A POLITICISED EPISTEMOLOGY AND ITS EFFECTS UPON UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT OF SOCIETAL ONTOLOGY.

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A Politicised Epistemology and Its Effects upon Universities and Their Management of Societal Ontology

ABSTRACT:

By Jon Harrington

In recent years the universities have changed from pre-enlightenment “protectors” of societal knowledge to typically modern “business” orientated bureaucracies. It is argued that as a consequence, their status has also changed from one of independent “observer” into that of “product producer”; driven particularly by their newly adopted managerialistic principles, aimed at making them more “business” orientated. This has been fuelled by the domination of a scientific (Positivist) epistemology throughout the university sector, which emerged from an important philosophical debate, in the sixties, between Kuhn and Popper. Establishing facticity, based upon scientific methodology, in research as supreme; it allowed for a marriage of convenience between the managerialistic ambitions of the new elite and the worldly theory it purported, as a self-fulfilling justification and prophecy of their actions.

Debate in this area has been centred upon the practicalities of managing such a change and its consequences in terms of organisation and management efficiencies. Discussion regarding longer-term effects of whether such a change in the universities, driven in particular by their business schools and senior management, might have a more fundamental impact upon the way we theorise and think about ourselves, is rarely covered. It is contended that such omission is misplaced. The universities’ traditional role in society as guardians of our ontological theoretics is being downgraded by increasing demands for them, from government bodies and the like, to behave akin to profit making organisations.

This thesis is contending, therefore, that as a consequence of university management search for greater efficiencies, the epistemological frameworks for research, and subsequent theoretics, in the universities have become politicised. It is argued that eventually this will affect society’s ontological frameworks and hence change the way we, as individuals, regard our reality. Central to this, is the premise that given the dominant scientific method, alluded to above, is tainted by political intrusion, it would be inappropriate to use it as a method of analysis. However, it is also contended that constructivist ethnomedology is similarly, and ultimately, dependent upon rationo-factual research and therefore is inappropriate. With the use of a negative dialectic, instituted by early Frankfurt School discussion, this work, therefore, seeks to establish a new facticity-
independent, universal theoretic based upon proto-epistemological states. The aim is to lay bare the corruptible nature of the relationship between politicised epistemology and its consequential ontological state and thus demonstrate the potentiality of the danger facing our universities and society.
To Norman, John and Janice
Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work.

Name: Jon Harrington

Signature:

Date:
Chapter One

Introduction

"The dilemma that faced us in our work proved to be the ...the self-destruction of the Enlightenment. We are wholly convinced ...that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought. Nevertheless, we believe that we have just as clearly recognized the notion of this very way of thinking ...already contains the seed of the reversal universally apparent today" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972: xiii).

The main proposition of this thesis is that the fundamental nature of social ontology is changing as a consequence of changes in the universities; and that this has had an impact upon the way that scientists and social observers model our societies. This will be discussed throughout the work within the context of four major themes. First, is the Popper/Kuhn debate which provided the necessary watershed in achieving the present state as discussed in this work. It was a debate which is more than forty years old, held principally within the U.S. and U.K. Its major thrust was pivoted around the question: "What drives theoretical innovation and consequential research in our scientific communities?" Nevertheless despite its age and relative parochialism, the consequence of the debate still has had a profound influence upon the ways current analysis of the 'modern world' is to be conducted and theorised.

Second, is the nature of Positivist science itself after Enlightenment, in particular how its politicised historicity gave rise to the requirement that all research and subsequent theory be facticity based. It will be argued that the effect of such political action was to demand, eventually, a theorised world in the image of those who held sway over the researchers and theorists. However, this did not, and could not come about without the emergence of the third and fourth themes in this work.

The third is the possibility of consequential politicisation and managerialisation of the universities, initially in the U.S. and U.K., followed by those on mainland Europe. In the U.K. – which this work will be concentrating upon – Blair government pressure upon the vice chancellories of the universities to become more profit orientated and business like,
provided a major strategic momentum to fundamental change, which left their senior managements at least regarding their research and course base as ‘products’ and the students as ‘customers’. It will be argued that this left the universities with no other option than to tread the same path as any other business; that is to be driven by the bottom line with everything else – albeit still important – in second place.

The fourth and final theme, refers to, on the one hand, the changing nature of university management itself; and, on the other, universities becoming fundamentally different to what they were previously. Universities are important, it will be argued, because unlike other organisations they have acted as ‘guardians’ of our social ontological ‘purity’. With them now acting more like businesses, and more importantly possessing the drives and morals of businesses, the need for research will no longer be driven by scientific ideology, as it was, but by profit. Thus particular research will be chosen no longer because it is academically desirable but because it will make money. For this to happen, however, the university elites themselves had to change and become more managerialistic.

It will be argued that this final stage could have been achieved in part by the emergence, and domination, of Business Schools. They were money-making projects, initially, to fund the other ‘proper’ research; but their managers, already imbued with the managerial ethic, became powerful and influential within the universities. They soon were to become Vice Chancellors themselves, or at the very least persuade their Vice Chancellors to become like them, and adopt the mantle of managers. No longer the colleagues of researchers but now their managers, the Vice Chancellors possessed the power and the will to ‘manage’ their universities’ ontological base through its research programme, as any senior manager would their product base.

Evidence of this changed approach to higher education can be easily found despite the change in government. For example, as recently as April 14th 2008 the guardian ran an interview with John Denham, Minister for Universities, skills and innovation – during which he declared, “If you look at the university system as a whole, and the way in which it engages with employers, it needs to be closer, more intensive, and part of what university offers has got to be tailored for the needs of a very different group of students and the people who are going to be paying for these courses.” Or put more bluntly, “University VC’s should behave more like CEO’s” declared a headline in The Independent on Thursday 17th April 2008. Anna Fazackerley, who wrote the article, went onto to conclude that, “...as institutions battle to find and assert their place in the market,
there is no doubt that they will have some tough and unpopular decisions to make. Lily-
levered vice chancellors afraid to put their heads above the parapet or outside the door will 
put their institutions at risk.” And there are indeed many vice chancellors who are more 
than willing to comply with such a strategy as suggested by Fazackerley.

It will be argued that such a politicised and populist stance by those who are 
themselves members of various Elites within our societies, are encouraging a 
fundamental and undesirable change to the social ontology. This is a consequence of an, 
albeit possibly unintentional, attack on the unique historical position of our Universities as 
‘guardians’ of our knowledge. University managerial eyes are upon other, and hitherto 
unconsidered, things such as profits and costs. In short, they are behaving like their 
counterparts in the private business sector. Courses and research which do not meet the 
stringent criteria of such financial considerations are mercilessly rejected regardless of 
their use. Those that have survived would have been measured in terms of popularity and 
not academic utility. The academic staff is then encouraged by one means or another to 
concentrate upon the remaining courses and research, at the expense of the rest. In time, 
it will be argued, this could work through to the social ontological frameworks simply 
because less popular academic models will not be, or allowed to be, discussed.

As already implied, such an outcome is not solely the consequence of managerial 
action in the universities but a combination of factors referred to above. In particular, an 
appropriate epistemological foundation had to be in place to allow for the emergence of 
managerialism in the universities. Such a foundation was based upon a Positivist 
Scientistic ideology and in particular a Functionalist paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
How this came about will be discussed in the following section.

Finally, the question has to be asked: in what ways will this work add to the 
betterment of academic knowledge? First, by questioning the current and past 
epistemology in terms of the relationship between the universities and scientific process, 
this work should encourage theoreticians – hitherto unexplored – determining the utility of 
science in the development of social – particularly business – analysis. Second, the 
development of a model of proto-epistemological states portrays – and reconciles – for 
the first time a potential conflict within an individual of power driven epistemology and their 
own ‘natural’ epistemology. This is important and innovative, because it allows anti- 
positivist theory to avoid the positivist accusation of solipsism and thus ensuring 
potentially a more robust theoretic epistemology. Third, the questioning of the scientific 
process – with particular regard to empiricism – is not new; however, its placement into a
profound theory of knowledge is unusual, and as a consequence states clearly that within an ontological theorectic at least the need for empirical statements could not only be suspect but problematic. Overall, therefore, it is recognised that this work could be regarded as distinct. But it is contended that this is its strength; because by being distinct it is hoped that a different perspective could be gleaned from the relationship between knowledge and society.

An Historical Context for Kuhn/Popper Debate

The dominance of a conventional Functionalist epistemology presented today is regarded as a given, principally based upon the outcome of a keystone debate more than forty years ago, between Karl Popper and his acolytes on the one hand, and Thomas Kuhn on the other. Its subject matter was vast covering every aspect and manner of how we 'do science', nevertheless concentrating upon the epistemology necessary to conduct 'proper science'. For Popper particularly The Principle of Deduction is paramount since its rigour underpins the process of Science itself (Magee, 2001). As he stated, "Systems of theories are tested by deducing from them statements of a lesser level of universality. These statements in their turn, since they are to be inter-subjectively testable, must be testable in like manner – and so ad infinitum" (Popper, 1968: 14). This then has a profound impact upon the ontology of the science in question, which is discussed in greater detail below. Thus for Popper the concept of a sustained universality achieved by an inductive methodology (as opposed to a deductive one) is not supportable because it would lead in Popper’s mind to “…an infinite regress” (Popper: 1968) and a consequential inability to prove, or more importantly disprove, any particular statement about reality. This is core to the argument, Science is thus to be linked to reality in a Positivist way, whether it be a physicality or mind/perceptual entity (See Popper, 1968).

Thomas Kuhn is placed by history on the other side of this "great debate" as Watkins once termed it; and this is where the problems in fact start. Since Kuhn – expressed particularly through his major work (1970) – is no: an opposition in a philosophical/ontological sense; that is an anti-positivist, but rather one of the same as Popper but possessing a different view as to how the scientific process should be interpreted (Horgan, 1991). Nevertheless it will be the contention of this work that history placed Kuhn as the opposition to a debate determining the validity of Positivism itself. It was a debate which Kuhn lost. As a consequence all epistemology which was not Positivist was somehow tarred with the same Kuhnian brush (see Watkins, 1970).
Subsequently, this has been transformed to a more critical debate between the constructivist and empiricist interpretation of social reality – Kuhn wrongly representing the former and Popper the latter. This is not correct and yet Kuhn’s label of “loser” seems to have remained with the constructivist project. A situation acknowledge by some today such as Friedman: “Over the past twenty-five years, a growing body of active research has been devoted to detailed study of the rise and decline of the logical empiricist movement. And this research has shown, not surprisingly, that the accepted conventional wisdom concerning the relationship between Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions and logical empiricist philosophy of science is seriously oversimplified and fundamentally misleading.” (2003: 19).

Kuhn is an empiricist, and his discussion of good and bad science is therefore placed within the context of such a framework. For him the debate is not about ontology but rather the political process within a given positivist epistemology (Pinto de Oliveira, 2007). As a historian of science Kuhn describes his job as being, “Concerned with scientific development… [Appearing] to have two main tasks. On the one hand, he must determine by what manner and at what point in time each contemporary scientific fact, law, and theory was discovered or invented. On the other, he must describe and explain the congeries of error, myth, and superstition that have inhibited the more rapid accumulation of the constituents of the modern science text” (1970: 2). This declaration is not only Positivist but also Functionalist (a paradigm within Positivism) in that it seeks function and to differentiate it from dysfunction. So Kuhn does not portray a ‘constructionist’ sense of reality. He was the natural scientist he had initially been trained to be (Horgan, 1991). Throughout his book there is little regard for the social sciences, effectively dismissing them from the debate with a cursory, “…and it remains an open question what parts of social science have yet acquired such paradigms at all” (1970: 15).

His use of the term ‘paradigm’ is also interesting, indicating a commitment by a group of scientists “…to the same rules and standards for scientific practice” (1970: 11). At best this would cover epistemological process and not ontological process; but in greater sense it is no more than a political expression of like-minded individuals – a ‘community’ Kuhn calls them. To underpin this, Kuhn declared later on in his book that, “…one of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake” (1970: 37). Clearly in Kuhn’s mind the
paradigm is controlled by its leaders in the same manner as any organisation. This is distinctive from the traditional philosophical sense of the term paradigm.

Kuhn’s paradigm does possess the commonality of ‘worldly view’ or weltanschauung binding the scientific ‘community’ with an agreement upon a common vision. So to with the philosophical term, in which the primary binding between individuals – identified as a paradigm – was seen as their commonality of vision. And yet for Kuhn their relationship with their real world is given and therefore any vision contained within his paradigm – even though quite often dynamic and changing – is set very much as Positivist framework which sees reality as a predetermined (Dyson, 1999). For Kuhn paradigmatic integrity is thus maintained by power relations and not perceptual construction.

There can be more than one paradigm – indeed numerous – and they are seen as competing. Those that achieve the status of acceptability are then regarded as part of ‘Normal Science’ or the conventional wisdom of the time. As Kuhn stated, “...a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other problems, including many that had previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the concerns of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to be worth the time” (1970: 37). For the critical analyst in particular, a paradigm is an a posteriori event, that is – as Schultz would have us believe – a construction made apparent through continued social action. This is as opposed to an a priori event for Kuhn. Unsurprisingly this also maps the distinction in part between positivism and constructionism.

This will be discussed in greater depth later. The objective here is to determine that the debate was won by Popper and his followers; that is the pro positivist ‘paradigm’ advocating a realistic ontology and a nomothetic methodology. In effect this meant that ‘the truth’ for an individual wishing to seek out their social world lies within a scientific exposition guided by the principles – and ideology – of objectivity. In short social investigation should be conducted in a ‘proper’ scientific manner with particular regard to empirical evidence.

Significantly, this did not contradict Kuhn’s and his advocates’ view. As already stated, they too were positivists. To reiterate, therefore, in the minds of those that followed, they were transformed into the ‘champions’ for a more ideographic and less deterministic framework which was soon related – perhaps not so accurately – to
constructionism, which did indeed embrace such principles. Nevertheless it should be stressed it was never in the mind of Thomas Kuhn or his supporters to actively argue such an ideology.

The substantive point to be made here is that since it was perceived by the 'intelligentsia' that Kuhn had lost, so too, in their mind, had the subjectivist argument wrongly associated with him. Unfortunately, because the outcome of the Kuhn/Popper debate became well entrenched in the academic psyche, this has also become reflected in the subsequent academic literature on the subject. The literature, for example, on business topics is dominated by positivist thinking. Literature representing the views of the winning side is seen as more relevant and hence sells more copy. Whilst of course there are still highly significant books published on the ideas of social construction and phenomenology, they are in the minority, and to put it bluntly give the impression as such. The debate it seems is over and Positivism has won; everything else is banished to the fringe of conventional wisdom.

The Kuhn/Popper Debate, Universities and Business Schools

It is, therefore, the contention of this work that the Kuhn/Popper debate has had a palpable effect upon the way our universities and business schools are not only managed, but also how they research and teach. This is not as a direct consequence; similar to, for example, a DES report on higher education, but rather as a more subtle, if not subliminal, influence. It has been acknowledged that during the sixties the climate throughout higher education had changed from one of academic prioritising to one of greater pragmatism and recognition for commercial necessity (Becher and Kogan: 1992). It is argued throughout this work, therefore, that such a change was conditioned, in no small part, by the temper of the discussion within the Kuhn/Popper debate (Burke: 1983). In particular, the nature and requirement of “good” scientific practice (Watkins: 1970).

This was not the main thrust of the debate, which was centred upon scientific development and the nature of paradigms; however it was an important determinant to such development in terms of quality and process (Popper: 1972). Placed into context of the main debate, therefore, the implication of this for universities, and particularly business schools, evolved around whether scientific development should be based upon “good science” or something more Kuhnian and pragmatic (Reisch: 1991). As Popper stated, “The rationalist tradition.... represents the only practical way of expanding our
knowledge..." (Quoted in Miller: 1987); and it was this view which dominated. So that science in maintaining its rationality and controllability through Popper's theoretic, was a gift to increasing university managerialisation; theory and practice – praxis – matched by university management action. The self-fulfilment and justification of such was established in the epistemologies of their individual business schools. In short, they enacted what they preached.

The eventual Popperian ascendancy over Kuhnian rhetoric was complex, and so was its consequential impact upon business schools. Whilst there was recognition of some political intrusion into the actions of our scientific communities, it was conditioned by the Popperian dictate that science, to be good process, had to remain rational and detached (Pinto de Oliveira: 2007). The acknowledged political processes were, therefore, consequential upon social action and not epistemology, which remained pure. As discussed in greater depth elsewhere within this work, such an outcome had the effect of reinforcing, and intensifying, already established positivist principles in the scientific process; namely, that the only science worth doing was one which was both rational and controlled through “governing laws” (Pratten: 2007). This had a twofold impact upon the area of discussion within the context of this thesis.

First, it acted as a harbinger to the emergence and then predominance of the business school within the university sector. This is based upon the premise that the epistemology of the Business School in terms of its specialist subject areas, is intrinsically rational and objectified, thus easily lending itself to an empathetic application of the Popperian theoretic (Maki: 2002). Coupled, coincidentally, with increasing government intrusion into the higher education sector, and their active encouragement of a managerialised university elite (Bennich-Bjorkman: 2007), the Business School was readily seen as a conduit for the proffered change (Pfeffer and Fong: 2002). Additionally, the university elite themselves compelled by the need to pursue business orientated options to solve their increasing funding problems (Richards: 2002), personally attended management courses, such as the MBA. Imbued through them with the Popperian theoretic and a "business outlook", they forced through strategies for their universities which complied with what they had learnt on these courses. Not only did that make their government masters happy (Shattock: 2008), but it also secured the university elite's increasingly favourable opinion toward their business schools through the fulfilment of prophecies of good management practice established by such courses. Discussed in more depth below, the net effect of this was to ensure the predominance of both the Popperian theoretic and the Business School. It is also argued below that whilst this
might have happened in any event because of externalities, such as changing demographics and government pressure to respond, the Kuhn/Popper debate had already placed in the minds of the senior academics within the universities an epistemology capable of immediately fulfilling their needs to rationalise and control their university organisations (Richards: 2002).

The second impact was more profound for this thesis; in that the concept of “good science” emerging from the Kuhn/Popper debate, was to set the university elite against the universality of metatheory for reasons of commercial acumen and utility (Trakman: 2008; Ttmeyer: 2005). As a consequence researchers and academics were encouraged by their managers to abandon “esoteric” theory for more “practical” – income generating – pursuits, particularly those mimicking business aspiration. Palpably, this affected the business schools the foremost, but it was also prevalent throughout the other university departments (Willmott: 1995). It should be stressed that it is recognised that this was not always without exception. There is a growing interest, for example, in the action-orientated projects of Critical Management Studies both within the academe and business. However, even here, such projects had to be justified by their managers in terms of their income generating potentiality (Zell: 2001). Yet, the direct conflict between the Popperian theoretic and universality is not of itself the issue, it is rather its effect upon those with power within the universities, and therefore the ability to determine the nature of courses and research therein; perhaps more profoundly, through politicised epistemology, the nature of the debates carried out.

It is proposed above that whilst the impact of the Popperian theoretic is seen throughout the university in all departments, Business Schools were particularly affected because of their subject association (i.e. business and management studies) with the university elite. Yet another reason why this was apparent was that Business Schools like other “humanities” departments are based upon social studies and therefore more hermeneutically orientated than their physical sciences counterparts. The requirements of “proper science” had a much more profound effect for them than it did for the physical sciences. It should be stressed, therefore, that not every subject area and hence university department determined the Popperian theoretic problematic. Indeed, in essence, this is the point. The Kuhn/Popper debate was developed upon a discussion centred on the physical sciences, and the social sciences were very much regarded as the poorer relation to the extent of dismissal by Kuhn. Nevertheless, it seemed that with their scientific management principles, Business Schools could be more readily
transformed and developed than their fellow "humanities" departments, into rationally
driven, physical science emulating institutions.

In summary, the significance attached to Business Schools throughout this work is
a function of two aspects within the context of the Kuhn/Popper debate. First, in terms of
the drive by the university elite for greater managerial control of their organisations and
the use of their business schools as useful conduits to that end, as already discussed.
The link here is of course indirect. It is argued throughout this work that the university
management, compelled by external influence to adopt rational options, utilized the
already dominant Popperian epistemology as a means of doing so, and then merely
applied the newly emerging Business Schools, as not only mirrors reflecting their own
aspiration, but also as tools to achieve such aspiration.

Second, the epistemological nature and the underpinning philosophy or theorectic
of the Business School reflects, perhaps more than other "humanities" university
departments, the essence of the Kuhn/Popper debate. Osensibly "social sciences", the
Business School, however, alluded back to the neo-classical concepts of "scientific
management, invoking the very Popperian dictate of "good scientific process". The
struggle between that and its "softer" sociological intents mirrored the nature of the
Kuhn/Popper debate in terms of the process to its consequential understanding (Yaneva,
2006). This of course has implications beyond the nature of linkage between Business
Schools and the Kuhn/Popper debate: in particular, in terms of the wider meta-theoretical
implications of this work. Given it is claimed here that such a debate was the harbinger of
the ideologicalised Positivist scientism that predominates today, then the Business School
in mirroring the Kuhn/Popper framework is made manifest as an anathema to the
universality of meta-theory, instrumentalised as social action enactments of the positivist
predictions from that debate.

As will be discussed in detail below, this has profound implications for the
robustness of the universal theorectic proposed by this work. Namely, that the Business
School could be argued as providing evidence of the workability of the Popperian
theorectic in terms of the applicability of scientistic principles to social determination. If, as
will be contended, an academic's life, through dispositional power, is one contained by
Scientism despite the individual's worldly view, and in particular driven by the Business
Schools, then in effect should we not accept this as proof of the scientistic prophesy? In
other words, however we might like to phrase the theorectic, the reality is that we are all in
the end positivists, whether we like it or not. Palpably this position will be opposed, in
particular with this work's presentation of proto-epistemological states, which – it is argued – will allow the theorectic to escape the potentially fatal solipsistic condition.

For the present, however, the chapter below will return to the intricacies of the debate itself, reflecting upon whether there is residue from it some thirty years ago now, which has influenced our present day understanding. If so, then what impact has this had for the theorectic being developed here?

The Current Position

In 2008 the above debate regarding the nature of epistemology is conspicuous by its absence. For example in his book On Science (2001) Ridley did not mention Thomas Kuhn once and Karl Popper only twice. This is despite his opening statement declaring boldly that, “The motivation for writing this book has had several energizing strands. One is my perception of a widespread belief, often explicitly stated, that, given time, science will explain everything. This belief which I term ‘scientism’, I felt needed to be explicitly challenged.” (2001: ix). Given what was discussed above, the Kuhn-Popper debate should have at least been mentioned here; but it wasn’t. Yet, this is not the final triumph of Kuhnian methodology at the expense of Popperian absolutism; and indeed even if it were, the argument throughout this thesis would suggest it did not augment the dominance of constructionism. The Positivist ideology, in particular Functionalist aspiration through deduction, dominates scientific discourse as effectively as it did 30 years ago. As Ridley later adjudged, “Scientific knowledge is not only public knowledge – it is the simplest. Unique events in the universe, which nevertheless exist, are forever outside its ken. It cannot do otherwise than focus on a tiny element of reality, that is, to analyse into manageable interactive components what is sometimes clearly an organic whole” (2001: 9). Despite Ridley himself being dubious of the supreme confidence of what he termed as the 'empirical sciences', nevertheless his book demonstrates that the positivist within him cannot gainsay it.

What has emerged after the demise of the Kuhnian project is the dominance of empiricism through a deductive method. It is a scientific world comfortable in its own assertion of the logic and right of both its ideology and consequential methodology. Controversy is no longer centred on the issue of epistemology as it was in Kuhn’s day, or indeed methodology, with deductivism supremely in charge. Popper himself is banished to history, claimed by many such as Wettersten (2005) to be considered some sort of dissident. At the beginning of his paper Wettersten stated, “He was one of the most
controversial philosophers of the 20th century. He challenged the best theories and the best minds; it was rare that anyone went away from an encounter with him empty-handed. Yet he never won a wide following. Today at least some influential thinkers suggest that there was much more heat than light in the controversies his views led to, and even that they are hardly serious" (2005: 120). If this is sounding the gracious consent of funereal litany – Caesar is dead and buried so there is no point in being cruel - then it is worse for Kuhn, upon whom he says nothing. It seems, despite the victory of deduction over induction due in no small part to Popper, he was seen as not much more than a disciple to Whewell; whereby Popper has, "...preserved much that is excellent in Whewell's philosophy, while bringing it forward dramatically: previous views either could not explain scientific knowledge or explain it away. He lays down a challenge to do better and an excellent foundation for the formulation of new interesting problems, not merely concerning general philosophy of science, but also, e.g. social science and technology" (2005: 119). But such praise is then qualified with a final belittling, "A small but important minority continue to view his ideas as a breakthrough, which has improved our agenda and led to considerable progress; they think that his ideas have been of enormous importance in the 20th century and that they should lay the groundwork for research in the philosophy of science in the 21st century" (2005: 120). The palpable suggestion being that Popper is very much passé.

Ironically, Kuhn has received a better press in the dissenting fringes of Positivism than his major antagonist. Indeed, Kuhn was more the champion of empiricism than Popper ever was, who was regarded – perhaps unfairly – as continually finding fault with it. Typical of this view is Pinto de Oliveira's (2007: 147-157) in which he not only, surprisingly, labels Kuhn as a logical positivist but also a revisionist, allying him with Carnap's empiricism. There is much contention regarding this. Reisch (1991) wrote a paper "Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism", whilst Friedman (2003) expressed the opposite. Dobbs (2000) was in no doubt of Kuhn's contribution when he stated, "...it was Kuhn's publication in 1962 of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that gave the concept [of the Scientific Revolution] its widest currency..." (29). Whilst of Popper he said nothing. Palpably this is not conclusive either way, but merely indicative that, as to be expected, after 30 years, both Kuhn and Popper is confined to mere historical interest.

The subject matter itself has also moved on. As stated above, it was always illusionary and thereby presented through time as a debate between two competing epistemologies – Functionalism and Constructionism. This was never the case and the consequence of its outcome has already been referred to above. Nevertheless its impact
upon how ‘conventional wisdom’ regards ‘good science’ is with us today. Normal Science (as per Kuhn, 1970) is generally comfortable with the rejection of the metaphysical and by implication, induction and consequently construction. This of course was never at issue in the Popper/Kuhn debate, since both were Positivists, and yet emerging from that was the transformation of Science into an ideology of Scientism. On this point Fuller (1997) proposes an interesting analogy he found as a student and based upon how a Martian would view our scientific process. He declared, "The first thing our Martians realize is that ‘science’ refers more to an ideal form of Earthly enquiry than the way inquiry is normally conducted. Ideally, the scientist is concerned with the difference that truth or falsity of a hypothesis makes to understanding why something happens the way it does" (1997: 40). It is the contention here that the need to differentiate between truth and falsity is an obsession arising as a consequence of the debate between Kuhn and Popper. Subsequently, in the present day, as we to glance back to earlier times, it must be through a veil created by that debate and so adjudge by it what was said and discussed then.

Underpinned by the positivist principles espoused by Popper et al, Science has become certain in its own inherent right to the truth. Thus human thought throughout history is seen to be determined and categorised by its principles alone. The deductive method established by scientifically sound empirical observation (empiricism) is seen as good and preached throughout our universities and textbooks as being so. Theoretic works on both sides of the veil are assessed in such terms as being ‘scientific’ or not and then applied or rejected accordingly. To a degree the logic of this creates a form of scientific realism whereby, "... our successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. In this hypothesis (approximate) truth is being attributed not only to a theory’s claims about observables, but also, and quite crucially...to the theory’s claims about unobservables" (Lyons: 2006). Lyons goes onto to inform the reader that this is based upon “the no miracles argument”; that is "...It would be a miracle were our successful theories not (at least, approximately) true..." (2006). The apparent contradiction of this with the Popperian ‘rule’ of theorectic substantiation through falsification is indeed illusionary when a political dimension is added; and it is this which transforms modern science into an ideology.

There are two ensuing dimensions to this. The first is probably uncontentious and referred to in a typical positivist exposition on management research: "While philosophical issues may seem hidden in research methods, it is hard to escape political and ethical factors in management research. Access to companies can be obstructed by managers if they see a piece of research harmful to their...interests..." (Easterby-Smith, 1991: 2). This implies political forces either blocking or restricting the researcher’s ability to do their
research. Since there has been considerable discussion over the years on this topic, it will only be referred to in passing by this work.

The second dimension invokes a more subtle meaning of political interference whereby the intrusion is not external but internal to the research process. In the previous instance as referred to by Easterby-Smith (1991) above, the presumption was that intrusion came from outside the research process, and whilst its outcome might well be tainted by an overzealous manager in the company being researched, the process itself remained inviolate. Indeed, it was this difference which presented the cusp of the debate between Kuhn and Popper. That is, the degree to which such political externality affected the research process. But the second dimension of political intrusion infers an internal intrusion whether from the researcher’s managers or the researcher himself, changing the validity of the research process itself. The contention of this work will be that over a period of time such internality can become further internalised and part of the process. For example a research manager requires of her researchers specific activities because it is only they that will bring in the money. By such a demand she is forcing her minions to ignore other factors that might be pertinent to the research conducted. If continuous, this will effectively ‘train’ the researchers to always ignore such factors, and in time could substantially alter the epistemology of the theory established by such research. It is the consequential frameworks set up to maintain and justify such research that makes science an ideology, since it is then based upon the powerful’s ideal of how to do science.

Kosso (2007) discussing scientific understanding indirectly supported the point being made here. In his conclusion he stated, “There can be more to science than knowledge and the accumulation of facts; understanding is also possible, insofar as we can recognize the connections between the facts”. Toulmin and others have pointed this out. Roger Newton, for example, argues that, “a mature science goes beyond the acquisition, description, and tabulation of facts and makes understanding its primary aim” (Newton, 1997, p. 46, original emphasis). Piecemeal empiricism that ignores the big, interconnected nature of the theoretical web misses scientific understanding. It also misses an aspect of beauty in science, and an important intersection of natural and social sciences. For these reasons, the holism of inter-theoretic links is an essential and informative component of any account of scientific method." The process of linking basic piecemeal empiricism, as he called it, with true scientific understanding is by implication open to control by external factors such as managers, and thus eventual corruption and transformation into ideology. Then it is merely a matter of human nature to defend and maintain those aspects which are dear, no matter how tentative. As Horkheimer put it,
“The more threadbare ideologies are the crueler the means by which they are protected” (quoted in Held, 1980: 45).

Today, however, this is no longer considered pertinent. The battle won, it is a matter of fine tuning within a Positivist interpretation. In a sense the true spirit of Kuhn (1970) has been accepted as given by a general acceptance that science is not without struggle amongst competing groups. But this is far from a constructionist’s ideal in that, as explained above, the political struggle is external and thus very Kuhnian in nature. For one thing it seems that science has become more complex than in the days of Popper; for example Hansson discussing falsification declared, “Popper’s conviction that hypotheses can be falsified but not verified seems to have been based on the view that hypotheses should have the form “All x are y” ... Statements of this form can be falsified by a single observation; hence the observation of a single black swan falsifies the statement “All swans are white” whereas no number of observations of white swans can verify that statement. However, judging by the...articles studied here, most modern high-status research is either explorative or devoted to hypotheses that do not have this logical form” (2006: 275-286). Yet even here the epistemology of Popper remains intact, it is purely a discussion of methodology analogous to someone who has built their house and is worried about the decor.

Arguably the emergence of peaceful confidence in science has given rise to greater ambition in what it can achieve from the understanding of our micro world of the infinitely small to the other end of the scale of the universe itself and the infinitely large. Moves are afoot to link everything together in one huge perceptual map. Ridley (2001), among many others, refers to this as “the Theory of Everything...” and proceeds to describe it as the “...search for a theory that will describe all the interactions that occur between the elementary particles” (2001: 81). For positivists like Hawking it would be liberalizing event, almost in Marxist style freeing the individual from the tyranny of science. He declares brashly in the very last paragraph of his book, “...if we do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all...be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason – for then we would know the mind of God.” (1988: 175). Ironically it was this last concept – “the mind of God” – which ignited many a scientist’s imagination. The idea of being at one with God was presumably a good one. It was certainly in keeping with the positivist’s ontology – to find ultimately the one truth...the joined together of everything and its theory. Eminent scientists such as Carl Sagan (1985)
were moved to declare their belief in God and question the purpose of science without such a belief. It was little wonder then that philosophers moved their attention from dried old debates of *Weltanschauung* to the nature of *Verstehen* or understanding. This was a return to the best tradition of Enlightenment and its philosophers and scientists such as Hume and Newton, whereby the presumption was that humanity had absolute power over nature. The difference today from then is that it could be true.

Mesmerised by big questions such as what is God, we are no longer concerned about the wellbeing of ontology but rather the intricacies of epistemology and method. Palpably, business schools do not necessarily concern themselves with God, but they too have an eye on their own areas of importance. It is no longer for the individual academic to decide what these should be but are controlled by the academic’s ‘managers’ and then distributed on their behest and gift, to various academic underlings as the “main idea”. For example, in my own university “Leadership” is presently espoused as the definitive research focus; and those who apply themselves to it could be rewarded. Kosso implied this much with an opening statement in a recent paper, determining the consequences of such action: “... accounts of scientific method tend to focus on the treatment of individual ideas. In this light, a fairly strict empiricism shows up. A hypothesis is suggested by what has been observed so far, and is tested by what it predicts will be observed next. The emphasis is on connections between a theory and evidence, with little attention paid to connections between a theory and other theories.” (2007: 173). Managerial involvement in all spheres of the academe and not just business schools, determines a political demand that the “main idea” is verifiable by whatever means, and there is certainly no pursuit to determine whether other theories are better through falsification (see Popper). For present day epistemologists such as Kosso this is of concern, not because of managerial intrusion in the ontological process but because their requirement in relating one theory to fact within itself alone, can give us reasons but never understanding. How can we know God if we do not have understanding? As Kosso stated, “This may give the basic idea of how we come to know about nature, the reasons for thinking our beliefs are true, but it says nothing about how we come to understand nature. There is a difference between knowledge and understanding, and both are important accomplishments of science. Only a global view of the way theoretical claims fit together will show what it is to understand.”(2007: 179). There is of course nothing new here; Weber and others have for many years distinguished between different types of understanding.

Nevertheless, it will be the contention of this work that the ideologicalised scientific process, as a consequence of management control, has indeed had a profound effect
upon our scientific understanding. Not only idealised as scientism, whereby worth is determined by appropriate facticity, but also our social ontology is being altered by such intrusion in terms of a slavish compliance to empirical process so that it too is ideological into empiricism. In time it turns in on itself and rejects all that is not in its image, even the theory that instigated it in the first place. Nierlich put it succinctly, "The meaning of a literary text is no longer taken as a possible object of scientific empirical explanation, nor its rational justification as a scientific goal that might be practically relevant." (2005: 351).

The current debate outside this work does not extrapolate the consequence of the dominance of empirical process to such an extent; as already discussed conventional wisdom is content with the unassailable supremacy of Scientism. What is of concern today is indeed the nature and quality of empiricism and that it should exist at all. For example Nierlich continues his treatise on empiricism by determining that, “Scientifically constructed hypotheses of general empirical laws, though they must be checkable in principle, cannot be verified or made into approximations to an empirical truth by repeatable experiments as Popper already stated in his Conjectures and Refutations. And the scientifically fixated “practical beliefs” of Pragmatism, in which, according to Charles Peirce, “the community settles down”, are neither a continuous joint approximation to an empirical truth – there are often quite abrupt resettlements –, nor need they be practically relevant in the sense of qualitatively improving joint capacities of a specific practice.” (2005: 352). It is almost Kuhnian in its interpretation of some form of process disturbance through competing factions, but it is conflict between those of a like mind (in terms of ontology at least) as Kuhn always intended.

In summary then, the lack of literature in the area of ontological differentiation as expressed by Weltanschauung and Verstehen is not coincidental. In the thirty years since the Kuhn-Popper debate epistemology has moved on, reconstructed by the dominance of Positivism in the particular guise of Empiricism. Despite the Kuhnian taint to conventional understanding of how science is done today (that is through struggle and disturbance), Popper has been accredited with much of the acclaim. In short, the world cannot be theorised about unless it is understood. It is this – understanding – that is today in dispute, particularly within the context of a “General Theory about Everything.” What little is said of Popper these days relates to the essence of the current debate in terms that the “Philosophy of Science is caught between the alleged need to protect the authority of science and the desire to be progressive.” (Wettersten, 2005: 121). Popper certainly might not have approved of a General Theory of Everything, perhaps unfairly so he would have
been placed with those defending the authority of science. I say unfairly, because he has always insisted he was a pragmatist. Indeed those who could be regarded as traditionalists would agree. As Wettersten declared, "Today at least some influential thinkers suggest that there was much more heat than light in the controversies his views led to, and even that they are hardly serious." (2005: 120). So in this new scientistic world even Popper has become a moderate.

This is a theme this work shall return to in the chapters below. Certainly in the brave new world of a "General Theory of Everything" Popper's postulates present a problem. Hübner stated it clearly: "Popper's fundamental methodological postulate states that a scientific theory must be falsifiable. But if such falsification occurs, we are not permitted to avert the breakdown of the theory by means of ad hoc hypotheses or other assumptions....It means that so-called basic statements (by which Popper understands singular existential statements something like: in such and such a space-time region, this or that exists) either do or do not contradict the theory." (1983: 63). To work it requires reliance upon empirical testing which is becoming increasingly problematic as the macro-science of cosmology merges with the micro-science of atoms and the rest. Yet, "Popper holds that the most important aspect of a theory is its ability to be falsified and subjected to empirical testing. Accordingly, for him everything else involved in and leading up to the formulation of theories belongs to the realms of psychology, the history of science, or metaphysical belief, and as such has nothing to do with a scientific foundation" (Hübner, 1983: 145-149). Ironically for modern day science to work in terms of a micro/macro relationship, it needs to become more inductive in its methodology; by starting with the grand theory and working down to the smaller links.

However, the Constructivists are not crowing in the sidelines with the thought of their pending victory. Ultimately the elite/managerial control of science will not allow it to degenerate to an individualistic musing of universality. Nevertheless, Popper notwithstanding, because of the intrinsic nature of a general theory, there is a substantive concern about relationships. Stavenga phrased this concern as follows, "Although the sciences offer us much knowledge and insight, in the end they still leave us with basic questions. Even if a theory has been found that allows us to understand a particular domain of reality properly, the question remains why this reality should be as it is according to this theory". (2006: 111). The problem seems to be that Positivism is nearing the limits of its ability to understand the world given its need to empirically test everything. It appears that much within the universe is not immediately testable given at least present technology. This led Stavenga to conclude, "This holds true for all sciences. In the final
instance, all of them show this limitation of their power to explain things. But there is yet another restriction inherent to any science: scientific results always raise the question of how to interpret them. Any theory reached leads to the question: what does it actually mean, “What is really going on (according to this theory)?” The disciplines concerned cannot conclusively answer this question themselves, which gives rise to all kinds of interpretations and continuous foundational debates.” (2006: 111). As a matter of interest this particular author proposes a very positivistic solution with the use of systems analysis, which in effect once again externalises the problem.

The world of business and organisation seems remote from such a discussion. In a sense it is. Certainly if it is to be believed that the social sciences should be epistemologically separate from their natural science counterparts. Flyvbjerg was prominent in discussing this: “Can we speak of a unified science, or should natural science enquiry and social science enquiry be viewed as two basically different activities? The history of science shows these questions to be both difficult to answer and controversial. The controversy is due partly to the fact that besides having fundamental methodological consequences, these questions touch on sensitive factors such as the status of social science in relation to natural science, as well as what the philosopher Richard Bernstein calls, “Cartesian Anxiety,” that is, the fear of ending in relativism and nihilism when one departs from the analytical-rational scientific tradition that has dominated western science since Descartes.” (2001: 25). There is more than a hint of patronizing attitude within these words. Since Enlightenment and the wholesale rejection of metaphysics accompanied by the rise of empiricism, the social sciences have been viewed with disdain by its natural science counterparts. The view, in brief, is that “proper science” cannot be done with elements such as thoughts and social process that on the whole are not facticities. Bernstein’s fear put into context, therefore, is that with the increasing rise of the social sciences, science itself will eventually abandon its hard earned empiricist tradition.

This was the wrongly interpreted essence of the Kuhn-Popper debate, but nevertheless its echoes have continued to this day, albeit as a depleted and defeated force. For the purposes of this discussion the rejection and isolation of the social sciences by those influential in such things, is important; not necessarily from an epistemological perspective but mainly from a political one, which in turn through a politicised epistemology will affect ontology itself. There are two dimensions to this which will be discussed in greater depth in the chapters below, but summarised here. First, social science’s continued stigma of not being a “proper science” allows the elites to contain and
control it better. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in philosophical exposition. Due to an innate suspicion of many commentators that the social sciences are fickle and can never behave in a trustworthy fashion. None could make this clearer than Cartwright: "My overall conclusion is the old fashioned positivistic advice: Do not let metaphysical issues . . . intrude into our scientific practices. Where this is not possible, hedge your bets and hedge them heavily." (2003: 1). Many (i.e. Chalmers, 1987; Hoover, 2002; Hands, 2001) would disagree with such extremism and have been labelled pragmatist for their effort. Whilst Cartwright and all her likeminded colleagues (i.e. Lawson, 2004; Mäki, 2002; Hookway, 2000) have been labelled as realists. This is reminiscent of the Kuhn-Popper debate many years before; and like that debate, this one too is contained within the same scientific epistemological framework, so that the resultant ontology is never under question. Yet as discussed in the following chapters, this provides further fuel to the postulate above, regarding social sciences manipulability.

The second dimension is that, given the state set by the first dimension, continuous elite intrusion will eventually affect ontological frameworks themselves behind the social theory, and fundamentally the ways we understand our social and business world. The argument here is more subtle one than above and indeed thirty years earlier. Cartwright has never been against metaphysical exposition per se such as Popper and Watson for example, but it has to be the right sort of metaphysics. Psillos puts it thus in a review of Cartwright’s work, “To be sure, the metaphysics that Cartwright is fond of is not of the standard a priori (or armchair) sort. It is tied to scientific practice and aims to recover basic elements of this practice . . . But it is metaphysics, nonetheless” (2002: 1). In a sense this is worse than the outright rejectionist stance of Popper in that it wishes to internalise and then defeat, rather than externalise and then expel, the nature of inductive or universal enquiry. I say inductive enquiry because that is what is meant by “a priori” or deliberately provocative “armchair” theorising. As will be argued below, such internalisation allows for universality to become a subset of deduction and hence dependent upon empiricism. This in turn allows for managerial elite control through processes already alluded to above. For example in terms of one of the “Social Sciences” – Economics – Pratten proffers some advice: “For some who insist that ontological theorising should adopt a largely descriptive orientation to speak of mainstream economics at all, already betrays a worrying clumsiness. The suggestion is that in the current context, with a discipline that is so splintered and specialised, it is rather unhelpful to refer to an overarching category of mainstream or orthodox economics to which key characteristics can be attached. The concern is that those who fall into this trap will only
provide a caricatured and unsophisticated reading of the field” (2007: 238). In short, this is an argument for maintaining deductive method because it most suits the established practices, and therefore the objectives of the managerial elite.

In the words of Kuhn himself, “The success of a paradigm....is at the start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise, an actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm's predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself” (1970: 23-24). A paradigm is a formalised instrument to normality, achieved by hard work, good science and more than a hint of intuitive politicking. This would be the view of the pragmatist today. A paradigm is certainly not a “worldly view” portraying so called wishy-washy armchair thinking. So in one way at least the battle continues, not in the fundamental aspects of ontology as it did prior to Popper-Kuhn debate, but no less intricate in its pursuit of whether induction/universality has any place in “good” scientific practice – in other words, positivist science.

This work will therefore proceed in the next chapter by determining an appropriate methodology to examine this contention. However, as indicated above the present day position has evolved from a more fundamental historicity. Firstly, there was the debate between the positivists, Marxists and anti-positivists in the earlier parts of the last century, about the nature of Ontology and hence our ultimate understanding, and indeed controllability, of the world itself. In particular the Frankfurt School led by Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) questioned the established positivist and analytical social science of Auguste Comte and later Durkheim, criticising (hence the subsequent term to describe them as Critical Theorists) the nature of its postulates. They were heady times as well as unsettling ones; not only were nation-states subjected to collapse and reformation (i.e. Germany, France and Russia), but also the ideas and science which drove the politics of the day. It was indeed then, between the two world wars, humanity became used to the concept of a functionalist science serving its masters of the day (Moore, 1973). It will be argued below that this had profound implications for the present day in terms of a formalising traditionalist historicity.

Second, there was the Popper-Kuhn debate in the 1960’s and 1970’s, evolving around the nature of scientific evolution. The horrors and hardships of war fading fast, society (at least Western Society) was becoming used to being comparatively well off
(Hutton, 1995) and increasingly confident through technological innovation (Schumpeter, 1934) by prolonging life, accessing the globe as never before and producing an understanding, through an emerging powerful scientific ideology, undreamt of a few years earlier. It seemed then, in the days before Aids and Global Warming that humanity did indeed control nature. The Soviet Union and its acolytes remained a threat but had evidently been contained not only by the might of American capitalism but also the superiority of Positivist Science. Marxist ideology as portrayed by Marx himself and others such as Lenin and Lukács (1971) was seen bankrupt and with it any alternative science no longer a major option. So for the philosophers of the time, the only palpable question remaining was: how? How should society conduct their sciences in the most effective ways to not only destroy the Soviet bloc, but also to achieve even greater things? Jenkins (2008) discussing the rise of Al-Qaeda determined that to a great extent the organisation had been deliberately transformed into a “Great Satan” because all governments (democratic or autocratic) need an overt enemy to survive; a compelling threat “out there” to galvanise its people to a sense of belonging. As he went on to declare, “They yearn for an easily characterised, demonised foe. In the 1950’s the FBI created a singular entity called “the mafia” – as opposed to the reality of disparate criminal gangs – to justify its federal status and ballooning and its failure to suppress outbreaks of local organised crime” (2008: 16). It is the contention here that this is the case for any elite, whether governments or “paradigms” of conventional scientific thought. The opposition is demonised and marginalised. This was the essence of the Kuhn-Popper debate. McCarthyism, and its demonization of “reds under the bed”, was still rampant in the psyche of Western Elites (Moore, 1973) transformed and politicised the Kuhnian position into “Great Satan liberalism” and therefore seen as being similar to the overtly established and debunked liberal philosophy of critical thinkers of the time, such as Marcuse, Foucault, Feyerabend, Althusser and more recently Habermas. The degree of fear for anything liberal (as opposed to democratic – a difference born out of McCarthyism) cannot be over-emphasised in the high days of the cold war and “five minutes to midnight” analogies of mutual-destruction. The idea of a politicking science proposed by Kuhn was regarded as exceedingly liberal and therefore doomed to the fringes scientific discussion. It will be contended here that this view haunts us, albeit transformed, even today and provides the compulsion toward ontological intrusion.

Finally, there is, indeed, the present day and the aftermath of the long worked for destruction of the Soviet Bloc and with it the demise of the greatest “Great Satan” in recent history – the Soviet Union. Yet as suggested by Jenkins (2008) with all victories
comes uncertainty and insecurity (Moore, 1973). In the longer term other “Great Satans” would have to be found – hence Al-Qaeda. Positivist science of the day, as always, will play its part; controlled and politicised as it is by the elites beholden to such governments. But too comfortable in its absolute supremacy, Positivist Science has also lost its own “Great Satans” and is thus floundering, like society, in its need for cohesive community. Ironically, the search for “The General Theory of Everything” is one such response (Hawking, 1988). Social commentators were worried that perhaps we have gone too far in our rejection of liberalism (Yaneva, 2007), and that without competing senses toward reality we might never be able to establish a unifying theory. The Positivist debate between Realists and Pragmatists mentioned above is a tentative step toward liberalising the tyranny of empiricism (Stavenga, 2006); whereby the only “good” science comes as a consequence of that which is observed. Neither side, it should be stressed, are themselves anything other than Positivists to varying degrees. But it seems that whilst Kuhn overtly lost to Popper, the diminishment of the scourge of empiricism has brought with it the acceptance that science is perhaps not perfect, and is open to political process after all.

These three epochs thus form the context of current day science. It will be argued below that together they had a profound impact upon establishing the characteristics of the socio-political arena in which the four major themes to this work’s contention regarding ontology and our universities are able to exist. This was as a consequence of a certain history, not necessarily peculiar to the United Kingdom alone, but certainly driven by its unique position as an off-shore island to the European mainland. This, it will be argued, generated a revolutionary perceptual framework impatient with the dogmatised metaphysical explanatory framework embedded in the Mainland through the Roman Catholic Church. It was this, through the revolutionary scientism of Bacon, Hume, Locke, Newton, Smith and others, which developed within the context of the Industrial Revolution a particularly fervent type of Positivism in the form of Functionalism; and consequently exported throughout the world. Albeit no more than a history of philosophical thought, it is important here because it explains why we are where we are today in terms of a dominant and tyrannical positivist ideology. This is in turn important because such an ideology by its very nature as an outcome of its historicity is of necessity tyrannical...there had to be truth and a science to attain it in order to counter the other tyranny of the Roman Catholic Church.
CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review 1 - The Scientistic Revolution

"False clarity is only another name for myth; and myth has always been obscure and enlightening at one and the same time: always using devices of familiarity and straightforward dismissal to avoid the labour of conceptualization" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972: xiv)

The following two chapters are somewhat unusual in that they will both be literature reviews. This is deemed necessary because there are in effect two sets of literature required to underpin the theoretic frameworks established in this work; and whilst they are interdependent, often containing the same authors, the logic of their presentation is not. The first of these – to be dealt with in this chapter – will be an historical examination of the epistemology pertinent to this work, in particular the U.K. which provided, through its industrial revolution, an important dynamic to the social modernity we experience today. This is necessary in order to determine why the Positivist ideology dominates not only our universities but also our societies and therefore provides the ideological backdrop to the scientism entrenching the educational/research elites. The following chapter – chapter three – will then examine the literature behind the theoretic underpinning of the arguments presented in later chapters. As such, it is not of necessity a historicity as with this chapter’s set of literature. Its aim, therefore, is not to provide an explanation, but rather to establish the credentials of the argument presented.

Returning to this chapter, the discussion will commence with a review of the importance of language as a determinant of Positivism. Wittgenstein above all others recognised how language could create an individual’s perception of reality and therefore their epistemological loyalty (Mayol-Sharrock, 2007). The nature of language and the rationality it demanded, therefore, was a pre-given for the emergence of Positivism in Modernity through individuals attempting to rationalise their world in order to speak to one another (Kendel et al, 2000). And yet because there was language did
not, of itself, make Functionalism as opposed to Positivism - and consequentially the current scientistic methodology - inevitable; there was also a series of historical events that took such forces and turned them into an inevitable Functionalist dominance (Lemon, 1995). In particular the dominant and tyrannical nature of the medieval Church’s relationship with the individual and its eventual downfall in the period of Enlightenment created a societal perception (at least amongst its elite) that Science – the Church’s successor as the dominant social ideology – should avoid its predecessor’s mistakes and reject any metaphysical explanation of nature (Butterfield, 2006). To do otherwise would align the new elites too closely with the horrors of the Inquisition that awaited any dissenter to the Church’s view. The bulk of this chapter, therefore, after the first section discussed above, will explore this period, demonstrating and explaining how those unique historical events resulted in a scientistic approach found currently in the universities and our scientific communities.

But more than this, there is one final piece to the historical jigsaw. The claim here is that because of the rationalistic characteristics of Positivism – in particular Functionalism – its scientistic methodologies are well suited to the epistemology of organisation and its management (Monasta and Zarandi, 2004). With the emergence of “Managerialism” in the late twentieth century pervading all aspects of organisational existence, Functionalism became the de rigueur method of business analysis (Holmwood, 2005). And since society’s managers were increasingly being taught its methods, in a self-fulfilling way its predictions found “truth” in its former students and therefore increased legitimacy. By the early twenty first century the Universities themselves finally succumbed to its epistemological onslaught and were governed no longer by academics but by managers. It will be argued in the final section of this chapter that the Business Schools provided the conduit for such an assault and as such examine why this happened.

Positivism and the Role of Language

Society in the West is predominantly driven by scientism (Lyons, 2006). That is, a belief supported by political persuasion that humanity will only develop/evolve through the pursuit of scientifically orientated objectives based upon methods appertaining to natural science founded in rational-empirical logic (Peterson, 2003). In particular, their interpretation, therefore, is dependent upon a rational-predictable framework based
upon current scientific convention. Kuhn called this normal science, whereby "...some accepted examples of actual scientific practice... provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research" (1970: 10). How particular frameworks become embedded in the norm and others do not, will form part of the discussion below. Before that, however, another question is addressed. Was it inevitable that society would adopt a scientistic epistemology? Or was it merely a quirk of history; a lottery, to be won or lost in the making? Such a distinction is important in order to establish the legitimacy of a nihilist prediction that nothing is a lottery beyond the initial casting of fate.

The Hobbesian metaphor of mean and brutish man in a state of nature is no longer fashionable. Yet the Hobbesian ghosts haunt us still; in particular, the idea that society makes the man, and the generation of the irrefutable link between an individual and their society. For Hobbes (1981) this was manifest as a controlling mechanism, which transposed man from his brutish state and gave him his humanity.

Subsequent social analysis is perhaps more subtle (e.g. Garcia, 1988). Individuals have always been regarded as human above the imposition of society or a Leviathan. Even so, there are constraining mechanisms forcing, or encouraging us – for good or bad – to act cohesively; thus, rendering the concept of man without society as impracticable. For Weber (1971) such forces created an iron cage; a Pandora's Box, which, once opened engulfed us all in a deterministic framework shaping the essence of our social being. Gareth Morgan (1986) described this as a Psychic Prison; implying we create our own controlling forces, and once created, we, even the creators, fall victim to them.

But then Weber's concerns have always been considered unusual; although at the same time regarded as forming a foundation to "modernist" sociology (Sica, 2004). What concerns "conventional wisdom" more is how social life is possible in the first place; out of which, necessarily, arises the nature of the linkage between the individual and society. Generally, such a relationship is seen as a given, and therefore transcends social action. It is compelled, nevertheless, by certain immutable "laws" determined, for instance, by psychological or sociological factors, dependent upon the characteristics of the particular theory invoked (Giddens, 2001).
Nowhere is this process more apparent, and prevalent, than in our attempts to explain organisation. Parsons (1960) for example determined social structure as systems generating binding social values in pursuit of specific goal achievement. Blau and Scott (1963) on the other hand asked the question "who benefits?" in order to demonstrate social cohesion through goal attainment; while Etzioni (1961) examined structures of compliance. Yet others, such as Selznick (1949); Gouldner (1954); Merton (1949) and Crozier (1964) have examined, in one form or another, the influence of the Weberian Iron Cage upon our social cohesion. These are manifest, for example, in the Institutional concept in the case of Selznick, or Bureaucracy as with Crozier. Each an exemplary and well-established model, but by no means fully representative of what there is. However, there is but one commonality on the part of them all which is the tenet proposing each individual is aware, and can relate to, a transcendent and immanent framework of reality. In a Popperian (1972) sense, this comprises a knowledge base born out of, yet existing beyond, each generation.

There is, therefore, an ideal to which we must all aspire; and against whose perfection, in theoretical social action, the rest of us are adjudged. If it was not so, why then are we always keen to assert normality in human behaviour? Indeed Psychology and Psychiatry are orientated toward these very objectives: to highlight and demonstrate culpable deviancy from expected norms. Weiner refers to supra-natural metaphors to describe the normative presentation of a "...completely rational and knowledgeable human being..."(1992: 287). Indeed the very foundation of the work of Freud, himself, is set, albeit perversely, in the Popperian tenet of ideal rationality. That is, we are rationally irrational: determined by inevitable social relationships (See for example Freud, 1934).

A detailed review of all the schools of thought in both Psychology and Sociology is beyond the scope of this work. The little presented here is used merely to demonstrate the dependency of our reality frameworks on subsequent substantive expectations. In short, we expect that our perceptions will conform to a common rationality which is immanently fixed. Whether such fixations are interchangeable or not, and whether they form an internal or external contingent is a matter of contention. (See for example Burrell and Morgan, 1988; Willmott, 1993a; Jackson and Carter, 1991)
In referring to rationality, we arrive at the hub of the problem. By the very nature of theorising, we assume a pre-set tenet of rationality. When Kuhn (1970) talked of a "Normal Science" and refers to its transmogrification into New or Revolutionary Science, he is emphasising a rational process. When, for example, Habermas (1984) presents us with his concept of "Communicative Rationality" he is presupposing an ideal and attainable state embedded in the principles of rationality. Indeed Habermas claims legitimacy to his framework upon the Weberian tenet of Rationalisation (1998), whereby modernity is driving us to increasing rationality - not less. To theorise, it would seem almost by definition, we have to possess, a priori, an identifiable sense of predictability; even if - perversely - we say the world is not rational. This is not a problem unless the very nature of the science pursued, demands rationality of not only itself but the world it analyses.

In terms of the Modernism versus Postmodernism debate, this does not necessarily support the former. It is a paradox no doubt. To reject rationality and claim irrationality, one has to process the argument rationally. Nevertheless, of course in so doing one can argue individual rationality, which is consistent to the individual concerned but unknowing and unpredictable to the outside world. Yet even to say this one has to utilise the weaponry of the rationale; thus returning to the paradox. Schutz (1967) is a classic case here. Apart from one or two lecture notes of his, there is very little else. He did not write formally because he claimed to do so would defeat his argument against the hegemony of formal theory. Marx (see discussion in Clegg, 1989) was also confronted by this problem; in order to criticise capitalism successfully he needed to use its epistemological tools thus describing such a dilemma as the Paradox of Emancipation. There is also a hint of this in the current debate regarding the distinction between knowledge and understanding (Grimm, 2006).

In all of these examples, there is always an underlying assumption of rationality. If this is not the case in the world examined, certainly in the model presented, whether substantive or not. For the Postmodernist in particular Rationality is not a given, as for the Modernist. Cooper and Burrell state, "Post-modern discourse begins with the idea that systems have lives of their own which make them fundamentally independent of human control" (1988: 91). While Derrida (1973), in questioning Rationality, highlights the concept of difference leading to differential forces, which prevent an intrinsic and natural understanding. This is in contradistinction to Popper (1972) who talks of a "third
world" of independent and immanent knowledge - a pool of understanding. For Lyotard (1984) the Derridian differentiation leads to discourse encouraged, as he sees it, by the designs of the "grand narratives."

These "Grand Narratives" in their search for harmony create conflicts within us all as we try to reconcile ourselves to them, while at the same time instinctively maintaining our independent humanity. For Habermas (1972), termed by Cooper and Burrell (1988) as a critical modernist, the problem of discourse is one of language, which is the medium of reason (and contentiously non-reason). It is pure and assailable containing within it an ideal rationality. Derrida (1973) would also agree language is important, but in the antithetical sense of creating disharmony. Foucault (1977) would have us seen as a product of modernity; and as such, our language is a consequence of that. While Wittgenstein (1961) considerably earlier made the point that as well as some immutable logic, language contains a reflection of the objectivity of our social frameworks. In an even earlier work (Wittgenstein, 1953) he made the point that words expressed are related to the objects for which they stand.

Yet to speak with understanding we must all possess a similar rationale, paradigmatic positioning notwithstanding (Grimm, 2006). Willmott implied a transcendent rationality in language when arguing against paradigmatic incommensurability, which is "...a view with which... (he disagrees)... because it locks analysis into a series of parallel narratives that disqualifies them from engaging with each other." Language therefore in a truly Wittgensteinian sense transposes objectivity onto subjectivity turning in on itself so that we believe we are individualistically driven ("the world is mine, not yours.") (1993b: 727). But of course, language is not ours, it is initially no ones, yet its power is to objectify rationality. Thus Descartes' Cartesian dictate "I think, therefore I am" is not true since my rationale to think is governed by language which is objectively orientated rather than subjectively. In short, "I think because I am given the ability to do so by language, but in so doing I become objectified and thus I am another." So that I can never be me: because language is always there, as a veil between reality and me. A madman can reject language and develop his own, but in so doing, he rejects consensus and his humanity. Kenny (1973) makes this point for Wittgenstein in restating his argument for the impossibility of separating language from the human milieu of its location (see also Hassard, 1988).
To recap, rationality is inevitably deterministic; self fulfilled by the consequence of our humanity through language. The question remains, however; just whose rationale we are referring to? Put it another way; is language genuinely consensual, as Habermas (1984) would have it in his concept of ideal communication? Or is it open to abuse and in so turning in on itself becomes through particular interest groups (e.g. elites, etc.) artificially objectified through the subjective interest of a few. Marxists such as Lukács (1980) talk of Institutional models emanating from powerful individuals/groups driving the reality frameworks of the powerless. In other words, those in power (e.g. management) control the mechanisms of language governing their social frameworks. They do this through enforcing their own explanation of how the world works. This is a classic Marxian stance whereby, "The distinction between humanity and nature, and therefore between subject and object, emerges, and is ever posted anew, within the labour process" (Browne, 1990). Habermas (1984) see this process as a distortion of our humanity, rendering us susceptible to external power forces. Braverman (1974) claimed that far from this being merely a localised phenomenon, it is a systemic objectification; whereby the language rationale of Capitalism itself has reified "inanimate objective factors".

We become susceptible because we are merely human. Our nature is to believe that we are above nature and able to grasp the reality of the world around us. The language we have learnt since the first time we started to think, and thus become human, encourages us to believe this was so (Kendal et al, 2000). When we called a tree a tree we knew it to be true, our language encouraged us not to question. To do otherwise would risk being called psychotic by the keepers of "The Iron Cage". Most of us are therefore powerless and our rationality is bounded (Simon, 1979); the less power we have, the tighter our boundaries and thus the more we have to depend upon others. As language is the major agent of objectification, we depend upon it to tell us how to subsequently respond to others. Thus the old adage that "if we say something enough times we come to believe it" is probably insightful.

At the root of modernity, according to Bauman (1982), is power in which the state is manifest through key intellectuals acting as "legislators" policing, through appropriate language, immanent knowledge frameworks. As Hobbes determined, the nature of man is such that we cannot avoid power; it is manifest in all aspects of our social framework, continually reinforced by language.
Positivism expressed through the Functionalist Paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1988) is modernity manifest. It is also deterministically Conventional Wisdom, not because it is more truthful than any other paradigm, but because the characteristics of its rationale reflect most accurately the determinants of power necessarily existing in human kind, freed from the state of nature (Hobbes, 1981). We cannot escape our language and it cannot escape control by those in power. As such, no sooner had we picked up the challenge of our humanity by speaking for the first time, than we opened ourselves up to the vagaries of external influence. That in turn had to be based upon a rationality, which enabled an acceptance of a controllable environment. This is by definition, since power could not control without rationality. It was, then, that the first of the many Weberian "Iron Cages" was created, which confined us all to the inevitability of Positivism.

It was inevitable, because positivism speaks the language of the powerful. Its drive for the status quo and its normatively orientated framework inevitably supports the maintenance of elites, in whatever form. Kuhn (1970) talks of "Normal Science" as being stimulated by prevailing ethos (see also Willmott, 1993a) requiring not only loyalty but also a suspension of contradiction. Progression, it is argued, is by political process rather than scientific; whereby the paradoxical nature of the incumbent paradigm is so great that it undermines those in whose ownership it is, which then produces a crisis (Bernstein, 1983). For Kuhn, however, this happens all too rarely. He quotes Max Plank in demonstrating a more frequently occurring incremental progression (evolution rather than revolution); whereby the older generations, who hold paradigmatic power, die out only to be replaced by the newer, younger ones with more "modern" ideas.

Tragically, we may not even have the forlorn hope of that eventuality. It seems to be the cost of our humanity. As argued above, we need rationality in order to maintain our language (Kendal et al, 2000), and in that is our inherent and continual vulnerability. The Kuhnian definition of a paradigm, it would seem, is far narrower than more recent perceptions. The concept of Weltanschauungen reflects a far greater breadth of "worldly view" than mere Newtonian or Einsteinian physics. Therefore, Kuhn may be right; these might well come and go. Yet the claim will be that positivism is here to stay. Remaining so until, at least, the very essence of humanity, expressed through language, is changed.
The Historicity of Functionalism

Positivism might well be inevitable, but Functionalism, the major paradigmatic expression of Positivism, is not. This is because, as argued here, Functionalism is manifest expression in terms of social action consequential from epistemology, and therefore subject to the vagaries of political action. Yet it is indeed Conventional Wisdom, and has been for the greater part of the Modernist period. Burrell and Morgan (1988) claim a pedigree for Functionalism traceable back to the times of the ancient Greeks. However, on many occasions when they refer to Functionalism, they really mean Positivism. Indeed, throughout their work they interchange the two concepts as if they were one. Others such as Holmwood (2005) believe that the two, although interdependent, are in fact different. Positivism is an ontological expression, whereas Functionalism is an epistemological one, a paradigmatic position made possible because of the political conditions created by Modernism. This distinction should be emphasised since the conventionality sometimes regards both to be epistemological and ontological. Yet to argue a politicised epistemology it is necessary to differentiate the two.

Cooper and Burrell stated that, "The discourse of modernism rests on transcendent yet anthropocentric criteria such as 'progress and 'reason'...when man invented himself; when he no longer saw himself as a reflection of God or nature" (1988: 91-94). Theryby the perfect conditions for Functionalism prevailed. Yet, perhaps it has become something more; Cooper and Burrell also claim that Modernisation dichotomised into two factions. Critical Modernism, on the one hand, a Kantian expression of enlightenment, and Systemic Modernism on the other; initiated, for example, by Comte and Saint-Simon, developing into Functionalism itself, which Cooper and Burrell term as "instrumental rationality" (1988: 95).

It is a matter of history why the UK at least, along with Western Culture generally, chose Systematic Modernism as the substantive philosophy of our society. There was no conspiracy as such, of course; no active decisions in the sense of a conscious intent to choose. Indeed, it is likely most would not be interested in, or know about, any form of philosophy. Life is for living, they would argue, for doing and achieving; not for
delving into the irrelevancies of philosophical debate. Yet, as Weber (1965) himself would argue, the very act of living produces out of itself the necessary ingredient for a philosophical framework. Modernity, therefore, has produced Rationalisation, which has coloured the way we want to think about the nature of our being in the world. Obviously, there will be disagreements, but when we examine the consequent effects these frameworks have upon our social action, power then determines which is predominant, and hence what is Conventional Wisdom. History, in retrospect, shows us this. Heel, in an introduction to “The Philosophy of History”, said, “The only thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of History, is the simple concept of Reason...that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process.” (1956: 9). In hindsight we are more knowledgeable, and perhaps can see our mistakes more clearly. Yet we can also identify inevitable (a Functionalist would say deterministic) trends arising from the nature of our power relationships preventing us truly learning from those mistakes. Once we became Modern, we had to become rational; not because as a society we wanted to, but because in a Weberian sense, the inevitability of power tainted social action caused it. Put crudely, power elites need rational frameworks in order to control. It was then a mere matter for History to comply.

Medieval Spiritualism

It was not only Burrell and Morgan (1988) but others (e.g. Laudan, 1993) who would claim a pedigree for Positivism going back to the ancient Greeks. However, in reviewing, the more politicised, and perhaps western culture orientated, Functionalism, one needs only return to the Middle-Ages. A period in which, as Heel put it, the production of "...the isolation and therefore defencelessness of individuals ... [whereby]...individuals sought protection with the powerful, and the latter became oppressors.” (1956: 366) This was known as Feudalism; a highly structured and hegemonic society, in which state power was transmitted downward from an absolute sovereign at the top through his lords to the peasants at the bottom (Moore, 1974; Hobbes, 1981). Each layer was powerfully absolute over the one below, and required total subjugation. There was a code of law but this only served to verify the truth of an absolute rule. Separate, but in many ways overarching all, was the Church; governed differently by theocratic means, it nevertheless provided the elite with divine justification for its continued existence. The Middle-Ages were spiritualistic – if not
fatalistic – rather than functionalistic; that is, the basis of their worldly understanding was to be found in the metaphysical frameworks of deity. They are nevertheless of interest here because firstly, the Middle Ages were pre-modern; and secondly, as a consequence, have lead directly to the modernising process, which we are seeking to understand.

At the centre of this spiritualistic nature of the Middle Ages were theology and the Church; represented by an epistemology ranging from Pelagianism through Fideism to Scepticism (Carre, 1972). Each was competing for predominance. Yet none questioned the idea of Truth as God, the Church and the Bible, maintained in agency by the lay ruling classes. The outcome, of course, was that God was seen to support the continuation of the ruling classes; anyone daring to question this was not only treasonous but also blasphemous. Collingwood put it thus, "History, as the will of God, orders itself, and does not depend for its orderliness on the human agent's will to order it." (1993: 53). To back up such beliefs was a range of ghastly deaths awaiting any dissenter in support of the urgency of divine retribution.

Through the mechanisms of the Church, therefore, and consequentially Feudalism, power structures manifest in the ultimate sanction of death, developed society's perception of reality. On the whole, it was a fatalistic one in which God would provide; one where independent, particularly innovative, thought was not encouraged. The ancient Greeks and their Positivism would not have been tolerated in Medieval Europe. Particularly toward the end of the period when such restive contemplation was stirring for the first time in fifteen hundred years, people were going to the stake as heretics more often than ever before.

Medieval society was neither rational, in the philosophical sense, nor free. It was populated by a people, who although not in constant fear of their lives, nevertheless were not in full possession of their humanity. To them reality was given by their lord and God; unquestionable and undeniable institutions which controlled every aspect of their life. For them the pursuit of truth was not a necessity or even desirable, what ruled was the requirement for political expediency. Collingwood described it as being mere play of human purpose, in which "... [Man]...took the side of his friends..." (1993: 53). Yet with the mantle of deity brushed to one side, we can see the political machinations (of self-interest) surfacing; whereby the scientist/philosopher would use history, not in
pursuit of greater knowledge, but to flatter ones friends. The more powerful such friends were the better. An increasing revulsion toward such patriarchal relationships grew amongst the thinking classes of the day as Europe became increasingly enlightened (Moore:1974). They argued that truth should be the commodity of careful scientific process and not power and influence. Many people died for such an opinion; and it was the horror of this that formed the basis of Modern Positivism and the Functionalist code. But it was going to take the selfish ambitions of a King to achieve it in the end.

_The Fire and the Book – A Renaissance_

There are innumerable complex reasons why the Renaissance occurred when it did; not the least being a technological one. When Caxton had developed his printing press toward the end of the fifteenth century the written word became more widely available and thus undermined the Church's monopoly on knowledge. In this country, particularly, a civil war (1455-1487) had devastated the ruling classes placing new people, and a new monarch in charge (Jacob, 1997). The new elite wanted and encouraged new ideas; especially if those ideas were to plainly place them in a position of strength relative to their old adversaries. Couple this with the lustful intent of Henry VIII (the heir of the new monarch) causing him to break from Rome thus inducing our Reformation, and fifteen hundred years of the predominance of the Roman Church was effectively sidetracked.

Though Mills (1970) describes the confluence of Elite interests in "modern" America, his words are equally relevant to the period under study. "The power elite have been shaped by the coincidence of interest between those who control the major means of production and those who control the newly emerged means of violence..." (1970: 246). Carre termed the fifteenth century as affecting "...men's views on the ultimate question. The growth of a commercial class ... broadened interests and directed them into practical channels." (1972: 178) In short there emerged from the ashes of thirty years of civil war, an alliance between the victorious parties; the new King - Henry Tudor - and his followers on the one hand; and the merchant classes on the other. It was in both their interests to see the old Church destroyed along with its ideas, and encourage Protestantism and the new order because it helped trade and divorces (Weber, 1958).
Social frameworks became liberated from what Heel termed as the "...ecclesiastical piety.... the very essence of superstition - the fettering of the mind to a sensuous object, a mere Thing - in the most various forms: - slavish deference to authority; for Spirit having renounced its proper nature in its most essential quality... has lost its Freedom, and is held in adamantine bondage to what is alien to itself" (1956: 413). Ideas fell into the public domain like confetti. One in particular, was the idea of a objective individual with his maker - at one with God. The world and its reality became determined, not given. The Science and all the Positivistic determinism of the Ancients once more became praised (Weber, 1958). Social reality, still cohesive - more or less - had changed; the monarch was absolute, as always, but had a hot line directly into God himself rather than through Rome and the Church. More importantly, the increased trade and technological innovation encouraged people to see themselves as individuals, responsible for their own destinies (Naphy, 2007).

Nevertheless, of course the Church - in whatever guise - was not yet dead. Moreover, it is an inevitable fact that new elites with new ideas mature and become old elites with old ideas. Henry VIII established and now divorced, supported by his cohorts, no longer wanted a liberating social framework. Their objectives had been achieved. Protestantism had supplanted Roman Catholicism; Commercialism had supplanted Feudalism; the individual, his King and God, had supplanted the all-encompassing collective theocracy of the Church. The radical thinkers such as John Wycliffe were once again marginalised by a new middle class elite represented typically by lawyers such as Thomas Cromwell. But radical's influence was European wide – from Knox in Scotland to Luther in Germany – and not so easily destroyed. The rest of this period therefore, perhaps culminating in Descartes, became a struggle between these two factions; at times much more bloody than the original revolution. The unholy alliance between the radical thinkers and the nouveau riche ambitious for real power was exposed as a sham, and consequently the need to completely destroy the other that much more urgent.

For our purposes, this period was particularly important because in the early days of the unholy alliance, the uncertainty of two competing reality frameworks – church and state; physical and metaphysical - determined almost inevitably, the emergence of not only Positivist doctrine but also Functionalism. Even with the triumph of the new elite over the radical thinkers, there was no desire to return to tutelage under
Catholicism; too much water and commitment had passed under the bridge. Suffice to say that the memories of these times continue to be embodied in our social psyche. Films, books and other cultural transmitters relating to those times persisted with the theme of persecution by torture and fire. This had an even greater effect upon individuals, such as Hobbes or Descartes, writing not long after those events took place. They were bound to feel vulnerable to its potential return, and fearful indeed of ending up on a pile of sticks themselves.

Simmel (1950) talks of a social, or collective, consciousness transmitting cultural factors through time, which he termed as "Folkways." Certainly the terror of those days would find its way into the consciousness of subsequent thinkers through such pathways. The Church represented all that was bad and intolerant; standing, as it did, for a more metaphysical and theological interpretation of life. The two sides of the coin - the Church and Metaphysics - were matched as one, and seen as one. To be rid of one, was to be rid of the other. Couple this with the renaissance of ancient positivism, and the consequences were somewhat predictable (Hack, 2003).

The Church's power, by the seventeenth century was considerably waning in Northern Europe. Whilst the nouveau riche in those parts had become “old money” and established as landed gentry, and had no stomach to continue the fight. Yet the Radicals were on the incline once again, having suffered a disastrous few decades of war and famine there was a hunger for change. God and nature was dead and man would be in charge; armed with the powerful knowledge of science, Utopia would soon be theirs (Hegel, 1971). It was a time when, “Accurate scholarship became important, because actions were no longer felt to be dwarfed into insignificance in comparison with a divine plan”(Collingwood, 1993: 57). Carre (1972) proposed as a consequence that the pursuit of this liberating philosophy based upon the rejection of the non-rational, the Church and its monopolistic theology suffered its final defeat. Science became the new deity and the scientists its priests (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972). As with any liberalised social order, with it came a tyranny of ideas rejecting anything that hinted of the metaphysical absolutism of theocracy as being unscientific. The truth was nothing more than an observable facticity interpreted by man and not God (Peterson, 2003).
The Enlightenment and Beyond

As with any prisoner, who bursts from his "iron cage", there follows a period of ecstatic relief as he leaves the prison gate behind and tastes freedom for the first time. However, we all know that will not last; getting home to the bills or whatever, he has to start thinking of the practicalities of the situation. So too with the liberating philosophies, the practicalities of a newfound world based upon rationality began to intrude. And it was not long before Descartes, and his like, were taken severely in hand; not by the Church or the lay elite this time, but by fellow colleagues.

Michels (1958) and his "Iron Law" predicted the inevitability of oligarchy for the hierarchy of any social framework. Whether formal organisation, or schools of thought, the principles are the same. Inevitably, therefore, as the new power elite became established its ideas were corrupted and as a consequence, more introspective. Hutton (1995) referred to a similar process when examining the fifteen years of Thatcher rule. It is perhaps a natural inclination, by very definition, for all power elites to become conservative (Greene, 2008). Yet Kuhn (1970) would have us proceeding in a "revolutionary" way: not returning to an older norm but always seeking newer horizons. Popper (1972) made this point also when he discussed paradigms in terms of green fields and large hedges. Conservatism (small 'c') is not therefore reactionism, whereby one returns to the old ideas. It is in short, the rejection of continuing change once a new position has been established; a maintenance of the status quo - so too with the liberating philosophies of the Renaissance. The Radicals had established a new order of things. Having done so, were themselves too liberal for the new elite's liking. This new elite comprising the institutional formalisers of the day (Lukács, 1980) themselves former "revolutionaries" made good would see any further change (in a revolutionary sense) as contrary to their interests, even though their own original frameworks were advocating such. This shall be further examined below in terms of what Clegg described as two concepts of power: "On this basis an important conceptual distinction has been made. On the one hand, there is the episodic exercise which is initiated by agency, while, on the other hand, there is the dispositional power which is said to structure that agency's capacity to act." (1989: 84) At this point it is sufficient to identify a deterministic consequential power relationship through the human need for increasing rationality (Weber, 1978), whereby an episodic act, such as the liberalisation
of old philosophy, is driven by recurring power interests (e.g. Mills, 1970; Dahl, 1963) based in the ways we always act in society (i.e. "Instrumental Rational Action.", Weber, 1978).

Descartes, it could be argued, was the zenith of the liberalising philosophies of the Renaissance. He was claimed to have portrayed the true spirit of the movement (in a very general sense) to be free from the knowledge-power of Church and Feudalism. Yet he and his like were also paradoxical to that very view. The Cartesian framework portrayed by him (i.e. "I think, therefore I Am.") would have been an anathema to the emerging Functionalist. On the other hand there was more than a hint of the Positivist within him (in the classical tradition of Plato, etc.) when he said "...that the reading of all good books is like a conversation with the worthiest of men of past centuries who were their authors, and, indeed, a studied conversation in which they reveal to us only their best thoughts." (Donagan and Donagan, 1965: 42) Using Collingwood's (1993) framework it might be more appropriate to label Descartes as the first of the Romantics (Herder to Marx) rather than the last of the liberating philosophers (Grayling, 2005). For the rising power elites of his day, however, whose power was based upon the predictive rationale of the nation-state his call for an ontology founded in subjective orientation was highly undesirable. Thus, the "unholy alliance" between all factions opposing the tyranny of the Church had come to an end as they began to squabble amongst themselves. Since Conventional Wisdom, through the established schools and the emerging science institutes, demanded the maintenance of the Nation-State (Kuhn, 1970), Descartes and his Individualistic rationale was doomed to oblivion (Carre, 1972).

This politics of Ontology had in its turn an effect on our everyday frameworks of Social Action. The widespread rejection of the Church and its Metaphysics had re-established Positivism as the dominant philosophy. Yet the language of the Nation-State transformed Positivism into a more politicised being. Representing not so much this party or that, but rather a moral/ethical code of what is/is not good science backed up by sanction. Kuhn would see this as the emergence of paradigmatic based normal science; whereby the norms are set by power relationships and the paradigm by dogma based on them. He calls a paradigm "...a term that relates closely to normal science" (1970: 10); hence suggesting they are one and the same thing.
However, although such a close relationship cannot be denied, it is nevertheless a dichotomous relationship. The medieval period had "normal science" but was not paradigm based. Paradigms should be seen essentially a "modern" experience, driven by a self-awareness of political relativity and positioning. Only liberation at some stage could bring about paradigmatic positioning (i.e. the Renaissance); since awareness must be self taught through an ability to know of alternatives. Under the Church’s theocracy, there were no such abilities.

Willmott (1993: 687) observed that "...some commentators have concluded that social science is pre-paradigmatic..." His conclusion was that this is improbable. Power relationships in the auspices of something like a Nation-State do render "...a scientific division of factual and knowledge..." (Willmott, 1993: 688) as inevitable, although probably not desirable. Clegg unwittingly, however, developed a more pragmatic position when he declared, "The modern state emerges from a series of circuits of power in which both ecological and isomorphic pressures contributed to the stabilisation of various organisation fields of force and to their outflanking" (1989: 272). Power makes the paradigm; through the activity of the elites, who aim to create conventional wisdom and hence maintain their institutional model (Lukács, 1960).

Science, in any of its forms, would be regarded as a threat in Clegg’s terms and therefore to be controlled in all aspects whether natural or social. The point being, if we attach political intent to paradigm formation, then either all sciences are pre-paradigmatic (e.g. medieval period) or all sciences are fully paradigmatic. There can be no halfway house, since power relationships will not distinguish between them other than in terms of knowledge utility. Those with the greater utility will be accepted; those with less will be rejected. Purity of truth in a transcendental sense does not come into this equation. Neither do the scientists themselves per se figure in such an equation, because in terms of the above definition they must become themselves powerful to have influence and then consequentially form part of the elite. This is indeed the kernel of the nihilistic framework.

The period of Enlightenment was dependent, therefore, on a whole series of relative factors, mainly the nature and pro-action of the power elite themselves, reflected subsequently in the sub-elite control of the various paradigms, which had emerged subsequent to liberation. We attach much to the period labelled "an age of
reason" and cite people like Hegel and Kant as personifying the ideal of those times. Yet they too were figureheads in the end, sidetracked or misinterpreted for political reasons: only to be established as creditable in subsequent works of the Romantics, such as Marx (Carre, 1972). For the true spirit of the age, in this country at least, we should turn to people such as Bacon, or later still Hume. Between these two was not only 150 years, but also an epistemological transformation from the tacit acceptance of metaphysics, independent of church, into outright rejection and the scientific Functionalism of Hume. Carre (1972: 238) described this as being where "The fundamental processes of experience and the problems of theology are put aside in favour of a comprehensive investigation into sensible and material things." For Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, being an Attempt to introduce Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, 1739), particularly, this was best done through substantive empirical observation.

Auguste Comte, however, formalised this growing disquiet at "too much enlightened discussion" by stating in System of Positive Polity, vol 4, "...the Catholic-Feudal system has lost its power ... the preponderance still maintained by the negative tendency constitutes obstacle to the progress of civilisation.... Its persistence forms the first cause of those terrible and continually renewed shocks by which the crisis is accompanied." (Quoted in Fargins, 1993: 30) The so-called "negative tendency" was considered to be too much concentration upon "freed" metaphysics and not enough on "positive science". For many the consequence of such thinking was the French Revolution; a point not missed by Hume and colleagues during our own periods of unrest when similar events in Britain threatened. His opening statement in Theory of Politics - Book III (ed. Watkins, 1951: 3) set the position out clearly: "There is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse reasoning, that it may silence without convincing an antagonist, and requires the same intense study to make us sensible of its force that was at first requisite for its invention." For Hume, like Comte, to convince and to develop, one had to employ scientific principles so that one could be in no doubt about subsequent reason; he described it as being positive rather than negative.

This then was the spirit of the age; whereby freedom was not "a state of nature" in a Descartian/negative perception but an endowment of a profound sense of positive purpose in seeking truth. Such objectives were encouraged as conventional wisdom since they rejected, as irrational, the individualism of the early liberalist, and set in their
stead a "social contract". Hume ("Of the Original Contract") saw this in a far more epistemological sense than either Rousseau ("The Social Contract") or Locke ("An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government"). To pursue truth was rational and just, which in itself would lead to an obligation to obey and hence support society. For Hume and subsequent British Positivists, at least, the greatest crime was to be irrational, because it could lead to either the negative metaphysical doctrine of Catholic-Feudalism or the very break down of society itself and the horror of revolution.

*Increasing Rationalisation*

Weber claimed (1965) that the Reformation and Enlightenment led to conditions enabling the Industrial Revolution. Technology, in particular machines, was no longer considered the work of the Devil; indeed, they were the very essence of the new merchant classes. The breaking from the tyranny of the Catholic Church, led to Protestantism and the concept of "the work ethic". It was "Godly" to work hard, to save money and to invest; all attributes, which in the medieval times were regarded as usury, a crime punishable by burning. As Weber put it, "...it is a fact that the Protestants...both as ruling classes and as ruled...have shown a special tendency to develop economic rationalism which cannot be observed to the same extent among Catholics" (1965: 40). With the early liberalists and the old Catholic-Feudal elite now safely out of the way and scientistic rationality supreme, this freeing up of moral-ethical thought through more practical religious doctrine allowed for the first time the idea of wealth generation by surplus or added value (Weber, 1958; Marx, 1977). The age of the capital owner had come. Its arrival had a profound effect upon the way we viewed our social world.

Humanity was seen no longer as being subservient to Nature but divorced from it and able to control it. Carre described the process as an increasingly subjective one, whereby "Nature, the primal reality, becomes a self-sufficient mechanism; mind is divorced from matter; the mathematical structure of blind force and material threatens to absorb the kingdom of ideals"(1972: 226). Interestingly he places the explanation of this at the 'feet of Descartes' "...concerned with the mode of consciousness." However, the opposite could be argued; industrialisation demanded the rejection of the objective individual in favour of the objectification of labour (Marx, 1977) and "... the confidence
in the capacity of scientific method to unify and explain the whole arc of experience...." (Carre, 1972: 227) Our sense of social reality thus moved from the irrational-infinite in which the ruling class were mere agents (The Pope is "God's Bishop on Earth" etc.), to one of increasing rationalisation controlled ultimately not by God but by Man (Weber, 1971).

This was a transformation, which was no longer of contrite philosophical interest as in the Enlightenment years, but one of the practicalities for control. Industry needed consistent well-regulated labour in order to succeed. Such regulation had to be built upon the principles of rationality. It is thus perhaps no coincidence that so-called proper Economics was born in these times; explaining the rationality of organised labour. Adam Smith (The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759) for example expounded the morality of hard work for the betterment of society. While in The Wealth of Nations (1776) he determined that "Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command" (Quoted in Widgery, 1961: 165).

It is an ideology, which does not reject the individual per se, since it gives him responsibility for his own "well-being". It does demand, however, his compliance on a day-in-day-out basis; whereby in selling his labour as a commodity he alienates himself from production and becomes a "slave" to the machine (Marx, 1977). As with the emerging organisations themselves, those who did not succeed went to the wall. It was a harsh doctrine, justified by the increasingly popular Darwinian concept of "survival of the fittest"; particularly with regard to society rather than theology. No one liked to think of an Ape as their great grandfather, but it was a different matter when the same idea enabled the ruling classes to rescind moral responsibility for the "fallen" other than by charitable means.

Thus was developed the concept of the regimented working day, during which a man did "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay." If he did not turn up and do his work he was not paid. God for the average worker in the "dark satanic mills" therefore became the owner who lived always, so it seemed, in a big mansion on the hill. It was he who in the end determined whether they ate and were to be housed, or whether they starved and were homeless. It was true to say up until this point (circa the industrial revolution), a shift in power from one ruling class to another did not mean very much to the lower
classes (Kets de Veris, 2006). They were as much repressed and oppressed whether it was by Bishop or Feudal Lord (Moore, 1974). The rationalisation of the industrial revolution, however, changed all that; and for the first time the peasant himself was affected. State violence (manifest in more subtle means than direct physical assault), representing the merchant/industrial classes, enforced changes in perception through continual rationalised social action. God was dead, but as the nineteenth century progressed, so too was the power of the owner in decline. In the ascendancy was the organisation, as a life force in its own right, and the concept of the institution.

The Icy Polar Night

For many (e.g. Weber, Habermas, Crook, Pakulski and Waters) one of the major attributes of modernity was organisation. For Weber (1972) this represented increasing rationalisation through bureaucracy; a "polar night of icy darkness" reflecting a highly rational social order in which people are trapped in "iron cages" (Sica, 2004); whereby it was no longer sufficient for them to be merely coerced as before; Capitalism demanded their absolute commitment (Moore, 1974) - that of their minds. This is because, as Adam Smith pointed out, large-scale production required consensus in order to achieve the necessary cohesion for economies of scale. People were thus punished if they did not conform to the rules; set through the institution as a set of rational and fundamental truths (you work 9 to 5; you take breaks when told, etc.) As a workforce, therefore, society became trained by industrial organisation to accept rationality as an important driving force in determining the "truths" about their social action (Soulsby et al, 2007).

The essence of Rationality is control. This must be so because a rational act requires the majority who perceive it, to agree that such is the case. They can only arrive at some form of consensus through rules; and rules need constant policing to ensure everyone adheres to them. Rationality thus provides the framework within which the policing is maintained; it is a social litmus test for legitimacy. We cannot have competing rationalities, because then we have chaos (Stacey, 1992). As in many things, therefore, power is the determinate of whose rationale is to be implemented. The rationale that we go to work to work at least some of the time, for example, is evidenced by the consequences if we do not. Weber claimed "The Protestant Ethic" established much of the rationale of Capitalism (1965). In general "rationality sets" are not immanently transcending social action (e.g. the so-called "laws" of Economics) but
are placed within social action. Established by the powerful (e.g. management) as a set of rules, they are maintained in "reality" by the particular institution within their organisation. Given a "free choice" most of us would want to "sun ourselves on a beach in Spain" rather than work. Of course, we are prevented from doing so, initially, by sanctions in one form or another (e.g. reprimand, unemployment etc.): although eventually by our own socialised sense of the irrational act. We accept this as inevitable because the institutional pressures have convinced us of it. Weber (1965) explored this concept a little further when he attempted to predict what type of person would live in these psychic prisons (Morgan, 1986). He stated, "No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development, entirely new prophets will arise, or, if neither, mechanised petrifaction, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might as well be truly said: 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilisation never before achieved'" (1965: 182-183). Marcuse put this a little more forcefully with his concept of One Dimensional Man (1964) in which he portrayed modernity increasingly driving our individuality into a highly rational institutionalised existence. Whilst Habermas (1984) in post-Wittgensteinian tradition sees the rationalising processes of modernity producing bureaucratic transmissions, which distort our communicative language, symbols and hence increasingly divorce us from ideal (natural?) communicative action.

If the Enlightenment is the "spirit of Capitalism" (Weber, 1965) and hence modernity, then the Industrial revolution along with its prodigy, organisation, must surely be the engine. For the average person during this period if the Weberian concept of rationalisation was to mean anything, it had to be in connection with changing culture and life styles. Brubaker (1984) identifies this in terms of three major themes: changing social knowledge base; increasing bureaucracy and "impersonalisation"; and greater control.

In a Habermasian framework, these served to enforce the entrapment of the individual into a rational institutionalised environment. No longer free and now objectified (Marx, 1977), labour is alienated from its "natural" processes and forced to turn against itself by becoming instrumental in the subjugation of its own sense of reality (Lukács, 1980). Never before had labour been denied the right of ownership -
more than this, rationality. In short, it suggests we are being irrational, and hence in some ways inhuman, if we decide to play truant instead of working hard at our desks.

The real power of Weber's Iron Cage concept is to be found in this very point. Morgan (1986) perhaps demonstrates its potential better by referring to it as a "Psychic Prison"; a term which encourages us to understand that while organisations may be socially constructed realities, these constructions are often attributed an existence and power of their own that allow them to exercise a measure of control over their creators" (1986: 199). No longer can we envisage a Marxian power struggle between the haves and have-nots. Rather, it is the opening of Pandora's Box; whereby once a reality framework has been established as rational through institutional mechanisms, it takes over, driving its own originators by its own sense of rationale (Chang, 2007). In short, we are all its victims, including the power elite themselves.

This brings us once again to the distinction in power analysis between Episodic and Dispositional power (Clegg, 1989; Wrong, 1979). The particular Iron Cage is created by episodic power emerging, maybe, through a Kuhnian style paradigmatic revolution. Then once established, is maintained by Dispositional power through the promotion of the institution by the power elite (Mills, 1970), in a similar manner that clerical powers maintain their deity.

If such a framework was placed within the context of the Industrial Revolution and its consequential corporatisation, we can perhaps envisage the impact formal organising had over our senses of reality. Salaman (1973) puts the point across well when he refers to this period as being driven by systematic organisation determining the "...invention of the invention.... [Whereby]... Science is no longer applied, in Comtel's sense, to the organisation of production, but society itself is organised with a view to scientific production" (1973: 50). It was due to the emergence of industrial organisation that Functionalism defeated "Liberal Positivism" and became Conventional Wisdom. No doubt Hume, Bacon, Smith and all the others were part of that victory, but if it was to be more than mere semantics then the "masses" themselves had to be involved (Marx, 1977).

Production Organisation was an extremely effective means of doing this. Enabled by a host of complex social forces (described above), it mercilessly drove into the
common person a sense of the rational. Having done that it laid them open to potential abuse by those most able to control mechanisms of rationality. Tannenbaum (1968) determined the essence of organisation as being one of control; others, such as Etzioni (1961), see it as consensus or commonality of objectives. Either way the disparate collection of individuals which make up any organisation need to be not only controlled, or to act in some sort of harmony, but have to believe that it is reality itself, and indeed all there is. It is perhaps this above all else which is the true spirit of Capitalism. As Moore (1974) and Marx (1977) would tell us there have been many unpleasant and repressive regimes in the history of humanity. None, apart from Capitalism and its derivatives have ever successfully altered a society’s view of reality.

Post Industrial or Post Modern?

One of the major tenets of the Weberian "Iron Cage" is that the constraints it places upon us are psychological. In a similar way to power itself being a psychological process, our assessment of the constraining social factors around us are based on perceptually. One of the problems visitors to different cultures experience is that their "Iron Cage" factors are in some way different to that of their hosts and therefore seen, by their hosts, to act strangely. Quite obviously, from an individual's point of view (especially a powerless one) social constraints can result in physical consequences - if you commit a crime you are punished, etc. Nevertheless, such accepted constraints are dependent upon the powerful to enforce them, whose own perception is constrained by the "Iron Cage."

Yet, as with any power situation, if the basic perceptual tenets of the “Iron Cage” are questioned, then an alternative state is consequentially, and sometimes quickly, seen. This renders obvious to the observer that they are no longer indeed fundamental "truths" and are nothing more than socially invented codes driven by the rationale of our language. As Morgan himself puts it when referring to Plato's "Cave": "...if one of the inhabitants were allowed to leave the cave, he would realise that the shadows are but dark reflections of a more complex reality, and that the knowledge and perceptions of his fellow cave dwellers are distorted and flawed." Once seen for what they are, the particular individual might never view them the same again.
One of the basic tenets of the Postmodernist critique of Modernism is based upon our reluctance to leave the psychological, womb-like comfort of the "Cave". Yet in so doing we deny our scientific understanding with the proposition that our search for truth is based upon fallacy (Willis, 2007). The Functionalist research (i.e. Empiricism) assumes no political/power influence on the researchers themselves. As Morrow (1994: 63) stated: the: "...dominant political and social interests shape the development of science and technology, hence the autonomy of science and technology is always problematic ... (and) ... cannot be fully neutral... because they inevitably mediate social relations." We ignore the influence of the "Cave" at our peril. If we cannot understand its true purpose, nor, indeed, understand its relationship to other "Caves", how can we claim that what we observe is more than a socially engineered fabrication? Of course, for the Postmodernist this is the case for all research, particularly in the social fields (Bauman, 2000). We cannot break free from our "Caves", no more than we can break free from our humanity. It is the fundamental of being human. Society, through language, defines our humanity and in so doing, sets the Iron Cage in which we are to live. Researchers, like every other human being, cannot break free of this; and like every other "normal" human being, they can, however, increasingly control the characteristics of the "Cave" with greater power, through their affectation of institutional mechanisms. For Giddens (1990), aligned on the cusp between Modernity and Post modernity, "modern" society necessitates the need not to recognise epistemological exits from the "Cave". To do otherwise would be fundamental to the power relations within Modernity itself. Iron cages - whether of their own doing or not – keep people under control (both rulers and the ruled); and control, predictability is an essential rationale of modernity. In an almost Habermasian way, Giddens identifies a "disembedding" between any authoritative explanation of social relations and their counterpart day to day social action. It is Habermasian in the sense that Giddens (1990) predicts a consequential form of social distortion; whereby our explanations of what goes on do not match the reality. Indeed, our science provides a major role in the maintenance of such misconceptions. So not only is it naive to expect researchers to be neutral, for reasons discussed above, but if anything they are politically charged.

Ideas portrayed and proposed by Postmodernism are antithetical (by definition) to the rationale of modernity. Yet the point has already been made that the nature of language itself, thus our consequential humanity is naturalistically orientated toward a
rationale of commonality expressed through control of the many by the few. Therefore, when Postmodernists such as Crook et al. (1992) express a future for society in a postmodernist state, one has to be sceptical. As Clegg declared at the very end of his book (1992: 275), "...this 'forgetting' of power may yet be the 'fate of our times.'"

The reality of Human relationships is power. Therefore a world whereby there is "...the collapse of culture into a collection of package styles" (Crook et al., 1992) is somewhat suspect. The powerful in our society would, bluntly, not permit such a decline, since it would palpably (not even in any conspiratorial sense) be against their interests. It is not in a conspiratorial sense because it is doubtful whether the powerful are to a great extent fully conscious of their best interests. In a Weberian sense, once the Iron Cage has been created then it is both its creators and the controlled who suffer its consequences. Clegg cautions us in this respect by stating, "...the question of what... real interests are cannot reasonably be determined by reference to what a theory of patriarchy says they are or should be, any more than Marxists theory can determine what real interests are, without falling into the paradox of emancipation." (1989: 150) So it seems Post modernising or not, we are doomed to live in the social Iron Cages of our own creation – or at least the Powerful's creation; developed, although not fundamentally changed, by social-power histrionics.

That does not mean to say Post-modern philosophy should be rejected, on the contrary. It has already been argued that one of the constraints on social development has been the linkage between our attempts to understand the world and our power structures, through particularly a politicised institutional model. Postmodernism highlights this undesirable, if not realistic, state and in so doing provides perceptual pathways for its decoupling. Whether such consciousness leads to a freeing of society of course remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the very act of providing a different light on our social relationships has utility in itself.

For purposes here, the Post-modern framework will contribute below in terms of the critique it provides for modernity - the basis of most business school thinking. As an element for the theme presented in this chapter it has not been influential since it does not concur with basic tenets of conventional wisdom and rationality.
Ontology and the Business School

The purpose of this particular chapter has been to demonstrate that rationality and its consequential positivistic understanding is fundamental to the nature of our humanity. In so doing, it is not being suggested that positivism is naturally superior to any other ontology. Indeed, this is the very point; as Foucault stated (1980: 133) "It's not a matter of emancipating truth from ... power ... but of detaching the power of the truth from the forms of hegemony." What controls our understanding is not Truth but rather the contention that since we live in societies we are compelled by our fellows to interact with them, otherwise we deny the fundamentals of our humanity. Therefore it is not some Popperian state of truth that directs us, but more a Machiavellian political reality. We expect this of states and businesses, but somehow want to deny this for academics and scientists. We readily accede to models of power relations shaping our organisations' structures, but then believe it inappropriate for our academic organisations. Truth is relative; we all say we agree to that. Then so is Conventional Wisdom: in the sense that it is not achieved through better Epistemology, but through more effective political mechanisms. He who rules controls the truth.

Positivism, then, was inevitable. Its ontology reflects most accurately ontology of power necessary for the continuity of social hierarchies born from the complexification of society as a consequence of organisation. It is hoped that the above potted history of human ontology has shown this to be so. The choices made are found in the dawn of our thinking, not the here-and-now; thus, the inevitability of present society can no longer allow us further discretion. Functionalism, particularly, is a politicised expression of Positivist Science; whereby the mechanisms of a Modernistic state/business have forged a compulsion for not only control and order, but also absolute belief. Its insidious effect demands compliance through power-developed institutions, held and controlled by our purveyors of truth. Jackson and Carter refer to management in this respect when they state, "Management knowledge is both powerful and dangerous ... (such) ... knowledge claims an absolute authority, deriving from Science, which makes it difficult to question... (and) ... far from being value-neutral, it actively supports a particular sectional interest..." (1995: 197). In so doing, therefore, requires not understanding but compliance - at almost any cost. This we can see clearly working in Pettigrew's (1973) political networks for large business organisations such as ICI. Yet
they work equally well for research and academic organisation; and as with any power
elite in control of the truth, the troops are expected to remain loyal.

It is thus not difficult to demonstrate the inevitable linkage between Functionalist
Conventional Wisdom and the emergence of our Business Schools. They mimic very
effectively the control mechanisms necessary for such epistemology. Kuhn (1970: 37)
stated: "...One of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a
criterion for choosing problems that...can be assumed to have solutions. To a great
extent, these are only problems that the community will admit as scientific or
courage its members to undertake. Other problems ... are rejected as
metaphysical... or just too problematic.... A paradigm can even insulate the community
from ... problems that are not reducible...". This could only be specifically so within the
"one-truth" domain of conventional Functionalist wisdom. Business Schools are the
latest attempts by Functionalism to insulate and protect its rationalistically orientated
rationale; initially in terms of the rather nebulous area of
business/organisation/management analysis. Yet, even here, we find our business
schools encroaching upon other, hitherto independent, disciplines (Economics, Law,
etc.) citing their eclectic natures as the excuse. When in reality, the motives could well
be political rather than academic. Particularly with increasing demands of government
for our academic institutions to become more commercialised, the business school
presents the ideal vehicle for them to respond (Chance & Chance, 2002).

They do this in terms of a functionalistic rationale. Commercialism is seen as being
rational and possessing the ability to predict future trends in a particular environment:
an assumption that Jackson and Carter (1995) would think highly suspect. By definition
almost, the government requirement of the academe to become more commercial, is a
demand for them to adopt the mantle of Functionalism. In the spirit of Jackson and
Carter's (1995) opening statement, they are expected to acquiesce in the authority
imbued within it. So that no longer is Functionalism one amongst many, it is now the
one amongst none - the truth. To be anything else, particularly in the Business/Social
Sciences, is seen somehow as a betrayal.

This is not to argue that conventional wisdom is linked to the political nature of the
particular government in power (although this does not help); whatever government is
in power, the basic tenet of the argument is that Functionalist conventional wisdom was
historically inevitable for the reasons discussed above. A form of epistemological
determinism is operating, governed by aspects as fundamental as our humanity itself.

Within the business school, a collective *Weltanschauungen* is encouraged by
management, which sees itself as highly rational and in full ownership of the truth. It is,
indeed, Functionalism personified; and made manifest through courses such as
business degrees and particularly MBA's. Such an outcome is inevitable, since to claim
to be guardians of truth must mean all others are false prophets. Functional
conventional wisdom cannot entertain epistemological dissension since the rationale of
rationality is fundamentally one truth. Business schools exploit this to the full, because
to do so is to declare to their market what they want to hear. That is, "we have the truth
and the magical formula for your success."

An individual, of course, can still possess a Functionalist epistemology and dislike
business schools for their lack of rigour, etc. Nevertheless, the argument to be
expounded below is that the close nature between power elites in the academic
institutions and subsequent interpretation of social reality through their institutional
mechanisms, make it inevitable that the mechanistic nature of the business school is
bound to succeed. Worse still, because of other factors, discussed in detail later, the
pattern of the business school is becoming the dominant example for our academic
institutions to follow; and in subtle ways, beyond, as yet, our comprehension, changing
the fundamental nature of our social epistemology.
CHAPTER THREE

Literature Review 2 – A Critical-Nihilist Perspective on Politicised Epistemology

"When language enters history its masters are priests and sorcerers. Whoever harms the symbols is, in the name of the supernatural powers, subject to their earthly counterparts, whose representatives are chosen by the organs of society. What happened previously is hid in darkness. The dread which gives to manna, wherever it is met with ethnology, is always sanctioned - at least by the tribal elders." (Horkheimer, 1972: 33)

The Basic Premise

It will be the contention here that a nihilist's epistemological framework is better able to grasp the fundamental nature of what Adorno and Horkheimer termed as the “...false clarity...” (1970: xiv) in our science. Contrary to Popper's invocation of Humean philosophy: “…what we attempt in science is to describe and (so far as possible) explain reality...” (1972: 40) we can never be free to do such a thing, imprisoned as we always are by the politicisation of our own individual – and collective – psyches. It is just not enough to adopt the Popperian postulate of determining "appropriately scientific" outcomes by ensuring "appropriately scientific" inputs (1968). And whilst today much of Popper's epistemology is, if not discredited, certainly marginalized, the idea of falsification through good empirical science does remain (Wettersten: 2005). Yet as Kuhn (1972) pointed out scientists – and academics – are equally subject to the vagaries of societal and political action as anyone else. Yaneva makes this point in relation to an individual's relationship with knowledge: "The Observer risks to substituting his desired 'object' for something else. Being self-contained, knowledge is curiously closed between material embodiments and knowledgeable persons. The Observer is then obliged to make use of a peculiar ilmsus-test intermediate – an involved Knower (indicator) – again hardly discernible through visible empirical signs. And the initiated Knower needs, in plus, to be demonstrated a pattern of what is liable to discernment. . . Hence, the simplest act of preliminary discernment – as prerequisite for further observation – proves impossible. The
Observer has to dispose in advance of what he is empirically looking for. . ." (2007: 334). Thus, Empiricism – the manifest expression of ‘proper’ science - cannot reflect nor represent truth, nor indeed anything akin to it; for like every other thought of humanity it too is tainted by politicisation and ideology. Lukács (1978) referred to such a phenomenon as a “veil between us and reality” through which we must all peer, thus rendering objectivity through any scientific framework unattainable.

Current day pragmatists have a similar view, when stating that: “Science’s aim of getting at the truth is unreachable: the real truth lies neither with the present nor future science nor the future convergence of science.” (Lee, 2007: 123). The nature of objectification, particularly through empirical means, is open to abuse and intrusion by those with political influence. This is hardly surprising when: “The collected and systematized descriptive empirical knowledge is still directly based on notions of objects and yardsticks of comparison taken from non-scientific practice, which may be explicated in common language and purged of unclarities and contradictions. Some of our paradigmatic empirical sciences have, indeed, started from here, as e.g. astronomy, biology, chemistry, and some empirical sciences as geography are still lingering at this level.” (Nierlich, 2005: 354). It is, therefore, contended below that facticity coupled with opinion and politicking, the component parts of empiricism, is not the basis of a sound methodology. Yet, it is not merely the Functionalist with such a problem.

In particular, Lukács (1971) sought to criticise the basis of Marxist epistemology, which he perceived as being built upon an objectified ontology as much as any positivist framework. Moreover, as with any objective orientated ontology, the importance of an ultimate ‘truth’ rationalised and verified by facticity is important. For him the only difference between Positivism and Marxism is the nature of the process by which the truth is attained; for the Positivist it is through ‘proper’ science, while for the Marxist – although not necessarily rejecting science – it is better understood through ideology, especially Historical Materialism. Neither rejects the need for objectification in their analysis, merely the means by which such ends are achieved. As with the early Frankfurt School – such as Adorno and Horkheimer – Lukács conceived science, in the Popperian sense, not as a liberating agent but rather as an imprisoning one, bounded by the ideology of the powerful. That is, those who are currently in power are able to determine the nature of not only societal but also scientific ideology – a crucial point for the contention here and will be discussed below. Even today, Yaneva alludes to the point when discussing scientific

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1 This word is used as a deliberately vague reference to represent a positivist analogy to their position vis-à-vis science and anti-positivism.
observation: “Later, the tentative procedure of involved discernment is abandoned and the Strong Programme declares that a ‘community of believers’ will be treated as representative for the scientific-knowledge-object.” (2006: 338).

This for Lukács therefore, was the ‘veil’ through which the individual – scientist or otherwise – must peer. What he sees beyond, despite its portrayal as facticity and thus objectified, can never be anything more than subjectification; and worse still, such subjectivity is no longer the individual’s own but one ‘tainted’ by an institutionalised being.

Figure 1: An Interpretation of Lukács’s Institutional veil

Berger and Luckmann (1967) discuss such reality as being contextualised by ‘social relativity’, so that the institutionalisation of the Lukácsian veil is more complex than a mere dichotomy between the powerful and the powerless. It is dependant – as Berger and Luckmann (1967) implied – on any number of variables ranging from the cultural and structural aspects of a particular society itself, to the more psycho-cognitive experiential basis of the individual. The argument therefore being that even from a Positivist perspective there are far too many potential variables to permit confidence in the application of an analytical framework necessarily deduced from universality. The
argument therefore proceeds: so why not, therefore, contemplate universality itself rather than attempting to deduce it (Kant, 1781). Pragmatists such as Christiansen (2006) have revisited Kant with the aim to re-utilize his "Schemata" which are, "rules linking concepts to intuitions and provide them with their meaning..." (2006: 1). This, once again, has become important to positivist science in current times as a consequence of a "General Theory of Everything" being sought to explain the necessary universal constructs "...to provide a mediation between the concepts of the understanding (e.g. causality, substance etc.) and appearances. Therefore, the schema must be void of empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible." (2006: 5). The ideology of Empiricism, and hence the basis of positivist ontology, afforded by the politicization of its epistemology will not permit such a "mediation" to take place. The detail as to why will be discussed below. The point to be made here is that any methodology with its inclusion cannot afford the necessary ability to break free of the schemata that shackles empiricism to a factualized world.

This particular exposition will not be a defence of Nihilism, but indeed an attack upon the predominant fundamentals of empiricism and therefore positivist science itself, with regard to the dichotomous nature of the relationship between deduction/induction – instruments of a Positivist process – and universality. The purpose in so doing will be to establish the necessity for an alternative methodology based upon the absence of an empirical input. As Christiansen implied even without such an objective in mind, "...our ability to form images from the schemata is what provide the empirical concepts with their meaning..." (2006: 4). In short, empiricism can never fully reflect facticity since in order to make sense of such observation and transform it into theory a substantive subjective input is required. It will be argued that this evolves from the differentiation between deduction and induction vis-à-vis universality. The justification of deductive process in Popperian Positivist science, at least, is that only it can provide the necessary requirements of empiricism, and of course, empiricism is the essence of "good" science. Induction and consequently universality is rejected because they cannot. And yet the "General Theory of Everything" could never be established without acceptance of the latter. A present day quandary harping back to a former debate of forty years earlier: and it is here that this work will seek the answer.

Popper (1968) himself argued forcefully that deduction and universality could never be logically integrated. He stated, "Whatever may be our eventual answer to the question of the empirical basis, one thing must be clear: if we adhere to our demand that scientific statements must be objective, then those statements which belong to the empirical basis of science must also be objective, i.e. inter-subjectively testable. Yet inter-subjective testability always implies that, from the statements, which are to be tested,
other testable statements can be deduced. Thus if the basic statements in their turn are to be inter-subjectively testable, there can be no ultimate statements in science: there can be no statements in science which cannot be tested, and therefore none which cannot in principle be refuted, by falsifying some of the conclusions which can be deduced from them...We thus arrive at the following view. Systems of theories are tested by deducing from them statements of a lesser level of universality" (1968: 47). Science, therefore, for Popper and his acolytes such as Watkins (1970), is an objectified rationality transcending not only the subjectified individual but also universality itself! And yet, contrary to the implications of a "General Theory of Everything" contradicting, and therefore discarding, Popper's legitimacy in the present day, it could not then be argued that that is good reason to reject Popper. There are two reasons why. First with the regard to a general theory, it involves a few leading edge scientists, who in any event are not ready to reject the process of deduction, only to accept some partial input of universality (Wettersten, 2005). Second, the social sciences – in which this work includes Philosophy – already stung by the accusation of improper process (Pratten, 2007), have adopted the Popper postulates with greater enthusiasm than perhaps their physical counterparts – particularly in Business and Management analysis for reasons discussed below.

The ultimate test of good science, therefore, remains one of falsifiability; that is a theory cannot be deemed scientific unless it opens itself up to the potential of being shown to be wrong or inaccurate (Popper, 1968. Ttmeyer, 2005). Universal statements such as, there is or is not a God, cannot lend themselves to such rigour and therefore must be rejected as science. Watkins went even further when he stated, "...what Popper relies on as the mark of a scientific theory is not that is has actually been tested but that it is testable, the more testable the better (other things being equal). So it is entirely in line with his philosophy of science that one scientific theory should be replaced by a more testable theory even though the previous theory has not yet failed a test" (1970: 29-30). In stating this he was attacking Kuhn's contention that only he supported the idea of a dynamic transformation in science from the norm to the revolutionary (Kuhnian concept). And that indeed Popper quite accepted the idea, only expressing the process as transforming rather than revolutionary. Yet the point could be even more profound since neither side to the debate (Kuhnians v. Popperians) contested the nature of universality and its relationship with the deductive processes of science (Wettersten, 2005).

The task of doing this had been left to Adorno and Horkheimer (1970) some thirty years earlier and then quickly marginalised in the empiricist fervour of positivist science (Foster, 2007). An important aspect of their thesis was that the nature of the relationship between the individual and science had been corrupted and falsified by the values of Enlightenment itself. Erranging from the fatalistic explanations of medievalism, Europe,
particularly, glorified in its liberation from the oppressive dogma of previous centuries; where to question anything was to be a heretic. Science, but more importantly its attached ideology expressed for example through the writings of early enlightened observers such as Bacon. Hume and Smith, became the conduit for such expression, but in terms of anti-establishmentarism rather than at the time positivistic aspiration. To be scientific therefore was not to be theocratic and all that went with such a label. No doubt for us at the latter end of the modern age with mature democracies, it is hard to imagine the terror, particularly during the pre-enlightened renaissance age of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, that accompanied those who wished to rebel. The spectre of the Inquisition in the form of the Rack and the Stake was as powerful as anything Stalin or Hitler could have ever mustered. Its ghost haunts us still even after five hundred years! Yet considerably more so in the liberalising rush of theocracy’s destruction and the emergence of Enlightenment: and for a while it was truly liberated, even calling into question the secular mechanisms of state (see for example the Essays of Michel Eyguem 1533-1592²). The Church in Rome was never happy with such a position, but its power in the Northern parts of Europe had gone so it could do nothing. On the other hand, the states themselves were content to allow such talk because the Church’s demise reflected their own increasing power. Yet as with everything, there was a limit.

Enlightenment brought about an alliance between science and government (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1970); and consequently it was soon in both their interests to put an end to the individualistic mutterings of the earlier years as the new heresy. Science had become a useful tool for government in the need to justify their existence to increasingly liberated societies; while science for its part had become embedded, for a myriad of reasons, into the establishment. Moreover, mimicking the mechanisms of such, it developed its own cabals and cadres with which to terrify its members into compliance. Thus no longer the rebel, its elites had become equally jealous of their positions as any monarch. As Machiavelli himself determined there was a strong political logic in the destruction of the individual when any grouping formalised into organisational characteristics. Science was never a process honed by ideology as Popper et al would have it, but an organisation equally politicised and ideologicalised as any. And once its organisation achieved, the individual was transmogrified into a symbol of threat. As Adorno and Horkheimer themselves declared unequivocally, “The unity of the manipulated

² Paradoxically Eyguem’s philosophy was based upon Skepticism, which argued in favour of the existence of a God; but it was both anti-theocratic and state because in so doing it contended the paramountcy of an individual’s instinctive action. In the end, he would always come to God, but would reject control by both secular and clerical mechanisms.
collective consists in the negation of each individual: for individuality makes a mockery of the kind of society which would turn all individuals to the one collectivity" (1970: 13).

The argument is not solely that science became politicised as a result of modernity and the growth of its bureaucratic progeny. Indeed the Kuhnian inheritance today is conditioned upon the idea that science somehow develops between knowledge and understanding and subject to those holding sway at any particular time (Yaneva, 2006). It was thus a combination of factors. Modernity did bring about Positivist science as opposed, for example, to a more ‘naturalistic’ science practiced by the ancient Greeks. Though democratic, ancient Greek society did not contain the necessary sophisticated organisational mechanisms of the modern state that emerged in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe (Gibbon, 1960). The point presented is twofold and dichotomous in its nature: first, is the nihilistic proposition that the seed of what science is, and always has been, was embedded in the concept itself. To perform science is by its very nature to be subjective. So-called current “progressive” thought contained by empiricism recognises this possibility. Yaneva for example willily observed while citing the distinction between knowledge and understanding that in applying the strict codes and logic of empiricism: “...the simplest act of preliminary discernment – as prerequisite for further observation – proves impossible.” (2006: 335). But it was also the essence of Adorno and Horkheimer’s influential book *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1970). Nihilistic in this part of their argument at least: it contended that the nature of man created an inescapable doom manifest in the ways of his science and made palpable by the Enlightenment. In short, Science could be nothing else than a subjectified expression because of the nature of man himself. It could thus never achieve objectivity, since ultimately it has to come from man himself and thus is subjective in expression. Enlightenment, therefore, and its pronouncement of an objectified science is a sham; and as the instrument of the powerful, it has turned in on itself and become worse than the very thing its supporters set out to deny – an elite’s subjective expression of their sense of reality. As Adorno and Horkheimer declared, “Enlightenment is totalitarian… the myths which fell victim to the Enlightenment were its own products” (1970: 7-8).

The second proposition is to do with the nature of modernity itself as alluded to above. Indubitably, the consequence of Enlightenment was to transform the importance of science in a modern state’s forms of instrumentality. Moreover, this is the core of a Nihilistic argument in this respect. As Adorno and Horkheimer proposed, to be ‘modern’ is to be scientistic in one’s approach to humanity’s relationship with nature. Hegel himself

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3 Their sentiment
argued much earlier that, "Science is the key to the control of nature and... of human beings. By obeying nature one can ... command her: ‘for you have but to follow and as it were hound nature in her wanderings, and you will be able, when you like, to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again’" (Held, 1980: 151). Held went onto translate Hegel’s thoughts by declaring, "Enlightenment consciousness...objectifies the world. It sees it as an 'absolute reality' of 'pure and simple' things – a world of 'material things', which are given to the senses with no further determination of any sort" (1980: 151-152). Since Modernity is the progeny of Enlightenment, to be modern is to objectify the world through science. Yet as discussed above, science can only be performed – made palpable – through the actions and thoughts of individuals that in turn can only be subjective. This then is the dichotomous nature of the relationship – if not indeed the paradoxical one. Science, the subjective process, is transformed and reified into an instrument of Modernity, which by its very nature can only be objectified. Marcuse determined this when he declared, "...scientific experience as well as pre-scientific experience are false, incomplete inasmuch as they experience as objective what in reality is subject-object, objectivation of subjectivity" (1974: 234).

The nihilistic temperament of such a dichotomy is then manifest. As such, it also provides a template for the dialectic to be used in this work's methodology and the reason for the rejection of a positivist one. The doom is that science, in the name of the individual, will seek out subjectivity and destroy it by objectification and thus in a Weberian sense increasingly rationalise our world! The nature of objectivity is to turn in on itself and deny all aspects that challenge its dominance. In so doing, it has to demand greater objectivity and thus greater rationality. These, indeed, are the nihilistic tendencies identified by Weber in the logic of his concept of Rationalisation. This prompted him to disavow modern science as the "...disenchantment of the world – the displacement of magical and religious views of the world by the scientific view of the world as a causal mechanism that in principle can be mastered by technical means and calculation" (as interpreted in Brubaker, 1984: 34). Adorno and Horkheimer’s quotation above concerning the negation of the individual into the collective also exemplifies this view. They viewed no: only science as the progeny of Enlightenment but also its sibling Abstraction. Somewhat paradoxically, science does not make real our world but merely rationalises it. They made this point clear by stating, "Abstraction, the tool of Enlightenment, treats its objects as did fate, the notion which it rejects: it liquidates them. Under the levelling dominaion of abstraction (which makes everything in nature repeatable), the freedom themselves finally come to form that "herd" which Hegel has declared to be the result of Enlightenment" (1970: 13). The inference from this being that science is the major engine of rationality and abstraction, a point not missed by Popper himself, but declared in defence of science
rather than against it. "...I oppose the attempt to proclaim the method of understanding as the characteristic of the humanities, the mark by which we may distinguish them from the natural sciences. And when its supporters denounce a view like mine as 'positivistic' or 'scientistic', then I may perhaps answer that they themselves seem to accept, implicitly and uncritically, that Positivism or scientism is the only philosophy appropriate to the natural sciences" (1972: 185). 'Proper science' can only be supported by a Positivist philosophy because only it possesses empathy with science's ultimate goal, which is rationality. Perhaps contentious, nevertheless he does have a point with regard to the argument that the 'opposition' (an interesting term itself) supports by default the proposition that positivistic science is the only worthwhile science. Current day discussion is not so absolutist, as already discussed it centres around the distinction between knowing and understanding. Kosso for example determined that: "The intellectual architecture... is found in the structure of relations among theories. This is what is needed to not merely know about nature, but to understand it as well" (2007: 177). Certainly, a potential for Kuhnian type intrusion through political process and the prejudice of pertinent elites. Nevertheless one that remains firmly entrenched in an ideology which if not Functionalist is certainly positivist and reflects the sentiment of Cartwright (2003) and the concept of a "proper" science.

Yet, the position contended by this work is neither an argument for the return to theocratic explanation; nor necessarily against science itself other than for recognition of its limitations. The central philosophy being as Helmut Thielicke put it, "There is no one obligatory way to perceive things" (1969: 3). A contention, nevertheless, proposed by many other philosophies, even Scientism as Popper would argue. For example Berger and Luckmann declare in the first chapter of their book that, "The phenomenological analysis of everyday life...refrains from any causal or generic hypothesis, as well as from assertions about ontological status of the phenomena analysed" (1967: 34). However, the point being made is more than a debate upon differing individual perceptions and paradigms. Bhaskar encompasses this in terms of a metatheoretical analysis when he distinguishes between fact and a priori: "Suppose," He declared, "...that the philosophical and scientific accounts were to clash. What would this show? Merely that one had come up against the limits of a particular scientific form, just as the limits of the possibility of measurement may be given in quantum theory. But that measurement has limits does not mean that nothing can be said a priori about what the world must be like for measurement to be possible within those limits" (1979: 9). So in a philosophical sense at least, rather than a paradigmatic one, there can be fundamentally differing ontological viewpoints. Even Lukács (1978) tied by the fetters of a Marxist historical material framework, aspired to such a notion in his pursuit of the philosophical state of "a social being." He talks of a
“transition” – almost in a Weickian “enactment sense” – between a social being’s thought state and social state, as if they are competing states of being within the individual himself! He claimed that science is limited because, “The social here and now of such a transition stage cannot be reconstructed experimentally...Thus we cannot gain any immediate and precise knowledge of this transformation from organic being into social. The most we can reach is a post festum knowledge, by the application of the Marxist method” (Labour, 1978: ii). Social being for him, therefore, is a contradistinction between two states of reality, one ‘obligatory’ in terms of a social ‘iron cage’ and the other an individual’s metaphysical (natural?) state.

Empirical versus Empiricism – Are They The Same?

Ironically, the changing nature of current science through quantum physics is demanding a similar understanding. For example, Christiaens determined that: “One physicist for example (Dirk Aerts) communicated to me that he is convinced that the world has something like the structure (or the nature if you will) of a Hilbert space. A Hilbert space is the state space used for describing the behaviour of quantum mechanical physical systems. In the present paper I develop a view of the scientific world and of the background from which the scientific world arises, that accommodates this claim. Following a number of continential philosophers, Maurice Merleau-Ponty in particular, I reason from the premise there is also a life world.” (2006: 249). Yet, lest we get carried away that epistemology has moved on since the Kuhn-Popper debate; Christiaens finally concludes in a rather dismissive – and probably very Popperian way – by declaring, “The end-point of the scientific process of idealization – while having its beginning in the life world – ends in a mathematical structure that is very close to the life world in many respects. (The) world is already non-local, non-separable, non-countable, negation-incomplete and inconsistent...I take the life world and the phenomenological view of consciousness as the proper background for both the classical and quantum world...Some physicists have referred to the strange quantum phenomena as the “ghost in the atom” (Davies and Brown, 1986). Philosophers have called the mind the “ghost in the machine.” “The ghost in the atom (object-side) and the ghost in the machine (subject-side) are one and the same. They are remnants of the primordial source from which subject and object are borne; they are the background noise of the original creative “Big Bang”: the bursting out as consciousness-in the-world”. (2006: 271). In short, Physicality – and hence positivist science – is safe in its role as the determinant of reality. Businesses or universes, they all might have a certain subjective temperament, but ultimately the “Hand of God” touches our life world with its physicality.
The essence of a Nihilistic state palpably denies this. It is not that humanity is predestined to a particular end \textit{per se}, which is where the theological nature of such a prediction would have come to play; but rather that the relationship between the Lukácsian obligatory and individual states will always be dominated by the former rather than the latter. In a Weberian sense, the ‘Iron Cage’ is merciless and never relinquishes its control over us all, including – it should be added – the members of the elite themselves. As with Pandora and her box, the only choice she possessed is not whether to open the box, but how! And when done, Pandora relinquished even that. The sense of such helplessness is within us all – by whatever means. Indeed, we are all Nihilists at heart for we fear the ‘nothingness’ death brings, yet seek to reject it through the invention of science. As Adorno and Horkheimer state, “\textit{Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything unknown}” (1970: 16). Thus unable to face the starkness of ‘nothingness’ humanity must create an alternative and much more acceptable consciousness (see for example Freud, 1953; Fromm, 1962 or a more current discussion in Engelland, 2008), either through a deistic interpretation or a post Enlightenment scientific one – or indeed a combination of the two as with some ‘cult’ followings. Adorno and Horkheimer added, “\textit{That (being free from fear) determines the course of demythologization, of Enlightenment, which compounds the inanimate with the animate. Enlightenment is mythic fear turned radical}” (1970: 16). Science, the offspring of Enlightenment, is thus no more than ‘radical mythology’ to provide a protective barrier against ‘nothingness’. Adorno and Horkheimer made this point when they continued, “\textit{The pure immanence of Positivism, its (Enlightenment/science) ultimate product, is no more than a so to speak universal taboo. Nothing at all may remain outside, because the mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear}” (1970: 16). So far from being the great liberator of Popper et al, Science is the Weberian ‘Iron Cage’; and worse still, its fundamental Positivist ideology is no more than yet another myth. This state, Engelland (2008) noted, was termed by Heidegger as the “Oblivion of Being” and its solution was proffered as a return to Transcendental Philosophy based upon Kant’s interpretation of rationalism.

But what alternative could there be if science was indeed rejected? Probably none, and this is the point of a Nihilistic perspective; Science is what it is and cannot be changed. It would be the rejection of myth through the rational act, but it is also the rejection of things beyond our understanding and demonstration. It is in terms of Horkheimer and Adorno (1970) the attempt of humanity to ‘naturalise’ and ‘objectify’ itself into a logical explanation of its domination of nature. Any metaphysical alternative to this died readily in the cinders of the purifying fires of the sixteenth century; set alight by theological dogma. Thus to be seen opposing science was seen to be allied with the
forces of dogma. As Held put it in his discussion of the Frankfurt School, "The decline of critical thought is also furthered by the incorporation of opposition. Opposition has been rendered increasingly ineffective because the representatives of the 'forces of negativity'—although they have not lost the 'title of opposition'—have all too often become mimics of the dominant apparatus" (1980: 69). The demand of science to conform is merciless, like any other process within Rationalisation. Adorno writing alone declared that today, "...standardized, opaque, and overpowering social processes...leave the 'individual'...little freedom for action and true individuation" (1974: 76). So an individual academic wishing to be taken seriously, for example, must be seen as being 'properly scientific' and so accept all the baggage that such a label implies. Today, half a century later, this is seen as even more crucial outside a small circle of a few cosmologists seeking a theory to everything (i.e. Hawking, 1988). As Ridley states whilst defining the concept: "[Science]...seeks out the world of the repeatable, public fact that is, in a sense, timeless and unchanging. In doing so, science inevitably divorces itself from the unique and the subjective and largely from the whole phenomenon of becoming." (2001: 40). The "scientist" using a scientific methodology, therefore, must be an individual willing, and capable, to do this.

The corollary is that to be otherwise is to be non-scientific and anecdotal. Popper (1968) determined the essence of this argument to be found within the 'empirical content' of a theory in terms of its 'testability' and subsequent 'falsifiability'. For Popper the distinction between science and non-science is the degree of universality that a particular statement contains. Thus, science is legitimate because it is based upon empiricism, wherein rationally controlled facticity is a fundamental requirement. Criticality based upon universality alone, which he determines as the founding tenet of the 'opposition', is not. Without the support of empirical observation, such statements expose themselves to 'political' manipulation⁴ and in his terms become 'singular' and therefore unable to be either tested or falsified. As he states unequivocally, "We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to survive" (1968: 108). But then in rejection of the Kuhnian realpolitik approach he continues, "This will be the one which not only has hitherto stood up to the severest tests, but one which is also testable in the most rigorous way" (1968: 108). Unlike some, Popper does not reject universality per se, but it must be as a precursor to empirical observation, otherwise how can we know what we are theorising about in the so-called 'real world' is correct? He put it thus: "...It is far from obvious...that

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⁴ Popper does not use the word 'political' but it is implied in his word 'competition' (see his quote following). It is interesting that semantics apart, it is one of the few areas of debate in which he agreed with Kuhn!
we are justified in inferring universal statements from singular ones, no matter how numerous; for any conclusions drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusions that all swans are white" (1968: 27). Ultimately, Popper's objective in his book 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery' was to give the meta-theory of Philosophy a place in 'the scientific process', but only as a 'John the Baptist' to science itself.

In today's debate between pragmatists and realists, the position although similar is not quite so absolute. All parties are agreed that there is a definitive distinction between understanding and knowing (Yaneva, 2007) and its interpretation in terms of what are and are not observable. Typical of such postulation is Yaneva's declaration: "When common knowledge is intended to be observed, then the Observer, naturally cultivated or involved therein, has an easy access to its understanding and discernment. So, he is a routine Indicator. This entails, however, a lot of self-deception – a light-minded conviction that 'knowledge is here', in his mind or before his eyes or ears. He could retell it but hardly – demonstrate. By means of retelling (transmission), one more Indicator is merely involved in understanding. The communication of both only changes the embodiment – say, from textual to spoken – and simultaneously the bearer." (2007: 335). Popper would not find himself necessarily disagreeing with this, other than the scientist must himself know the difference between knowing and understanding but he is only part of the process, one of many, and it is his colleagues and history that will judge him.

This is not too far from the position argued here. The logic in the assertion, "how can we know our theories are relevant to the outside world without first testing them there?" is tempting. Yet it is based upon two premises. First, and perhaps most fundamentally, that what is being theorised about is observable. Second, that empiricism manifest in the Popperian dictate for good science is the only legitimate way to observe any external physical state. Leaving the first premise aside, the second perhaps formulates the basis for contention. Popper - and today's debate has not changed this – is typical in his attitude toward 'science' conducted without observation in his declaration, "To me, idealism appears absurd, for it also implies something like this; that it is my mind which creates this beautiful world. But I know I am not its creator. After all, the famous remark 'Beauty is in the eye of the beholder', though perhaps not an utterly stupid remark, means no more than that there is a problem of the appreciation of beauty." (1972: 41). It is interesting to note for example, that all science which is not empirically based, is termed by Popper as “idealism”, as if it were somehow only casual contemplative doodling and not “proper science” and therefore not to be taken too seriously as an end in itself. Berger and Luckmann (1967) would argue that this attitude is precisely the consequence of an objectified society and one which has been “institutionalized" possessing "...a history that
antedates the individual’s birth and is not accessible to his biographical recollection” (1967: 77). Yet, to use Stavenga’s (2006) systems analogy, the individual in science has always presented a potential threat to its systemic propriety. For Popper “idealism” meant “not facticity” but subjective universality, whereby the individual stepped unwittingly beyond acceptable practice in search of an ideal universality. Even so, as Danks (2005) determined, even correct science is not without its cost and therefore not as perfect as Popper or any subsequent Positivist might claim. A paradox is identified which is double edged in that not only is “good science” dependent upon the individual conducting his experiments, but also, if a complex project, upon many individuals threatening to subjectify and objective process. Danks described such an event in the practical terms of applied science: “A pervasive feature of the sciences, particularly the applied sciences, is an experimental focus on a few (often only one) possible causal connections. At the same time, scientists often advance and apply relatively broad models that incorporate many different causal mechanisms. We are naturally led to ask whether there are normative rules for integrating multiple local experimental conclusions into models covering many additional variables.” (2005: 791). Science, like any other process/organisation within society has been institutionalized; and scientists – even great men such as Popper – are like any other individual who are subjected to the vagaries of objectification, which include fractionalising into compartmentalised perception. To preserve our sanity we convince ourselves that the world is an immanent facticity, and as such when we conduct scientific experiment; we want to confirm our subjective projections with an objective affirmation and so legitimise them.

There is, of course, nothing new in this argument. Weber implied this with his principle of Rationalization. Adorno and Horkheimer, along with many others, debated around the contention all their academic careers. While more recently, Habermas extended this further by the addition of language and the ‘speech-act’ requiring objectification for it to work effectively. More recently still the aforementioned debate regarding what is understood and known between the observable and unobservable phenomenon extends this (i.e. Stavenga, 2006). Yet, none of these would deny observation its place in any theoretic framework. The point at issue is the degree of legitimacy, and hence influence, such observation has within the context of an individual theory. Popper, for example, would claim paramountcy for such a thing in any scientific process; yet even he was not beguiled into thinking, similar to Adorno and Horkheimer, that the acting of seeing something is the end of it. As he unequivocally stated, “…there seems to be a common sense theory of knowledge: it is the mistaken theory that we acquire knowledge about the world by opening our eyes and looking at it, or, more generally, by observation” (1972: 34). This is not paradoxical, since for him observation is
an element of an exacting process that he would term as empirical. Moreover, it is at this point there would be disagreement between 'the two sides'. Adorno and Horkheimer would certainly accede to the importance of an empirical input, but in so doing would distinguish it from empiricism, which for them is ideological, and not mere science. The distinction being as Morrow put it: "...an approach to science that stresses the primacy of the factual basis of scientific knowledge, as opposed to, say, the purely rational or intuitive foundations" (1994: 43). Whilst for Adorno and Horkheimer it is where: "...the individual is reduced to the nodal point of the conventional responses and modes of operation expected of him" (1970: 28). In effect, therefore, it seems there is a difference between empirical and empiricism; the former not necessarily requiring, nor compatible with, the latter. Empiricism requires as a tenet to any scientific legitimacy an initial and continuing empirical action on the part of the theorist/observer. Morrow (1994) specifically places this in the middle of a theorectic continuum with Metatheory at one end and Normative Theory at the other. The implication of this being, that even within the context of Positivist Science an empirical action is not necessarily all there is to achieve legitimacy. Normative theory for example is concerned with what 'should be' and not necessarily what 'is'; and this can only be established by some input of judgemental interpretation (some would argue, as indeed with everything, whatever the nature of science). As Morrow put it: "Many social theorists and philosophers have claimed that normative theories are, like ideologies, mere beliefs that cannot be justified rationally at all" (1994: 52). For the purposes of this argument, it is merely a demonstration that within normative theory at least Empiricism does not hold the key to the legitimacy of an individual theory. Indeed, the major paradigm of a Positivist ideology – Functionalism – is by its very nature normative to the extent that it determines a value or function for every element within society.

It is contended here that a distinction between 'empirical' and 'empiricism' counters the absolutist and empiricist requirement of Popper’s scientistic dictate. Namely, that every piece of theorising about our social (or indeed physical) world, should not only be based upon 'fact' through self-observation – or that of some other legitimate source – but (most importantly) also applied in a specific logico-ideology appertaining to empiricism. Popper’s belief is that in so doing the process can remain scientifically 'pure' and untainted by the political machinations of the relevant elite. Whilst acknowledging ‘The Problems of the Empirical Basis’ (Popper, 1968: 38), he also subsequently determined a solution by declaring, "...I believe, [we can do it] if we clearly separate the psychological from the logical and methodological aspects of the problem. We must distinguish between, on the one hand, our subjective experiences or our feelings of conviction, which can never justify any [theoretical] statement...and, on the other hand, the objective logical
relations subsisting among the various systems of scientific statements, and within each of them" (Popper, 1968: 44).

Critical theorists, such as Adorno and Horkheimer, would disagree and counter that such ability is impossible since we cannot meaningfully separate our subjective world from our objective one. Popper and others of course would argue that through 'good' science it could be done. Amongst such people would be Kuhn himself, the essence of his high profile debate with Popper never included a denial of the ultimate utility of science, only that its making was never as pure as many (Popper always denied he was one) would claim. Indeed, the point will be made below, that critical theorists from Adorno to Habermas have also never rejected science per se, merely and more specifically Positivist science. Even subsequent to the damming indictment of Adorno and Horkheimer's "Dialectic of Enlightenment" they pulled back from the 'abyss' of dämmerung by determining the error to be found in the politicisation of Positivist science and not in science itself. Ultimately, they had to conclude, that humanity would improve and benefit from the activities of people like themselves.

But what if this was not the case; that the fundamental nature of science could make it nothing other than the siren's call of the powerful?

A Nihilistic Interpretation of Science

A problem always arises as a consequence of any discussion upon the validity of science as to whether it is beneficial to humanity or not. It is perhaps obvious to many that humanity has progressed considerably since its early days. For good or ill, we are more technologicalised. We live longer, are healthier and richer (or at least for a small fraction of the world!) than we have ever been. It is thus claimed this was due mainly to science, particularly post-Enlightenment. Worldly development has ridden on the back of a relentless scientific drive to seek out and control the rational. To the extent that eventually the means, rather than the ends, become important: science becomes important because in a rational world it is the edifice to all that is worthy (Danks, 2005). Weber talks of 'means-end' rationality whereby there is, "...the methodological attainment of a definitely given and practical end by the use of an increasingly precise calculation of ...means." (1972: 293-294). In pursuit of such precision, it has been argued that the developing world at least has had much to regret from the domination of western science and technology. The arguments are well known and will not be pursued here, suffice to state that the instrumentality of science through its adherence to rationality is toward the destruction of that which is not standardized, whether that be a national culture or an individual within it. Adorno, quoted in Held (1980), determined that “...standardized, opaque, and
overpowering social processes...leave the individual...little freedom for action and true individuation" (1980: 119). This might not necessarily be the direct fault of science per se, but it is science and its pursuit of rationality that have set the social conditions for this to happen (Yaneva, 2006). To use the words of Adorno and Horkheimer (1970) science is 'mythology' (designed by the powerful), to promote the idea that humanity is in control of 'nature'. As they stated, "False clarity is another name for myth; and myth has always been obscure and enlightening at one and the same time: always using the devices of familiarity and straightforward dismissal to avoid the labour of conceptualization" (1970: xiv).

Opponents of this argument would of course disagree, but there is a legitimacy (to be further explored in chapters below) to the claim that science per se is not necessarily as beneficial as the followers of Popper would have us believe (i.e. Watkins, 1970; Tmeyer, 2005: Nierlich, 2005). Put simply, science is not merely "the method of bold conjectures and ingenious and severe attempts to refute them" (Popper, 1972: 81); that might well form part of it – depending upon the individual/s involved – but in the main it is an instrument of those in power to maintain their institutional control.

Weber (1972) well recognised this process to be what he termed as rationalization and predicted it would increase in its intensity chronologically; that is, as capitalism and the twentieth century evolved. And what better instrument to do this than science itself – the 'perfect' tool of rationality? The individual is thus forced by his 'social milieu' to abandon his 'oneness' with nature and adopt the mantle of civility (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1970) but it would seem not without cost! Freud (1949) for example saw that the "...price of civilization is paid for by the forfeiture of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt...Every renunciation becomes a dynamic font of conscience; every fresh abandonment of gratification increases its severity and intolerance..." (quoted in Held, 1980: 123).

By definition, therefore, Science can only be a group activity: by definition, because Science as the progeny of Enlightenment is the consequence of the emerging Positivist epistemology at the time, and thus subjected to its innate methodology (Yaneva, 2006). Who better than Popper to determine the nature of this? His opening statement in 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery' declared somewhat optimistically, "A Scientist, whether theorist or experimenter, puts forward statements, or systems of statements, and tests them step by step;" (1968: 27) which in itself is fine, always presupposing that such statements are themselves 'truly' objective and value free. Popper does indeed presuppose this when he declares further along, "My use of the term 'objective'...is not unlike Kant's. He uses the word ...to indicate that scientific knowledge should be
justifiable, independently of anybody’s whim: a justification is ‘objective’ if in principle it can be tested and understood by anybody...Now I hold that scientific theories are never fully justifiable or verifiable, but they are nevertheless testable. I shall therefore say that the objectivity of scientific statements lies in the fact they can be inter-subjectively tested.” (1968: 44). For this to happen it requires the perception and comparative ability of at least another; hence why by definition Science (in Popperian terms at least) must be a group activity.

The scientist to succeed has to be something of a sociable individual: to the extent that he must converse with colleagues in order to gain the credibility and acceptance necessary to advance his theory above others. To do this successfully is in a sense not too dissimilar to becoming a member of the local golf club, or something akin! Yet for the scientist it is not necessarily something as overt as a club – although the Royal Society etc is indeed an example of this; the social boundaries of what he must join are more subtle - taking the form of so-called paradigms (see Popper, 1968). Nevertheless, their mechanisms for control are equally comparable – if not more so – to those of any golf club. Ttmeier (2005) discusses in terms of ‘traditional methodology’. In a golf club all an individual risks is the ability to play golf and perhaps development of some social standing; whilst for a scientist to lose membership of her particular paradigm is to forfeit her livelihood. For this reason, alone it is therefore not surprising that Kuhn declared, "Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice" (1970: 11). Indeed the 'cocktail' of social control becomes even greater when a further dimension of commitment to one's beliefs is added. It is hardly surprising that “...commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition" (Kuhn, 1970: 11).

It will be argued below that science, therefore, can never be in the state whereby the individual’s sole "...object is to solve a puzzle, preferably one at which others have failed, and current theory is required to define that puzzle and guarantee that, given sufficient brilliance, it can be solved" (Kuhn, 1970: 7). This, of course, in itself is not necessarily a problem if it is mere observable technological advance and understanding that is, being sought (Yaneva, 2006). Yet with that accepted, such achievements can only be assessed on a face value basis because their impact cannot be judged on technological aspects alone. Science is, in part at least, about person observation of observables and transposing that to understanding. In thinking through the implication of such a context, Yaneva determined that a: “...no ‘empirical approach’ is possible, simply because there is nobody to apply it! The minimal threshold of ‘distance’, needed for an observation, is now lost and the ‘empirical situation’ collapses. No hard-scientist – whose
naturalistic, empirical approach has been borrowed and recommended for use – has ever experienced such dangerous metamorphosis into his Object . . . The situation outlined, reminds a misfortunate impasse for any empirically disposed sociologist.” (2006: 335).

Nor should they be judged upon those observables of society alone because to be perceived as reality it must arise from the sentience of the individual whose science it was, otherwise we find ourselves in the state of a Robinson Crusoe. Applying the Yaneva framework (2006), there are three elements comprising the involvement of the individual: Technology, understanding and society. The technology and its progress are passive. Therefore, how the other two elements relate to technology is crucial. This in turn has implications for science – in whose name technology advances – and for the individuals performing it, providing the observables for subsequent understanding.

Understanding society is not the same as understanding the physicality of our world. Indeed, this is the precise point! Since the Enlightenment, especially its early advocates such as Bacon and Hume, there has been a need to reconcile social virtuality with physicality under a single scientific banner. For Adorno and Horkheimer this was not some sort of Humean transformation equivalent to Paul’s conversion on the Road to Damascus, but a ‘grubby’ and continuous historicity between man and nature. To this extent, they declared when discussing the transformation of myth into science, “What the primitive experiences... is not a spiritual as opposed to a material substance, but the intricacy of the Natural in contrast to the individual. The gasp of surprise, which accompanies the experience of the unusual, becomes its name. It fixes the transcendence of the unknown in relation to the known, and therefore terror as sacredness. The dualization of nature as appearance and sequence, effort and power, which first makes possible both myth and science, originates in human fear, the expression of which becomes explanation. It is not the soul, which is transposed to nature, as psychology would have it...but the echo of the real supremacy of nature in the weak souls of primitive men. The separation of the animate and the inanimate, the occupation of certain places by demons and deities, first arises from pre-animism, which contains the first lines of the separation of subject and object.” (1970: 15). Science as well as the product of Enlightenment and its scientific outpourings - as Popper et al would have us believe – is also the consequence of a fear of the very thing, humankind sought to control – Nature! Born in the early pre-history days of humanity, priests, deities and elites have sought to use that fear to control those under their sway. Current Post-Positivist thinking is not so stark in its conceptualisation. Whereby Science is seen as “...estranged units of knowledge in various materialized forms...and...are but parts of a formation, completed by initiated individual's understanding.” (Yaneva, 2006: 340); yet palpably battered by
dominant positivist science, there is no questioning present of ontology but an implied acceptance of Kuhnian politics.

Thus, the moment the individual begins to theorise beyond the everyday mutterings of curiosity; with the intention to conduct scientific analysis, he or she does indeed commit himself or herself to a nihilistic doom. That is to say, to be successful they must submit to the ‘politicality’ of some convenient/influential paradigmatic organization. The more dominant this elite happens to be, the better for the individual (Kuhn, 1970). Nevertheless even if it is a Kuhnian type paradigm-in-waiting and thus not yet predominant, the individual will have to submit to its ‘rules’ as much as he would any predominant paradigm. The end result is therefore equally comparable. The individual is immersed into the ‘politicality’ of the paradigm, whereby his theories become theirs and more importantly, his Weltanschauungen tainted by the already corrupted view of the elite controlled paradigm. Hence, to produce ‘good science’ in true Popperian style is to reflect that corrupted view in a way that does not appear inert but respectfully contained within the prescribed boundaries of the paradigm. It is then a matter of the workings of political processes to determine the predominant view from amongst the paradigms (Kuhn, 1970). In short, to take an example from organisation theory, Contingency Theory is not predominant as an explanation for organization because it is necessarily the best explanation, but because it is the supported proposition within the prevailing paradigm – Functionalism.

The individual wishing to conduct science is confronted by two dimensions. The first is within a ‘world’ outside a paradigm. He is controlled by social/political elites even in a democracy, but more so, in totalitarian states; but in both cases certain thought processes are forbidden or discouraged; for example, individuals are discouraged from investigating genetic differences between ethnic groups. Therefore, provided the individual’s interests be within the bounds of social/elite acceptability he is then free to pursue what he will to the full extent of his curiosity. The second dimension is the ‘world’ within a paradigm, in which an individual must submit his individuality to the ‘will’ of the group but more probably to that of its elite. In so doing, the individual has given up his freedom to ‘see nature’ (at least theoretically) since he views it through the institutional veil of the paradigm as set by the elite (Lukács, 1978). Such a relationship between the two dimensions is reflected in the ‘obsession’ of the Kuhn-Popper debate to establish the nature and boundaries of ‘normal science’ – in other words ‘acceptable’ science! As Kuhn declared early on in his book, "Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science" (1970: 11). And whilst Kuhn argued that ‘advancement’ was not solely through ‘good science’ as Popper
claimed, but a consequence of politicised paradigms, his overriding presumption was nevertheless that science – good or bad – could only be conducted from within a paradigm. A position with which Popper would concur. His disagreement with Kuhn centred upon the nature of science and the boundary of its prevailing paradigms. For him it was a journey of the righteous, where a theory dominated by a process of natural selection. As he declared, "We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to survive" (1968: 108).

The contention here, however, is not regarding the determination of paradigmatic boundaries as with the Kuhn-Popper debate, but rather the presumption of the existence of such boundaries. That is, 'good science' can only be conducted within the bounds of a paradigm – whether it has to be acceptable and hence normal, or revolutionary and thus 'proto-normal' is the essence of the Kuhn-Popper debate. Given the particular nature of the academe eluded to above and discussed in greater depth below, scientific advancement as opposed to social revolution will only occur within the boundaries of an acceptable paradigm. The consequence is to determine 'normal science' alone as 'good science' and hence place it firmly within the auspice of the prevailing paradigm. Change is seen as an intricate part of the process and not revolutionary, thus alienating in one stroke all other paradigms as unacceptable to varying degrees of erroneousness. Indeed, the Positivist's stance (i.e. Popper and Watkins) is not only to reject the Kuhnian concept of revolutionary science, but also the notion that paradigmatic positioning is anything other than of passing interest. As Watkins declared belligerently in his rebuttal of the Kuhnian project, "One way of challenging it would be to point to historical counter-examples, that is, to long stretches of scientific history in which no clear paradigm emerged and during which the typical symptoms of Normal Science were absent. I remember Popper saying...that, although Newtonianism did turn into something like a paradigm in Kuhn's sense, no such paradigm emerged during the long history of the theory of matter" (1970: 34). For these people therefore, who are indeed the propagators of the prevailing paradigm, incommensurability was – and is – an anathema to the purity of science. The reasoning behind this was that two incommensurable theories, for example, could not be "...logically incompatible with each other" (Watkins, 1970: 36). Hence, given such a state, they would contradict one of the nostrums of Positivism – that is for the conduct of good science all observations must be potentially comparable and testable against all others (see Popper, 1968, 1972). For them, so-called 'Normal Science' is a palpable state.

5 The presumption being made here is that the Kuhn-Popper debate was won by the Popper camp. The reasons and evidence for this are well known.
Individual ‘scientists’ would conduct ‘normal science’ by the consequence of being rigorous and conscientious in their science. If they were not, then *ipso facto* they would not be good scientists and not deserve to be taken seriously.

And so we arrive at the nihilist’s doom!

Put simply, an individual must conduct their observations ‘scientifically’ if they wish their theoretic output to be considered anything more than anecdotal. To be scientific however is to place oneself into a politicised framework controlled by nostrums and elites, and therefore in effect to distance oneself from the ‘truth’ by means of a Lukácsian institutionalised veil. This of course does not mean technological/knowledge advancement does not take place, particularly in the physical sciences, nor that any consequential theory is necessarily a sham. Yet central to the Critical project (i.e. Adorno and Horkheimer, the Frankfurt School etc) is the proposition that scientific process should not be about technological advancement – or as they would have it domination – alone, but the reconciliation of humanity and nature torn apart by Enlightenment (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1970). It is our world seen through science that is the “sham”; rationalised, falsified and justified by a Positivist science in the name of technology. Yet, it is this very thing – our science – because of its intrinsic nature that in the end will see our demise!
CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

"The unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual: for individuality makes a mockery of the kind of society which would turn all individuals to the one collectivity" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972: 13)

As already discussed above, this work is presenting its theorectic in the form of a dialectic as opposed to an empirically based piece of scientific process. The reason for this, again discussed, is twofold. First, the epistemology of this work is subjectivist; and whilst this does not deny the appropriation of empirical data through ethnomethodology for example, it's positioning in terms of the universality and singularity debate is open to question. Second, and probably more importantly, a fundamental argument within this work is that due to the nature of Empiricism (as discussed throughout) aspects of ontological analysis are being overlooked. It has therefore been a conscious decision – without necessarily rejecting the need for Empiricism per se – to seek an analytical alternative. The distinction to be made here is that such a theorectic is usually regarded as part of methodology – that is an analysis of episto-ontological principles appertaining to the particular enquiry. Yet, here, it is also presented as a method – a means of analysis – to replace empirico-scientific analysis. The reasons for this are argued adequately throughout this work.

Within such a context, therefore, it is important to demonstrate the dynamics of the chosen dialectic. Briefly, it will plot a relationship between three principle elements. First, is power; an element of social action with particular regard to university management activity as an elite base. This is considered important because it is argued in this work that such activity has been itself a dynamic of the ontological change determined as the eventual outcome of the process plotted throughout the dialectic. Second, is epistemology politicised and affected by the university elite power. This is also important because politicised and affected, epistemology, in its role as a conduit, is the stimulant to ontological change. Then finally is the ontological state itself; argued here through the dialectic to be altered not purely by scientific process but also politicised social action. It should be appreciated that in any event much would be difficult to observe given the
nature of the theoretic; but this should not prevent an attempt to understand it. As such this work will be presented tentatively, recognising that such a model is merely a start rather than an end.

This, then, is the objective of the present chapter; to provide the necessary methodological basis of the dialectic as an analytical method in place of empirical observation; without as a consequence rejecting the need for such Empiricism. Certain fundamentals, however, need to be established. The first of these is the potentially solipsist state between method and methodology. This is a factor within subjectivist contention because the two, for reasons discussed throughout, are not necessarily distinct between observers and observed. Its reconciliation is regarded here as being important in order to eventually demonstrate a counter non-solipsist theoretic of proto-epistemological states. Fundamental to this methodological position, therefore, is the nature of the states themselves; these in turn are dependent upon perceptual mapping of not only the subjects but also the observers (scientists) and this is described by paradigms. This will be the subject matter of the first section below, with particular regard to paradigmatic commensurability and incommensurability.

How these aspects interplay is important in understanding two aspects about the dialectic. First its relationship with the arena under examination; in this case the three elements mentioned above; and second, its relationship with the author and observer within this work. Both aspects are important on two domains independent of the theoretic being developed. First, the epistemological domain and how it interacts with that; and second, the ontological state itself. A solipsist argument with regard to this is that since the observer cannot, by subjectivist contention, be independent of what they are observing, how can they 'scientifically' promote 'solutions' to any given state or theoretic? The consequence is that by subjectivist methodology, any observation of a 'true' ontological state is not possible. It is important to the contention of this work that such a position is successfully countered because a model will be presented plotting the knowledge states of both observers and observed. The foundations for this, and the required necessary support as discussed, will be explored in the second and third sections of this chapter.

The final sections of this chapter will be devoted to organisation and the nature of its change. It should be stressed at this point, that organisation is considered, by this work, as being important as an arena or framework within which the ontological conditioning takes place. That is not to claim for the process to work, organisation is per se required, but rather it is because universities themselves are organisations. In methodological terms, therefore, it is a necessary dynamic to determine the nature of the
first element of the dialectic — that is social action. Beyond that a particular type of
organisation is pertinent — business organisation. This is so for two reasons. First, the
universities themselves are organisations; and are becoming more businesslike,
dependent increasingly upon the second aspect: business analysis as an academic
discipline. Senior managers are attending MBS's etc and thus this alone is important. But
there is also another potential solipsist point to be identified which is methodologically
important. University management, forced by Government and markets to become like
business managers, have adopted business techniques to run their universities. In turn
they have required of their academic staff — as well their administration- a similar
approach, whatever their discipline. Thus, it will be argued, those who are responsible for
not only a specific social action but also its analysis are increasingly imbued with a
specific politicised epistemology. This needs to be included within any model presented
here, because if the argument presented is sound, then its author — by definition — must
also be influenced by such factors, himself being a member of one such university.
However, it is hoped the model will explain the apparent contradiction and take it beyond
such a solipsist state.

Paradigmatic Commensurability or not

It could be argued that if paradigms are not incommensurable then their inclusion
in any ontological debate is not necessary, since, if they are by implication
commensurable, their definition and differentiation becomes irrelevant (Jackson and
Carter, 1990). A paradigm is considered generally to be a theorectic framework which has
"... an underlying unity (between theorists) in terms of its basic and often taken for granted
assumptions, which separate a group of theorists in a very fundamental way from
theorists located in other paradigms" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 23). It would not be
meaningful to say that one paradigm is more or less more correct than another. They are
different worldly views (Weltanschauungen); one could almost say different universes in
which individuals construct their realities from a different set of ground rules. They may
have similarities in their epistemologies but their ontologies could be entirely unique
dependent upon the specific epistemology. Discussing this in terms of Kuhn's arguments,
Ladyman determined "...that scientific theories are often incommensurable with each other
in the sense that there is no neutral way of comparing their merits." (2006: 115).

To change therefore from one paradigm to another is difficult; Keat and Urry talk of
such changes for an individual being: "... akin to Gestalt switches or changes of religious
faith" (1975: 55). Ladyman on the other hand implied this to be impossible when he stated: "The idea that comparing paradigms are incommensurable is supported by the theory-ladenness of observation; if it is true that all observations are contaminated by background theories then the merits of each paradigm cannot be compared by subjecting them to experimental test because the proponents of the competing paradigms will not necessarily agree about what is observed." (2006: 116). Whilst Thomas Kuhn (1970) described any such shift in terms of social revolution whereby dominant and conventional wisdom is usurped by a theorectic framework based upon an entirely different paradigm, and also quite often an entirely different set of people. He quoted Max Planck as once declaring, "...a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents ... but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it". Even for those who see no problem with paradigmatic commensurability such as Popper, they still nevertheless envisage a shift from one paradigm to another as not being easy, analogous perhaps, to escaping from one thickly hedged field into another. Popper put it thus, "i do admit that at any moment we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language. But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: if we try we can break out of our framework at any time. Admittedly, we shall find ourselves again in a framework, but it will be a better and roomier one; and we can at any moment break out again." (1970: 56). Lipton, many years later, discussing the nature of understanding vis-à-vis knowledge stated that: "Understanding is not some sort of super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge: knowledge of causes." (2004: 30). Paradigmatic incommensurability, at whatever degree, does not of course deny knowledge development, but it is seen to occur mainly within each paradigm and only becoming "interparadigmatic journeys" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 24) of Kuhnian proportions on rare occasions.

For purposes of ontology therefore, the argument is that, in the short term at least, Paradigms are not commensurable. To argue otherwise would be to strip the paradigmatic concept of its meaning. If, for example, the Burrell and Morgan model of paradigm boundaries was adopted – whatever else one might think of it – the incommensurability of its four paradigms would have to be accepted by definition. Within such a theorectic framework, paradigmatic commensurability would be paradoxical because a paradigm establishes a boundary between two or more different understandings (Verstehen) based upon completely different worldly views (Weltanschauungen). To jump from one paradigm to another, although recognised as possible (e.g. Marx's so called epistemological break), would involve a different theorectic framework and thus go beyond the Burrell and Morgan model. Yet, as will be discussed in greater depth below, caution must be applied to a
limited extent since the presumption of Burrell and Morgan *et al* was that the individual’s knowledge and his subsequent understanding would develop compatibly within the same paradigmatic allocation. The Lipton (2004) quote above implies this might not be the case necessarily. Grimm makes the point more forcefully: “...that understanding is a kind of knowledge is something that—so far at least—has rarely been doubted by those working in the field. That makes it all the more striking that virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about the nature of understanding...has come to the conclusion that understanding is not a species of knowledge. They variously claim, for example, that understanding is immune to Gettier problems [when is a fact a fact?] whereas knowledge is not, that understanding is transparent whereas knowledge is not, and that understanding is possible even in the absence of truth, whereas this is an impossibility for knowledge. All in all, they argue, understanding and knowledge are simply pulling in too many different directions for the former to be thought of as a species of the latter.” (2006: 315-316). It will be argued below that this allows for the application of commensurability in paradigmatic analysis, whilst at the same time not denying an incommensurable one, palpable in the short term. This is an important point in a discussion on methodology because it can determine the nature of the dialectic and the ensuing theoretic developed and used.

Ontologically, Burrell and Morgan's model is somewhat limited. Kuhn (1970), on the other hand, was able to overcome such a paradox through a revolutionary mechanism, which automatically allocated the appropriate theoretic framework to the conventional or dominant paradigm of the time. Popper's model also displayed interparadigmatic features with his "Pickwickian" analogy. However, it could be contentiously argued, that because within Popper's model it was possible to maintain the same theoretic framework as one shifted from one paradigm to another, in terms of Burrell and Morgan's definition of a paradigm at least, Popper's so called paradigms should not be called paradigms.

However, despite the obvious appeal of the argument against paradigmatic commensurability it will nevertheless be supported throughout this work. This will not be presented so much in terms of whether paradigms are commensurable or not *per se* as in the Kuhn/Popper debate (see for example Beauchamp, 1975), but rather whether paradigmatic commensurability can provide a useful analytical mechanism for the interpretation of politicised epistemology. William Firestone, for example, determined that: "Those who argue that paradigms are incompatible view them as systems of rules that are largely deductive. Higher order theoretical principles about the nature of the world (ontology), and how one knows it (epistemology), govern the conduct of research. The first task here is to suggest alternative conceptions of paradigms. One approach is to view
paradigms as cultures; another is to suggest that the relationship between principles and practice should not be unidirectional but dialectical" (Firestone, 1990 in Guba: 105).

Although there are considerable ontological implications between the positions adopted by the two sides of the debate these can be reconciled. In short, what is proposed here is that paradigmatic commensurability and incommensurability need not be the antithesis of one another, when they are seen as occurring within different theoretic domains. Again, this is afforded extra support by Grimm discussing Zagzebski’s (2001) views on understanding and knowledge. According to Zagzebski (2001), one of the most striking differences between knowledge and understanding is that while understanding is transparent, knowledge is not. In her view, understanding is fundamentally a matter of grasping how various pieces of information relate to one another; it is a matter of making connections among them, of seeing how they hang together. But if that is the case, she argues, then it is natural to think that the object of understanding—apparently, the connection that we “see” – must be internal.” (2006: 316). This could provide a theoretic conduit between the everyday “life-world” governed by the need to understand, and the ontologically based “state” of knowledge.

Another clue to possible accommodation are to be found in Firestone’s comment quoted above when he talks of a dialectical relationship between paradigms. However, the position should not be as absolute as he suggests. Contention could still arise from Firestone’s statement because he places the dialectic within one theoretic framework. It will be proposed below that such a dialectic transcends the two levels of epistemology and ontology. It is not an argument, therefore, for a Mike Reed (1985) type of paradigmatic pluralism, which by implication suggests no constraint on logic. Paradigms are determined in a Popperian (1971) sense to be comparatively meaningful in all domains. People do not shed or adopt their paradigms like one does a suit of clothes, but rather are able to relate to one another’s worldly views and internalise them in their everyday life-world. Such a possibility of commensurability also palpably contradicts the incommensurable nature of Empiricism. Dicken explains thus: “The dilemma for the constructive empiricist is whether a state of affairs being observable is an objective modal fact. For if there were no objective modal facts, whether or not a particular state of affairs counts as observable would depend on which theory we use to describe it; and if this were the case, ‘the distinction between the observable and the unobservable really would have no epistemic relevance and constructive empiricism could not be sustained’ (2000: 850). Yet on the other hand, if there are objective modal facts ‘it is totally incompatible with constructive empiricism to
allow that we could know about such things, since that would amount to allowing that scientific theories tell us about more than the actual phenomena." (2007: 606).

Consequently, the analysis here shall commence in terms of identifying a dialectic between epistemology and ontology. In the former we are looking at how we make sense of the world. By definition this involves the individual interpreting their world and using such to live from day to day. With the use of perhaps a rather crude management analogy, at this level the individual is immersed within the woods, amongst the trees, as it were, trying to make sense of the fragmented environment confronting them. In the latter case (ontology), it involves stepping up out of the day-to-day life-world onto a higher metatheoretical level. In terms of the above analogy they are "helicoptering" out of the wood. Such a level transcends day-to-day interpretation and attempts to develop the basics of reality itself. At this level we are not concerned with interpretive social action and its immediate theorectic framework, but rather logical relationships. The two domains could be seen as being related in a dialectical relationship because one emerges, and is transformed by, the other. How we interpret our day-to-day life (epistemology) is a function of immanent (perhaps transcendental) logical constructions at the ontological level. They in their turn are continually being modified by a history of incrementally changing experience. Current day discussion (Dicken, 2007; Grimm, 2006; Yaneva, 2006) provides a further interesting dimension to this, in that the distinction identified between knowing and understanding, which is the fuel for current discussion, could also provide a dynamic to the dialectic between ontology and epistemology. On most occasions this is by implication. For example when Yaneva states: "Is an individual, provided with school education, capable to understand ‘fresh’ scientific texts? Is any graduate half-a-scientist, half – educated citizen, adapted to the intellectual and moral customs of his milieu, having good manners, competent in poetry, history, Bible’s cautionary tales? As ‘empirical being’, his knowledge is folded somewhere in-between all that. But anybody is aware, by personal life experience, that his normal or common literacy does not give access to scientific knowledge." (2006: 336); he is referring to such a relationship whereby through knowledge an individual gains perhaps understanding and in so doing transcends from epistemological to ontological state.

Such a relationship between the two domains whilst not overtly discussed in definitive terms is nevertheless well documented in the established literature, if only by implication, as demonstrated above. For example, Habermas (1988) discusses "the Linguistic Approach" to understanding society in terms of consciousness and its transcendental construction. In so doing, he implies a dialectical relationship between the two domains with only language providing the mechanism for its recognition and
evaluation. Habermas states that, "...the problem of language has taken the place of the traditional problem of consciousness: the transcendental critique of language takes place of that consciousness" (1988: 117). Consciousness forms out of our day-to-day action and is meaningfully expressed epistemologically as "everyday" language. The logic behind such life forms, however, is beyond expression within the context of our everyday life-world (Husserl, 1969). They are thus transcendental and as such situated within the ontological domain. Wittgenstein (1961) calls this linguistic transcendentalism and expresses it in terms of a pure linguistical logic, which he, too, sees as being beyond the essence of everyday language. As we shall see below there is also support for this dialectical relationship from Lukács (1980) and Bhaskar (1979).

For every individual, therefore, there is this over arching, transcendental relationship within our reality construction (in or out of different groups) between our life-world at the epistemological level and the "given" aspect of the world immanently defined at the ontological level. The two do not represent one theoretical framework and therefore, although linked dialectically, are driven by different logical relationships. As such one could legitimately claim different paradigmatic relationships without contradiction in the separate domains. Moreover, as discussed above, this can be readily interpreted in concrete "life-world" terms as the distinction between understanding and knowing of any individual (see Yaneva, 2006).

**Dialectic — Epistemology**

Within the epistemological domain the main concern should be the interpretation of social action, which relates to the explicit, formal and informal, level of society (see for example Silverman, 1970). The logical relationships developed within this theoretic framework are about me, and my fellows, making sense of the world. However, as individuals we are precluded from ownership of any transcendental and immanent truth because we can never fully know how others see the world since communication between ourselves can never be perfect (Habermas, 1979). We are thus forced to rely upon our own perceptual judgements of what is "out there" and to reconcile that with our fellows through the societal framework (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). An epistemological examination, therefore, frees us from the necessity to go beyond into the foundations of knowledge itself and thus in particular allows us the freedom of a "given", perhaps reified, world (Dogan, 2005).
Nevertheless, in epistemology's transformation to a life-world concept such as society, we are faced with something of a problematic. As Habermas and others continually point out, society is an anathema to our individuality. Its logic demands that we understand it as immanent and transcendental - a truth to which we all must comply. Yet at the same time, logically we cannot fully comply because we can never truly know the mind of the others (Ladyman, 2002).

It is argued here that a solution could lie in the nature of the dialectic between the epistemological and ontological domain. Our social action requires us to act in the present. Thus all social frameworks, being set in an historical context and also ontologically formed, are considered for a particular point in time as "givens". In every social action event the actors assume a rationality of action for each other, which is based upon such "givens". Only in times of fundamental dispute such as change or political disruption are such givens brought into the social action framework and we are then perhaps confronted by a Kuhnian revolutionary situation. In the meantime our presumption of a common ontology allows us to reconcile or ignore all minor differences for the sake of present action. We have therefore divorced ourselves from the need as individuals to fundamentally grasp the transcendental nature of society or organisation because the logic and rationale of our social action does not require it.

Quite obviously organisations, for example, do exist beyond the fluid day-to-day interpretative expressions of individuals. In other words there is something continuous and apparently objective about them, since each of us is able to interpret particular examples in a roughly similar fashion. However, Habermas (1979) determines this to be a conceptual and linguistic mechanism contrived for communicative purposes by the dominant group in order to maintain power. One, which nevertheless falsifies and distorts the true nature of the way we interact. Lukács (1980) describes such a process more succinctly in terms of an institutionalised model of reality.

The institution provides the link in terms of a mechanism of logic between the epistemological and ontological domain. It is the driving mechanism for the dialectic mentioned by Firestone (1990 in Guba) above. At the epistemological level it is a transmission of power from the elite ensuring continued compliance and constraint of social action. Although individuals abandon complex ontological perception for the sake of day-to-day activity and thus make assumptions about the givens, they are able to do so because the institutional model itself has provided them with a rational and legitimate basis to make such assumptions. To put it crudely, the institution has encouraged them through a combination of reward and sanction, to forsake their ontological responsibilities for the comfort of an unquestionable, and apparently transcendental social framework.
(Laing, 1965); one, which provides for the necessary social action in order to support the incumbent organisational elite.

The advantage of such an institutional model linking both domains is that it does not deny the individual, for the sake of an understanding of social action, the potential of a contradicting and competing ontology. Indeed if one is to envisage certain fundamental change, such as a takeover by one elite over another, then this must be the case. Although the average individual's model of reality will reconcile quite readily with that of the institution, for theoretical purposes it is quite important to allow the possibility of differentiation. As we have seen it enables change to occur, but it also allows the potential of political activity and not continuous consensus. As a consequence, even at an epistemological level the individual is allowed his particular paradigm. Not many will take up the challenge, being only too willing to acquiesce to power. It does, however, enable a model of organisation, because of the real potential, to incorporate the concept of paradigmatic commensurability without contradiction to the tenet set up at the beginning framework, therefore, an epistemological domain in organisation no longer seems paradoxical. It does not exclude from an individual his paradigm, and yet at the same time recognises the need for paradigmatic security and hence incommensurability. This can occur because by creating a dialectic between ontology and epistemology in organisation one can suspend the need for continual reference to basic beliefs for the sake of social action. In any event, the institution itself ensures that even at an ontological level, for the majority at a given point in time, there is consensus for a particular paradigm But because we cannot separate practicality from analysis to any meaningful extent, and also to ensure the possibility of fundamental change, we must logically allow for the potential within the epistemological domain of competing and contradicting paradigms.

Dialectic – Ontology

Proceeding hypothetically upward onto an ontological level all aspects of social action are left behind. Relationships are now based upon logic and not behaviour or social action. It is a world, if it can be called such, representing, as it does, immutable consequences in logic form of our own interaction on the epistemological level whether within society or our physicality. It is contended here that such a world cannot be simply likened to the stand apart objective codes such as those found in Popper's "World 3" hypothesis (1983) for example, which seem to act as great storage tanks for human knowledge and transcend all individual interpretation. Whilst on the other hand, nor is this world solely the consequence of an individual's interpretation. Schutz (1967) for example
portrayed reality only through the stream of consciousness based upon our lived experiences. These have no meaning in themselves and thus cannot appeal to a Popperian metaworld. Meaning arises not through immanent logic but through each of us looking back at our experiences retrospectively, but such collectivity does not make the matter of ontology.

It is perhaps a position appertaining approximately to what Egon Guba (1990) has termed as Post positivism, although in terms of the relationship between epistemology and ontology this stance is located within a Critical perspective. Guba's definition of post positivist ontology is that "reality exists but can never be fully apprehended. It is driven by natural laws that can be only incompletely understood" (1990: 23). Giorgi perhaps captured the essence a little better by stating that "... the priority is given to the measurement perspective, and, in order for something to be measured, only its tangible aspects can be apprehended, and thus the indices itself of a phenomenon become more important than the phenomenon" (1970: 291). Within the early Critical tradition, Adorno (1973), especially, emphasised in opposition to Hegelian philosophy, and the subsequent viewpoint of Popper, that reality could not be grasped from a single standpoint, whether a subjective or an objective one. David Held interpreted Adorno's understanding as suggesting "... only negativity - that the difference between subject and object cannot be abolished.... Critique cannot escape the terms of reference of its object ... [whilst] ... The power of reflection is inadequate to 'grasp the totality of the real'" (1980: 204).

The ontological domain, therefore, is characterised by a tension, almost paradoxical, between an objective reality on the one hand, representative by fundamental and immanent facticity anchoring us down to an immutable societal framework; and a subjective application on the other through the inevitability of individual interpretation into social action or the epistemological level. The debate highlighted by Burrell and Morgan (1979), amongst others, seems to present us with the option to focus toward either end of a continuum but not to have both. The continuum Burrell and Morgan identify is between Nominalism and Realism, which is whether we believe our world to be meaningful in the mind or as an independent facticity. Today, the contrast is not so stark and generally rests upon different degrees of Empiricism, whether logico-structuralist or relative-naturalist (Pihlstrom and Siitonen, 2005). Merely labels perhaps, but it provides a slightly altered view of the differing states discussed above in terms of an a priori or a posteriori one; expressed as a consequence of knowledge or understanding. Pihlstrom and Siitonen determined that: "...all pieces of genuine human knowledge, are either analytic a priori or synthetic a posteriori..." (2005: 82). This can nevertheless provide the dynamic for the dialectic between the two levels.
Such debate inevitably contains political undertones, expressed ultimately in terms of Positivism and anti-Positivism (Morrow: 1994). On the one side of the continuum is Nominalism, which ostensibly at least idealizes a theoretic of isolationist diversity in terms of observable states (Yaneva, 2006). As such it could be argued that it is not as open to the machinations of political intrusion by management, because the nature of its epistemology is itself not so easily politicised. This is a big assumption to make, but one that will be allowed to stand for the time being. Realism, on the other hand, is at the other end of the continuum and is seen as being part of the establishment - the dominant orthodoxy - conservative and wishing to support the status quo. This has arisen over the years from the belief that Realism underpins an objective reality driven by natural laws, which emerge in a Darwinian way to become the most appropriate for humanity. As Egon Guba stated, **"If there is a real world operating according to natural laws, then the inquirer must behave in ways that put questions directly to nature and allow nature to answer back directly. The inquirer, so to speak, must stand behind a thick wall of one way glass, observing nature as she does her thing"** (1990: 19). The effect of this is to encourage the continuity of the norm through "conventional wisdoms" (Galbraith, 1967) because the world is largely factual and beyond our control. Thus all we can do, as observers, is allow it to take its course and explain any manifest deviances in the hope of indirectly affecting better outcomes. How well we fit our actions/thoughts to that are termed in degrees of rationality. Typical of this perception is Tondl when he states: **"The human goal-oriented activity which we are prepared to perceive as rational is naturally assumed to involve certain knowledge in its orientation. In such contexts, we also tend to consider making use of specific knowledge, of applications of suitable or competent knowledge, of our abilities not only to reproduce knowledge or rather to understand its meaning, adequately to interpret such knowledge, but also to master its competencies, manage its relations in tackling defined problem situations, etc. Seen in this light, this also involves the practical, pragmatic or praxeological dimensions of specific knowledge or rather its sets. To believe in an independent, natural and objective world is to adhere to the rational."** (2007: 91).

The analysts of such a world are by implication looking for a rational, and thus predictable, explanation of the phenomenon unfolding before them. Since it is independent it must have its own logic and therefore be rational otherwise it is a deviation from the norm. To be rational as an independent object is to have some sort of functionality, which can be empirically observed and recorded. This, then, is the essence of a Positivist's epistemology, which is supported by an objectivist paradigm. Its application is particularly useful in the machinations of the establishment because it is far easier to manage something if it is seen as a facticity rather than an idea. One can control
far more effectively something, which can be owned, or something, which is stated unreservedly as a natural law. One cannot control very well other peoples' perceptions.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in our business organisations. The point is put quite well by Pfeffer; "The belief in the value of [the] rational... provides a common ideology... to hide the use of power and legitimate decision outcomes ... [and]... are part of a ritualised ideology, used to legitimate and partially obscure the actual choice processes that are taking place" (1981: 194-196).

The underlying politics of ontology, therefore, cannot be lightly dismissed because they govern our willingness to accept or reject certain worldly models which do or do not support personal or group agendas. A quick glance at most of our academic, socio-political and culture media demonstrates a widespread assumption of the objective paradigm. In a Kuhnian sense we all achieve greater success if we conform. One definite way in which one is perceived not conforming is to be seen supporting a range of models, by no means a cohesive set, which either directly or by implication question the legitimacy of the dominant power group's authority. To this end, Roy Bhaskar observed, "[Positivist] knowledge must be viewed as a produced means of production with intransitive objects existing and acting independently of it" (1979: 19). Gouldner put it a little more forcefully, "The myth of a value-free sociology has been a conquering one. Today, all the powers of sociology... have entered into a tacit alliance to bind us to the dogma that, 'Thou shalt not commit a value judgement,' especially as sociologists. Where is the sociologist, where is the introductory text-book, the lecture on principles, that does not affirm or imply this rule?" (1962: 199). Whilst Thomas Kuhn stated, "Normal Science ... often suppresses fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments." (1970: 5). Those at the top of each discipline more often than not control such basic commitments tightly and as C. Wright Mills (1959) would have us believe, they in turn form part of the dogma attached to the so-called power elite or establishment.

The exact nature of these political and social mechanisms is beyond the point being made here. However, in the sense that we are all subject to socio-political pressures, from all levels of society, then such constraints are relevant in a discussion on ontology because they can form inducements, or otherwise, toward the creation of specific models within our worldly views. To put it crudely, it takes a fairly resilient person to reject the established or institutional model for something more individualistic. This applies not only within the domain of social action in terms of, say, the desirability of an employee possessing a similar institutional model as the employers if he or she is to advance; but also at an ontological level in terms of, say, a social scientist producing socially (as opposed to academically) acceptable social models. It is an unsaid wisdom that one is
able to achieve more easily the publication of an idea reflecting the conventional wisdom, than with one rejecting it. Ultimately, therefore, we must recognise that our models do not always result from pure thought alone, but are the consequence of external socio-political pressures which quite often give them a hermeneutical expression which is more than mere revelation of truth!

The establishment rejects a world that is subjectively orientated. Once again this is particularly apparent within business organisations. My own research within a number of firms in the North East indicated that it was not simply a rejection of relativity in favour of positivism, but rather a rejection of individuality itself (1992). Many senior managers regarded views that were sensitive to the formation of individual perceptions in organisation as being in some way subversive. For example, one manager when asked about something as innocuous as cultural development dismissed it as "left wing propaganda for worker control of business". It perhaps says something for the state of British management. The point to be made here, however, is that to a greater or lesser degree many managers are suppressing ideas of a perceptual domain within organisation for politico-rational reasons.

The purpose of the argument has been to demonstrate the dominance of the physical domain paradigm in the modelling of organisation. This has arisen not only as a consequence of any "scientistic" argument, but also more cynically as a consequence of political interaction. In effect this has generated a falsified dichotomy between the two domains by presenting them in terms of Kuhnian paradigms as opposing and indeed contradicting worldly views. Habermas (1988) saw this as a Philosophical dualism reflecting the Weberian distinction between the natural and cultural sciences. He stated that, "The mutually uncomprehending coexistence of analytical philosophy of science and philosophical hermeneutics troubles the rigid self-consciousness of neither two parties. Occasional attempts to bridge the gap have remained no more than good intentions. There would be no reason to touch on the well buried issue of the dualism of science if it did not in one area continually produce symptoms that demand analytic resolution: in the social sciences, heterogeneous aims and approaches conflict and intermingle with one another." (1988: 2)

At an epistemological level this has not proved critical since the outcomes of day-to-day social action has demanded their integration. But at an ontological level, however, we have been allowed the luxury of maintaining such a split as an expression of "true" knowledge construction rather than political necessity. The point is, however, that despite us perhaps realizing that politics has tainted the purity of our worldly models, we must still
nevertheless accept that as given because the cultural/social pressures upon us to conform to "conventional wisdom" are considerable.

Thus a person adopting an opposing paradigm does so in the full knowledge of contradicting the norm and hence to a certain degree may feel alienated from the general stream of social science. They are therefore positioned by their fellows as revolutionaries. They can then be easily dismissed, if so desired, as subversive because they are seen to contradict the socialised acceptability of the norm. Two opposing views can be listed to demonstrate this, one from the "conventional wisdom", whilst the other from the perceived revolutionary perspective. First Emile Durkheim: "If the laws governing natural life are also found in society, they are found in different forms and with specific characteristics which do not permit of conjecture by analogy and can only be understood by direct observation.... Like the individual, the collective life is composed of representations, and it may therefore be presumed that the collective and individual representations are in some ways comparable" (1953: 1-2). The second view is by Marcuse; "As the given world was bound up with rational thought and, indeed, ontologically dependent on it, all that contradicted reason or was not rational was posited as something which was to be overcome. Reason was established as a critical tribunal." (Bronner and Kellner (eds), 1989: 59). It is suggested that "Reason" and "Rationality" implied within both these quotes are fully owned by those controlling the incumbent institutional model.

In many respects this is Adorno's concept of Negative Dialectics (1973) by stating what the world is not, rather than what it is. However, because we cannot indeed separate theory from practice, it is exceedingly difficult to know what the world ever is. As we have already seen, at an epistemological level this determines a commensurable paradigmatic structure because social action is always potentially the consequence of action which could theoretically contain any paradigmatic form. Paradoxically when we proceed to the ontological level the opposite is true. Ontology is divorced from social action in the sense that unlike epistemology it is not a reification of our life-world experiences. As such it is an immanent declaration of fundamental worldly "truth" from which manifest social action emerges. It transcends the day-to-day activity and appears to us to be indisputable within the short term at least.

Contrary to a Schutzian perspective (1967), however, it is contended here that this knowledge construction is not necessarily set by the individual's own experiential base. Nor is it in a Durkheimian sense (1953) purely a consequence of social structure, almost predetermined and therefore only to be observed. It is set in a Kuhnian sense (1970) by individuals wishing to conform. Thus it is not perception as such, which divides the different models, initially at least, but political expediency. In the case of the theorist, for
example, such pressures can be quite overt – “you do not get published if you do not conform”. For the average individual, the pressures are perhaps more subtle and exerted through cultural and structural mechanisms. At the ontological level therefore, it is institutional mechanisms and not the day-to-day social action, which creates the original divisions to which individuals become committed and thus form the basis for their worldly views. By definition institutions are not commensurate, creating as they do paradigms which are contra-distinctive and in opposition. The deal for the individual to be a member of any organisation is to adopt them willingly or to be excluded. As such at an ontological level, because there is thus no quarter, paradigms must always be incommensurate.

The Nature of the Dialectic

To summarise the argument so far, it is claimed that the paradigmatic framework is not such an absolutist model as the two extremes of the debate are determining. It is not merely a question of commensurability or incommensurability depending upon the individual’s underlying political beliefs, but rather one accompanied by the logic of a particular theorectic framework. In the social action sense and thus at an epistemological level, our life-world is governed by our relationship with others through enacted processes. We are thus forced by whatever means to adopt not only our own worldly models, but, through modification to our own, other peoples’ as well. The logic of commensurability is therefore well founded here. Many of our social models - if not the majority - are merely formalised statements of social action and therefore can be legitimately considered to be commensurable.

The Ontological domain, however, comprises fundamental life-world truths and societal frameworks manifest through culture, which are to us immanent facticities. These provide meaning or a framework to our social action but are not a part of social action. They transcend the day-to-day form of our life-world. They are not, however, pure knowledge construction unique to every individual. Ideally this would be the case, but in reality individuals are affected by their life-world and as a consequence by the institutional models present there. These are thus post rationally translated back to worldly views, which reconcile with dominant or conventional models for social action on the epistemological level. Ontologically therefore knowledge is divided by a political pressure to conform in one-way or another and falsified by the representing institutional model. There is no room for convergence or compromise since the knowledge has been captured and distorted through the institutional model. To reflect this in terms of differing paradigms we must at least initially deny them the ability of being commensurable.
So at these two levels a differing theoretical framework confronts us. They are not independent but interdependent, thus allowing the possibility of commensurability and incommensurability. This cannot be considered a description of organisation, but rather a complex logical relationship. To the employee within his or her own organisation, they, of course, will not be particularly aware of such complexity. To them, their everyday life exists within their social action and very rarely taps the so-called givens of ontology. The two domains are nevertheless interactive and the process of understanding the day-to-day interpretations of the institutional model is itself an ontological link. The point being made here is that the dialectic between the two domains occurs continuously as an outcome of their intrinsic nature (see figure 1 below).

FIGURE 1 - DIALECTIC BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

The above diagram, although perhaps not perfect, represents the dialectical process between commensurability and incommensurability of the same paradigm within the two domains. We have seen that the essence of the argument is that at the ontological level, paradigms, untouched by social action are allowed to remain inviolate and hence incommensurable. These are fundamental truths, which by definition are constrained or contaminated by political realities. At the epistemological level such paradigmatic purity is forced to converge by the necessities of social action. The institutional model forces and distorts these so called truths into a converged paradigm, which although still
distinguishable in terms of confrontation of different truths, is still nevertheless commensurable with social action.

THE WEAKNESS OF CRITICAL THEORY AND THE POSTMODERIST CHALLENGE

Throughout the discussion above many of the theoretic frameworks sought and alluded to therein have been based upon Critical Theory, especially The Frankfurt School; and in particular upon Adorno and Horkheimer's work, "Dialectic of Enlightenment" (1970). Whilst it is recognised that their work was developed in the earlier half of the last century, it is argued that there is still considerable relevance to the current debate between singularity and universality. As Crook et al determined: "Adorno’s work...forms one of the most important archives for the development of a post-foundational radicalism, and is constituted as a thorough-going critique of the claims of modern radicalism" (1970: 78).

However, it is also recognised that their adoption of negative dialectics as a major analytical tool to determine the relationship between myth and science or universality (totality) and singularity (particularity) could – and has – exposed them to substantive criticism. Aronowitz put it thus, "Perhaps two texts, Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of the Enlightenment...and Herbert Marcuse's One Dimensional Man...exemplify best how critical sociology unwittingly generates new, one might say positivist, categories – not in the course of constructing analytic categories such as system and structure, but as a concomitant (not the outcome) of historically and hermeneutically based enquiry. Dialectic of the Enlightenment problematizes the rupture between myth and science and thereby begins an investigation of the Enlightenment by subverting one of its underlying claims: to have freed knowledge (and therefore humanity) of the thrall of superstition" (1992: 301-302).

Negative dialectics were proffered in particular by Adorno as an anti-foundationalist counter to the Hegelian foundationalist aspiration of the earlier critical theorists accused of being "Radical Positivists" (Crook et al, 1992). Aronowitz defined it as being, "...just like The Philosophy of No...(and)...was offered as a corrective to the tendency of knowledge to reproduce itself dogmatically in the wake of epochal changes in society" (1992: 310). But it was also a reaction to the, then, increasing domination of Marxism in radical theory. Forced by this into a position of denial, negative dialectics were seen to be effectively anti-theoretical by identifying non-identity thinking, or dialectic, in terms of the concept-object (Crook et al, 1992). The problem arises, therefore, in part that negative dialectics, by implication, determine theory as seeking to establish a truth and therefore should logically reject as positivistic. Yet in so disavowing theory, it has of itself
created its own theory and thus seeks to establish its own form of truth, contradicting itself in the process. Schutz (1967) understood this “entrapment” only too well and throughout his academic career was reluctant to establish formalised theory from his work.

Adorno and the Frankfurt School were very aware of this defect. Indeed the historicity of Critical Theory is one of transformation from Horkheimer’s foundationism, which was regarded as radical positivism and thus theory supporting (Crook et al, 1992); to Adorno’s anti-foundationism, which rejected a philosophical theorectic in favour of narrative (Guess, 1981). Throughout, the debate evolved around the nature of the identified entrapment whereby the critical theorist in so using negative dialectics undermined his own position. Marcuse – a latter day critical theorist – discussed the issue when he stated, “The Critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its [civilization’s] future: holding no promise and showing no success, it remains negative. Thus, it wants to remain loyal to those who, without hope, had given their life to the Great Refusal” (1964: 257). Alexander (1992) noted that this was a position not too dissimilar to a postmodernist one; although Marcuse, like Habermas after him, always denied they were postmodernists.

Nevertheless postmodernism was seen by Crook et al (1992) in providing a way out for critical theory in terms of its self inflicted theorectic entrapment. As such, it would be useful to examine, briefly, the postmodernist perspective in relation to the theorectic presented within this thesis. It should be stated from the outset, however, that whilst postmodern dialogue (as opposed to theory) contains valuable insight to the problem, for reasons that will become self evident this work does not support a postmodernist epistemology and therefore must reject its ultimate conclusion.

Jencks (1986) ascertained postmodernism to be amorphous possessing “…a sinuous, even tortuous path. Twisting to the left and then to the right, branching down the middle, it resembles the natural form of spreading root, or a meandering river that divides, changes course, doubles back on itself and takes off in a new direction” (1986: 2). It is perhaps this which often invokes denial from those who are asked whether they are postmodernist or not. Foucault, contentiously considered by many to be the greatest of the postmodernists, has often denied that he ever was one. It seemingly means many things to different people and hence, perhaps, the confusion; whether in the arts, cultural analysis or perhaps most famously in architecture. Here, postmodernism will be considered purely as an alternative to critical theory.

Seidman (1992) considers postmodernism to be a great liberator developing from an anti-foundationalist theorectic to determine not universality but particularity through
dialogue and thereby freeing the observer from the solipsistic doom of theory and ultimately the critical theorist’s entrapment discussed above. Yet for Wood (1999) this is not without cost. Its amorphous nature is both its strength and weakness. Its strength, as Seidman (1992) discussed allowed it to break free from theory. But this was also its weakness since without theorectic foundation it was dependent upon the frameworks of modernism as a counter-critique. As wood put it, “The relationship is something more akin to a continuous engagement, which implies postmodernism needs modernism to survive, so that they exist in something more like a host-parasite relationship” (1999: 6).

Nevertheless relevant to the discussion within this thesis is the perceived postmodernist rejection of the concepts, and the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity; in particular Heidegger’s (1968) work developing an anti-theorectic dialogue from Adorno’s (1973) anti-foundationalist critique of his own critical theory. Rose (1978) in reflecting Heidegger’s view, observed that the induced categorical opposition of both subjective and objective could not capture adequately the dominance of objectivity and thus laid it open to the solipsism of negativity. Heidegger’s solution was to evoke the nihilistic frameworks of Nietzsche by re-citing the ‘death of metaphysics’ and consequently theory in favour of dialogue. It was seen as laying the foundations for Sartre’s “Existentialism” and Derrida’s “Deconstruction”; both playing a vital role in determining the critique of the negative dialectic between subject and object.

Despite his denial, perhaps Foucault is seen as the most prominent postmodernist; and certainly for the purposes of this thesis – along with Lyotard – having the greatest relevance. In particular, his theoretics on power and reason are recognised as providing a progression forward to substantive critical theory (Boyne, 1990; Gutting, 2001). Centre to the critical theorist project is power and by implication the Marxist agenda for social change attached to it. As represented in this thesis, such power possesses a nihilist doom that demands solely a negative dialectic to augment its reckoning; set as an instrument within a social arena governed by the relationship between the oppressors and the oppressed. Marcuse – seen as a transmutation between Critical theory and postmodern – concluded, in referring to the consequence of the critical theorist negativity, that, “Social transformation remains a utopian hope, without contemporary base in actual social life; in fact, social life is counter factual to any hope of change unless we are somehow able to compose a constellation of differentiated elements” (1964: 256). The critical theorist’s instrumentation of power is monolithic, and certainly not differentiated, in its application; termed by Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) as “instrumental reason” it was the “nexus of rationality and social actuality” (1972: xvi) and driven relentlessly by the myth of Enlightenment. It was this latter indictment against Enlightenment, and by implication
science itself, which caused many such as Marcuse and to a lesser extent Adorno himself with his discussion regarding anti-foundationalism, to baulk at the ultimate logic of its negativity – that is the negation of any release through a liberated science. It was a ghost which was to haunt all of the Frankfurt School and their successors – including Habermas; and they were aware of it. Aronowitz was considerably more blunt when he declared, "...I argue that no critical theory, including the Frankfurt School, can dispense with either categories or metacategories, from which to make historical and empirical judgements....In short, just as doing science entails making judgements in the sense that its axiomatic structures may be interrogated, so those who would interrogate social life cannot avoid science, if by this constellation we mean positing a hierarchy of existents without which empirical judgement is arbitrary" (1992: 314).

For postmodernists such as Foucault power was therefore something different; it was contended to be more a dynamic than a state of existence, placed in a de-categorised and un-universal process (Foucault, 1970), mirroring the practicalities of social action through discourse, discursive formation and knowledge (Foucault, 1972). Unlike critical theory it was not deterministic and consequently producing an inevitable negative dialectic of critical analysis and solipsistic event of an un-liberated science. Aronowitz finally determined that, "When we seek to explain social relations, we must go beyond negative dialectics. From critical theory's own perspective, what lies beyond must necessarily be historically and practically situated. I believe that just as Foucault is right to point out that intellectuals no longer work in categories of "universal" truths but theorize and do practical research in situated locations.....so categories of social knowledge must be specific. We can no longer characterize entire societies by divisions into sectors, orders or invariant relations of determination such as economic infrastructure or Great Ideas" (1992: 314).

It will be contended below, however, that such an interpretation of the contextualisation of power and its consequential diminishment in episto-ontological formation is to miss the point of critical theory itself. Whilst the Frankfurt School might well have backed away from the solipsistic abyss, nevertheless they set in train an inevitability that power is instrumental rather than dynamic through their deterministic labelling of the scientific process itself. The postmodernist balks at the intrusion of power into knowledge, but as will be argued throughout this work; it is achieved through the instrumentality of science and as such is an indirect acquisition.

Foucault found himself in a similar position to Marx, in that other’s were to champion his cause and inevitably did not represent his true intent, since he always denied much of what he was purported to believe. One such misrepresentation was
power, but another was "reason" which was packaged and hurled against critical theory as a disclaimer, not by Foucault so much as his acolytes. Foucault determined reason as an instrument in order to achieve the "truth" particularly in his analysis of madness and sanity in terms of their dialectical juxtaposition (1967). For the early critical theorist "reason" was a Hegelian proposition setting the foundation of the dialect but, in their view, wrongly asserting a positive association rather than a negative one. As Held determined in identifying the argument, "The positive character of the dialectic emerges from the attempt to grasp negativity of the real. The particular exists only in and through the totality of relations of which it is a part. To grasp its nature is, therefore, to grasp the complete set of its relations or the universal that makes it what it is....Thus the true form of reality is not the unity of the particular as such but the universal – the universal that comes-to-be and through the particulars. Dialectical thinking is positive because in Hegel's words, it is the source of the Universal in which the Particular is comprehended" (1982). It was Marcuse, and later Habermas, following Adorno's anti-foundationalist agenda who laid the path for a postmodernist critique of the Frankfurt School based on such a Hegelian proposition.

They, and the postmodernists, posited that since there can be no "Universality" it was "Reason" which was instrumental of the Particular in order to grasp the "Universal". For Foucault, "Reason" represents an important contradistinction to the condition of madness driven by the Weberian compulsion to rationalize and hence reject madness as irrational and therefore an abomination. Yet he determined "Reason" as central to the positive critical dialectic when he declared, "I think the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers" (1984: 208) Hence Foucault saw "Reason" the essence of rationality and the enemy of the nihilist doom. So that it was "Reason" which would save us from the solipsism of Critical Theory. As Grassby determined; "Reason is involved in this process in so far as it conditions and restricts our choice, our assertion, of primary values, for we cannot accept a value system that is inconsistent or would lead us to some irrational conclusion" (2005: 65).

Lyotard (1984) in particular developed this thesis; that the end of The Great narrative and with its "large scale theories" of not only the critical theorist but also positivist science, generated scepticism in the adequacy of metatheoretical explanation. An irony not lost on Baudrillard (1980) whereby postmodernist and positivist could unite in agreement at least in part against critical theory. For Derrida (1973) such criticism was rendered in pair rather than glee. His major concern was phenomenology rather than criticality, yet no less damning of the critical theory's solipsistic state of its narrative. In
particular, he did not decry the Grand Theory per se but rather an individual’s ability to transfer its conception in the mind to the medium of writing. He acknowledged that this was the case even with his own writings when he declared, “In this essay the problematic of writing was already in place as such, bound to the irreducible structure of ‘deferral’ in its relationships to consciousness, presence, science, history and the history of science, the disappearance or delay of the origin… this essay can be read as the other side (recto or verso, as you wish) of Speech and Phenomena” (1981: 5). In true Wittgensteinian (1953) sense he determined that language was the bête noir of metatheory in that the state of its particular denied expression of the Universal. In short, critical theory could not work because the mind concepts it produced were just too complex to articulate as theory.

The postmodernist position, therefore, renders the positivist/anti-positivist dialectic as irrelevant. For them it is a question of degree of structure within the framework discussed above. This did not mean, necessarily, that they all determined it to be the driving instrument of their narratives; indeed, as already stated above. Yet there were two “post-structuralist” themes occurring throughout all the work of Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Barthes and Kristeva for example. First, that there were not, and could never be, absolute “truths” about the world as particularly expressed through universality (Derrida: 1991). Second, the concept of a post-structuralist epistemology was not a particularly appealing one to any of them, since it would imply politicisation through a manifesto – the very thing they were accusing critical theory of becoming. Rather it was a reaction as Foucault himself put it, “…For the last ten or fifteen years, the immense and proliferating criticizability of things, institutions, practices, and discourses; a sort of general feeling that the ground was crumbling beneath our feet, especially in places where it seemed most familiar, most solid, and closest to us, to our bodies, to our everyday gestures. But alongside this crumbling and the astonishing efficacy of discontinuous, particular, and local critiques, the facts were also revealing something… beneath this whole thematic, through it and even within it; we have seen what might be called the insurrection of subjugated knowledges (2003: 2).

For the purposes of this work, however, such an epistemology is rejected. The post-modernist denial of the metatheoretical “truths” and hence universality of Critical Theory is illusionary. Indeed, whilst beyond the scope of this particular work, a counter-argument could be established that postmodernism is, itself, metatheoretically based and thus could be contended as solipsistic and internally inconsistent (e.g. Willard, 1996). Since discussion regarding the nature of Critical Theory will be continued in depth below, it will be sufficient to declare at this juncture that despite the postmodernist claim to the impracticality of metatheory, it will be argued throughout this work as providing the only
means in establishing a relevant framework in order to understand the nature of a politicised epistemology.

*Critical Theory and the University*

Postmodernism aside, it is, however, recognised that there still remain some fundamental criticisms of the Frankfurt School. In particular, Held (1982) listed them as being: first, that Critical Theory is merely an extension of German Idealism and all that entails; second, that Critical Theory shows undue concern for philosophical problems rather than the practicalities of changed social action; third, that Critical Theory spent too much time on aesthetics and culture when at least half the world is in poverty; and finally, that Critical Theory was generally too remote from working class politics and is of itself elitist.

It could be considered contentious, therefore, that such a theorectic is being presented here as an appropriate framework for the analysis of what is an organisation – the university. Palpably there is Critical Management Studies which could adequately fulfil such a role; generally considered to have started in 1992 from Alvesson and Willmott’s collection of papers *(Critical Management Studies)* by bringing together potentially contradictory Critical Theory and Post Structuralist writings, with specific focus on management and organisation theory. It is, however, not the aim of this work to conduct a radical organisational analysis of the universities; that is left for others to conduct. The main purpose – as already discussed above – is to contend the potential nature of societal ontology as a consequence of university managerialisation and its politicisation of research epistemology.

Put bluntly, it is asking a “what-if” question based upon the universality “that since universities guard our societal knowledge and if they are being changed by increased managerialisation, can we also expect to find our societal ontology changing in a similar fashion?” It is difficult to conceive a singularised facticity-based research project which could answer such a narrative.

The attempt to understand such a universality is considered to be important not because of the nature of the universities *per se* but because of their role as guardians of societal ontology. Therefore the necessity to establish the adequacy of critical theory as an analytical tool in order to understand universities is not compelling, since it is their epistemological states attached to societal ontological state which is vital: a role with which, it will be argued in detail below, the “traditionalist” critical theory of the Frankfurt School is more than capable of providing. As such, the state of social action, and hence
any linkage to movements therein (i.e. the specifics of university management or its structure), whilst regarded as important input to the dialectic are determined as anecdotes driving the social action within the universities and hence non critical to the epistemology of the dialectic developed. Their importance rests with the perception of the actors within the arena studied (universities et al) that they are important. Thus, whilst the theoretic of organisation analysis, for example, is not regarded by this work as central to its epistemology, it is seen as being vital in understanding the nature of the social action of the actors studied; organisation analysis probably more so than other aspects of business analysis. It will be argued below, that this is because the linkages between the actors's beliefs and the consequential prophecies of organisation analysis through its theory self fulfil in social action the original beliefs. It is their narrative we seek, therefore; applied to the epistemological state developed from the dialectic. In this instance organisation analysis (or any other business analysis) is no: of itself an epistemological state as it normally would be, but a principle of university management enactment.

To this end what will be done below is to translate this principle into a form of identifiable social action. In short, to determine how organisation analysis theoreticians have affected the social action of the managerial elite so that the university's epistemological state could consequently change? It needs to be shown that the intrinsic nature of organisation (a dynamic of contradicting forces) demands an approach that exploits the dialectical relationship between these two levels and thus requires at one level a paradigmatic commensurability and at the other level, incommensurability. To a great extent this will be left unresolved for future chapters to address. The problematic of achieving this aim, however, is manifest in the concept of the individual in organisation. It is within him/her that conventional wisdom would attempt to escape the claim of an institutionally based, and hence distorted, analysis of organisation.

ORGANISATION

Chester Barnard is an often quoted example when he defined organisation as "... a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons" (1938: 73). Perhaps more popular in the management texts at least is Etzioni's definition, "Organisations are social units (or human groupings) deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals" (1964: 3). Standard management texts such as Johnson and Scholes (1989) that are attempting to place management into context do not even bother to define organisation. This merely reflects the increasing tendency these days in the management and undergraduate texts to take organisation as given. Where it
is defined Stephen Robbins is perhaps typical. To him: "An organisation is a consciously coordinated social entity, with a relatively identifiable boundary, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common goal or set of goals" (1990: 4). As it can be seen, not considerably different from Etzioni's original definition some thirty years earlier, except perhaps tinged with the influence of Simon's (1957) organisational boundary analysis. Soulsby and Clark on the other hand determined more political resonances by defining organisations as: "...processes and practices perceived...as economic and instrumental mechanisms, when placed within...strong and continuing cultural resonances...[becoming]...issues of wider human meaning and moral commitment." (2007: 1424).

The aim here is not to necessarily reject these definitions or those like them. They represent an aspect of organisation, which is probably indisputable. There are formal aspects of organisations, which are "coordinated" social activities designed to achieve "common goals" or as expressed in terms that are more current: "cultural resonances". More to the point however, is that conventional wisdom demands our acceptance of these as fact and thus generates a self-fulfilling prophecy of its consequential social action. It tells us all that there is only one fundamental truth concerning organisation, and that is one supporting a form, which is both independently observable and controllable. As such these are purposeful, and the interpretation of which is given over to a specific group - usually management expressed in terms of their capability through governance. Costea et al determined an important part of the process was the institution tying in the complexities of control and governance: "...forms and contents of governance processes cannot be fully understood without grasping the self-understandings that are constitutive of them and of their institutional forms. The sphere of such an investigation is the historical constitution (or genealogy) of matrices of self and world-understanding which ground the cultural possibilities of certain discourses of governance." (2008: 661). They manifest a legitimate, immanent ownership of a specific set of priorities not adjudged by the full membership. The implication being that one is employed by the organisation and is not a part of it.

Such assumptions can be seen evidenced in our industrial relations and labour laws, for example. As Renner put it, "In the eyes of the law, the property-subject is related to the object only, controlling matter alone. But what is control of property in law becomes in fact man's control of human beings, of the wage labourers, as soon as property has developed into capital. The individual called owner sets tasks to others, he makes them subject to his commands and... imposes his will upon personae, autonomy is converted into heteronomy of will..." (1969: 34). The positivist model of organisation is legally tied into our cognition and "lawfully" acquiesces to its implication, and hence more
significantly, to the demands of the institution. Costea et al expressed this in less legal and more sociological terms: "...managerial discourses that aims to establish particular subject positions in the governance of work processes. These discourses are deployed as a public code presenting work as a particular form through which human 'selves' ought to express their inner potentialities. However, in concrete social practices and contexts these discourses create a new kind of political space for their own contestation, disruption, transgression and subversion." (2008: 661-662).

The individual is thus denied any significant influence. Legally confined to a set of specific codes; he is unable to express sufficient individualism which would enable an efficient challenge to the institutional model. In truth, this does not mean perceptuality cannot or does not exist within organisation. Society cannot legislate against individuality. Nor does it mean therefore that conventional theory necessarily rejects the potential of individual contribution to organisational form. Tony Watson, as typical example of the "newer", more positivist thinking, defined organisations as being not "...like machines, composed of inanimate bits and pieces...but are made up of living, thinking, choice-making beings...organisations ultimately only exist in the minds, and actions of people, with all their variety, fickleness, ambition and individuality" (Watson, 1986: 55-56). It is a factor which none can really deny without appearing perilously nonsensical. Organisations, no matter how intricately structured, cannot exist without the individuals to reify them. (Knights and Willmott, 2001).

They can, however, be coerced into compliance with a particular institutional model and therefore appear to maintain a common ontology and hence establish an accepted commonality in terms of an immanent truth – or set of truths (Paras, 2006). The political realities of social action would ensure that individuals without power (the vast majority) must acquiesce to the demands of those with power (the minority). The theoretical justification of this is to be found in the deterministic nature of an organisation. Its facticity so dominated the way individuals acted that it was nonsensical to talk of organisation without consensus. For a successful reconciliation between an individual's psychology and the collectivity of organisation, emphasis was placed upon the adoption by everyone of a role. The individual was thus effectively dehumanised within organisation by being given a role (see Weber, 1947). Through this mechanism, control, and thus consequentially organisational cohesion, could be structurally - rather than perceptually - conceded (Clegg et al: 2006). While Weber, for example, in distinguishing the corporate group from other social organisations, emphasised the formal role factor for individual members by stating that "...so far as its [corporate group] order is enforced by the action of specific individuals whose regular function this is, of a chief or "head" and also usually
administrative staff" (Weber, 1947: 145-146). Perhaps the role for individual has been honed to its most sophisticated in Blau's so-called exchange and power model (1964). Alternatively, Pettigrew's (1973) network analysis of large organisation through his concept of gatekeeper developed the role into a sensitive organisational mechanism. According to Ezzamel and Reed the consequence for organisational governance was dire whereby: "...organisations of any sophistication are increasingly premised on work whose doing is simultaneously subject to hyper-surveillance of its being done, characteristic of both managerial work and work more generally... ordinary organisations have capabilities for power that would have been but a dream for a Honecker or a Ford, running a state or a production plant" (2008: 597).

The point of these type of approaches is not the description of the role mechanism itself, but rather its reification into the organisation and hence the institutional model. This in effect succeeds in distancing the role concept from any responsibility in organisation formation and thus the rejection, by implication, of the individual's psychology, beyond rather mundane stimulation processes (Maslow etc), and the reification of the individual himself into the being of the organisation. Roles therefore deny the possibility of the individual being individual who could threaten the concept of organisational cohesion; instead, they allow the channelling of individualism into a structure defined concept and thus render it controllable by the institution.

Such a determination has been a long time coming (Oswick et al: 2002), although its seeds and implication have always been present throughout the history of organisational analysis. Etzioni (1961) for example has emphasised compliance in his organisational system. Such compliance was expressed through authority relations manifest in role mechanisms. On the other hand Parsons (1951) and his Social System was able to exclude humanity through their internalisation into the overarching, and immanent, system structure by allocating system element status to the roles of individuals. Although these works and others like them are perhaps regarded a little extreme in their neglect of the individual as himself, as opposed to him as an element, they nevertheless reflect an underlying assumption about the individual still present today. Mintzberg (1987) for example developed the idea of an organisational structure determined by externalities affecting political processes within it as a consequence of its impact upon roles: as did Handy (1976) with his similar models of organisational structure and culture. They were seen as organisations that work like efficient and well-oiled machines; entirely predictable and hence overtly manageable, a mechanism by which management could control product output. Mintzberg defines organisational structure for example as, "... the sum
total ways in which it [organisation] divides its labour into distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them" (Mintzberg, 1979: 2).

The reified individual expressed as a structural role exemplifies the positivist's assertion of an integrated organisational epistemology and ontology. This is intrinsic and thus implied, rather than explicit in their analysis. Positivist philosophy (see Popper, 1971 for example) quite obviously recognises the distinction between the two domains, and political pressures through recognition of the supremacy of the institutional model have enforced compliance with the myth of no effective distinction. The institution is both fact (ontology) and action (epistemology) and therefore we need not delve any further. In this world, therefore, the individual is an anathema. His very existence threatens the compactness of conventional organisational analysis and thereby calls into question the ability of management to legitimise their ownership of the social action principles, which form a business organisation.

Such an accusation does not deny the practitioner a sensitivity for his environment nor indeed the academic their analysis of an individual's relationship with their organisation. Mike Reed for example emphasises the point by stating that, "... a growing number of practitioners are increasingly sensitive to, and appreciative of, the historical traditions and institutional contexts in which present concerns have to be located and interpreted" (Reed, 1992: 198). Modern management styles have certainly produced, as a result of courses such as the MBA, a plethora of prescriptions to more effectively internalise the individual into the management process (i.e. Human Resource Management etc). These, however, do not change the fundamental issues discussed above. The concept of a "Human Resource", for example, evokes the reification of individuality into an immanent resource facticity!

Therefore, in one stroke there is both recognition of the individual in organisation whilst at the same time placing him very much into a reified framework of the objectified organisation. To this extent, it is thus not contradictory to observe in the academic positivist literature a detailed analysis of the individual at work, and indeed the acceptance that his perceptions are important in determining the health of the organisation. The presumption must always remain, however, that this is contained by an immanent and transcendental fact. The representation of this is for the positivist manifest in the organisation.

The position of this work is to accept an apparent facticity to organisation, which contains continuous social action. However, this differs from a positivist perspective by emphasising such a factual framework as an enforced political process designed to falsify
individual perception. It is in other words a mechanism of the institution. The conventional view determines the institution as an ontological given and hence a facticity, emerging as a natural consequence obeying some transcendental law of organisation. In so doing, the individual is integrated in a deterministic sense into the whole. On the other hand, in a Lukácsian sense, there is also a power relationship, with the dominant group holding ownership of the institutional model and thereby portraying it to be facticity. The difference is, of course, that institutional models are neither immanent nor transcendental and are very much governed by the perceptual drives of their owners.

However, irrespective of the merits of either paradigm, as individuals we do tend to treat our social frameworks as immanent, if only for a simple life. The conventionalist would see that as an end to the matter. Others would claim it to be only the beginning. By evoking both Lukács (1980) with his institutional model and Habermas (1979) with his communicative distortion, the basis of this claim can be demonstrated.

The institutional model is therefore a powerful control mechanism, which is designed to prevent individuals from achieving their own interpretation of reality. It is rigorously enforced through power mechanisms such as social sanction and ethics. Like some ethereal social transmitter the signals it omits are far greater than any individual can muster and hence is able to appear more real and legitimate than its competitors, at least for the time being (Leiter et al: 2007). On the other hand, our life-world still requires us to interpret and implement social action on a day-to-day basis as individuals within the institutional framework. In this arena there is no room for organisational facticity, being something we refer to when confronted by formality. Therefore we as individuals depend upon our own perceptions and instincts to act efficiently and, perhaps contentiously so, naturally. Habermas (1979) would claim that the institutional model prevents us from doing this and hence distorts the true nature of our being by enforcing its own channels upon our individual and meaningful communication. Within the organisation, we thus operate at two levels with the institution arbitrating between (see also Ezzamel and Reed, 2008).

The possibility of an ontologically independent individual therefore, no matter how improbable this may be, encourages a substantial argument against immanent and transcendental facticity of organisation. An individual is allowed their own Weltanschauungen, which may well contradict those of others. More probable perhaps, the academic is allowed their own paradigm, which in order to be legitimate need not agree with conventional wisdom. The positivistic domination of the organisational concept through management and academia does not guarantee truth. Such meta-political influence finds its outlet within epistemology through a social action based upon its
falsehood. This philosophy is so ingrained within our concept of organisation that the only way we can successfully highlight its impact is through the analytical separation of the two domains.

CHANGE AND LOGIC

To understand better organisation, the question must be asked: "Why organize?" One answer could be: to control. Arnold Tannenbaum for example determined control to be "... an inevitable correlate of organisation" (1968: 3) and therefore we organize in order to control. One group - usually the owners or their management as the dominating power group - may well consider their organisational world to be expressed in terms of physical resource manifestations. Such a belief is most suited to their needs. This will be thus expressed, more or less efficiently, through their specific institutional model in situ at the time and authorised by an external and internal legal code. Their view of reality becomes manifest therefore because they have the means to implement and control the institutional model (Delmestri, 2006). Equally, however, there could be others who may well have a different ontological expression. To them, for example, their organisational world may well be defined in terms of the boredom they must suffer each weekday and hence the temporal organisation required getting through each day. It does not matter one jot, nor are they likely to know, how many resources their organisation may have, and what in particular are its objectives. The clerk in one department of a large business organisation is unlikely to grasp the subtleties necessary to gain a holistic view of organisation, nor indeed care. Their view may well guide their day-to-day social action and thus is, in an epistemological sense, important. However, the clerk and his peers do not possess the necessary power to influence the institutional model, nor indeed to create and sustain a competing one of their own, and thus ontologically are not particularly effective in creating the accepted organisational reality.

The point remains, therefore, that it is the continuous social action, forced by the dominant group, to conform to the institutional model, which reveals to an onlooker an apparent social cohesion and objectivity. This is only an illusion created by the power of the institutional model to bend our individual wills to a common sense reality. It is apparent, however, only at an ontological level and not at an epistemological one, which merely requires us to get on with our day-to-day living on an individual basis.

There is existing support for such a claim within the established literature. Bhaskar (1979) in particular talks of an intransient dimension and a transient dimension and
thereby implies a dialectic between the two. Although he initially places this within the context of scientific development when he states, "... if one is to avoid the absurdity of the assumption of the production of ... knowledge ex nihilo, it must depend upon the employment of antecedently existing cognitive materials (which I have called the 'transitive' objects of knowledge). So science must be seen as a social process, whose aim is the production of the knowledge of the mechanisms of the production of phenomena in nature, the intransitive objects of inquiry" (Bhaskar, 1979: 15). Since we cannot separate the doing of science from other worldly interpretations, what holds true for scientific analysis must also do so for societal analysis (Ladyman, 2002). Bhaskar demonstrates this by producing in a following chapter a synthesis of societal development. Based upon the knowledge dialectic constructed earlier, and quoted above, he uses particularly the work of Peter Berger in defining its framework. He states that, "...society forms the individuals who create society; society, that is, produces the individuals, who produce society, in a continuous dialectic" (1979: 41). It is no different within the terms of organisation.

As an organisational analysis, therefore, we are in many respects presented with an ontological fa;it a compls since not only the analysts themselves but also the practitioners are captured by the predominance of the institution (Delmestri, 2006). The dialectic mentioned by Bhaskar is not reflected in our conventional models of organisation because they portray a social framework as a given fact. Even those who can perhaps see beyond the mechanisms of the institution as social researchers, for example, are still nevertheless locked into the dominant wisdom through pressures of conformist social action (Giddens, 1996). In other words, in order to be considered to be behaving "normally", and despite the fact I, as a researcher, might believe in an intransient organisational structure, I nevertheless adopt a "conventional" view of organisation, and through that, instinctive habits and perceptions, for the sake of simplicity and social acceptance. I, as a constructivist, thus may claim a greater wisdom than the positivist but the nature of my social action in the end concedes his point.

However, the argument is not lost if the Positivist's perspective is viewed merely as a metaphor of organisation. In other words, in order to simplify an otherwise complex environment we all acquiesce to the temptations of a positivistic facticity in organisation (Oswick, 2002). The institution, being the mechanism of this metaphor, is so strong that it enforces a false interpretation of our surroundings, which fulfils its own prophecy through our subsequent social action. Any research that we conduct, therefore, is itself falsified by this strong institutional veneer, which in logic can be argued as being overcome, but in practice is extremely difficult because the researcher is as much a victim
of the institution as those they are analysing. Through the power process at the epistemological level from both the pressure of conventionalist demand and the need for purposeful social action, it is difficult to envisage, even through ethnomethodology, any substantive live research breaking such strong social frameworks.

Smircich (1983) determined that the successful route to an understanding beyond the institutional veil is through what she termed as the root metaphor. Expressed as a cultural manifestation she states that it, "...goes beyond the instrumental view of organisation derived from the machine metaphor and beyond the adaptive view derived from the organismic metaphor. Culture as a root metaphor promotes a view of organisations as expressive forms, manifestations of human consciousness." (1983: 347)

The proposal of a root metaphor suggests a fundamental metaphorical basis from which all our other ideas about the particular organisation spring. This point will be argued in greater depth below. But in this sense it is difficult to argue that culture meets the necessary criteria. It is a debatable issue. However, the linkage between structure and culture is so much a "chicken and egg" situation that any identification of one, or indeed the other, being the root metaphor of organisation is tantamount to a tautology. That is not to say, as with every other element of organisation, that culture is not a metaphor. It just does not explain "why organisation" sufficiently to be the root metaphor. Paradoxically, it is therefore proposed that the institution itself is the root metaphor, driven very much by the positivist ideal.

In many respects the situation has seemingly worsened by establishing the institution as the root metaphor; the researcher is condemned to an inability of reaching beyond. Fortunately, however, this is not so. The postulate still stands that a meaningful understanding of organisation cannot be achieved through an ethnomethodological or empirical investigation, because all we would produce is a reflection of the positivistically orientated institutional veil. Like it or not, we are all thus condemned by the modernist philosophy and its scientific demands. The political institutions of the academe do not only reject alternatives, but also our individual socialisation tends to constrain us all instinctively within an objectivity-based framework. Resisting such inclinations, therefore, the legitimacy of the postulate depends not upon fieldwork but upon logic relationships through establishing a dialectic, which can then be subsequently used to predict organisation. This shall be done between the two domains already discussed using the institution as the root metaphor. One further element needs to be considered, however, and that is change.
There is a potential here for a circular argument based upon what is stated above. If we are indeed condemned by various perceptual constraints to see no more than an institutional reality - analyst or practitioner - then it seems tautological to attempt the production of a model which claims otherwise, which is itself based upon the very logic preventing it from recognising such a capability. The answer is of course that, in part at least, the two domains of this hypothesis can be expressed as two different sets of logic without the fear of internal contradiction within the model. Second, however, expressed as life form, the very nature of dialectic relationships is one of change. That is a continual and continuing adjustment to externalities.

In terms of seeing beyond the institutional veil, this can be portrayed as shifts, albeit subtle at times, of the institution itself. The reason for this is in proposing my postulate that the institution is a knowledge, hence logic, construction, its sustained perceptual acceptance is dependent upon its stability and continuity. Any change situation, therefore, is a potential threat to it and thus, albeit temporarily at times, its otherwise strong signal to those within its domain is disturbed. The veil is then broken for a time and we can perhaps look beyond into a hidden world. It is the objective here, therefore, to use the concept of change as a dynamic of the model of organisation developed below.

It will be argued that like many aspects of organisation, change is more than the observable facticities portrayed by the management literature as a readily controllable resource (see for example Carnall, 1990). In one respect it is, indeed, the essences of organisation itself, particularly if we view organisation as a logic construct. To put it crudely, it is the logic of the dialectic between the two domains enacted through manifestly observable outcomes. This is thus not an analysis of change as such but rather an exploration of its impact upon the characteristics of organisation.
CHAPTER FIVE

Paradigmatic Hegemony

"In modern times there are no more changes. A turn in events is always for the better. But if in times like the present the need is greatest, the heavens open and cast their fire on those who are already lost." (Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1972: 220).

The tone and discussion of this chapter is set by its title, which is deliberately provocative. Essential to the contention within this work is that science is not a process alone, but emerges from the political pressure of the academic elites. Indeed the nature of the science conducted is dependent upon the collective ‘worldly view’ of those in power within the universities – this is most likely to be the university elite since they potentially control, more than others, the types of research conducted. The paradigm these elites belong to is therefore important. It is argued here that this is inevitably a Positivist one. But more than this, because of their power, the elite’s particular paradigm will continuously hold sway over other competing paradigms, which are controlled and headed by less powerful elites. In effect, the predominant elite’s paradigm and those attached to it, gain the greatest influence in the manner of research conducted. So long as the elite survives, so too will the ways of research the particular paradigm promotes. For reasons already discussed, a Positivist paradigm in some form will always survive in a current epistemological state. It is this condition that will be referred to within this work as Paradigmatic Hegemony, because like any hegemony, there is a specific elite leadership and control maintained through greater power. In this instance, it is the formal theorectic as to how we view our world and hence conduct research.

Central to the argument is the politicisation of the dominant paradigm’s epistemological state; without this, there could be no control since science, by definition, should be consequentially neutral and thus pure. The elite, to achieve paradigmatic hegemony, must control our very thoughts so that we at least passively – if not willingly – conduct our own research, as they would have us. This state is thus discussed below and its importance established in the theorectic developed. However, the argument is more profound in that it will also claim that not only is there a dispositional power process evolving into paradigmatic dominance but also an episodic fulfilment in terms of the evolution of the consequential theorectic itself. That is, the universities have rationalised and become managerialised not merely as a consequence of external political intrusion.
(i.e. government policy) and the dominance of Positivism; but because as the elite became managerialised, they determined increasingly the importance of organising like businesses. Consequently its theoretic analysis became important too, in order to help them do that. In a self fulfilling way, this then developed its own ‘head of steam’ by appealing to the changing attitude of society, which of course the elite reflected. Therefore, it was inevitable Business Studies would become popular with the ‘customer’ (the student) and thus reinforce its importance. Consequently whilst it is not claimed business, and its analysis, is the only driving factor in this process of politicised epistemological state, it is indeed an important one. As such, much of this chapter will be devoted to examining its consequences.

The first section below will therefore present a more detailed examination of the business studies theoretic; the purpose being to establish its importance in the following section’s discussion of the politicised epistemological state itself. This theoretic is central to the dialectic established here, because it is through a politicised epistemological state that societal ontological state is changed. Subsequent to such a discussion, the following two sections will examine the literature underpinning business and organisational analysis. This takes prominence within this work over other literature because it provides the basis for part of the theoretic here that through the managerialisation of our universities elites the universities themselves have transformed into business entities. An important dynamic to such a state has been a combination of the growing predominance of business schools and their elites based and built upon Positivist managerial courses and literature, which in turn have increasingly influenced the university elites. The relationship between knowledge and social action is therefore unique, in that it is not only serves as a dynamic for understanding what is happening, but also is itself an important aspect of understanding the phenomenon itself (Grimm, 2006). Finally, this chapter will conclude that because of the ‘special relationship’ between Positivism and the new managerialised universities, business analysis, in both its forms of knowledge as academic courses and organisation as business schools, has enjoyed a considerably greater influence in the changing politicised epistemological state than it perhaps would otherwise.

A Special Case for Business Organisation and Its Analysis

An investigation of the journal shelves of most university libraries would demonstrate how much the positivistic ideal is in control of our epistemology. Increasingly, it would seem, a rationale based upon an anti-positivist ontology is being confined to the margins of academic discussion in both undergraduate and
postgraduate courses. Thomas Kuhn determined as much when he referred to the dominant ideology as ‘normal science’, whereby the resultant dominant paradigm “...is rarely for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification...” (1970: 23) Tyrannically, it jealously guards its frameworks as ‘conventional wisdom’. Kuhn continues that, “No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; indeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all.” (1970: 24) So that once installed as legitimate ‘normal science’, it is insurmountable by any upstart until at least the conditions are right for a Kuhnian-style revolution; although even here change is unlikely.

This is important for the contention here because, as Kuhn and others have often intimated, whoever is in control of the societal concept of “normal science” and hence its epistemology, determines, through political process, the nature of our research and consequentially how we model our reality and thus our ontology. If, therefore, a Positivist ideology expressed through Functionalism, dominates the minds of those in control of our society, particularly our universities, the nature of research will be driven, through their power and influence, by positivist ideals, based, as already discussed above, upon scientism (Monastra and Zarandi, 2004). Such a methodology in requiring an adherence to specific codes of conduct on the part of the individual researchers involved, laid them open to external management/elite influence because codes of conduct could be controlled politically (Haack, 2003). This then forms the basis of the argument here. That is, the way we view our social reality is being transformed not through scientific research as such, but by the political processes controlling it. Positivism, through a Functionalist epistemology, provides better than other paradigmatic ideologies, the appropriate framework for political control. The reasons why this is so form the basis of the arguments and discussion presented in this chapter.

Nowhere is this condition more prominent than in the analysis of business organisation and management within university business schools (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002). This is because the concept of a business organisation, and indeed the business schools themselves, are driven by a similar logico-rationality suited to the scientific principles of Positivism. As such, both these concepts will be often visited as examples while presenting the discussion throughout this work. But it should be stressed, that the nature and scope of this thesis is not limited to these two alone. Whilst they are important because they both fuel the conduit between a politicised epistemology and a hitherto unaffected ontology through their encouragement of
rational positivistic research, other social factors, such as elites and all forms of organisation (i.e. Government, schools and churches etc) are equally critical.

The underpinning for such contention is based upon Positivist need for observable rationality, which in turn provides the fundamental basis for Empiricism. Whilst acknowledging that there are different degrees of Positivism, whereby in Logical Positivism, for example, metaphysical content is recognised as part of the analytical framework, the fundamental keystone of all Positivist ideology is that the world, in the end, must be rational and hence receptive to scientific process (Feyerabend, 2005). Popper implied the importance of this when he stated, "I row come to my most central contention. It is this. The rationalist tradition, the tradition of critical discussion, represents the only practicable way of expanding our knowledge..." (1987: 30) That is, the only way to understand our world is as an empirically observable and scientifically verifiable state. It is this desire for rationality, confirmed through observable and quantifiable scientific process that renders Positivism vulnerable to political persuasion. In short, rationality requires a group consensus and as such lays open the individual member to the machinations of leadership (Nozick, 1993).

The typical business organisation – being itself based upon strong rationalistic principles (Soulsby and Clark, 2007) – provided the perfect framework for such analysis. Oliver Sheldon (as quoted by Raube in Sexton, 1970) for example defined organisation as, "...the machine of management in its achievement of the ends determined by administration"; and in so doing limits the analytical-rational to empirically attestable criteria already well established within Positivist testimony. Thus, normal science is also a prison within which the radical (the Popperian 'irrational') analyst is contained and never allowed to break free. Within the business organisation, already contained by the self-prophesising logic of the 'rational' organisation, he is challenged to step beyond such containment at his own risk. As Sheldon (1970) implies, Functionalist organisations have to be rational and predictable to be useful, it is therefore the duty of the analyst to maintain those principles by ensuring he produces a science that is also seen as useful in terms of the criteria applied. Even today, Soulsby and Clark's (2007) analysis of organisation theory in "post-socialist" times presumes the rationality to remain despite varying cultural inputs from the developing world. To do otherwise in all Positivist analysis, is to require the analyst to step into realms that are considered to be beyond utility and therefore irrational. Popper put it thus, "...How and why do we accept one theory in preference to others...We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other theories...[and]...this choice is in part determined by considerations of
utility.” (1968: 108). Perhaps a little more thread-worn by the impact of change over the last thirty years, but positivist inclination to rationality is not considerably different.

This is not to claim that positivists have a common perception of ‘utility’. That is, what aspects of organisation should be analysed. If anything, it supports through functionalist principles, more disparate allegiances of theory than any other paradigm. A question of utility, therefore, as defined by scientific prognosis demands merely that the participant acknowledges the importance of rationality as the basic tenet from which to theorise. For example, using a well-known definition, Etzioni (1964) determined that, “Organisations as social units that serve specific purposes are artificial social units. They are planned, deliberately structured; they constantly and self-consciously review their performances and restructure themselves accordingly.” Within the context of Etzioni’s postulate is the ability to scientifically test, through empirical means, the legitimacy of his prophesy. This is not in the normative sense of how much – or little – a particular organisation attains a degree of planning or deliberate construction: or indeed how effective it is at reviewing its performance. That is left for peers, and whoever, to judge in their own way. More important for Popper, and presumably Etzioni, is whether the epistemology is capable of demonstrating adequate verification within the context set by positivist ideals of rationality. For Popper, therefore, a theory to be ‘useful’ has to be rational, and probably more onerously, to comply with a set of politicised tenets. This should not be placed in the context of an agenda for conscious societal – or any other – change, but as a consequence of the nature of modernity, and hence Positivism itself, alluded to above. As Hollinger claimed: “The agenda of the social sciences…is designed to promote the understanding and control of modern society” (1994: 4). The degree of utility would be judged therefore in terms of how much any new theory would contribute to this greater understanding and consequential control.

It is recognised that this goes beyond Kuhn’s hypothesis (1970). For him, and his antagonists, it was a question of how one defined the term ‘normal science.’ Indeed a conference was convened (Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London 1965) to debate this very issue and four volumes of work were subsequently published. One of the contributors, Watkins, in a paper tellingly entitled ‘Against Normal Science’ (1970) lambasted Kuhn for daring to claim his views were reconcilable to those of Popper. Referring to Kuhn’s book he stated angrily, “Near the beginning he [Kuhn] says: ‘On almost all the occasions when we turn explicitly to the same problems, Sir Karl’s view of science and my own are very
nearly identical.’ My aim will be to bring out the larger conflicts [italics his] between these two views.” (1970, Eds. Lakatos and Musgrave: 26) Watkins then proceeded to state what they were. One passage was of particular interest; “For Kuhn, Normal Science is…the normal condition of science; Extraordinary Science is an abnormal condition; and within Normal Science…the genuine testing of prevailing theories is rendered…impossible. [Bold mine] For Kuhn it is virtually a cliché to say that scientists normally engage in a lot of testing: they test their solutions to anomaly-generated puzzles; and it is for him, startlingly incorrect to say that it is normal for scientists to test theories.” (1970: 28) By implication he places the accusation on Kuhn’s lips that ‘normality’ for the scientist is a tacit acceptance of prevailing conventional wisdom and therefore ‘testing’ is only required at times of ‘Extraordinary Science.’ This is, of course, a travesty of Kuhn’s argument. Nevertheless, it does serve to demonstrate the lengths to which Functionalism will go in order to defend its ground!

The analysis of our business organisations is particularly sensitive to such an attack because unlike any other social unit or entity they demand an epistemology that is closely linked to the nostrums of their managerial elite. The concern, as described by Philip Pettit, “…is with a set of beliefs which is maintained by members of the commonsense community and upheld by social scientists that attach themselves to the image of rational man.” (1978: 44) It is seen as commonsensical that good management is the prerequisite of any ‘useful’ (Popper, 1968) organisational analysis. Charles Handy (1985), Peter Drucker (1954), Henry Mintzberg (1983) all place utility in the fore of their organisation frameworks. In “Understanding Organisations” (Handy, 1985) for example, despite its opening paragraphs expressing uncertainty in the organisational world, quickly proceeds to discuss ‘The Utility of Organisational Theory’ (p.16 onwards), stating at one point, “…excessive management analysis can lead to management paralysis. But action without analysis becomes mere impulse…organisation theory seeks to substitute a coherent set of conceptual frameworks for these collections of assumptions.” While Mintzberg opens his book with the question, “What could be more important to the effective functioning of our organisations…than the design of their structures?” (1983: v)

The purpose here is not to contend the validity of their theory as such, but to cite them as being typical of the Functionalist approach to analysing our organisations. No doubt what both Handy (1985) and Mintzberg (1983) state is perfectly legitimate; the contention however is with the epistemological tenets that they, and all the others, imply. That is to say, an organisation, particularly business
organisation, exists to formally pursue some stated purpose and consequentially whatever analysis is performed should also be conducted within the constraints of that purpose in order to be deemed of possessing utility (Holmwood, 2005). Put more crudely, the onus seems to be on the Functionalist researcher to produce a science reconcilable to the universally accepted tenets of management or risk being ridiculed as unscientific and therefore not useful (Hansson, 2006); implying that the only purpose in analysing an organisation is, through better understanding, to make them more effective. Similar in manner to a biologist or clinician conducting research to improve our health, and judged by its utility toward that end, a social scientist must also be called to account. Popper himself established the epistemology for this in his book ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’ (1968), when in opposing the use of induction. Yet it will be the contention below that since, as suggested above, all epistemology is politicised to varying degrees, those who manage such expressions, particularly in the academe and especially in the business schools (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002), are able to apply coercive techniques to control acceptable research output according to implemented strategy, are thus able to transmogrify such epistemology through ontology into general laws.

The key to this is to be found in the nature of Functionism itself, founded in the birth of the enlightened age, whereby metaphysical aspiration, both social and physical, were rejected as the tools of the church-state (Bronner, 2004). An essential factor to the argument here is that the habit has subsequently remained – enforced as discussed in chapter one, through the Kuhn-Popper debate – and whilst we no longer regard meta-theory as a coercive expression of the will of The Church, the belief that somehow it is unscientific most definitely remains. The precise form and nature of this epistemology will be discussed below.

*The Politics of Epistemology*

Epistemology put simply is the theory of knowledge, and as such, its process is sometimes considered to be of pure science (Mitchell et al, 2007). That is, whatever the methodology, the analysis of the grounds of knowledge and the assumptions behind them were to be applied *a priori* and without consideration of any intrusion to their internal logic by outside forces. It was the one area over which Popper and Kuhn did not argue. As the latter made clear, *“We are both concerned with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is acquired rather than with the logical structure of the products of scientific research. Given that concern, both of us emphasize, as legitimate data, the facts and also spirit of actual scientific life,*
and both of us turn often to history to find them." (1972: 1) Yet for the sanctity of Kuhn’s position, such a reconciliatory statement was a fundamental error, since it ultimately lead to his defeat in the debate. He continued, "We both emphasize, for example, the intimate and inevitable entanglement of scientific observation with scientific theory; we are correspondingly sceptical of efforts to produce any neutral observation language..." (1972: 2). For his part, Karl Popper referred to "...a structure of scientific doctrines...already in existence; and with it, a generally accepted problem-situation" (1970: 31). The problem with this, therefore, was that the debate was always going to be contained and governed by positivist ontology since both were Positivists.

No matter how the recognition is couched – either Kuhnian or Popperian – ultimately the presumption on the part of both parties is that science is pure and devoid of politicisation. For Kuhn particularly, there will be problems as a scientist battles against the predominant will to establish their version of the truth, but never in that process is it ever suggested that the epistemology behind the ‘new paradigm’ itself would ever be tainted or corrupted by it. Thus, once it wins through, it will return to as it ever was. It is suggested this is problematic. Politicised epistemology has always existed; but with the increasing bureaucratisation/rationlization of our universities and institutes, it is increasing (Zell, 2001). Much earlier Weber warned: "The ...bureaucracy thus emerges on an apparently objective and impersonal ground, provided by the rational specialization of functions...For, the more the individual functions are divided, fixated and synchronized according to objective and impersonal patterns, the less reasonable it is for the individual to withdraw or withstand." (1922: 669) This would include the individual and the epistemology of their paradigm, inevitably corrupted by the political processes interacting around them.

A more realistic debate can be found in the writings of The Frankfurt School particularly that of Adorno and Horkheimer (1972). They argued the juxtaposition between the control of nature (as discussed by Hegel and Francis Bacon et al) and the indomitable logic of conventional epistemology. Held put it succinctly, "Science is the key to the control of nature and...of human beings. By obeying nature one can...command her..." (1980: 151) The contention is that conventional wisdom (the dominant paradigm) will always struggle to adopt the scientific – if not moral – high ground seen as best reflecting nature itself, and in so doing through political means possess the one truth. Francis Bacon for example determined that one simply had "...but to follow [nature] and as it were hound nature in her wanderings, and you will
be able, when you like, to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again."
(As quoted in Held, 1980: 151) This is the essence of the Kuhn-Popper debate in
determining the nature of ‘normal science’: and precisely to what extent does normal
science reflect the true state of nature. Is the scientist when they ‘do normal science’
tapping into the natural scheme of things as set by nature herself and therefore de
facto legitimising what they do (Popper); or has it been falsified by the process as
set through the dominant epistemology (Kuhn)? The distinction between these two
positions is one of degree, in terms of the presumptive ontological position behind
the particular theory. As Popper himself stated in a paper to the International
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, "A scientist engaged in a piece of
research...can attack his problem straight away. He can go to the heart of the
matter: that is, to the heart of an organized structure. For a structure of scientific
doctrines is already in existence; and with it a generally accepted problem-situation."
(1976: 51-58) Kuhn, of course, would disagree by claiming that ‘normal science’
does not possess such a dependable ontology because it is tainted by the
domination of the conventionally wise. Normal science for him is not the purest ideal
of Popper, but one that is constantly subjected to political pressures to conform. He
stated early on in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that, "Normal
science...often suppresses fundamental novelties because they are necessarily
subversive of its basic commitments." (1970: 5)

Unsurprisingly Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) disagree with both camps. For
them, and others such as Marcuse, epistemology is a historical process and not one
merely reflecting good methodology or ‘normal science’ practice. The Enlightenment
itself is the key; not necessarily the time period in which it occurred but the process
of transformation from dependency upon the meta-physical to the Hegelian insight
of scientific consciousness (the rational world). Moreover, with enlightenment came
the objectification of the world through scientism, and its consequential separation
from the subject: palpable in the desire to know and master everything in nature as
immanent fact. Nature was subjugated (as discussed by Hegel in the
Phenomenology of Mind) and placed within the remit of a scientistic agenda. To this
end, a unifying system was quickly established a priori placing everything within a
rational framework by which every new addition had to be judged (Horkheimer,
1972a: 146). Yet there seems a glaring internal inconsistency to this logic. As
Horkheimer put it, "The claim that there is an absolute order and an absolute
demand made upon men always presupposes a claim to know the whole, the totality
of things, the infinite. But if our knowledge is in fact not yet final, if there is an
irreducible tension between concept and being, then no proposition can claim the
dignity of perfect knowledge” (1972: 27). Thus, the presumptions (tenets) behind the Kuhn-Popper debate could be flawed because both sides struggle for an adequate description of the means rather than the ends: since for both in the end the ultimate logic of science remains intact. It is the process by which they get there that is under contention.

Yet one could also aim this very criticism at both Horkheimer and Adorno.

For these two there is an acceptance that models of social action are tainted by the politics of conventional wisdom, transforming the process from what was described as ‘normal science’ to what they termed as ‘second nature’ (1972). Held described their position as “society is conceived...as ‘second nature’. The social world is reified: socially created rules, conventions and regularities are comprehended as ‘natural’, ‘the way things have been and always will be’, social institutions and processes are taken to follow ‘the order of things’...As a result, history embodies the possibility of nature (through human beings) attaining self-consciousness.” (1980: 167-168) Knowledge is hypostatised as a ‘tool of power’ (Nietzsche, 1968) within the dialectical process of enlightenment (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972). Whilst Nietzsche’s position was one of a positive philosophy, that is knowledge as power can be used for the betterment of people – hence the reason why the Nazis were keen to adopt his work, Adorno and Horkheimer’s was much more a ‘negative critique’, almost nihilist (Held, 1980) in its prediction. The Enlightenment is a positivistic concept because it “…has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972: 3). No doubt an admirable objective, but in so doing we have learnt to objectify nature and thus falsify our presuppositions about it, creating interpretations based upon a flawed ‘second nature’. These then result in a science (both social and physical) based upon what we would like reality to be, rather than what it actually is! Held put it thus, “Positivistic consciousness objectifies the social as well as the natural world; that is it conceptualises the world as a field of objects open to manipulation.” (1980: 167) Yet, despite this, epistemology remains intact.

To recap, the debate for Kuhn and Popper was never a question of the dominant epistemology, which they termed as ‘normal science’. For them it was the question of what constituted the embodiment of competing paradigms into ‘normal science’: that is whether it was by purely good scientific practice (Popper) or something more (Kuhn). Once established by whatever means, the consequential dominant paradigm was never conceived as corrupting epistemology. It was merely a case of those supportive of the dominant paradigm holding sway in ‘normal
science': while for Adorno and Horkheimer, this would have been simplistic. They envisaged paradigms as being the outcome of not only 'normal science' but also of a politicised historicity looking back onto Enlightenment and producing a dialectical relationship between science and human nature, which they termed as 'second nature'. Paradigms and their science could never reflect 'reality' because they are tainted by their members' own ideals. This is particularly the case with regard to business analysis. Our models of business organisation and management, for example, are never as they really are but as we would like them to be, not merely in a prescripto-normative way telling managers what they should do, but rather based upon the dialectic between the scientific pressures of Enlightenment and our individual needs. The organisation thus portrayed, by each model, is an ideological framework rather than one of social action, which in a self-fulfilling way predicts the prophecies of the particular epistemology involved.

At this point, however, Adorno and Horkheimer pull back, and do not develop their dialectic any further by incorporating the question of integrity of epistemology itself (Foster, 2007). That is, whether there is a circularity between our interpretations of the world and the fundamental knowledge behind them. Put crudely, eventually we not only believe in our theories of the world, but also allow them to embed themselves into our psyche as unquestionable ontology. The first part of this circularisation is not new. As Horkheimer himself argued, "The scientific idea of man, as well as nature, which is known and to be known by science, are elements in the dynamism of history and will play a role even in the future. But by themselves are determined and altered by the total process, just as much as they in turn...determine and alter it." (As quoted in Held, 1980: 179) In current textbooks on organisation, for example by Hatch, there is an implied acceptance of this when, after briefly mentioning 'the Enlightenment Project' she states, "...if sensory perception does not serve as the sole basis for (objective) empirical tests of our theories, then the scientific view of knowledge is opened to debate." (1997: 45) In other words, we have to take much more into account (according to 'postmodernists') when theorising about the world than mere empirical observation or sensory perception. In addition, for Kuhn (1972) himself, of course, this formed the foundation of his argument. However, this was as far as it went in whatever guise the argument was analysed.

The second aspect of the circularisation is far more profound and forms part of the contention in this work. The mainstream argument has always been presented in terms of the degree of epistemological intrusion into the nature/outcome of 'normal science' or 'second nature' (depending upon the side
adopted) as being a one-way process; that is the paradigm of which the individual is a member will influence strongly his science, but not the other way around (Pippen, 2005). The individual’s science is never seen as changing or corrupting his or her own particular epistemology, no matter how powerful that individual happens to be. Epistemology is expressed as a given and only altered by aspects of ontology as a consequence of an entirely separate process (Yaneva, 2006). But what if this were not so and that the intrusion was both ways, so that an individual had not only the ability to maintain their epistemology as given but to also change it, even corrupt it to serve their own ends, within the short term: and more than this, as a consequence of such activity to profoundly affect the basis of our knowledge itself at an ontological level? This is central to the argument here. In such a situation, epistemology is no longer changed and manipulated by the political processes surrounding it but indeed becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of the processes themselves and thus politicised! Our worldly understanding, both social and physical, is no longer merely the consequence of science applied in terms of its particular paradigm, but something that has been institutionalised by its incumbent owners.

Such a position is substantially different to the Kuhn-Popper position and their debate hitherto. As already discussed, Kuhn recognises the involvement of politics/power in paradigmatic evolution, and neither does Popper deny it. Their view could best be demonstrated by the following ‘equation’:

\[
\text{Epistemological Tenets + Political Processes} = \text{Paradigm}
\]

Their major concern and cause for debate, however, was around how a particular paradigm became conventional wisdom. For them the epistemology was set by an established ontology and the political process by the given social processes of the day, perhaps within, or without, an historical context. Thus, it was the paradigm that was the variable in this so-called equation, maintaining the purity of the pertinent epistemology in the short term at least. Popper in particular envisaged the status of this as being, “...knowledge in the objective sense, human knowledge, which consists of linguistically formulated expectations, submitted to critical discussion” (1972: 66). So that change to the epistemology of ‘normal science’ could only be by something like a democratic process, contained within the ontological framework and submitted to the rigours of common sense (Popper, 1972). Scientists would come to an agreement through the process of ‘normal science’ as to what was to
remain and what was to change and the result would become the basis of the transmogrified paradigm.

It is recognised that current thinking (i.e. Yaneva, 2006; Tondl, 2007; Stavenga, 2006 etc) has moved on from such an overt debate regarding the nature and existence of politicised science (as opposed to epistemology). In a sense, there is a tacit acceptance amongst most that science is not ideally pure, and that there can be significant intrusion in to the process (Bloor, 1984). Today’s discussion – referred to in earlier chapters – concerns the transformation of knowledge into understanding; and how that relates to the scientific process. For example Yaneva determined that: “... the first strangeness of knowledge emerges as self-containment: it dwells somewhere in-between the forms-incarnations and the suitably ‘processed’ people, able to understand it. What is just ‘understanding’ we still ignore but seemingly this property makes one with knowledge” (Yaneva, 2006: 210). Nevertheless, it will be argued below that this debate is not that different from the earlier one as far as this discussion is concerned; the transformation between knowledge and understanding could be a political one, mirroring the transformation in to a politicised epistemology.

It should be stressed that a politicised epistemology does not necessarily deny “good” science as a matter of course. Much will depend upon the nature of the political arena surrounding the specific scientific process (Mintzberg, 2004). Yet, the institutionalisation of knowledge suggests such purity to be a precarious event. Suffice to state here that Lukács was one of the few who clearly saw this when he stated, “The dynamic of dialectical contradictions is not simply a general becoming...nor a succession of stages in comprehension...but rather...the first unification of dialectical sequence and real historicity. In this way alone, the dialectic already obtains an ontological importance, as the real vehicle of history...” (1978: 3) For him, understanding (Verstehen) through a Popperian (or Kuhnian) scientific state of rationality and common sense is never viable, no matter how much, or little, one applies a political veneer. As far as we can ever achieve true understanding, it has to be set in terms of an historical process between the interpreters and the thing they are analysing, which is established not as a paradigmatic framework but as a dialectic (Lukács, 1978). This therefore strongly suggests that scientists cannot develop knowledge truly independent of their world. To a certain extent Kuhn (1978), particularly, would agree, seeing the political realities of the world inevitably intruding upon the understanding of it, and thus the likes of Yaneva (2006) as discussed above. Lukács (1978), however, would argue that such an intrusion is not merely a discussion over which paradigm succeeds against the others, rather that
the intrusion itself, in whatever guise, has to be internalised into the logic/rational of
the paradigm. Yet even he baulked at progressing to the next stage by arguing such
a consequential impact upon the embracing epistemology would fundamentally
change it and thus, in the longer term, render the ontological underpinning itself
under threat. This would imply, by definition, the circularity discussed above. The
fundamental framework of ‘knowing’ our world is based not upon ‘normal science’,
Verstehen or second nature but the politics of the dominant epistemology acting in a
grotesquely self-fulfilling parody of itself. Thus, we are doomed to ‘know’ our world,
as we would always have it, and to remain locked into ontology that of itself fulfils
such expectations; hence, the difficulties identified in Yaneva (2006) et al
concerning transformation of knowledge into understanding.

This could be construed as nihilistic, in that there is no escape, no salvation
nor deliverance to be had...we are as we are and that is it! Without a doubt, this is a
proposition that has deterred many from fully adopting: the logic being just too dire
to contemplate. Ultimately, we like to believe that there is indeed hope no matter
how onerous we might find our present world. Whoever the theorist and whatever
their particular paradigm, each conceives theirs as being the most appropriate
means to achieve the best results. Yet it is precisely this that is flawed, for it ignores
the very thing they are eager to observe in others outside the academe; namely, the
openness of their worldly interpretation to externality such as political process.
Some would concede, indeed promote as discussed above, the subsequent effect
upon epistemology through paradigmatic re-interpretation (see Kuhn, 1970; Lukács,
1978 for example). Nevertheless, epistemology (and by inference ontology) is
sacrosanct and forever under the guardianship of the academe, who analyse and
theorise change but themselves are never subject to it, despite the arguments of the
Kuhn-Popper debate.

A politicised epistemology rejects this as simplistic, and contends that all
organisations must be subject to the same dialectical process; otherwise, its logic is
rendered nonsense. To state the obvious, universities (indeed business schools) are
organisations of academics, amongst others, and should be analysed consistent
with the epistemology relevant for any other social analysis. The Kuhn-Popper
debate of course skirted on the fringes of this contention over how much ‘normal science’ comprised political intrusion etc. Whilst the Frankfurt
School, amongst others such as Lukács (1978), concerned with the Hegelian
phenomenology, were happy to argue the toss between objective and subjective
interpretation, this was always applied in a neutralised condition at an
epistemological level...the ontology remained inviolate. However, if we accept that
continuous and consistent political process can shape the rationale of a particular epistemology, and not the other way around as in the Kuhn-Popper debate, then this means that we ultimately have to accept that ontology can also be changed by it. In addition, if we also accept that academic organisation is no different from any other organisation, however we may like to see ourselves as the guardians of ontology, then for the reasons discussed above there has to be established a direct link, going in the opposite direction to the one normally accepted, from the nature of our social action, through its theorising and ‘laws’ of application (epistemology) right to the fundamental tenets of ontology itself.

Paradoxically ontology is one at the same time freed from its epistemological prison, in that “normal science” no longer contains it, but also is contained instead by it, through political intrusion and theoretically laying it open to the machinations of dominant elites. In organisations other than academic ones, this does not present too much concern, since it is logical to determine the links in this instance as being discontinuous. That is managers are not concerned with theorising, or indeed philosophy, in so far as it exceeds their strategies and social action. Although, interestingly, with the rise of the ‘management consultant’, and their so-called gurus, particularly in the U.S. and U.K, this distinction is becoming somewhat blurred. Nevertheless in the main, the traditional role of the academic as the guardian of ontology remains intact. However, if we abandon the notion that somehow our universities are no different, but politicised organisations like any other, then we also have to accept that our guardians of ontology are employees, and like other employees subject to the vagaries of their managers and superiors. Thus if ‘the guardians’ are politicised and controlled; it follows that their ontology could be subject to the same processes.

This, of course, is nothing new. The basis of a politicised epistemology has to be historical; although here, the contention is one of phenomenological interpretation as instigated by Hegel (1931). But it will be argued in the following chapter that in keeping with other sectors of our social world; our universities, particularly our business schools, are becoming increasingly rationalized (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002) and thus more susceptible to the manipulation of the management with subsequent consequences upon how we theorise about our world. This will be an essential part of the argument presented because it is claimed that the Functionalist nature of the Business School fuels the conduit between politicised epistemology and ontology.
However, the argument so presented is more than even this. Not only do university political elites, through their academics, influence the nature of their conventional epistemology (Sennett, 1998), but the academics themselves also influence such a process through their theorectic response from elite pressure (Zell, 2001). In short, theories produced on organisation or management are self-fulfilling prophecies of the “vision” inspiring the academics themselves by their own management (Mintzberg, 2004). In the event, some theorectic frameworks – especially the Functionalist ones – could be more susceptible than others. It is necessary, therefore, to determine the nature of these theorectic frameworks: and how they could potentially affect the politicised epistemology. This will be examined in the following sections.

The Self-fulfilling Prophecy of Organisational Analysis

It should be stressed that although the discussion will be centred on organisational analysis, it is proposed that all disciplines – both social and physical – are affected by paradigmatic hegemony, since a politicised epistemology cannot be anything else, by its very nature, other than transcendental. It is not content to dominate itself: as with all elites, it must control others. Bhaskar determined in pursuit of the same question: "... that the sciences are (actually or ideally) unified in their concordance with positivist principles, based in the last instance on the Humean notion of law." (1979: 1) In the process of argument in this chapter and elsewhere, a politicised layer will be applied to this epistemological tenet, and in so doing demonstrate the contention stated herein.

In particular it is the fragmentation of organisational analysis into competing ‘schools of thought’ that encourages, more than any other social science discipline, control by the elites through the dominating paradigm. Morgan has identified these as metaphors of organisation when he declared, “...all theories of organisation and management are based on implicit images or metaphors that lead us to see, understand, and manage organisations in distinctive yet partial ways” (1997: 4). Tausky (1970), on the other hand, provides a framework in which each author of note is categorised into a typology of Classical, Human Relations or Structuralism; definitively placed within the Functionalist framework. He stated, “Classical theory for the most part is prescriptive; structuralism is descriptive; and human relations has elements of both prescription and description. Both types of theory can be empirically based, and neither inherently better.” (1970: 11) Functionalist categorisation has not changed significantly since then; the labels attached to
various groupings come and go but intrinsically they remain the same, culminating in Morgan's (1997) metaphorical expressions. It seems anything will be used in order to avoid the term 'paradigm', or when it is used, it is fundamentally changed and thus rendered harmless as in Johnson and Scholes (1989).

The reasons and consequences of this will be discussed below. First should be the examination of the Functionalist schools (or metaphors) themselves in order to demonstrate politicisation of the dynamics within the epistemology of organisation analysis itself. For simplicity, the Tausky typology (1970) will be used. Yet, this is not to promote it as being solely representative of a Functionalist tradition, but typical of its genre, it recognises neither the existence nor the need of paradigms, which is an important aspect in this discussion. Perhaps in other areas of social analysis such epistemological rejection might not be so easily defended, the nature of organisations themselves exacerbates the problem. They are indeed the perfect Functionalist tool, fulfilling the Functionalist prophecy of rational order and harmony…none more so demonstrative of this than Parsons (1951) with his social system.

*The Domination of Classical Theory*

Tausky (1970) divides his first school of Classical theory into two sub-sections. The first is 'Physiology and organisation of work' into which he places the early greats such as Taylor, Gilbreth and Gantt. The second sub-section is termed 'organisational structure' and occupied by Weber, Fayol and Urwick. Not everyone agrees with this division; Hatch (1997) for example has expanded her classical grouping to include Durkheim who would have been regarded by Tausky as a Structuralist. Whilst Rollinson (1998) in his newest textbook creates a research based typology labelling Tausky's classical period as 'Early Formative Work' which included a wide diversity of people from Smith to Marshal and Taylor. Robbins (1989) took a more open/closed rational systems approach labelling this period of interest as 'Classical Rational Mechanical efficiency'. The stalwart of the student textbook, Huczynski and Buchanan (2001), however, does not discuss it other than to refer briefly to an epistemological division between positivist and anti-positivist theory. However, they are in the minority. Most tend to establish some sort of analytical framework similar to the Tausky typology. Most, also – for reasons discussed below in greater depth – tend to be textbooks rather than prime analysis. This is because the argument about what is or is not an appropriate analytical
framework has long since been lost to positivism. It is therefore left to the textbook to discuss this in an historical context (Tranfield and Starkey, 1998).

No greater is the drive for Positivist standards than in the ‘classical theorist’ framework. This reflects the emphasis on rationality and predictability, which Morgan (1997) – amongst others – termed the mechanistic interpretation of organisation. A good organisation should run like a machine – well oiled, predictable and hence easy to control… the perfect analogy for management intrusion. Students of organisational analysis tediously cite the tenet of Taylorist ‘Scientific Management’ as being “…a place for everything and everything in its place” (quoted from a student’s exam paper), followed by a discussion of Taylor’s work-study methodologies. Many have never experienced a business organisation; so this is a ‘God-send’ in an otherwise often inexplicable and unfathomable morass of theory and counter-theory. Here at least is something they can understand; a prescription for analysis and action in a highly normative epistemology, which mirrors in many ways the logic and rationality of their own limited experience.

The avoidance of anything other than the simplest of theory by the student is analogous to familiar ground established by Pavlov’s infamous dog experiment (see discussion in Dennis Child, 1981); whereby individual perception is ‘conditioned’ through an avoidance/attraction continuum to label life-experience as pleasurable or unpleasurable. Throughout our lives, we have been ‘trained’ by family and school to filter information with this regard. Abercrombie put it thus: “…our reacting to the present bombardment of information involves ignoring some of it, seizing the rest and interpreting it in the light of past experience in order to make as good a guess as possible…” (1985: 14). It is therefore proposed that Classical Management offers the student a safe haven in which he or she can grasp understandable issues. Consequently, other, more hermeneutic, theory is dismissed as unrealistic and illogical. The presence of such psychology on the part of the student is demonstrated by their eagerness, generation upon generation, to prefer questions with a classical or Structuralist bent in the examinations.

This refusal ‘to see’ (Abercrombie, 1985) would be no more than a passing interest if it were not for the impact it has upon politicised epistemology. As such, it is central and of considerable importance to the arguments presented here. The term, “Business School” suggests unequivocally to its members – both student and staff – the standards of academic behaviour, expected by management. Albeit subliminally in many cases, the message emanates downwards that ‘to get on’ an individual should behave like a business person (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002). For the
member of staff in a business producing knowledge, this requires the production of acceptable and ‘sensible’ units or courses, as well a research output in a similar vein. For the student, they are not only expected to behave like “customers” but in so doing approach their role that would fulfil such expectation. Compliance by both academic and student means the potential of reward; failure to do so could be dire (Zell, 2001). Business school management – and/or University Management – imbued with the business rationale would wish their staff to “produce” products that also fulfil the prophecy of the student’s role as customers. This then provides the link between student desire for simplicity and the politicoised epistemology of the dominant paradigm. Through this, the academic management are simplicity providing what the customer wants – a universal mantra for any successful business. More will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

Classical theory particularly therefore enables the reification of student into customer to work the most efficiently because its established methodologies and frameworks are the most open to it. The subsequent acquiescence by staff and student is due to a marriage of convenience rather than ideology. For the student it provides easy prescription, which many other schools of thought do not. For the academic, the issue is perhaps not so straightforward. Many do not prescribe to its ideology, but in these days of increasing demands and capability for their students’ academic progress it provides an easy – if not false – haven. Such overtly prescriptive, often normative, analytical frameworks allow for an easier assessment and thus less hassle. More complex is the academic’s position within their particular faculty or business school. The increasing rationalisation of our societies has not left the universities and other colleges untouched. The need for commercial competence has driven the senior management (vice-chancellor and cohorts) to demand highly rationalistic, management orientated strategies on the part of the academic staff in all faculties and not just the business schools. This in turn has lead in a perverse way to a renaissance in the Taylorist principles of scientific management – the corner stone of classical management theory and the MBA.

Support for the above argument is presented by figure one in chapter four of this work. It will be recollected that this figure was developed to demonstrate the apparent contradiction of an individual academic ideologically positioned in one paradigm but required by power relationships with their management, to interact in another. The above discussion is just such a case. The individual academic might well believe in the universality of their social business world and wish to produce output reflecting that, and yet their managers, pressurised by the university elite,
demand that they produce output that the customer wants not whether it is academically desirable.

Specifically therefore, in what ways could the domination of classical and neo-classical management theory affect the politicised epistemology? It is argued that our perception of business organisations, although not necessarily simplified, is over-rationalised by the implementation of such frameworks probably in a self fulfilling way. As Gareth Morgan stated, "The whole thrust of classical management theory and its modern application is to suggest that organisations can or should be rational systems that operate in as efficient a manner as possible." (1997: 21) He lays the blame for this fully at, "...the people designing these management systems... have come to think about organisations mechanistically and are unaware of other ways in which these techniques could be used..." (1997: 21). This is no more than a Functionalist generated self-fulfilling prophecy grounded, at least initially, not in the rationalistic ideology of the academics, but in the managerialism of their bureaucracies, upheld and enforced by the vice-chancellors.

Many senior members of staff in the universities, both academic and administrative, possess MBAs (Mintzberg, 2004) and thus probably have already adopted the tenets of a rationalised managerialism as reflected in their classical and neo-classical principles (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002). They would have been introduced to Functionalist works such as Drucker's 'The Practice of Management' (1954) or the many works of his disciple Henry Mintzberg such as 'The Structuring of Organisations' (1979), 'The nature of Managerial Work' (1973) and 'Power in and Around Organisations' (1983). Typical of this genre is the definition presented in one of the many textbooks on the topic; namely that management is "...The process of setting and accomplishing goals through the use and coordination of human, technical, and financial resources within the context of the environment." (Baird et al, 1990) For Henry Mintzberg (1983) management and organisation are one and the same thing when he states, "The Structure of an organisation can be defined simply as the sum total of the ways in which its labour is divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved among these tasks." (1983: 2) He then continues to describe the principle tasks of management to be just that. Yet another icon of British MBA managerialism is Sir Geoffrey Vickers who, like Henry Ford and Frederick Taylor before him, turned to the academe for some autumnal life fulfilment. He is best known for his views on the art of judgement, a quality he believes every manager should possess. He stated in an early speech, "...Judgement is an important quality in a manager; perhaps more eagerly sought and more highly paid than any." (1961: 31-39) After giving examples of 'good'
judgement, invoking great names such as Churchill, Bolivar and Ford he then proceeds to show us how to determine someone with ‘good’ judgement. Unsurprisingly perhaps, what he proposes is a mirror of Popperian epistemology when he states, “In the ultimate analysis, all reality judgements are matters of inference and can be confirmed or challenged only by new reality judgements, based on further inferences” (1961: 31-39). In the same way Popperian Functionalist science excludes meta-physical reality from being legitimate, so too for Vickers the art of judgement, the essence of management and hence in a Mintzberian quality the organisation itself, is based upon the Functionalist tenet of rationality. Even in that analysis where management is recognised as not being overly rational, such as Charles Lindblom’s ‘The Science of Muddling Through’ (1959), the problem is not seen as being with Functionalist epistemology itself but in the nature of what it studies.

The point being made here is that a recipe of various Functionalist solutions for quality management has been presented to our senior and middle university managers through their various management courses; dominated by neo-classical ideology. It is then hardly surprising that they subsequently fulfil the prophecies contained therein through their actions. Even if a substantial number have not attended such courses – and it seems unlikely that individuals have not attended at least ‘good management’ seminars based on such principles for a day or two – then there are still sufficient numbers present to generate the necessary ‘blue-chip’ culture for managerialism (see Peters and Waterman, 1982). Once in place the principles of a rational management, for good or bad, is applied to their own organisations like a veneer. “We are talking the ideology of Harvard, the East Coast institutions such as the Pentagon, CIA and Washington...” as one consultant from Price Waterhouse once said (Film: “The Emperor’s New Suit”, BBC Management Series, 1994) explaining the epistemology of his analysis. Neo-classical management epistemology, particularly, determines no distinction between business and non-business organisations. They are all to be managed – university or Vauxhall...presumably like the CIA!

The circle of logic, therefore, is almost complete. Academics or students are not immune from the organisation in which they find themselves. An obvious point no doubt, but one that is often forgotten, particularly in Functionalist theory. Thus the academic manager in whatever form or level, like every other employee in a business organisation – for the managerial veneer has made it so – tailors his/her actions accordingly. So too with the student, surrounded with increasing and persistent rationalization reflected in the nature and scheme of their courses is
further encouraged to reject all aspects that are not considered rational. The academic in their function as teacher, or ‘facilitators’ in MBA-speak, experiences considerable pressure through control mechanisms, such as student pass rates, so-called quality measures and student complaints, to comply by mirroring the organisation that surrounds them in the epistemology of his teachings. Only in their research are they allowed some freedom from these proto-rationalistic mechanisms. Yet in so doing, if they are fully compliant then the organisation – including the individuals themselves – will divorce their statements from the institutional reality as enforced by its management. Thus we see papers and research being conducted in a Marchian ‘Technology of Foolishness’ sense (see Marche, 1976), whereby employees (i.e. academics) are encouraged perceive themselves as acting foolishly, not only in order for them to give vent to their frustrations and thus ultimately protect the integrity of the organisation’s institution but also to distance the organisation from anything “undesirable”. Ultimately, as a consequence, the principles of rational management found in classical and neo-classical theory are unassailable. The exact nature of this impact will be left for another chapter below.

The Rest

The contribution of Tausky’s (1970) other schools of thought to the politicisation of Functionalist epistemology has increasingly diminished over recent years, particularly after the emergence of managerialism in our universities. It is not that they have diminished as a science in a Kuhnian sense: that is they are no longer, “Men whose research...based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards of scientific research” (1970: 11). Or indeed in a Popperian sense whereby in “…their anxiety to annihilate metaphysics... [They]...annihilate natural science along with it” (1968: 36). It is neither treachery in terms of a divorce from Functionalist epistemology, nor a deliberate attempt at revolution. As Watkins put it, “What is genuinely scientific for Kuhn is hardly science for Popper, and what is genuinely scientific for Popper is hardly science for Kuhn” (1970: 29). It is indeed something that they both ignored in their debate and was to colour our subsequent perceptions of it in the determination of the final outcome. Simply, in the same way that they both argued over the externalisation of other paradigms, so to within the dominant paradigm itself; theory and schools of theory can be equally marginalized. Perhaps not as absolutely as with the other paradigms, but nevertheless forced to accept a less influential position. We thus return to the
above contention: classical management was dominant, because the elite in our universities had internalised its tenets into their institutions.

So where does this leave so-called Structuralists and Human Relations theorists...condemned to oblivion along with the other paradigms? Palpably not, if nothing else both schools of thought share the same epistemology as classical theory. Curt Tausky’s view was that, “They simply represent different approaches to the subject matter for somewhat different purposes. Prescriptive theory [as portrayed by classical management] is ‘advice’ to the practitioner, such as a manager whereas descriptive theory [the rest] explains to interested observer, such as a social scientist, what the situation looks like” (1970: 11). Such a statement itself is highly contentious to those from other paradigms of course, but it does represent the epistemology of the members of the dominant paradigm. Moreover, when such epistemology is politicised, the distinction between prescriptive and descriptive theory is important, particularly so in business orientated academic subjects, because they are open, themselves, through pertinence more directly to university management adoption – or rejection. Thus those unadopted schools of thought within the paradigm representative of the institutional conventional wisdom, are sidelined, rather than rejected, as being of interest but not practical. Yet as we shall see in the following chapters, this nevertheless allows sub-elites (human resources for example) to adopt such ideas providing they are strictly maintained within the framework set by the tenets of rational managerialism.

The relationship between the dominant school and the rest is therefore a curious one. Institutionalised by the adoption of university management, the dominant school enforces upon the individual academic a politicised template for acceptable behaviour as a member of the university, while at the same time permitting the above mentioned Marchian-style ‘foolish technology’ (1976) in his function as a researcher – but not teacher. Interpretations of organisations that fall outside the analytical boundaries of classical theory suffer as a consequence a degrading of legitimacy, which in many respects is much worse than mere banishment as with the other paradigms. As one Director of a Business School put it to me informally once, “The touchy-feely, beards and sandals stuff is all very well to get the publications up, but we have to in the end manage in the real world where ‘love the employee’ is not really very practical...” Thus like many other professions academics, even those possessing the ontology of the conventionally wise, must reconcile two competing ideologies...the institution’s and their own (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002) and as already explained above with figure one from chapter 4 these are often not the same.
Within this context, therefore, the dominance of an epistemology founded on classical theory epistemology is assured. In a prophetically self-fulfilling way, it controls and governs, through management, the very institutions that conduct the research just like any other business process (Delanty, 2001). Yet in similar ways to research predicting how other outputs – cars, washing machines and the like – are ultimately affected by the inputs (management strategy, structure, culture and so on), so too we must accept the same for our research as an organisation (university etc) output. Place this within the framework of a politicised epistemology and the consequences are interesting. Popper stated at the Tubingen Symposium that, “...Knowledge does not start from perceptions or observations or the collection of data or facts, but it starts, rather, from problems.” (1976: 88) The problem in this case as we have seen is the control of our universities. To a certain extent Kuhn also accepts a potential problem here when he states that, “...one of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake.” (1970: 37) However, his belief – along with Popper – that for the purposes of ‘Normal Science’ at least the dominant paradigm is homogeneous is probably misplaced and misleading. It is perhaps a problem of definition in terms of where one decides the location of the paradigmatic boundary lies. Jackson and Carter for example define theirs as being up to the point “…of the shared beliefs and assumptions of knowledge producers about where the knowledge is.” (2000: 57) Many such as Feyerabend prefer a much more anarchistic state: “…there are always circumstances when it is advisable not only to ignore the rule, but to adopt its opposite.” (1970: 22). Or recently the more obtuse view of Yaneva et al: “Scientific knowledge is not so immediately accessible. Its understanding requires additional training. Large parts of past scientific achievements are, in fact, packed, and adapted for school training – a public form for imparting literacy, institutionalized long ago” (2006: 336). Although of philosophical interest, the debate is somewhat archaic in that the nature of our universities has changed considerably since it was first waged. In the following chapter, it will be argued an individual’s epistemology is often overridden by power relationships they experience.

Nevertheless, a paradigm, particularly the dominant one, is not homogenous. It is made factious by the politicised epistemology of the controlling elite, and differentiated from other paradigms by the consequential power of such an elite. This not only marginalizes other paradigms but also those ideas within the
dominant paradigm not considered for some reason completely acceptable. Such is 
the position of the so-called Behaviouralist and Structuralist schools of thought as 
labelled by Tausky (1970) and others. Condemned to the periphery of conventional 
wisdom in our business schools and universities, theirs is the twilight world of 
neither one thing nor the other: similar enough not to be regarded as threatening, 
anarchic or revolutionary and therefore to a limited extent internalised. Nevertheless, 
this is only to the extent of academic content such as units, courses or research, 
and not in terms of the institution’s own rationalized principles of governance. It 
could be argued, therefore, to some extent at least that there is not much difference 
in status, in the minds of the elite, between this and what is regarded as the more 
disaffected paradigms. Critical Management, for example, based in part upon the 
epistemology of Radical Humanism is flourishing as a post-graduate course in many 
universities, such as Lancaster. However, the key point here is one of degree of 
integration. Critical management, or any other similar subject area, is maintained as 
a separate entity either as a course for the aspiring revolutionaries amongst us, or 
as an isolated contribution to a ‘normal’ course.

**POSITIVISM AND ORGANISATION THEORY**

It seems that if there were no such thing as organisations, then Positivism 
would have had to invent them. More than any other aspect in our worldly analysis, 
there is a special relationship – on the point of being self-fulfilling as discussed 
above – between positivist ideology and the acceptable criteria for a ‘perfect’ 
organisation. Add to this the requirement for any ideology – whether positivist in 
nature or not – to be organised in order to become embedded into social action 
(Weick, 1979), then the pressure to portray organisation in terms of the positivist 
ideal becomes irresistible. The term ‘ideal’ here, when referring to Positivism, is 
quite deliberate because once epistemology is politicised then ontology transforms 
into aspiration and is expressed in terms of an ideology. As Popper himself stated, 
*The positivist dislikes the idea that there should be meaningful problems outside 
the field of ‘positive’ empirical science...He dislikes the idea that there should be a 
genuine theory of knowledge, an epistemology or a methodology. He wishes to see 
in the alleged philosophical problems mere ‘pseudo-problems’ or ‘puzzles’...for 
nothing is easier than to unmask a problem as ‘meaningless’ or 
‘pseudo’...Moreover, if you admit as meaningful none except problems in natural 
science, any debate about the concept of ‘meaning’ will also turn out to be 
meaningless. The dogma of meaning, once enthroned, is elevated forever above the*
battle. It can no longer be attacked. It has become (in Wittgenstein’s own words) ‘unassailable and definitive’ (1968: 51), which is tantamount – it is argued – to being ideological.

Habermas (1971) argued similarly that the domination of Positivism as conventional wisdom has given rise to an increasingly vibrant ‘technocratic consciousness’, which serves only to promote and maintain those in power. Expression of this in terms of, for example, the Popperian ideal of what comprises ‘normal science’, or indeed Adorno’s attestation of ‘natural science’ (both discussed above), would be that the only good science and therefore worthwhile science is that based upon the rational and well-tested principles of empiricism. As Watkins put it, “...Normal Research largely consists of resolving...anomalies by making suitable adjustments which keep the paradigm intact” (1970: 27). This for Habermas transforms over time into technological justification for those who control the processes involved and thus in the name of science becomes ideological. Nevertheless, it is the nature of language itself that then converts this, finally, into a specific ideology. In very much a Wittgensteinian approach to language – rather than the normal Freudian one of early critical theory, Habermas identifies our language as the transmission mechanism between ontological expression through epistemology to social action. Yet the fundamental nature of language – almost by definition – is one of passivity; based upon our ontological awareness, it serves to make real its tenets. Gadamer (1975: 431) discussed language as speaking “…its own being...” and yet if the framework of ‘being’ is no longer neutral as Habermas contends, the ‘being’ is someone else’s! The formal ways of organising knowledge are, as discussed above, already politicised (Yaneva, 2006). It is thus language that transmits such a state to ontology and embeds in it an institutionalised reality based upon the incumbent elite. Therefore, in a Lukácsian sense it is the doom of humanity never to achieve the perfection of a Popper/Kuhn good science because the choices that could have been made are no longer there. The support of this is to be found in the ‘ratchet-effect’ of language...once uttered it becomes reality and thus not retractable (Kandel et al, 2000).

Thus, elites may come and go but they are forever contained, through language, within an ontological framework of their own making. This, then, is the basic flaw in Habermas, because like many others before him, he wants to save the world and unfortunately, the world is no longer saveable. Yet in this desire he is forced to pull back from, or even contradict, the ultimate logic of his argument, which is a Nihilist one, in that the nature of our Weltanschauungen is contained not by the progress of our science in whatever form, but by our ontology made, through
language, independent and unaffected by our science. In short, we have long since set the caste by which we exist and are doomed to abide by it, paradoxically because of the very thing that broke us free from the 'shackles' of nature in the first place – language (Katzner, 1999).

The language of Positivism – one of rationality, standards and predictability – is also the language of management. Since the early days of business analysis and the emergence of Scientific Management, this has been the case. So that even today, such principles - much moderated and elaborated - continue to thrive. They are embedded within the rationale of management practices. The following quote from Hayes and Jaikumar sets the viewpoint: "To maximise the capabilities of the new technologies, managers must learn to think more like computer programmers - people who break down production into sequences of micro steps..." (1988). Curt Tausky stated that, "Management, for its part, must commit itself to scientific determination of the best way to perform tasks..." (1970: 12) Kanter envisaged managers as not only masters of change but of their organisational environments as well with "...ideas that move beyond the organisation's established practice, ideas they can form into visions" (1983). While for Peters and Waterman (1982) and Drucker (1989), amongst many, management is about "...human beings...deeply embedded in culture...requiring commitment to common goals and shared values... [Without which]...there is only a mob" (Drucker, 1989). For Handy (1985), managers are likened to GP's. Mintzberg (1973) defines managers as possessing a definitive set of roles (ten in total) through whose effective implementation they can be adjudged. The list is seemingly infinite, old and new, with Simon (1945), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), and Rosemary Stewart (1991) to name but a few. Alfred P. Sloan's quote perhaps summarises the spirit de corps of these people when he stated that, "An organisation does not make decisions; its function is to provide a framework, based on established criteria, within which decisions can be fashioned in an orderly manner" (1965).

Despite being a disparate group of theorists and theories their basic tenet, and hence common epistemology, is one of rationality and scientific verification. For them a predictable and controllable environment is all-important in which the manager enacts the prophesy of positivist methodology; he must be objective in the true sense by somehow lifting himself out of the milieu of his surroundings, and thus becoming truly scientific in the ways first determined by Frederick Taylor with his ideas of 'Scientific Management'. For Vickers (1965) this is manifest in a manager's ability to make and commit scientific judgements as effectively as any scientist would, with an emphasis placed upon the setting and meeting of objectives.
put it thus, "Businessmen will have to learn to build and manage an innovative organisation. They will have to learn to build and manage a human group, which is capable of anticipating the new, capable of converting its vision into technology, products, and processes, and willing and able to accept the new" (1989: 51). With the increasing popularity of strategic analysis as a consequence of the rise of the ‘management consultant’ the situation if anything has intensified. The emergence of ‘gurus’ – quasi academics – such as Peters (1978), Mintzberg (1983), Porter (1980) and the infamous McKinsey with his so-called ‘seven s’, has served to blur the boundary between the ‘observable’ world and the academe. Neither one thing nor the other, they are nevertheless indubitably powerful figures in both worlds: leaders and shapers of managers as well as academics. It is they who become the managers of our universities, business schools or occupants of the more prominent chairs. It is also to these people that others from different spheres of the academe will look for advice and guidance in terms of managerial propriety as vice chancellors or deans. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that their theoretic frameworks can become embedded within the institutions of these places.

The circle thus becomes complete. Through their academic subordinates university management influence and restrict the nature of their institution’s research/teaching epistemology; and then in turn have such frameworks fulfilled when they are communicated back to them, either through courses they attend or research conducted. It should be stressed again, that more often than not this influence is not with the intention of changing epistemology. It is perhaps executed with the naive presumption that their actions will not somehow inviolate the purity of their science (Pfeffer and Fong, 2002). Within Functionalist methodology, theory and practice become one. The theory predicts scientific managers and indeed, in practice they are. Such praxis is therefore the ‘test’ of scientific management principles in any organisation, commercial or academic. Particularly how well they control their environment and produce predictable results. Any up-and-coming theory would have to pit itself against such measures in terms of its prophetic abilities.

To summarise this chapter, then, it has been argued that there are six first line elements in achieving an established politicised epistemology. Figure one below demonstrates the relationship between these elements established as three theoretics of Ontology; expressed as Positivism; the managerialised and business transformed organisation of the universities; and finally business analysis. The primary element is the Positivist ontology itself as interpreted through the functionalist paradigm. It has been demonstrated that without such ideological
methodology, the social action arena would not have been so intensively cultivated for the extreme normative rationality of managerialism that has so entrapped our elites. As a consequence, their demand for change based upon rational principles (Starkey and Tempest, 2005) – probably learnt in their various MBA’s and management courses – is frankly insatiable.

The second element is the organisation and in particular – the third element – the business school. The concept of an organisation is the ideal arena for scientific management principles to be enacted. The business school, the sibling of organisation, is the academe’s attempt to emulate the business organisation predicted in scientific management. The former was born inevitably from Enlightenment itself, as a rationalised prediction of how humanity should organise scientifically. The latter was nurtured by the emergence of the next two elements, management and business analysis. Management was essential for the scientific predictions of Functionalism to hold sway in organisation – someone had to be responsible for controlling them scientifically and hence rationally: whilst Business Analysis was the self-fulfilling prophecy of that expressed in theorectic frameworks, and a methodology for management action. Additionally, however, these two elements fed off one another turning inward to fulfil their own predictions. Management needed scientific backing to legitimise their action, and what better than the theorectic frameworks they had influenced in their development through the arena of their Business Schools. It was circular, if not incestuous. University Management tailored their business courses to “match the needs of the market”; then as part of the market themselves they “purchased” those very courses and then enacted the principles learnt on them (Mintzberg, 2004).

The final element is language, acting as a driver to epistemological change and its consequential politicisation. It is somewhat ironic that the nature of language and its demand also for rationality determined the inevitable emergence of Positivism as the dominant ideology. It is often observed, to the extent of being clichéd, that the socially constructed paradigms, as opposed to Functionalism, are very difficult to express (see for example, Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and thus not workable as social theory. Palpably, as discussed in previous chapters, this is because they do not sit very well with the required rationality of the dominant scientific methodology of Empiricism. But language too is self fulfilling; its forms as words and sentences, mirror the expression of the powerful. More than this, language is thought itself and therefore is able to assault epistemological boundaries with ease. So that if its forms are intensely politicised, then so too will the logic of its output in terms of thought and epistemology.
There is of course a contradiction contained within this argument, and indeed probably any anti-Positivist argument, that borders on the solipsistic. To argue this case, the work here is by very definition, through the written word that is obviously a form of language, adopting a rational-scientific approach, which is precisely the ideology against which it is arguing. The simple answer is that there is no solution to this as Bishop Berkley determined. This, however, is not very satisfactory. It is the major reason why this work is using a dialectic rather Empiricism to support contention. It also the reason why the model in figure 1, chapter four has been developed. As already explained it allows an individual to “live” on two epistemological states – one their own and the other formulated by the powerful. In terms of the discussion here, therefore, the individual academic might well have a liberating Weltanschauungen and research all he or she might like within that context, but they are also a member of a management controlled and highly
rationalistic organisation that enforces compliance within the dominant paradigm. Language then commits the final assault and transforms social epistemology into a politicised one. Ultimately, the individual is driven by ambition and/or fear, through the demands of language, into total acceptance; and in many a case to abandon their own heartfelt paradigm.

The following chapter will explore this further. Indeed, the following two chapters will form the core of the contention within this thesis. The first, chapter six, will explore the relationship between academic and management, and the mechanism of how it finally manifests in a politicised epistemology. The following chapter, chapter seven, will take this forward and examine how the changing nature of higher education transforms a politicised epistemology into a changing and perhaps false ontology.
CHAPTER SIX

Managerialism in the Universities and Market Focused Strategy

“There is now after all a majority in all social classes that want to go to university.” (John Denham, ‘The Guardian’, Monday April 14th: 2008).

Organisation is the product of modernity, not only in its various forms but also in its consequential analysis (Clegg, 1990). To put it in terms of Adorno and Horkheimer (1970), organisations are the children of the enlightenment, born out of the need to apply rationality to the ways we must organize ourselves for ‘the modern world’. It is this point which is vital in support of the contention concerning politicised epistemology, determined and discussed in the previous chapter. The six elements identified therein (Positivism; Business Analysis; Business Schools; Language; Organisations; and Management), as concepts, are phenomenological in form and would have remained so without the driving rationality of modernity to transform them into politicised ideology and social action. Core to this is modernity’s hatred for the metaphysical – and thus Positivism’s as well; to reject all that is not verifiable, as already explained in a previous chapter. This marginalised at best, expunged on the threat of death at worst, a host of competing ideology to the point of unacceptability and opened the way for the politicisation of the surviving scientistic epistemology into a Positivist ideology. The historical context of this has already been discussed above, along with the nature of the elements most affected. It is, therefore, left for this chapter to determine the nature of the process by which this occurs.

This chapter will therefore firstly explore the distinction between pre-modernity and modernity post Enlightenment; arguing that since universities were one of the very few organisations that transcended this transition, such a change had a profound effect upon the ways they managed their original function as guardians of our ontological state. Positivist ideology, in the name of science through business schools applying business analysis, drove the university elites to become increasingly managerialised and hence market focused. As already discussed, this is at odds with the original principles of university ontological tutelage. The nature of such will form the discussion in this chapter’s second section. In the sections following, the discussion will broaden to firstly defining managerialism as applied to any business organisation. This is in order to determine similarities in the universities and hence project to the nature of their change which has, it is argued, threatened the condition of our ontological state. Then, secondly, examine how
becoming more ‘customer’ (i.e. student) focused has altered the basis upon which research is conducted and subsequently politicised epistemology. Finally the chapter will end with the consequences of this change.

**Pre-Modernity and Modernity post Enlightenment**

Before Enlightenment, and the scientism it perpetrated, society did not perceive itself in terms of organisation, but rather in terms of organising. The concept of a bureaucracy and its inherent rationality for example would have been beyond their comprehension. For the individual – lord or serf – living in pre-enlightened days their concept of work was in terms of their labour, driven by the nature of the occupation and their social class (Soulsby and Clark, 2006). In the modern post-Enlightenment days, work is rationalised by the nature of the organisation to which we belong. We may be professionals such as solicitors, accountants or teachers, but ultimately we are held to account to our organisations – they are our paymasters and our employers (Pettigrew, 1990). Marx in particular was keen to highlight this distinction – pre and post enlightenment – in much of his work, such as Das Kapital (1976). For him organisation was the politicisation of labour into power; between the owners of capital and the workers in order for the former to effectively control the means of production. Thus organisations, and all that they entail, were their invention born out of the need to maintain control (Tannenbaum, 1968). For Abbott (1989), organisation can be seen as falsifying the relationship between a person and their world of work. Prior to modernity, Abbott envisaged a comprehensive weave between occupations, work, and what he termed as ‘the pattern of staffing’. He went onto state that, “These combined...in such a way that the division of products was isomorphic with the relatively permanent partitioning of persons into occupations. Occupations themselves provided whatever social structure was required for work, and, since the division of products was a division of people, staffing was itself isomorphic with the division of products” (1989: 274).

Throughout modernity, industrialisation and mass production alienated the worker from this process (Moore, 1973). Currently – despite piecemeal labour legislation during the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, correcting many of the injustices etc, in our nearly post-modern times – the worker, if anything, is even further divorced from the process of their labour and hence organisation, than ever before. Yet, today, because of much better social conditions and increased average wealth, in the West it is no longer the issue it was. An individual’s alienation is no longer seen as being fed by tyranny but by anonymity through increasing technologicalisation. Ormrod et al (2006) are typical of the discussion in their referral to individual positioning upon a social network within
organisation and, in a Pettigrew-sense (e.g. 1973), gaining power and knowledge from it, as opposed to the arguments for and against Marxian praxis of capital-tyranny of hitherto earlier analysis (e.g. Clegg, 1989). For the purposes of the discussion within this thesis, this is a return to the knowledge-understanding debate referred to in earlier chapters. Swan and Scarborough (2005) for example argue that innovation (i.e. potential Kuhnian scientific revolution) increasingly occurs at the boundaries between different groups of professionals networked within organisation. They go on to state: “it is at these interstices, through the operation of networks, that distributed knowledge can be brought together and integrated into new products, processes and services” (2005: 914). This is an important advance for the argument presented herein because it allows a distinction between pre-modern and modern organisation. Yet in so doing, does not of necessity deny a power-orientated explanation for consequential social action. Such a condition is necessary because of the unique characteristics of a university as an organisation. It has transformed over the centuries from a pre-modern to a modern organisation – by definition of its survival from one period to the next – whilst retaining the same identity. This is in turn important in providing, in part, an explanation as to why university management over and above other management forms can have such a profound effect upon social ontology through their social action. On this basis, therefore, a modern organisation reifies the human labour process beyond the control of the pertinent individual, into knowledge inputs and outputs; transposed by power into understanding and consequential control. The problem at our universities in short is that because of their historicity stretching back centuries, their mechanisms of governance are based upon pre-modern culpabilities; whilst their management systems have become modern (Delanty, 2001).

The point of demarcation between pre-Modernity and Modernity is Enlightenment and the consequences of scientism, and hence their control of knowledge and understanding (Bump, 2004). Prior to this, modern organisation was piecemeal, existing only in bodies such as the Church and the universities; while after enlightenment especially as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, it became manifold (Foster, 2004). Thus for organisation theory the issue was a fairly simple one, since organisation is a ‘modern’ concept, the theory – or indeed the epistemology behind it – did not have to transcend the gulf between pre and post modernity in a way a discipline such as history would have to do (More, 2000). Concerned with the distinction between Modernity and Pre-modernity, Clegg for example declared that: “Modernity can thus be seen to be premised on processes of differentiation…and their management as a central organizing principle…” (1990: 10-11) Implying quite strongly that both Modernity and organization were intrinsically linked, and thereby further inferring the latter was born out of the former.
There are, however, those rare organisations that, because of their sheer age, transcend the theoretic gap between pre-Modernity and Modernity. The established universities are a classic example (Bump, 2004). Vernon (2004) argued that the state elite itself has historically encouraged universities, old and new, to develop in this way because it has suited their purposes to maintain a rift between rulers and ruled, through quality of education. Vernon determined that whilst it was not the case, "...the State was always the overriding force...without the activities of the state...the English universities would not have taken the form they did" (2004: 7). This is still pertinent, however, with so-called red brick and new universities established within modernity. Whilst they may lack the specific historicity of their own, they "borrow" it from their more established siblings. This then is reflected in their organisation structures (Deem and Brehcny, 2005); transported from the "old" to the "new" via cultural and epistemological folk-pathways in a manner as defined by Simmel (1966). So that to investigate the "old" is to understand the "new". This then made the universities unique as organisations because unlike their modern cousins (i.e. McDonalds, ICI or Microsoft) they lacked their discontinuity, which would not allow the aforementioned transgression of analysis from old to new. By discontinuity it is meant that the specific organisation, such as McDonalds, does not possess an epistemological historicity that transcends its particular demise. When McDonalds dies its historicity goes with it. Palpably there are commonalities in organisation which are inherited such as structure, management and production – product design, but these are technological based and in the realm of social action. For universities and churches, on the other hand, there is an epistemological logic through their culture and thus traditions, which not only transcends the birth of modernity itself, but also survives beyond their specificity as organisations (Shatock, 2008). Their language taps into, and effects, an ontology based upon organising rather than organisation, as discussed above and in Clegg (1990). As such their enactment, and therefore their consequential social action (Weick, 1979), is conditioned at the very least by pre-modern aspiration, thus suggesting that theoretic tenets guided by modern ontology alone should be called into question.

This is crucial for the argument here because of the nature of the universities themselves as guardians of our ontological freedom. This role has been uncontested since their birth, based upon the premise – ironically exemplified by Enlightenment – that it was to the common good (see Rousseau, *Du Contrat Social*, 1792) to allow the individual to pursue whatever ontology he would. The structure and culture of these places evolved as a consequence of that premise whereby no one person held sway other than on an informal basis. The Vice-Chancellery and all its supporting structure, was incumbent by the grace of the Senate, who in earlier times at least truly reflected ‘the common weal’ of the university (Bump, 2004). Individual lecturers were not referred to as
‘staff’ but rather as ‘members’, insinuating a collectivity – club almost – of equals...although admittedly some were more equal than others.

The great Victorian scholar John Henry Newman, in his book The Idea of a University, determined their major objectives were fourfold, "...the advancement of knowledge through research, the transmission of knowledge through teaching, the preservation of knowledge through scholarly collections, and the diffusion of knowledge through publishing..." (As stated with regard to Newman by Pelikan, 1992: 16-17). Pelikan himself then went onto say that these were as he termed it, "...the four legs of the university table, no one of which can stand for very long unless all are strong, it would follow that in the future even more than in the past they will all have to be represented in strength as components of any program..." (1992: 17). The premise of Newman’s determinants at least was one of academic freedom whereby competing epistemologies could battle it out for supremacy. It did not occur to him that one of those epistemological frameworks could of itself gain control of the mechanisms of the universities.

Pelikan, on the other hand, was somewhat more sceptical. Much of his book worried about the diminishing of Newman’s so-called ‘four legs’ to the detriment of knowledge itself. As such, with current scholars the erosion of freedom is of even more concern, manifest in what they term as the ‘New Managerialism’ within our universities. Deem and Brehony, for example, determine that new managerialism is: “...best understood as a ideological configuration of ideas and practices recently brought to bear on public service organisation, management and delivery, often at the behest of governments or government agencies...” (2005: 219). Whereby: “Inherent in the claim that ‘new managerialism’ serves the needs and interests of managers is a view of ideology articulated by Lenin and subsequently by historicists like Lukács, Gramsci and Mannheim. Central to this conception is the notion that cognitions, beliefs and theories express the interests of a particular class. In this conception of ideology, questions regarding the truth of the ideas attributed to classes are laid aside in favour of a functionalist account focusing on the external relations of one class to another and ideology’s function as a cement that enables class unity” (2005: 221). Representing a return to Radical Positivism, it does not fully capture the ideological impact beyond social structuration (Giddens, 1984). This will be discussed further below; for now it is sufficient to determine that ‘new managerialism’ is both the instigator and consequence of the changing nature of our universities.

It will therefore be argued that the role of a university, as guardian of ontology, cannot be compatible with the ideology of managerialism that is prevalent in our ‘modernising’ institutions. But more than this, because of the consequential politicisation
of the dominant epistemology (as discussed in previous chapter), the process of modernising in our universities and institutions of higher education is transforming their language into one incompatible with an independent and free ontology.

The New Elite and their Ideology of Managerialism

Many such as Tom Bottomore (1976) regarded Elite Theory as “fascist doctrine” supporting the view that history was not a struggle between the classes but a struggle between the elites. Attributed to the concept of power, it evoked persons or collectives of powerful persuasion or sometimes systems/structures within which they act (Lukes, 1978), and in so doing denigrates the essentiality of the “working man”. But then the Marxist theorists did not recognise that the “dictatorship of the proletariat” would do anything else other than transform into a democracy of the people without any form of elite, despite examples such as the Soviet Union proving them wrong. On the other hand Elite Theory does concentrate heavily upon structuralist reasons for their existence to the exclusion of other more perceptually subtle factors. Prewitt and Stone (1973) identified two “principles of the Elitist perspective” as being those, “...who see power and privileges of the ruling class and conclude that the rulers exploit and manipulate the ruled for personal benefit...[and]...there is the contrary view that rulers perform necessary and socially beneficial tasks.” (1973: 5) Both sides, therefore, are not without fault. Yet both agree that the basis of all analysis is power. Whether Marxist interpreting this in terms of a struggle of ownership, or pragmatists, such as Mills, viewing it as Machiavellian exploitation for good or bad ends, power – and who has it – is the dynamic. Hobbes’ Leviathan was necessarily all-powerful for our own good and as a consequence saved us from the “horrible and mean state of nature”, while Voltaire saw power more practically in terms of making someone do what they would otherwise not, or even more simply put was Bertrand Russell’s definition as “the production of intended effects” (1938: 35). Power was the important motivator to social action outcomes, no matter how the people wielding it were defined.

Mills defined Power Elites as being: “...composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women: they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences” (1956: 3-4). He went onto observe that whether they made a decision or not, was not as important as the fact that they could. Within the U.K. university sector the obvious people ascribed these terms would be the Vice-Chancellor, comprising the Vice Chancellor and their immediate assistants. However, as already discussed above, the situation within a university was never as overtly palpable as within the echelons of American high society, which Mills was
studying. That is not to suggest that it was no less politicised, as Becher and Kogan stated, “There is, then, in traditional academic organisations, at most an uncertain allocation of tasks through a complex system of roles in which the powers of managers are exercised over subordinates” (1992: 75). Yet there was also an ideological veneer alluded to particularly at times of importance such as degree ceremonies or crisis when the organisation for some reason is under threat. For Becher and Kogan (1992) the basic unit of the university organisation was the “subject department” comprising individuals and not systems, and central to their power-base was their ability to conduct research without hindrance. Their fear was that over recent years of continued government intervention, this was declining. Deem and Brehony imparted a slightly skewed explanation – with their discussion on ‘new managerialism’ – by determining a rise in top management power at the expense of the organisation’s inherent systemic power which is manifest by: “...the erasure of bureaucratic rule-following procedures; emphasising the primacy of management above all other activities; monitoring employee performance (and encouraging self monitoring too); the attainment of financial and other targets, devising means of publicly auditing quality of service delivery and the development of quasi-markets for services” (2005: 220). Taken with the Becher-Kogan theoretic, the implication is that subject department power-base decline is at the expense of the increasing power of university top management; encouraged by central government intervention with the agenda of making the universities more “business like”. Middlehurst quoted a senior ministry official at major conference on higher education as saying: “The changes we have underway... are driven partly by a recognition of the central role of the universities in the modern advanced economy... partly by a desire to achieve greater social justice...” (2004: 261).

For Becher and Kogan this would have been undesirable. Their view of the university process was very much a Kuhnian interpretation of the advantages “normal science” evolving out of a struggle for theoretic domination. They state this quite clearly at one point: “The individual’s academic freedom of choice is...a fundamental requirement stemming from the socio-technology of higher education” (1992: 115). Yet Hardy et al (1984) cautioned against too much idealism regarding academic freedom. “The reason why individual professors are trusted to make their own decisions...is that their skills and knowledge have been standardised through long years of training...Thus a professor...need not spend a great deal of time co-ordinating his or her efforts with another teaching to the same students. The necessary co-ordination between the two can be affected almost automatically” (1984: 352-353). The inference being that far from actively opting for, and defending, academic freedom, it was left as one of those “myths” of organisation (Schein, 1985); allowable because the necessary co-ordination of tasks
was achievable without its demise. Indeed it proved useful to serve as an idealistic façade behind which the “real politick” of everyday organisation could operate (see for example Mintzberg, 1983). Bennich-Bjorkman’s survey in Swedish universities seemed to support this when he suggested: “...that the institutional changes, not least in the way the funding system is organised, are having a determinate impact on the behaviour of academics, while academic freedom as a norm still thrives in the research community as a whole” (2007: 334). Kogan was much more direct: “The steering of research through the financing structures becomes much more salient...” (2003: 15). He goes on to determine that financial rather than academic factors are driving not only university policy but also the nature of its relationship with academic staff. Neave agreed adding that: “...globalisation and the rise of the knowledge society – where the production of knowledge is not confined to academia anymore – create even more complexities that universities have to face...” (2002: 331). The academic thus possesses a facile freedom, one which Bennich-Bjorkman termed as “negative freedom” (2007: 344); whereby the individual academic are able to research within a tight framework set by university management. It is illusory, often referred to as advantageous in times of dispute, but ultimately the nature of what the academic researches, is the product of university management strategy.

Moreover, it is contended that such a stance is further justified – as discussed above – by the epistemology of the prevailing paradigm, Functionallism. The university management have married themselves to the faith of its ideology and therefore enact to fulfil its prophecy. The consequential reinforced paradigmatic hegemony, itself encouraging an ideology of “scientism”, permitted the integration of prescriptive/normative analysis with descriptive analysis because in the end there should be reconciliation between “good science” and the “reality” it purports to observe (my inference as per Popper, 1968). No more was this evident than in the production of the Lambert Report (2003) on management and finance in the universities with regard to creating greater links to external business. Its message was clear enough, to: “Increase efficiency, find new sources of income and improve performance across an ever widening range of activities and services” (as quoted in Middlehurst, 2004: 258). There were indeed a range of reports over a twenty year period: DES (1987); DES (1991); Dearing (NCIHE, 1997); DFES (2003) to name but a few. The massage was unequivocal in each for the vice-chancellors – modernise or be damned. The inference, although never explicitly stated, was do this even at the expense of academic integrity (Deem and Brehony, 2008).

Academic freedom, ostensibly at least, appears not to be the romantic ideal the myths would suggest. Yet it is the contention here that indeed academic freedom did, until recently, act as a brake upon the excesses of the university elite; not for reasons of
structural facticity since, as discussed, the condition was mythological, but because other – perhaps more powerful – elites outside the university perceived it to be so and acted accordingly. Throughout his book Mills (1956) emphasised the integration of the elites from his three sectors of society and more importantly, their awareness of one another and indeed dependency upon one another. Pluralists such as Robert Dahl developed this much further in his book “Who Governs?” (1961), in which he argued, in reply to Latham’s exposition on Pluralism (1965), that the effectiveness (and legitimacy) of any elite is dependent upon how well they promote themselves. Riesman (1961) maintains that if there are identifiable elites at all, their “visibility” is dependent upon the nature and, again, effectiveness of the group over which they preside. Much of this, therefore, evolves not from any de facto power the particular elite may or may not have, but from the societal perceived prestige attached to the context of the elite. Thus the myth of academic freedom, albeit a much-respected tenet to enactment, tended to reduce the power of the university elites, in eyes of the governing elite themselves, because they saw it as rendering them less effective than otherwise. In short, university elites did not consequently possess sufficient political power to hold sway where they considered it counted. Indeed, Bennich-Bjorkman (2007) seemed to support this view with his survey amongst Swedish academics.

Riesman (1998) extended this hypothesis by discussing the rising power of the student-body at the expense of the university elite. He presented a society dominated in the past by what he termed as “the hegemony of the faculties” (1998: 42-64); whatever their nationality, universities were “ruled” by faculty sub-elites reflecting not so much their own power, but the neutered effectiveness of the vice chancellery itself. Yet today, the faculties’ power in turn is being diminished by the increasing influence of the student-body, supported by governments, who determined them, in true managerialistic ideology, as the consumers and therefore a group of considerable importance. Riesman (1998) was not critical of this and indeed welcomed it. Yet in so doing was fully aware it could only serve to not only break faculty power (which he seemed to despise) but to further the decline of the university elite themselves…again, for him a good thing. Baxter et al (2007) confirmed in their survey that the students themselves perceived that their power was increasing and are more willing to exercise it in terms of changing the nature of their degrees than ever before. For them there were two approaches to the increasing problem this presented: “… one approach adopts a ‘deficit model’ and aims to change the students to make them fit into the existing provision, the other focuses on structural issues, that is, changing existing provision so that it meets the needs and accommodates the skills and educational backgrounds of the students” (2007: 266). In either case, there is no issue about academic diminishing power, just the degree of its dimishment.
The rise of student influence does, perhaps, reflect government interest in them, for one reason or another; but also as a consequence – in part – of the changing context for the university elite itself. They willingly adopted managerialism, because for the first time, through initial government intervention, they became aware of the benefits of externalising their power beyond the boundaries of their own institutions. To do this, they had to become more business-like and abandon the perceived restrictions of academic freedom for more consumerist objectives (Becher & Kogan, 1992). Whilst political and economic expediency – first in the U.S. and then Europe particularly the U.K., driven by increasing unemployment in the post-war decades – forced successive governments to look to higher education as part of the solution to their problems (Hutton, 1996). The university elites found themselves with effective influence in political circles, but with that came increasing exposure and the need for justification...vice-chancellors were increasingly being held to account for any organisational incompetence on the part of their universities (Richards, 2002). Yet, once freed from the need to maintain academic freedom at whatever cost, the vice-chancellors (and their cohorts), with government backing, actively reduced power from the faculties in the name of student consumer interests (Riesman, 1998). Then, with further encouragement from government, they subsequently strengthened their position vis-à-vis the faculties, by collectivising into pressure groups, such as “Universities UK” (Richards, 2002); whilst the faculties themselves remained, as ever, disjointed and isolated (Riesman, 1998). In short, the vice-chancellors transformed into senior managers of big business, and in so doing presented government officials with an "image" they could recognise and with which to identify (Richards, 2002). Subsequently the vice-chancellors accessed government echelons hitherto denied them. Deem and Brehony asserted this effect and concluded it was fully embraced by the management when they concluded: "...managing a contemporary public service such as higher education may involve taking on the ideologies and values of 'new managerialism', and for some, embracing these. So management ideologies do seem to serve the interests of manager academics and help cement relations of power and dominance, even in contexts like universities which were not traditionally associated with the dominance of management" (2005: 217).

Schumpeter (1951) presented the process discussed above more formally in an essay, in which he determined that the power of any elite is dependent upon the significance with which other elites view their function. The continuation of the elite’s power is conditional upon its function remaining significant; in other words, an elite must continually work to maintain its power and influence. The second aspect, also important in their ability to retain influence, is the degree to which they successfully perform their particular function (Prewitt & Stone, 1973). Both these tenets are critical to the point being
made here, but with one proviso: namely, that the significance attached to a particular elite, in the Millsian (1956) definition of an elite at least, should be defined in terms of political influence. The university elite has hitherto had other forms of non-political influence but consequently was never externally politicised, and thus not significant (Becher & Kogan, 1992). Habermas, for example, maintained that power is generated (as opposed to acquired, maintained, and employed) through “common convictions in unconstrained communication...convictions which are however illusionary” (1977: 4-22). Therefore an elite must recognise itself as a cohesive force through bodies, such as Universities U.K., in order to maintain the significance of its function in the wider society, as well protecting its interests. Prior to this universities not only perceived themselves to be – as their own entity – at odds with other universities, but also of necessity the government itself (Becher & Kogan, 1992). A few years later this situation had perhaps become even more solid when Deem and Brehony concluded: “...not only that new managerialism as a general set of ideological principles has permeated higher education but also that many manager-academics have embraced these principles and the associated language” (2007: 231). They went on to determine: “This seems to be especially so for those who are in senior positions or hold permanent managerial posts at any level. Many senior manager-academics interviewed, despite most having a background as academics themselves, seemed to assert their right to manage over both academics and other staff, thus suggesting that as a social group, such manager-academics are very interested indeed in maintaining relationships of power and domination. This is bolstered by outside agencies concerned with quality audit and assessment of research and teaching which further legitimate the right of university managers to manage. ‘New managerialism’ has changed and will continue to change what universities do and how they do it; this is very clearly an ideological rather than simply a technical reform of higher education and one that is firmly based on interests concerning relations of power and dominance” (2007: 231-232).

Transformed by the changing political scene, the university elites began to emulate their big business colleagues in order to maintain their influence. Part of which was (as discussed in Chapter 3) to adopt the scientific mantle of managerialism; due in part to the pressure of government, but also to the change in the university elite’s ideology and thus attracting those imbued with ambitions aimed at other things than the guardianship of the purity of science. Hopkin, vice-chancellor of South Bank University, described the typical employment record of a successful candidate for the ultimate job in a university: “On the way up the ladder they (VC’s) are likely to have had experience of areas like strategy, human resources, equal opportunities, estates and project management...” (Quoted in Richards, 2002). Richards goes onto describe the scheme initiated by Margaret Hodge,
Higher Education Minister, "...under which 25 vice-chancellors and (university) senior managers will be paired with private-sector bosses." With the aim, it must be concluded, to make the vice-chancellors more business-like and less academic.

The contention then, in summary, is that for a range of political reasons, the significance of the university elite increased and consequently obtained greater power, but this had to be at the price of a more business-like approach. The adoption of managerialism was achieved at the demise of an absolute commitment to the principles of academic freedom; although its ghost still haunts the words of many a vice-chancellor at times of ceremonial significance. But with it gone two things were allowed to happen. First the university elites were able to exercise their power with greater efficiency (Becher & Kogan, 1992) and in particular keep the individual academic faculties under better control (Riesman, 1998). Secondly, a void was created in the university’s dominion, which was quickly filled by the prevailing paradigm (as discussed in previous chapters). The domination of a scientistic (Positivist) epistemology provided the perfect conduit for a marriage of convenience between the managerialistic ambitions of the new university elite and the worldly theory it needed to purport as a self-fulfilling justification and prophecy.

Thus managerialism had finally come to the university elite and with it, paradoxically, one at the same time an increasing bureaucracy to support the scientistic methodologies demanded by its many mantras; and second, a decreasing of organisation power in favour of a greater concentration of power for the management elite (Ommrod et al, 2006). Its spirit des corps was summarised rather well by Hayes and Jaikumar when they pronounced, "To maximise the capabilities of the new technologies, managers must learn to think more like computer programmers - people who break down production into sequences of micro steps..." (1988). No longer the academic, the vice-chancellors are senior managers of a multi-million pound business along with all the – as the vice chancellor of Queen’s Belfast would have it – "...strategic..." baggage that that entails. It is inevitable, therefore, that a more business-like ideology amongst the senior management would ensue. Based upon the positivistic scientism of Scientific Management, it would mercilessly route out all differing views as being negative and thus somehow unworthy.

What is Managerialism?

As a general concept, it is perhaps easier to determine what managerialism is not rather than what it is. Certainly it is not a science, although its prescriptions are claimed to be based upon science. Geoffrey Vickers for example asserted –ironically, given his
Functionalist epistemology – that a senior manager’s most valuable asset is his/her judgement dependent upon a set of highly unprogrammable criteria (1965). It is not cohesive enough to be a prescription, or a set of norms, for social action. Yet rules are invariably ascribed to its most vociferous exponents. Power (2007) describes such rules as “an audit society” entrenched in all levels of the organisation. Costea et al determine that whilst they may not be a cohesive set of rules they do possess significance in that: “...they have a certain cultural coherence that can be perhaps better glimpsed within a wider historical context. As a particular way in which managerialism frames its logic, analysing ‘soft capitalism’ historically offers a reasonable basis for understanding the strength of its hard disciplinary edge as a regime of governance” (2008: 660).

They are not set before the followers in judgemental way, and yet the literature is abounding with myths and anecdotes designed to lead the reader to inevitable conclusions of the right way. For example, Henry Mintzberg is prone to such measures. One such myth is worth relating in full. It goes, “A friend came by and (seeing his friend on his knees) asked:

‘What have you lost, Nasrudin?’

‘My Key,’ said Nasrudin.

So the friend went down on his knees, too, and they both looked for it. After a time, the friend asked: ‘where exactly did you drop it?’

‘In my house,’ answered Nasrudin.

‘Then why are you looking here, Nasrudin?’

‘There is more light here than inside my own house” (1978: 49-58).

Costea et al (2008) described managerialism as containing anecdotes, based upon prejudice and designed to lecture and prescribe without being seen to be doing so. As such it is contentious whether managerialism is an ideology. In the previous chapter of this work, it is argued that positivism had transformed into an ideology, based upon a scientistic philosophy. Managerialism is a part of that ideology; but it does not possess sufficiently powerful semantics to make it an ideology in its own right. Yet it is, as Meszaros would have it, “...soaked in ideology” (1989: 3). He went on to define ideology as, “...a specific form of – materially anchored and sustained – social consciousness” (1989: 10). Managerialism is certainly not that, but is perhaps one of Meszaros’ tools by which this is achieved. More probably, it is a doctrine; even a cult with all its myths and gurus or high priests, such as Drucker, Peters and Mintzberg. They speak a special language for the initiated based upon, as one consultant once put it, “...the industrial east coast, Harvard and the MBA...” A language designed to captivate and entrance the listener and consequently subliminally convert him (Costea et al, 2008). It is particularly
insidious throughout the “G-8” economies, perhaps with the exception of Russia but definitely led by the USA. Morgan identified the effects of such a doctrine: “Positive reinforcement is practiced in many Japanese, British, French... organisations, often with considerable influence on employee motivation and performance. However, the United States stands supreme in the extent to which a concern for winning and direct reward for appropriate behaviour have established themselves as important features of the culture and corporate life” (1997: 128-129). Not only is there, then, a consequential cultural exchange contained within the language of such “speak”, but an epistemological one also whereby the managerialistic models become indelibly embedded into the rationale of management strategy (Weick, 1979). Like some educational, or doctrinal virus, senior managers contract “the bug” when they go to their conferences and institutes of management education to study MBA’s etc. Once infected, they transmit its doctrinal codes into their own organisations, which then begin to enact the prophecies contained within the epistemology, memorised like mantras. The critical point here is that these newly infected managers are senior enough to have the power to enact the prophecies contained within them. Costea et al cynically determine that this is presented not as management self-interest but concern for others: “…human subjects are exorted to expand and intensify their contribution as selves (as ‘human resources’) in order to enhance production, maximize value, thus leading the organization to success. The slogan ‘people are our most important asset’ left deeper traces than the episodic waxing and waning of one fashion or another…” (2008: 665). Whilst for Deem and Brehony the impact upon universities specifically has not just been in differing language – that of business – but rather, “The creation of new layers of management and the introduction of performance management, league tables and targets, for example, are not simply discursive. Furthermore, new managerialist language asserts that the solution to all public service problems is management“ (2008: 223).

The circularisation is then complete. That is, the scientistic management courses prophesy through theory and anecdotes, the “scientific” way of management, which is then subsequently enacted by the acolytes. This subsequently serves to re-enforce the ideas through self fulfilment. A classic example of this is the Peters and Waterman book, “In Search of Excellence” (1982), in which the authors subscribed to the theory that organisation culture was readily transferable. Highly scientific in its epistemological approach it mapped out for the reader cultural templates based upon fifty so-called “blue-chip” companies for them to apply to their own companies. Morgan describes the book as one that “…can be understood as an early American management response to Japan” (1997: 128). Many adopted its message, and the myth which spread, that Peters and Waterman’s book contained magic. In the event – by the authors own admission
subsequently – the template was proved disingenuous and eventually erroneous; but in the meantime senior management both sides of the Atlantic applied its doctrines faithfully.

As such, the transmutation of management strategy into the doctrine of managerialism (Reed, 1989) impacted upon the nature of organisations themselves. Most were bureaucratic and seeking to reduce their costs in an increasingly hostile environment. The codes for action emerging from the U.S. Eastern Seaboard universities seemed to fully address this need with their ‘gung-ho’ managerial-speak of ‘helicopterizing’, ‘holding onto knitting’ and ‘downsizing’; the latter being a way to sack people with a conscience and thus reducing cost. In the new environment offered by such doctrine so-called ‘hatchet-men’ were no longer the pariahs they used to be, but respected managerial technicians seeking the best for their companies. Deem and Brehony summed it up quoting Macintyre: “What managerial expertise requires for its vindication is a justified conception of social science as providing a stock of law-like generalisations with strong predictive power” (2008: 222-223).

Managerialism is a doctrine, therefore, because it offers more than a set of prescriptions for management action (Reed, 1989) but a lifestyle as well, dictating not only strategies to be pursued but also the way a manager should think (Watson, 1986). Before the days of Thatcherism and New Labour Blairism, it provided only a calling to the more adventurous types, vying for increasingly effective avenues to promotion. Today it is different. Those younger people, nurtured on their ‘East-Board’ gurus, have matured into the top jobs and are now insisting upon acolytes with similar attitudes (Hutton, 1995).

In addition, with increasing globalisation organisations were becoming more complex and, many would claim, dysfunctional (Abbott, 1989; Clegg, 1990; Drucker, 1968); for them changing management style was part of the solution. Drucker put it into context: “Everywhere there is rapid disenchantment with the biggest and fastest-growing of these institutions, modern government, as well as cynicism regarding its ability to perform. We are becoming equally critical of the other organized institutions; revolt is occurring simultaneously in the Catholic Church and the big universities. The young everywhere are, indeed, rejecting all institutions with equal hostility” (1968: viii). There was a desire to achieve the ‘ideal’ organisation – flat, vibrant and competitive (Peters and Waterman, 1982), to break the ‘continuity’ in Drucker’s words and to somehow return – perhaps impossibly –to the pre-bureaucratic days (Jaques, 1990). The doctrines of managerialism seemingly provided a light forward, and a path to better and more efficient organisation. None exemplified this more than Peters and Waterman (1982) and their provision of “templates” to manage organisation culture. On both sides of the Atlantic, senior managers would pay considerably to listen to their mantras; and for a while, during
the eighties, it seemed as if “Camelot” had been finally achieved (Crainer, 1997). Then the
dream shattered. Organisations such as IBM identified by Peters and Waterman as being
“blue chip” companies ran into problems, contrary to their predictions. Yet as Crainer
(1997) pointed out this did not lead to a decline in managerialism as a viable and workable
organisation strategy. The central themes transformed from cultural management through
“Downsizing” to the current “Leadership” contingencies as expounded by House (2004) or
House and Podsakof (1994). It remains, however, the same essential story first developed
by Peters and Waterman; that is the manager is central to the continuity and identity of
any organisation (Crainer, 1997).

Managerialism, therefore, is not solely about management techniques in order to
manage organisations better; its doctrinaire stance not only provides a rite of passage for
initiating acolytes but a code of conduct for those already established in its principles
(Watson, 1986). The doctrines, therein, thus provide a framework for power relations
between the elites in an organisation and their various minion groups (Deem and
Brehony, 2008). Within organisations themselves, the effect of managerialism is to
polarise further the relationship between the management and the staff by highlighting in a
Watsonian (1986) manner the magic and power of the elite’s knowledge (Costea et al,
2008). It is recognised that this is contrary to the prevailing – more contingent-orientated –
view of management action; for example Rosemary Stewart (1991) and Rosebeth Kanter
(1983), portray a more conciliatory role for a manager as a shepherd of their flock. Reed
determined that: “...management control strategies are forced to mediate between the
simultaneous need for industrial discipline, imposed by the structure of industrial
capitalism, and the demand for freedom and autonomy, implied in the notion of formally
free labour” (1989: 51). So despite the increasing popularity of leadership analysis and
critical management studies, the rise of managerialism has established an agenda in
organisations that has returned the tone of management to the more
authoritarian/draconian days prior to ‘liberalisation’ (Kelley et al, 2006). The ‘management-
speak’ may be softer and legally coded protecting ‘worker’s rights’ but ultimately the
actions result in the same powerlessness of the staff as identified by for example Marx
(1976), Blauner (1964), or indeed the cynical assessment of Michael Rose (1975).

The Changing Student Status

If the universities are becoming more like their business counterparts and their
senior managers more like directors and CEO’s rather than academics, then it could be
claimed that their students are becoming more like consumers (Filippakou and Tapper,
2008). Much of the credit for this has been explained as an increase in student power
during the sixties and seventies (Riesman, 1998); matched by the declining traditional power-base of a faculty/collegiate university as discussed above. Becher and Kogan cite the increasing power of university administration as another major factor, stating that; "The growing power of non-academic administrators raises the question whether they develop functions and values which are separable from those heads of institutions and other academic decision-makers whose work they service" (1992: 75). They are, in the main, business-orientated personnel, who might have, in a previous employment, worked for a business organisation and therefore possibly already trained in managerialistic doctrines (Meister-Scheytt and Scheytt, 2005). They would understand the students in terms of such business worlds...that is as customers. Becher and Kogan continue: “...administrators...specialise in operational issues concerning the maintenance and development of the institution as such and on the running of non-academic services. Maintaining and developing the institution appeal to values entailed in the public service ethic; these include ensuring equitable treatment between competing groups and a fiduciary concern for the proper spending of resources and for the maintenance of due process (as discussed further by Kogan, 1975). Their ability to advance such value positions as against those of academics whose preoccupations are largely otherwise dependent upon the institution’s ethos and ways of working” (1992: 75).

The rise of managerialism within the universities has resulted in a shift in power not only from the faculties to the vice-chancellorship, as discussed above, but also from academic manager to administrative manager. Since the vice-chancellors require their universities to be more like large businesses, they also require people gifted in the skills to manage them (Willmott, 1995). As one ex-registrar of Warwick University declared, “A medium-sized university is now likely to have 10-15,000 students, 2,000 or more staff and an annual turnover of £120m-£150m” (Richards, 2002). In such a world it is the administrator that is supreme not the academic. Financial planning, through necessity, demand more urgent attention by the senior management than academic matters and therefore those administrators whose function cover such aspects gain far more frequent access to them and thus greater dispositional power (Wrong, 1979). But more profoundly, their ‘vision’ and that of the senior academic management become as one, systematically distorted by the increasing closeness of their association (Willmott, 1995; Costea et al, 2008). Theirs is a shared community of language, heightened by the vice-chancellors’ conversion to managerialism, whereby enactment and its consequential social action is justified and assessed, particularly in terms of future action (Costea et al, 2008).

A question arises as to the nature of the relationship between the newly empowered student body and the administration sub-elite. The students particularly are not regarded as ‘allies’ by the university elite in the same way the administration is
regarded; to put it in Riesman’s terms (1998) they have been ‘consumerised’. As Student transformation was consequential of the changing nature of the universities themselves whereby ‘product consumption’ was seen as a necessary measure of output (Deem and Brehony, 2008). Consequently the student benefited in direct proportion to academic/faculty decline (Riesman, 1998), simply because they were the only group able to provide the prime input to newly regarded measure of product consumption (Delanty, 2001). Like every other business organisation, the universities were forced to concede a financial bottom line, which demanded they recruit sufficient numbers to satisfy it (Shattock, 2008). So it was not an overly complex task to place the two aspects of product consumption and student consumerism together in university management strategy. Interestingly, it quickly became an issue of quality; specifically quality assurance as opposed to the rapidly emerging quality enhancement (Filippakou and Tapper, 2008). Unlike most business organisations, the universities suffered - particularly under the Blair administration - increasing intrusion from the Government in terms of quality assessment. The distinction between the two methods of quality management (assurance or enhancement) is one of degree and nature of intrusion (Filippakou and Tapper, 2008). The former was passive and entailed the occasional “quality assurance” visit by government auditors; the latter was much more active management and required direct government intervention in the university’s quality management mechanisms. Filippakou and Tapper identified the distinction between the two, as a consequence of a government report in 1997: “...to modify substantially the established system of external examiners (by creating a pool of accredited external examiners), to encourage higher education institutions to develop ‘for each programme they offer a “programme specification” which identifies potential stopping-off points and gives the intended outcomes of the programme’, and to propose that the remit of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) should be amended to include ‘standards verification’ (2008: 85). Seemingly innocuous, this would in fact have a profound effect upon the way the universities were managed; to put it succinctly, controversial issues could no longer be hidden beneath a veneer of management inaction (Shattock,2008). One such issue was how universities were financed; another was the quality of the student experience whilst at university. Both of considerable interest to the Government. It did not require too much innovation on the part of university managements to marry the two into one strategy; that is increased quality meant increased students and less government intervention.

If this were not bad enough, in the UK, Polytechnics and other colleges of higher education were allowed to become universities, which was tantamount to greater competition. Student numbers through greater quality became the driving force for university management teams. For example an article in the Times Higher Education
Supplement (Goddard, 29th June 2001) bemoans a crisis in recruitment in which there were 8,000 unfilled places mostly at the ‘newer’ universities. This has led to many institutions introducing all manner of incentives to maintain their student recruitment numbers. Even Oxford University announced a whole range of bursaries to attract students, although expressed under the auspice of helping students out. As the vice-chancellor himself was quoted in the article: “Oxford is a world-class centre of learning. To maintain this standard, it needs to attract the brightest students.” Implying to do that they effectively have to ‘bribe’ the students to come.

Another aspect of increasing student influence emanates from government policy and the consequential effect of that upon the university elites. It is well known that the Blair Government, and the Brown administration is no different, wished to see 50% of young people of higher education age go to university – or its equivalent – by 2010 (Bunting, 2001). Whatever the merits of such an ambition, it would have an effect upon the policy of the university elite. Frank Furedi (reader in sociology at the University of Kent) is quoted in Bunting (2001) as saying that higher education in the U.K: “...is the most homogenised system in the world. Every single university is run on the same kind of central funding mechanism, everyone has to deal with the same quality measure, every subject is supposed to be taught in the same way and, ultimately, everything is determined by the way the government is pushing.” Yet it is no different in other parts of the world, from Africa (see Times Higher Education Supplement “Degrees Shake up”, 12th September 1997) to Germany (see Times Higher Education Supplement “Student Demos Plug Quality”, 5th December 1997). The university elites, wherever they might be, are increasingly subsumed into the epistemology of government-speak and act accordingly, as discussed above.

A problem for the universities in allowing students the increased status of ‘customer’ is that with it comes extra rights and privileges, one being the ability to complain; particularly now that most students (or at least their parents) have to pay for their education. As Andrew Pakes declared (THES, 16th July, 2001), “Students are ready to ‘name and shame’ universities that ignore their grouses...” He went on to observe: “From next October vice-chancellors had better watch out because students in every university in the country will be urged to start making formal complaints if they are unhappy with the quality of teaching, coursework or whatever else they receive in return for their ... tuition fee”. Education having transmogrified into a product, the same way a customer can complain about a washing machine, so too can a student complain that their course is not working as advertised. According to Pakes, “The first step is to get students who are unhappy with the service they receive for their tuition fees to complain. Student unions will then audit the procedures at each college by tracking the progress of those
complaints. The information they collect will be used to ‘name and shame’ institutions.” At many of the newer universities such as Oxford Brookes, students are indeed encouraged to obtain redress through the courts and seek judicial review (Pakes, 2001). It is thus not difficult to imagine the sort of impact such potentially problematical consequences could have upon the thinking/strategy of the university elite. Indeed, current statistical tables in “The Guardian” and “The Sunday Times” are dominating senior management strategy in terms of course output.

Schumpeter (1951) determined that the major preoccupation of any elite is not reform/rule but prevention from ‘disintegration’ of its own and societal/area of influence. University elites’ have recently gained power beyond the remit of their organisations as discussed above, and they wish now to protect this (Trackman, 2008). It should be noted at this point that universities throughout the world are by no means homogeneous in their methods of governance; as Trackman observed there are: “...five primary models of board level governance in universities: (1) faculty; (2) corporate; (3) trustee governance; (4) stakeholder; and (5) amalgam models of governance” (2008: 63). However, he later admitted that: “Whatever the virtue of a governance model may be in the abstract, its functional value hinges on how it is applied in a particular case. Ultimately, each governance model is only as effective as those who craft it along with those who order their lives in light of it” (Trackman, 2008: 63). It is upon this basis the argument here proceeds. Namely, that ultimately however a university is governed the elite will hold sway; the ends therefore are not in doubt, it is the means which are under discussion.

Prewitt and Stone ascertained, while discussing Schumpeter’s thesis, that: “The social order is fragile indeed, and must continually be protected from the untutored passion of its masses” (1973: 27). In this context the student is by no means a friend of the university elite, and thus to be regarded as a potential threat. Yet the situation is not simple, and somewhat paradoxical. Palpably the student cannot be simply ignored, since they have attained customer status. More over they have the support of government and therefore need to be respected. Thus any resolution would require considerable effort and as Michels stated, “Organization, based as it is upon the principle of least effort...is the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong” (1962: 21). The university elites would quickly discover the path of least resistance was one of compliance rather than confrontation.

Students therefore are not only important as customers, but also have become an important component – if not the major component – in a conciliatory process between the governing elite and the university elites (Riesman, 1998). And they know it. Yet they, themselves, are not – and can never be according to the Bottomore criteria (1976) – an
elite. But their influence is no less pervasive, and through their student unions they seek to take advantage of their newfound status (Becher & Kogan, 1992). For them, however, it is not a question of power as with the university elite itself; Bottomore (1976) would argue the student body can be in many ways likened to a bus queue...brought together by force of circumstance but lacking the political will as a consequence of a high degree of heterogeneity. Each individual member might well be part of the same class as their fellows and thus possess similar backgrounds etc, but then so would a bus queue located within a specific area; yet it is never argued that their common weal would extend beyond anything than the short term objective as set by the need to catch their bus. So too with the students; theirs is a transient existence whereby their leaders, manifest in the student unions, hold sway for only a year or two and then are gone. Mills (1956), for example, regarded the identification of an elite only legitimised by the ability of its observers to identify palpable ‘coherence as a historical force’. Bus queues and student unions have been around for a long time, but despite phenomena such as the 1968 Paris riots neither have presented society with a cohesive and coherent awareness of any destiny.

Pluralists such as Truman (1951) present the notion of “potentiality” in any sustained grouping. Their leaders might change frequently but as group they are continuous. In a Millsian sense they might not possess the necessary ‘coherence’ to become a ‘proper’ elite, but there is a potential, as readily demonstrated in the 1968 Paris riots – albeit temporarily. It is this, as one of the factors, which can give the student body influence if not power (depending upon which definition of power is used.). However, their ability to influence – effect – events is mainly passive (although not entirely i.e. 1968 riots) rather than overt positive enactment; that is, groups with power (elites), for whatever reason, are willing to take account of any palpable – and acceptable – view which might emanate from the body. Truman (1951) terms such groups as ‘veto groups’. Their influence is to stop or change something not to promote; for that they would require the help of an elite. In a post Lambert Review context with increasing government intrusion, Harrison (2006) contended that ultimately the student’s power of sanction comes from their ability of “withdrawal”. This is paradoxical because it requires an individual act rather than a collective one; yet if in sufficient numbers can create university management considerable problems. For example in his own university he determined that: “The university’s student records system was used to identify the 249 full-time UK undergraduates from the 2002–2003 entry cohort who had been recorded as withdrawing between October 2002 and April 2003 (i.e. within their first two terms)” (Harrison, 2006: 378).

Whilst such an event is tragic, its importance for the argument here is in its effect upon both government and university management. Bennett et al place the initiative fully
at the feet of university management by stating: "This matter will become increasingly salient as governments apply further pressure on the ...universities to recruit greater numbers of non-traditional students in order to assist governments in achieving national participation targets...A significant connection was observed between service dissatisfaction and early exit..." (2008: 126). The net effect seems to suggest pro-action rather than re-action on the part of university management. As Harrison concluded: "Students persist at university where they have a sufficient breadth and strength of links, but withdraw where these are insufficient and where they are dissatisfied by one of more aspects of their experience. ... It was notable First year undergraduate withdrawal that few of the students in this study had built any such links, with withdrawal seeming to them to be a relatively painless process. This rejection of a deficit model shifts the emphasis of institutional efforts away from fire-fighting areas of perceived weakness, focusing rather on improving all aspects of the student experience. Approaches which focus solely on addressing dissatisfaction or identifying perceived 'at risk' individuals are likely to meet with limited success..." (2006: 388). The message is clear that like any other business customer, the universities must deal with their students sensitively. For good or ill, the student possesses power through their ultimate sanction of withdrawal because it would not only mean problems with government inspectors but more pragmatically loss of revenue.

The increasing 'consumerisation' (Becher & Kogan, 1992) of the student body by both government and the university elites has increasingly transformed the student body into a Truman-type 'veto group'. The opening statement of THES (27th June 1997) editorial makes this palpable when it declares, "Consumer, customers, stakeholders. Whatever the word is used – and they are all pretty unattractive to the providers of higher education – power is moving their (students) way. Now that a third of the population expects to go to higher education and the Government expects many of the rest to use its services from time to time during their lives, the days when the academic community could pick and choose its clients are long gone."

This would be an opportune point to succinctly present the objective of my contention above. It is simply to demonstrate that as a consequence of becoming a 'veto group', the student body can not only directly affect the nature of their particular education, but also, more importantly for the purposes of this thesis, indirectly affect the way we apply science and understand our world. The argument so far has been to suggest that the conduit for such impact is not the students themselves but the university elite. It is they, who have the power to influence the individual academics, and do so in many cases consequential of student demand. In a sense the relationship can be simplified to purely one of business. The students are customers; the university elite is the
management providing them with a service/product and the academics are the workers on the production line producing the goods. There is a value chain operating between these three groups at least (see Porter, 1985: 59-62). Like any value chain, its efficiency will have a bearing upon the competitive advantage of the specific contributors (i.e. the individual universities). The university elites through their management indoctrination (via MBA’s etc) will be acutely aware of this and operate accordingly. As in all value chains the ‘customer’ and their care is critical... in this case the students and how many of them attend the particular university. To quote the THES editorial 27th June 1997 once again: “...higher education is now a large-scale service industry and customer care is moving up the agenda fast, however much such managerial expressions may offend those committed to ‘traditional academic values”’. In this context the university elite would see those ‘traditional academic values’ in a similar manner that commercial business management would regard union practices of their production line workforce... a potential blockage to increased productivity. “Pressures from the external environment have made for a definite shift of authority towards the institutional leadership. These have included the demands for stronger management, the early retirement schemes, the weakening of tenure, and the writing of detailed institutional plans, all of which have reduced the power of the basic units and their individual members in favour of the institution” (Becher & Kogan, 1992: 68). Into the void, therefore, created by the institutionalisation of ‘traditional academic values’ have rushed the commercial orientated values of customer care and good system’s practice. No area is sacrosanct, including the nature and quality of PhD’s themselves. Johnston and Murray argue that: “The PhD has traditionally held a pre-eminent position amongst academic credentials as a mark of advanced study and training in research methods, and as a key element in the creation of new knowledge. However, this status has come under scrutiny and pressure for change, due to a range of quite different factors: declining numbers of candidates, concerns about limited relevance to the economy, uncertainty in academic labour markets and reduced confidence in the career benefits to individuals”.” (2004: 31). Where is the sanctity of science in this? Palpably, universities, as businesses, are concerned through their institutional practice (Porter, 1985; Selznick, 1957) to manage and maintain their customer base; a substantial part of that, as any management book would determine, is to react to customer demand.

Critical, therefore, to the debate here is the nature of such demands and their consequential effect upon epistemology. The increased competition for graduate employment has resulted in a corresponding student concern for more vocationally orientated courses at university such as business, law, finance etc (Pakes, 1999). For many individuals, therefore, the objective alone must be a good degree result to enhance job prospects and no longer that coupled with the experience itself (Halpern, 2007).
pressure is on the academic to produce courses, which achieve such objectives (Becher & Kogan, 1992). This does not only emanate from the students themselves, but also the university management concerned with their annual recruitment figures. Courses and modules that produced good results with as little time and resource commitment as practicable would therefore make both sides happy (Starkey and Tempest, 2005). Golding Lloyd and Griffiths saw this in terms of straight forward market forces: "Higher education institutions (HEIs) are responding to changing market forces by focusing on alternative methods of attracting students. As a result these institutions are forging stronger links with business and vocational areas—and are, indeed, developing courses which reflect this..." (2008: 16). Probably without exception in any university, lecturers and/or their modules are performance rated by the students through for example the local and national student surveys; and if the particular institution is still not keen to conduct them then newspapers such as "The Guardian" and "The Times Higher Education" journal are. Education these days is assessed like any other consumer product (Harrison, 2008). The merits of this and whether it is a worthwhile exercise or not is beyond the scope of this work, the purpose here is to demonstrate the nature of the conduit existing between social action and epistemology.

Such a claim is based upon a proposed distinction between good education and good science. The two are certainly not synonymous; indeed they are often antagonistic to one another in terms of what is proper pedagogy and theorectic. Abercrombie defines a good teacher (and hence one who produces good education) as being someone who presents “...new information in a suitably organized form and is not much occupied with investigations as to how the new information he presents comes into relationships with the old schemata” (1985: 73-74). This is definitely not how Popper, for example, would define as good science. For him the objective of good science is "...to describe and (so far as possible) explain reality. We do so with the help of conjectural theories; that is, theories which we hope are true (or near the truth), but which cannot establish as certain or even as probable (in the sense of probability calculus), even though they are the best theories which we are able to produce, and may therefore be called "probable" as long as this term is kept free from any association with the calculus of probability” (Popper, 1979: 40). In short, good science should allow itself to be open to the vagaries of falsification and not be overly confident with the sense of its own unassailable truth. Adorno and Horkheimer (1970) would, perhaps surprisingly, agree to a limited extent but for different reasons. Indeed they would regard positivist science, as committing the very crimes, by implication, Popper suggested was bad science. The educating of its principles therefore are the continuation, in their terms, of "false clarity" which, they continue, “...is only another name for myth; and myth has always been obscure and enlightening at one and the same time;
always using the devices of familiarity and straightforward dismissal to avoid the labour of conceptualization” (1970: xiv).

Good education, in Abercrombie’s terms, does not seek to falsify or destroy myth but to perpetuate it. Kuhn (1970) contended that education tended to portray the dominant science of the time in a legitimising way, and therefore present students with a sense of its unassailable clarity...the truth and nothing but the truth. Meszaros was more cynical when he described science and its education as the “legitimator of ideological interests” (1989: 177-204). Here he would be in agreement with Adorno and Horkheimer (1970) by suggesting that education (not only of science but all aspects) is the creature of the prevailing ideology and as such does not only seek to perpetuate prevailing ideology, but also to destroy opposition from competing ideologies. By definition, therefore, to educate is to exclude and to reject (highly contentious to many), because to do otherwise in terms of the Abercrombie tenet (above) would not be good education. The objective in education is to clarify, if not to simplify, to sort the ‘wheat from the chaff’ and to present the dominant, conventional, views as paramount. It would seem, without exception, that this is not anyone’s view of good science. Hegel perhaps was one of the first to formally declare the criteria for good science, and hence by implication education of it, when he stated that science, “…cannot simply reject a form of knowledge which is not true, and treat this as a common view of things, and then assure us that itself is an entirely different kind of knowledge, and holds the other to be of no account at all…” (1971: 134).

Johnston and Murray (2004) would certainly understand the distinction alluded to here in terms of the declining quality of PhD’s. Probably more than any other area it is here which is open to the vagaries of university student consumerisation. Stated simply to avoid an in depth discussion, a traditional PhD requires in depth analysis and research, dependent very much upon individual skills (Johnston and Murray, 2004), which would be considered academic. Teaching whilst not necessarily excluding the individual academic process, lends itself well to collectivity. This is useful for a management team wishing to rationalise and cut costs. To them PhD’s are expensive and seemingly unwanted by the student body who prefer to be taught (Johnston and Murray, 2004). The solution is to provide courses such as DBA’s and term them as comparable. Pedagogy, therefore, has transformed into a useful tool in management’s armoury to both at the same time please the “customer” and to cut costs.
The Consequences of Universities Becoming Student Focused

The problem here is not one of the contextual nature of good education and indeed whether it can be applied in a way that would ever satisfy Adorno and Horkheimer for example; but rather whether it has to be by definition the antithesis of good science. The point contended is that the changing nature of universities in focusing much more upon good education rather than good science, for reasons discussed above, is irrevocably changing the way universities conduct their science (Johnston and Murray, 2004). Furthermore, because of increased student power, as a veto-group, their demands for well-structured truth patterns in order to facilitate good exam results has had its mark upon an increasingly more powerful university elite (Gorard, 2006). They in turn have brought pressure to bear, either coercive or reward, upon the academics to produce courses and units which have greater student appeal and thus attract greater numbers (Bennich-Bjorkman, 2007). The analogy is simple. Any washing machine manufacturer would encourage their designers and engineers to produce a washing machine possessing qualities that would give it a competitive advantage over its rivals. The universities are doing no less. Unfortunately for them, their so-called products are not similar to washing machines or indeed any other service such as banking or transport. Perhaps obviously, nevertheless seemingly ignored, is that – as argued above – because of their unique status as guardians of ontology, change to their processes as educators and researchers could have a profound effect upon the way we understand our world (see for example Johnston and Murray, 2004).

University management power, therefore, is the conduit between the student need to be educated and the particular university’s ability to research and influence prevailing epistemology. For reasons also discussed above, both the government and the university elites are keen to see the student’s needs dominate, if necessary at the expense of academic quality. There is indeed an informal alliance between student and university elite... the objectives of either side are not the same, but the means are (Henkel, 2000). Since management wish to control and exclude possible disruptions, this requires the simplification of the academe. The student body would like the same so that they pass exams (Halpern, 2008). Thus both university elite and students share a similar epistemology and therefore do not perceive their positions as contentious. Education has been the dynamic to their union. The university elites through their MBA’s and management –speak (see Richards article, 2002); the students through their increasingly structured courses and units.
Abercrombie (1985) by implication defines good education as effectively passing on the prevailing opinions about the world in a well-structured manner. This is another way of saying that education exposes the student to the prevailing paradigm, which is already contended as positivism. Thus our education system promotes, through 'an enlightened' view of the world, a positivist ideology, which the students bring with them to higher education. Then, as a veto-group, their epistemology becomes harmonised with the already established university elite.

Positivists would claim that this is no bad thing. After all, their ideology, if not epistemology, does not permit them to recognise any other paradigm as being legitimate and therefore students with a positivist view are to be encouraged and regarded as truly scientific (Guba, 1990). There are two dimensions to this proposition. The first discussed in detail above, is the undesirability of rejecting contending paradigms because in Adorno and Horkheimer terminology, “The unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual: for individuality makes a mockery of the kind of society which would turn all individuals to the one collective” (1970: 13). To reject everything else as unscientific would be to turn in on ourselves and corrupt the essence of our humanity, which is governed by the freedom to choose. The second point to be discussed in the next chapter, and thus the above prognosis substantiated, is that through epistemology, ontology could be laid bare to the vagaries of an elite. It is not only the processes, and social structures, that could then change, but the most fundamental and profound thought/language patterns that make up the way we view particular aspects of our world. It will be claimed that since these are important to the very nature of social action (see Weick, 1979) the way that we consequently perform within a particular predictive environment will also change. To put it crudely, if we are able to change the fundamentals of the ontological patterns which make up how we view the world then we place a doom upon ourselves to enact them as a self-prophesising fulfilment.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE NATURE OF ‘MODERN’ HIGHER EDUCATION

“Around 30,000 new places will be co-funded by employers as part of the plan, which aims to refocus the culture and purpose of higher education.” (Patrick Wintour, ‘The Guardian’, Monday 14th April: 2008)

Business Education has been emphasised throughout this work because it is here that ontological manipulation can be at its most powerful. Business Schools act as one of the most important epistemological conduits between the managerialism of the university elites and the consequential epistemology within prevailing scientistic ideology of the universities (Deem and Brehony, 2005). It was argued in chapter four that the changing political environment has resulted in an increased power for university elites (accompanied by an increase in veto for subsets such as students and administration), offset by a consequential decrease in power for individual academics and their faculties (Riesman, 1998). The university elite had already adopted a business epistemology and politicised it as their own (Deem and Brehony, 2005). Through a combination of outside political pressure and greater power on their part, they were able to enforce more effectively their adopted paradigm upon the already weakened faculties and academics (Trakman, 2008). Business schools were thus not the only recipient of such epistemological intrusion, but they were in the front line as it were, since it was their area of study utilised as the dynamic between the managerialism of the university elite and consequential strategy affecting the specific science (Deem and Brehony, 2005).

The discussion will nevertheless continue to focus upon the epistemological nature of universities generally, and only draw upon business analysis and its schools in particular to demonstrate the specific processes by which, through politicised epistemology, ontology itself can be affected. This chapter in particular will examine the dynamics which serve to maintain a politicised epistemology throughout the historicity of our universities, with regard to the nature of the Positivist deductive facticity and the process of rationalisation. Finally, and preparation for the following chapter, it will combine these two aspects into a revised model developed in chapter four, concluding that there is not just one epistemology confronting an academic institution but many proto-epistemologies. It will be demonstrated that when taking into account the effects of
rationalisation this can have profound implication for the eventual nature of the ontological state itself.

A major dynamic in understanding the impact of this is to be found in the distinction between deductive analysis and inductive analysis. The assertion here, being that an inductive logic, whereby an analyst induces the general from the specific, is potentially more appropriate than the scientific norm of deduction (Pihlstrom and Siitonen, 2005). The argument in favour of this has already been presented in chapter 3 above and so will not be pursued further. The contention for here, however, will be that the requirements of deduction for specificity – the focusing of universality into scientific/specific – lay it open to the externalised machinations of realpolitik. This is because it requires, as Popper would have it, an “axiomatized set of statements” (1968: 69) strictly formulated upon good scientific principles so that tests of falsification can be easily applied. Someone has to set those rules/principles in the first instance (Stavenga, 2006). For Adorno and Horkheimer this is core to their critique of the Enlightenment project itself, leading them to accuse it of being ‘Totalitarian’ (1970: 6). In their terms Popper’s ‘axiomatized principles’ are no more than “...the Enlightenment stereotype repeatedly offered as information, irrespective of whether it is faced with a piece of objective intelligence, a bare schematization, fear of evil powers, or hope of redemption. In advance, the Enlightenment recognizes as being and occurrence only what can be apprehended in unity; its ideal is the system from which all and everything follows” (1970: 7). They would thus claim that such ‘principles’ do not reflect so much the nature of ‘pure’ scientific interpretation with the best will in the world, but rather the human nature – through Enlightenment consciousness – wants to “...objectify the world. It sees it as an absolute reality of pure and simple things – a world of material things, which are given to the senses with no further determination of any sort. Nature is perceived as neutral and disenchanted. Matter has no intrinsic significance” (Held, 1980: 152). Quality of science is of course the palpable issue but not the motivator. As Horkheimer claimed in one of his earlier works, Dammerung, “The more threadbare ideologies are, the crueler the means by which they are protected. The degree of effort and terror with which swaying gods are defended, shows the extent to which dusk (Dammerung) has set in” (1974: 225). His argument was set against the increasing scourge of fascistic doctrine/ideology in Nazi Germany, where there was violence and terror. Nevertheless, the spirit within his indictment was taken up later by him and Adorno (1968), Marcuse (1964) and Habermas (1971); the latter, particularly, viewed the process with cynicism when he declared, “What was once supposed to comprise the practical efficacy of theory has now fallen prey to methodological prohibitions. The conception of theory as a process of cultivation of the
person has become apocryphal (a myth). Today it appears to us that the mimetic conformity of the soul to the proportions of the universe, which seemed accessible to contemplation, had only taken theoretical knowledge into the service of the internalization of norms and thus estranged it from its legitimate task..." (1971: 302).

Scientific polemics and their verification through deductive processes, therefore, are effectively the objectification of potentially disparate individual subjective experiences (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). More than this, they are a political control mechanism; not conscious necessarily as discussed, but the consequence of those in possession of the prevailing paradigmatic prescriptions seeking to maintain their importance (Meister-Scheytt and Scheytt, 2005). However, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) point out objectification is not easily – nor indeed desirably – avoided. They declared, “The reality of everyday life is not only filled with objectifications; it is only possible because of them. I am constantly surrounded by objects that ‘proclaim’ the subjective intentions of my fellowmen, although I may sometimes have difficulty being quite sure just what is that a particular object is ‘proclaiming’; especially if it was produced by men whom I have not known well or at all in face-to-face situations” (1966: 50). In a sense we are all deducing the universality of our ‘lifeworld’ by objectifying those general experiences into our own perceptions of reality. Thus, so the positivist’s argument would proceed, science does no more – except perhaps somewhat more formally – than what we would do ‘naturally’. Such polemics relating to this strain of the debate are Durkheimian in their logic, as opposed to the competing Weberian counter that they are embedded as symbols in the meaningful experiences of individuals. Bhaskar (1979) summed it all up by declaring that; “It is customary to draw a divide between two camps in sociological theory: one, represented above all by Weber, in which social objects are seen as the results of (or constituted by) intentional or meaningful behaviour, and the other, represented by Durkheim, in which they are seen as possessing a life of their own, external to and coercing the individual” (1979: 39-40). He subsequently went onto describe a typical ‘Weberian stereotype’ as represented by the concept of ‘voluntarism’, while a typical ‘Durkheimian stereotype’ as similarly represented by ‘reification’ (1979: 40). It is this distinction that is the basis of my contention that the deductive process of scientific methodologies, as prescribed by Popper et al, is effectively a key to a politicised epistemology. Abstract thoughts are transformed into indubitable laws (e.g. The laws of supply and demand; Newton’s laws of gravity; Michael Porter’s Value Chain etc) whereby they become embedded in a collectivised and universalised sense of the truth so that no one individual can be regarded as legitimately opposing them (Yaneva, 2006). In short, they adopt the mantle of deity – God given and immutable: In particular importance,
unquestionable. Lukács (1923) went further by showing how reification permeates all spheres of life. “Although reification involves a process whereby social phenomena take on the appearance of things, it is not, he stressed, simply a subjective phenomenon; rather it arises from the productive processes which reduces social relations themselves to thing-like relations…” (Held, 1980: 22). It is not only the factory worker who suffers for reification. The scientist also becomes part of a ‘production-line’ deducing lifeworld experience into immanent universality; no doubt claiming his science to be unfettered in true Popperian spirit but as Adorno and Horkheimer would have it, in truth compelled by the ‘tyranny of Enlightenment’.

The point argued here is not that deductive, scientific methodology is somehow, by its very nature, corrupt. Rather the demands it places upon individual researchers/teachers/scientists for a consensually orientated ‘solution’ fulfils the necessary criteria for the emergence of tyranny of the powerful. That is – as alluded to above – deductive analysis demands the reconciliation of the individual to the ‘established’ consent more than any inductive methodology would. As Kuhn (1970) would argue, it encourages the concept of a ‘normal’ science. Thus once established as such, it is for the ‘upstarts’ to counter and dispute its epistemology, which of course – as in all things politicised – is difficult. Kuhn himself made this clear when he stated, “Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition” (1970: 11). An inductive methodology is less likely to encourage ‘normal’ science, and therefore to be discouraged by many in the university elite. The need to reconcile to a normalised viewpoint established by politicised elites is an important controlling mechanism within a university to maintain academic compliance (Middlehurst, 2004). The Positivistic epistemology, such mechanisms demand, for reasons already discussed generates scientific analysis that would lay bare to managerial scrutiny any individualistic deviation whether that is as an organisational member or researcher (Deem and Bre hony, 2005). Thus, whatever the epistemology of the particular researcher, the realities of their politicised environment will deny them the choice, within the bounds of convention and acceptability, to pursue their own path; but rather tie them in with the threat of sanction, to a management generated process. The argument here is that the method which allows this happen the most is a deductive one for the reasons discussed above.
The deductive process maintained by the managerial elite within universities, espoused by the prevailing scientistic ideology (Positivism), enforces an increasingly egocentric perceptualisation of its particular universalities (Deem and Brehony, 2005). That is, in the Popperian sense, the evidence to support a specific truth-statement about some universal law might not necessarily be all too obvious; but its epistemology – effectively politicised – is continuously rationalised and updated to overtly support the objectives of the controlling weltanschauung (Middlehurst, 2004). Thus as its science develops, it increasingly turns in on itself and looses contact with ‘naturality’ (Bhaskar, 1979). The universalities it subsequently claims as its own are consequently no more than hollow statements of intent, divorced from the best interest of both ‘nature’ and the individual in terms of understanding it. Marcuse termed this as a ‘concept of fate’, that “generalizes the blindness of a society which reproduces itself behind the back of individuals…” (1968: 215). But worse for Adorno and Horkheimer, it is the ‘child of Enlightenment’ (1970), compelled by scientistic ideology into ever increasing self-justifying objectification of the ‘lifeworld’. Disguised as science, ‘things’ are reified and objectified, in order to be manipulated to fulfil the prophecies of the prevailing will. “The unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual: for individuality makes a mockery of the kind of society which would turn all individuals to the one collectivity” (1970: 13). For Adorno and Horkheimer this was a concern with their main pre-occupation of explaining the rise of the Nazis in Germany. Nevertheless, the ‘spirit’ of their words haunts every social grouping, whereby there emerges a tyranny of the majority. Within universities in particular there are similar pressures to conform, even if their compulsions to governance are somewhat different. It is – it would seem – a doom for us all, even Horkheimer. When he was director of the Frankfurt Institute like his forbear, Gruenberg, he believed in ‘the dictatorship of the director’: that is the director should be pivotal in the running of the institute; thus by implication in control of research strategy.

Yet, whatever the incumbent governance of the universities there is a tension between the individual academic and their social control groupings formed by management (Middlehurst, 2004). The ‘loyal academic’ expressed as a positivist scientist, through the many myths expounded, is encouraged to be competitive and individualistic; in the same way that the manager in a business organisation who secures ‘that deal’ against ‘all-the-odds’ is all but transformed into an icon of excellence and achievement. Nevertheless, this is a myth and there is a limit, beyond which the individual treads at their peril. In the business organisation, it is good to be ‘self-motivating’ providing it does not
contravene the prevailing policy/strategy pronouncements. Similarly, in the university, that new revolutionary theory is all very well if it remains respectful to, or isolated from, the epistemology of the prevailing paradigm. If the boundaries are exceeded then the penalties can be severe – to the extent of loosing creditability and/or jobs. As Kuhn declared: “Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none” (1970: 52). It does not wish to find any; content with its lot, it is suspicious of those who wish to call it into question. But according to Freud – amongst others – this is not without cost. “Every renunciation [of individuality]…becomes a dynamic fount of conscience; every fresh abandonment of gratification increases in severity and intolerance…every impulse of aggression which we omit to gratify is taken over by the superego and goes to heighten its aggressiveness (against the ego)” (1949: 114). In short, we do not really wish to give up our individuality but through social pressures etc, acquiesce and therefore resent others who we see as not doing so.

The problem is particularly pertinent for the university elites, above all other organisation elites, because the tension between the employee and academic roles is unique to them, and despite their attempts to the contrary, is not simply managed. Driven by the need to induce employee conformity, the university elites are also aware that newfound competitive success comes in part through academic innovation (Johnston and Murray, 2004), which taps into the individualistic Freudian ego. With use of the Lukács (1978) model such complexity can be represented as ‘politiciised virtuality’ contained or embodied within the logic of the institution. Acting like a ‘veil’ between the individual and reality, the institution ‘intercepts’ and ‘distorts’ communicative signals in favour of the university elite in order that the individual is ‘beguiled’ into believing that they are acting in their own best interest. Thus the individual in supporting their managerial elite believe they are doing so in their own best interests. However, being only illusory this does not of course attend to the problematic that scientific deduction compels conformity and consequentially sets individual against institution (Bhaskar, 1979). This is central in understanding the dynamics of a politicised epistemology and therefore worth pursuing further.

Habermas (1970) refined such dynamics in terms of Wittgensteinian speech acts, whereby the ‘nature’ of reality is governed by the competence of the institution – as individuals in power – to ‘communicate’ their wishes through language. The intention, Habermas argued, is willing acquiescence through consensus on the part of the individuals to be controlled, as opposed to their coercion. But this very rarely – if at all – ever happens, and therefore the elite are forced to use their institutional expression as a
mechanism of coercion. Yet this in itself brings further problems. As Held explained, "It is Habermas's contention that in every communicative situation in which consensus is established under coercion or under other similar types of condition, we are likely to be confronting instances of systematically distorted communication" (1980: 256). In the Adorno and Horkheimer (1970) sense, this is when the individual is alienated (the word they used is 'divorced') from the 'naturality' (see Bhaskar, 1979) of their 'lifeworld' through the falsification of their speech acts. As Lukács determined, the institution overrides the delicate interplay of individual perception with its own roughshod message, so that consequential social action/interaction is affected in a way that denies the individual their own 'truth'. This distinction also evokes – in part – present day discussion vis-à-vis knowledge and understanding (Grimm, 2006); whereby the individual academic possesses understanding in terms of his research and context, but lacks as a consequence of institutional intervention true knowledge (Middlehurst, 2004). Such falsification is relentless, and demands its own logic and life form by denying truth and reality beyond their own reckoning. In a sense, therefore, the Freudian problematic is not so problematic for university management, because the institution does what they want automatically by virtue of its characteristics.

Yet, it is a Pandora's Box, which has been opened. Once falsified, the truth can never be established, even if we could decide on what exactly the truth is. That is the point; the university institution determines, through the maintenance of a Positivist ideology, there is only one truth – its own; whilst the individual knows instinctively that there could be many (Macfarlane, 2005). Cognitive dissonance ensues whereby the individual is contained by Adorno and Horkheimer's 'false reality' knowing that their careers are dependent upon their compliance to it, and yet resentful in a Freudian sense of their sacrifice to it. As for those whose institution it is; they too suffer a cost by finding themselves on a relentless treadmill in order to stave off the individual bearing witness to their falsehood. Kohliberg, within the context of socialization, interestingly explained the process as such: "As long as the pressure of reality is overpowering...so that the instincual renunciation can only be brought about by forces of affect, the species finds collective solutions for the problems of defence, which resemble neurotic solutions at the individual level. The same configurations that drive the individual to neurosis move society to establish institutions" (1969: 353). This, then, is the essence of Habermas's point. There can be no reconciliation between the individual and the institution, which are by their very nature in opposition to one another (Macfarlane, 2005). Within the context of the academe this is particularly pertinent since the prevailing positivist ideology not only determines the nature of the institution and its governance but also the nature of its
science and consequentially its epistemology (Shattock, 2008). The merging of these two factors – governance and research – contextualised by the dynamic of the university's institutional mechanisms create the necessary conditions for a politicised epistemology.

Given that, what happens to the relationship between the individual academic and the university's institution over time? Although Adorno and Horkheimer, Habermas, and Lukács hint at this, it is really to Weber and his dynamic of Rationalization that we should turn for an answer. For him, within such a concept, there was a nihilistic doom that could never be overcome or denied. By the very contradictions between the individual and the institution, as described above, humanity finds itself on an ever-increasing spiral to justify itself in rational terms for the events, actions and decisions made previously. No more self evident of this for Weber than the emergence of the bureaucracy. His views were certainly not ambiguous and Marcuse put them into a context quite succinctly: "The private and public bureaucracy thus emerges on an apparently objective and impersonal ground, provided by the rational specialization of functions...For, the more the individual functions are divided, fixated and synchronized according to objective and impersonal patterns, the less reasonable it is for the individual to withdraw or withstand" (1941: 431). Weber himself put it far more emotionally, and is worth quoting in full: "This passion for bureaucracy is enough to drive one to despair. It is as if we were deliberately to become men who need order and nothing but order, who become nervous and cowardly if for one moment this order wavers and helpless if they are torn away from their total incorporation in it. That the world should know no men but these; it is in such an evolution that we are already caught up, and the great question is therefore not how we can persuade and hasten it, but what we can oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life" (quoted in Bottomore & Nisbet, 1979: 391).

Certainly, the process of rationalization is understood to be well advanced since Weber's day. Marcuse (1964) for example, amongst many others, claims that already as individuals we are driven by the rationality of big business organisations to the extent that we have denied ourselves our humanity. This is, for reasons argued above, no different for universities. Yet, more is being contended here than that. The momentum of rationalization increases relentlessly, so that it is more now than it was previously. In Universities, for example, the rationale for them to behave like businesses, previously seen as alien is now accepted as the norm (Johnston and Murray, 2004). With each turn, we become more and more inward looking, justifying our previous actions in the name of a scientistic rationality, so that anything different is seen as non-rational and at best
nonsense, and at worst threatening. What was done before becomes the rationale of what is to be done now, and ‘change’ is the life-essence or fuel of such scientistic rationality. Indeed, it is not so much ‘change’ as ‘flux’, whereby the governing elite, in whatever the institution, are compelled to maintain a momentum to their rationality for governance to remain one step in front (Deem and Brehony, 2005).

Rationalization is thus a divisive process between the governed and the elite. As Weber himself pointed out, “The progress of social differentiation and rationalization therefore usually – though not absolutely always – means a wholesale widening and separation of those practically affected by rational techniques and rules, from the rational foundation of those rules, which, on the whole, is likely to be more mysterious to those affected than the meaning of the sorcerer’s magical procedures is to the ‘primitive’” (1981: 178). In ordinary business this is bad enough as Marcuse identified, but the issue there did not necessarily evolve around the domination of the prevailing paradigm in terms discussed above. The rationalization of a production process might well have beneficial as well as adverse consequences for example. In universities, however, because of their unique position, the integration of management process into epistemological output through research etc, in terms of the Positivist ideology, furthered the intrusion of the former into the latter as rationalization increasingly demanded at each turn the justification of one by the other (Deem and Brehony, 2006). University management was doing what their business schools exalted in their courses; and thus each turn became increasingly embedded and encouraged by Positivist ideology.

Anecdote within the universities often marvels at how individual academics, when promoted to management, become like ‘them’. The answer is simple in terms of the process described above. The individual is internalised by the elite they have joined and thus start to reflect their new grouping’s views. Comprising individuals, they are no different from the academics in that they too are confronted by the ‘falsehoods’ of their institution, albeit of their own initial making. They are, therefore, equally divorced from the ‘truth’ of their epistemologies in the pursuit of their own survival. Consequently they appear to the previous colleagues as alienated from their own sense of reality. Thus, rationalization, through change, not only increasingly isolates them from those, whom they govern, but also drives them increasingly from the very foundations of their own science upon which their governance was initially founded (Macfarlane, 2005). Consequently they become increasingly isolated and their actions more inwardly rational to the point of irrationality; and in the end they resort to increasing forms of bureaucracy in order to protect themselves (West, 2006). A condition eloquently invoked by Churchill when he
declared: “So they [the Government] go on in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent. Tragic, indeed, are the men who opt to hide themselves behind closed doors and refuse to see the world for what it is...” (Hansard, 12th November 1936, col.1107). For these individuals, concealed in the safety of office or ‘executive corridor’ it is the institution, serviced and shepherded by their acolytes, which maintains their governance (Lukács, 1978).

For Weber the expropriation of the individual from ‘the material means’ of his activity was not something limited to the power elite; on the contrary it was caused by their activity in the first place (1978). Yet, Lukács (1978) would have it that the elite are just as much the victim of their doing as any worker. Although the cynic might declare this to be an attempt to appease Stalin on Lukács’ part, it is nevertheless in keeping with his view of institutionalised control. The obvious distinction being one of power; the will of the elite is greater than certainly the will of the individual worker, and probably the collective will as well in most cases, up to and until the institution is shown up for the sham it is (Lukács, 1978).

Rationalisation and Politicised Epistemology in Universities

Friere in his book “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” (1973) identified the communicative process within education in terms of a Marxist confrontation between the oppressors and the oppressed. He indeed identified in the preface a state of “Conscientização”, a position presumably beholden upon all individuals to attain whereby they “...learn to perceive social, political and economic contradictions and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality” (1973: 19). In terms of the argument presented here this would mean that the “academic oppressed” would take action against their incumbent institution by learning to recognise it as a political instrument of the dominant elite. He goes on to quote Francisco Weffort, “The awakening of critical consciousness leads the way to the expression of social discontents precisely because these discontents are real components of an oppressive situation” (1973: 20).

This perspective is typical of a Marxist epistemology; and whilst portrayed in a state of despair still nevertheless offers an eventual – if not immediate – salvation in the context of a revolutionary awakening on the part of the oppressed. Thus, in terms of what is being discussed here, the individual academic will somehow achieve an awareness of his or her plight, form into an opposing group and overthrow their particular elite. Yet, seemingly, this never happens (Macfarlane, 2005). By definition indeed, the nature of
Weberian rationalization is to increase and worsen, not to reduce and improve. Individual academics might achieve salvation as they gain access to an elite or sub-elite group, but they transform into members of the elite; thus in achieving the necessary power, ironically they no longer wish to use it in pursuit of their previous colleagues’ freedom. So in short, there is no escape. Enlightenment set the cart to the track of an inevitable doom, as Adorno and Horkheimer (1970) argued, the consequences of which, no doubt, have yet to be realised.

Since the onset of significant UK Government intrusion into the UK universities as a consequence, for example, of the Dearing (1997) and Lambert (2003) Reports, there is no longer, arguably, the safety net of academic freedom for the universities to fall into; the demands of government that they are financially accountable like any other business has transformed that into an unaffordable luxury (Macfarlane, 2005). Previous chapters have explored the effect the changed perception of the student by university staff has had upon the nature of the institution; they are referred to as customers and their degrees as products. Like any customer, they are paying for a service – up to £3,000 per annum in tuition fees, and more if the universities get their way. The student is thus seen as a ‘proper’ customer parting with real money and not just local government grants. The problem with this is that the relationship must as a consequence change to one of customer and supplier. This, then, becomes a real commercial world of providing, in a timely fashion, a product in exchange for monies given. The logic then becomes questionable to suggest that the customer could pay good monies for a product, and in the end get nothing – if for example the student fails the degree they have taken. If a person buys a fridge they expect to get the fridge they bought and not to be told they cannot have it because they are not worthy. So too increasingly with the production of university degrees, it seems only in dire circumstance will a university fail a student. Regulations consequently have been devised which delay such an event as much as possible (Harrison, 2008).

The merits of such a change and others like it throughout the higher education sector in the UK are beyond the scope of this work. The point to be made here is the consequential effect they have upon the institutional and organisational mechanisms of the various universities; and then their subsequent effect upon the ontological frameworks through an increasingly rationalised process. For example Grey and Mitev (1995: 75) argue that “…by importing ‘real-world’ and ‘commonsensical’ concepts such as customers and markets, they commodify both the teaching relationship and knowledge itself; this has particularly disastrous consequences for management education where the need to
satisfy the customer's need for relevance to the real world impoverishes further the teaching/learning experience." Such a statement, again, evokes the distinction between knowledge and understanding (Grimm, 2006), when it hints at the impact upon epistemology by alluding to the commodification of knowledge. Again a few lines earlier to this they declare, "...the object of management education is to improve the managerial competence of students for the instrumental reasons of control..." (1995: 75). Many would think that fair enough. But then they relate these to education as a whole by then going onto say, "...it is assumed that because practices of control routinely occur in organization, it is acceptable that management education should contribute to this control [within universities]" (1995: 75). This does not go as far as to suggest that the university elites are themselves increasing the output of management education, for commercial reasons, to the extent that their actions and aspirations become a self fulfilling prophesy of the management education (MBA et al) they themselves have received.

As far back the seventies these aspects were a matter of debate in the U.S. In particular, the discussion evolved around whether universities should serve their local/regional communities or some more esoteric philosophy of the increased knowledge. Livingstone observed this when he declared in relation to North America, "The perspectives that see the university primarily as a teaching or research community contain a strong element of isolationism" (1974: 10). Being himself, then, a U.K. lecturer from Glasgow University, he determined this to be an argument that was yet to come to this side of the Atlantic. To him the idea or concept of a 'Public University' serving its community has always been a strong one in the U.S.; whilst over here such a position was regarded with something nearing abhorrence. Yet even then (in the seventies) the ideals were becoming manifest, especially within our 'Colleges of Advanced Technology' by their attempt to render their courses more practical. For Livingstone the "American way" comprises "...two main expressions...The first is the existence...of overtly vocational programmes in subjects which in Britain would be held to be of dubious educational value e.g. physical education, home economics, secretarial science, Journalism etc. Secondly, there is the awareness among American industry and commerce of the skills and facilities that can be utilized in universities" (1974: 10-11).

Today, some thirty years later, the transformation Livingstone (1974) predicted is almost complete (Deem and Brehony, 2005). Students so transformed into 'customers' and as a consequence adopt the perceived need by the business orientated university management teams of requiring transparently useable 'products'. Thus by treating students as customers, the expectation is straight forward and simple: that their
purchased products (courses etc) are as transparent as any other product for sale (Macfarlane, 2005). Thus in terms of Livingstone’s (1974) prediction business and higher education (and arguably increasingly lower education) are as one. Universities become an extension indeed to the training departments (or training suppliers) of business and commerce. As in any training department of an organisation, there is no room for ethereal discussion; practicality and direct application must dominate (Macfarlane, 2005). The rationalising process, discussed above, determines this, then, to become embedded increasingly into the institution of the university – confirmed and exonerated by Positivist ideology.

One major consequence of behaving more business-like is that universities have become more bureaucratic. In my own faculty for instance, the Dean’s role has become more akin to that of a CEO in a typical commercial organisation; isolated at the top of a management structure, enforced by a separated suite of offices and a lock on the door. Beneath this is a multi-layered structure of managers comprising Assistant Directors, Programme Directors, Programme Leaders and Module Leaders. Perhaps more profoundly, the faculty is increasingly entering into agreements with external businesses, without recourse to the academics, affecting the provision of education and research. An example of this would be single publisher deals for the main books on a particular course. The effect of such deals can only be to reinforce further the influence of managerial control in the faculty’s research epistemological frameworks. In a sense it reflects the classical relationship depicted by the ‘master-slave’ dialectic as discussed for example by Morrow (1994). Such a relationship whereby one party determines another’s epistemology: “...contributes to the distorted self-understanding of oppressed social actors who come to internalize a belief in the legitimacy of their own subordination and innate status as inferior humans” (1994: 149). It is tempting to regard such statements as relating to overt proto revolutionary arenas such as those in seventies Latin America or Russia at the turn of the last century, not the more cosy world of the university. But there are as ever, more subtle – although probably equally as far reaching – examples such as above, especially with the increasing emergence of bureaucracy (Macfarlane, 2005). Thus, in the case to hand, albeit for perhaps perfectly sound economic reasons, a decision is made to enforce a particular epistemology upon academics through the requirement to adopt specific texts. The result is just as much psychological, if not physical, oppression as the more spectacular variations. Raw power demands obedience and thus in the end provides the conduit to the institutionalised and effectively politicised epistemology, whereby the oppressed become ‘epistemological slaves’ to the
‘Weltanschauungen’ of their masters. Bad enough perhaps in most organisations, but doubly so in universities.

The merits of these new so-called ‘managerial’ cultures of our universities in the requirements of a reality reflecting market forces is beyond the scope of this work. In fairness it has already been noted that those who implement such forces would – perhaps legitimately – claim that without them there would be no universities. Nevertheless, it is also possible that with their increasing rationalisation there will be nothing but a scientistically orientated, and managerialistic construction of our social world. Some would argue (Marcuse, 1964) that the former would perhaps be better than the latter.

It is admitted that the argument established here can be seen as fringing upon a nihilistic tenet in its inference through the rationalisation process that the ‘past’ is a given, which hitherto produces set parameters for future social action. The sole contention is therefore based around the nature and specifics of “the inevitable outcome”. For example, Microsoft is presently one of the most successful business organisations in the world and indeed one of the richest. Yet, inevitably in train are social forces set in the past which will come to bare in Microsoft’s future through a rationalisation process, which will see its inevitable demise. For management at least the only question is when. Like Pandora with her box, she can only determine the nature of its opening and not the nature of the box itself. Managements will develop and implement their strategies but their effect can only be short-term, longer-term forces are established by other more profound factors.

It is in a deterministic sense, therefore, that the concept is being used here. The word determinism can be misleading, invoking a positivistic expression in terms of looking inward at the specific theory itself. For example, the work of Talcott Parsons could be described in this way, whereby the theory itself is determining a particular outcome by the very nature of its prediction. However, the form of nihilism as proposed by Nietzsche is not deterministic in that sense. Rather, it glances outwards in establishing a critique of not only positivist but also many constructivist theoretic frameworks in their need to not only understand but also change what it is they research. Heidegger in comparing Nietzsche’s European version with classical nihilism described it thus, “The name nihilism looses the purely nihilistic sense in which it means a destruction and annihilation of previous values, the mere negation of beings and the futility of human history” (1982: 5). To Heidegger – and Nietzsche before him – classical nihilism was indeed a political agenda whilst European nihilism was a framework of analysis. But more importantly for here, it is argued as a counterbalance to post-Enlightenment modern theory. It is such by proclaiming a universal truth that metaphysics is dead, killed off by a scientific agenda as argued in the
chapters above. Horkheimer and Adorno alluded to this when they declared, “...the Enlightenment recognizes as being and occurrences only what can be apprehended in unity: its ideal is the system from which all and everything follows. Its rationalist and empiricist versions do not part company on that point. Even though the individual schools may interpret the axioms differently, the structure of scientific unity has always been the same” (1970: 7). Where perhaps they would differ with Nietzsche and Heidegger is in their interpretation of ‘metaphysics’. They see it as pre-scientistic innocence when mankind was in unity with his being and nature. Rationality and explanation was consequential of a mythological framework and not science (1970). But when Enlightenment prevailed, through scientism, metaphysics fell. As they stated: “Myth turns into Enlightenment and nature into mere objectivity” (1970: 9). Yet for them it was no great loss other than what it heralded – the domination of a politicised epistemology through scientific methods. Yet for Nietzsche the death of metaphysics was far more profound. It was the loss of individuality and an individual’s right seek his own explanation of nature and being.

Heidegger put it thus, “...the end of metaphysics...means the historical moment in which essential possibilities of metaphysics are exhausted” (1982: 148). Metaphysics thus had been important not in any way as a science, but more as an aspiration which had maintained our subjectivity untainted by the conspiracy of a politicised epistemology. Adorno and Horkheimer put it more forcefully when they declared, "The system Enlightenment has in mind is the form of knowledge which copes most proficiently with the facts and supports the individual most effectively in the mastery of nature. Its principles are the principles of self-preservation" (1970: 83). For the scientist, a truly ‘modern’ person could only be free of the shackles of a mean and brutish history (Hobbs: 1660, The Leviathan) when through enlightened discovery, driven by pure science, they saw the world as it really was and not the aspiration of some myth or other. Paradoxically, in the claim of Nihilism, it is this very aspiration of early Positivism that has established the reverse. A doom set by Positivist science to turn increasingly inward through rationalisation to ever greater mythology in terms of the universal truths of the institution; nowhere more so than within our universities. It is not metaphysics, but science which is dead; captivated by its own myth of the ‘truth’.

Unpalatable concepts for any academic to behold, and hence why they are rarely accepted in totality. Even Adorno and Horkheimer pull back from this Nihilistic brink unwilling to progress down such a path. They declared optimistically at the beginning of their monumental book ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’ (1970) that they, “...believe these fragments (of their book) will contribute to the health of theoretical understanding, insofar
as we show that the prime cause of the retreat from Enlightenment into mythology is not to be sought so much in nationalist, pagan and other modern mythologies manufactured precisely in order to contrive such a reversal, but in the Enlightenment itself when paralyzed by the fear of the truth” (1970: xiii – xiv). In other words they determine Enlightenment to be the cause of all ‘evil’ in the modern world. Thus reverse the process of Enlightenment and return to a position beyond a Bhaskarian state of Naturalism whereby as Bhaskar put it, “…the sciences are (actually or ideally) unified in their concordance with positivist principles, based in the last instance on the Humean notion of law” (1979: 1).

For the Nihilist there is no such release. Social progress is uni-directional and if not impossibly so, is certainly difficult to reverse. The folkways have been laid throughout history and continue to have an influence upon us. Humanity is what it has become and forever contained by History; in that sense we are power-driven, so that in any epoch there will always those who will wish to dominate. Thus the inevitability of our historicity is set in terms of a need to influence at best and corrupt at worse our social epistemology. Thus politicised we will always need to control the truth and be alienated from our true selves.

It should be stressed that Nihilism is presented here as a necessary dynamic, not a theoretic framework, to the argument of this thesis. So what implication does this have for our universities? To summarise so far; in previous chapters and above it was established that due to the transformation of the university elite into a politically active institution, as a consequence – in part – of greater government intrusion, the universities’ universal theoretic epistemology became politicised. This process was not inert but ongoing and increasing, driven by rationalisation whereby the myths of one period became embedded and accepted as facticity in another. One such myth was Positivist ideology with its scientific aspiration that we would all benefit from the control of nature and the rejection of metaphysical dependency.

Such a position was further underpinned by the emergence of managerialism in the universities based upon the scientific principles of Positivist ideology. There was consequentially a self-fulfilling relationship between one and the other, culminating in the university’s own theoretic output justifying the existence and actions of its management. Yet there was a cost to not only the academic but also the manager. Science was no longer the thing of Enlightenment but of political expediency. The desire of the individual to know their true relationship with nature was sacrificed to support of the elite’s institutional veil. It is, therefore, at this point the nihilist proposition of deterministic
historicity is important, because it denies the ability of either manager or academic to recover a previously embedded context. This is not to claim that university management cannot reverse a bad strategy; for example changing to or from faculty or matrix base structure. Even here, however, the efficacy of this will depend upon how embedded such a phenomenon is within the epistemological framework of the institution. It is a well known within organisation analysis, for example, that established bureaucratic structures are difficult to 'downsize' (see Burns and Stalker, 1961). This is due in part to the employees continuing to behave like bureaucrats despite the downsized structural changes.

The context discussed here is perhaps more profound, in that, as will be argued in the following chapter, ontological frameworks can also be affected and consequentially an individual's fundamental beliefs. For present it is sufficient to determine that once a new process is embedded in epistemology, whether it is social action or a science methodology, there is no going back; rationalisation has ensured that it will become tomorrow's accepted facticity. All that remains between this and the absolutist position of nihilistic despair is the individual (Heidegger, 1982). Paradoxically they are one at the same time a saving factor whereby there will always be individuals to compete with and confront the institution (Benso, 2007); and the means/transmission by which the institution takes command (Brobjer, 2007). The process is dialectical and complex, taking place within the mind of the individual.

In a Descartesian sense as soon as an individual academic 'knows', such knowledge becomes objectified as an independent and universal truth – albeit conditional (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The 'knowing' is the key to individual acceptability and in particular whether the institution is seen as real. Yet, given the above discussion, are there different degrees of knowing and belief? This links back to the discussion referred to above in terms of the distinction between knowledge and understanding. Grimm determined in his conclusion: "...that, while belief can be quite a thin psychological state, some forms of belief are thicker than others. On this way of looking at things, belief emerges as a kind of umbrella category for "ways of saying Yes" to a claim, and within belief there are simple acts of assent and then there are also acts of assent that, as it were, combine an element of grasping with the act of assent" (2006: 534). It is this different condition of belief on the part of the individual in one epistemological state which shows the way forward. Brevity prevents this work from pursuing in detail such a genre; however it does have certain significance, in part, for the discussion at hand. Namely, the university's institution is a 'known' and therefore objectified as a facticity. But the same individual academic also 'knows' many other things in terms of his research and teaching
etc, which might indeed contradict the epistemology of the institution as idealised by the vice chancellery (Macfarlane, 2005). To repeat an above testament, it is this second aspect which makes the university organisation unique (apart from perhaps the Church); the output of the individual academic employee relates not just to specific organisational output (e.g. washing machines, banking services or even death) but to future ways society understands and knows itself through science and to eventual ontological restructuring.

Therefore a question relating to this contradiction is twofold. First, can there be reconciliation between the two positions over and above cognitive dissonance of the individual? Second, whether there is or is not reconciliation, what are the dynamics to maintain historicity for both individual and institution in terms of a politicised epistemology? The palpable answer to the first question is that there can never be reconciliation within the individual’s own mind at least and that – in answering the second question – university elite power is the dynamic which forces an eventual reconciliation. The problem with this is again twofold. First rationalisation is a relentless driving force which sweeps all before it including the university elite as well as the academics, turning them all into ‘historicity victims’ dependent in a nihilistic way upon past social action. So it is difficult to see how power alone can be the great reconciler in this. Second, even if the first context was ignored, it would be a dubious argument to determine that ontological frameworks themselves could be affected by such irreconcilability; and indeed that power relations could somehow intrude. In a sense at least, the individual academic – despite their palpable cognitive dissonance – must truly ‘know’ the facticity of their institution and thus believe it as reality. This, therefore, leads to an inevitable logic that within a university – because of its unique situation – the individual academic is confronted by two epistemological states.

The first is generated by the institution and maintained by the power of its elite; its scope is not simply defined by social action but by how much the individual is prepared to accept it, and which could include their research action etc, therefore putting it beyond empirical observation. The second one is in a proto-epistemological state. Effectively virtualised by the dispositional (Clegg: 1989) power of the university elite it is in a pre-rationalise state whereby aspects of its context could be either accepted or rejected. It is at this point, in a Weickian pivot of enactment (Weick, 1979,) that freedom of choice is truly manifest and the nihilist despair, albeit momentarily, discarded. Kvanvig (2003) would set these two states, in terms of the knowledge and understanding debate, as a form of lottery whereby what belief is chosen is a matter of luck; but importantly for this argument, it can be determined as making no difference to the quality of knowledge provided; in the
end it relates to the 'truth' – known universally as 'The Gettier Effect'. The individual academic can choose in their own minds the merits of one theory against another; or which Weltanschauungen they will adhere to; or indeed which sense of reality they believe. Yet, the moment is only brief, albeit continuous in terms of different phenomenon. Power once again intrudes, this time episodic (Clegg, 1989). As such it is not manifest, but itself proto-action in terms of a potential, whereby the choice for the individual is simple: comply or deny (Sievers, Long and Lawrence, 2006). It is here that the Positivist ideology and its scientistic aspiration, through the through the potentiality of elite power, is at its most influential. Most individual academics confronted by its subliminal pervasion acquiesce and submit to its scientistic demands, which of course owned by the prevailing university elite, are in keeping with the needs of their institution (Kvanvig, 2003; Zagzebski, 2001). In a Kuhnian sense new ideas are generated in this proto-epistemological state, but because of this condition, their accessibility to consequential social action is easily controlled; nevertheless giving it the impression of academic freedom.

FIGURE 1 – A REVISED DIAGRAM FOR THE DIALECTIC BETWEEN EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

Referring to figure one above, which is a diagram developed in chapter four, the process discussed can be further explained. In the previous discussion, the diagram examined the
relationship between an ontological and an epistemological state at an individual level. For the purposes of this discussion it has expanded the view to an institutional one, to show the relationship between the institutional epistemological state and the potentially competing proto-epistemological states. Most is self explanatory in terms of the dominant paradigm’s relationship with other competing paradigms. For the individual they are real enough but in terms of the institution they are only potential possibilities and thus proto-paradigms, which of course can never successfully compete with the institution’s own state. More interestingly is the role rationalisation plays in this process. Its effect is – through processes discussed above – to push each competing proto-paradigm incrementally further into the domain of the dominant paradigm. The argument in the following chapter will thus be as the diagram implies; namely, eventually over time proto-ontological states will be subsumed into the institutional ontological state. There will be no alternative \textit{Weltanschauungen} to the Positivist one. In determining this it would be foolish to deny the possibility of an individual academic still continuing with their own \textit{Weltanschauungen} but it will, in all likelihood, book for nothing. The Marcusian state will surely then be achieved, whereby society will have but one dream and one sense of reality.

One final point to be made here is that it is not being suggested that there is only one pre-ordained path for Humanity to take, as ordained by some deity. Indeed our increasing understanding of time-space suggests the future could be more complex in its unfolding than ever imagined. However, the nature of humanity and its need to attain power in whatever scenario could be argued as historically continuous (Thompson, 2008). As discussed above, part of this is achieved through the scientific state of facticity. Hence why there is Nietzsche’s claim of the ‘\textit{death of metaphysics}’ and Adorno and Horkheimer’s lament for ‘\textit{the tyranny of Enlightenment}’, because they both saw, amongst many others, the compulsion to factuality in any assessment we may want of ourselves. Our epistemology politicised and tainted by the positivist ideology, it is hardly surprising that this is not the case.

Rationalisation, therefore, is the important dynamic in this process (Sabine, 2007). Weber argued it to be “\textit{the mathematization of experience and knowledge}” (1972: 44) but did not declare the process irreversible. It takes a nihilist such as Nietzsche to do that. Whilst for a Positivist, Rationalisation is not a adverse process at all; it is no more than the positive process of scientific discovery and the pursuit of the domination of man over nature (hence the name positivist). Again, something which is not irreversible; although in
this case, not necessarily a good thing because it could imply, in Popperian terms, bad science.

Depending upon the individual’s view of Rationalisation will be whether what is happening in our universities is necessarily a good or bad thing. At one end of the spectrum would be the view (predominantly positivist, although not all positivists are happy with what is going on) that universities are becoming like any other business organisation and therefore, like every other 21st century organisation, must undergo change if they are to survive; particularly with regard government funding policy (Filippakou and Tapper, 2008). As one Positivist book on Change once declared, “Any organisation which ignores the concept of change does so at its own peril” (McCalman & Paton, 1992: 4); a statement and its many variants which have become mantras in the MBA’s and other ‘executive’ business courses encouraged throughout the universities (Macfarlane, 2005). This is somewhat ironic since their eagerness to promote such courses, because of the rich income streams they afford, has resulted in them becoming amongst the first recipients of the new managerialist ideas spawned from them (Duberly, Cohen and Leeson, 2007). Nevertheless this would be regarded by many of those espousing such courses and the managerialist positivist approach as a good thing. Currently it is about vocation rather than education whereby a university’s worth is adjudged by how useful it is in such a task (Johnston and Murray, 2004). Professor Kel Fidler, Vice-Chancellor of Northumbria University was moved to declare recently that his university’s “… modernity is evident in its dynamic, robust dealings with industry and commerce, and its delivery of highly skilled, highly motivated graduates into the workforce” (‘Insight’ February 2005). This reflects the positivist ideal atoned by the protestant ethic that the ultimate Godly thing is to be hardworking. A necessary function it would seem, since according to Adorno and Horkheimer (1970) and Nietzsche (1968) Positivism killed off God leaving humanity solely dependent upon itself and its domination of nature.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUDING UPON ONTOLOGICAL SINGULARITY

"As a linguistically expressed totality, whose claim to truth suppresses the older mythic belief, the national religion or patriarchal solar myth is itself an Enlightenment with which the philosophic form can compare itself on the same level." (Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1972: 11)

The foundation to the contention of this work has been, in part, that the nature of humanity, in particular its use of power in the organisation it creates, has established a self-fulfilling prophecy of its own historicity (Soulsby and Clark, 2007). The two remaining consequences of this to be dealt with in this chapter – the final conclusion – are firstly: does a metatheoretical constructionist argument establishing Positivism dominant in the universities, render it vulnerable to self defeat? If Positivism is indeed dominant, then surely the world is Positivist and the constructionist theory pointless. This is a problem of meta-analysis. Second: based upon that, how can one demonstrate the nature of the research without the use of direct empirical evidence? This is a problem of politicised epistemology. When implementing constructionist metatheoretical analysis it is difficult – if not impossible – to separate both the focus and method of the discussion because one of its major tenets is that it cannot be separated. This does have, however, profound and solipsistic implication for consequential theory. Finally, this chapter will conclude upon the importance of this work for future research and discussion, with particular regard to its contribution to such a debate.

A Deterministic Historicity

Ultimately, the claim here is argued, we shall become ‘rationalised’ and the ontological state which moulds the nature of our humanity so reflecting, solely, the status of such a condition. The process is, and has always been, not a short one; in that, there will never be a verifiable point of attainment because the accompanying process of rationalisation is like a veil to such reality and therefore renders it an improbable point of identification (Doring, 2007). Nowhere is this process more important than in our universities (Trakman, 2008). In an organisational sense, they are
unique; in that, they provide the cauldron for society's ontological state and therefore the conduit to its potential change (Deem and Brehony, 2005). It has been argued above how this process occurs and why; it is sufficient to state here, therefore, that if the impact rationalisation is significant, then our ontological state can equally be threatened. In a Marcusian sense, academics – like every other organisation member – are becoming uni-dimensional, power strapped, and organisational inhibited individuals increasingly obedient to the whims of the powerful (Johnston and Murray, 2004). This will eventually affect the way they research (Macfarlane, 2005), and thus through a politicised epistemology affect the ontological state. It is not necessarily a conscious effort on the parts of those in either power, or receiving power. Indeed, this is the point. The process is subliminal. In the everyday business of university management and academics responding to each other and their perceived 'stakeholders', they set in train, made dynamic by rationalisation, an inevitable doom leading to a changed ontological state.

Long-term outcomes, therefore, are determined by rationalised historicity. Universities and their staff – both academic and other – play the part of 'enablers' in this process not only through theory outcomes but also the social action determining which of those are acceptable. Future evolution is set in train by technological innovation (Schumpeter, 1962), yet through rationalisation it is already pre-ordained by the actions and decisions of the managerial elite. There are potential theories/ideas no longer available because the actions of our predecessors and incumbent elites have denied them to us (Macfarlane, 2005). This is a process identified in part by Fukuyama (1992). An example is whether we take action to reverse world climate change. Positivist science has determined it as 'unscientific' – even politically incorrect – to gainsay the established view. What was a contentious issue twenty years ago has become embedded in the university institutions by a politico-rationalised process as an accepted facticity. Consequential university action enacts such embedded facticity through funding opportunities, for example, to those projects which meet the accepted criteria. As argued in previous chapters, the intent, therefore, is not consequential of a Popperian/Kuhnian pure science but politicised epistemology. It may well be that the Earth is to meet its doom and equally it may not. This is not to deny that 'proper science' has been done; but such science is weeded and filtered to suit the needs of the university and societal elites: of which the former is a part of the latter. More profoundly, it can appear that society possesses the ability to reverse such decisions and actions, so for example we could reverse our policies on climate change; yet the impact upon ontology is not so easily reversed. The distinction being that our epistemological state is based upon social action and thus easily politicised; this is why it is fluid and appears reversible. Ontology on the other hand is the consequence of embedded rational historicity and once set is difficult to reverse (Schneider, 2006). In so doing we learn a complex set of social relationships and the best any 'invented 'technology can do is to mutate to another set of
relationships but never reverse them (Schumpeter, 1962). People experience their world at one point in history, are influenced by it, and then move onto another in many ways different to what they were. It is a simple socio-experiential process.

**Figure 1: Experiential Change**

![Diagram](image)

“$A$” is changed by their experience to “$A + e$” which in turn revises their worldly interpretation and then eventually through their epistemology acting as a conduit, their ontology itself – by how much would obviously depend upon the experience etc. The point to be made by this very simple – almost simplistic - model is that once “$A$” has had an experience their worldly view is forever change by it. So even if they are confronted by the same experience, their starting point for such an experience has been changed by “$e$” and therefore their new worldly view change would be “$A + e + e$” which in turn would feed back into their worldly view; change and create a new one and so on *ad infinitum*. To carry this to an extreme, even if this was a strange world indeed with only one experiential social interaction, there would be ontological progress. University social action is obviously far more complex, in terms of not only individual numbers and power elites, but also the uniqueness of their research output, which is already the stuff of ontology.

This is hardly complex, yet its implications are profound and contentious in parts. The Tavistock Institute was among the first to recognise such a simple circular social process in relation to our interaction with technology (i.e. Emery and Trist, 1960). This can, however, be applied in general principle to any other experiential framework without contention; the point being that in all cases whatever the experience, the individual is somehow perceptually changed. The model itself, however, is positivist by assuming objectivity as represented in the experiential framework. Yet it can also form the basis of subjectivist work. Berger and Luckmann (1967) for example based the foundation of their work on the tenet that social progression is dependent upon a parallel
progression in ontological expression. More recently – and more applied – is the knowledge transfer work of Leiter et al (2007) using a similar epistemology; whilst Tondl (2007); Yaneva (2006); and Grimm (2006), in their discussion of knowledge and understanding, question the processes involved. Adorno and Horkheimer (P. xiii: 1972) stated in their introduction that, “We are wholly convinced – and therein lies our petito principii – that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought.” For them such thought had to be unfettered from the tyranny of enlightened science and ontologically developed by social pragmatism, itself enlightened to the nature of the tyranny, which confronts them. Readily Hitler’s Germany and what happened there comes to mind, given that Horkheimer and all of the Frankfurt School fled it at the time; mostly Jewish and fearful of what would happen to them. For the Frankfurt School Germany was not enlightened. It suffered “False Clarity” which they determined as a mythical belief – “...obscure and enlightening at one and the same time...” –, which convinces a society that its tyrannous subjugation is not that, but indeed freedom. Yet the point to be made here is that even within such a social state, ontological development continued and it was this, which would eventually form the seed of true enlightenment: progressing inevitably experience upon experience to a different society.

However, Adorno and Horkheimer were not nihilists. They baulked at the idea that there was no escape. Indeed, for them such ‘escape’ would have been science – finally liberated from the shackles of the powerful (Held, 1980). Giddens (1990) developed this aspect with his concept of “Time-Space Distanciation.” In such a context, the university elites are the determinants for the ontological consequences of their universities, whether that is in terms of their governance and/or theorectic outputs. Giddens (1990) argued that their prime duty – although expressed in different terminology – is to “manage” the boundaries of their social structures: to maintain the “boundedness” as he put it. In so doing, particularly with regard to a modern organisational state, they are instrument in bounding the social entity to time and space (1990: 14). However, they themselves are “distanced” through deliberate, or consequential, structural isolation from their masses; for university elites this could be achieved through something as simple as a separate suite of offices guarded by officious secretaries (Macfarlane, 2005). Painfully this is a physical manifestation of a far more complex social relationship. Consequentially however, the social development of both parties (bosses and underlings, the rulers and the ruled) is different and yet bounded by time and space. It would suggest by implication – although Giddens himself did not – that the future development of either party could never be integrated, always at best running in parallel but distanced in time-space from one another.

Yet if Science were the true saviour, as Adorno and Horkheimer ultimately conceded, there should be an eventual convergence of interest between the rulers and the ruled. A period of
reckoning in which all would come together and Utopia as seen by Thomas More would emerge. In a sense, this is the implied aim of positivist science – the prodigy of such philosophy, developing as it did from Enlightenment (Stavenga, 2006). To protect ourselves from the Nihilist’s despair there must be hope and a point to the passing of time; we have to believe that we are here for some purpose, and if no longer divine then certainly altruistic (Brobjer, 2007; Benso, 2007). This was the purpose of Enlightenment itself (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1970), to provide such a hope of eventual salvation and emancipation in the wake of the demise of the Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) – the monarch and the Roman Catholic Church. Popper on the other hand was not quite so apocalyptic when he discussed the path as "... not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor is it a system which steadily advances towards a state of finality. Our science is not knowledge (episteme): it can never claim to have attained truth, or even a substitute for it, such as probability." (1968: 268).

This indeed is the crux of the argument between not only subjective and objective analysis, but also the assertion for the condition and changeability of our ontological state. It is contended that Popper and his acolytes committed the fundamental error in their assertion that universality has to be empirically tested; and since it cannot be tested, it should therefore be treated with caution to the extent of being ignored. For Adorno and Horkheimer – many years earlier – the distinction between singularity and universality was much more than mere methodology, taking the form of political expression. Indeed this was the driving essence of the Frankfurt School; universality is, *de facto*, Nature itself; and as such should remain "untainted". For "The unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual: for individuality makes a mockery of the kind of society which would turn all individuals into one collectivity" (1972: 13).

Universality is less an anecdotal, hence unverifiable, state of being and more a philosophical statement upon ontological positioning of the individual in their world; in particular "the radical separation of subject and object" (Held, 1980: 155). It is also an important ‘pathway’ for this work in legitimising the contention of a politicised epistemology (and accompanying proto-epistemologies) rationalised into a changing ontological state. With the increasing modernisation of university managements and their adoption of Positivist ideology as their own (Deem and Brehony, 2005), universality is discouraged and rejected in their organisation outputs for the reason discussed above. The external world is reduced "...to quantified objects of manipulation, the subject becomes increasingly repressed and dominated by a second nature, by a history which appears as "fatefully structured, pregiven"" (quote attributed by Held to Adorno, 1980: 157). Held continued by asserting that the replacement of universality by empiricism and positivism has lead to the reification of the social being; objectified and turned in on itself establishing what Adorno termed as "the false whole"
(Adorno, 1974: 50). It is this, then, which creates the condition of politicised epistemology. The university elite, through the mechanisms of its institution, places upon the individual academic a ‘singular’ – as opposed to universal – framework for social action, verifiable by rationalised facticity (Macfarlane, 2005); instigated by their episodic power and maintained by dispositional power (see discussion in previous chapter).

Yet, it has been argued within this work, and by many others, to the point of being a truism, that theory explaining identified phenomenon cannot be divorced from influencing that very phenomenon it is explaining, perhaps even in a self-fulfilling way. Since Positivist ideology dominates our academic communities within the universities, it is not unreasonable to look initially to its epistemological processes in order to understand the transmission of a politicised epistemology to the ontological state. Figure 2 below presents this process in a simple manner. Based upon the principles of Deducto-singularity, it can be seen that there are five elements. The first three: i) Experiential, ii) Perception, and iii) Physicality are based upon Popper’s ‘Three world’ model (1979) and therefore could be viewed as presenting a substantive axiom for Positivist epistemology. The fourth element is the researcher himself or herself, which is self-apparent. Finally, is the process of research; set independent from both the research and the researchers themselves, as if in some way it is beyond their direct control. There is a sixth element unrecognised by Positivist epistemology and that is the politicisation from the elite.

The contention is that it is the fundamental nature of this relationship providing the conduit to the ontological state. A detailed philosophy of such epistemology has already been discussed above, the points to be emphasised here are firstly, the epistemological positioning of the researcher and research process/methodology outside the research arena renders them vulnerable to external elite influence. To put crudely – and as Kuhn has already argued – ostensibly, since the researcher and his methods are somehow independent from that being researched, the integrity of its physicality would not become questionable by any external influence upon the researcher. In other words, if as claimed by this work, that university management are influencing not only what their academics should research but also how it should be researched; then for the Positivist, at least, the culpability of this is unimportant since the process of science is sufficiently rigorous to weed out those ineffective theories, that might for some reason emerge as triumphant. Positivist confidence that this would indeed happen is based upon their universal acceptance of the principles of deductive logic – the whole cannot be legitimised and hence the ‘truth’ established without first a thorough and scientific investigation into the parts.

The second point to be noted is that due to the separation of research epistemology from the researcher no ‘leakage’ from that to the subject in hand would be identified as legitimate and
therefore Positivist theory could not ‘see’ changes to their subject matter as resulting from their own research (Stavenga, 2006). It is accepted that within Positivism there are methodologies such a ‘social action research’, which seek to immerse the researcher into the arena of their subject. Nevertheless, they are no more than that: a recognition that social action can progress ‘behind the back’ of the researcher and therefore they too must be part of that process in order to ‘see’ everything (i.e. The Awakening Giant, Pettigrew, 1985).

*Figure 2: Positivist Epistemological Framework*
The solution it would appear is simple; by some means determine that science itself changes and that universality and induction are the basis upon which to proceed. Indeed, in his introduction Hegel tackles the problem directly when he declared, "...if the fear of falling into error introduces an element of distrust into science, which without any scruples of that sort goes to work and actually does know, it is not easy to understand why, conversely, a distrust should not be placed in this very distrust, and why we should not take care lest the fear of error is not just initial error. As a matter of fact, this fear presupposes something, indeed, a great deal, as truth, and supports its scruples and consequences on what should itself be examined beforehand to see whether it is truth. It starts with ideas of knowledge as an instrument, and as a medium; and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge. More especially it takes for granted that the Absolute stands on one side and that knowledge on the other side, by itself and cut off from the Absolute, is certainly also outside truth, is nevertheless true – a position which, while calling itself fear of error, makes itself known rather as fear of the truth" (1971: 132-133). Whilst according to Weber, Empiricism is too simplistic. He determined that "...as soon as we attempt to reflect about the way in which life confronts us in immediate concrete situations, it presents an infinite multiplicity of successfully and coexistently emerging and disappearing events both 'within' and 'outside' ourselves. The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity is seen to remain undiminished even when our attention is focused upon a single 'object', for instance a concrete act of exchange, as soon as we seriously attempt an exhaustive description of all the individual components of this 'individual phenomena' to say nothing of explaining it causally..." (1949: 72). Even currently Lyons for example concludes in his discussion on Scientific Realism that, "...since each false constituent that is deployed in a key successful prediction constitutes a counter instance, and since a particular false constituent stands as a counter instance each time it is deployed in a successful prediction, deployment realism has the potential to fare far worse against the historical argument than the 'naive' holistic versions of realism over which it is thought to be an improvement" (2006: 558). So the proposition is not without merit, and if not actually stated is implied by many anti-Positivist discussion.

Unfortunately, it is not quite so simple, as already discussed in earlier chapters. The problem of a politicised epistemology exists for both sides of the philosophical divide and therefore a change in the way we research and produce theory would not result in a safer ontological state. The problem is not new; relating to the old debate around solipsism. In a sense figure 2 above refers to a proto-epistemological state, in that it portrays ontological contamination solely as the consequence of a power relationship. It implies that the nature of the political influence could be altered to produce less contamination to the research process and hence reduce the contamination to the consequential epistemological state. In the previous chapter, it has been argued that
dispositional power alone will not sustain a politicised epistemology; this has to be achieved through the interaction of several further factors.

Namely; first, the rationalisation process: second, the institution: and third, the multi-epistemological states. Core to the argument is the predominance of Positivist ideology within the psyche of the university elite, made manifest – as already argued – by changing government policy driving the universities to behave more like businesses. Their views are not only transmitted in real time, as it were, to the academics and their underlings, but also through rationalisation in virtual time, they become embedded into the institution of the university. The point being that if this did not happen then the university elite’s influence over the way the academics conducted their research might only last as long as they held office. This is not to say that it might not be an extended period of time; dispositional power is transferable from one group of individuals to another. Yet without rationalisation, this would miss the essence of the argument, which is based upon the evolutionary embedding of the elite’s initialising behaviour into social action, so that the elite become as much a victim of its consequence as any other. More than this though, is that the process is continually intensifying; yesterday’s rationalised action becomes not only today’s embedded facticity for action but also twofold (Macfarlane, 2005). This would result in increasing commitment on the part of the elite to maintain the progress.

At this point, it should be noted that whilst the above occurs in all organisation, its manifest characteristics might not be as intense as in the universities. Business organisations can for example, ‘upsize’ or ‘downsize’, which can give the impression, at least, of change, although even here in many cases, it is only an illusion. Ostensibly, universities could do the same, but they do not. As discussed above, this is due to the consequence of their unique relationship between social action, particularly elite social action, and the Weltanschauungen, which eventually drives it. This point is better portrayed through a constructionist perspective, as opposed to a Positivist one in figure 2 above, since: firstly, Positivist Weltanschauungen is itself one of the problems and; secondly, is universally and not singularly orientated and therefore better able to demonstrate the process.

The inducto-constructionist sense of reality rejects Empiricism, but palpably not the need for observation, which is different. Figure 3 below demonstrates those differences. Put simply, the boxes in the diagrams are nearly the same; it is their positioning which differs. Established proto-epistemology forces the Constructonist to focus their research through the individual who is seen as a veil to an understanding of social action beyond. There is, nevertheless, still an unassailable intrusion from the physical world over and beyond sentient epistemological construction. In a sense,
this could be regarded as the ‘Achilles Heel’ of the methodology and in its extreme form is defined as solipsism.

In direct contention with the Positivist perception of figure 2 above, the constructionist epistemology recognises considerably more potentiality in influencing the research process. Put simply, in both figures 2 and 3, the solid lines represent accepted internalised dynamics of their particular epistemology; so that in the latter there are more, thus indicating greater potential for influence. The dotted lines represent the dynamics argued in this thesis. It should be noted that the dynamic between the researcher and the externalities of political influence is theoretically a two way process; but this of course would depend upon the specific power of the individual involved. What is palpable in figure 3 is the extent to which research, and hence consequential epistemology,

**Figure 3: Constructionist Epistemological Framework**
can be politicised indirectly or directly. By a process already discussed, it can be seen how the elite through its power and influence can do this: to the extent that the research process transmutes into an important dynamic for elite power and influence. Much of this by definition of the Constructionist epistemology occurs within the minds of the individuals involved, but research and its processes are palpable in facticity and therefore a useful gauge in both social action and metatheory. By it, elites can determine whether their will is being implemented; or metatheorists the nature of the effects upon epistemology of elite power. However, it is also the means by which rationalisation is fuelled through the continuous enactment of its perpetrators enforced by specific elite ideology. It, therefore, does not matter whatever research methodology is in situ; all that will change by it will be its analysis. To determine that a Constructionist epistemology would eventually win through to a less rationalised and purer world is to misunderstand the maintenance of long-term elite dispositional power in the university institutions.

Research, controlled and politicised by university elites, thus taints the methodology of all epistemology, yet this is exacerbated by an enforced Positivist ideology because empirically driven science creates the very thing Popper did not want: the driving out of everyday lifeworld common sense for rational scientific pursuit. The drive to scientific purity becomes a means in itself (Yaneva, 2006); but more than this, Positivism contradicts its own basic tenet of no presumptive induction – no matter how reasonable – in understanding reality. A quick glance at figure 2 demonstrates this. The epistemology behind the research and the required rationality are not one of the same things because of the intrusion – in whatever form – of the university elites. Nevertheless, a positivist epistemology demands that for empiricism to work this should be so. It has to assume (indeed presume) that an individual’s worldly view is driven by their social action because the researcher cannot ‘see’ it, only the consequences of it; manifest in social action (Yaneva, 2006). Worse, the process of turning these into tangible objective events (Popper’s third world) is itself intangible. Something akin to Weick’s (1979) “Enactment” process, it demands a leap of faith to determine transformation – somewhere outside the individual – from subjective to objective, and hence observable, reality. It is argued here that, logically, this must require an inductive process since the sense of reality has to start from the individual and therefore subsequently turn outward to universality to achieve independent observable events and thus objectivity. Berger and Luckmann put it succinctly, “Everyday life presents itself as a reality interpreted by men and subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world. As sociologists we take this reality as the object of our analysis” (1967: 33). The counter argument to this is that science, and its acolyte, empiricism, is not “everyday life”, it is indeed “…conjectural, and less certain of itself than ordinary life because we have consciously raised to the level of a problem something which normally may have been part of
our background knowledge’ (Popper, 1979: 80); hence the need for deduction rather than induction to examine and prove every facet.

This, of course, is a fallacy because the observable, and hence empirically testable, event is ultimately dependent upon unobservable enactment because individuals have to at some point transpose what they see into understanding (Grimm: 2006); and therefore demands, as always, that leap of faith, which the positivist wishes to avoid (Yaneva, 2006). This is no new revelation and has exercised minds for many decades. It concerns the objectification of subjectivity. Positivist ideology denies it as irrelevant, and therefore lays itself open further to the machinations of the process. Dominant in the ideology of university elites, they develop their strategy and manage the consequential social action believing that resultant research outputs are the product of ‘genuine’ science, honed by their careful shepherding of the university structures in order to produce more relevant business orientated outputs (Johnston and Murray, 2004). It is argued here, however, that such a transformation is no more than the rationalisation process expressed in terms of epistemological constructs.

Returning to figure 1 in chapter three, this process can be represented by Lukács’s institutional veil, whereby the Positivist ideology emanating the institutional mechanisms transforms individual Weltanschauungen into an objectified scientific rationale in order to achieve the university’s research/teaching outputs. These in their turn serve to fuel consequential university management strategies and rationalise the in-house epistemology even further. Palpably, as Lukács’ model tells us, Positivist ideology – like any other ideology – can be only entrenched in epistemology and not reality. As discussed above, the individual academic, for whatever reason, might well possess a Weltanschauungen that is not in keeping with the university’s prescribed epistemology but based upon another. They might resist all power attempts to change them and thus become marginalised or worse (Macfarlane, 2005). They might acquiesce to the dominant epistemology but maintain their own ‘in secret’. Either way, as previously discussed, there will be proto-epistemologies belonging to these individuals or their groupings, defying the established epistemology. In a Kuhnian sense, some could form and challenge in part the dominant epistemological state, but on the whole, they are doomed to eventual failure, dying away as the individual who owns them leaves. Figure 4 below demonstrates the extreme logical position of the rationalisation process whereby there are no longer any challenging proto-epistemologies. It is contended that universities, as organisations, would be particularly prone to achieving this end because their outputs in terms of research and teaching are quickly transformed into inputs and thus effectively doubling the impact.
Rationalisation, therefore, is the key to everything. It is a one-way conduit to the above state. History, manifest in the Enlightenment has ensured that Positivist ideology dominates our university management and institutional structures so that it is Positivism, which fuels the process. Proto-epistemologies exist but they are battered and defeated by the power of the enforcing elite and are soon destroyed by rationalisation. Ultimately, there will be but one way to research, not only based upon the scientistic Empiricism of Positivist ideology, but also concentrated in application particularly to commercial activity. This may or may not be still some way off; it is difficult to determine the condition of our social ontological state, nevertheless anecdote suggests the situation to be foreseeable.

The only part of the jigsaw to remain is ontology itself. By simple logic, it is not difficult to understand how it would indeed change. The epistemological state could be viewed as a form of river flowing into the ontological pool. When there were potentially, many streams then the waters were mixed, but when there is only one, then the waters in the analogous ontology pool will reflect only that. Assaulted and battered by Positivist scientific, business orientated research and teaching; rationalised to singularity, ontology itself will eventually begin to believe that perhaps the world is not understood by what you know, but how you apply scientistic mantra. The Marcusian state is then achieved. As Marcuse himself stated; "...Theory...not only anticipates political practice, runs ahead of it, but also upholds the objectives of liberation in the face of failing practice. In this
function, theory becomes again ideology — not as false consciousness, but as conscious distance and dissociation from, even opposition to, the repressive reality. And by the same token, it becomes a political factor of utmost significance” (1964: 106). Of course, this is contentious. So to end with an opposing view: when contending critical epistemology, Neumann determined that: “...on the whole, the German exile, bred in veneration of theory and history, and contempt for Empiricism and pragmatism, entered a diametrically opposed intellectual climate: optimistic, empirically orientated, a-historical, but also self-righteous” (1953: 19).

Of Universities and the Mind

One objective of this thesis has been to argue a nihilistic—deterministic—inevitability that Positivist scientism would become pervasive, since its birth after Enlightenment (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972). Inevitable because of the nature of humanity and how it formulates society and the consequential governance; the whole spectrum of debate from positivist (Mills, 1956) to anti-positivist (Adorno, 1969) thinking agree to a certain extent at least that elites — in whatever form they take — wish to take control of their societies, preferably by the manipulation of mind rather than coercion. The novelist Huxley with two of his works, A Brave New World (1932) and Eyeless in Gaza (1936), expounded upon the increasingly desperate lengths such elites would attempt in order to persuade rather than coerce opposition. Institutionalists, in particular, emphasised this in terms of organisation. Latter Positivist theorists, such as Scott (2001), interpreted this within a more acceptable facade in terms of a formalised governance base; against which everyone was measured and ultimately controlled (see also Tannenbaum, 1968). Whilst a constructionist perspective such as expressed by Lukács (1978) presented a more radical model, and more in keeping with Huxley; whereby the institution was an illusionary veil locking both rulers and ruled into an ontology originally established by an elite in control of the organisation (as opposed to the institution). The things and matter of the mind, such as science — in whatever guise — are open to the vagaries of elite power politics. The universities, it is claimed here, are certainly no different. Indeed their changing characteristics have exacerbated the already established process.

Returning to Figure 2 above, the efficacy of positivist research is portrayed as being protected from contamination through its isolated detachment. This is quite deliberate for the many reasons already discussed, in particular because it is fundamental to the philosophical stance of scientism; namely that a good scientist is detached from the subject of their analysis (see Popper 1968 and 1979). However, the consequential, and unintended, objectification of the subject (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) allows for its manipulation by the needs of the dominant/conventional science (Kuhn, 1961), in the same way that one could alter and control a physical entity. It thus is a given
physicality, no matter what form it takes, whether that is de facto a physical entity or a social one. From the anti-positivist viewpoint, as represented in figure 3, this is tantamount to inevitable political intrusion by the power elites, as discussed above, because physicality is controllable. Unsurprisingly, the Positivist views this differently and indeed antithetically. For them, the subject’s detachment protects the independence of its being/existence from the scientist’s own subjectivity, allowing it to be open to the “...search for truth” (Popper, 1979: 69). It is this need for “truth” that separates the two positions and in the ant positivist’s view allows for epistemological and ontological contamination. Yet it is also argued in this thesis that it is indeed the seeking of ‘the truth’, which has ultimately laid bare ontological state to the vagaries of university elite political machinations.

Two questions however, among many, arise from this discussion relevant to the conclusion of this work. The first is, despite the continued discussion over the years, could something of the mind ever be considered, especially for practical purposes, existentially similar to a physical entity. We transform between the subject and the object by the process of objectification as if they are. Yet ultimately do we really believe it? On the other hand, is it a mere contrivance for the sake of philosophical debate? In short, do we merely discuss the theoretic propositions in the safe arena of the academe? Yet, when we have to return to the “real world”, we are forced, by not only the powerful but also even our own human traits, to behave like positivists? So in the end, are we all really positivists, no matter what our academic stance? Practical, as well as fundamental, questions arise such as: how can an academic manager manage effectively whilst at the same time claiming to be of a Critical epistemological position, since the concept ‘management’ is a Positivist trait not a Critical one? This is exceedingly important: for the argument here because in a sense it can determine the nature of the doom predicted above.

Namely, this work’s contention is that, ultimately, the way we model our world is changing not solely through the process of science but also through university elite political machinations. If there were indeed no such thing as an existentially equal and independent subject, but rather an entity dependant entirely upon the object as Popper et al would argue, then the basis of the above contention would be without foundation. Therefore, the basis of the argument above rests mainly upon the validity of a constructionist epistemology. This is because its premise relies on the ability of the subject transforming its physicality, in terms of social action, into ontological form. If this could not happen then, as Popper claimed with his “three world hypothesis”, the way we model our world is not directly dependent upon the way we act. As Weick (1979) would have it, for example, a process of Enactment converts the thinking/perceptual world into physicality, thus protecting the ontological one from intrusion. This is indeed the proposition posed by figure 2 above.
Given the proposition in the two paragraphs above, it is recognised that the contention of this thesis could be construed as verging upon the solipsistic. One at the same time, it is tempting to admit that in the end the strength of university elite dispositional power does force us all to be Positivists – certainly, if visible action is all that counts, then perhaps we are indeed all positivists; yet the irony is that such a state could not be construed if we were. In short, is it legitimate to argue a Constructionist epistemological state in a world determined by the same theorectic as being Positivist? Indeed, this could be projected to the author’s own experience. In that, in order to complete this thesis he had to abide by the rules of engagement, which were Positivist and thus compelling him – if he wished to complete successfully – to perform within an epistemology he was contending. Ostensibly, it is easy to argue that was why, for internal consistency, this theorectic developed the proto-epistemological states – separated but competing; combining into a singular ontological state, fuelled by the dominant politicised epistemology; thus allowing for situations such as this, whereby the author is enforced to adopt an alien epistemology, yet retaining consistency through the maintenance of his own. Ultimately, however, an unsolvable residue remains within the meta-theoretical domain. If, as argued here, we are condemned by our politicised epistemology to be Positivist in our social action – even if we do not really believe it – and if as a consequence our academe is willingly, through its theorectic applications, changing our ontological state to a Positivist orientated ideology; then surely, essentially, the world is Positivist. The contention here can do nothing but agree; otherwise it would deny the very basis of its proposition. This is the solipsistic position referred to above. But it is also the nihilistic doom; whereby the ‘fringe’ is forever marginalized within a positivist state.

The second question is perhaps as equally profound. It is palpable – and no apologies are made for this – that the contention presented in this work is not supported by what is termed as traditional research. By that, it is probably meant Positivist Empiricism, but certainly some sort of legitimisation process of the entity in question through existential facticity. Again, this has been discussed previously in this chapter above and others, but the question remains, does the lack of empiricist-based research weaken the argument?

Unsurprisingly, the answer to this, as argued here at least, should be no. Indeed, it has already been argued above, that research through the empirical process, afforded to it by scientism, can provide a corrupting conduit between social action and epistemology. It was not the objective to determine how far a politicised epistemology has evolved within the universities, but rather to demonstrate the potentiality of the process. Yet to conduct traditional research would have been to partake in such a process, which from the perspective of this work would be self-defeating. Nevertheless, it is readily accepted that a suspicion must remain that would demand, “How can you
be sure what you say is true when you have not gone out and verified it in some way?" This in a sense links the argument back to the previous question, because its verification would determine the pointlessness in trying to answer the second. If the subject is an existentially independent entity then how could we ever verify, by any conventional means of research, legitimacy? Such research, particularly through empiricism\(^1\) is based upon physicality in order to verify existentiality. As figure 2 above suggests, in terms of Positivist research, the researchers must place themselves in relation to the subject researched on the outside as if what they research has a definitive independent physicality, and hence a dependent existentiality. The title of Popper’s book, Objective Knowledge, points to this direction. For him reality must be, at some point, physical and thus its sense of existence (existentiality) depends upon that. It is for this reason, Popper once stated, “My thesis is that, in order to gain a real understanding of any given problem...more is needed than an analysis of this problem or of any problem for which some good solution is known to us: in order to understand any such “dead” problem we must, at least once in our life, have seriously wrestled with some live problem” (1979: 181). If a researcher does it once, they might as well do it another time and then again, and again ad infinitum. This is indeed the trap of Positivist Empiricism. Its prodigy, Enlightenment, was likened by Adorno to a siren tempting the unwary into unsuspecting misery.

However, the basis of the contention here is that it is not a simplistic “battle” between one side and another – the Positivist versus the Anti-Positivists – as quite often portrayed in the more accommodating literature such as that by Burrell and Morgan (1979). The implication being that between the two "sides" it is a question of whether a researcher uses empirical, facticity based-methodology, or whether they use an ethnmethodological, constructivist based one. This has also been discussed in depth above, but for the purposes of this conclusion, the point made earlier that indeed ultimately all research taken – upon whatever the side of the divide – is facticity based with a dependent existentiality, by its very nature, is moot. Figure 2 above is, therefore, not only an action plan for Positivist Research but can be also for Anti-Positivist as well. Figure 5 below details the proposed combination of both positivist and constructionist epistemology. The problem, however, is not one of ontology but rather epistemology. Research cannot be conducted - de facto – in any other the way than with an underlying assumption of a facticity (Danks, 2005); to be otherwise would not be research. Popper et al would agree. This is not an argument in favour of Positivism, rather the questioning of research as an underpinning for ontological construction. More importantly for this work, the insistence of our post-enlightenment “scientific” community that theory must

\(^1\) My argument to be expanded below is that all research, even ethnmethodology, is empirically based in some form and thus vulnerable to my contention.
always be supported by research has potentially tainted our understanding of the effects such a research-compelled methodology has had upon the fundamental ways we formulate knowledge constructs (Macfarlane, 2005). Again, this has been discussed in chapters above; for here, therefore, it remains to be placed into context of the changing nature of our universities. It provides, in effect, insight at least – the above discussion notwithstanding – into an internalisation of university research outputs from the social action they examine. It is no doubt a facticity but one that paradoxically produces the opposite Positivist perception of pure and integrity-intact science whose epistemology is imbued the independence of the scientist.

Figure 5: the Relationship between Research, Theory and Social Action

In the final analysis, we should return to the original question, which is whether the change compelled by managerialism in our universities is having a more profound effect than mere
organisational systemic change. That is, because of their unique position as shepherds of knowledge in our society, will changing them into more competent business-like organisations, and all that accompanies such a move, result in changing the ontology of our society itself, and thus the way we think as individuals? It is contentious and basic psychology that groups possess collective thought processes, compelled by various power mechanisms emanating probably from some form of leadership. However, the individuals themselves were always regarded as different – somehow ultimately inviolate; even if the getting there could be difficult. Creatures of Enlightenment, they might fall victims of the whims of history compelled, controlled and contained by whoever is dominating them at the time; yet in the end, the individual would finally win through. This was indeed an important principle of Enlightenment itself and hence the scientistic ideology that emerged. The purpose of Science was to return the individual to the path of righteous domination over nature. The protectors of this principle were always seen as being our universities; uniquely and fiercely independent organisations.

The contention here is that this is no longer the case.

Through managerialism, the universities have finally become subjected, like other business organisations, to the tyranny of the accountant’s bottom line. Compelled by their new breed of managers to act like businesses, their degrees and research projects metamorphose into “products” and the students into “customers”. This has all been discussed in detail above, so the only point to be remade here is that since universities are no longer seen as unique, so too their product – knowledge- is also not unique, and consequentially as controllable as that in any other organisation. Herein lays the problem. Ontology cannot be controlled directly, as already discussed, but its indirect conduits through epistemology – research etc – can. Couple this with the particular physicality of positive scientistic ideology and the path is open to change as envisioned by the new managerialistic elite. Yet as has been discussed, the demonstration of this is difficult because it can produce an argument falling into solipsism.

The kernel of the debate, therefore, has always rested with the proposition about firstly, how ontology is indeed affected by externalities; and secondly, the nature of the dominant ideology in Western society in terms of knowledge which is Positivism. The latter is pertinent because by definition the controlling elites will have adopted it, for reason of governance, as the best method of doing science and understanding nature. It has previously been argued here and by many others also mentioned that science is two faceted. On the one hand, it was the harbinger of modernity and brought the betterment for society; and yet in its achievement, through established process (scientism), it became a prison (an iron cage) entrapping those who fell under its spell. Confounded by the call, “how can you be a proper scientist if you do not conform to the established scientific
methods”, there are not many who in the end have resisted. This of course was the doom, for it opened the possibility of all that is discussed above and the ultimate demise of the individual within the academe.

The Contribution of this Work

The essence of the theoretic discussed herein has been debated since the days of Hegel and Kant when the state of human knowledge between the objective and the subjective was seen as pivotal. Then, as now, the argument has centred upon the degree with which world is formed through social construction or physicality. This is has had profound implications for meta-theory and the way we research, because the way we research will depend upon the nature of our regard for the world we observe – do we believe it to be an external facticity or an internally constructed framework held together in commonality by power. Weber with his analogy of an ‘iron cage’ brought home the distinction very succinctly. It is of course not the purpose here, in these concluding remarks, to re-examine such debate in detail but merely to determine that the issue – emphasised in this work – was already in contention. It is argued, however, that the position between the two sides – Constructivist and Positivist – never contended the Hegelian consequence of the debate; that is, the very nature of science itself.

The implication being, whatever the state of their debate, either side were positive orientated scientists, and that their investigation – however much they could be influenced by political intrusion – were, in the end, considered by all to be ‘pure’. For example, Adorno and Horkheimer have been quoted within the body of this work as stepping back from the ‘brink’ of the ‘abyss’ when the logic of their argument was compelling them to accept that it might not only be societies that are constructed from political ends but science itself. This thesis, therefore, is unique in determining such rejection of the purity of science as the starting point – rather than an end to be dismissed – to the theoretic defined further on. It is argued that such recognition could have a profound effect upon the way we understand how we understand our world (meta-theoretical analysis). The most important implication being that science, particularly through empirical observation, does not necessarily serve the need of advancement and truth as much as we would like to believe. The timing of such recognition is somewhat ironic in the light of the Cern particle accelerator coming online, designed to determine, finally, the truth of our creation. One has to wonder how much of this will be driven by political epistemology.
However, it is argued that this work’s contribution to the overall debate is greater than merely its acceptance of the impurity of science. Not only is it arguing that scientific outcome is politically controlled (Kuhn has done this to a very limited extent), but that such outcome is paradigm specific appertaining to the dominant paradigm. Furthermore, over a period of time because of the managerialisation of our universities, this will change society’s ontological state; that is, the way our ‘scientists’ try to determine the nature of our world and consequentially map theorectic explanations. In a self-fulfilling way – as explained in the argument above – the university research departments are producing models in the image of their managers’ own Weltanschauungen: in time therefore the view of ourselves will be no more than some pseudo mythical didactic fulfilling the needs of those in power. This is certainly not something debated too often within scientific circles; yet it is potentially extremely important not only for the future of science but humanity itself. In a Marcusian sense, the implication of this is that we all become one-dimensional people, compelled and propelled by explanations that drive increasingly toward obedience.

It is recognised that to some extent such a theorectic expressed through this work is a limited return to critical/ Marxist epistemology. This is of course deliberate. It is also, why the work in its early stages returned to a debate some forty years ago between those supporting Kuhn and the other side supporting Popper. It was argued in this work that such a debate and its outcome as already discussed provided a watershed to the Positivist dominated science of today. Whilst it was not really a ‘battle’ between constructivists and positivists, it did provided the necessary epistemology to finally put paid to a subjective theorectic of the world as being solipsistic. For this work, such an argued condition was important to allow for the emergence of managerialism in the universities and the consequential dominance of business schools and business analysis. These two latter aspects, in turn, served as harbingers to an increasingly politicised epistemological state that simply was not so critical in universities before their emergence. This, it is contended, is a unique and useful position.

In a sense the overriding problem identified by this thesis, is an old one. That is a solipsistic consequence in the attempt to argue a theorectic based upon a socially constructive world, which then has to be ‘scientifically’ proven. It is at this point the more constructivist aspirations tend to fall. By questioning the purity of science, this work has at least opened a debate as to whether it is necessary to be scientific in the sense currently defined at least. More than this, this work has attempted to provide an alternative with its theorectic defining epistemological state and ontological state and the reconciliation of the individual to that. For example, the academic manager who claims to possess, say, an
interpretivist epistemology but is forced to comply with Positivist frameworks. By understanding potentially, the commensurate nature of paradigms at social action levels as opposed to the incommensurate nature of paradigms at another epistemological level, it is hoped eventually to fully understand the nature of what is happening.

Yet, this work has suggested often that it is, if not by epistemology at least by intent, nihilist in its understanding of the processes discussed. The expectation has always been, given the nature of humanity, that we are set on a path to the Marcusian world of one dimensionality, exacerbated by the theoretics established in our increasingly business orientated universities. Whether that is a good or bad thing depends upon the epistemology of the individual involved.
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