic of this elite – bridging the public-private divide – allowed for the two groups to assume diverse roles and functions in West German-American relations from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. They acted as public diplomacy agents seeking to explain US and West German politics and policy to the respective other public and foreign policy elites in particular; mastering a tainted past, and ultimately contributing to improving their country’s image. They engaged in informal diplomacy, mediating and managing conflict, and rendered
services as policy and public relations consultants. In resuming such roles, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke could draw on a mix of public and private funds provided by the Federal Press Office, the Federal Foreign Office, the Ford Foundation, and fees of the organisations’ members.

This study of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke illuminated three sustainable achievements resulting from their activities. First, the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke contributed to forging a reliable and lasting bipartisan foreign policy consensus at whose core was a strong West-German-American relationship. Key in achieving this was the redirection of West German Social Democracy away from anti-militarism, neutralism, and socialism in which transatlantic elite networks had no small part. This is underpinned by recently published findings pertaining to US government funds supporting Willy Brandt’s Berlin SPD.¹ Second, the thesis establishes the ACG’s and Atlantik-Brücke’s function of coordinating elites across the Atlantic. In doing so, the organisers helped to secure the transatlantic partnership consensus by conveying it into business, trade and industry circles in the US as well as in West Germany. Finally, by utilising their manifold links to media and academia, they assisted in manifesting this consensus in public discourse. These efforts turned out to be highly successful to forge a reliable alliance between the two countries, which would even outlast the Cold War to be carried on into the multipolar world of the 21st century.

In conclusion, this thesis contributes to the “new diplomatic history” of West German-American post-war relations in a number of ways. By transferring the state-private network concept to the transnational level hitherto neglected private actors – individuals and organisations – came into view who conducted informal diplomacy without being democratically legitimized. Private elites – recruited from among business and media communities, and academia – featured prominently in this study, shedding light on the fact

that the electorate have less influence on who conducts politics on the international stage. Thus, the research on the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG also contributes to elite studies. Especially with regard to the German section of the transatlantic elite network, the thesis proves the longevity of transnational links of representatives of the German elite. At the same time, it disproves the “zero hour” concept indicating a total collapse of German society including the elites. Instead, certain elites and their transatlantic networks endured severe disruptive periods during the first half of the 20th century. The biographical sketches of the four founders of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke are telling examples. Their networks survived the Nazi regime, the Second World War, followed by occupation and division of the country. Moreover, these networks served as base to develop new, broader transnational elite networks. With regard to the activities of the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG, this thesis contributes to the study of public diplomacy by illustrating that the nation state is not the only point of reference. Rather, the ACG’s and the Atlantik-Brücke’s efforts show that promoting a country’s image can be a transnationally organised undertaking for the sake of a greater international project such as the formation of the Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War.

The endeavour of closing a research gap – in this thesis with regard to the intertwined history of the ACG and the Atlantik-Brücke – opens new doors making visible further gaps in historiography. In this sense, the study indeed offers new vistas on West-German-American post-war relations but it also raises many new questions and outlines possible new research efforts. At many points of the history of these transatlantic elite organisations, historians could probe deeper. For example, the motivation and advantages of corporate members in the Atlantik-Brücke and the ACG deserve more detailed scrutiny. Furthermore, an integrated historical social network analysis of different transnational elite networks – the Bilderberg, German-English, German-French, liberal, neoliberal, and conservative networks – could possible shed more light on how dense and congruent the transatlantic-Western European foreign policy elite was during the Cold War. Last but not least, research on the transatlantic
project started by Christopher Emmet, Eric Warburg, Marion Dönhoff, and Erik Blumenfeld could be extended by exploring how it faced the challenges of the 1970s, the shift of generations, the end of the Cold War, and globalisation?
List of References

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