Complex Archetypal Structures that Underlie the ‘Human Condition’.

Monica Lee
Department of Organisation, Work and Technology,
Lancaster University
LA1 4YX

Tel/Fax 01524 593850
m.lee@lancaster.ac.uk

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Professor Monica Lee is Visiting Professor at Northumbria University, and is based at Lancaster University, UK. She came to academe from the business world where she was Managing Director of a development consultancy. She has worked extensively in Central Europe, CIS and the USA coordinating and collaborating in research and teaching initiatives. Recent publications include papers in Human Relations, Human Resource Development International, Management Learning and Personnel Review, and books in the ‘Studies in HRD’ Monograph series that she edits.

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Abstract.¹
In this paper I synthesise notions from several different field to argue that there are archetypal structures that underlie the human condition that can best be understood through the language of complexity. In so doing I accommodate the disparity that exists between different branches of the social sciences through the provision of a holistic overview that accords with the idea of a coherent scientific body of knowledge. To do this I use a Jungian typology to reinforce the parameters of four archetypes by which organisation and individuals have been interpreted, and locate this within some findings from evolutionary psychology, thereby building a metatypology of the human condition. I conclude by suggesting that this can best be understood through the notions of relationship and (knowledge through the opposite) and by examining some of the implications this approach holds for the field.

Social science and complexity.
As the various branches of social science have developed the way in which they build accounts for the world and our existence within it they have moved away from each other and from the natural sciences. Barklow, Cosmides and Tooby (1992) note that the natural sciences have retained a common root in their development, such that any move forward needs to fit with both its ‘home’ discipline, and also be concurrent with all others in order to be accepted. This has not happened in a consistent way within the social sciences. In adopting a post-scientific perspective postmodernism has challenged many of the contradictory yet self-sustaining frameworks that have developed. Yet in creating a world that is devoid of structure other than our own unique and individual structuring of it, postmodernism is actively engaged in preventing constructive (or ‘with structure’) dialogue between the various disciplines of the social science (though see Cilliers, 1998). In contrast to this, the notions of

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complexity provide the ideal vehicle by which a meta-view of human existence can be established within which apparently contradictory world views can be accommodated.

In bringing together notions from diverse fields of social science in order to make my argument, I am not doing full justice to any of them. This diversity presents both a challenge to the ability to create a coherent account, and also the foundations of such an account. Each sub-set of my argument, however, has its own literature and language. A word used in one account may be used in a subtly different way in another, such that the implications and meanings of the word become distorted in a hybrid account such as this. These words, however, are signifiers of deeper meanings, and it is those deeper meanings that I seek to access here.

It is for this reason that I talk here about archetypes rather than paradigms. As Yolles (1999) describes, ‘A paradigm is ‘the set of views that members of a … community share’ (Kuhn, 1970, p 176)... It is a shared weltanschauung together with the explicitly defined propositions that contribute to understanding. When weltanschauungen are formalised they become paradigms, and transparent to others who are not view holders. While groups may offer behaviour in ways that are consistent with their shared weltanschauung, paradigms emerge when the groups become coherent through formalisation.’ (Yolles 1999, p **7) They are definable, and formalised through language which ‘enables a set of explicit statements to be made about the beliefs and propositions (and their corollaries) of a weltanschauung that enable everything that must be expressed to be expressed in a self-consistent way.’ Yolles 1999: p **11). Paradigms are incommensurable, and grow and die, to be replaced by new paradigms. In other words, paradigms are conceived of as ‘things’, and are given existence in their own right.

I want to make it clear from the start that in talking about archetypes I am not talking about things that can be defined or formalised. An archetype can be conceptualised through what it is not, but it has no existence in its own right, and its conceptualisation could be called into question if there existed an entity or system that uniquely demonstrated all the qualia associated with it. Similarly, as is implicit in the typologies that I introduce later on, archetypes can be seen as commensurate, in that entity’s and systems contain within them the potential for demonstrating the qualia of
all quadrants of the typology – but in differing strengths or preferences. These might change over time, but the underlying archetypal structure does not.

In so far as paradigms are coherent and incommensurate ways of thinking about and portraying the world, then the ideas presented here are rooted in the relatively new paradigm of complexity. Central to complexity theory is the idea that a complex system is more than ‘just’ a complicated system. A complicated system or a problem might be very complicated indeed, but with time and effort all its parts, and its whole can be measured and understood. In contrast, a complex system might be quite simple, yet its parameters cannot be measured or quantified (in the normal sense) and the whole is more than the sum of the parts. However much we atomise the different parts we can never get to the essence of the whole. In this there is similarity between postmodernism and complexity theory, however, unlike postmodernism, complexity theory suggests that whilst aspects of complex systems cannot be measured in the normal sense, we can infer relationships between the constituent parts and sub-systems, and we can deduce global underlying principles. It follows from this that we cannot define what we ‘know’ in any unique sense, because all that we know about something is rooted in its relationship to other things – we know it by what it is not, its antithesis, as much (or more) than by what it is.

There is no requirement that a complex system be uniform in nature. It may have sub-systems that appear in structure and function to be significantly different to each other and to the whole yet each is in relationship to the others and to the ‘environment’ of the whole, and the whole is in relation to the wider environment. This relationship might be one that is in a state of ‘far from equilibrium’ yet the system maintains dynamic coherence and adheres to its global underlying principles.

Put another way, however we chose to represent the world to ourselves, I shall argue that there exist processes that underlie all of humanity, and the principles of complexity theory might provide a language by which we can get closer to an appreciation of them. (Tsoukas & Hatch, 2001). Further, I suggest that the diversity apparent between individuals and nations is indicative of self generating and self-managing sub-systems that might be complex in their own right, but which are still parts of the whole, as each derives its identity or being from its opposite (as perceived
from the whole) and ‘development’ in any of these sub-systems is synonymous with interaction with the whole. The following sections of this paper flesh out these claims and offer mechanisms by which these underlying principles might be transferred across generations.

**Underlying Processes.**
In this section I shall explore what these processes might be through illustration. I do this to emphasis their metaphorical or representational nature. The words employed are used to represent concepts which are themselves socially constructed representations – in other words – whilst there might be some commonality of language between the various constructions discussed here it must be remembered that the meanings behind the words are dynamic, situated and ephemeral. One word may mean different things in different contexts and different things to different people (Jankowicz, 1994). I am therefore trying to explore the parameters of the concepts or meanings behind the words, whilst acknowledging that these concepts are also socially constructed and essentially undefinable.

**An evolutionary basis?**
Research into evolutionary psychology and psychiatry (Barklow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Bradshaw, 1997) suggests that human (and primate) affectional development progresses through the maturation of specific affectional systems, and that ‘All major psychiatric syndromes may thus be conceives as inappropriate expressions of evolved propensities concerned with adaptive behaviour in the domains of group membership (..), group exclusion (..), and mating (..).’ (Stevens and Price, 1996:29). They argue that there exist two ‘great archetypal systems’. The first formative experience faced by our proto-human ancestors would be that associated with parenting and family. As our ancestors developed the pattern of bearing live young that needed parental care for survival they also developed the pattern of behaviours and emotions that bonded parent and child in a dependant relationship. Thus their first great archetypal system has to do with attachment, affiliation, care giving, care receiving, and altruism. As the child grew, was replaced by other children, and eventually became a parent themselves, so ‘self’ – and as a necessary and integral part of that process, ‘not-self’, or the ‘other’, emerged. Therefore, that the first fundamental dynamic played out in each person’s life is that of self and other.
This pervades the whole of our existence and is the core of self-development literature.

The second formative experience was that of collectivity. For 99 percent of its existence, humanity has lived in ‘extended organic kinship groups’ of about forty to fifty individuals, comprising six to ten adult males, twelve to twenty child bearing females, and about twenty juveniles and infants. (Fox, 1989). As predators, they were sufficiently effective not to need to develop large aggregations, flocking behaviour and high sensitivity to others in the group in order to survive, but they were sufficiently weak that they could only exceptionally survive as solitary individuals. We are therefore left with an awareness of society and its necessary structures and hierarchy, and also of individual agency. This equates to Steven and Price’s second great archetypal system, that concerned with rank, status, discipline, law and order, territory and possessions.

Stevens and Price posit that the search for achievement of archetypal goals occurs throughout the whole of the life-cycle, though the presenting face of the goals we seek changes as our circumstances change with age. These dual aspects of our collective psyche (self and other, and the structured law and the anarchic body (Hopfl, 1995)) can be seen mirrored in the tensions between sociology and psychology, or between structure and agency, as elucidated by Giddeons (1976).

In other words, we can identify two fundamental processes derived from our evolutionary history that continue to effect our humanity and our enactment of our existence. I want to make a clear distinction between the discussion here about the existence of fundamental or underlying processes and our day-to-day appreciation of them. Our daily lives and ways of seeing them are framed by our sense making of our past and by our anticipation of the future – we each live in our own self-constructed worlds. The surface diversity of our own worlds does not, however, detract from the existence of underlying processes. Our existence is interpreted differently across the spread of our civilisations, but that is a matter of the ways in which we choose to make sense of our existence. These two fundamental processes present the basis for a typology, and are mapped as the vertical and horizontal axes in Figure 1.
A Jungian perspective?
Parallels to these notions can be seen in the work of Carl Jung (1964, 1971). To reiterate, I am taking some ideas from his enormous contribution to this area, and I am using them in a loose sense to facilitate synthesis with ideas from other fields. It is beyond the confines of this paper to delve more fully into his work, but these ideas are not used in a manner that would contradict other aspects of his work. Briefly, Jung suggested that there are four archetypal aspects of psychological orientation that fit together as a whole typology and which can be seen to be associated with the ways in which we perceive our world.

“The quaternity is an archetype of almost universal occurrence. It forms the logical basis for any whole judgement. .. There are always four elements, four primal qualities, four colours, four castes, four ways of spiritual development etc. So to, there are four aspects of psychological orientation .. in order to orientate ourselves, we must have a function which ascertains that something is there (sensation); a second function which establishes what it is (thinking); a third function which states whether it suits us or not, whether we wish to accept it or no (feeling), and a fourth function which indicates where it came from and where it is going (intuition). The ideal completeness is a circle or sphere, but its natural minimal division is a quaternity.” CG Jung 1961

In other words, whilst everyone seeks to make sense of the world around them, they focus on different aspects of their existence in order to create their account of it. In support of his typology he suggested that there exist two processes (perception and judgement) which are independent of each other, and both are bi-polar.

Perception is the process by which individuals make sense (consciously or otherwise) of their surroundings, and is thus mediated by previous understandings, expectation and anticipations, memory and unconscious influences (from the ‘promissory notes’ of metaphor, myth and rhetoric (Soyland, 1994) to primal drives). When gathering information people prefer to focus either on the ‘here-and-now’ information from their senses, or on the ‘what-if’ information they ‘intuit’ from the possibilities and patterns they see developing. Judgement is the process of deciding which of the many alternative perceptival interpretations available at any one instant to adopt as ‘reality’.
Judgement is influenced by previous understandings and is more likely to be based upon post-hoc rationalisation than the traditionally accepted view of ‘scientifically’ weighing up the alternatives and rationally choosing the best option in advance of the final decision. When deciding about the information they have gathered, people prefer to make decisions based on objective thinking, by analysing and weighing the alternatives from a wide perspective, or to make decisions based on their feelings for each particular situation in an individualised manner.

There is strong evidence of individual variation in preferred perceptual and judgemental styles (see, for example, Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978, and Reason, 1981). Such variation forms the basic premise of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a management assessment and development tool for individuals and organisations that is being increasingly used world-wide (see Briggs Myers and McCaulley (1985), Krebs Hirsh and Kummerow (1987) for more detail). I raise the issue here to record general acceptance of the MBTI tool, and thus (by implication) the assumptions on which the tool is based. Other researchers have used Jungian dimensions as a basis upon which to build an analysis of their area, for example, Tufts-Richardson (1996) links Jungian typology to individual spirituality by mapping four types of spiritual path, whilst McWhinney (1992) maps four paths of change, or choice, for organisations and society.

Figure 1 maps Stevens and Price’s fundamental processes against a Jungian typology, in order to illustrate the archetypal quartiles and to demonstrate the generalisability of this by mapping Hofstede’s (1991) typology that has been developed without reference to Jung. He described national culture by its position along five dimensions: those of individualism vs. collectivism; low vs. high power distance; masculinity vs. femininity; low vs. high uncertainty avoidance, and; short vs. long term orientation. Although Hofstede makes it clear that many organisations illustrate a mix of these basic trends, his initial work can be criticised for an overly broad categorisation of national culture. For example, Poland is classed, alongside Sweden and Germany, as almost centrally balanced between long and short term orientation. Yet Poland (as a nation) is a compromise of relatively extreme and disparate tendencies towards either long or short term orientation, whilst both Sweden and Germany show less polarisation.
Despite the problems associated with categorisation of nations, Hofstede’s dimensions are illuminative if viewed as relativistic indicators of preference - as archetypal parameters rather than ‘reality’.

Also included in Figure 1 (in the circles) are associated approaches to learning and organisation. The approaches to learning are picked up again in Figure 3 and addressed later in the paper. The approaches to organisation are derived from Lee (1996b) and are discussed more fully there. Briefly, the ‘Hierarchical’ quarter is characterised by a system of high leader control in a rationalised environment, in which independent thought, action and the ability to cope with ambiguity is minimised. The archetypal ‘Hierarchical’ person is sensitive to the requirements of those in power and to the analytic nature of ‘acceptable’ contributions. Questioning is allowed, so long as it occurs within the recognised hierarchical structure and conforms to the ‘scientific’ investigative format.
The ‘Normative’ archetype is characterised by a particularly strong focus upon the creation and maintenance of behavioural norms supporting a leader-defined vision of the future. Rules of the predominant culture are imposed, under the assumption that without such imposition individuals would have little ‘self control’. Appropriate behaviour is seen to evidence belief in the leader’s vision. Ultimate power is awarded to those who can convert others to their view of existence, thus questioning of these norms is anarchic or heretical behaviour, however, the coercive environment encourages such rebellion.

The archetypal ‘entrepreneur’ views externally imposed values and codes of behaviour as non-mandatory, and preserves the freedom to question and choose. He or she responds rapidly in a changing environment and is able to be anticipatorily pro-active. However, as 'individualists', archetypal entrepreneurs, whilst able to lead others, have difficulty working as equals with others, or as subordinates, potentially falling into a damaging pattern of impotence and rivalry (Stacey, 1991).

The facilitative archetype is characterised by co-operative social responsibility within a flexible power structure. This requires the ability to understand the machinations of the external world, whilst maintaining integrity and lack of 'game-playing' (Baddeley & James, 1987; Berne, 1964; Harris, 1973). Lack of unidirectional leadership challenges the group decision making processes, such that the organisation’s political system might result in power vacuum and drift (Stacey, 1991).

The conjunction of individual and national foci in the mapping of typologies in Figure 1 is intended to highlight the nature of this mapping, by which a ‘preference’ is interpreted through the extent to which its opposite is realised; in which exploration of the unit under investigation is independent of the ‘size’ of the unit, and; is, instead, linked to the unit’s relationship to its wider context. In other words, the ‘categories’ presented in Figure 1 are archetypal are applicable to any size of grouping (to individuals, organisations and nations). Similarly, I wish to emphasise that it is not the intention to label the dimensions in a fixed and unique manner, but we do need to understand their qualia better if they are fundamental to our way of describing and enacting self and society.

Archetypal approaches to management and development?
In this section I shall examine what these qualia might be in relation to management and development. Four main views of 'management' can be identified: the classical, scientific, processual and phenomenological. (Lee 1997a). Managers, within the classical view, must be able to create appropriate rules and procedures for others to follow, they must be good judges of people and able to take independent action as and when required. Good managers are assumed to be ‘born’ rather than ‘made’ – and so Management Development is a matter of selecting the 'right' people with leadership potential. The scientific view assumes that human behaviour is rational, and that people are motivated by economic criteria (Taylor, 1947). Within this view ‘correct’ decisions can be identified and implemented appropriately through scientific analysis, and thus good management techniques can be acquired by anyone with the right training and ‘training departments’ systematically identify and fill the ‘training gap’. Both of these approaches assume a structured and known world based upon rational principles and in which rationality leads to success.

The other two approaches to management assume a world in which agency (rather than structure) is the predominant force. The processual view of management assumes that economic advantage will come to those who are best able to spot opportunities, to learn rapidly, and to create appropriate commitment amongst colleagues. Human resource development is seen to help managers develop leadership and interpersonal skills, creativity, self reliance and the ability to work in different cultures. Although the individual is the main stakeholder in his or her own development, the direction of the organisation (and thus of an individual’s development) remains at the behest of senior management who, through initiatives such as Business Process Re-engineering (BPR), aspire to mould the organisation and the people within it. Phenomenological management, differs from processual management by the way in which the activities drive the functions, strategies and even leadership of the organisation. For many, management is about ‘purpose’ and ‘doing’ whilst phenomenology is about the ‘study’ of ‘being’. All individuals are seen to collude with their situation and, through that collusion, are ‘together’ responsible for the running and development of the organisation (despite some being ‘senior management’ and others from the shop floor). ‘Management’ is about being part of a system whose activities change as a function of the system and of its relationship to its environment.
These four approaches link quite closely to the four ways in which the word ‘development’ is used in the literature, as delineated through an entirely different line of research (Lee 1997b). An analysis of the literature showed that one meaning of development was to indicate a form of maturation – the (inevitable or natural) progression through series of stages of life cycle. When used to indicate shaping it similarly implied a known endpoint to which the individual or organisation was steered by the application of various tools, within a known, quantifiable and manageable environment. In contrast, the other two uses of the word ‘development’ that were identified did not have a known endpoint. Development as a voyage was evident in literature about personal development – in which the self was the agent and the object, and development as emergent was evident in social science literature particularly, in which the lines between the individual and the organisation became blurred and the focus was upon co-development and co-regulation.

Figure 2. Four types of ‘Development’, after Lee 1977b
Figure 2 shows a representation of these four forms of development, presented as a typology (in which the lines of the figure indicate the strength of spheres of influence, and not delineations or divisive categories) and maps on to these the four views of management discussed earlier.

This latter point is important and worth emphasising. I am NOT here discussing ‘real’ differences and saying that there exist four ways of ‘doing’ management or development – or that management or development are ‘things’ that can be done, or can be done to. In contrast, I am saying that there appear to be differences in the way that people talk about, or enact, whatever it is that constitutes ‘development’ or ‘management’ in their eyes, and, that there appears to be some consistency within the realisation of those differences. I have also linked these to different approaches to learning, as I shall build upon these in the next section.

**A Mechanism for promulgation of the sub-sets.**

In this section I suggest that these different approaches to the human condition are maintained by socialisation, but more than that, as each approach can be associated with a different view of learning and development so that approach is reconstituted and reinforced in its own likeness. Socialisation can be seen as a mechanism by which the tensions and their resolution between self and other, and between structure and agency, are promulgated and emphasised through succeeding generations. I base my argument on the view that social development is a process of creative interaction in which ‘individuals dynamically alter their actions with respect to the ongoing and anticipated actions of their partners.’ (Fogel, 1993:34; Smith, 1992; McWinney, 1992; Lee, 1994). Relationships exist within mutually constructed conventions or frames of reference (Kelly 1955; Duncan 1991:345; Moreland & Levine, 1989), and a dynamic view of culture is facilitated (Hatch, 1993).

'Society' exists in so far as people agree to its existence - and could be a family unit or a nation. In some way (whether by being born into and thus socialised within it - as in a family or nation; through meeting ‘like minded people and thus forming friendship groups; or formally through induction into an organisation) individuals come to identify (and be identified by others) as part of a community. In so doing they help create and collude with underlying values and norms. This process starts at birth and
is a basal acculturation mechanism in which the underlying processes are the same whether the focus is upon family and friendship groupings, temporary ‘micro-cultures’, small or large organisations, or national culture (Burns, 1977). There is empirical evidence of correlation between form of parenting and the child’s life stance (Baumrind, 1973; Bee, 1985), and between career and family history (Cromie, Callaghan & Jansen, 1992). Similarly, there is evidence that choice of curricula, methodological approach and course design are partially governed by the value base of the providers, and thus perpetuate that value base (Ashton, 1988; Boyacigiller and Adler, 1991). Thus the approach to learning adopted by each society has a fundamental effect upon the continuation of the parameters of that particular society (Author 1996).

In Figure 3 different forms of learning were mapped against the archetypal parameters of self and other, and of structure and agency. In practical terms, the ‘cognitive’ environment carries with it group norms about received wisdom and the value of qualifications. Power is vested in those who have achieved qualifications and those who can give them. Cogent argument carries more importance than does applicability or individual difference. The ‘problem’ student (or heretic, Harshbarger, 1973) would be someone who lacked sufficient intelligence to master the required concepts. The ‘behavioural’ environment focuses upon activity, functionalism, and the importance of the end result. Norms are about identifying competence, and filling the ‘training gap’ to achieve appropriate levels of competence. The heretic is someone unable to demonstrate the required competence. The ‘humanistic’ environment focuses upon difference and equality. Received wisdom (in so far as it epitomises a particular view of reality) is inappropriate, as are identifiable and assessable ‘competencies’ (in so far as they epitomise a ‘right’ way of doing things). The problem participant is unwilling to explore and share their affective and attitudinal aspects. In the ‘experiential’ environment the focus is on actionable outcomes - the end justifies the means. The heretic is someone who questions the route, or prefers inactivity. (‘The confidence to act is a prerequisite for learning’, Blackler, 1993)
I am not suggesting that in ‘real life’, ‘learning’ only occurs within one approach. Instead, it is much more likely that in any situation one learns more ‘holistically’ (Lee 1996). Honey and Mumford (1989) suggest that ‘experience’ plays a part in any learning, regardless of whether or not it is acknowledged or focused upon within the educational process. One of the best known models of experiential learning is that of Kolb (1974, 1984) who suggests that the process of learning is cyclical, revolving through experience, reflection, theorising and planning. In Figure 3 this is represented by the large (arrowed) circle. From this perspective, we only really learn by engaging in all aspects of the activity.

Transformative experiences, therefore, appear to be those that force us to (re)examine our world-view… (Emery & Trist, 1965, Pascale 1990). Any ‘experience’ is an opportunity for learning, however, as Dewey (1938) pointed out, ‘It is not enough to insist upon the necessity of experience, nor even of activity in experience. Everything
depends upon the quality of experience which is had ... every experience lives in further experiences.’ Vasilyuk (1984) takes it further, building the case that all learning that has a transformative effect upon us is derived from a clash between our understanding of the world and our experience, such that learning and change are painful processes of redefinition and Romanelli & Tushman (1994) offer empirical support for rapid, discontinuous change in organisations being driven by major environmental changes. Similarly, Stevens and Price argue that our changing lives necessitate re-negotiating our position with respect to the great archetypal systems, and that ‘Psychopathology results when the environment fails, either partially or totally, to meet one (or more) archetypal need(s) in the developing individual.’ (1966:34). In the terms of complexity theory, transformative experiences occur at bifurcation points, when the system and the environment impact in such a way that the system can either continue in its current, well travelled pattern, or shift to some way of being that is new and unpredicted (though not necessarily unpredictable). Indeed, the current analysis would suggest that the system is likely to shift to incorporate qualia of a different world view.

I have argued that there exist two main bi-polar underlying processes by which the human condition is structured, and that these give rise to four main archetypes. The processes of socialisation, or learning, emphasise particular aspects of our world view, such that the various systems or sub-systems, be they individuals, organisations or nations, have a tendency to enact the qualia of a single archetype. However, although I have talked of the qualia of the archetypes, I have deliberately failed to define them other than by example. Archetypes, by their nature, are indefinable in the scientistic sense, and also, as discussed above, the qualia are unmeasurable other than dialectically (Pascale 1990) by reference to their ‘opposite’. Furthermore, that ‘opposite’ might be different under different occasions or interpretations. For example, in one situation it was found that the word ‘conflict’ was interpreted by some people to be ‘contested negotiation’ whilst others saw it as ‘a fight to the death’, and acted accordingly with misunderstanding on both sides (Lee, 1998). We could extrapolate that for these people the opposite to their views of conflict would be the similar but subtly different qualities of ‘easy negotiation’ and ‘peaceful life’. We live within our own world view yet in order to understand or even describe it we need to compare it with that of others in a dialectic manner. In other words - to know what we
are, we also have to know what we are not. We can’t categorise the human condition in a positivistic mutually exclusive sense, but we can use the arguments above to develop a dialectically based meta-typology.

**A Wheel of typologies.**

Figure 4 shows a typology of typologies, or a meta-typology, of the human condition, constructed by plotting the axes of the great archetypal systems against typologies of individual, organisational and governmental approach and those of individual influence, education and metaphor (as a form of organisational glue, after Morgan, 1986). In other words, it is intended as a typology that underlies those discussed previously and others in the literature.

This is not intended as a categorisation. Each spoke of the wheel supports the others with no clear distinction between neighbouring typologies, and each is validated dialectically by the qualia of the spoke opposite it. Thus an archetypal individual and organisational approach is represented as if it were located in a radial segment of the wheel (the width of which would depend upon the diversity of the element in question), and the probability of identifying an approach typified by other segments or individual parts of the wheel would be negatively correlated with distance from the primal segment. If this meta-typology is imagined in three dimensions, with the centre forming the tip of a cone, the third dimension represents a continuum moving from micro variables at the apex towards macro variables at the base. In other words, the tip of the cone might represent degrees of aggregation, and the base, large aggregates of elements, yet each has influence upon the other.

An example of the influence the individual can have upon a large organisation can be seen in Connolly (2004) who recounts how the raising of an eyebrow by a senior manager in a meeting delayed an organisational change initiative by several years. Similarly, work exploring gene-culture co-evolution indicates the potential for rapid genetically-linked cultural change linked to choice of mate (Laland, 1993; Richerson & Boyd, 1989). This example also indicates the permeable nature of the boundary between individual and society. Individuals might be actively choosing a mate (though factors of background and parenting are likely to mediate in such choice (Duck, 1986)), but they are unlikely to be doing so in order to influence societal form.
These examples emphasise both the unpredictable influence of individual factors (cf. Gleick, 1987, and chaos theory) and the speed with which such ‘inactive’ change might occur.

Figure 54 A typology of typologies. (note the words are indicative, not definitional)

When visualised as a cone, however, the meta-typology represents three dimensions each of which possess a pole that focuses upon ‘individuality’, though the import of this is different in each case. This generates multiple layers of meaning that are sacrificed if a one-dimensional form of analysis is adopted. Each segment and type is interpretable in the light of its archetypal opposites within these multiple layers, thus
analysis of the meta-typology is richer if a dialectic perspective is adopted. Organisations comprise multifaceted membership and are likely to contain dissidents who might be expected to voice an approach at the polar opposite to that held by the organisation (heresy) or to work outside the accepted bounds of the segment (deviance). Inconsistency of approach might also be found across the levels and/or functions of the organisation (Demirag & Tylecote, 1992), and within the individual (leading to analysis within psycho-dynamic frameworks) (Parsons, 1951). It can be speculated that level of conflict will be positively correlated with degree of inconsistency both between individual approaches and within aspects of an approach.

The three-dimensional interpretation of the wheel presents a holistic and interactive overview of the meta-typology that is, in essence, static. Given the notion that individuals and organisations, despite their ‘presenting approach’ will possess hidden qualia of their opposites and that it is the conflict between these, which are, themselves, part of the environment, or with other aspects of the environment, that generates creative tension and transformation, then it is necessary to introduce a fourth dimension to the meta-typology - that of transformation over time, or dynamism.

From Hereclites onwards (circa 500 BC) it has been suggested that humanity is in a state of always ‘becoming’ despite the appearance of structured categorisation and ‘being’ fostered by Western scientism (Author 2001; Stacey, Griffin and Shaw, 2000). In other words, our lives are dynamic, and in a state of constant change. Fixed goals, known end points and clear delineations are tools that we use to provide a sense of stability, but that sense merely a mechanism and is false with respect to the wider reality of existence. The meta-typology, presented here with lines and detail, is merely an attempt to indicate underlying structures, those structures exist, however, not as things in themselves but are presented as a possible pattern of relationships: a representation of the relationships between other representations. As noted above, even the terminology used is just a representation. For example, Campbell and Muncer (1994) show that both occupational role and gender are indicative of whether a person views ‘aggression’ as a functional act aimed at imposing control over other people, or in expressive terms as a breakdown of self control over anger. Thus understanding of the word ‘aggression’, co-varies with the axes and will be interpreted by different readers in different ways.
Implications of the meta-typology.

I have argued that although the terminology differs, the underlying processes permeate our existence. Links between existing work and the meta-typology could be limited to positive correlation with existing typologies along a single axis. For example, Handy’s (1981) typology of organisation culture (Power, Role, Task, Person) shows some similarity to the vertical axis. Debates about field dependence/independence in cognitive style (Hayes & Allison, 1994) appear to fit more closely to the horizontal axis, whilst those about the way in which individuals and societies are interconnected and mutually influencing are represented by the third-dimensional axis. Similarly, Rasheed & Prescott’s (1992) dimensions of complexity and dynamism in the classification of organisational task environments show some similarity to the two diagonal axes. Thus the meta-typology can be linked to one-dimensional measures, such as equity sensitivity (King & Miles, 1994), interpersonal orientation (Swap & Rubin, 1983), or machiavellianism (Robinson & Shaver, 1973), and is potentially testable in its prediction of relationships between such measures. However, nearly every 2x2 matrix I come across seems to accord with the meta-typology in some way or another.

It is, perhaps, not surprising to find that 2x2 matrices, as representations of something, accord with other representations, especially if there do exist underlying processes from which we structure our worlds. However, I do not wish to suggest that any organisation or individual might demonstrate all the qualia of a particular typology – to do so might establish them as an archetype! As a complex system the individual might demonstrate forms of behaviour akin to one segment of the wheel (espousing an approach similar to that of the free-market), whilst the observer notes aspects of behaviour that are located within another segment (working within traditional educational methodology and reinforcing respect for position and rules - theory in practice), whilst voicing a preference for a third segment (one that respects ‘human values’) (cf., Argyris, 1990; Bate, 1990; Papula, 1993).

The exploration of inconsistency might lead to greater understanding of organisations in practice (Schein, 1985) and point to areas of knowledge that are, at present, under explored. For example: the form of the model suggests an expansion of Morgan’s
(1986) typology of organisational metaphor; it supports Buchanan’s (1991) call for alternative accounts of change, and; it might provide insight into the problems encountered when applying Western-style bureaucracy to African culture (Hyden, 1983), or help contextualise inconsistencies in research findings (Judge & Watanabe, 1994).

Different parts of the organisation or society might well adopt different configurations, and configurations might change as ‘needed’. The activities of the social system are emergent and feed back into it (Weick, 1977), they can influence all other aspects of the system, and the system itself can be far-from-equilibrium. This approach, therefore, denies the ability to ‘plan’ or ‘control’ organisational development - it argues for a resource-based view of the organisation in which the role of ‘managing’ is fragmentary (i.e. Mintzberg, 1979) and offers a valuable critique of the established ‘discipline’ of strategy. In addition, because this view eschews ideas of (real) control by a hierarchy, as well as questioning the ability of the organisation to (really) predict or plan, it is more in tune with work that questions the serial and causal nature of our existence (Lee & Flatau, 1996).

So how does this link to my earlier points about the integration of the social sciences? Perhaps the earliest discipline was philosophy, from which grew core disciplines of psychology and sociology with their very different views of the world. This can be seen in relation to the meta-typology. If we look at the core disciplines of sociology and psychology, sociology, with its focus on social forces and core debates around structure and agency can be seen to be aligned along one axis of the representation, whilst psychology, with its focus upon the individual and their relation to the collective, can be seen to be aligned along the opposite axis. Both are looking at the human condition, but from very different perspectives. They understand it differently and employ different techniques to further their understanding

There is, of course, wide variation within each discipline, and many of the fields of study that have developed from these are more hybrid in their approach. Disciplines such as education, politics, law, and anthropology, can also be associated with particular areas of the meta-typology (in relation to content and approach) as can
hybrid fields of study such as cultural studies, ethnography, ICT, management (including economics, finance etc), and organisational studies.

However, these are just titles that are applied to a particular focus on the world, and, if we are to apply my previous arguments, it is inappropriate to delineate one from the other in a delimiting fashion. Indeed, having gone through a period of diversification and delimitation, the rhetoric is now about interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary investigation. It is worth noting, though, that these terms in themselves imply segregation. Whilst there might be a desire to work together across disciplines, the tenets and language of the various disciplines mitigate against this.

There is a need to adopt a flexible view of language (as has been evident throughout this paper) in order to encompass the multiple specific meanings that have developed around particular words. Take, for example, the words consciousness, sub-conscious and unconscious that merit a field of study in their own right and mean very different things to a Jungian and a sociologist. This refining of language cannot be done through definition, as each field defines it within their own terms – it can only be done by a refusal to define (Lee, 2001) and through joint understanding by exemplar.

The more hybrid fields of study, by their very nature, can suffer from the diversity inherent in their approach, but also offer a way forward. I will briefly focus here on Human Resource Development (HRD) as an example, though similar things could be said about other hybrid fields. I suggest that, regardless of one’s ‘understanding’, or the terminology used, that which might be called the development of human resources is actually located at the dynamic and co-creative interface between the elements of the system, and between sub-systems, such that interacting, they become more than the sum of the parts. Thus the business of HRD, in so far as it exists as a concept and a practice, is concerned with the relationship between the representations. Research into HRD is, in effect, research into the processes that underlie the human condition. The practice of HRD is about influencing the relationships that comprise the glue of the human condition. From this emerges organisational transformation and social change.
In terms of complexity, as we research the human condition we need to be aware that we are researching the intangible and un-measurable. We can catch glimpses of what we are looking for and we can try to represent or model it – but we need to avoid the temptation to overly objectify or embody that which we research. The ‘individual’ and the ‘organisation’ are not unitary bounded concepts – they are part of a whole and are identifiable by their relationship to the whole. It is the interactions that are of importance, rather than descriptions of ‘purpose’. Similarly, when we intervene in the human condition with some aim in mind, both the ‘outcomes’ and their ‘value’ are subject to interpretation. There is no longer necessarily a clear and obvious route between cause and effect - and one person’s preferred ‘outcome’ might be someone else’s feared possibility / cause. We can no longer assume that a particular intervention at a particular time will produce a known effect. We lose the gloss of certainty that permeates a well defined and causal view of the world.

**In Conclusion.**
I have suggested that there exist ‘great archetypal structures’ that underlie the human condition, and that these can be identified by their effect upon it, such that human society and thought clusters into four main archetypal world views. The axes by which these are located are bi-polar and termed, again, for convenience, self and other, and structure and agency. This forms a meta-typology or representation of the human condition. I suggest that much of human functioning, including ways of examining the world (research methodologies) and interpreting it (disciplines and fields of study) can be mapped against this meta-typology. These great systems and their products are most fruitfully discussed by embracing the language (and thus concepts) of complexity. This recognises that whilst the entity cannot be pulled apart and understood, it can be accessed by examining the relationships between the multiplicity of representations that are located within it. Thus the study of the entity is the study of the relationships within it.
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