Proof beyond a context-relevant doubt. A structural analysis of the standard of proof in criminal adjudication

Kotsoglou, Kyriakos (2019) Proof beyond a context-relevant doubt. A structural analysis of the standard of proof in criminal adjudication. Artificial Intelligence and Law. ISSN 0924-8463 (In Press)

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-019-09248-x

Abstract

The present article proceeds from the mainstream view that the conceptual framework underpinning adversarial systems of criminal adjudication, i.e. a mixture of common-sense philosophy and probabilistic analysis, is unsustainable. In order to provide fact-finders with an operable structure of justification, we need to turn to epistemology once again. The article proceeds in three parts. First, I examine the structural features of justification and how various theories have attempted to overcome Agrippa’s trilemma. Second, I put Inferential Contextualism to the test and show that a defeasible structure of justification allocating epistemic rights and duties to all participants of an inquiry manages to dissolve the problem of scepticism. Third, I show that our epistemic practice already embodies a contextualist mechanism. Our problem was not that our Standard of Proof is inoperable but that it was not adequately conceptualized. Contextualism provides the framework to articulate the abovementioned practice and to treat ‘reasonable doubts’ as a mechanism which we can now describe in detail. The seemingly insurmountable problem with our efforts to define the concept “reasonable doubts” was the fact that we have been conflating the surface features of this mechanism and its internal structure, i.e. the rules for its use.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: evidence, philosophy of evidence law, justification
Subjects: M900 Other in Law
Department: Faculties > Business and Law > Northumbria Law School
Depositing User: Paul Burns
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2019 14:14
Last Modified: 11 Oct 2019 13:20
URI: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/40765

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