Race and Disorder: 
Addressing Social Disadvantages through State Regeneration 
in a Multi-Ethnic Community in Leeds 

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
the University of Northumbria at Newcastle for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 

2011
Abstract

This thesis critically examines governmental responses to physical and social disorder in inner-city neighbourhoods through urban regeneration policies. Through an exploration of historical, social and political narratives on urban areas, the thesis identifies that the concept of dangerous places and faces has been a dominant discourse and feature in Britain for the past 200 years.

Using Chapeltown, Leeds as a case study, this thesis explores the urban regeneration interventions in this area. Chapeltown is selected because it is, historically, a community with a high population of minority ethnic people and immigrants. Thus, ‘race’ and racism, and a critique of public policies as they affect UK Black and minority ethnic communities are the primary concerns of this thesis.

It is argued that the tools of urban regeneration aimed at tackling physical and social disorder such as partnership, participation and community involvement/engagement are mere ‘rhetorical devices’ that are out of sync with normative standards of citizenship and fairness.

The thesis has adopted a case study research methodology. It argues that for social and physical disorder to be tackled, there is the need to consider how the concept of citizenship should be the central issue in urban regeneration policies. The thesis concludes that the processes that result in some urban neighbourhoods being considered ‘bad’, ‘dangerous’ or ‘criminal’ must be understood as part of a broader set of political-economic forces which shapes the spatial distribution of urban populations and, in particular, the ‘placing’ of the poor in urban space. Hence there is the need to examine the social and physical disorder using the lens of citizenship.
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Gratitude is not only the greatest of virtues, but the parent of all the others.
Cicero

To God who is able to do exceedingly and abundantly above all we might ask or think; I give all the glory.

I wish to acknowledge the support, kindness, love, and encouragement of my family. I really appreciate all that you have done

I also wish to express my gratitude to Martin and Patricia for their words of encouragement and support.

Special thanks to Dr Bankole Cole, a great mentor and a total legend. Your advice, encouragement and critical views proved useful in the writing up of this thesis.

Most importantly, to my dear EM, who stood by me throughout the writing period.
Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work

Name

Signature

Date
Introduction

There is a long history of public disorder in Britain. These disorders were underpinned by political, economic, religious, social and even cultural factors. Examples include the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381, 1667 Corn Excise riots, 1842 General Strike, the Suffragette Marches 1910-14, the 1919 race riots, Brixton Riots 1981, Coal dispute 1984-5, Poll Tax Revolt 1990 and, most recently, the 2011 urban riots. However, in this thesis disorder is considered from the lens of conditions and events which signal that a neighbourhood is in decline, which is both physical and social in nature. Physical disorder is indicated by junk and trash in vacant lots, poor maintenance of homes, boarded-up buildings, vandalism of public and private property, graffiti, and abandoned vehicles. Social disorder will include bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, public solicitation for prostitution, joblessness, begging, public drinking, verbal harassment, and drug use. According to Skogan (1988) disorder within neighbourhoods involves both visual signs of physical deterioration and behavioural evidence of social disorganisation.

The concepts of disorderly population and disorderly places have a long history in Britain. Indeed, they are presented and represented in diverse ways and forms in political and social discourses on urban problems. Phrases such as ‘rebellious mobs’, ‘dangerous classes’, ‘paupers’, ‘pimps’, ‘vagrants’, ‘pickpockets’, ‘beggars’, ‘filthy’, ‘worse than wild animals’, ‘contagious’, ‘chaotic’, ‘underclass’, welfare-junkies/dependants’, ‘foreign’, ‘criminal race’ and ‘alien’ have been used to describe the urban poor. In addition, the areas inhabited by the working class have been described as ‘problem areas’ ‘locales of social disorganisation’, ‘lawless zones’, ‘wild district of the city’, ‘inner-cities’ and ‘excluded communities’. Most importantly, there is an enduring legacy of historical continuity and a powerful resonance of immigration and ‘race’ entrenched in the debate on disorderly population and places.
Consequently, disorder is bound up with racially and spatially understood meanings, and these have become institutionalised and legitimised.

Central to modern debates on urban problems is the notion of ‘problematic citizens’ - those (British citizens) with pathological traits and behaviours such as problems of indiscipline, lack of self-control or social control, in need of ‘remoralising’, ‘responsibilizing’ and ‘recitizenisation’ in order to fit into mainstream society. This is noticeable in the language of the New Labour government in relation to social inclusion. For instance, those labelled as socially excluded are clearly not viewed positively, since to be validated as a full citizen, it is necessary to achieve ‘inclusion in the cultural mainstream and labour market participation’ (see Haylett, 2003). As such public and social policies in Britain since the 19th Century have probably done more to stigmatise, exclude and polarise groups especially those that live in inner-city communities.

Key to this debate is the notion of disorder itself. It is important to note that disorder only emerges out of a vision of order: one cannot have order without some sense of disorder (Bauman, 2002). Both concepts are highly ambiguous, reflecting particular interpretations of urban life and wider social arrangements. This raises conceptual concerns in terms of what is meant by disorder and who defines disorder.

This thesis started as a study of housing problems in inner city communities, the experience of black and minority ethnic people in these communities, and how this explains their disproportionate involvement in crime and as being responsible for disorder statistics. On visiting Chapeltown in 2005, it was discovered that the problems of Britain’s inner cities are
far reaching and deeper than the researcher thought, but that ‘race’ was still a key issue. The 2005 observation raised issues in the researcher’s mind as to what the state has been doing to address deprivation and the problem of disorder in Britain’s inner cities, particularly where there are disproportionate populations of black and minority ethnic (BME) people. This led to the research focus being changed to that of a critical analysis of urban regeneration policies in Britain, with particular focus on an inner city area with a high population of BMEs, and how this is linked to the problem of disorder commonly associated with such areas. Chapeltown was chosen because of its history, diverse ethnic populations and its reputation for certain types of disorder, predominantly drug misuse. In addition, it is an area with high deprivation indices. Despite the fact that the area has been site for three urban regeneration programmes, the visit to the area in 2008, two years after the most recent regeneration exercise, showed that the deprivation, social and economic problems in the area were still pronounced.

Historically, urban interventions in Britain have focused on poor areas of cities, and have been directed at addressing disorder and crime problems, starting with the period of the Industrial Revolution and the birth of industrial cities. ‘Waves’ of migration by the Irish and the Jews into Britain’s growing industrial cities further extended the growth of urban ‘slums’, as the majority of these immigrants, who were poor, settled in these areas. The segregation and racialisation of urban communities which began in the 19th Century was further expanded in the 20th Century during the inter-war years, and particularly after 1945, as immigrants (mainly black Caribbeans and South Asians) from British Commonwealth countries came into Britain, largely at the invitation of the British government, to occupy gaps in low-paid employment left as a result of deaths during the wars. Experience of rejection (by landlords) and ‘racial’ discrimination led these ‘blacks’ and Asians, like their Irish and Jewish
predecessors, to settle in the poor inner city areas that were already notorious for crime and disorder. Inevitably the crime and disorder problems in these areas became racialised. Racial tension grew in some of the inner cities, culminating in inner city disturbances in the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s. In all these disturbances, the BME residents in these communities, particularly youths who were more disproportionately disadvantaged than their white counterparts, took an active part. This did not improve the image of the immigrants (who had become British citizens) but led to further stigmatisation and labelling of their communities as no-go areas, infested with crime and disorder.

Chapeltown is a classic example of a British inner city area that has experienced an ‘influx’ of immigrants for centuries. Because of this, the area has earned itself many racialised nicknames such as ‘Little Israel’ and ‘Irish ghetto’. This thesis critically examines the issues of race and disorder, particularly in relation to state ‘regeneration’ efforts in Chapeltown Leeds in 2006 – 2008. The thesis sets out to challenge the existing conventional presupposition which tend to conflate race and disorder. The principal aim of the thesis is to examine the historical link between ‘race’ and disorder, and how the state continues to reinforce particular perceptions of disorder through urban regeneration programmes.

The research objectives are:

- To ascertain the nature and extent of the disorder problem in a multi-ethnic English city, namely Chapeltown, Leeds.
- To scrutinize the theoretical literature on the link between ‘race’, ‘disorder’ and communities.
- To deconstruct the notion of inner cities as inherently divisive and disorderly communities.
To critically examine the concept of ‘urban regeneration’, and how it has been applied in urban intervention programmes historically, and particularly under New Labour.

To assess the state regeneration activities in Chapeltown in 2005-2008; their aims and objectives and the nature of resident involvement.

To investigate the extent to which state urban ‘regeneration’ programmes conform to ‘community’ perceptions of ‘needs’.

To deconstruct the concept of citizenship in the context of black and minority ethnic people’s access to welfare and social rights.

The key research questions are:

- How could the disorder problems in Chapeltown, Leeds be explained?
- What part does ‘race’ play in the definition of the disorder problems in the area?
- What part did the residents play in the state definition of, and solutions to, their ‘problems’?

Structure of the thesis

Chapter One discusses the main theoretical perspectives on neighbourhood disorder. The key theoretical positions discussed are the ‘social disorganisation’ theory of the Chicago School (1920s), Albert Hunter’s (1978) ‘Symbol of Incivility’, James Q Wilson and George Kelling’s (1982) ‘Broken Windows’ theory, Wesley Skogan’s (1990) thesis on ‘Disorder and Decline’, Robert Sampson et al.’s (1997) ‘Collective Efficacy’ theory as well as Marxist and Conflict theories. In addition, the chapter examined state construction and the definition of ‘disorder’, specifically referring to the moral dimensions that underpin British criminal justice and urban policies, particularly under the New Labour government in the UK. These perspectives provide the theoretical focus for this thesis, and underpin most of the theoretical
debates on urban regeneration presented in the thesis. Since the thesis focuses specifically on ‘race’, Chapter Two examines the arrival and settlement of immigrants into Britain, starting with the 19th Century, which was a period of rapid industrialisation and growth of cities in Britain. Three ‘waves’ of immigration are discussed, starting with the Irish and Jewish immigrants of the 19th Century, to the ‘blacks’ and Asians post-1945, and the most recent ‘wave’ following the expansion of the European Union in the 21st Century. The themes covered in these sections include those of prejudice and racial discrimination against the new arrivals, their settlement in the poor areas of developing cities, and their eventual social construction as a social problem. The chapter showed how black and minority ethnic peoples (BMEs) became increasingly linked with urban crime and disorder problems. A discussion of the inner city unrest of the 1980s and in 2001, in which black and Asian youths were predominantly involved, showed how political and criminal justice agencies and the media have played a significant part in demonising minority ethnic groups and labelling their communities as no-go areas.

Chapter Three examines political approaches to the crime and disorder problems in city slums and in the inner city areas in Britain, through various urban interventions, starting with the urban ‘reforms’ of the 19th through to the 20th and early 21st Century inner city urban regeneration and renewal programmes. The chapter charts how the construction of inner-city urban areas as epicentres of social disorder, has remained dominant in urban policy discourses in Britain. It must be stated that the objective of this chapter is not to examine specific urban policies, but rather to unpack the language of debate on urban problems, particularly its impact on policy developments. The methodology and research instruments used for the research are detailed in Chapter Four. Specifically, this chapter explains the methodological rationale behind the choice of a case study methodology, supported with
reference to academic literature on the value, reliability and viability of this approach to social science research. In addition, the chapter accounts for the research design, the data collection strategies, and other procedures that were implemented to ensure a high standard of rigour throughout each stage of the research process, and how the researcher went about strengthening the credibility and integrity of the research. Also considered in this chapter are issues of sampling, access, research ethics and the ‘insider and outsider’ debate with regard to the role of the researcher during the research process.

**Chapter Five** focuses on the study area: Chapeltown, Leeds. Drawing on information provided in the Leeds Neighbourhood Index 2010, the chapter presents a recent ‘picture’ of the area with regard to the socio-economic challenges and problems associated with the area. In addition, it highlights the level of disorder within the area, and examines the extent to which Chapeltown is deprived, compared with the rest of the city of Leeds. Next, the chapter discusses the residents’ own perception of the ‘problems’ in the area. Following this, the chapter provides an analysis of the regeneration exercise that took place in Chapeltown in 2005-2008 (especially in 2006). The analysis revealed a mismatch between what the residents thought were their problems, and what the regeneration exercise focused upon. Finally, the chapter examined the extent to which the area could be said to be a cohesive community, the aim being to test the position expressed in the theoretical literature, particularly in Robert Sampson et al.’s (1997) ‘Collective Efficacy’ approach and in the political literature following the northern city disturbances in 2001, that social cohesion or community cohesion is directly related to disorder. In other words, the theoretical argument that suggests that a lack of ‘community’ cohesion makes such a community more likely to be disorderly, was disputed as findings from this research show that Chapeltown, despite its problems of crime
and disorder, is largely a cohesive community, where the diverse ethnic populations within it live together amicably and love the area.

Following on from the findings in Chapter Five regarding the mismatch between the Chapeltown residents’ definition of their needs and the focus of the regeneration exercise that took place in their community, Chapter Six examined the extent to which the locals of Chapeltown were consulted during the planning and execution of the urban regeneration programme that took place in the area. In the chapter it is argued that New Labour’s modernisation agenda is based on a flawed definition of ‘community’ and that the concepts of ‘community participation’ and ‘community engagement’, which are central to the modernisation agenda, are defensible in theory, but problematic in practice. This point is reinforced by comments from residents who were also the key actors during the regeneration exercise in Chapeltown, which showed that the consultation process was shoddy and ineffective. In addition, 87% of the residents who were consulted through the various forums that were set up also felt that their views were not taken on board by the regeneration teams. Thus, the conception of the ‘citizen’ as an empowered, active and participating subject (participative governance) central to New Labour’s modernisation agenda, is questioned. Arnstein (1969:216) has argued that ‘…citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power that enables those have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future’. Findings from the research indicate that the expected ‘empowered participatory governance’ (cf. Fung and Wright, 2003) was non-existent with regard to the participation of the residents of Chapeltown in ‘their own’ regeneration. Instead, the form of citizen engagement in Chapeltown is best described as ‘placation’, ‘consultation’ and ‘informing’ (Arnstein, 1969), whereby “…the citizens may
indeed hear and be heard but lack the power to insure that their view will be heeded by the powerful” (Ibid:216).

Finally, Chapter Seven further examined the concept of citizenship, particularly in relation to welfare and social rights. Specifically, the chapter looked at ‘race’ and welfare provisions within the context of the debates on citizenship, and argued that since the 1905 Alien Act, there has been the notion of the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ in the construction of welfare provision and social rights, and that within this classification, ‘race’ has played a very important part. Since its inauguration, the welfare state has operated a dual system of welfare provision, whereby black and minority ethnic peoples have been reduced to the status of second-class citizens with regard to their access to state welfare. As a result, nationhood has been constructed around the white majority. The ‘second class’ citizen status of the BME working class population, who predominantly live in the inner cities, puts them on a lower social status than their white counterparts with regard to their right to welfare. Their histories and experiences of racism have combined to ‘confirm’ their non-deserving status (see Williams, 2008).

It has been shown how ‘race’ became historically linked with disorder. It is the argument of this thesis that the state approach to regeneration in inner city communities with high populations of BMEs needs to be reworked in such a way that it is inclusive. The thesis, therefore, argues for the centrality of inclusive welfare policies, that is, policies that incorporate provisions based on equality and universal citizenship. More importantly, the thesis argues that it is the uncaring state and social injustice that produce disorder in the inner cities, not the individuals who live there (see Figure 1 below). Inner city multi-ethnic ‘communities’ are not, as popularly portrayed, divided communities. The experience in
Chapeltown indicates that they are, in fact, cohesive communities. Therefore, the political ploy of explaining the disorder problems in inner cities as emanating from their lack of ‘community cohesion’, is seriously flawed, and, in the case of BME communities, tainted with racism. Whereas British governments have initiated public policies that proclaim to be democratic by giving communities more of a say in policy decisions, the mechanisms for implementing this in communities are yet to be thoroughly worked out, particularly in multi-ethnic communities. Chapter Seven concludes by highlighting the fact that for physical and social disorder to be addressed, the government needs to reconsider its approach to citizenship and how citizenship is mainstreamed into public policy interventions.

Figure 1: The Construction and Reproduction of Disorder

The central argument of this thesis is that social injustice resulting from the collapse of public institutions and urban abandonment, as well as the failure of the welfare state, is responsible for disorder in inner city communities. In line with this argument, the author sees disorder stemming from structural inequalities that obtain within the society and this is largely driven by the capitalist structure. As argued in Chapter One, theories on disorder such as the Social Disorganisation theory of the Chicago School; Hunter’s Symbol of Incivilities; Skogan’s
Disorder and Decline, Wilson and Kelling’s Broken Windows and Sampson et al.’s ‘Collective Efficacy’, leave out the important role that the state plays in the creation and sustenance of social disorder. Furthermore, this thesis opines that regeneration projects do not challenge the existing social status quo, as they are more geared towards the physical rather than the social aspects of disorder. In this regard, it is an issue of treating the symptom (for example bad housing) rather than the disease (social injustice and lack of state support).
Chapter One

Theoretical and Political Debates on the Concept of ‘Disorder’

1.0. Introduction

Due to the fact that social science is concerned with the activities of human beings, it has always had a problem to decide what form of explanation to adopt in explaining human activities. According to Bottom and Wiles (2003), there are twin dangers. These are that explanations either operate with models of human action which are so deterministic that they deny any role for human agency, or they are so voluntaristic and particularistic that they deny any real possibility of social science explanations at all. Consequently, the result has been that at different times, explanations have been dominated by structural accounts, which have stressed the extent to which human behaviour is a product of the constraints imposed by social structures which are external to the individual (such as the economy) or alternatively by accounts of action, which have emphasised the extent to which human action is a consequence of the creative understanding of particular individuals, and their interaction with other actors (Bottom and Wiles, 2003). Indeed, both approaches have had the advantage of highlighting different aspects of the human condition. Nevertheless, the disadvantage is that they remain partial. Implicit in these statements is the problem that social scientists encounter when it comes to defining social issues and occurrences.

The concept of ‘social order’ has been central within sociology in general, and ‘disorder’ within urban sociology in particular. As stated in the introduction, this thesis is concerned with the concept of ‘disorder’ as it relates to communities or neighbourhoods within cities. Indeed, the concept of ‘disorder’ is fraught with definitional inconsistencies. Literally, the word ‘…brings to mind a range of negative attributes such as ‘confusion’, ‘disorganisation’, ‘disarray’, ‘disruption’ ‘dysfunctional’, ‘abnormal’, ‘uncivilised’, or even ‘chaotic’. 


However, ‘order’, which is often seen as the ideological opposite of ‘disorder’ in the sense that it connotes an organic world where everything would function perfectly and on schedule (Kundera, 1976 cited in Bauman, 2002: 23), is also fraught with definitional difficulties. For instance, Bauman (2002) argued that longing for order is longing for death, because life is an incessant disruption of order. Thus, the idea that it is possible to impose uniformity, regularity and predictability on a human world that is endemically diversified, erratic and unpredictable, is in itself fundamentally flawed (cf. Bauman, 2002). ‘Order’ apportions blame in advance, deciding a priori the issue of responsibility. Consequently, the attempt to impose ‘order’ could be seen as an attempt at social regulation and control, through the enforcement of social regimes to ensure conformity or ‘normality’. According to Bauman (2002), ‘order’ performs the job of exclusion directly, by enforcing special regimes upon the excluded, further excluding them; and the excluded themselves are then blamed for their own exclusion (Bauman, 2002). In other words, the meaning of order is not stable and fixed; neither is the meaning of ‘disorder’ clear (Harcourt, 2001). More importantly, ‘order’ and ‘disorder’ are important aspects of social regulation.

There are still academic concerns about the concept of disorder. For example, what makes disorder a problem, and who defines what constitutes ‘disorder’? What is the nexus between crime and disorder, and what are the consequences of disorder on communities? Indeed, the problems one encounters in investigating disorder are immense. One of these problems arises from the fact that disorder continues to have widely different connotations and denotations. According to Lawrence Lessig (1995: 960-961):

“When these understandings or expectations become uncontested and invisible, social meanings derived from them appear natural or necessary. The more they appear natural, or necessary, or uncontested or invisible, the more powerful or
unavoidable, or natural social meanings drawn from them, appear to be. The converse is also true: the more contested or contingent, the less powerful meanings appear to be. Social meanings carry with them, or transmit, the force, or contestability, of the presuppositions that constitute them. They come with the pedigree, presumed or argued for, of their foundation”.

As the concept of ‘disorder’ has been used overwhelmingly in sociology, social policy and criminology to refer to communities or neighbourhoods, the overarching aim of this chapter is to critically explore and discuss the different theoretical perspectives on neighbourhood disorder. Accordingly, the main objective of the chapter is to unravel some of the inconsistencies surrounding the concept of ‘disorder’ as they relate to the use of the concept to refer to communities or neighbourhoods.

The chapter is divided into two major sections. Section one (1.1.) discusses theoretical perspectives on neighbourhood disorder. The key theoretical positions that will be discussed in this section are the ‘social disorganisation’ theory of the Chicago School of the 1920s, the ‘Symbol of Incivility’ thesis of Albert Hunter (1978), the ‘Broken Windows’ theory of James Q Wilson and George Kelling (1982), the ‘Disorder and Decline’ thesis of Wesley Skogan (1990), the ‘Collective Efficacy’ theory of Robert Sampson et al. (1997) and Marxist and Conflict theories. These are the key theories and theses that have set the pace of academic and political debates on neighbourhood ‘disorder’. These authors have provided variegated analyses of the concept of ‘disorder’, ranging from social, economic and political explanations to cultural and even ecological definitions. Section two (1.2.) will focus on state construction and definition of ‘disorder’. This section will critically examine the moral dimensions that underpin British criminal justice and urban policies. In addition, the section highlights how state responses to neighbourhood disorder are based upon implicit theoretical
assumptions about the behaviour of the ‘urban poor’ who are predominantly from black and minority ethnic backgrounds.

1.1. Theoretical Debates on Neighbourhood Disorder

1.1.1. Chicago School and the Concept of Social Disorganization

The Chicago School are a group of American sociologists who, in the 1920s and 1930s, developed theories on the relationship between crime, delinquency and the evolution of cities or urban growth. Greatly influenced by the work of Emile Durkheim, the Chicago School postulated that human behaviour is determined by social structures and the nature of the physical environment, rather than genetic and personal characteristics; thus, crime, delinquency and anti-social behaviour are linked to social organisation (see Newburn, 2007; Lilly et al., 2007; Akers and Sellers, 2009). According to Heathcote (1995:341) the social disorganisation theory of the Chicago school is not concerned with the study of crime per se, but more with the sociological problems of urban living in periods of rapid social change.

However, there were significant events happening in the United States that influenced the emergence of social disorganisation theory. There was the growth in urban development in terms of population on an unimaginable scale, precipitated by industrialisation. For instance, in 1833, Chicago had 4,100 residents, by 1890, its population had risen to 1 million and by 1910 it was more than 2 million (Tibbetts, 2012:128). It is worth noting that most of those who moved into Chicago and other urban areas carried little with them and as such brought little economic relief with them (Lilly et al., 2007). Thus during the first decades of the 1900s, the city became a dominant feature of American life, with constant warnings that the social fabric of urban slum bred crime and disorder (Lilly et al, 2007). As a result of the growth in population in the late 1880s, Chicago was largely made up of citizens who did not
speak a common language and did not share each other’s cultural values. According to the Census Bureau data from that era, 70% of Chicago residents were foreign born and another 20% were first generation Americans (cited in Tibbetts, 2012: 128). As such, it was difficult for these citizens to organise themselves to solve community problems because lack of understanding and different cultural values (Tibbetts, 2012). Chicago represented the classic example of a society with complete breakdown in social control. Children were running wild on the streets in gangs with adults making little attempts to intervene (Tibbetts, 2012). Therefore delinquency was soaring, with gangs controlling the streets as much as with any other group. It was these events happening in Chicago that led the sociologist working at the University of Chicago to reach the conclusion that growing up and living in such negative conditions undoubtedly influenced the outcome of people’s lives (Burke, 2009).

Central to the Chicago School’s disorganisation theory, therefore, is the theory of urban development, explained in Robert Park and Ernest W. Burgess’s Concentric Zone Theory or the ‘zonal hypothesis’, first postulated in The City, published in 1925 (See Palen, 1981; Newburn, 2007; Lilly et al., 2007; Akers and Sellers, 2009). This theory stipulates that the ‘city’ evolves through a series of concentric circles, ‘…each being a zone of social and cultural life’ (Newburn, 2007:191; see also Bottoms and Wiles, 2003). In other words, the growth of the city is far from haphazard, but patterned in ways that can be understood and explained sociologically. This patterned growth is linked to the historical process of urban development. The key argument in this theory is that, once fully grown, cities would take the form of five concentric rings (or zones) at the centre (the Central Business District) from which radiates the other four zones; with the areas of social and physical deterioration being concentrated near the city centre, and the more prosperous areas located near the city's edge. Below is the breakdown of the Zones:
o **Zone I** - the *Central Business District*, is located at the heart of the concentric circles. It has high property value, a small residential population, busy by day but deserted at night.

o **Zone II** - the interstitial area- sometimes called the 'Zone of Transition' or 'Twilight Zone' - is a zone of decaying but formerly opulent residential properties, consisting of flats, hotels and the ‘bed-sit’ land of students, casual workers, new immigrants and deviant ‘marginals’ such as prostitutes and alcoholics; also containing the ‘underworld dens’ of thieves and drug pushers and, (in Chicago), China Town, Little Sicily and minority ethnic ghettos.

o **Zone III** - the Blue Collar Residential Zone is the zone with the respectable artisans, including modest residential homes of people who have escaped Zone II.

o **Zone IV** - the Middle Income Residential Zone is a more affluent residential district, or suburbia, including private housing, large and less densely situated homes, where middle-class white collar workers live.

o **Zone V** – the Commuter Residential Zone consists of suburban areas with large individual residential properties of the relatively more affluent people (See Heathcote, 1995; Bottom and Wiles, 2003; Lilly et al., 2007; Newburn, 2007 for details).

Although this is an idealised model, it has provided a framework for academic and political discourses about the nature of urban occupancy and urban society. The model see cities rather like ecosystems in which people compete for resources, whereby the demand for better housing drives the more affluent away from the aging and decaying housing near the city.
centre (the inner city) into the suburbs and commuting zones. In the process, immigrants
from poorer countries and people from rural areas who flock to the rapidly expanding city in
search of job opportunities are forced to occupy the worst housing, nearer the Central
Business District (CBD), since they have a relatively weak competitive position or minimal
economic power. However, it was the wider issue of the resultant social processes or social
organisation which concerned the Chicago sociologists - how the city population is divided
into distinctive groups, defined by common ethnic identity, occupational status, or economic
position. Within each zone, groups occupy particular natural areas, thereby forming an ‘urban
mosaic’ of local communities. This was the foundation for the social disorganization theory
associated with the Chicago School.

The social disorganisation theory was made popular in the 1940s by another pair of Chicago
sociologists: Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay. The theory was developed to explain
the consequences of urban growth for people living particularly in Zone II of the city – the
zone of transition. The key argument of social disorganisation theory is that rapid population
turnover in this zone, whereby many residents move frequently, or are looking to move,
coupled with ethnic heterogeneity whereby different races, cultures, faiths and languages are
found living in close geographical proximity but not effectively communicating with each
other, physical deterioration and poverty. This development led to weakened family and
community ties that bind people together, resulting in ‘social disorganisation’.

The Chicagoans argue that these social, cultural and economic conditions provide an
excellent breeding ground for a range of social pathologies, including crime and delinquency
(Lilly et al., 2007: 38). According to Burgess in ‘…the zone of deterioration encircling the
central business section’ there ‘…are always to be found the so-called “slums” and “bad
lands”, with their submerged regions of poverty, degradation and disease and their underworld of crime and vice. Within a deteriorating area are rooming-house districts, the purgatory of “lost souls” (cited in Downes and Rock, 2007:55). What is distinctive about the ‘Zone in Transition’ was that it seemed to possess a distinctive social organisation of its own which could not be explained simply by the characteristics of the populations who lived there at any one time; hence its ‘social disorganisation’ (Ibid:55).

The lack of social bonds or community ties (due to the transient nature of the population and the fact that majority do not own their own homes) reduces willingness of community residents to realise the common values of their residents, or solve commonly experienced problems (Kormhauser, 1978, cited in Bursik, 1998:157).

According to Bursik (1998), the theory of social disorganisation is basically a group-level version of control theory: population turnover and heterogeneity are assumed to increase the likelihood of disorganisation because (a) institutions pertaining to internal control are difficult to establish when many residents are “…uninterested in communities they hope to leave at the first opportunity”; (b) primary relationships that result in informal structures of social control are less likely to develop when local networks are in a continual state of flux and (c) heterogeneity impedes communication and thus obstructs the quest to solve common problems and achieve common goals (Bursik, 1998:157).

These social conditions also weaken the ability of families to exercise effective social control in order to steer the young away from delinquency and crime. Shaw and McKay believed that juvenile delinquency could be understood only by considering the social context in which youths lived - a context that itself was a product of major societal transformations wrought by
rapid urbanisation, unbridled industrialisation, and massive population shifts. Shaw and McKay emphasised the importance of neighbourhood organisation in preventing or permitting juvenile waywardness (Lilly et al., 2007:38). In more affluent communities, families fulfilled youths’ needs and parents carefully supervised their offspring, whilst in the Zone in Transition, families and other conventional institutions (e.g. schools, churches, voluntary associations) were strained, if not broken apart, by rapid and concentrated urban growth, people moving in and out (transiency), the mixture of different ethnic and racial groups (heterogeneity) and poverty; social disorganisation prevailed (Lilly et al., 2007). In short, when growing up in a socially disorganised area or neighbourhood, it is the combination of a breakdown of control and exposure to a criminal culture that lures individual youngsters into crime and, across all juveniles, creates high rates of delinquency (cf. Lilly et al., 2007:40). Nevertheless, Bursik (1998) claimed that causal link between social disorganisation and neighbourhood delinquency rates was not clearly explained by Shaw and McKay.

A key argument of Shaw and McKay (1942) therefore, was that crime and social disorder was high in slum neighbourhoods, regardless of which racial or ethnic group resided there (see Lilly et al., 2007; Newburn, 2007). This observation led to the inescapable conclusion that it was the nature of the neighbourhood - not the nature of the individuals within the neighbourhood - that regulated involvement in crime and delinquency. This theory of urban development did not itself explain why offenders lived in some areas rather than others. Essentially, their argument was that offending manifested itself in a lack of structurally located social bonds which encouraged legitimate and discouraged deviant behaviour. Such social disorganisation was the result of new immigrant populations coming together and not having had the opportunity to develop a stable social structure and clear norms or values. Such populations were to be found in those areas of the city (Zone II), immediately
surrounding the inner-core, which had been abandoned by more established groups and so offered the cheapest available housing for the new immigrants - the well-known ‘interstitial areas’ of Chicago (Bottoms and Wiles, 2003; Lilly et al., 2007; Newburn, 2007). Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) summed up the arguments of social disorganisation concisely thus:

“Unlike theories centered on “kinds of people” explanations for crime, social disorganization theory focuses on the effects of “kinds of places”—specifically, different types of neighborhoods—in creating conditions favorable or unfavorable to crime and delinquency. Social disorganization refers to the inability of a community to realize common goals and solve chronic problems. According to the theory, poverty, residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, and weak social networks decrease a neighbourhood’s capacity to control the behavior of people in public, and hence increase the likelihood of crime” (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003:374).

Indeed, the theory of social disorganisation has been attacked as being at best a value judgement and, at worst, empirically false (Bottoms and Wiles, 2003). For instance, Matza claimed that the Chicago School wrote on disorganisation when what they were actually describing was diversity. Diversity lends itself to schematic theory, while disorganization does not (cited in Downes and Rock, 2007:55). In a critical exposition of the Chicagoans, Downes and Rock (2007) maintained that ‘disorganisation’ essentially points to two distinct, but occasionally linked, properties of social life:

- The first property is the reduction of social relations to a rather rudimentary condition in which mistrust, heterogeneity, and change abound. In that condition, new opportunities and combinations arise and disappear with some rapidity. Old habits are broken. Life becomes unpredictable. Cohesiveness is threatened. The dependable group shrinks in size. A world so disorganised possesses a palpable order, but it is an uncomfortable order which is sensed as comparatively vestigial and unreliable. Such a
world is both more and less complicated than the one conventionally defined as organised (Downes and Rock, 2007:56)

- The second property is the description of disorganisation as a property of the wider social structure. It would then refer to the relations between and not within worlds. Social differentiation, a period of excited social change, or uneven development, can exaggerate the instability of those relations, leading to strain and a breakdown of local order. In turn, particular worlds can become dislocated, thrown up out of their context and exposed. They can achieve a social and moral independence which some sociologist have chosen to emphasise (Downes and Rock, 2007:56-57)

Furthermore, Bottoms and Wiles (2003) argued that an illegal or deviant behaviour is not always the result of ‘disorganisation’. Rather, it might, instead, be the result of highly organised but alternative sets of normative values. The fact that an action is morally disapproved of does not mean that it is necessarily any less related to social organisation. The result, it was argued, was that the theory of social disorganisation, like a number of other social theories of crime, was over deterministic, and therefore over-predictive of crime (Bottoms and Wiles, 2003).

The notion of Stable Ecological Structures argued by the Chicagoans has also been challenged. According to Schuerman and Korbin (1986) the ecological stability assumed to exist by Shaw and McKay disappeared after World War II, when acceleration in the rate of decentralization in urban areas significantly altered the character of urban change. Thus, the effects of such developments on the distribution of crime and delinquency are impossible to detect without longitudinal data (Bursik, 1998). Lander (1954 cited in Bursik, 1998:160) also argued that the value of the social disorganisation construct “...is dubious in view of the fact
that social disorganization itself has to be defined as a complex of a group of factors in which juvenile delinquency, crime, broken homes and other sociopathological factors are included”. Despite these ‘shortcomings’ the Chicago School and social disorganization theory remain quite influential in urban policy studies and criminological research. The social disorganization theory has had a significant influence on the development of other later criminological theories on crime and urban growth, such as Merton’s Strain Theory (1938), Newman’s (1972) Defensible Space Theory, Cohen and Felson’s (1979) Routine Activities Theory, and Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) Broken Windows theory.

1.1.2. Hunter’s Symbols of Incivilities

In a paper presented at the American Society of Criminology Conference in 1978 entitled ‘Symbols of Incivility: Social Disorder and Fear of Crime in Urban Neighbourhoods’, Albert Hunter argued that “…incivility and crime are both correlated manifestations of a more general social disorder; and furthermore that incivility has a greater impact upon fear than does crime itself” (Hunter, 1978:2). Hunter did not provide a definition of ‘disorder’, but made reference to ‘the absence of a civil public order’ being linked to incivilities and personal fear. As he puts it:

“Neighbourhood change, though not necessarily leading to disorder, may often be experienced as incivilities that result in personal fear because of the absence of a civil public order”.(Ibid:7)

This argument was presented graphically in the following manner:
According to Hunter, signs of incivilities could be found in ‘uncivil’ interpersonal encounters in public places (personal incivilities) and the physical environment of the neighbourhood (physical incivilities) such as “…the burned-out buildings or the litter and garbage in the streets [that] lead people to make inferences about an area, and more specifically, the type of people who inhabit it, or use it” (Ibid: 7). Hunter maintained that incivilities are more frequently experienced, more ubiquitous in daily routines than crime, and therefore are more experientially significant in generating fear and insecurity among urban residents (Ibid).

More importantly, Hunter argued that symbols and signs of incivility are indicators of the degree to which the agencies of the state (the police, the fire department, housing authorities and so on) are effective, willing or able to maintain or preserve social order within a civil society (Ibid: 9). In other words, it could be argued that incivilities (personal and physical) are the results of a lack of social order (disorder) which results from the ineffectiveness or ability of state agencies to maintain social order. The consequence is fear of victimisation (which is not necessarily the same as the fear of crime, but more likely to be a fear of interpersonal incivilities).

According to Taylor (1996) this description is important because it suggests that the causal attributions residents make - their conclusions on why the incivilities occur and persist -
shape their fear. Therefore, it is not just the presence of the signs of incivilities that is threatening to them, it is also the meaning attached to them. Hunter (1978) suggested that those origins can be viewed as both endogenous and exogenous to the community.

According to Taylor (1996), extensive incivilities will be found in high crime neighbourhoods, and high crime neighbourhoods and high crime will be found in neighbourhoods with extensive deterioration. Hunter’s symbols of incivilities thesis can be summarised thus: (1) communities with higher crime rates should also have more extensive incivilities (2) high community crime rates and extensive incivilities share common structural origins such as instability, low status, and more extensive minority populations.

The argument offered by Hunter (1978) reflects some of the events that were going on in America at that point in time. For instance, there was the problem of stagflation reflected in inflation, stagnant business activity, and increasing rate of unemployment (Lilly et al, 2008).

1.1.3. Broken Windows Theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982)

The ‘broken windows’ theory is premised on the notion that ‘…where visible signs of disorder in a neighbourhood such as vandalism, broken windows, litter and graffiti, dilapidated structures, public drinking, are left unattended to, there will be criminal invasion and activities such as robbery, assault, drugs and prostitution (Ibid:32). Consequently, there will be breakdown of informal community control and social ties, weakening of the neighbourhood economic base, fear of crime, particularly amongst the vulnerable groups in
the community, and residents’ withdrawal from community life in terms of participating in local voluntary activities.

It is worth noting that the genesis of Broken Windows was the political sea of change that saw the abandonment of the post war social rationalities in favour of conservative values. In general, there are two hallmarks of conservative theorizing. First, there is a denial that crime has any “root causes”- which criminal behaviour is caused by, such as structural arrangements in society, including but not limited to inequality. Instead, crime is attributed to ‘individual choice’- might be due to human nature, to rationality, or to moral defects from being raised in a permissive and immoral society. As such bad people chose crime and create a bad society, not vice versa. Second, in solving the crime problems, the focus is on placing more restraints or controls on individuals, usually in the form of greater discipline imposed in societal institutions such as the family, the schools and the criminal justice system (Lilly et al, 2007: 234). Using the conservative paradigm crime does not have “root causes” or, if it does, they are beyond any kind of government intervention that would redistribute wealth or extend safety nets to those in need (Wilson, 1975). Instead, crime is seen as a choice- a choice by individuals who are impulsive, stupid, psychopathic “super-predators”, calculating, raised in moral- not economic- poverty, and/ or allowed to “break windows” without fear of consequences.

The crux of the ‘broken windows’ theory is that (more serious) crime evolves from minor infractions. This theory establishes the nexus between disorder and crime. One broken window left unrepaired invites other broken windows. According to Wilson and Kelling (1982), window breaking does not necessarily occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more
windows costs nothing. The authors also posit that at community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a developmental sequence, by which unchecked rule-breaking fosters petty plundering and even more street crime and theft, consequently breaking down community standards.

This theory is well described in detail by Hope and Shaw:

‘The model postulates a series of stages leading to the social breakdown of neighbourhoods. It suggests that certain visible neighbourhood conditions such as dilapidated buildings, litter and vandalism, and such things as noisy neighbours, unruly youths hanging about, and drunks in the street (collectively termed “incivilities”), can come to signal to outsiders and residents alike that the neighbourhood is in decline. This perception has further psychological effects on residents, increasing their worries about crime and diminishing their satisfaction with the neighbourhood. If residents continue to observe such conditions, it can lead to their gradual withdrawal from community life. Such withdrawal can take a variety of forms: for instance, residents may lose interest in participating in local voluntary activities; they may also be afraid to venture out at night to attend them; they may retreat behind closed doors and develop strategies to minimise their contact with neighbours; and, at the extreme, they may move away from the neighbourhood altogether if they can.

The consequence of such withdrawal is to greatly reduce the reservoir of informal control which community members exercise amongst themselves. Additionally, flight from the neighbourhood and reduced social activity starts to cut into the neighbourhood’s economic base, particularly in retailing and small business enterprise. The neighbourhood [ ] begins to acquire an adverse reputation, the area becomes unattractive to prospective residents and only those in greatest housing need start to move in. Offenders from outside now begin to perceive this absence of community control and commit crimes within the neighbourhood, knowing that residents are unlikely to intervene. Local youths increasingly offend within the residential environment in the absence of persons to monitor their leisure-time behaviour or who offer non-criminal alternatives.
As a result of this vacuum in community life, incivilities now begin to escalate into increasing rates of serious crime. Additionally, as conventional retailing and business activity withdraws from the shopping centres of the neighbourhood, they are replaced with “twilight enterprises” such as massage parlours, pornographic retailers, etc, which in themselves attract further criminal activity. The process is circular and, if unarrested, may continue with accelerating force, such that the greater accumulation of signs of neighbourhood disorder comes to signify the further deterioration of the neighbourhood, and so on.’ (Hope and Shaw, 1988: 15-16)

The empirical support for this theory was based on experiments carried out in the Bronx in New York, and Palo Alto in California by Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist in 1969. An automobile without license plates parked with its hood up was placed on a street in the Bronx and a comparable automobile was placed on a street in Palo Alto. The car in the Bronx was attacked by “vandals” within ten minutes of its “abandonment”. The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of the car in Palo Alto with a sledge hammer. Soon, passers-by were joining in and damaging the car. Within a few hours, the car had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. According to Wilson and Kelling

“Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder, and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider themselves law abiding. Because of the nature of community life in Bronx - its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things stolen or broken, the past experience of “no one caring” - vandalism begins much more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to believe that private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behaviour is costly. But vandalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers - the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility - are lowered by actions that seem to signal that “no one cares” (1982:31).
Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) incivilities/broken windows thesis is graphically represented thus:

**Figure 3: Broken Windows Theory**

Source: Taylor (1996:67)

However, the broken windows theory suffers from what Harcourt (2001) referred to as ‘pervasive lack of empirical evidence’. Quite apart from this, the theory is too simplistic, deterministic and largely misplaced, with no theoretical basis. The theory fails to address why windows in poor communities are broken in the first instance. Harcourt contends that disorder is far too complex to be explained by the ‘broken windows’ theory.

In terms of policing disorders, Wilson and Kelling (1982) suggested that police agencies should identify areas in jeopardy - places that are “deteriorating”, and assign police officers to those areas to support local efforts to control disorder. Wilson and Kelling are of the opinion that the worst areas are beyond salvation, and they appear to call for a kind of “triage” which condemns some areas to the urban scrap heap. Rather than calling for more traditional policing in worthwhile areas, the authors advocate that police take the initiative in targeting and counteracting disorder in accordance with what they call “communal needs”. However, it is important to note that they do not spell out just how the police could know
what various neighbourhoods want in the way of order. In the absence of a guiding legal code
to enforce in a traditional fashion, police would have to develop ways of discovering the
problems and priorities of local residents. In such a case, they would have a great deal of
leeway on how to act to contain disorder, for the rules for these cases can be ambiguous,
because patrol officers enforce them in the field, out from under the eye of their immediate
supervisors. In these cases there typically is no victim or complainant around to keep an eye
on what they do. They are relatively unconstrained in their ability to use laws to harass or
punish people they dislike, or to settle past accounts (see Harcourt, 2001). In the course of
maintaining order, the police would have to make important discretionary decisions. It has
been observed that James Wilson in 1968 himself has spelled out how efforts by police to
maintain order can become a source of racial and class discrimination, when the definition of
who is ‘orderly’ lies largely in the hands the police.

According to Harcourt (2001) the ‘broken windows’ theory is premised on a number of
shared assumptions about the privilege of order over disorder and of insider over outsider,
about the likelihood of criminal invasion in disorderly neighbourhoods, and about the
suspicious nature of the unattached adult, the importuning beggar, the unpredictable person -
in sum, the disorderly. It is premised on a categorical distinction between disorderly and
decent folk. The ‘broken windows’ theory intimates that reducing crime is merely a question
of detail - that it requires only that we pick up litter, paint over graffiti, hide inebriates and
panhandlers, and fix broken windows. In addition, the broken windows theory reflects an
aesthetic of orderliness, cleanliness and sobriety. And on these assumptions it tells a
compelling story about crime. The basic plot is simple: fighting minor disorder deters serious
crime (Harcourt, 2001).
1.1.4. Disorder and Decline (Skogan 1990)

In his book, “Disorder and decline: crime and the spiral of decay in American neighbourhoods” (1990) Wesley Skogan noted that disorder has a social and physical dimension, ‘physical disorder’ being visual signs of negligence and unchecked decay such as abandoned or ill-kept buildings, broken streetlights, trash-filled lots, and alleys strewn with garbage and alive with rats; while ‘social disorder’ is a matter of behaviour that you can see such as public drinking, prostitution, catcalling, sexual harassment, etc. (ibid:4). Physical disorder refers to ongoing conditions, while social disorder appears as a series of more-or-less episodic events. Skogan found that on a neighbourhood basis, the two sorts of disorder were strongly correlated (ibid: 51). Skogan also noted that disorder tends to be highest in areas with low neighbourhood stability, high levels of crime, poverty and a high ethnic minority population. In line with the argument put forward by Wilson and Kelling (1982), Skogan (1990) argued that communities beset by disorder can no longer expect people to act in a civil fashion in public places. As he puts it, ‘disorder’ reflects the inability of communities to mobilise resources to deal with urban woes and the distribution of disorder “…mirrors the larger pattern of structured inequality that makes inner-city neighbourhood vulnerable to all manner of threats to the health and safety of their residents” (Skogan, 1990:173). More importantly, Skogan argued that disorder plays an important role in sparking neighbourhood decline.

Taub, Taylor and Dunham (1984), in their research into Chicago neighbourhoods, devoted some attention to the ways in which individuals make decisions relevant to neighbourhood decline. First, the authors concluded that crime levels are an issue for residents and potential residents in terms of the quality of an area; however, these judgements are comparative rather than absolute. Second, they found some empirical evidence for a ‘threshold model’, which
might operate in the following way: early signs of deterioration will lead some residents to move away (‘Pioneers’); but some (e.g. the elderly) will not move whatever anyone else does (conservative); while others in between these polar groups will be influenced by opinions and decisions in the area (see Bottoms and Wiles, 2003). Therefore, the impact of disorder on neighbourhood decline depends, in part, on the level of tolerance community members feel towards that disorder, with different members having more or less tolerance or more or less capacity to move away. Neighbourhoods with sufficient economic or political resources can withstand quite high levels of crime and incivility if the area has other amenities that the residents value, such as schools, housing and parks (Taylor, 2001).

Furthermore, Skogan (1990) identified three main impacts of disorder on neighbourhoods:

- ‘disorder undermines the mechanisms by which communities exercise control over local affairs’ (ibid: 65), leading to social withdrawal which inhibit cooperation between neighbours, and discourages people from making efforts to protect themselves and their community in simple prevention activities such as property marking or asking neighbours to keep an eye on their housing during an absence. In summary, privatistic, household-oriented measures, as well as collective, community-oriented activities, are undermined by area disorder.
- ‘disorder sparks concern about neighbourhood safety and perhaps even causes of crime itself’ (ibid: 65), and this further undermines community morale, and can give the area a bad reputation elsewhere in the city. He noted that perceived crime problems, fear of crime, and actual victimization are all linked to social and physical disorder.
- ‘disorder undermines the stability of the housing market’ (ibid: 65). He suggested that disorder undercuts residential satisfaction, leads people to fear for the safety of their
children, and encourages area residents to move away. Consequently, fewer people will want to move into the area; so also the stigmatizing effect of disorder discourages outside investors, and makes it more difficult for local businesses to attract customers from outside. All of this erodes the value of real estate in disorderly communities, contributing to the further deterioration and abandonment of residential and commercial buildings (Ibid: 65). Skogan noted that the stigma associated with high levels of visible disorder probably affects the perceptions and decision of outsiders as well.

**Figure 4. Disorder and Decline Thesis**

Source: Taylor (1996:71)

Skogan’s theory was elaborated further in Hope (1998:53), where six kinds of ‘concentration effect’ were identified, which ‘…ratchet together and amplify each other into a spiral deterioration’: compound social dislocations (i.e. an accumulation of social problems alongside crime); the criminal embeddedness of local youth; disorder; repeated localised victimisation; diminishing informal control; and criminal networks.
Skogan identified community policing as a useful way of tackling disorder. According to him (1990:90), community policing does not focus exclusively on problems of disorder, but it is relevant because conditions of disorder could surface as a priority concern in many neighbourhoods, and it might help the police do more about them. Once the public begins to play a role in defining what “important problems are”, and the police begin to define their problem-solving responsibilities more, disorder will gain new attention (Ibid:90). He also identified principles that should guide community policing:

1) Community policing assumes a commitment to broadly focused, problem-oriented policing.

2) Community policing relies upon organisation decentralisation and a reorientation of patrol tactics to open formal, two way channels of communication between police and citizens.

3) Community policing requires that police be responsive to citizen demands when they decide what local problems are, and set their priorities.

4) Community policing implies commitment to help neighbours help themselves, by serving as a catalyst for local organising and education efforts.

However, Harcourt (2001) noted that Skogan’s position on the nexus between crime and disorder is empirically weak. According to Harcourt (2001), Skogan patched together data from five separate studies that were not entirely consistent and, as a result, his study is missing a large amount of information. Robbery victimisation is available in only thirty neighbourhoods, and the disorder information is missing on average 30-40 per cent of the time. The first point, then, is that the data were not reliable. Harcourt (2001) argues further:

“But even more troubling is the fact that Skogan failed to disclose that there is no real connection between disorder and crime with regard to the other four crime
variables in his study. Skogan focused on robbery victimization - where he found a connection between disorder - but failed to reveal that there is no similar connection between disorder and burglary, rape, physical assault, or purse-snatching victimisation. In other words, in four out of five tests, there is no real connection between disorder and crime. Moreover, on close analysis, it turns out that the one place where there is a connection - the disorder-robbery nexus - is itself questionable. First, the survey question that was posed to neighbourhood residents about robbery victimisation was neighbourhood specific. In other words, the questions did not specify that the robbery victimisation had to occur in the neighbourhood in question, so, as a result, it may have occurred in another neighbourhood. Second, and more important, there is a set of five neighbourhoods in Newark that exert excessive influence on Skogan’s findings. When we take away those Newark neighbourhoods, the tenuous connection to robbery disappears. As a result, Skogan’s study does not support the broken windows hypothesis. In four out of five tests, there is no real connection between disorder and various crimes. In the only test where there is a connection, the nexus, is itself highly questionable” (Harcourt, 2001: 59-61).

A study, based on longitudinal data on neighbourhoods in Baltimore, essentially confirms Skogan’s result, following a more rigorous longitudinal analysis. Summarising his findings, Taylor (2001) indicates that disorder (or ‘incivilities’ as he terms them) are important for crime changes, social-structural changes, and changes in perceptions of the fear of crime. But, Taylor continued, incivilities are not responsible for as many outcomes as proponents of this thesis have suggested; nor do they matter as consistently as other features of neighbourhood fabric, especially (neighbourhood social) status; nor do they matter consistently, regardless of the indicator used (ibid:20). Indeed, generally speaking, initial neighbourhood social status, neighbourhood racial composition, and crime rates were each as important as initial incivilities in shaping later crime changes and social decline (ibid: 22). The implication for Taylor was that research into ‘incivilities’ and broken windows should
break away from the tradition of treating these topics in isolation. Instead, incivilities research ‘…needs to reconnect more firmly with work in the areas of urban sociology, urban political economy, collective community crime prevention and organisational participation’ (Ibid: 20).

1.1.5 Collective Efficacy (Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999)

The most comprehensive, stringent and thorough social scientific evidence on the relationship between disorder and crime is the study by Sampson et al. (1997) entitled “Systematic Social Observations”. Sampson and colleagues took social disorder to be behaviour considered threatening, such as verbal harassment on the street, open solicitation for prostitution, intoxication and rowdiness by groups of young males in public, while physical disorder refers to deterioration of the landscape such as graffiti, abandoned cars, broken windows and rubbish in the streets. Sampson et al. (1997) observed that neighbourhoods vary in their ability to “activate informal social control”. Informal social control involves residents’ behaving proactively - not passively - when they see wayward behaviour, such as by calling police authorities, coming to the rescue of someone in trouble, and telling unruly teenagers to quiet down and behave. The likelihood that residents will take such steps, however, is contingent on whether there is mutual trust and solidarity among neighbours. As a result, in neighbourhoods where such cohesiveness prevails, residents can depend on one another to enforce rules of civility and good behaviour. Such places have “collective efficacy”, defined as social cohesion among neighbours, combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good (cited in Lilly et al., 2007: 45). Sampson et al. (1997) see ‘disorder’ stemming from the combination of structural constraints and a deficit in “collective efficacy” that is, a lack of social cohesion, mutual trust and informal social control on the part of the residents and users of the area. According to Sampson et al. (1997) concentrated poverty
includes low incomes, high unemployment, a high ratio of financial dependence of one part of the population on another, and a lack of investment potential. They see structural constraints not only as economic, but also the absence of social control. Tangentially to Skogan’s (1990) thesis, they contend that disorder tends to be high where an immigrant population is high. Sampson et al. (1997) argued that the two sets of forces - the structural characteristics of the neighbourhood and human intervention - are interrelated, working jointly and reciprocally to affect crime and disorder. Therefore, the crux of this theory is that concentrated poverty and residential instability undermine collective efficacy, which in turn fosters an increase in crime and disorder. Sampson et al. (1997) posit that disorder is part and parcel in itself, and contend that, for instance, graffiti, does not cause robbery, but a lack of informal social control is a cause of both. Therefore informal social control is a dynamic process which impacts on crime and disorder.

Sampson et al. (1997) also argued that ‘collective efficacy’ is not evenly distributed across neighbourhoods. Rather, in communities marked by a concentration of immigrants, residential instability, and the grinding economic deprivation of “concentrated disadvantage”, collective efficacy is weak. Sampson et al. (1997) predicted that these communities will not have the social capital to impose informal social controls and to keep the streets safe.

Importantly, Sampson et al. (1997) provided data to back up these theoretical claims. In 1995, their research team interviewed 8,762 people who lived in 343 Chicago neighbourhoods. Controlling for the personal characteristics of the respondents (sometimes called “composition effects”), the authors found that collective efficacy was a “robust” predictor of levels of violence across neighbourhoods (see Lilly et al., 2007, p46). Their analysis also revealed that collective efficacy “mediated” much of the relationship between crime and the
neighbourhood characteristics of residential stability and concentrated disadvantage - findings that are “…consistent with a major theme in neighbourhood theories of social organisation” (see Lilly et al., 2007: 46).

The concept of neighbourhood collective efficacy captures the link between cohesion and shared expectations for action which is enacted under conditions of social trust. Therefore, residential stability in terms of home ownership and low transience, instil in residents a “stake in conformity” and the formation of social networks is also linked to residential stability. Nevertheless, stability does not mean a lack of change, but rather the social reproduction of the neighbourhood residential structure, typically when population gains offset losses and house values appreciate. Along with lack of resources and stability, other structural constraints affect neighbourhood resilience against disorder: population density, non-residential land use, public transport nodes, and large flows of population that can overwhelm local public services. Analogous to the structural factors are human agency: the ability of residents to organise themselves to achieve shared ends. It is necessary (but not dangerous) to assume a relative consensus amongst residents that a common goal is to live in a safe environment free from predatory crime and disorder (see Fielding et al., 2001).

Furthermore, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) looked at how neighbourhoods fare as units of control over their own public space, regardless of where offenders reside. Their unit of analysis was the neighbourhood. Their logic of collective efficacy focused on activity patterns that can be visibly observed, hence the use of the Systematic Social Observations method. For the authors, collective efficacy is aimed at explaining the incidence of disorder and crime in public spaces, and crimes like robbery and burglary that typically elicit target selection decisions based on visual cues. Sampson and Raudenbush’s hypothesis is that
disorder is a manifestation of crime, and that collective efficacy should reduce disorder and crime by disabling the forces that produce both. They also suggest that structural constraints such as resource disadvantage and mixed land use, account for both crime and disorder simultaneously.

Rather than see disorder as a direct cause of crime, Sampson and Raudenbush saw disorder as part and parcel of crime itself. Sampson and Raudenbush hypothesised that public disorder and predatory crimes are manifestations of the same explanatory process, though at different ends of the spectrum of seriousness. Even elements not obviously criminal (garbage, vacant housing) are violations of an ordinance. Thus, they challenge the idea that graffiti causes robbery. If so, one should measure the specified causal mechanism rather than inferring a lack of order from graffiti, and then using it to explain robbery. The attraction of such a conceptualisation is that it gives the opportunity to observe and thus measure manifestations of crime-related processes (cf. Fielding, 2001). Muggings (street robbery), assaults, and rapes might be impossible to reliably observe, but vandalism, prostitution, gang congregation, and evidence of drug use can be observed by all, whether researchers or residents. Sampson and Raudenbush’s argument is not that social and physical disorders are unimportant for explaining neighbourhood dynamics. Their argument is that both crime and disorder reflect common origins, and crime may be less relevant for understanding processes like population flight and the incivilities of urban life because they are largely unobserved, whereas disorder is the more visually proximate or immediate neighbourhood cue, even if not itself a direct cause of crime.
Sampson and Raudenbush used multivariate analysis and regression to examine physical and social disorder measured by ‘Systematic Social Observations’ on structural differentiation, collective efficacy, density and land use. With about half the variance explained, the authors contend that disorder is strongly associated with concentrated disadvantage and immigrant concentration. They argue that concentrated disadvantage coefficients are easily the largest in terms of predicting physical and social disorder, after accounting for structural aspects of neighbourhood differentiation by class and ethnicity. Whilst broken windows theory argues that disorder causes crime, Sampson and Raudenbush argue that both are products of weakened social controls and structural antecedents.

Sampson and Raudenbush showed that public disorder is a robust ecological construct that can be reliably measured at the neighbourhood level using systematic observational methods. Structural characteristics, notably concentrated poverty and mixed land use, are strongly associated with physical and social disorder. They argue that Collective efficacy, which is the fusion of social cohesion with shared expectations for the active control of local public space, predicted lower observed disorder after controlling not just for socio-demographic and land use characteristics, but also perceived disorder and prior predatory crime rates. Collective efficacy also maintains a significant relationship with violent crime after adjusting for simultaneous feedback effects.

Thus, Sampson and Raudenbush’s study suggests that broken windows theory may simply be wrong - that disorder may not be the active ingredient in crime. Sampson and Raudenbush concluded from their study that:

“Observed disorder do not match the theoretical expectations set up by the main thesis of “broken windows”. Disorder is a moderate correlate of predatory crime,”
and it varies consistently with antecedent neighbourhood characteristics. Once those characteristics were taken into account, however, the connection between disorder and crime vanished in 4 out of 5 tests—including homicide, arguably our best measure of violence [ ]. Although our results contradict the strong version of the broken windows thesis, they do not imply the theoretical irrelevance of disorder. After all, our theoretical framework rests on the notion that physical and social disorders comprise highly visible cues to which neighbourhood observers respond. According to this view, disorder may turn out to be important for understanding migration patterns, investment by businesses, and overall neighbourhood viability. [ ] What we would claim, however, is that the current fascination in policy circles on cleaning up disorder through law enforcement techniques appears simplistic and largely misplaced, at least in terms of directly fighting crime. Eradication of disorder may indirectly reduce crime by stabilizing neighbourhoods, but the direct link as formulated by proponents was not the predominate one in our study. What we found instead is that neighbourhoods high in disorder do not have higher crime rates in general than neighbourhoods low in disorder once collective efficacy and structural antecedents are held constant. Crime and disorder are not even that highly correlated in the first place. [ ] Put differently, the active ingredients in crime seem to be structural disadvantage and attenuated collective efficacy more so than disorder. Attacking disorder through tough police tactics may thus be a politically popular but perhaps analytically weak strategy to reduce crime, mainly because such a strategy leaves the common origins of both, but especially the last, untouched” (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999:637-638).

Despite its attractions as a method, ‘Systematic Social Observations’ is obstructed by uncertainty with regard to how to assess its measurement properties at the neighbourhood level. ‘Systematic Social Observations’ is also labour intensive, and can therefore be costly, although the conventional survey method is also expensive and is susceptible to sampling and response rate problems (see Harcourt, 2001).
1.1.6. Marxist and Conflict Theories

Marxist theories of crime focus on contradictions created by capitalism, emphasising how the society is divided by power and money. Marxist and Conflict theories on crime and disorder appeared in the late 1960s in Europe and North America due to the radical culture that emerged in the aftermath of the political turmoil of that period such as the Vietnam War, civil rights campaigns, Paris uprisings in 1968, the popularity of the communist alternative, and the miners’ strikes that brought down the Heath government. Some of these events were precipitated by a call for the end of western capitalism. Marxist theories of crime focus on the fact that people from the lower classes (the poor) are arrested and charged with crime at a disproportionate level (Tibbetts, 2012). As such, the law is viewed as tool by the middle and upper classes, used to maintain their dominance over the lower classes. Marx argued that the law is used as a tool to protect the economic interests and holdings of the bourgeoisie, as well as to prevent the lower classes from gaining access to financial resources (Tibbetts, 2012). In addition Marx and Engels argued that conflict was inherent in the nature of social arrangements under capitalism, for it was capitalism that generated differences in interests and gave the few at the top so much power over the many at the bottom (cited in Lilly et al 2007:150). Early theorist such as Willem Bonger and Richard Quinney that applied Marxist theory noted that the capitalist economic system was the only reason for crime and that the best way to reduce crime and disorder was to adopt socialism and communism (see Lilly et al, 2007; Tibbetts, 2012).

Conflict theorists argue that constant change in society alters the dynamics in social relations and thus creates conflict amongst different groups. As such, conflict theorist argues that laws are created and enforced such that powerful groups can exert dominance over the weaker groups. Therefore laws are not a neutral expression of social relationship; on the contrary,
they are created and applied in capitalist societies for two main reasons: (1) To protect certain property rights and (2) To maintain a forms of social order (Burke, 2009). The position of Marxist and Conflict theorist has been supported by Louic Wacquant in his book the Urban Outcast. Wacquact (2008) argued that the social structure of today’s society has been radically altered by the mass exodus of jobs and working families by the rapid deterioration in housing, schools, business, recreational facilities and other community organisation further exacerbated by government policies of industrial and urban laisse faire.

1.2. Political Definition of Disorder

The central contention in this section is that the political definitions of disorder and institutional interventions have an explicit moral dimension. Since the Elizabethan period, the official definitions of disorder have always assumed a positivistic outlook. For instance, the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 carried with it a message of ‘corrective intervention’, ‘regulation’ and inspection’, as it labelled the poor as a threat to the moral fabric of society. In addition, law and order have been at the core of political debates since the 1970s. At the core of Conservative Party’s political ideology were New Right ideas firmly rooted in both neo-liberalism, that is freedom, individualism, the free market and rolling back of the state, and neo-conservatism, that emphasised law and order, public morality and national identity (Page, 2005). The Conservative Party’s popularity, especially under Margaret Thatcher, was based mainly on the party’s law and order agenda. The fundamental ideas of New Right are based on two themes: placing responsibility for crime and disorder squarely on the individual, and reasserting the importance of punishment in responding to crime (White and Haines, 2008). According to Page (2005) the Conservatives rejected the notion that crime can be explained by reference to structural inequalities and instead argued that the base instinct of individuals is the prime cause of criminality. In line with their belief and political ideology of
New Right, the Conservative Party introduced a considerable number of criminal justice laws, notably the Criminal Justice Acts 1982, 1990 and 1994. The boundaries of disciplinary and social control were expanded as more and more deviant behaviours were criminalised (Lea, 1997), with law and order considered as ‘war on crime’ and an assault on the disorder of society. Consequently, this translated into a call during the 1980s and 1990s for increased police personnel, power and resources, longer jail sentences, the provision of more prisons, stronger discipline within families and schools and a return to more traditional values generally (White and Haines, 2008). New Right criminology revolves around the individual, and provides a moralistic and punitive approach to issues of crime, criminality and deviant behaviour (Young, 1981). The Conservatives were also influenced by different ‘right-wing’ criminology theories such as control theories and the underclass thesis.

The getting tough approach adopted by the Conservatives has generally been associated with populist appeals to the public because they are electorally expedient and attractive (White and Haines, 2008). In fact, since the 1980s, populist rhetoric about crime have been used actively as a major electoral tool, particularly in the UK, whereby the extent and seriousness of crime and disorder are highlighted (but not necessarily backed up by statistical or other research findings) and this, in turn, is used to justify harsher penalties, and the assertion of state authority in more and more spheres of everyday social life. As part of this process, specific groups or categories of people are singled out for special attention: young people, welfare recipients, minority ethnic groups and sole parents. Thus ‘we’ are protected by having ever greater state intervention in the affairs of ‘them’. The rationale behind such intrusion is usually a combination of the protection of private property and differential treatment that should be meted out to the moral and immoral in society (White and Haines, 2008). This process is often referred to as ‘authoritarian populism’ (see Taylor, 1981; Hall, 1980; Hall et
al., 1978) - a process in which crime is ideologically and strategically conveyed in a series of moral panics about law and order issues, in such a manner as to appeal to popular concerns about crime, on the basis of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. On the one hand, the ‘us’ is always viewed as virtuous. The ‘them’, on the other hand, whoever they are, are viewed as being parasites, destructive to the fabric of civil society (cf White and Haines, 2008).

In terms of crime, the essence of populism exaggerates the dangerousness of crime, and the foreign or alien nature of the criminal. Therefore, criminal is seen to be outside society - its networks, institutions, communities, mores, values, methods of income and ways of life. Insofar as the criminal is not seen to be bound by normal social rules of conduct, so too it is argued that normal rules of order should necessarily be adhered to if criminals are to be brought to book for their offensive activities (White and Haines, 2008). According to White and Haines (2008), the rhetoric of populism is one that reduces all crime problems to simple solutions. Offenders are made entirely responsible for their actions, simply because they are seen as outside the normal institutions of society and a race apart. Hence, the deployment of draconian solutions to deal with their crime problem is legitimate and justifiable.

The nature of the ‘problem’, from a right-wing perspective, is a combination of lack of economic incentives (such as welfare dependency), a culture of poverty (such as familial breakdown and inappropriate role models), intellectual deficiencies (such as hereditary genetic inferiority) and low standards of morality (as in illegitimacy via sole parenting) (see Page, 2005). Thus the solution is to make members of the ‘underclass’ more responsible and accountable for their own welfare and lifestyle choices. In effect, the demand is for the withdrawal of government support for the disadvantaged, coupled with efforts to re-socialise people into new values and moral systems (White and Haines, 2008). As such the concept of
underclass which was first used in America became synonymous with the poorest blacks in the inner-city ghetto in Britain and perceptions of urban problems as being essentially to do with black people (Robinson and Gregson, 1992:41). In essence, apart from the political undertones in the concept so also are the racial undertones in its use. The Conservatives worked from the premise that Britain was becoming more and more lawless, and that certain communities were becoming increasingly ‘dangerous’. The last criminal justice legislation initiated by the Tories prior to their removal from power was the Crime and Disorder Act Bill, which became law under New Labour as the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998.

The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 moved the boundaries of criminalisation even further by introducing various sanctions that are designed to regulate presumably non-criminal behaviour, but with a threat of criminal sanction attached to it if breached. Thus, the Crime and Disorder Act marked a new preoccupation with more authoritarian forms of crime and disorder prevention, focussing on the criminalisation of anti-social behaviour through an increase in the powers of local authorities to use civil injunctions to control the movement of people who have caused, or are considered likely to cause, what the Act characterises as ‘alarm, harassment and distress’.

The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 introduced the anti-social behaviour order. Known initially as the Community Safety Order, Anti-social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) are civil orders that were designed to deter anti-social behaviour and to prevent the escalation of such behaviour without having to resort to criminal sanctions, although breaches do give rise to criminal proceedings and penalties (Campbell 2002). It can be used against any person aged 10 or over who has acted in an anti-social manner. ASBOs were made available to the police and local authorities in April 1999 (Campbell, 2002).
Section 1(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 defines anti-social behaviour as:

“Acting in a manner that caused or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as (the defendant)”

However, the law did not define what actually constitutes an anti-social action. What is regarded as ‘anti-social behaviour’ varies between communities and individuals. As Brown (2004:203) observed

“Anti-social behaviour, rather than a sub-criminal form of behaviour, is a social construction, which indicates the creation of a new domain of professional power and knowledge”.

Card (2001:208) also observed

“Behaviours are categorised and labelled so that they are identifiable and can be acted on appropriately; different types of label influence the type of policies seen as appropriate and acceptable for the management or elimination of that type of behaviour”.

Furthermore, as Papps (1998:645) puts it:

“Any classification of behaviour as anti-social or nuisance must be seen as subjective because different people are annoyed or upset by different things”.

In other words, ‘anti-social behaviour’ means different things to different people. A behaviour seen as anti-social by one group or individual may be perfectly acceptable or normal to another group (see Card, 2001). Thus, anti-social behaviour is both a vague term as well as a strongly symbolic and evocative one (Brown, 2004). Invariably, there are other
definitions of anti-social behaviour available to local authorities that they could apply locally. For example, the Housing Act (1996) defined anti-social behaviour as:

“Engaging in or threatening to engage in conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance or annoyance to a person residing in, visiting or otherwise engaging in lawful activity in residential premises... or in the locality of such premises, using or threatening to use residential premises ... for immoral or illegal purposes, or entering residential premises ... or being found in the locality of any such premise”.

In addition, the Chartered Institute of Housing Good Practice briefing (1995) defined anti-social behaviour as:

“Behaviour that unreasonably interferes with other people’s rights to the use and enjoyment of their home and community”.

In Scotland, the Scottish Executive Central Research Unit Report defined anti-social behaviour as

“Behaviour (by one household or individuals in an area), which threatens the physical or mental health, safety or security of (other) individuals and households, or causes offence or annoyance to individuals and households in the neighbourhood”.

Furthermore, before the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, there were various legislative provisions upon which the police and local authorities could draw to deal with anti-social behaviour. Cases could be dealt with under the Environment Protection Act 1990 where a problem is judged prejudicial to health and also under the Noise Act 1996, the Public Order Act 1986 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Thus, the 1998 provision simply complements existing measures. This further complicates the matter, as the 1998 Act is not
the only measure in the armoury of local authorities and the police, with which they could deal with anti-social behaviour.

Since the definition of anti-social behaviour is open to different interpretations, different agencies of intervention have defined it in various ways to match local needs. Although local definitions can have a number of advantages, for example in terms of tailoring the legislation to local situations, local definitions can also encourage prejudice and discriminatory practices because of myths and stereotypes about troublesome people and places. According to Hunter (2001:223) ‘...problem of definition clearly leads to problems of solution; if the nature of the problem has not been defined then defining a solution seems impossible or problematic’. Many of the local definitions of anti-social behaviour contain implicit moral judgments about those that commit these acts (Card, 2001). The perpetrators are seen as simply unaccepting of the norms of society, and therefore must be outside society. Such judgements enable governments to apply more stringent qualification criteria to services provided by them (e.g. housing), and to employ stricter measures and tougher penalties (Card, 2001).

Nevertheless, anti-social behaviour is a high priority for central and local government. Some of New Labour’s views on the impact that anti-social behaviour could have on individuals and communities are expressed in the Social Exclusion Unit’s National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal Report, 2000. According to the report:

> Anti-social behaviour destroys quality of life and contributes to fear of crime. It can result in people not going out or stopping their children playing outside. Anti-social behaviour destroys communities, with people living in fear and those who can move away doing so. The impact on deprived neighbourhoods is particularly profound, as anti-social behaviour can rapidly tip struggling neighbourhoods into decline. There are a wide range of costs, with small shops going out of business
and, in extreme cases, recently built properties being demolished (Policy Action Team 8 Report on Anti-social Behaviour: 1)

Apparently to show their commitment to dealing with anti-social behaviour, the New Labour government passed the Anti-social behaviour Act 2003 into law which expanded the power of the police and local authorities to dispersing groups that cause harassment or intimidation. The law imposed restrictions on the ownership or possession of air guns and replica gun, banned the sale and manufacture of high powered air weapons, extended fixed penalty notices for disorder to 16 and 17 year olds, allowed newspapers to name and shame teenagers punished by courts with anti-social behaviour orders, and gave local authorities powers to apply for anti-social behaviour orders to tackle nuisance behaviour. According to the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett (2004), these are new tools in New Labour’s fight against ‘neighbours from hell’

What is significant about ASBOs is that they blurs the fundamental boundary between civil and criminal law, and operate with a rule so vague that almost anything could break it (Burney, 2002). Anti-social behaviour has become and all-embracing category with ‘intangible properties and proportions’ (Burney 2002:482). Anti-social behaviour is constructed in official discourse as a property inherent to the behaviour itself, just as the category ‘crime’ is constructed as a self-evident category, reflecting some inherent property of the behaviour (Brown, 2004). Field (2003) concludes:

“Crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour are now the horseman of the apocalypse. While capable of acting on their own, these horsemen are more commonly seen riding over the same territory in joint attacks on homes, vehicles and people, so adding enormously to a prevailing sense of unease which often tips
Legislation passed in response to anecdotal and unspecific social threats is unlikely to produce the anticipated impact. ASBOs can only be seen in terms of the punitive populism that has become the symbol of New Labour’s approach to law and order. Through their slogan of ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’, New Labour has further extended the scope of criminalisation and the boundaries of social control. In the case of ASBOs, one sees the construction (and reconstruction) of the ‘dangerous classes’. ‘Disorder’ has become the personal property of individuals – a label that ascribes blame to individuals for the problems of their communities. ‘Disorderly persons produce disorderly places’ seems to be the political message that has emanated from the state reaction to urban disorder.

1.3. Summary

This chapter has looked at the different theoretical perspectives on neighbourhood disorder as well as the political response to the problem. The variations in the theoretical perspectives demonstrate recognition of the problematic nature of the concept of disorder. The section on the political definition of disorder also shows that the concept is politically and socially constructed.

From the foregoing arguments, the following attributes of ‘disorder’ are revealed:

- Disorder is an attribute of ‘disorganised’ communities (Chicago School).

- There are two types of disorder: physical and social disorder. The former is often associated with environmental conditions in the neighbourhood – for example, dilapidated buildings, broken windows, graffiti and unkempt gardens. The latter refers
to acts of incivilities (behavioural and personal), deviant behaviour (such as prostitution and illegal drug use) and anti-social behaviour.

- Disorder is a condition that results from ineffective state intervention in communities which then produces incivilities and crime, and consequently the fear of crime victimisation (Hunter 1978).

- Disorder is a state of being in inner cities, visible in the physical condition and behavioural traits of people who live there. Disorder, if not checked, will lead to crime (Wilson and Kelling, 1982).

- Disorder results from the inability of a community to mobilise resources to deal with its own problems. Disorder can result in the affected communities or neighbourhoods becoming vulnerable to decline (Skogan, 1990).

- Social disorder diminishes with ‘collective efficacy’ or social cohesion (Sampson et al., 1997). Disorder does not lead to crime. Rather, disorder and crime are manifestations of the same explanatory process. However, disorder (incivilities) could be the foundation for some crimes, but it is certainly not the foundation of all types of crime as proposed by Wilson and Kelling’s ‘broken windows’ theory (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).

- Disorder is strongly associated with concentrated disadvantage and concentrated immigration. In other words, disorder is highest in areas with low neighbourhood stability, high levels of poverty and a high ethnic minority population (Chicago School; Skogan 1990, Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).

- Political definitions of disorder are far more moralistic than the academic theories propose. ‘Responsibility’ is included in the definition of ‘disorder’, whereby people
who engage in ‘disorderly acts’ are believed to have taken a deliberate action to live outside the established moral codes of society, the emphasis being placed on particular social groups and individuals. Apportioning blame to ‘disorder’ has meant that regulation, punishment and control have been pushed forward in political policies as possible approaches for dealing with disorder. This is evidenced in the widening of the net to include minor incivilities commonly referred to as ‘anti-social behaviours’.

In this thesis, the author is not concerned with the nexus between crime and disorder (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Neither is the thesis directly concerned with the correlation between social and physical disorder (Skogan, 1990). Instead the author sets out to challenge the existing notion that points to the intersection of race and disorder. This thesis looks at the nature and extent of disorder in a heterogeneous neighbourhood which has elements of both physical and social disorder. Hence, the following chapter looks at the historical origins of Britain’s ethnic minorities, their treatment on arrival, and how their existence is linked with the problems of cities and urban ‘disorder’.
Chapter Two
Historical Precedents to the Social Constructions of ‘Race’ and ‘Disorder’ in Britain

2.0. Introduction

Following the theoretical debates on disorder and urban development in Chapter One, this chapter presents a critical review of the historical and contemporary literature on the social construction of disorder, with a specific focus on how ‘race’ became embedded in the discourses of ‘urban disorder’ in Britain. Accordingly, this chapter looks at the history of migration and settlement in Britain of four of the country’s main minority ethnic groups – the Irish, the Jews, and the commonwealth immigrants from the 19th Century onwards. The 19th Century is chosen as a starting point for the discussion because it was the era in British history that is most commonly associated with modernisation and the growth of cities. Whereas the arrival and settlement of these ethnic groups dates back for centuries (see Bowling and Phillips, 2002), the most significant ‘influx’ took place in the 19th Century, during the industrial ‘revolution’, and in the post-war era (post-1945); in both cases, for economic reasons.

It is important to highlight that change in the mode of production from agrarianism to industrial capitalism in the late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Centuries has altered the dynamics of British society. These changes - such as new forms of employment, immigration, migration from rural areas, social disorder, crime and violence, poor sanitary conditions, socio-cultural differentiation and segregation - were more evident in the urban areas than in rural ones (Holmes, 1988; Mooney, 1998). As Wilson (2004:27) rightly argued ‘…industrialisation is a dynamic source of social transformation, resulting in complex changes in economic organisation, the division of labour, class conflict, social dislocations, alienation and the reorganisation of society’. Quite apart from these changes, industrialisation
created a climate of fear and anxiety, particularly amongst the middle-classes. For instance, in
the London middle-class, anxiety about the developments precipitated by industrialisation
was closely related to fears about the growing potential of social unrest from the: ‘dangerous
classes’: the outcasts, or residuum, and immigrants, who were separated socially,
economically and geographically from the middle classes (Mooney, 1998). It is important to
note that dangerousness was not necessarily equated with crime and disorder, but with
notions of moral poverty (see Mooney, 1998). The working class and, invariably, the migrant
communities, were viewed by the ruling and middle classes as a ‘social problem’. The
changes that industrialisation brought were more evident in heavily urbanised and
industrialised towns and cities such as Liverpool, Manchester, Oldham, Preston, St Helens
and Salford. These towns and cities also had a great number of immigrants (Lowe, 1989;

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.1 examines the arrival and settlement of
Irish immigrants and 2.2 examines the arrival and settlement of Jewish immigrants during the
same period. The themes covered in these sections include Irish-prejudice and Jewish anti-
Semitism. The focus is on the way in which the Irish and Jews were discriminated against
and constructed as a social problem. Section 2.3 focuses on post-Second World War immigration. The section continues with the theme of the social isolation and poverty of the
newly arrived commonwealth citizens who, like their previous Irish and Jewish counterparts,
settled in the poor areas of the major cities. In addition, the section examines the role of
selective policing in perpetrating dominant notions of black and minority ethnic peoples
(BMEs) as criminal and disorderly citizens. Furthermore, the section examines the
consequences of the inner city unrests of the 1980s and 2001, in which black and Asian
youths were predominantly involved. A review of Lord Scarman’s report into the Brixton
riots reveals that whereas Scarman warned about the need to address the social exclusion of BMEs. communities as a route to addressing the crime and disorderly activities that they are disproportionately involved in, this was not done. Finally, the chapter concludes (Section 2.4) that the historical experiences of the Irish, Jews, blacks and Asians in Britain clearly showed how embedded the discourses on crime and disorder in Britain’s inner cities have become.

The main argument in this chapter is how the arrival of these ‘foreigners’ led to the development of a concept of social disorder that is soaked in a symbolism, which conflates ‘race’ and social class into images including, but not limited to, crime, violence and ‘social disorganisation’. The nexus between immigration, disorder and criminal justice in Britain is examined, as well as the consistent patterns of reactions to immigrants in the country. Although these ‘waves’ of immigration took place in different historical periods, there are similarities in terms of settlement patterns and the treatment that the new arrivals received at the hands of the media, their host neighbours and the state criminal justice and social welfare systems. These treatments and reactions are tainted with racial prejudice and rejection, and they contribute to the social construction of these foreigners as a social problem.

2.1. The Irish Immigrants

The migration of the Irish into Britain was not a unique feature of British history. Irish migrants started migrating to England as early as the Middle Ages, and had begun to form permanent settlements in London by the Elizabethan period (MacRaild, 1999). However, the largest ‘influx’ of Irish immigrants into England is believed to have occurred between 1800 and 1900. It is estimated that a total of 2.3 million Irish settled in England during this period (Holmes, 1988:20). According to Swift and Gilley (1985:1) Irish immigration took place in
stages: it was ‘...a trickle in the 1790s, a stream in the 1820s, a river in the 1840s, and a flood from late 1840s’. The numbers rose from 291,000 in 1841 to 520,000 in 1851. In 1861 it was 602,000 (ibid: 1) and by 1900 it was in the millions (Holmes, 1988: op.cit.). Needless to mention is the fact that there was already a sizeable Irish contingent in the British armed forces (Winder, 2004). In 1830, the British army was almost 40 per cent Irish; the majority in the ranks (they were not often thought of as officer material, despite the prominence of the Irish-born Duke of Wellington). In 1868 there were some 55,000 Irishmen in the ranks (Winder, 2004:198).

The Irish immigrants who were not in the army were concentrated in the ranks of the semi-skilled and unskilled casual labour force; in railway construction, transportation, dockside labour, textiles, sugar refineries, gasworks, paper-making and food distribution. Others worked as sawyers, coal-heavers and porters (O’Tuathaigh, 1985:16; Connell, 1999, Davis, 1991, 2006). John Denvir (a chronicler of Irish immigrants in Nineteenth Century Lancashire) asserted that in the mid-Nineteenth Century, and for long afterwards, it was unusual to find a stonemason’s labourer who was not an Irishman (cited in O’Tuathaigh, 1985:16). There was also an Irish labour element in the coalfields of South Wales, the west of Scotland and, to a lesser extent, in the English northeast and the midlands, and in the unskilled labour sectors of the heavy industries (Ibid: 16). It is worth noting that most of the occupations were heavy, dangerous, seasonal and prone to termination (Hickman, 1998). The most common occupations among female Irish immigrants were in textile factories, in laundry work and in domestic service. In addition, many Irish women survived, or contributed to the family income, through earnings from piece-work (such as needlework, sewing, or rag-packing) in their own homes. Both male and female Irish immigrants were also greatly involved in hawking and street trading in the larger centres of population or
cities, while the keeping of lodgers was an important source of income for the enterprising immigrant Irish family, both because of the rent that accrued from it, and the laundry services often rendered for cash by the ‘woman of the house’ (O’Tauthaigh, 1985: 17; Connell, 1999).

However, not all Irish immigrants belonged to the ranks of the unskilled labouring classes. There was a sizeable Irish artisan or tradesman element in most of the larger British towns, especially during the first half of the Nineteenth Century, with tailors, masons and shoemakers being particularly numerous (O’Tauthaigh, 1985). Moreover, though not very numerous, there was a middle-class element among the Irish immigrants - such as doctors and lawyers, writers and journalists; and a handful in the world of business and finance. According to Winder, nearly half of the Irish in Britain were able to find skilled or professional work, belying the stereotype of the Irish navvy. The Irish ‘influx’ did have a middle class streak broader than is usually thought. Notable writers crossed the Irish Sea, maintaining a literary tradition in Britain that stretched back to Swift, Sterne and Goldsmith (Winder, 2004:208). However, the Irish presence in these higher reaches of the occupational structure was disproportionately small, whether measured in terms of the occupational structure of the Irish immigrants themselves, or in terms of the occupation structure of the communities in which they settled (see, for example, O Tauthaigh, 1985: 17.; Connell, 1999; MacRaild, 1999; Davis 1991, 2006).

Social reaction to the arrival of the Irish immigrants was generally negative, clouded with prejudice and hatred on the part of the host British population. Such immigrants were seen to be at the centre of the crime and disorder problems that were already plaguing the industrial cities. The Irish immigrants were perceived to be even more criminal than the rest of society, and they were seen as forming the heart of the ‘dangerous classes’ who were perceived to be
a great threat to law and order in Nineteenth Century Britain (Summers, 2009). For instance, in 1836, the Report on the State of the Irish Poor in Great Britain devoted four pages to the examination of Irish criminality, noting that “…the Irish in the larger towns of Lancashire commit more crime than an equal number of natives of the same places” (cited in Swift, 1997:399). There was a widespread belief in the innate criminality of the Irish, particularly the Irish poor (Swift, 1997:399; Swift, 2002).

The media played a significant role in promoting the image of the Irish immigrant as inherently criminal. For example, in Victorian South Wales, the local press was a major purveyor of anti-Irish sentiment. The stereotype of the Irish criminal was reflected in everyday language in Wales, for example in the phrase ‘dwgyd fel Gwyddel’ which meant ‘thieving like an Irishman’ (see Summers, 2009). Moreover, in his book ‘the Criminal Prisons of London’ Henry Mayhew asserted that 90% of London’s habitual criminals were ‘Irish Cockneys’ that is, persons born of Irish parents. The Irish were generally viewed as part of a social residuum with an alien character and unruly disposition, belonging to a criminal and dangerous ‘race’ that constituted a threat to the new social and economic order. Henry Fielding, famous author and Bow street magistrate, asserted that uncontrolled Irish immigration contributed to an increase in crime in London, concluding that ‘…when we consider the number of the wretches, it is a nuisance which will appear to be big with every moral and political mischief” (cited in Swift 1989:164).

Phrases such as ‘as dark as Africa, ‘in darkest Liverpool’ or ‘in Darkest England’ were used to describe areas inhabited by the working class and by Irish immigrants (see Mooney, 1998). The use of these stereotypes to refer to the Irish immigrants carried with it the language of domestic colonialism. According to McLintock (1997), the languages and imagery associated
with domestic imperialism was dependent on colonial discourse, and their use reached a zenith during the heyday of British imperialism, from the 1840s onwards (cited in Mooney, 1998:124). It was evident in popular journalism, literature and in some of the newly emerging social sciences, such as anthropology. Not only did the Empire provide much of the imagery for domestic imperialism, it also provided legitimacy for its use (Nord, 1987, cited in Mooney, 1998:57). It is important to note that Ireland came under English domination in the Seventeenth Century and became part of the United Kingdom in 1801 (see Hickman, 1998). Thus, the social construction of the Irish was built on the colonial relationship which existed between British and Ireland in the Nineteenth Century.

Of greater significance was the association of the Irish immigrants with the squalor and disease that plagued the industrial cities during this period. The Irish immigrants settled in the worst districts of the industrial cities. As Boyle (1968:422) puts it ‘Irish were concentrated in the most disadvantaged parts of the social structure of British cities’. Invariably, this led them to being made a scapegoat for the overcrowding and slum conditions in the cities, especially at times of killer epidemic diseases such as cholera and typhoid (O’Connor1972; Davis, 1991, 2006). Irish communities (quarters) in London, Liverpool, Manchester and other northern cities were associated with disease, crime and disorder and, generally, considered to be a threat to the moral and economic order.

Indeed, it was the onset of a cholera epidemic in Manchester in 1832 that prompted a local doctor, J.P. Kay, to identify the Irish, living in ‘Little Ireland’ Manchester as part of the myriad problems facing the city (cited in Davis, 2006:26). Kay used the presence of the Irish to sound alarm bells about levels of overcrowding, the spread of disease, the burden of the poor rates, the shortage of schooling, and the need for a borough police force to combat crime.
and disorder in the city (Davis, 2006:26). Similarly, the medical officer of the Cardiff Union identified the main cause of the increase in disease in the city as the ‘…immense invasion of Irish destitute labourers, navigators and others, who have been brought over by public works’ (Ibid: 26). Therefore, the inner city Irish settlements such as ‘Little Ireland’ in Manchester, the ‘courts and rookeries’ in London, the ‘tenements’ in Glasgow, the ‘cellars’ in Liverpool and similar quarters in Cardiff, Bradford and other centres of British industry, became by-words for industrial slum living: the ‘Irish ghetto’ (O’Connor, 1972; O Tuathaigh, 1985; Davis, 1991,2006; MacRaild, 1999). Booth’s description of the rat-infested Irish ghetto of dockside London at the close of the Nineteenth Century is as chilling as anything penned in the worst years of the famine ‘influx’ (Booth, 1902). Their reputation for living with their pigs in overcrowded tenements led to them being depicted as a lower form of civilisation than their counterpart ‘decent’ English working class (O’Tuathaigh, 1985; Davis, 1991, 2006).

In addition, the Irishman’s alleged fondness for alcohol and alcohol-related violence and disorder was frequently mentioned in much of the literature on the Irish immigrants of the Nineteenth Century (Davis, 1991, 2006). The stereotype of the Irish as the comic ‘paddy’, ‘the drunk’, and the ‘fighting navvy’ were reinforced by the British press which apparently fuelled the anxieties and resentments of the public. According to O Tuathaigh (1985:22), a stereotype of the brutalised ‘paddy’, intemperate, improvident, violent, totally innocent of any notions of hygiene, mendacious and undependable - not so much a loveable rogue as a menacing savage - gained wide currency in British society. Although the intensity of these prejudices and this hostility towards the Irish immigrants commonly varied from time to time, from place to place, and between different classes, nevertheless, it remained true that, whether dominant or roused by accidental circumstances, a deep-rooted set of anti-Irish attitudes and perceptions was widespread in British society throughout the Nineteenth
Century. Thomas Carlyle, no stranger to racial generalisation, was happy to refer to the Irishmen’s ‘...squalor and unreason... his fatuity and drunken violence’. The average Irish person, he felt, was ‘...a readymade nucleus of degradation and disorder’ (Winder, 2004:199). Indeed, crime and disorder were popularly perceived to be Irish traits. The Irish were soon stigmatised as inveterate criminals, and the police, as the representatives of public unease, were quick to harass and arrest them.

Swift identified two forms of violent disorder amongst the Irish immigrants. First, there were intra-communal disorders, consisting largely of drunken brawls, quarrels between neighbours and domestic disputes, which were confined to Irish districts. This kind of violence was not of particular interest to the police unless it spilled over into the public domain. Second, there were inter-communal disorders, which reflected hostilities between the Irish and sections of the host society (Swift 1989:169). The clashes that eventually took place between the Irish and the police occurred in the context of the latter. The attempts on the part of provincial police forces after 1835 to closely monitor the working-class districts of British towns and cities, made Irish districts particularly vulnerable to police surveillance. Specifically, police attempts to quell intra-communal disorders, enforce the licensing laws (notably the Beer Act of 1848, which regulated the sale of beer and other liquors on the Sabbath), trace illegal stills, regulate lodging houses (which were regarded by the police as nurseries of crime and havens of criminals), and apprehend suspicious characters, brought them more and more into conflict with the Irish immigrants in the Irish districts (Swift 1989:170). According to Hickman (1998), the police found the Irish a ‘natural target for their attentions’ and the Irish reciprocated by defending their areas and people with attacks on the police. Citing the example of the Irish in Wolverhampton, concentrated in ‘Caribee Island’, Davis noted that the displeasure of the police in the face of the illegal distillation of spirits and the sale of
liquor in ‘wabble’ shops, took the form of aggressive, paramilitary action to suppress the Irish population (Davis, 2006:29).

The Irish were persistently over-represented as defendants in magistrates’ courts in that they were at least twice as likely to be brought before the bench than the indigenous population, although evidence suggests that their crimes were overwhelmingly petty in character (MacRaild, 1999). Davis (2006) talked about the unflattering description of the prisoner that commonly preceded the details of cases involving Irish suspects. For example, in 1848, Julia Murphy, an Irish defendant, was described as ‘an Irishwoman of shabby appearance’. Alfred Witch, another Irish defendant, was described as ‘a thorough Irishman, in rags and tatters’ (Bath Chronicle, 9 November 1848, cited by Davis 2006:30). The Irish defendant also became a target for English humour. Irish prisoners with their obvious destitution, strange accents and ignorance of English ways, were often the subject of amusement in court. For instance:

“Mary Collins, an old Irishwoman of drunken habits, [was] charged with stealing a waistcoat and handkerchief. The garrulity of the prisoner of her vernacular, when called upon for her defence, partook of the semi-comic and excited an amusement among the bystanders which ill-comforted with her pitiful slum condition” (Bath Chronicle, 28 June 1849 cited in Davis 2006:30)

The high proportion of prosecutions made against the Irish population was designed to increase the general level of convictions in order to impress the ratepayers as to the efficiency of the borough police (Ibid: 2006). Irish ‘disorder’ was highlighted as a means to justify the size of the police force (Swift, 1984; 1989).
McManus’ research in Durham shows that charges of drunkenness and disorderly conduct accounted for 46 of a total of 96 ‘Irish’ offences dealt with by the city’s petty sessional court throughout 1861 (cited in MacRaild, 1999:163). In the same vein Swift noted that:

“There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that for the period in question, Irish criminality was overwhelmingly concentrated in less serious or petty categories of crime. Evidence also suggests that the Irish were not over-represented in all categories of petty crime. Indeed Irish criminality was highly concentrated in all categories of drunkenness, disorderly behaviour and assault (including on police). It is also important to acknowledge that, in contrast to the popular perception of the Irish as inveterate imbibers, a great deal of Irish drinking was confined to the weekend; located as they were in marginal employment, the bulk of the Irish working class could not afford to drink throughout the week” (Ibid, 1989:167).

Irish born defendants were overrepresented in committals to prison in the 1860s. Judicial statistics for England and Wales indicate Irish-born offenders were five times as likely to be committed to prison than the English, comprising 15 percent of all committals in 1861 (an index of overrepresentation of 4.9). This figure decreased steadily afterwards: 14 percent in 1871 (5.7), 12 percent in 1881 (5.7), 8 percent in 1891 (5.3) percent and 7 percent in 1901 (5.6) (Swift, 1997: 402).

A large proportion of petty sessions and police court business related to drunkenness or drink-related violence and disorder, involved Irish immigrants (Swift, 1997). This problem was exacerbated by the growth in cheap beer-shops and a tendency to transact all manner of routine business (including payment of wages) in public houses. Additionally, in the mid-Nineteenth Century, water and milk were often highly dangerous, pumps were in short supply and the soft drinks industry was at its infancy; beer was cheaper than tea and the public house
(the pub) was very much a part of the working-class culture, often preferable to an overcrowded lodging house for relaxation (Summers, 2009). Whereas this was a common working class trait in the Nineteenth Century, the Irish immigrants were disproportionally represented amongst those arrested for being drunk and disorderly (see Chief Constable Napier’s quarterly reports to Glamorgan magistrates in Summer, 2009:303). The lifestyle of the Irish immigrant was captured graphically by Engels (1999:105) thus:

“The filth and comfortlessness that prevail in the houses themselves is impossible to describe; the Irish man is unaccustomed to the presence of furniture; a heap of straw, a few rags, utterly beyond use as clothing, suffice for his nightly couch’. So the custom of crowding many persons into a single room, now so universal, has been chiefly implanted by the Irish immigration. And since the poor devil must have one enjoyment, and society has shut him out of all others, he betakes himself to the drinking of spirits. Drinking is the only thing, which makes the Irishman’s life worth having, drink and his cheery carefree temperament; so he revels in drink to the point of the most bestial drunkenness. The facile character of the Irishman, his crudity, which places him but little above the savage, his contempt for all humane enjoyments, in which his very crudeness makes him incapable of sharing, his filth and poverty, all favour drunkenness. In every great city, a fifth or a quarter of the workers are Irish, or children of Irish parents, who can wonder if the life, habits, intelligence, moral status - in short, the whole character of the working class - assimilates a great part of the Irish characteristics” (Engels, 1999:105).

Accordingly, the British government saw the Irish as a real social problem; a heavy price to be paid for the economic benefits of having a ready source of cheap labour to sustain the progress of industrialisation (Davis, 1996; O’Day, 1996). For the Victorians, the words ‘Irish’ and ‘slum’ were virtually interchangeable; each epitomising middle-class attitudes towards
working-class lifestyles (cf. MacRaild, 1999). Thus, Irishness became a synonym for decaying moral values.

However, as mentioned above, the Irish immigrants were merely convenient scapegoats for a host of urban social problems that their arrival did not manufacture, and scarcely worsened (MacRaild, 1999). As Winder maintained:

“It is easy, with hindsight, to see that the chronic urban conditions were caused not by the Irish but by an extraordinary surge in the overall population (from 10.5 million in 1800 to 18.1 million in 1841) with which the social infrastructure could not cope. It was hideously unfair that the Irish, simply by dint of being the most visibly outlandish, should take so much of the blame” (Winder, 2004:200).

Indeed, the image of the Irish as a negative and alien presence had more to do with the urban world in which they lived, rather than with the character of the Irish themselves (Ibid: 1999). In fact, modern research has shown that the idea of the ‘ghetto Irish’ is, in fact, a myth. Davis (2006:27) noted that only a minority of the Irish lived in urban slums, and that they lived alongside English and Scots in slums that existed before the major Irish ‘influx’ in the 1830s (Davis, 2006:27). According to Busteed et al. 1992 (cited in Davis, 2006: 27), the physical conditions in ‘Little Ireland’, Manchester in 1851, were found to be no worse than in the streets where non-Irish households were in the majority.

Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, the Irish immigrants improved their social, residential circumstances and occupational structure. The important improvements that took place in their communities led to some dispersal of the Irish from the city slums. However, it would be unwise to assume that the dispersal of Irish immigrants from city slums and their
resettlement in more peripheral areas, automatically meant accelerated assimilation for the immigrant Irish (O Tuathaigh, 1985:18).

Apart from suffering from prejudice, the Irish people were also victims of crime and communal violence. There were sporadic outbursts of violence connected with employment (Davis, 1991) in which Irish immigrants were involved. The Irish immigrants, being predominantly Catholics, also experienced sectarian violence from protestants. For example, in Bradford, the Irish immigrants from the Gaelic-speaking west of Ireland, but settled in a staunchly Protestant city, were constantly in feuds and clashes with the non-Irish protestant population (see Davis, 1991). In local police reports, the Irish were singled out for special attention. There were similar anti-Irish riots in Cardiff in 1848, Greenock in 1851 and Wigan in 1852 (Winder, 2004: 204).

From this historical account of the migration of the Irish into Britain, what has been identified is the process of the racialisation of Irish immigrants, and this focuses upon issues of British imperialism and colonialism. For example, Samuel (1989: xi-xii), writing of the critical role of the Irish in the making of the British national identity, suggests that: ‘…the Irish formed a distinct underclass in Nineteenth Century towns and cities, living in ethnic streets and clustered around their chapels, funeral parlours and pubs ( see Winder, 2004). They suffered a double opprobrium, as bearers of an alien religion and as a source of cheap labour, and their recalcitrance to authority invited the hostile attention of the Poor Law and the Police’. The notion of the criminal Irish immigrant was transferred to Jewish immigrants.
2.2. The Jewish Immigrants

By the late Nineteenth Century, the Irish notoriety as undesirable guests was transferred to the Jewish immigrants that were beginning to enter Brittan, mostly from Eastern Europe. Between 1881 and 1914, 120,000 to 150,000 East European Jews settled permanently in Britain (Pollins, 1982; Endelman, 2002: 127). The most fundamental cause of emigration from Eastern Europe was the failure of the economy to grow as rapidly as the Jewish population (Endelman, 2002:128) and an attempt to escape persecution, i.e. 1881 pogroms and repressive legislation (Garrard, 1967). In addition, the Tsarist policy made it difficult for the Jews in Russia to support themselves and the conscription of Jewish males, imposed in 1873 as well as countless arbitrary acts of cruelty, made material immiseration seem even more unbearable (Endelman, 2002).

Unlike the native-born Jews who had lived in England for centuries, the eastern European Jews were poor. Their poverty, occupation and foreignness drew attention to them and fuelled the fires of anti-Semitism in Britain (Bild, 1984; Klein, 2005). The local press portrayed the Jews as dirty and disease-ravaged aliens who were flooding the country with cheap labour and spreading communism (Endelman, 2002; Greenslade, 2005; Klein, 2005). For instance, an editorial of the Manchester Evening Chronicle in 1904 entitled ‘The unwanted, unfed and the unemployed’, called for laws that would “…exclude the ‘dirty, destitute, diseased, verminous and criminal foreigner’…” (cited in Klein, 2005:14). The Jews found themselves the butt of British economic protectionism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and conspiracy theories (Endelman, 2002; Winder, 2004; Klein, 2005).

About 60 to 70 percent of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe settled in the East End of London for a number of reasons. First, it offered opportunities for employment. Second, it
was home to synagogues and other institutions necessary to lead a traditional Jewish life, and third, and above all, it was the chief residence of fellow Yiddish-speaking Jews who had arrived in Britain earlier in the century (Klein, 2005; Endelman, 2002:129). The East European Jews were also attracted to Manchester, because of its growing clothing industry, and, in much smaller numbers, they established provincial communities in places like Liverpool, Birmingham and Glasgow, where they found opportunities in tailoring, market trading, and peddling (Endelman, 2002:129). In addition, there were new centres of Jewish settlement. One such place was Leeds, whose Jewish community numbered a mere 144 persons at the time of the 1851 census, but began to expand in the 1860s with the arrival of Russian and Polish Jews seeking employment in its burgeoning men’s clothing industry. Leeds’ Jewish population then rose from almost one thousand in 1871 to about twenty thousand on the eve of World War 1 (Endelman, 2002:130). Like the Irish, the centres of Jewish settlements were fewer in the seaports and market towns of the south of England, but concentrated in the manufacturing and mining towns in the North, the Midlands, and Wales. By the end of the Nineteenth Century, for example, there were small Jewish trading communities in most industrial towns in the valleys of South Wales. In addition, Jewish communities grew in port towns on the indirect “land” route to the United States - Grimsby, Hull and Newcastle on the east coast, and Liverpool on the west coast (Endelman, 2002:130).

As a result of East European immigration, the Jewish population of Britain was close to 300,000 on the eve of World War 1 (Endelman, 2002:130). Jewish communities were to be found in dozens of locales in England, Scotland and Wales - as well as in Belfast, Cork, Limerick, and Dublin. However, 80 per cent of Britain’s Jews chose to live in just three places: London (180,000), Manchester (30,000), and Leeds (20,000). The Jewish
communities in Liverpool (8,000), Glasgow (7,500) and Birmingham (6,000) accounted for another 7 or 8 percent (Endleman, 2002:130). Given this degree of geographical concentration, the history of British Jewry from the end of the Nineteenth Century to the present is in essence the history of the six communities in London, Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, Glasgow and Birmingham. According to Endelman (2002:130), what happened elsewhere, however piquant or arresting in human terms, reveals little about the main currents of Anglo-Jewish History.

Like the Irish, the majority of Jewish immigrants settled into overcrowded and dilapidated neighbourhoods with poor sanitation. The districts into which Jews moved already lacked sufficient housing, as a result of slum clearances and demolitions for railways, warehouses, and streets that started in the 1860s (Endelman, 2002). According to Bild (1984), until they were able to find a place of their own, most of the new arrivals stayed as lodgers with friends, relatives or contacts. Conditions were very poor and overcrowding was common. When people eventually found a home of their own, they might themselves take in lodgers and the cycle would continue. Willing to suffer overcrowding and pay higher rents (offset in part by the taking in of lodgers), the Jewish newcomers exacerbated the housing shortage. The increasing demand allowed landlords to raise rents and demand so-called key money, which in turn made housing in the East End of London, for example, a speculative investment for successful immigrants. The result was that native, non-Jewish tenants were forced to seek lodgings elsewhere (Endelman, 2002: 157). Conditions in the East End of London were particularly bad, and worsening for a number of reasons: overcrowding increased as slums were knocked down to make room for railways, warehouses and, ironically, street improvements. As pressure on housing grew, rents rose and hardship and poverty resulted (Bild, 1984).
The poor housing conditions faced by the Jewish communities were in many ways inseparable from the low standards of housing and sanitation found generally in urban areas. According to Bild (1984) it was a time when very little was done by local and national government to improve conditions. The press provided the public with loaded pictures of the Jewish neighbourhoods, which further fuelled anti-Jewish sentiments. For instance, Whitechapel became known as ‘New Jerusalem’ – a place that was “…teeming with vicious and angry rejects from the rest of the world” (Klein, 2005). The Evening Standard, of October 1904, offered its readers an alarming picture of the areas inhabited by the Jews:

“It was all gloomy alleys and Stealthy footsteps running through patches of shadow, with fleeting echoes of strange passwords and shards of foreign vocabulary. Here you might find the ‘thin Galician’, the ‘fox-looking’ Lithuanian, the ‘restless’ Pole and the ‘muddled-headed’ German. In their boozey clubs designed to ‘tempt poor flies into the trap’ the architects of future unrest sat drinking and gambling- ‘too lazy to work, they find in the mischievous propaganda they spread capital means of bringing grist to their own popular mills’...they spend night after night in the haunts mentioned and the card rooms that abound in the neighbourhood, gambling away the last coin that should have gone to their underfed wives and children, and returning home to rave afresh against society and the iniquities of those who do not go and do likewise” (cited in Winder 2004: 241).

Similarly, the report of the Lancet Special Sanitary Commission on the Polish Colony of Jew Tailors described conditions in the East End of London in 1884 as follows:

“In Hanbury Street we found eighteen workers crowded in a small room measuring eight yards by four yards and a half, and not quite eight feet high. The first two floors of this house were let out to lodgers, who were also Jews. Their rooms were clean but damp, as the water was coming through the rotting
wall. The doors fitted badly, and the locks would not act. In one room the window-frame was almost falling into the street; in another the floor was broken, and the fireplace giving away. The boards of the stairs were so worn that in some places they were only a quarter of an inch thick, and broke under extra pressure. The sink was not trapped; the Kitchen range was falling to pieces, while the closet was a permanent source of trouble. A flushing apparatus had been provided, but this charged the water outside the pan; the water consequently came out under the seat and flowed across the yard which naturally inclines towards the wall, where the slops accumulate and emit foul odours. Yet the tailor who hired this miserable abode showed us a receipt for £17 in payment of only one quarter’s rent. It seems preposterous that £68 should be charged for a house literally falling to pieces, and containing only six rooms. When, further, we consider that the top room, though the largest, had at times to hold eighteen persons, working in the heat of the gas and stoves for warming the pressing irons, surrounded by mounds of dust and chips from the cut cloth, breathing an atmosphere full of woollen particle containing more or less injurious dyes, it is not surprising that so large a proportion of working tailors break down from diseases of the respiratory organs” (Bild, 1984:17).

Even in their working lives, the Jewish immigrants had a reputation for working in cramped and unhygienic workshops that were lacking in sanitary facilities, and were sometime dangerous (Lipman, 1990). Generally, working conditions in the immigrant Jews’ stores were notoriously attracting the attention of social reformers, journalists, politicians and public health officials. Most Jewish workshops were housed in garrets, cellars and backrooms in private homes, stables, disused sheds, and crumbling warehouses (Endelman, 2002:136; Bild, 1984: 18). The workshops were generally overcrowded, dimly lit, poorly ventilated, littered with refuse, and permeated with foul odours. Toilet facilities were disgraceful. It was not unusual for inspectors to find floors smeared with faeces, toilets leaking water onto workroom floors, and unenclosed urinals. In Leeds, for example, in 600 inspections of 182 Jewish establishments in 1891, the local medical officer’s staff found 301 cases of defective
ventilation, 226 cases of dirty workrooms, and 180 cases of dirty toilets (see Endelman, 2002: 136).

Thus, the immigrant Jews became synonymous with physical disorder in the cities, particularly in East London. Their presence stirred up hatred and hostility from the ‘host’ residents. However, part of the hostility, which the aliens evoked, stemmed from the unsettled economic state of the East End, which, like in the case of the Irish, led to much attention being focused on issues such as the effect of immigration, jobs, housing and distribution of amenities (Lipman, 1954, 1990; Gainer 1972; Garrard, 1967; Bild, 1984; Klein, 2005; Winder, 2004; Solomos, 2003). Gainer (1972) explains:

“Part of the hostility, which the aliens evoked, stemmed from the unsettled economic state of the East End, where work was irregular and a family was able to subsist only as long as all its members contributed to its support. The oft-repeated and deeply felt belief that foreign interlopers were usurping British jobs and undermining British living standards had therefore an explosive effect. The reaction to the Foreigner must, therefore, be seen against the background of the natives’ continual fear for the job security which was their only bulwark, not against starvation only, but against a fall in social status” (Ibid: 1972:3).

In addition to the issues of housing and employment, the basic strangeness of the immigrants - their language, diet, gestures, dress, shop signs and wall posters (in Yiddish), religion and social habits, even their poverty - provoked indignation and unease. According to Endelman (2002:145), when outsiders visited the East End of London, they tended to see its filth, congestion, bewildering foreign character, and often little else. The Jewish ‘aliens’ were regarded as filthy, clannish, indecent, impious and, in the view of some, even subversive. The ‘locals’ were affronted simply because “…the aliens worked on Sundays, slept outside on hot
summer nights, ate herring and black bread, and read Yiddish newspapers” (Endelman, 2002: 158).

The reality was, however, more complex. What outsiders could not see was the rich organisational life of the Jewish immigrants, the extensive network of institutions they created to meet their religious, cultural, social and political needs (Endelman, 2002:145). For instance, in 1896, Henry Walker visited Whitechapel with the intention of writing a religious tract about the squalor of heathen life, but found to his surprise that “…this great and squalid colony is a peaceful and law-abiding population…the Jew is never intoxicated” (cited in Winder, 2004:242). Also, Gainer noted that the “…East European immigrants were notoriously law abiding, and crimes of violence especially were rare”. In fact, the Jewish immigrants won wide acclaim for cleaning up some of the worst streets in East London. Where they moved in, brothels and bad characters alike disappeared: neighbourhoods which were formerly ‘dens of vice’ became ‘exceptionally quiet and orderly’ (Gainer 1972:52). The Booth Report of 1889 stated that:

“The children of Israel are the most law-abiding inhabitants of East London... they keep the peace, they pay their debts, and they abide by their contracts; practices in which they are undoubtedly superior to the English and Irish labourers among whom they dwell” (Winder, 2004:242).

In London and the large provincial communities where they dwelled, the Jewish immigrants created a sophisticated, almost self-sufficient subculture of their own. The Jewish East End became “…for more than a few newcomers to London, especially those who failed to learn English, a social and cultural ghetto they rarely left” (Endelman, 2002: 145).
Nevertheless, the immigrant Jews were ‘associated’ with particular types of crime such as fraud, forgery, receiving stolen goods, and the illegal distilling of spirits (to avoid payment of excise) (Klein, 2005). Moreover, whenever crimes were committed that involved Jews, they were sensationalised and often they became focal points for the articulation of anti-alien sentiment. For example, the trial and conviction of the Jewish stick maker, Israel Lipski, for the murder of Miriam Angel in 1887, (he had poured nitric acid down her throat), sparked street fights between Jews and non-Jews in the East End of London. At his execution, a crowd waiting outside Newgate Prison broke into prolong cheering when the signal came that he had been hanged. According to the Evening Standard, the murder underlined how polish Jews, “a social cancer”, blighted the districts they occupied, lowering the standard of living and morality alike (Endelman, 2002:158). Thus, ‘Jewish criminality’ became a political and popular issue during the late Nineteenth Century (Knepper, 2007).

The numbers of newcomers in itself was not the problem; the Jewish population never exceeded one percent of the total population of Britain. But, it was rather their concentration in three or four urban centres, the East End of London pre-eminently, which was already the focus of much middle-class concern that drew much attention to their existence (Endelman, 2002:156). Images of a casual labouring class in the heart of the capital, described variously as immoral, vicious, besotted, atheistic, feckless and threatening to Victorian civilisation, existed in popular discourse and academic literature as far back as the 1860s - at least a decade before Jewish settlement in the area (see Endelman, 2002:156). The poverty, overcrowding, and sweated labour associated with the ‘new arrivals’ simply fed the debate about the condition of the masses in industrial cities, heightening existing anxieties about the moral and physical degeneration of these areas and communities (see Endelman, 2002: 156).
Whereas the attitude towards the immigrant Jews was linked to social realities in the cities, it was also clouded by intolerance, prejudice and fear. Residents of the East End of London and middle-class visitors to the area alike, viewed immigration as a foreign invasion, turning once-English districts into “little Jerusalem” and “little Palestine”. Chapeltown in Leeds was once referred to as “little Israel”. Native workers felt overrun and displaced as immigrants “…flooded in and occupied street after street” (Endelman, 2002). With Jews accounting for almost one-half the population of Whitechapel and St.George’s in the East End of London, a witness told the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration in 1903, “…the feeling is that there is nothing but the English going out and the Jews coming in.” (Endelman, 2002: 157).

The build-up of pressure against the immigrants led to the Aliens Act of 1905, which attempted to restrict further (Jewish) immigration (see Solomos, 2003; Klein, 2005; Winder, 2004). The most important provisions of the legislation were (a) that aliens could be refused permission to enter Britain if they did not have, or did not have the means to obtain, the means to subsist in adequate sanitary conditions; and (b) that an alien could be expelled from Britain without trial or appeal if he or she was found to be receiving poor relief within a year of entering Britain, found guilty of vagrancy or found to be living in insanitary conditions due to overcrowding (cited in Solomos 2003: 42). Other provisions include the power vested in the Home Secretary to expel ‘undesirable’ immigrants. As a consequence of this law, the flow of Jewish immigrants into Britain fell dramatically by 40% in 1906 when the Act took effect (Solomos, 2003:58), only to increase again just before World War 1. In addition, whereas immigrants who were refused entry to Britain could appeal to an Immigrations Board, the Alien Act of 1905 was followed by a plethora of Acts such as 1914 Aliens Restriction Act, 1919 Aliens Restriction (Amendment Act), Aliens Act 1920 (Solomos, 2003). These Acts made appeal against refusal of entry more difficult. According to
Hobsawm (1987), Britain was the first state in Europe to enact discriminatory legislation against immigrants.

In several ways, the experiences of the immigrant Jews were similar to those of the Irish. Their settlement in the most deprived areas made them the ‘scapegoats’ for ills that existed in British cities before their arrival. Rejection, prejudice and hostility led to these ‘outsiders’ being seen as synonymous with the problems of the industrial city. Whereas Irish and Jewish migration into Britain continued well into the Twentieth Century, ‘modernisation’ has not changed, in any radical way, the political and social attitudes to these foreigners. The next section examines the plight of the ‘blacks’ in Britain and the subsequent migration of other ethnicities into the country after the Second World War.

2.3. Post Second World War Immigrants

Twentieth Century immigration into Britain came largely from New British Commonwealth countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. Like the Irish and Jews who came earlier, these immigrants also settled in the poor and deprived areas of big cities such as London, Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, Liverpool, Cardiff and Bristol (see, for example, Smith, 1989; Solomos, 2003). However, unlike the Irish and Jewish immigrants, the ‘blacks’ (Africans and Caribbean) and South Asians were British citizens, recruited into Britain by the British government, in order to fill the gaps in employment left as a result of the casualties of war; mainly in the semi-skilled and unskilled jobs such as were available in the British railways (see Bowling and Phillips, 2002). More importantly, Britain’s black and Asian ethnic groups are very diverse, varying in terms of household characteristics, settlement patterns and cultures. These new Commonwealth citizens also experienced rejection and isolation by the host communities, perhaps even much more than their Irish and Jewish
counterparts, with their rejection compounded mainly by their skin colour (Banton, 1967; Miles, 1982; Smith, 1989). Much literature exists about the plight of the new commonwealth arrivals in cities such as London, Birmingham, Leeds and Liverpool, where, for instance, they were denied access to accommodation by English landlords because of their colour (see, for example, Karn, 1997; Karn & Phillips, 1998). Those amongst them who finally found accommodation, did so in the poor areas of the cities, where, as mentioned earlier, crime and disorder were already persistent problems. Invariably large clusters of ‘blacks’ and Asian began to grow up in the poor (inner city) areas, more so as their working class neighbours, who were able to afford better accommodation, gradually moved out (see Bowling and Phillips, 2002; Cook and Hudson, 1993). Invariably, these clusters grew into ‘communities’ where members were of the same ethnic group or sub-group. Research has shown that Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, for example, tended to live in wards where their own ethnic group accounted for the majority of all minority ethnic groups in the area (see Dorsett, 1998).

Various arguments have been put forward to explain the pattern of urban settlement of black and Asian people in Britain’s cities. Prominent amongst these are the choice and constraint theories. Choice theory argues that the blacks and Asians in Britain have been approaching the housing market in a way that satisfies particular needs, social obligations and aspirations such as social support and shared linguistic, cultural and religious traditions, and fear and experience of racial harassment (see, for example, Smith, 1989; Phillips, 1998; Ratcliffe, 2002; Somerville and Steele, 2002). Invariably, these ethnic groups have settled in parts of cities where they felt ‘comfortable’, amidst people of the same ethnic origin, religion and culture. If this is the case, why they did they pursue this goal or desire in the run down segments of the housing stock, rather than in the suburban areas where living is more secure? The constraint theory, therefore, argues that the housing position of these minority groups can
be attributed to external forces such as their economic position, a lack of information about housing opportunities elsewhere, the discriminatory behaviour of individuals, housing policy and complex multilayered institutional barriers within the housing sector (racial exclusionary practices by private market institutions such as building societies and estate agents) and legislative frameworks (see Somerville and Steele, 2002). For instance, Smith (1989) noted that national legislation has been influential in determining the location and quality of black peoples’ housing opportunities, and that this has built the foundations on which social segregation is erected (see also Peach and Bryon, 1993; Karn and Phillips, 1998; Ratcliffe, 1998). Somerville and Steele (2002) identified three types of constraints which stem from processes of racialisation in relation to housing. They are:

(a) Institutional racism of housing organisations and the housing market, prioritising the needs and demands of the white majority (the ‘middle English’);
(b) the disadvantaged position of black and minority (BME) people in the housing market caused by racism outside the housing market itself, in particular in employment and education;
(c) racial harassment in certain areas, resulting from ‘common-sense’ attempts by white residents to maintain what they perceive to be the social or cultural integrity of their neighbourhoods (Somerville and Steele, 2002).

Similarly, the housing policies also created constraints in terms of provision for the black and minority ethnic population. For instance, under Thatcher’s government there was a major move from public housing to housing as social housing. According to Burden et al (2000) council housing which was the bedrock of the welfare state was disparaged, deconstructed and reconceived as ‘social housing’, reduced to a tenure of last resort. Through the Right to Buy introduced under the Housing Act 1980, tenants were given the choice to buy their
homes, however, this policy and wider structural changes (decline of manufacturing) contributed to residualisation of council housing, making it the least favourable housing option for many households (Burden et al, 2000, Lund, 2005). Living in council housing increasingly became associated with an experience of multiple forms of deprivation, caused by increasing difficulties in accessing employment, education, health care, transport and leisure (Burden et al, 2000).

The persistent ideology of associating local crime and disorder problems in the community with the ‘foreigners’ was pronounced in the case of the blacks and Asians, much more than it was with the Irish and Jews. Needless to mention is their association with low moral values and the generally poor qualities or lack of social amenities in their neighbourhoods. The construction of the black population as a social problem was structured around youths who were believed to be disproportionally involved in crimes in the inner cities; mainly street crime (mugging), illicit drug trafficking, and prostitution (see Lea, 1986; Hall et al., 1978; Hall, 1980). In the 1970s, ‘mugging’ became associated with black youths who were disproportionally, compared with their white counterparts, at the receiving end of the problems of poverty, poor housing, and unemployment that were plaguing the communities in which they lived. In addition, the black youths’ problems were compounded by their experience of racial discrimination in welfare provisions, education and employment.

According to Solomos (2003), the negative images of young blacks were derived partly from commonly held images of race and inner-cities, and partly from the feeling of discomfort that was developing in British society as a whole, about the position of black communities and their place in the dominant institutions. Thus, in the 1970s, in areas such as Notting Hill and Brixton in London, Handsworth and Balsall Heath in Birmingham, and similar localities in
other cities, the question of rising crime and a lack of law and order, became intimately bound up with the broader question of the impact of black immigration on such areas. These inner-cities where the blacks lived became stigmatised and labelled criminal areas, with the media and the police playing a significant role in this process (Hall, 1980; Solomos, 2003).

Between 1969 and the early 1980s, there was growing tension between the police and black communities (particularly black youths), which led to clashes between the two, in particular communities and often in relation to specific events (Hall, 1978; 1980, Rowe, 1993; Solomos, 2003). A notable example was the Notting Hill riots in 1958, when clashes occurred between black youths and the police who were accused of siding white youths against their black counterparts (see Bowling and Phillips, 2002). Allegations of police officers going ‘nigger hunting’, indiscriminately targeting and harassing black youths, were common (see Hall et al 1978.,1980; Rowe, 1994; Solomos, 2003).

Invariably, black communities became the focus of concern requiring political attention, both in terms of the policing of their communities and their perceived criminality. The apparent escalation of the crime of ‘mugging’, particularly in London, and the pronouncement by the MET that it was especially a ‘black crime’, further increased the rift between black communities and the police. As Benyon (1987) rightly noted, race and policing went “…out of the court” in 1975-76, so that from this point onwards, the Metropolitan Police in particular began highlighting black crime as a “growing problem”.

The growing conflict between the police and black youths culminated in outbreaks of urban unrest across Britain between 1980 and 1981. The first unrest took place in April 1980, in the St Paul’s district of Bristol, between groups of predominantly black residents and the police.
This was followed in April 1981 by violent confrontations between the police and crowds of mostly black youths in Brixton, London. The Brixton unrest resulted from long standing complaints by local black youths of a police campaign of surveillance and militaristic policing of their communities, in the quest to clamp down on muggers (See Lea and Young, 1994). Police tactics included the use of the SUS vagrancy law of 1824 to indiscriminately stop, question and search mainly minority ethnic youths on suspicion of being muggers (Hall et al., 1978). This police action exacerbated the already strained relationship between the police and inner city black youths, which had built up as a result of previous encounters in the 1950s and 1960s (Hall et al., 1978; Keith, 1993; Lea and Young, 1994; Bowling and Phillips, 2002). The Brixton unrest was followed in July 1981 by a rapid succession of examples of unrest in other British inner cities with high concentrations of black people; for example, in the Toxteth area of Liverpool, Moss Side in Manchester, Handsworth in Birmingham and Southall in London (Benyon and Solomos, 1987; Solomos, 2003). There was also an uprising in Chapeltown, Leeds on the 11th - 14th of July 1981 (Farrar, 1981). Unlike the other unrests, there was no particular event that sparked off the riots in Chapeltown. However, according to Lea and Young (1984), a common denominator for all the unrests was the political and economic marginalisation of the young black males who lived in these areas - the experience of unemployment, racial discrimination and the lack of a political voice, made the insensitive, selective, heavy-handed and apparently racist attitude of the police more than intolerable.

In April 1981, Lord Scarman was appointed to inquire into the reasons behind the disorders that took place in Brixton, and to provide recommendations to the government on how such an incident could be avoided in the future. Whilst Scarman acknowledged the policing problems that immediately led to the unrest, he made it clear, through the numerous pages that were devoted to the social and economic conditions in Brixton and in other inner cities
where unrests took place, that the key issues were the social and economic conditions prevailing in these areas that provided the ‘fuel’ for the unrests. As he puts it:

“While good policing can help diminish tension and avoid disorder, it cannot remove the causes of social stress where these are deeply embedded in fundamental economic and social conditions. Any attempts to resolve the circumstances from which the disorders sprang cannot be limited to recommendations about policing, but must embrace the wider social context in which policing is carried out”. (Home Office, 1981:100)

The report highlighted that in Brixton, for instance, 13 per cent of households were overcrowded and below standard or unfit, compared to 9 per cent for inner London as a whole. Lambeth Borough Council confirmed that, on the eve of the unrest, an estimated 12,000 households in the Borough lived in overcrowded conditions (Home Office, 1981: 5).

In addition, the Local Authority’s waiting list contained 18,000 households; 37 per cent of households were homeless, compared to 20 per cent of households overall in the Boroughs.

The social and welfare problems emphasised by Scarman included underachievement in schools which, he argued, was due to the irrelevance of the school curriculum to the culture and needs of minority ethnic children, and high truancy levels amongst BME children; family breakdown (which also directly results from experiences of deprivation and poverty), leading to many black children (mainly boys) lacking a male role model; and the lack of adequate provision of leisure activities for the young. In addition, Scarman highlighted the high rate of unemployment amongst black youths which, he suggested, was due to discrimination by employers and in the workplace. According to the Report:

“Discriminatory and hostile behaviour on racial grounds is not confined to the area of employment. There is evidence that it occurs not only among school
Consequently, many of the young people of Brixton were born and raised in insecure social and economic conditions, and in an impoverished physical environment, “…living much of their lives on the streets, they are brought into contact with the police who appear to them as the visible symbols of the authority of a society which has failed to bring them its benefits or do them justice” (Home Office, 1981:11). Therefore, the report identified that the Brixton disorders cannot be fully understood unless they are seen in the context of the complex political, social and economic factors which affected the black community in a negative way.

According to the Report:

“Overall they [the blacks] suffer from the same deprivations as the host community (white population), but much more acutely. Their lives are led largely in the poorer and more deprived areas of our great cities. Unemployment and poor housing bear on them very heavily, and the educational system has not adjusted itself satisfactorily to their needs. Their difficulties are intensified by the sense they have of a concealed discrimination against them, particularly in relation to job opportunities and housing. The riots were essentially an outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police”. (Home Office, 1981:15)

The long history of ambivalence between the police and minority ethnic communities was noted in the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas report in November 1985:

“We have heard numerous complaints from black people of alleged discrimination against them by the police…. this loss of confidence in the police and suspicion of racial or class discrimination in methods of policing and among magistrates, can result in substantial groups in the community ceasing to regard the law as a friend”. (cited in Benyon, 1986:1).
In September and October 1985, further riots occurred in Handsworth in Birmingham, Tottenham and Brixton in London, and in Liverpool. Additional disturbances also took place in 1986 and 1987 (Benyon and Solomos, 1987). Between 1991 and 1992, thirteen riots took place in England; twelve of these riots took place on local authority housing estates, where the bulk of the immigrants and working class people live (Power and Tunstall, 1987). These unrests did not do much to improve the public image of BME communities and of inner cities. Instead, it earned them the additional label of being “lawless and disorderly” areas or ‘no-go areas’ (Keith, 1993). Black youths, in particular, were seen as troublemakers, ‘disturbers of the peace’ and potential criminals. They were treated as a ‘suspect population’ requiring control rather than protection (Solomos, 2003).

These urban unrests attracted the attention of the media and central and local governments to deprivation in the inner cities (that is, the environmental decay, poor educational and social service provision, inadequate recreational facilities, and substandard housing). They revealed that, in spite of the urban experiments of the 1960s (see Chapter 3), the problems in the inner cities have persisted. Additionally, they have brought to political attention, the contribution of racism and policing to the problems of the inner cities.

The responses to the urban unrests were varied, but generally condemnatory. For instance, the official view was generally that the riots were not protests against the dire conditions in inner-city areas or the actions of the police, but an excuse for committing criminal acts (see Gaffney, 1987). The Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, in one of his first appraisals of the Handsworth riots, declared that they were not ‘a cry for help but a cry for loot’ (Guardian, 13/9/85, cited in Gaffney, 1987). At the Conservative Party Conference, a month after the Handsworth riots, the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, made a statement which had the
quality of an epigram. She said: ‘Unemployment breeds frustration, but it is an insult to the unemployed to say the unemployment causes people to break the law’ (BBC2 ‘Newsnight’ 11/10/85, Gaffney, 1987). What these two governmental statements implied is that there is another cause, which can be linked to the autonomous decision of political actors (Rowe, 1998; Gaffney, 1987).

Similarly, there were sensationalised reports in the media on the disturbances. The ambiguities and subtext in much of the press coverage during 1980-81 highlighted the more extreme forms of discourse that put the blame entirely on blacks (Gaffney, 1987). Quite amusing was the Sun’s publication of the photograph of a man who became known nationally as ‘The Black Bomber’: ‘A black thug stalks a Birmingham street with hate in his eyes and a petrol bomb in his hand.’ (cited in Gaffney, 1987:8). The Sun has not only referred to the riots as ‘black riots’ (a white riot is simply a riot), but has also used the word ‘tribal’, insulting not in itself, but in its implication. What is striking were the racist connotations in the news stories and images presented by the popular press on the riots. Some presented the riots as a racist ‘war’ by ungrateful black youths on the white population. Headlines such as: Bloodlust (Daily Mail); Hate of Black Bomber (the Sun); War on the Streets (The Mirror); Torch of Hate (The Star); England, 1985 (Daily Express) accompanied by a picture of the ‘black bomber’ captivated the (white) British imagination, fuelling a moral panic (cf. Cohen, 1972) about black and minority ethnic communities and reinforcing the stereotypes that have long existed in popular discourse about the link between race, crime and disorder (see Gaffney, 1987; Solomos, 2003)

At the heart of the government and media response was the use of racialised ideas and stereotypes to simplify what were, in fact, fractured and multi-causal events. The racialisation
of the riots amounted to the downplaying of the real causes, which are the experiences of racial disadvantage by black and minority ethnic groups living in the inner cities, their social exclusion, economic and political marginalisation (cf. Lea and Young, 1984). Through racialisation, subordination is produced and reproduced in an unjust society (cf. Keith, 1993). Racialisation is a complex social process that involves an array of social actors and institutions - the media, politicians, community leaders, the police and ordinary members of communities. Central to the process of racialisation is the creation of a racialised ‘other’: a “them” against whose “difference” a dominant national, ethnic “us” is defined (Keith, 1993). This entails the production of knowledge about this other - a set of characteristics or behaviours, even pathological - deployed to explain social and cultural differences, and to rationalise social exclusion. This also involves projections of anxieties about social problems onto the ‘Other’, which becomes seen as the cause of these problems, the cause of conflict and disorder (Keith, 1993). The racialisation of the various disorders was deployed to capture the rather complex social dynamic that takes place between structural dimensions of social, economic and political exclusion, and the cultural representation of social relations.

The government’s lacklustre approach to the issues of black and minority ethnic communities could be seen in the Northern City disturbances of 2001, in which youths of South Asian origin (Bangladeshis and Pakistanis) were predominantly involved. Whereas, the Commission for Racial Equality identified social and economic conditions such as high unemployment, limited job prospects, bad housing, fear of crime, under-funded youth services, scarce leisure facilities, and arguably, worst of all, mistrust and resentment among local communities, as the causes of the disturbances in the Northern towns (CRE, 2002:3), others linked the causes to the experience of racial hostility and violence by the Asian community, emanating particularly from Far Right groups (including the British National
Party – BNP) and mistrust of the police (Kundnani, 2001; Amin, 2003; Webster, 2003). The problems of the inner cities has been intensified by racial divisions and ‘colour coding’ of areas in terms of ethnic ownership, which determines who may or may not enter, and this produced ‘neighbourhood nationalism’ (Webster, 2003). Whilst this gives an impression of inner cities or multi-ethnic communities as racially divided communities, the reality is localised, not general. Some inner city areas are still cohesive in spite of their ethnic mix (see Chapter 5).

Recent immigration, particularly since the expansion of the European Union, has led to the ‘influx’ of European ‘white ethnicities’ into Britain, mainly as migrant labour. In addition, other ethnicities, both whites and non-whites, have entered Britain from different parts of the world, as asylum-seekers and refugees. The majority of asylum-seekers and refugees in Britain also live in some of the most deprived parts of the country (given that they were offered housing, which was vacant because no-one else would live in it) (see Cole, 2011).

Living in deprived areas, with little or no support networks or employment opportunities, and due to the delay often encountered in the processing of applications for support, has placed many refugees and asylum seekers in positions of poverty and desperation (see Cooper, 2009).

Whereas there are no reliable official statistics on the offending rates of asylum-seekers or refugees living in Britain, the association of these groups with crime has been the subject of much media and public attention in recent years (see Malloch and Stanley, 2005; Rudiger, 2007, cited in Cole, 2011). A report published by Scotland Yard in 2007 maintained that there has been an increase in the numbers of young asylum-seekers and refugees engaged in
gang activities in London. There was concern expressed that these foreign youths were having a disproportionately negative impact on their British peer groups (MPA, 2007). David Green, director of the CIVITAS thinktank argued: ‘We are importing 15, 16, 17 and 18-year-olds brought up in countries with an anarchistic warlord culture, in which carrying knives and guns is routine. That is no exaggeration. We are asking for trouble if we do not confront this issue’ (Mail Online, 2007, cited in Cole, 2012:228).

In addition, the terrorist attacks on the London transport system on July 7, 2005, carried out by British Muslim youths of minority ethnic origins, have led to a ‘moral panic’ (Islamophobia) about British youths of Islamic faith, who also live predominantly in the inner cities, being potential terrorists. Thus, anti-terrorism control and prevention policies and tactics, the Prevent Strategy (HM Government, 2008), has targeted Islamic (mainly Pakistani) youths and their communities as potential breeding grounds for so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorism. The image of the British inner city has become significantly more complex than in the past. What is significant is that the “working class” element has remained, but with it is a new and stronger dimension of ‘race’. Whether or not ‘race’ plays a significant role in the state’s efforts to address the problems of the inner cities, is the key theme of this thesis.

2.4. Summary

Following the discussion of the concept of disorder in Chapter One, this chapter provides an extensive historical account of the arrival and settlement of three of Britain’s key minority ethnic groups, namely the Irish, Jews, ‘blacks’ and Asians. The chapter argues that:

- Whereas these ethnic groups entered Britain at different historical times and, in the case of blacks and Asians, were, indeed, British citizens, their experiences have been similar in terms of settlement, social exclusion, poverty and radical discrimination,
The foundation of the linkage between ‘race’ crime and disorder was laid in the Nineteenth Century, and the platform of racism in the areas where these new arrivals settled has expanded over the centuries.

Contemporary events such as the urban unrests of the 1980s have helped to perpetuate existing stereotypes and reinforce the image of inner cities as dangerous and ‘no-go’ areas.

The histories of race, crime and disorder, show that the idea of the ‘racial other’ is a reoccurring theme dominant in European thinking (see Patel and Tyrer, 2011)

In a nutshell, this chapter has highlighted the linkage of immigration to the question of disorder. The historical analysis presented shows that the themes and imagery of the problem population and problem neighbourhoods have been actively sustained in official and academic literature for two centuries. Whether one considers the Irish and Jewish immigrants of the Nineteenth Century, or the black and Asian ethnic groups of the Twentieth Century, or even the asylum seekers and refugees of the Twenty-First Century, crime and disorder has been a common theme in the construction of ideologies and policies towards them. For instance, the pathologisation of blacks and Asians is part of an ongoing assumption that the problem lies with the ‘other’ (due to foreignness) rather than with the native white (due to their racism). This pathologisation results in exclusionary policies of immigration control and assimilationist policies of geographical dispersal. A central argument of this chapter is that the conceptualisation of disorder in Britain ignores the social, economic and political causes of disorder. The questions that arise from this chapter are: (1) why are certain groups stereotyped as disorderly, and how does this notion feed into the debate on law and order and, (2) what are the socio-economic and political factors that facilitate such conceptions of disorder as a core issue in terms of migrant communities? The following chapter will build
on these arguments and examine how the state has addressed the problems of inner cities through urban ‘regeneration’.
Chapter Three

Political Construction of Problem Areas through Urban Regeneration Policies

3.0. Introduction

“Looking back at developments in UK planning and policy over the last hundred years, it is apparent that there is considerable continuity” (Rydin, 1993 cited in Shaw and Robinson, 2010:124)

Urban regeneration (or urban renewal) is a term that is typically used to refer to state initiatives or interventions aimed at tackling urban problems. Most regeneration initiatives are concerned with the redevelopment of the physical infrastructure of a location. However, modern contemporary urban regeneration has a wider remit, which can include activities to tackle the social and economic problems as well as environmental problems such as pollution and contaminated land in a particular area or location. House of Commons (2011) define regeneration as a long term comprehensive process which aims to tackle social, economic, physical, and environmental issues in places where the market has failed. Also, Roberts (2000:17) notes that urban regeneration is a comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change. Problems identified for urban regeneration often include problems of physical disorder, such as derelict land, redundant industrial capital and inadequate housing stock. They also include social or cultural problems, such as a lack of social cohesion within the community, crime and anti-social behaviour, poor education, health and/or other public facilities or services; and economic problems such as long-term structural unemployment and/or a lack of indigenous economic dynamism (see Hall, 2006). Due to the nature of these problems, it is not surprising that urban regeneration programmes are often targeted at ‘poor’ communities, where low income social groups usually live, for example, inner city areas. As
such, the principle of urban regeneration is based on the desirability that urban areas make a positive contribution to national economic performance as well as attain a range of other social and environmental goals. In that regard, urban regeneration is an interventionist activity that entails strategic process of management and delivery of change in an urban area (see Robert, 2000).

The objectives of urban regeneration vary. They include improving the social sustainability and economic stability of an area and, more generally, improving the physical infrastructure. Therefore, indicators of ‘successful’ regeneration programmes often include measurables such as renovated properties, community integration, improved quality of life, and the hopes and aspirations of people who live in the area. The ultimate aim is to produce viable, vibrant and sustainable communities. According to Turok (2005:57) there are three distinctive features of contemporary urban regeneration: (1) it is intended to change the nature of a place and in the process to involve community and other actors; (2) it embraces multiple objectives and activities that cut across the main functional responsibilities of central government, depending on the area’s particular problems and potential, and (3) it usually involves some form of partnership working amongst different stakeholders although the form of partnership can vary.

Nevertheless, while acknowledging that urban problems are real, as well as rhetorical, there are some major conceptual issues and concerns relating to the framing of urban regeneration policies. In other words, urban regeneration does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is reflective of a number of contexts including, but not limited to, political ideologies and historical processes. Therefore, it can be argued that the definition of ‘urban problems’ has an important role to play in the legitimisation of urban regeneration and policy (Hall, 2006). The
social constructionists claim that the construction of policy problems is not from free floating discursive struggle, but rather a combination of structural factors (see Jacobs et al., 2003). In fact, Kitsuse et al. (1984:162) note that there is the need to interrogate ‘…the relationship between social conditions that are asserted to exist and definitions of those conditions as problematic in need of some sort of collective action’. On the construction of social problems, Blumer (1971:301) notes:

“Social problems lie in and are produced by a process of collective definition. The process of collective definition is responsible for the emergence of social problems, for the way in which they are seen, for the way in which they are approached and considered, for the kind of remedial plan that is laid out, and for the transmission of the remedial plan in its application”

Similarly, Hajer (1993:45) argued that for the development of ‘problem definition’, there must be the existence of a ‘discourse of coalition’ composed of a group of actors (or organisations) who share a social construct about the world, or an aspect of it, and how that world functions. Atkinson (2000) noted that a ‘problem’ is constructed in a particular way which is congruent with the activities of a ‘dominant discourse coalition’, and a story is told about its genesis that entails a ‘solution’ which complements the existing thought and actions of the ‘discourse coalition’. Thus whether or not a situation is perceived as a political problem depends on the narrative in which it is discussed (Hajer, 1993:44). As such, for an aspect of the real to be defined as a ‘problem’ it needs first of all to be constructed and articulated as an object amenable to diagnosis and treatment, in and through a narrative discourse which carries with it an authority (Atkinson, 2000) or, in Bourdieu’s (1991) terms, is enunciated by an individual or organisation possessing the relevant symbolic capital to
make performative utterances. That is, to develop a narrative this will be both listened to and heeded. According to Stone (1989:282) ‘…problem definition is a process of image making, where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame and responsibility’. Stone (1989) further argues that political actors deliberately portray social problems and harm, thereby claiming the right to invoke government power to stop that harm.

The overarching aim of this chapter is to examine the underlying assumptions of state interventions in urban areas from the 19th through to the 20th and early 21st Centuries. It is worth noting that while organised urban interventions to improve living conditions in cities can be traced back to the Victorian era, the term ‘urban regeneration’ emerged only in the 1960s (see Hall, 2006). However, from the Victorian times to the present day, the dominant political narrative on urban policy (that is, the problem) has been conceptualised in terms of the social pathology of particular groups of people limited to relatively small areas of Britain’s cities. Drawing on the comments made above on the ‘definition of problem’ discourse and the narrative analysis, this chapter charts how the construction of innercity urban areas as epicentres of social problems has remained dominant in urban policy discourses in Britain.

Section 3.1 examines the geography of exclusion in Victorian Britain, focusing particularly on the impact of the Industrial Revolution and the various municipal interventions. It explores key historical processes and developments in relation to the emergence of social problems. Stedman Jones (1971) argued that the notion of an urban residuum, and the fear of contamination, was an enduring feature of 19th Century discourse, and this provided the incentives for governments to act through legislation. The discussion of the Industrial Revolution is important to any discussion of contemporary urban geography for two reasons.
First, industrial cities constitute a large part of the urban system of Britain, and industrialisation has influenced the internal geographies of many cities in Britain, as well as the economic, political and physical links between them. According to Hall (2006), these legacies have formed important dimensions of subsequent urbanisation. Second, the industrial city has also had a disproportionate influence on modern urban theory. For instance, the horrific images of the 19th Century writings (for example: Charles Dickens ‘Hard Times’ and ‘Oliver Twist’) did much to form the initial middle class reaction to the industrial city and the lasting perceptions still present today (Hall, 2006). This section also focuses on the process of de-industrialisation, sub-urbanisation and the impact on cities in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.

Section 3.2 addresses post war reconstruction projects and the emergence of urban regeneration policy as a distinct policy area in mid-20th Century Britain. Also addressed are the social construction of inner city communities as problem areas, and the emergence of the politics of race and place in British urban policy and political theory. What these points highlight is that pathological moral failings and cultural difference of the urban poor have permeated debates within planning and urban development in the first part of the 20th Century. This section will also discuss the impact of ‘the culture of poverty’, ‘the culture of dependency’ and ‘the cycle of deprivation’ discourses from across the Atlantic (the USA) on British urban policy in terms of the construction of urban areas as problem areas. This section also shows how council estates have played a symbolic and ideological role as a signifier of social problems and specialised dysfunctionality.

Section 3.3 explores the debates on urban policy in the late 20th Century, and examines the impact of the change of government in 1979 on urban policy and the inner cities. Section 3.4
provides a brief overview of the language of New Labour’s urban regeneration policy, and whether there was continuity or change under New Labour. The dominant themes explored in this chapter are: (a) the significance of the construction of certain communities as an ‘other’ of Britishness; (b) the signification of differentiation and contextualisation of the situation, based on urban regeneration policies; and (c) the significance of race, disorder and place (race and urban political theory). It is must be stated at the outset that the objective of this chapter is not to examine specific urban policies, but rather to unpack the language of debate on urban problems, particularly its impact on policy developments. Section 3.5 provides a summary of the chapter.

3.1. Urbanisation and Industrialisation: Geographies of Exclusion in Victorian Britain

“Whether categorised as the ‘mob’, the ‘dangerous class’, the ‘residuum’ or the ‘undeserving poor’, the urban working class that lived in the ‘great gloomy cities’ of the 19th century were both reviled for living their lives in social and moral degradation, and feared for their potential to contribute to civil unrest and social disorder”. (Shaw and Robinson, 2009:136)

“The earliest debate over housing reform and urban problems reflected British society’s broader preoccupation with the ‘social question’ moral and social health of the working classes”. (Burden et al., 2000:163-164)

The beginnings of urban decline in the late 18th and 19th Centuries can be linked to the massive increase in urban populations created by the transformation of the British economy from an agricultural to an industrial base (Midwinter, 1994; Tallon, 2010). It could then be argued that industrialisation laid the foundations for an urban society in Britain (Herbert, 2000). By the mid-19th Century, more people were living in towns than in the countryside
This population surge led to socio-spatial distancing or ‘a gulf’ between the social classes in major industrial cities (Sibley, 1995), with the working classes becoming increasingly separated socially, economically and geographically from the middle classes (Holmes, 1988; Mooney, 1998). This can be referred to as residualisation, that is, a situation whereby people move away from an area because it is considered as not able to cater for their needs, while those without economic power are unable to move. The divide was more pronounced in cities like London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Oldham, Preston, St Helens and Salford. The notion of a significant gulf in cities was widely perceived as one of the main social problems facing Victorian society (Cooper, 2005) and was encapsulated by Disraeli in 1845 who noted that England had become a country of ‘two nations’, ‘rich and poor’ (Mooney, 1998). These views were common in industrial cities, predominantly London, which had by the 1880s and 1890s become the main symbolic examples of urban decay, for much of the first half of the 19th Century. For instance, Manchester was referred to as Britain’s ‘shock city’ (Mooney, 1998). Friedrich Engels gave the following account of the separation of the classes in Manchester in the 1840s:

“The town itself is peculiarly built, so that person may live in it for years, and go in and out daily without coming into contact with a working people’s quarter or even with workers, that is, so long as he confines himself to his business or to pleasure walks. This arises chiefly from the facts, that by unconscious tacit agreement, as well as with outspoken conscious determination, the working people’s quarters are sharply separated from the sections of the city reserved for the middle class; or, if this does not succeed, they are concealed with the cloak of charity”. (Engels, 1999 184:85)
This gulf was often geographically represented in the form of an East End versus West End divide, for instance in London, with parallel geographical expression in Glasgow and other large cities (Mooney, 1998). Williams (1985:220) argue that the real physical contrast between these very different parts of Victorian cities had, by the last quarter of the century become what he termed as an ‘interpretative image’. The West end came to symbolise all that was prosperous, whilst the East End was dark, sinister, forbidding and threatening: a home to very different ‘tribes’ of people (Mooney, 1998). This gulf was perceived as serious threat to the social and physical structure of the city. There was real concern that this social ‘dissolution’ would have disastrous consequences on class relationships. This view was accompanied by middle-class fears about ‘the city’ and dangerous classes. Social problems were interpreted as ‘urban’ or at least often regarded as the inevitable outcome of urban life. In view of this, the city was perceived as ‘dystopian’ – a place that would eventually be engulfed by social disorder, crime and violence. It was a place where poverty and disease were rampant (Mooney, 1998). Thus a strong anti-urbanism pervaded many accounts of social life, social commentaries and social problems in Victorian Britain (Mooney, 1998).

Not only was the idea of a divide between East and West, between a city of darkness and a city of light, widely interpreted and expressed as a specifically urban and/or geographical phenomenon, it was fundamentally considered as a social one, underpinned by class relations (Mooney 1998). Therefore, the city was depicted and theorised based on dystopian ideas and metaphors. For instance, the East-West metaphor was among a number of images used in the 19th Century to ‘distance’ particular groups in a city, constituting them as a ‘social problem’ (Mooney, 1998). Thus, the social gulf, while giving an explicit and strong geographical referent, was also imbued with moral considerations about the state of urban industrial
society. These moral considerations frequently drew upon images of a mythical past, evoking the return to what was viewed as an orderly, rural society (Mooney, 1998).

The period from the 1880s onwards witnessed the emergence of urban slums, dereliction and ‘moral dangers’. Added to these was the perceived threat of the working class mob and migrant communities, particularly the Irish (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). As these areas were deemed dangerous, so too were the people who lived in them. Invariably, embedded within the Victorian narratives with regard to the city were the notion of ‘dangerous’ places and classes and ‘communities set apart’ (Cooper, 2005: 2008).

Victorian writers branded social disorder as a normal behaviour. It was not perceived as a product of a lack of socialisation and culture, but an issue to do with different cultures and values (see Young, 1981). Henry Mayhew, for instance, argued that the health of the economic body - those unproductive ‘...vagabonds who prey upon the earnings of the more industrious portions of the community’ were a threat to social progress (cited in Cooper, 2008:33). Mayhew noted that there was a large class which belonged to the criminal race, living in particular districts of society and (containing those) who are, in reality, dangerous (quoted by Gatrell 1980:242-3). In Victorian writing, phrases such as ‘residuum’, a ‘community left behind by industrialisation’, ‘alien’, or a ‘race apart’ were used to describe the working class communities in the cities. As Victor Gatrell noted:

“....the indiscriminate equation of the 'criminal class', the 'poor' and the 'working classes', and the loose assumption that the terms were rhetorically interchangeable, had become commonplace in the more sensational writings on the urban crisis which now began to proliferate. It was not only the motley, vast and hitherto little regarded populace of paupers and pimps, vagrants and sharp practices, pickpockets and beggars, unemployed and derelict, thieves and robbers, who were now
transformed into that collectivity which Frenchmen in the 1840s were to term the 'dangerous classes'. The whole world of the poor tended to be accommodated within a system of criminal labelling, not only to express the social fear of the respectable, but also to justify a broader strategy of control to cope with that fear”. (Gatrell 1980:270)

It is important to note that the label of dangerousness and the ‘diseased other’ were applied to both the ‘local’ working class communities as well as their migrant counterparts. The latter were seen as places of overcrowding, disease and squalor, and high levels of criminality (see Chapter 2 of this thesis). Together these areas were viewed as being at the centre of the myriad problems facing cities.

The use of such negative imagery and metaphors in social commentaries about working class and immigrant communities, served to constitute the poor as a ‘race’ (or class part). This discourse employed various labels and juxtapositions to emphasise the difference between the working classes and the emerging middle classes. Juxtapositions used included ‘savage’/‘civilised’; ‘immoral’/‘moral’; human/ subhuman; ‘diseased/healthy’ and foreign/English, with foreign being a label often applied to the Irish immigrants (Mooney, 1998). According to Cohen (1988), racist ideology was dominant in the representations of immigrants in the 19th Century, and it was based on a method of classifying human beings in a hierarchical way: the ruling class represented the ‘naturally cultured’ and below them were two groups: ‘the uncultured’ with the potential to be ‘civilised’; and the ‘subhuman’, that is, those deemed to be ‘savages’ and wild’. The English working class was, at various times, classified as ‘uncivilised’, whilst immigrants were regarded as ‘subhuman’ - a discourse that was based on an imaginary relationship between them (the immigrants) and dirt and disease. Therefore, immigrants with political demands came to be identified with an invasive and
contagious virus which must be isolated in order to achieve a more stable society. As Cohen (1988) points out, the Irish immigrants in Britain were the first ‘beneficiaries’ of this process of classification, racialisation, screening and segregation. The Language of subordination served as tool for reforming and civilising the ‘other’ of Victorian Society. According to Mooney (1998) the poor slum-dwellers became not only objects worthy of detailed investigation, but also objects of disapproval which required regulation and supervision.

State intervention in urban life started in the late 19th Century, when ideas of regulating the industrial cities emerged (see Hall, 2006; Atkinson and Moon, 1994). According to Tallon (2010), the intervention was in response to the catastrophic consequences arising from unregulated urban growth, associated with the ongoing process of industrial capitalism and industrialisation. Social reformers and politicians alike recognised that intervention was required to address the problems of the industrial cities of Britain. It was during this time (the late 19th Century) that formal planning systems began to emerge in urban areas, to regulate the developments of these places, and to initiate new forms of control in order to maintain social order (see Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006; Hall, 2006).

State urban intervention in the 19th Century was focused on the physical conditions of the urban poor neighbourhoods through town planning, sanitation improvements and sunlight laws. Thus, the intervention efforts of the 19th Century were dominated by public health discourse, characterised by what Topalov (Cooper, 2005:74) described as ‘cleansing’. The expression of the class divide in terms of topography and health was crucial. As Sibley puts it:
“The poor, down there on the swampy clays, were living in their own excrement and were subject to contagious diseases like cholera. The middle classes, up there on the suburban heights, were free from disease and uncontaminated by sewage, but threatened by the poor and their diseases. Nineteenth Century schemes to reshape the city could thus be seen as a process of purification, designed to exclude groups variously identified as polluting - the poor in general, the residual working class, racial minorities, prostitutes and so on”. (Sibley, 1995: 55).

Accordingly, intervention came in the form of different public health legislation with specified minimum housing standards, and measures to be taken when these were breached. Examples included the Nuisance Removal Acts of 1846 and 1855 that enabled local authorities to deal with urgent threats to public health. According to Burnett (1986), the 1851 Common Lodging Houses Act also gave the police powers to inspect accommodation, largely to control the ‘…filthy, overcrowded thieves’ dens and ‘twopenny brothels’ (Cooper, 2005: 74). The 1868 Artisans and Labourers’ Dwellings Act, and the 1875 Artisans and Labourers’ Dwelling Improvement Act, permitted local authorities to clear unfit houses and areas of unfit housing respectively (Cooper, 2005). Such measures ‘…dealt with the problem of the putrid masses’ (Sibley 1995:58).

The process of urbanisation and industrialisation in the UK intensified and continued apace. For example, Birmingham saw an increase in its population from 71,000 in 1800 to 765,000 by 1901 (Tallon, 2010). This brought about its own problems and challenges, as reform could not keep pace with the sheer rapidity of change. The internal geographies of many cities were radically altered, along with the economic, political and physical links between them, and these foundations greatly influenced future urbanisation in the UK (see Hall, 2006).
However, towards the late 19\textsuperscript{th} Century and the early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, the growth of transportation altered the course of the urbanisation process. According to Tallon (2010), from around the 1920s onwards, more flexible transport systems and the rise of the private car facilitated the deconcentration and decentralisation of people and capital from urban areas, and this began a counter-urbanisation process leading to the decline of cities. Transportation has been referred to as both the maker and the breaker of cities (Herbert, 2000).

The counter-urbanisation process was accompanied by a growing regional-scale shift in population and economic activity. This led to the dispersal of urban populations and their settlements in the outer ring of cities – a process that was vigorously continued in the 20th Century and beyond (see Hall, 2006). This process of urban decentralisation (de-industrialisation and counter-urbanisation) had great implications for the working class and for poor people who lived in the cities, as they remained in the old industrial cities whilst the more affluent social groups moved out, into the suburbs. This led to the concentration of the more disadvantaged within the old industrial towns. The old cities became increasingly associated with the poor, whilst the suburbs were associated with the rich. Thus, the foundation of the ‘inner cities’ were laid. Accommodation in the old cities became cheaper, allowing more immigrants and poor people to move into those areas in the early 20th Century. Thus, in terms of dwelling, the city increasingly became associated with poor housing.

3.2. The Emergence of Urban Regeneration in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century

\textit{“The rediscovery of poverty, its spatial concentration, the politicisation of race and the subsequent adoption of an area renewal approach to tackling housing}
Indeed, the post-war reconstruction and Keynesian (redistributive) economics stimulated economic growth and brought a new confidence to the economy and a general air of optimism after the Second World War (Tallon, 2010). For instance, in 1945 the Labour government launched a massive programme of government-financed factory construction in the Development Areas (depressed areas of outer Britain) together with much smaller-scale programme of financial assistance to firms and infrastructure development (Scott, 1997a:582). This was done mainly to promote long term local employment, promotion of external economies and prioritizing industries which were viewed as having the greatest potential for future growth (see Scott, 1997a). Due to the 1947 economic crisis, the Development Areas faced a huge cut in terms of substantial curtailment of regional policy expenditure, which was reduced from about £12 million per annum in 1947/8 and 1948/9 to £6.5 million in 1949/50 and 1950/51. In addition, the proportion of new industrial building approvals granted for the Development Areas fell from 51.3 percent of the national floorspace total in 1945-7 to 19.4 per cent in 1948-51 (Scott, 1997a:582-583). However, despite these cuts, factory development in Britain’s peripheral regions during 1945-51 was impressive (Scott, 1997a).

However, in spite of economic growth and growing optimism about the post-war boom, unemployment was rising in the cities and persistent poverty remained, and refused to be shifted (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Lawless, 1989). Scott (1997b) notes that the regional policy was a missed opportunity because the focus was on employment rather than creating a basis for self-sustaining industrial expansion. For instance, London lost half a million of its 4.5 million jobs between 1961 and 1975 and most major provincial cities lost at least 30 per
cent of their manufacturing jobs in the five years after 1971 (Lawless, 1989). Also, different independent reports and surveys conducted around this period confirmed that twenty years of the welfare state had not eradicated poverty (Lawless, 1989). For example, the Lambeth Inner Areas Study, published in 1977, suggested that developments in Britain’s inner cities offered:

“...a sinister caricature of the urban crises in the United States. The parallels are striking. Are the inner areas of London, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham to go the same way as those of the USA? Is “poverty in the midst of plenty,” as President Johnson put it, also to be a chronic malaise of British Urban Society? (Cochrane, 2007:27).

In addition, the problems of Britain’s cities were compounded by racial tensions in the inner cities, and what Solomos (1989) termed the ‘racialization’ of British politics. The increase in the presence of racial minorities in cities in the 1950s and 1960s, through the post war-process of immigration and labour force migration, was constructed by British politicians as a problem to be dealt with by tighter controls on non-white immigration (Lawless, 1989; Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Atkinson, 2000). From about 75,000 in 1951, the non-white population in Britain rose to almost 600,000 in 1966 (Lawless, 1989) and this was widely perceived as a problem by both the Conservative and the Labour parties, as well as amongst significant sections of the white population (Atkinson, 2000). For example, the Labour Party was returned to power in 1964 but lost the previous safe seat of Smethwick in the West Midlands largely due to the immigration issue and, with a parliamentary majority of just three, the labour government bowed to public pressure on the issue and introduced immigration controls (see Atkinson, 2000).
As has already been shown (Chapter 2), the poor immigrants from the former empire, being mainly migrant workers, had a weak bargaining position, which forced many of them to take low paid, unskilled jobs and to find cheap accommodation. Thus, the majority were concentrated in the poor and deprived inner-city areas (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). Poverty rapidly became an area-based and racialised problem (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). Racial tensions in the inner cities led to inter-ethnic riots such as the Notting Hill riots in 1958. These riots were underlined by the growing disaffection felt by the white population about the apparent high level of immigration. In 1968, Enoch Powell, the then Conservative shadow minister, made his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech where he prophesised that Britain’s inner cities would be transformed into ‘alien territories’ (cited in Cochrane, 2007:27). In his speech, Powell quoted Virgil’s warning of the River Tiber foaming with blood and preached both a halt to immigration and a policy of voluntary repatriation. According to Cochrane (2007:27), Powell, referring to the United States, predicted that the ‘…tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic…. is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect’. Particularly, these fears were reinforced by the imagery of urban ‘race riots’ – the US experience was presented as a frightening warning of what would follow unless action was taken (Lawless, 1989; Atkinson and Moon, 1994).

Furthermore, a number of official reports in the 1960s argued that particular problems were prevalent in certain areas, and that policy initiatives should be directed towards specific localities (Lawless, 1989). For example, the Milner Holland Report (1965) suggested that the problems of stress and overcrowding in parts of London merited the establishment of areas of special control, and the Plowden Report (1967) noted that compensatory educational resources ought to be directed towards deprived areas in cities to counteract their adverse environmental and domestic circumstances (Lawless, 1989:4).
Thus, Britain’s first experience of urban regeneration took the form of post-war urban interventions directed at addressing the problems of poverty and racial tensions in the inner cities. It must be noted that tackling urban problems had already happened in America through the US poverty programmes introduced by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson (Hall, 2006). Some of the assumptions and ideas contained in the US poverty programmes were assimilated by British policy makers. Consequently, from 1968 to 1977, there were about a dozen urban experiments developed primarily by the Department of the Environment and the Home Office. In May 1968, Harold Wilson announced the Urban Programme, which really symbolised the emergence of a distinct urban policy in the UK (see Lawless, 1989). However, it was the 1977 white paper, Policy for the Inner Cities (HMSO, 1977) that heralded an era of permanent British inner-urban policy (Lawless, 1989). This paper signified the beginning of three decades of constant central government intervention in urban affairs (Tallon, 2010).

In a debate that ensued in the House of Commons during the launch of the Urban Policy in July 1968, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, James Callaghan, began by stating that:

“The government have now completed the first stage of their study of urban areas facing acute social problems in the field of education, housing, health and welfare. Many of these areas include concentrations of immigrants” (Atkinson, 2000:219).

Callaghan also suggested that:

“[T]here remain areas of severe social deprivation in a number of our cities and towns- often scattered in relatively small pockets. They require special help to meet their social needs and to bring their physical services to an adequate level” (Atkinson, 2000:219).
It is clear from the words of Callaghan that the underlying principles and philosophy behind the introduction of urban policy were also based on the notion of containing and limiting social problems to ‘pockets’ in some urban areas, where communities needed special help to solve their problems (Atkinson, 2000). It is clear that there was nowhere in the entire debate in parliament on urban issues and problems, was an attempt made to link these problems to a wider societal context. Also, associated with the notion of problematic communities and pockets of deprived areas was immigration and immigrants. During the parliamentary debates the issues of immigration were simultaneously both affirmed and denied. For instance, having referred to concentrations of immigrants early in his speech, Callaghan justified the Urban Policy in the following manner:

“The purpose of this programme is to supplement the Government’s other social legislative measures to ensure as far as we can that all our citizens have an equal opportunity in life” (Atkinson, 2000:219).

In his reply the Opposition front bench speaker, Quentin Hogg stated:

“I welcome the fact that the statement contains, not a direct relationship to race, but an equal opportunity in life for all our citizens? Will the right honourable Gentleman also accept that if this is to have its optimum effect where we hope it will have to satisfy the country that the country as regards possible abuse, terms of entry and orderly settlement where reception can be possible? Does he recognise that much of the present unrest is due to disquiet about these matters?” (Atkinson, 2000:219).

Callaghan’s reply stated:
“As regards the separate but related question of immigrants- and it is separate, although obviously related - I agree that there must be continued control over the inflow of immigrants” (Atkinson, 2000:219).

It is important to highlight that race and immigration has played a key structuring as well as subliminal role in narratives surrounding the launch of urban policy. In fact, it could be argued that Britain’s urban programme was a direct response to fears about racial tensions in British society. A racialised urban pathology was a crucial element in generating Britain’s urban policy (Cochrane, 2007:27). According to Atkinson (2000:221):

“That clearly involved elements of political/electoral calculation on the part of politicians, it does illustrate how powerful were (and remain) the narratives relating to notions of ‘immigrant worker taking the jobs of indigenous white workers’ and threats to British culture. Without explicitly saying as much, the presence of non-white immigrants in Britain’s urban areas was constructed as part of a wider ‘problem’ for British society, and the Urban Policy was part of a ‘deal’ involving the tightening of immigration controls. It represented (along with the 1965 and 1968 Race Relations Act) an attempt to appease the liberal conscience of the Labour Party”.

Other reports such as that of Seebohm (1968) advocated co-ordinated social planning in areas of special needs. According to Lawless (1989:4), the assumptions behind these and other similar publications were influential in the urban debate. As such the underlying assumption of early developments of an urban dimension in the late 1960s, through to the policy innovation of the late 1980s, was that urban problems were concentrated in specific urban localities, and policies designed to deal with these problems should be defined in terms of locales (Lawless, 1989).
Cochrane (2007) argued that the very concentration of households with members whose origins were in the so-called New Commonwealth was identified as evidence of multiple-deprivation. For instance, the 1968 *Home Office Circular on the Urban Programme* concluded that: ‘...a substantial degree of immigrant settlement would... be an important factor, though not the only factor, in defining the existence of special needs’ (Cochrane, 2007:27). Alex Lyon, Minister of State at the Home Office in 1974 noted that ‘...a great many of those who suffer in these areas are black and immigrant and, therefore, add to the deprivation felt by the indigenous population of these areas’ and he emphasized fears about riots such as those which took place in Watts and Los Angeles, to justify the need for an urban programme targeted on areas with relatively high proportions of black people among their population (Community Development Project 1977:47-8, cited in Cochrane, 2007:27).

According to Cochrane (2007), even at this stage of the formal politics of “race” in Britain, it was ensured that any direct reference to the provision of additional services or targeted resources to black or ‘immigrants’ was avoided. It is worthy of note that the language adopted was one that used apparently universal terms such as urban deprivation and community (see Higgins *et al.*, 1983:53-4). It should also be observed that care was taken in drafting legislation and the guidelines flowing from it, in such a way as to avoid identifying particular groups directly, for example, through a stress on multiple-deprivation and its concentration in particular areas (what would now be described as neighbourhoods), highlighting a ‘different kind of social need’ rather than explicitly focusing on the social effect of commonwealth immigration, even if that was the unspoken agenda (Edwards and Batley, 1978:139). In other words, the area base itself became substitute for race-based intervention, since it was believed that the concentration of black and minority ethnic populations (or indeed, immigrants) in inner city areas meant that implicit targeting was
likely to be effective, even if many of those being ‘targeted’ actually lived outside such areas (Cochrane, 2007:28). It was not until the mid-1970s that urban programme funding guidelines clearly approved support for voluntary organisation representing and reflecting minority ethnic communities interests and needs (Cochrane, 2007).

It is clear from the above that the dominant political narrative and discourses restricted urban problems to discrete pockets of poverty in urban areas. With these conceptions, Atkinson (2000) argues that what had to be done was to identify these areas and then target the ‘deviant populations’ in the areas, and change their pathological behaviour. The causes of the problems were therefore deemed to originate within the areas concerned, and thus did not require the consideration of wider societal factors (Atkinson, 2000). This approach had the advantage of being economical, requiring small additional resources; it was largely a matter of better targeting of existing resources (Atkinson, 2000; Cochrane, 2007). According to Atkinson (2000:221), the notion that the welfare state and full employment had eradicated most social problems, created a dominant discourse coalition and structuration of thinking which meant that urban problems could only be conceptualized in terms of ‘pockets’ of poverty that required small-scale supplementary action to remedy any deficiencies, the outcome being the area-based approach of the Urban Policy.

3.2.1. The Urban Experiments

The origins of modern urban policy can be traced back to the 1930s and the designation of slum clearance areas; and to the Comprehensive Development Areas designed under the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act (Roberts, 2000: 29). Urban responses from the government in the period 1945 to 1965 focused on physical housing conditions and unrestricted urban
growth (Jones and Evans, 2008). The housing problems comprised of a lack of housing, poor quality of the remaining stock as well as damaged or destroyed houses during the war (Mullins and Murie, 2006). According to Tallon (2010) the urban problems were mainly tackled through physical solutions, that is housing and town planning rather than urban policy.

The 1965-1979 witnessed a move from the physical approach adopted in the post war period to social pathology, which ascribed the cause of residual poverty to the pathological behaviour of the people or communities who remained in poverty (Tallon, 2010: 37). Therefore urban experiments introduced in the late 1960s to 1979 were designed to: (a) explore specific problems of city life particularly in areas of ‘special needs’ (that is, poverty, education, housing, health and welfare) and (b) develop policies important to them (Lawless, 1989; Cochrane, 2007). These areas were defined as

“...localised districts which bear the marks of multiple deprivation, which may show itself, for example, by way of notable deficiencies in the physical environment, particularly housing; overcrowding of houses; family sizes above the average; persistent unemployment; a high proportion of children in trouble or in need of care; or a combination of these” (Cochrane, 2007:26).

For instance, the Educational Priority Areas (EPA) concept emerged from the Plowden Report of 1967. EPAs were set up as action-research projects in five deprived areas, with the expectation that lessons could be learned which would help to bring underprivileged children more productively into education (Cochrane, 2007). The EPA mandate included the development of community schools, training for teachers, attached social workers backed up by researchers (based at Oxford University) whose task it was to draw out the lessons for
further policy development ‘…to discover which of the developments in educational priority areas have the most constructive effects, so as to assist in planning the longer term programme to follow’ (Cochrane, 2007: 26). There was also a series of relatively small-scale locally based schemes (often described as community initiatives), in partnership with local authorities (Edwards and Batley, 1978, Higgins et al., 1983:47-85).

Edwards and Batley (1978:225) called this approach a ‘traditional’ urban programme, separating it from the development in 1977. According to these authors, this urban programme was:

“Modest in scale and intent and has in practice proved to be a small scale social and educational welfare program [and] while it talks of poverty and unemployment it spends money on projects that, however worthwhile, are not directly aimed at these issues”.

The headquarters of this urban programme was initially based in the Home Office, (with responsibility only transferring to the Department of the Environment in 1977), rather than any Department directly involved in the funding or management of welfare services. This was itself significant, because it showed that the concerns were about the integration of the ‘immigrant’ populations, the need to overcome threats to social order in the cities, as well as an orientation which stressed self-help rather than the provision of universal services, or even services to the disadvantaged communities (Cochrane, 2007).
3.2.2. The Urban Experiments and the Challenge to the Culture of Poverty Thesis

“The setting up of the community development Projects (CDPs) and the Inner Area Studies (IAS) set in motion the demise of the culture of poverty thesis” (Maggin, 2004:16).

Behind government urban policy in the 1960s and early 1970s was an explicit support or acceptance of the culture of poverty thesis. This thesis, which was developed in America through the work of writers such as Banfield (1970), assumed that anti-social behaviour is transmitted from generation to generation in families concentrated in some parts of cities (Lawless, 1989). For instance, in 1968, James Callaghan - the Labour Home Secretary - argued that:

“…there remain areas of severe social deprivation in a number of our cities and towns - often scattered in relatively small pockets and that urban aid was ‘intended to arrest, in so far as it is possible by financial means, and reverse the downward spiral which affects so many. There is a deadly quagmire of need and apathy’” (cited in Lawless, 1989:8).

Analogously, in the early 1970s, these sentiments were further reiterated by other politicians and policy makers. For example, Sir Keith Joseph, former Secretary of State for Social Services, argued that a culture of deprivation characterised by early marriage, early child-rearing, poor educational attainment, vandalism and petty crime, could be identified in parts of Britain (Lawless, 1989:8). Policy makers argued that inadequate parents produced inadequate children, and it was assumed that the cycle of poverty had to be overcome by improved preparation for parenthood, by better educational facilities, health visiting and education (see Lawless, 1989). Based on this prevailing orthodoxy, some of the early urban experiments - notably the Community Development projects - were evaluated according to
the degree to which they helped moderate social ills such as desertion, divorce and child abuse (Home Office, 1970).

According to Lawless (1989), to any government investigating questions of urban deprivation, there were obvious advantages in pursuing the idea that anti-social behaviour engendered by community or individual malaise in certain inner-city areas, was the root cause of disadvantage and poverty. Sinfield (1973) pointed out that during the 1960s and early 1970s, an all out attack on a number of specific areas was much more administratively attractive and certainly cheaper and potentially quicker, than the careful re-examination of the basic fabric of society (cited in Lawless, 1989:25). Those advocating the culture of poverty thesis tended to emphasise the apparent weakness of individuals and inner-city communities, whilst the wider questions about, say, the role of disadvantaged in the economy, or issues of wealth and power, or even class domination were largely ignored (see Lawless, 1989). However, the prevailing orthodoxy was substantially weakened, if not destroyed, as a credible explanation for deprivation in the mid-1970s emerged through the reports mentioned below.

The significance of the urban experiments lay in the fact that they were prepared to address problems in the inner-city urban areas. However, some of the reports that came out from this investigation challenged and rejected attitudes towards urban poverty held by central governments in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Lawless, 1989). These reports helped to move the debate from overly-simple models of deprivation, towards more profound and far-reaching attitudes regarding urban problems.
For instance, the Coventry CDP (Community Development Project) was instrumental and influential in evaluating the culture of poverty thesis. For instance, the area selected for analysis, Hillfields, did not appear to the project team to be different from other parts of inner Coventry, hence the team did not uncover facts to suggest that local inhabitants were in some way inadequate. They argued that poverty certainly existed, but it was clearly associated with variations in employment capacity in the local vehicle-manufacturing industry (Lawless, 1989:9). These conclusions were also echoed by other CDPs (Community Development Projects) and IASs (Inner Area Studies). Collectively, these studies were unable to identify pockets or areas of poverty within cities where especially deprived and inadequate communities existed (Lawless, 1989). Similarly, the Census Indicators of Urban Deprivations and associated publications examined the spatial manifestations of disadvantage as revealed by the 1971 census. This research identified the widespread nature of deprivation and the very limited spatial coincidence between different indicators of poverty (Lawless, 1989). The study discovered that bad housing, for example, tended to be concentrated in older, often privately-rented accommodation. However, the highest rates of unemployment were frequently encountered on the newer, public-sector estates. Hence, the 1971 Census did not highlight convenient small areas to which additional resources could be directed (Lawless, 1989).

The idea that poverty was a much more widespread and complicated phenomenon than the culture of poverty thesis would suggest, was reinforced in 1976 by the publications of Rutter and Madge’s *Cycle of Disadvantage*. This work was commissioned by Sir Keith Joseph in the early 1970s, and it was intended that it should highlight the extent of intergenerational continuities in a range of aspects of deprivations. However, far from concluding that intergenerational continuities characterised poverty, the research team indicated that,
certainly in the economic field, there was a surprising degree of mobility both upwards and downwards between generations (see Lawless, 1989).

Therefore, the collective conclusions of the CDPs, the Census Indicators of Urban Deprivation and Cycles of Disadvantage were important in undermining the culture of poverty idea. Due to this, blaming individuals and communities for their poverty, became more difficult. However, two final points could be generated from the conclusions of these different reports. First, it was apparent that intergenerational continuities in poverty do exist, particularly in certain urban areas and this raises broader questions of why such poverty is initiated and sustained. Second, although the culture of poverty thesis received little credence in the urban debate after the mid-1970s, similar thinking continued to dominate public and social policies of the Conservative government in the 1980s, largely due to the influence of the underclass thesis of Charles Murray and New Right ideology (Lawless, 1989). For example, the restructuring of the welfare benefits system in 1988 was based on the idea that a deserving poor should be supported to the detriment of an undeserving poor (see Lawless, 1989). There are clear parallels here with the culture of poverty’s assumption that the urban poor had only themselves to blame for their conditions (Lawless, 1989). The negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of inner cities, which started during the 1980s, continued into the late 20th Century, as will be examined below.

3.3. De-industrialisation and Polarisation of Cities in the mid and late 20th Century

Urban policies in Britain, post 1977, continued to support or sustain the discourse of ‘pockets of disorderly communities’. There were several factors responsible for this. Most notably was the change in political ideology to free market and the strong state as a result of the electoral
victory of the Conservatives in 1979 (Rogers, 1990). Urban problems were seen as a product of too much state intervention, individual and group dependence as well as restriction of the free market (Tallon, 2010). Urban regeneration under the Conservative government was characterised by entrepreneurial ethos of privatisation, deregulation, enterprise liberation and centralisation (Rogers, 1990, Tallon, 2010). According to Nevin et al. (1997) the government approach in the 1980s was based on the notion that urban problems can be resolved by competition and market economies. Enterprise Zones, City Action Teams, Task Forces were all driven by the neo-liberal principles. The housing policies were also driven by the neo-liberal policies, for example the sale of council housing (Burden et al. 2000:179).

Conservative social policy was based on encouraging individualism, reducing public expenditure and intervention, and promoting free enterprise and selective welfarism. The Thatcher government followed a national economic policy designed to liberate enterprise and reduce inflation. These were combined with a determination to specifically limit local government spending and intervention. This approach was extremely damaging for cities and their economies in the early 1980s, and it had adverse effects on major inner-city communities. For instance, the Conservative government abolished the metropolitan counties of Greater Manchester, the West Midlands and the Greater London Council because they were deemed unnecessary and irrelevant (Lawless, 1989). According to Lawless (1989), the decision to abolish these elected conurbation-wide bodies was short sighted. Lawless argued that metropolitan counties were needed to guide the strategic planning of the city regions, to organise intra-urban transport and to frame economic and demographic mobility within and between conurbations. In contrast, the abolition of these metropolitan counties increased costs, encouraged an over-proliferation of uneconomic developments, stifled the mobility of
the poorest, and generally inhibited rational urban planning (see Lawless, 1989:16). Similarly, the change in political ideology led to increased political marginalisation of the older industrial regions of the UK (this is addressed later in this section).

The 1970 and the 1980s also witnessed the decline in manufacturing in the older industrial cities of the UK, and this had a severe and long-lasting effect on these cities (Tallon, 2010). According to Hall (1995) it took over 100 years from 1851 to 1951 for technology and foreign competition to halve the numbers employed in agriculture, but it took only 13 years, from 1971 to 1983, to cut manufacturing jobs by a third. The decline in the manufacturing industry had a number of implications and dimensions. The greatest impact was on the emergence of long-term unemployment, which saw significant numbers of people out of work for over one year. This unemployment was concentrated in manufacturing which had once dominated the national economy, with this sector experiencing a fall in employment from 7.4 million workers in 1975 to 3.3 million in 2004 (Hall, 2006:38). Between 1971 and 2001, the UK’s 20 largest cities lost 2.8 million manufacturing jobs, and gained 1.9 million service sector jobs (Moore and Begg, 2004), leading to what has been termed a ‘job gap’ (Turok and Edge, 1999). Regions such as the North of England and South Wales suffered severe economic problems as a result, with cities in these regions being the hardest hit. The fact that manufacturing industry bore the brunt of this economic upheaval greatly affected the inner cities, as many of the manufacturing industries were largely concentrated in these areas (Lawless, 1981). Invariably, the worst impact of unemployment was felt within certain social groups such as the young, late middle-aged males, and ethnic minorities (Hall, 2006:38).
The key cause of factory closure was linked to a variety of factors including poor and inadequate sites and intense global competition, which contributed to every major urban area in Britain losing between one quarter and one half of its employment between 1960 and 1982 (Tallon, 2010). In addition, there were transfers of firms, forced moves due to urban regeneration and the closure of uneconomic units (Tallon, 2010). The migration of jobs to suburban and rural locations and overseas occurred because of new requirements of the post-Fordisim, expansion of information technology, automated systems of production and dominance of service sector economy (Hall, 2006; Tallon, 2010). Some of the worst affected cites in the UK have been Glasgow, Newcastle, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Birmingham and London (Tallon, 2010). These processes, which began in the 1940s, worsened after 1960, and the massive disinvestment in the industrial capacity of inner cities continued well into the mid-1980s. This pattern of economic dynamism and economic depression become geographically polarised, and took the form of a north-south divide (IPPR, 2007), with the northern cities being associated with economic depression and the south with economic dynamism. Although some former manufacturing cities have been physically transformed through investment in convention centres, offices, hotels, and retail and leisure developments, whilst others have failed to capture significant economic inward investment and have continued to decline (see Tallon, 2010).

The marginalisation of the inner cities and their inhabitants was felt mostly by the black and minority ethnic populations who predominantly lived in the inner cities. Unemployment was higher among the minority ethnic people who lived in such cities as Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol and London, compared with their white counterparts (see Bowling and Phillips, 2002; Lea and Young, 1984). Minority youths were mostly affected. Unemployment led to many of these youths being homeless and living rough on the streets, where they were more likely
to be involved in crime (street crime) and thereby more frequently in contact with the police (see Lea and Young, 1984; Scarman, 1981). The heavy-handed militaristic policing tactics adopted by the police in the inner cities, particularly in London, on the pretext of clamping down on street robbery (mugging) (see Hall et al., 1978), coupled with the economic and political marginalisation of BME peoples who live in the inner cities and their experience of racial discrimination, resulted in the inner city disturbances (riots) of the 1980s, beginning with urban disturbances in Bristol in 1980, followed by more violent disturbances in Brixton, London in July 1981. The Brixton riots were followed, in rapid succession with disturbances in the inner cities of Liverpool, Birmingham and the West Midlands in the summers of 1981 and 1985.

The urban riots of 1981 and 1985 brought the issue of race and the inner cities explicitly back onto the political agenda. The Scarman Report, following the Brixton riots, highlighted the disturbing degree of the political alienation and the economic marginalisation of BME urban-inhabitants, particularly young, single men (Scarman, 1981). Specifically, the Scarman Report highlighted the problems and found them to be mainly those of unemployment, homelessness and poor housing; educational underachievement and family breakdown. In addition, orthodox political parties appeared irrelevant, and public and private sector services seemed inadequate (Lawless, 1989). Scarman stressed the urgent need for the government to address these problems if the resultant problems of crime and social disorder in these areas were to be tackled effectively (Scarman, 1981). Thus, the violence that ensued during the riots became understandable, as a predictable and perhaps even ‘rational’ response to serious urban problems and social exclusion.
However, the Conservative Party, and a large segment of the popular press, opined that the disturbances were caused by immigration, as young black people were seen as engendering an anti-British culture, and this consequently led to conflict with the forces of law and order. This argument was challenged by Lea and Young (1984), as they argued that most of the rioters were not black and that some riots took place where there were few black people. Yet again, what this highlights is that “race” continued to be a key factor in debates on urban problems and urban policy in Britain (Atkinson and Moon 1994). This point was also echoed by Cochrane (2007) who argued that ‘Race’ has been a central element in the discourse which has constructed the image and idea of an inner-city crisis or problem in English cities. Thus the construction of urban policy as ‘colour blind’ has helped (as in the United States) to ensure that the label ‘urban’ is widely understood to mean ‘black’ (Cochrane, 2007).

The key issue is that the economic decline in the cities over the last 30 years brought about striking social and economic changes in terms of deprivation that were most visible in the inner city areas, and these have created problems for the inner city dwellers with regard to increases in crime and disorder. More importantly, the impact of these changes has led to the exclusion of certain groups in the city. Those mostly affected were young males and mainly of minority ethnic origins. Consequently, the long-standing concern about the division between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ in cities, especially the ‘have-nots’, or, as they were referred to in Victorian England, the ‘deserving and undeserving poor, grew (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; also see Section 3.1 of this chapter). By the 1980s the term ‘underclass’ came to prominence with the incorporation of the Victorian notion of the ‘undeserving poor’, but with a much wider ‘racial’ base or undertone (Tallon, 2010).
Coined in the USA, the concept of the underclass was originally used to describe the chronically unemployed who were associated with the collapse of manufacturing industry in American cities (Atkinson and Moon, 2004; Shaw and Robinson, 2010; Tallon 2010). Eventually, the term became associated with assumptions about the behaviour and characteristics of the affected groups; not the circumstance in which people found themselves, but in the choices they made (Tallon, 2010). This behavioural definition became the dominant one, and took on a moralistic and ‘blame the victim’ tone. In the USA, the term soon became racialised, and was applied mainly to the black population of cities. The problems of the US ghettos were associated with the alleged unwillingness of black and minority ethnic groups to adhere to the American work ethic. UK Conservative commentators in the 1980s did not discredit the term, but used it to refer to similar social groups who are dependent on welfare and lacked proper work ethic. Therefore the solution was to cut back on welfare dependency, in favour of self-reliance and independence.

In recent years, the term ‘social exclusion’ has become common parlance in the UK for explaining the plight of the urban poor, and to justify government policies aimed at tackling urban problems. The debate on social exclusion has centred on two long-standing tensions, namely whether people are poor through no default of their own (due to the system) or whether they are responsible in some way for their own poverty (original sin) (Tallon, 2010). According to Tallon (2010), the key questions relating to social exclusion are (1) whether it is conceptually different from terms like poverty deprivation or the underclass; (2) what evidence is available about the incidence and extent of social exclusion in the UK and (3) whether or not cities in the UK are becoming more unequal places, despite urban policy and regeneration. ‘Social exclusion’ does have multiple meanings, and these different meanings are significant because they point to, and emphasise, different kinds of explanations, and lead
to different kinds of policy solutions (Tallon, 2010). ‘Social exclusion’ is not simply about poverty. Poverty denotes lack of money, which constrains people in all sorts of ways, and affects their life chances. There has been a long-standing controversy about how to measure poverty, and whether it is ‘absolute’ or ‘relative’. Those in poverty experience multiple and complex problems ranging from poor housing, inadequate levels of education and skills, to health problems.

‘Social exclusion’ is multi-dimensional and dynamic, unlike poverty which is defined more narrowly in terms of material wealth. The key focus of analysis for social exclusion is the idea of detachment. As the Social Exclusion Unit (1998:1) explains:

“Over the last 20 years hundreds of poor neighbourhoods have seen their basic quality of life become increasingly detached from the mainstream. Someone or something is acting to push some individuals and groups out of mainstream society, causing them to become excluded. Social exclusion is not so much about how much money or resources individuals have, but what the mechanism or causal process are that lead them into that situation. The idea is that these processes or mechanism of exclusion generate outcomes in terms of poverty or deprivation”.

Madanipour et al. (1998:22) added that

“Social exclusion is a multi-dimensional process, in which various forms of exclusion are combined: participation in decision-making and political processes access to employment and material resources and integration into common cultural processes. When combined, they create acute forms of exclusion that find a spatial manifestation in particular neighbourhoods”.
Solutions to the problem of social exclusion, therefore, must focus on the processes or mechanisms that cut people off from the mainstream, rather than dealing with the state of poverty itself. To deal with problems in the long term, it is imperative to unravel why those who are excluded experience the problems they do, and to tackle those issues.

Whereas, as mentioned above, patterns of social and spatial exclusion in the UK are strongly tied to de-industrialisation, some patterns of inequality were further discombobulated in the 20th Century by government policy interventions. For instance, in 1996 the Joseph Rowntree Foundation inquiry into Income and Wealth showed that between 1979 and 1993 the number of individuals living in households with less than half the average net income (after housing costs) grew from 5 million to 14 million—including more than 4 million children and amongst these low-income households are 9.8 million people who live on the benefit safety net provided by income support (Kempson, 1996:1). Hills (1998:1) argued that overall income inequality was still greater in the mid-1990s than any time since the late 1940s.

In cities, the dichotomy between the rich neighbourhoods and poor neighbourhoods is become so evident. Rates of unemployment in different neighbourhoods are becoming more divergent, with some council estates appearing to be the areas mostly affected. Council housing was more closely associated with people on very low incomes and who lacked choice. In the cities, BME people constituted a significant percentage of the population of those who lived on council housing estates. (Burden et al., 2000; Hall, 2006; Tallon, 2010). The evidence that deprivation or social exclusion is concentrated in particular areas of cities
adds to the debate about whether it makes the problems of individuals worse, making it difficult for them to leave the area.

Overall, the concept of social exclusion has been seen as useful insofar as it focuses on the processes and causal mechanisms which lead to poverty and deprivation. From the point of view of developing solutions in terms of community regeneration, it seems a sensible approach to tackling social exclusion (Tallon, 2010). Being socially excluded is far more demeaning than just being poor. It demonstrates a state of powerlessness to ‘challenge’ existing practices – an almost permanent state of existence for those who live in the inner cities. The question could be asked as to what extent urban regeneration attacks or addresses the problem of social exclusion. If it does, which aspect of social exclusion does it attack?

3.4 The Language of Urban Regeneration under New Labour: A Brief Overview

“Over the last two decades the gap between these worst estates and the rest of the country has grown...It shames us as a nation, it wastes lives and we all have to pay the costs of dependency and social division” (Blair, 1998 cited in Social Exclusion Unit 1998:1).

Central to the narrative contained in the New Labour document ‘Bringing Britain Together’ was the argument that processes of industrial change and decline, forces beyond human control, along with the rise of the service sector, have destroyed the economic basis of many local communities and inner cities by removing unskilled entry level manufacturing jobs (Atkinson, 2000). At the same time, social changes, such as the decline of the family, have undermined the social basis of communities in these areas (Atkinson, 2000). This situation has been exacerbated by inappropriate government policies (that is, human actions),
particularly with regard to housing, which have concentrated ‘the poor and unemployed together in urban neighbourhoods where hardly anyone has a job’ (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998:9). The construction and representation of council estates as ‘problem places’ was central to the New Labour urban renaissance programme. This echoes what Johnstone and Mooney (2007) said about council estates being long represented as posing a ‘problem’ to the local government and to agencies engaged in the delivery of local services. In New Labour’s much heralded ‘urban renaissance’, the council estate is often counterposed against the vision of a revitalised urban citizenship, in which ‘responsible’ and ‘orderly’ communities are involved in the management of their own neighbourhoods (Johnstone and Mooney, 2007). In many respects there are enduring legacies from the past here. For instance, Haylet (2003, 690) points out that those labelled as socially excluded by the Labour governments are clearly not viewed positively, since to be validated as a full citizen, it is necessary to achieve ‘…inclusion in the cultural mainstream and labour market participation’. A browse through the literature on housing reveals that the problem estate is probably the one with the most enduring appeal for ‘housing experts’, politicians and academics alike. In order to unravel the extent of social exclusion, that Labour government developed indices of Multiple Deprivation. This will be discussed further in Chapter Five, in relation to the study area, Chapeltown, Leeds. In addition, New Labour’s approach to urban problems is scrutinized, in Chapters Five and Six in the context of the data obtained on New Labour’s regeneration activities in the study area in 2006.

3.5. Summary

The city has long been portrayed as a place of ‘social disorder’ and ‘social disorganisation’ (see Chapter One). The discussions above have shown that there has been continuity in the discourse which carries the notion of the ‘inner city’ as a ‘problem’ locale. The identification
of urbanisation with poverty, deprivation, ‘decay’ and disorder has persisted in political and popular discourses on the inner cities and their residents. Whereas a few things have changed - for example, the emergence of the concept of neighbourhood - the labelling of the inner city as a ‘problem’ persists in the understanding of politicians, and their approaches to urban renaissance. These issues are examined in detail in Chapter Five, with reference to the study area of Chapeltown in Leeds.

In summary, this chapter has been able to highlight that:

- Dangerous places and people continue to have a powerful resonance in urban policy interventions in Britain. That is, the definition of urban problems has an important role to play in the legitimisation of policies. According to Rogers (1990) the inner-city problem is principally a political construction, one shaped by the terms and language of political culture.

- The explanation of urban disorder and social disorganisation in political discourse clearly identifies the people living in inner-cities themselves as constituting the problem which has to be solved.

- There is also embedded within political discourse the notion of the remoralising and responsibilising residents of ‘disorderly communities’.

- The language of social exclusion carries with it the notion of problematic citizens.

Meanwhile, the next chapter examines the methodological questions and the research methods used in carrying out this research.
Chapter Four

Research Methods and Methodology

4.0. Introduction

Bryman (2004) rightly argued that the practice of social research does not exist in a bubble, and that research methods are not simply neutral tools, but are intrinsically linked with the ways in which social scientists envision the connection between different viewpoints about the nature of social reality and how it should be examined. What this reveals is that there is often disagreement amongst social scientists about some fundamental issues of research (Moses and Knutsen, 2007). For example, social scientists often disagree on issues such as the appropriateness of methods, the overall objectives of scientific inquiry or study and the competing claims. Although methodology is a simple enough term, it is commonly wrapped in ambiguity. The reason is that ‘methodology’ is sometimes used as a synonym for ‘methods’, although these two terms are not synonyms. Methodology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the science of methods and procedures. According to Moses and Knutsen (2007), methodology refers to the ways in which we acquire knowledge; in other words, ‘how we know’. Specifically, it is often used to refer to a set or system of methods, principles, and rules used in a particular discipline; for example, social science methodology. ‘Method’, on the other hand, refers to the research techniques or technical procedures of a discipline.

This chapter discusses how the research for this thesis was conducted. It covers both the methodology and the methods used. It accounts for the research design, the data collection strategies, and other procedures that were implemented to ensure a high standard of rigour throughout each stage of the research process and to strengthen the credibility and integrity of
the research. The chapter has three main sections: Section 4.1 explains the methodological rationale behind the case study method. In this section, the researcher argues that case study method is a viable method of investigation, despite the misunderstanding and stereotyping of the method as a weak offshoot of the social sciences. In this regard, the researcher discusses the writings of various scholars on the case study method and methodology, as well as questions of generalization. Also covered in this section are the reasons for adopting the case study method for this research. Section 4.2 examines the data collection instruments used for this research. Also considered in this section are issues of sampling, access, research ethics, documentary data and direct observation, as well as the validity and the reliability of the research process. It highlights the need for qualitative research not to be too restricted to the use of terminologies such as ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’, but to search for more relevant forms of description in order to ‘richly’ capture the complexities and varieties of issues. Section 4.3 looks at the ‘insider and outsider’ debate with regard to the role of the researcher during the research process. The conclusion to the chapter is provided in Section 4.4.

The aims of the researcher during the field work were to:

2. Obtain the residents’ perceptions of the social and economic conditions in which they live, as well as their perceptions of disorder, and the impact of disorder on their communities.
3. The nature and extent of the participation and consultation that took place with residents and key actors within the community during the periods of the implementation of urban regeneration programmes in the area.

These research aims to provide some answers to the overarching research questions presented in the introduction to the thesis.
4.1. Case Study Method: the raison d'etre

4.1.1. What is a Case?

Before examining what a case study is, it is imperative to explore the question of ‘what is a case?’ The term case is one of the many basic methodological constructs that have become distorted and corrupted over time, due to what Ragin (2000) refers to as the arguments that exists between quantitative and qualitative social science. However, there are two dichotomies in how cases are conceived: (1) whether they are seen as involving empirical units or theoretical constructs and (2) whether these, in turn, are understood as general or specific (Ragin, 2000). The first dichotomy (whether the question of cases involves empirical units or theoretical categories) is common in discussions of social science methodology, and overlaps with the philosophical distinction between realism and nominalism (Ragin, 2000). For instance, realists believe that there are cases ‘out there’, and see cases as either given or empirically discoverable, whilst nominalists think cases are theoretical constructs that primarily exist to serve the interests of investigators. They also see cases as the consequences of theories or of conventions (see Ragin, 2000:8). The second dichotomy focuses on the generality of case categories. It raises questions such as: are case designations specific and developed in the course of research (e.g. through in-depth interviews or historical research) or are they general (e.g. individuals, families, cities, firms) and relatively external to the conduct of the research? (Ibid). In order to address these dichotomies, Ragin developed a conceptual map for answers to the question, ‘what is a case?’ drawing on the work of Douglas Harper (Small N’s and Community Case Studies), Diane Vaughan (theory elaboration: the heuristics of case analysis), Micheal Wieviorka (case studies: history or sociology) and Jeniffer Platt (Cases of Cases…of cases).
Table 1: Conceptual map for answers to “What is a Case?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding of Cases</th>
<th>Case Conceptions</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As empirical unit</td>
<td>1. Cases are found (Harper)</td>
<td>2. Cases are objects (Vaughan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As theoretical constructs</td>
<td>3. Cases are made (Wieviorka)</td>
<td>4. Cases are conventions (Platt)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Ragin, 2000:9

In this conceptual map are four cells - two cells signifying an understanding of a case as an empirical unit (‘cases are found’ and ‘cases are objects’) and two cells signifying an understanding of a case as a theoretical construct (‘cases are made’ and ‘cases are conventions’). ‘Cases are found’ and ‘cases are made’ are specific conceptions of case, while ‘cases are objects’ and ‘cases are conventions’ are general conceptions of case.

**Cell 1: Cases are found:** In this instance, the researcher sees cases as empirically real, bounded but specific, that must be identified and established as cases in the course of the research process. Ragin (2000) argued that researchers who approach cases in this way see the assessment of the empirical bounding of cases as an integral part of the research process.

**Cell 2: Cases are objects:** In this instance, researchers also view cases as empirically real and bounded, but feel no need to verify their existence or establish their empirical boundaries in the course of the research process, because cases are general and conventionalised. Accordingly, these researchers usually base their designations on existing definitions that are present in the research literature. For instance, a researcher interested in explaining contemporary international inequality, for example, would accept nation-states (as conventionally defined) as appropriate cases for his or her analysis.
**Cell 3: Cases are made:** Researchers within this quadrant see cases as specific theoretical constructs which coalesce in the course of the research. Thus neither empirical nor given, they are gradually imposed on empirical evidence as it is shaped in the course of the research. For example a cell-3 investigator interested in tyranny, for example, would study many possible instances of tyranny. As such, the investigation can lead to an identification of an important subset of instance, with many common characteristics, which might be conceived, in turn, as cases of the same thing. Thus the interaction between ideas and evidence results in the progressive refinement of the original case. Ragin argues that for investigators in this category, the construction of cases is not about determining their empirical units, but rather their theoretical significance.

**Cell 4: Cases are conventions:** In this instance, researchers see cases as general theoretical constructs, but nevertheless view these constructions as the products of collective scholarly work and interaction, and therefore as being external to any particular research effort (see Ragin, 2000: 9-10).

What these positions reflect is the rather complex nature of defining a case. However, whether cases are geared toward empirical or theoretical constructs, they have a unifying point. As Ragin (2000) argued, the fourfold division is not absolute, as a researcher could both use conventionalized empirical units, accepting them as empirically valid (Cell 2), and try to generate theoretical categories or case constructs (Cell 3) in the course of the research. The researcher considers the case for this research to match most closely with Cell 2 and Cell 4.
More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that despite the controversy that surrounds the term ‘case’, there are still some agreements that a case might be an organisation, a person, a community, a household, or even an event (for example, a decision and its effects, or the implementation of a policy) (Becker and Bryman, 2004). Gerring (2007) argues that a case connotes a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time. A similar argument was also posed by Wieviorka (2000) who noted that a case draws its unity not from the theoretical tools used to analyse it, but from the way it takes shape, namely as a social or historical fact combining all sorts of elements. Having considered the definitions and theoretical underpinnings of what a ‘case’ is, it is imperative to examine in detail what case study method entails.

4.1.2 Case Study: theoretical discussion and justification

“Forget about the conventional wisdom, go ahead and do a case study”
(Flyvbjerg, 2006: 222-223).

Case studies have had a variety of applications throughout history (Scholz and Tietje, 2002). For instance, it has been noted that the French sociologist, Le Play (1855), used them as a traditional research method and that George H. Mead used them to explore family and sociology. The Chicago School also used the case study approach to explore social problems provoked by urbanisation and immigration (Scholz and Tietje, 2002: 5). To a large extent case studies are used in all the social sciences and are employed in a remarkably large number of different ways (see Moses and Knutsen, 2007). According to Bergen and While (2000:927) a variety of schools of thought have influenced the development of the case study method throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries, from disciplines as disparate as anthropology and sociology on the one hand, to pure science and single case experiments on the other. This
cross-disciplinary variety of definitions and applications of case studies has resulted in an equally large literature aimed at providing case study typologies (see Moses and Knutsen, 2007; Simons, 2009).

However, case study is not a term that is used in a clear and fixed sense (Hammersely and Goom, 2000). There is the problem of definitional morass. The definition confusion is compounded by the existence of a large number of near synonyms such as ‘single unit’, ‘single subject’, ‘case-based’, ‘case control’, ‘case history’, ‘case method’, ‘case record’, ‘case work’ and ‘within-case’ (see Gerring, 2007:18). According to Platt (1992) much case study theorizing has been conceptually confused, because too many different themes have been packed into the idea of the case study (cited in Gerring, 2007:18). Similarly, Bergen and While (2000) noted that the meaning behind the term is not always made explicit by researchers, and this has given rise to a number of assumptions which are open to challenge and questions about the robustness of the case study as a method of social inquiry.

In addition, concerns have been raised as to whether case study is a method - with advantages and disadvantages, to be used as and when appropriate, depending on the problem under investigation - or a pragmatic approach that one simply chooses on philosophical or political grounds (Goom et al., 2000: 5; Hammersley, 2004). Questions have also been raised about the issue of objectivity in case study research; for example, whether the aim is to produce an account of each case from an external or research point of view - one that may contradict the views of the people involved - or to portray the character of each case ‘in its own terms’ (See Hammersley, 2004). Nonetheless, most writers on case studies have regarded it as more than just a method of data collection. Rather, it has been regarded as a method of research
involving quite distinct assumptions about how the social world can and should be studied (Hammersley, 2004).

Despite the fact that scepticism abounds about the value of case studies, evidence abounds that they provide an appropriate approach to researching real, complex, and current problems that cannot be studied by using some of the known analytic methods of research such as experiment, proof or survey (Scholz and Tietje, 2002).

4.1.3. Definitions, Scope and Types of Case Studies

Having looked at the different methodological and philosophical issues concerning the case study method, it is imperative to explore some definitions of case studies that have been offered by different scholars, and to determine which of these best describes the research discussed in this thesis.

Various authors have also looked at the definition of case study research in terms of data collection. For instance, Hamersley (2004) noted that a case study carries implications for the kind of data that are to be collected and perhaps also how these are to be analysed. In that sense, Hammersley (2004) argues that frequently, but not always, it implies the collection of unstructured data, and a qualitative analysis of those data. Similarly, Simons (2009) opined that case study is research based, inclusive of different methods and is evidence-led (Simons, 2009). In addition, Simons (2009) argued that case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives, of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system, in a ‘real-life context’. The primary purpose is to generate an in-depth understanding of a specific topic (as in a thesis), programme, policy, institution or system, in order to generate knowledge and/or inform policy development, professional practice and civil or community actions (Simons, 2009).
Eisenhardt (1989) noted that case studies typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires and observations, and evidence that may be qualitative, quantitative, or both. It has been argued that by so doing, case studies aim to capture cases in their uniqueness, rather than use them as a basis for wider empirical or theoretical conclusions. What this methodological or philosophical position demonstrates is that general conclusions are to be reached by means of inferences from what is found in particular cases, rather than through the cases being selected in order to test a hypothesis. In line with this, it has been argued that case studies adopt an inductive orientation (Hamersley, 2004). It has also been argued that the method can be used to accomplish various aims; for example, to provide description, test theory or generate theory (see Eisenhardt, 1989:535).

Gerring (2007) synthesised the work of Eckstein (1975), George and Bennett (2005), Orum et al. (1991), Goode and Hart (1952), Ragin (1987, 1997), Hammersley and Goom (2000), Yin (2003) and Campbell and Stanley (1963) and proposed that a case study might mean that:

(a) the method is qualitative, Small-N( Single Case),

(b) the research is holistic, thick (a more or less comprehensive examination of a phenomenon),

(c) a particular type of evidence is utilized such as ethnographic, clinical, non-experimental, non-survey, participant-observation, process-tracing, historical, textual, or field research,

(d) the method of evidence gathering is naturalistic (a “real-life context”),

(e) the topic is diffuse (case and context are difficult to distinguish),

(f) the research employs triangulation (“multiple sources of evidence”),

(g) the research investigates the properties of a single observation, or that
(h) the research investigates the properties of a single phenomenon, instance, or example (cf. Gerring, 2007:17).

Bogdon and Biklen (1992) defined a case study as a detailed examination of one setting or a single subject, a single depository of documents or one particular event. Similarly, Becker and Bryman (2004) regarded a case study as a detailed and intensive examination of one or a very small number of cases. A much more interesting and academically stimulating definition of case study is the one provided by Yin (2003) who defined a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (or problem) within its real-life context, when boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2003:13-14). This is what makes the case study a research method that is appealing to social scientists, providing the opportunity to study the social world in a real life context in order to provide more or better understanding of a social problem or phenomenon. It was this quality of the case study method that urged the researcher to choose the method for this research.

Furthermore, according to Riege (2003), a case study is about theory construction or building, based on the need to understand a real-life phenomenon, with researchers obtaining new holistic and in-depth understanding, explanations and interpretations. Based on an analysis of the variety of different roles that case studies can play when lined up along an imaginary continuum stretching from descriptive to theoretical designs, Lijphart (1971:691) distinguished between six types of case studies, namely:

1. Atheoretical case studies
2. Interpretive case studies
3. Hypothesis-generating case studies
4. Theory-confirming case studies
5. Theory-infirming case studies
6. Deviant case studies

In the first two types of case study – atheoretical and interpretive - cases are examined because of an interest in the case per se. There need not be a generalizing dimension to such cases. According to Lijphart (1971), these types of case study are uninteresting, and they fit uncomfortably with the analytical ambitions of the naturalist, although they would be gleefully embraced by historians.

The third type of case study referred to by Lijphart (1971) as ‘hypothesis-generating’, or what Eckstein (1975) termed as a ‘heuristic case study’, is generally seen as a theory building method. In this type of case study, the author exploits his/her familiarity with a given case to generate new hypotheses or theories, which can be subsequently tested in a more rigorous design. According to Moses and Knutsen (2007:136), the researcher adopting this type of case study, studies a given case in order to generate a preliminary theoretical construct. But, because this construct is based on a single case, it can do little more than hint at a more valid general model. In other words, the hypothesis-generating case study method adopts an inductive approach, the aim being to use the case to help formulate hypotheses or theories for further or subsequent testing (see Moses and Knutsen, 2007). Although naturalists are loathe to generate theories (or to generalize broadly) on the basis of a single case, they do recognise the ‘heuristic’ value (cf. Eckstein, 1975) of case studies.

The last three types of case study (theory-confirming, theory-infirming, and deviant case studies) are case studies that aim to test an existing hypothesis or theory. In other words, they
are deductive. According to Lijphart (1971), these types of case study fit most easily under the naturalist’s rubric.

Building upon Lijphart’s (1971) classification, Moses and Knutsen (2007) emerged with three categories of case studies namely: fitting, misfitting and generalizing. However, misfitting is a combination of the theory-infirming and deviant case studies in Lijphart’s (1971) classification. ‘Fitting’ (‘theory-confirming’) case studies investigate the degree to which a given case fits a general proposition. Therefore, this type of case study tends to provide a descriptive framework based on an existing conceptual scheme. In other words, a fitting case study serves to demonstrate the explanatory power of a particular theory. In this sense, it is a fitting exercise whereby a case is chosen as an empirical venue for applying a particular theory (see Moses and Knutsen, 2007, op.cit.).

One of the most common applications of a fitting case study is what Harry Eckstein referred to as a plausibility probe, whereby a researcher might choose to run a trial test of a given theory on a particular case (before investing too much time and money on a full-blown test). In essence, plausibility probes involve attempts to determine whether potential validity may reasonably be considered great enough to warrant the pains and costs of full testing, which is almost always considerable; especially so if broad, painstaking, comparative studies are undertaken (Eckstein, 1975:108). According to Eckstein, to be able to find a case that ‘fits’ or illustrates a particular general proposition or claim, may have some scholarly promise. Consequently, it might be worthwhile to pursue the claim and perhaps develop it into a full-fledged theory later. This is what plausibility probes aim to accomplish (see also Moses and Knutsen, 2007:134).
Misfitting (theory-infirming and deviant) case studies seek to show how a case does not easily fit a general or a universal claim (Moses and Knutsen, 2007). Misfitting case studies combine the features of both the infirming and deviant case studies in Lijphart’s (1971) typology. In other words, they are case studies that ‘weaken theory marginally’ and/or attempt to ‘deviate from established generalizations’ (cf. Lijphart, 1971). A well-chosen misfitting case study will aim to strongly support or falsify a given theory. Using the famous phrase “all swans are white” as an illustration, a misfitting case study will mimic Popper’s (1959) falsification principle, whereby he proposed that just one observation of a single black swan would falsify the proposition that all swans are white – an observation that could stimulate further investigation and theory building. The ‘misfitting’ case study is well suited for identifying ‘black swans’ because of its in-depth approach. What appears to be ‘white’ often turns out on a closer examination to be ‘black’. The point is to choose a case, which is, in theory, falsible and which tests a central theoretical claim (Moses and Knutsen, 2007:134). As such, misfitting is a more critical approach to research than its fitting counterpart. By employing either fitting or misfitting types of case study, it is possible to anchor the case study approach firmly in the naturalistic tradition. Moses and Knutsen (2007) argued that generalizing case studies can be assembled like building blocks into a stronger theoretical edifice (this is further explored in Section 4.1.4).

Moses and Knutsen (2007:138) summarised the different ways in which naturalists employ case studies.
Table 2: Three types of case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of case study</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Logic</th>
<th>Corresponds to Lijphart (1971)</th>
<th>Corresponds to Eckstein (1975)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fitting</td>
<td>Illustrate a general proposition</td>
<td>Verification</td>
<td>Theory-confirming</td>
<td>Configurative-idiographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Example: plausibility probes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misfitting</td>
<td>Explore the limits of a general proposition; theory testing</td>
<td>Falsification</td>
<td>Theory-infirming</td>
<td>Crucial case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deviant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalising</td>
<td>Generate hypothesis and theory building</td>
<td>Cumulation</td>
<td>Hypothesis-generating</td>
<td>Heuristic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Moses and Knutsen (2007:138)

The researcher considered the case study approaches discussed above, and decided that the misfitting case study approach was the most appropriate for this research because it offers the best research design within which to challenge conventional presuppositions about inner-city communities and disorder, and addresses the set research questions.

The researcher contends that the case study method is the best approach when it comes to examining the problem of disorder in Chapeltown, because it allows for a critical and in-depth look at the issues within a defined area. It provides an opportunity to acquire meaningful, robust and rich data on the social processes within the study area that have earned it a reputation for being a problem area. The case study approach also enables the researcher to engage with the residents of the area, thereby acquiring in-depth information.
about the area. The richness of data that the case study method offers is its key strength as a research method. The ‘confined’ nature of the study area means that the investigation is more detailed, profound and grounded than if one was studying a ‘mass society’ (cf. Harper, 2000). Moreover, as a key focus of the research is a critique of government policies with regard to urban regeneration and renewal, multi-agency working and community engagement, a case study approach offers an opportunity to evaluate the delivery of these concepts more deeply within the defined community of Chapeltown in Leeds. In addition, the researcher is of the opinion that naming the area would empower the community and as such disabuse the minds of an outsider that the community is criminogenic. As mentioned above, case study is an ideal method for carrying out the research; the researcher will like to add that key studies on communities in the field of sociology and criminology have adopted this method, thus proving the fact that it is an reliable method of social inquiry.

Other reasons why the researcher chose a case study approach are:

1. It allows for a more intensive and fruitful use of multiple sources of evidence gathering.

2. It can provide an in-depth understanding of the problematic, and is quite useful for testing theories. According to Yin (2003), a single case study can represent a significant contribution to knowledge and theory building. The theories and propositions that this research sets to explore are those on the concept of disorder and the proposed link between the ethnic composition of a community and the community members’ experience of ‘disorder’. In addition, the research proposes to explore how, through its urban regeneration policies and efforts in the Chapeltown community, the government perpetuates dominant perceptions of the problematic citizen.
3. It helps to capture the circumstances and conditions of an everyday or common place situation. In other words, it could provide a holistic “thick description” that is, a rich account of events and issues (Geertz, 1973). According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), a thick description provides others with a database for making judgements about the possible transferability of findings to other milieux.

4. It opens the door to the process created and used by the individuals involved in the phenomenon, and the event, group, or organisation under consideration.

5. It allows the researcher to examine a phenomenon from different perspectives, and to see the connection between them (Wieviorka, 2000).

In a nutshell, the case study method enables the researcher to shed light on the fine-grain detail of social processes, and is ‘meaningful’ and ‘rich’ when compared to other research strategies. As Henn et al. (2006) observed, the purpose for using case study design is to examine the intricacies and complexities of a situation (setting or group). This does not mean, however, that the case study method is always appropriate or relevant, or that large random samples are without value.

4.1.4. Case Study and the Question of Generalization

The issue of reliance on a single case poses a problem for case study researchers with regard to how far it is possible to generalise from the results of such a research. Case study research has often been criticised on the ground that its findings are not generalizable, especially when compared with those of other research methods such as a survey (see Goom et al., 2000). Questions have been raised, in particular, regarding the extent to which findings from a single case study are capable of generalization beyond the confines of the particular case itself (see
Bryman, 1988). Qualitative researchers have raised questions as to how representative case study findings are of all members of the population from which the case was selected. In other words, how representative of the general population are the findings drawn from the study of a particular community? Bulmer (1986) added that the ability of a case study researcher to have an impact on social policy can be diminished by a belief that the findings may, in fact, be idiosyncratic. In order to address the problem of generalization, therefore, Bryman (1988) proposed a number of solutions. First, the researcher may study more than one case. Second, a number of cases may be examined by more than one researcher, whereby the overall investigation assumes the framework of ‘team research’. Third, the researcher could seek a case which is typical of a certain ‘cluster of cases’.

Nevertheless, Becker and Bryman (2004) argued that the claim of the case study researcher is not that the chosen case is representative and can therefore be generalised to a wider universe of cases. Instead, the argument for case studies is largely to do with the ability to generate findings that are theoretically interesting and capable of being taken up by other researchers for further elaboration or for replication. This notion is particularly related to what Yin (2003) referred to as ‘replication logic’ - a term that is used frequently in connection with multiple case study research, where researchers attempt to replicate findings using similar procedures across cases. The basic rationale is that each case is ‘…carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication)’ (Yin, 2003:47).

With regard to issues of replication, Yin (2003) proposes that if case studies use similar procedures to investigate research questions, it will enhance our understanding and generate
interesting differences. This idea of replication can be extended to suggest that a researcher should seek to extend his/her findings (perhaps exploring some further implications) or to examine a somewhat contrasting case to see if the findings hold there (Becker and Bryman, 2004:194-195). In other words, the key word in case study research is ‘replication’ not ‘generalisation’. The aim of the case study researcher is to attempt to capture cases in terms of their uniqueness, rather than to use them as a basis for wider generalizations or theoretical inferences of some kind.

Eysenck (1976) who originally regarded a case study as nothing more than a method of producing anecdotes, later realised that “…sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases - not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something” (Flyvberg, 2006:224). According to Yin (2003), a single case study design can be a legitimate approach to gaining theoretical understanding if it satisfies any one of three rationales: its represents the critical case associated with a theory; it is a revelatory case; or it is an extreme or unique case (Yin, 2003). Flyvberg (2006) maintained that formal generalization, whether on the basis of large samples or single cases, is considerably overrated as the main means of scientific progress. Formal generalization is only one of many ways in which people gain and accumulate knowledge. That knowledge cannot be formally generalised does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society (cf. Flyvberg, 2006). Hamel et al. (2003) also noted that a case study could be seen as representative in its own right, provided that there was a sufficiently detailed description, since this would lead to a clearer understanding and hence a better explanation.
Furthermore, Schofield (1993:201) argued that for researchers doing (qualitative) work, the goal is to describe a specific group in detail, and to explain the patterns that exist, certainly not to discover general laws of human behaviour. Also, Maykut and Morehouse (1994) maintained that qualitative studies are not as concerned with the generalisability of results as with a ‘deeper understanding’ of experience from the perspective of the participants selected for the study.

Despite the criticisms of case studies, particularly with regard to the issue of generalisability, the researcher upholds the views of the above writers on case studies as a research method, and its value in social science research. This case study focuses on understanding the dynamics present within a single setting (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989). It is an intensive study of a single case, where the purpose of the study is - at least in part - to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population) (cf. Gerring, 2007). Through the analysis of the data, the author aims to develop concepts to explain state approaches to disorder in a multi-ethnic inner city area in Britain. The aim is not to generalise, but to provide knowledge that is transferable to the study of other similar neighbourhoods.

Despite fairly well-formed conventional wisdom or presuppositions about case studies and the issues of generalisation, the author contends that in the context of this thesis, the issue of generalizability is resolved in terms of conceptualising and developing propositions. To conceptualise means that on the basis of the study area, and the use of methods of analysis which focus on conceptualising rather than describing, the author has been able to develop concepts to explain disorder, e.g. structural disorder. The author posits that the notions that
one cannot generalise on the basis of a single case, and that the single case study cannot contribute to scientific development, amounts to a basic misunderstanding.

The position of the researcher is well captured by the following quotation from Lijphart (1971):

“The great advantage of the case study is that by focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined even when the research resources at the investigator’s disposal are relatively limited. The scientific status of the case study method is somewhat ambiguous, however, because science is a generalizing activity. A single case study can constitute neither the basis of a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalisation” (Lijphart, 1971:691).

4.2. Data Collection Methods

Case study data collection is typically multi-method and multi-source. As Freebody (2003:82) noted, ‘Case studies are empirically omnivorous’. Accordingly, the following methods were used for this study:

1. Interviews with ‘key actors’; namely, representatives of Unity Property Services, Unity Housing Association, Labour Councillors for the Chapel Allerton Ward, Children’s Fund, Chapeltown Enterprise Centre/Black Men’s Forum, Yes - Cyber, Groundwork Leeds and Ridings Housing Association, Chapel Allerton Seniors Association and Palace Youth Project, selected on the basis of their first-hand knowledge of the regeneration process and their participation in some of these projects.

2. Questionnaire survey of residents of Chapeltown, Leeds.
3. Analysis of documents. These include government reports and policy documents on regeneration, particular documents on the regeneration activities in Chapeltown, Leeds, and other local documents obtained about the study area from Leeds City Council.

4. Simple observation.

These methods allowed the researcher to:

1. Obtain relevant information from the residents and key actors about their perceptions of their community and about ‘disorder’ in the area.
2. Assess the government’s efforts to tackle disorder in the community through the regeneration programme.
3. Assess the extent to which the residents and key actors were consulted, and their participation in the regeneration exercise that took place in the area.
4. Observe how residents in the community act on a daily basis, and generally define their situation.

The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted between September 2005 and April 2006. These data gathering procedures are now described in turn below:

4.2.1. Semi-Structured Interviews with ‘Key Actors’

Interviewing is about the most common research method for obtaining rich qualitative data (see Gillham, 2000). Much has been written on different types of interviewing – from structured to unstructured; the purposes of each and the kinds of questions to ask in the different types (Patton, 1990; Rubin and Rubin, 1998). Rubin and Rubin (1995) described
interviews as ‘guided conversations’ while Burgess (1982) described them as conversations ‘with a purpose’. Likening an interview to a conversation emphasises its informality, friendliness, and attempt to forge a relationship between interviewer and interviewee (cf. Simons, 2009, 44). The underlying philosophy and design of qualitative research requires that the researcher develops a relationship of trust and respect with the participants (Bogdan and Biklen, 1992). According to Punch (2005), the interview is a very good way to access people’s perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations, and constructions of reality. Yin (2003) also observed that the interview is one of the most important sources of information with regard to case study research. However, different types of interview have different strengths and weaknesses (Punch, 2005).

The major difference between the different interview types (unstructured, structured, semi-structured) is their degree of rigidity with regard to presentational structure (Berg, 2009). The type(s) of interview used in a research will depend on the focus of that research. Different types of interviews are suited to different situations. The researcher selected a semi-structured interview type for this research. While a structured interview has a formalized set of questions, often decided ahead of the interview, semi-structured interviews consist of both structured and un-structured sets of questions. The latter allows new questions to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the interviewee says. Thus, the interview literally becomes a two-way conversation, with both the interviewer and the interviewee receiving and giving information on issues relevant to the research. In addition, the interviewees asked questions about the research and the challenges I encountered in terms of accessing the residents. The majority of questions are created during the interview. Interviewees are also encouraged to ask questions during the process. However, semi-structured interviews are guided, but the interview guide provides only a framework for the interview. The flexibility
of semi-structured interviews means that it is less intrusive with regard to those being interviewed. Interviewees are more likely to want to talk about sensitive issues and are also more likely to provide, not just the answers, but also the reasons for their answers, including examples where possible (see Henn et al., 2006). The researcher is also able to ask follow-up questions. Unlike an unstructured interview where the interview is open and ‘free-floating’, the semi-structured interview is focused. This ensures that the interview produces relevant information which may not be the case where the interview is totally unstructured. Thus, data obtained from semi-structured interviews is generally rich and in depth, giving the researcher a fuller understanding of the informants’ perspective on the topic under investigation, and the reasons behind the views and opinions expressed (see Simons, 2009).

The use of semi-structured interview in case study research allows the researcher to explore the ‘why questions’ which will in turn enrich the data. Yin (2003) noted that in most situations, case study interviews must be open-ended in nature, so that the researcher can ask respondents about the facts of the matter as well as their opinions about events. The researcher believes that the use of probes, prompts and a flexible questioning style that semi-structure interviews provide (both in terms of the ways in which questions are asked and the order in which they are delivered) gives the researcher a great opportunity to explore and encourage respondents to give their detailed views on the issues. According to Henn et al. (2006) the use of probes and prompts in qualitative interviews enables the researcher and the respondent to enter into a dialogue about the topic in question, and this can be helpful in that the researcher and the respondent are given the opportunity to query questions and answers, and to verify that they have a shared understanding of meaning. In this sense Yin (2003) argued that this will turn the respondents into ‘informants’, thus making them crucial to the
success of the case study. By using semi-structured interviews, respondents are also encouraged to provide examples in order to ground their narrative.

Sixteen key actors were interviewed. These included: a representative (senior staff level) from each of the following organisations: Unity Property Services, Unity Housing Association, Labour Councillors for Chapel Allerton Ward, Children’s Fund, Chapeltown Enterprise Centre/Black Men’s Forum, Yes-Cyber, Groundwork Leeds, Ridings Housing Association, Chapel Allerton Seniors Association and Palace Youth Project.

The semi-structured interviews were comprised of exploratory questions framed around the study’s research questions. Accordingly, the interview explored issues such as:

- The key actors’ knowledge of crime, anti-social behaviour and physical and social disorder in Chapeltown;
- The economic and social profile of Chapeltown, including the perceived stigma attached to living in the area, and the extent of cohesiveness of the community.
- The key actors’ knowledge of the regeneration programme in the area, and the extent of social inclusion, community involvement, consultation and participation in the process.

The interviewees were identified from the Chapel Allerton guide book. The interviewees were first contacted by phone and the details of the research were then forwarded to them. The interviewees were asked to pick the appropriate and convenient time for the interviews. It is worth noting that it was not all the contacts identified through the guide book that agreed
to take part in the research, as such some interviewees were identified through snowballing. In total 25 interviewees were identified and it was a total of 16 that took part in the research. In recruiting the interviewees, the aim was to identify the key stakeholders that have been involved in the delivery and implementation of regeneration project in the area. The interviews took place in the offices of the interviewees. All interviews were audio tape recorded with the participants’ permission, and transcribed verbatim by the researcher. The transcription took over two hours depending on the length of the interviews. Interview transcripts were later returned to the interviewees for verification, or for the addition of material where clarification was needed. The interviews ranged in length from 45 minutes to one hour. Although the literature is not unanimous on the use of the process of recording, audio recording has a number of advantages. First it ensures accuracy of reportage and adds to the veracity of the reporting. Second it frees the researcher from having to make notes, so that he or she is able to concentrate on the interviewees’ answers and prompt more effectively (Bryman, 2008; Simons, 2009). Recordings are also essential for accurate transcription, and it provides the researcher the opportunity to re-listen to the interview, in order to review and highlights points missed during the first time of listening.

It must be noted that the interviews were conducted in line with the requirements of the University of Lincoln Ethics Committee, in that all interviewees were advised of the tenor of the issues to be addressed in the interview, which was sent by email in advance. The researcher provided the interviewees with an information sheet detailing the aims of the research and the structure the interview will take. Before the interview, the interviewees were asked whether they were still willing to take part in the interview and they have a right to withdraw from their participation. They were also provided with a consent form, a summary of the research aims and objectives and an introductory letter from the university. In addition,
the privacy rights of the interviewees were explained to each of them as they were also of paramount importance to the researcher. Most importantly, the interviewees were assured that the information gleaned from the interviews would be anonymised and confidentiality would be maintained in terms of disclosure (see Munn and Drever, 1991; Gillham, 2000).

Since interviewing involves asking, listening, reflecting and interpreting, interviews are inevitably influenced by the nature of both the interviewee and the interviewer. In this project there is no doubt that personal characteristics such as race and ethnicity came into play during the interviewing process. As Bell and Newby (1971) noted in their classic text, ‘Community Studies’, one’s background, status or position can be a benefit or a handicap when seeking to obtain acceptance. This point is further addressed in Section 4.3 that looks at the ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ debate.

4.2.2. Questionnaire Survey of Residents

A questionnaire was constructed and administered to a sample of the residents of Chapeltown, Leeds. The questionnaire was divided into two sections. The first section consisted of questions relating to the residents’ views of their community and their knowledge of the regeneration exercise that took place in the area, including the degree of their participation in that process. The second section consisted of questions on personal details or demographic characteristics of the respondents. Specifically, the questions in the first section were structured around the following themes:

1) Sense of community - for example, whether the residents enjoyed living in the neighbourhood, and whether people looked out for each other – how ‘cohesive’ was the community?
2) Regeneration and community involvement - for example, whether the residents are aware of regeneration projects that had taken place in their area, whether their views were taken on board, and whether they thought that regeneration had brought about sustainable development in their area.

3) Well-being and social amenities - for example, whether residents were satisfied or dissatisfied with housing provisions in the area; health services, employment, schools (education), and local authority provisions in general.

4) Physical and social disorder - for example, whether residents considered drug dealing, and crime as major or minor problems in the area.

The questionnaire consisted mainly of closed questions - tick boxes and questions that asked respondents to rate their replies in terms of a scale from, for example, poor to first class (see Appendix). According to Bryman (2004), the advantages of closed questions are that it is easy to process the answers, easy for respondents to complete, and to enhance the comparability of answers. The researcher decided to use a questionnaire survey for the residents because it would be straightforward to analyse the data due to the number of residents involved. The questionnaire questions ideas were adapted from the British Crime Survey questionnaire of 2004, and the Apsley community survey as such there was no need to pilot the questionnaire. Perceptions of residents are measured from questions using the Likert scale approach (see appendix 1).

The questionnaires were self-completed, but the researcher was in attendance, just to ensure that the respondents understood the questions being asked. This greatly improved the completion rate, unlike in postal surveys where the respondents’ lack of understanding of
questions might lead them to not completing the questionnaire. The aim was not to get a representative sample of residents in Chapeltown, but to get a feel of the views of the common people on the streets of Chapeltown about their area, and the nature and extent of public participation or consultation that took place during the regeneration process in the area. In total, eighty questionnaires were administered, with 41 male and 39 female respondents. In addition, there were 20 respondents within the age group 16 to 24; 28 aged between 25 and 39; 16 between 40- and 49; 11 between 50-59; 3 between 60 and 74 and three were 75 years and over. Below is a breakdown of the ethnicity of the respondents.

**Figure 5: Ethnicity of respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16+1 classification</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-White and Black Caribbean</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed- White and Black African</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed- White and Asian</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-Any other Mixed Background</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian or Asian British – Indian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian or Asian British – Pakistani</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian or Asia British – Bangladeshi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Asian or Asia British – Other Asian</td>
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<td>Other Ethnic group</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<table>
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<th>Frequency</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese or Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2.3. Sampling

Non-random (non-probability) purposive sampling methods were used to identify the key informants and respondents in this study. Non-probability sampling is often used where it is not feasible, practical or theoretically sensible, to undertake random sampling. According to Punch (2005), purposive sampling is the term often used; it means sampling in a deliberate way, with some purpose or focus in mind. The sampling techniques used were convenience sampling and snowballing. Convenience sampling was used for obtaining a sample of residents. It involved selecting respondents at random, for example in a shopping centre or pub. Snowballing, on the other hand, is a type of sampling technique that works like chain referral: the researcher asks a subject to identify people with a similar trait or interest, who could be contacted. The chain referral process that snowballing generates allows the researcher to reach populations that are difficult to sample or hard to reach when using other sampling methods; including people (usually government officials) who are more easily accessible through trusted colleagues. This method was used for the selection of the key actors.

Both methods were used because they are simple and have a generally low cost in terms of time and money. The selection process was continued until a sufficient numbers of subjects/respondents was obtained. These sampling techniques are prone to bias, as respondents only appear in the sample because of the ease of access to them. In addition, in snowballing, there is the fear that subjects might be nominating people that they know well. Because of this, it is highly possible that the nominees are people who share the same traits, characteristics and opinions as the subjects. Thus, it is possible that the opinions that the researcher obtains are the shared opinions of only a small subgroup of the entire population.
Snowballing was used in this research because it was the most effective way of getting access to key actors who work in the selected organisations, and were involved in the regeneration programme in Chapeltown. The selection was on the basis of knowledge of the key issues and participation or involvement in the regeneration programme in Chapeltown. This makes the issue of bias unimportant in this particular case.

Non-probability sampling has a significant value, as the views obtained are most likely to be closest to those of the ‘person on the street’ than one would get where a probability sampling technique was used. In the latter, there is a strong probability that only those with a grievance or having an axe to grind, would complete the questionnaire. Non-probability sampling is adequate for a case study because, as already mentioned, the aim is not to use the results as a basis for wider generalization, or to infer from the sample to the general population. The aim is not to prove anything, but rather to learn something about the population being studied (cf. Flyvberg, 2006, op.cit.). The researcher was not interested in working out what proportion of the population in Chapeltown gives a particular response, but rather to obtain an idea of the range of responses that the people in the area have on the research issues. Accordingly, respondents were ‘looked for’ in various locations in Chapeltown: at the local library, the business centres on Chapeltown Road, community centres, parks, local stores, local pubs and at a Housing Association open day. The respondents were fully informed about the aims of the research. The questionnaires were self-completed, but the researcher was nearby to collect them upon completion. Most of the persons approached were willing to complete the questionnaire. The people that refused to take part in the research noted that they have been over-researched with no concrete impact on their lives.
4.2.4. Documentary Data

Printed and archival documents are a rich source of data in social research. For this research, documentary data was used in conjunction with interviews, observation and a questionnaire survey (methodological triangulation) (Punch, 2005). Denzin (1989) observed that documents can be important in triangulation, where an intersecting set of different methods and data types is used in a single project. As Yin (2003) notes ‘…documents are helpful in verifying the correct spellings and titles or names of organisations that might have been mentioned in the interview and can provide specific details to corroborate information from other sources’. Academic and official documents give clues to understanding the culture of organisations and the values underlying policies (Simons, 2009). On the one hand, the use of documents can provide ideas about questions to pursue through observation, interviews and surveys. On the other hand, the information gleaned from the interviews with the Key Actors can provide insight into the existence of, and the need to locate, additional documents. However, in collecting documentary data, the researcher did not assume that the documents were literal recordings of events that had taken place, nor did he assume that the documents would provide accurate, comprehensive and unbiased records of events. It is important as a researcher using documents to pay particular attention to the selection of documents in order to avoid bias. Some documents were provided to the researcher by the stakeholders after the interviews in hard copy, whilst reports yet to be published were sent to his email address. (See appendix 2 for the list of the documents).

Although many researchers have been very critical of the use of documents in qualitative research, because it is assumed that documents contain unmitigated truth (see Punch 2005), Yin (2003) argued that the case study researcher is less like to be misled by documents
because they are meant to provide supplementary details to other information that has been gathered through other data collection techniques.

4.2.5. Direct Observation

Simple observation, as a research method, is a useful means of studying research objects (for example, people) in their natural setting. Through observation, the researcher can acquire knowledge about the patterns of behaviour of people as they engage in events and interact with each other on a daily basis, or within a particular social context (Bogdan and & Biklen, 1992; Glesne, 1999). The researcher used what Yin (2003) referred to as direct observation. This involved observing signs of physical and social disorder in the study area such as conditions of housing, graffiti, litter, boarded up and vacant properties, prostitution and drug use in the area. Also observed were meetings, sidewalk activities, regeneration projects, Housing Association open day, residents’ interactions, commercial and public spaces. Observational evidence is often useful in providing additional information about the topic being studied (ibid: 2003). According to Hennink et al (2011:173) observation is useful in identifying discrepancies between what people say and what they actually do. The observation of the area proved valuable, because it made it possible to cover events in real time as well as ascertain the context of the events and other activities going on within the area (both social and economic). However, observation has many drawbacks such as the time factor and reflexivity (that is events may proceed differently because they are being observed). The researcher counteracted some of the drawbacks of observation by using other methods such as interviews and questionnaires.
Yin also mentioned that, in order for a researcher to increase the reliability of observational evidence, a common procedure is to have more than a single observer making an observation - whether of formal or casual type. For this research, this was not possible because resources did not permit the use of a second observer. Having said this, the observation method proved useful for this research because it allowed the researcher to obtain a deeper understanding of disorder in the case study area. However, observation could generate quite a lot of questions in relation to ethical questions. In addressing this question, it must be noted that permission was sought from the different organisations before any observation was carried out in the area concerned.

4.2.6. Validity and Reliability

Reliability and validity are two factors that a qualitative researcher should be concerned with while designing a study, analysing results and judging the quality of the study (Patton, 2002). On the one hand, validity concerns the extent to which observations and/or in-depth interviews achieve a close approximation of the ‘truth’ of a particular matter, whether that be respondents’ views or their actions, and whether or not “…the researcher is calling what is measured by the right name” (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 69). Validity is also concerned with how you establish the warrant for your work; whether it is sound, defensible, coherent, well grounded, and appropriate to the case (Wolcott, 1995). On the other hand, reliability refers to the demonstration that the operations and procedures of the research inquiry could be repeated by another researcher and that the findings would be similar. In other words, reliability refers to the claim that the findings of the said research can be replicated, provided the same research techniques are used (Riege, 2003). Therefore the validity and reliability of case study research is a key issue in qualitative research (Riege, 2003).
However, whilst validity and reliability, as described above, are essential in quantitative research, the use of the terms for qualitative research has been questioned. Different arguments have been put forward for the use of specific terms and ways of establishing and assessing the quality of qualitative research that provide alternatives to reliability and validity. For example, Healy and Perry (2000) noted that the quality of a qualitative study should be judged in qualitative terms. Similarly, Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed that ‘credibility’ (internal validity), ‘applicability’ or ‘transferability’ (external validity) and ‘consistency’ (reliability) are to be the essential criteria for judging quality in qualitative research. Credibility, neutrality or conformability, consistency or dependability and applicability or transferability fall under two primary criteria: trustworthiness and authenticity (Bryman, 2004). Strauss and Corbin (1990) also noted that the “…usual canons of ‘good science’ such as reliability, validity and so on require redefinition in order to fit the realities of qualitative research” (ibid: 250). Lincoln and Guba (1985) further stated that: “…since there can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the former (validity) is sufficient to establish the latter (reliability)” (ibid: 316). And in between these positions are many who advocate that since reliability issues concern measurements, then it has no relevance in qualitative research (Stenbacka, 2001).

Because of the qualitative nature of this research, the author has adopted the terms proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985), namely dependability (reliability) and credibility (internal validity), to discuss and assess the quality of this research. Dependability means that the merit of the research process is established in terms of its trustworthiness. In order to ensure the dependability of the research, the author adopted the following strategies:
1) The documentation of all the phases of the research process from problem formulation, selection of research participants, field notes, interview transcripts, e-mail correspondence, with the intention of enabling another researcher to repeat the research with the expectation of arriving at the same findings and conclusions. According to Yin (2003:38), the general way of approaching the dependability problem is to make as many steps as operational as possible, and to conduct research as if someone were always looking over your shoulder.

2) The researcher made sure that all the records, field notes, interviews and quantitative surveys were preserved. The case study data base includes original and photocopied documents, transcribed interviews and questionnaires, bibliography of articles and texts used in the research, and an electronic file of correspondence between the interviewees and the author.

The researcher ensured the credibility of the research by the use of a mixed methods research design. According to Greene (2007:13):

“The core meaning of mixed methods ... is to invite multiple mental models into the same inquiry space for purposes of respectful conversation, dialogue and learning one from the other, towards a collective generation of better understanding of the phenomena being studied” (Green, 2007:13).

Mixed methods provide the researcher with the opportunity to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon being studied with much stronger validity or credibility, and less known bias. Thus, the researcher is able to present more defensible knowledge claims.
Greene et al. (1989; 2007) advanced five purposes for combining methods in a single study, namely:

- **Complementarity** whereby results from one method are used to elaborate on results from the other method, in order to deepen and broaden the interpretations and conclusions from the study.

- **Development** whereby the researcher uses results from one method to inform, shape or develop the other method.

- **Initiation** whereby results from one method are used to question or challenge results from the other method; the aim being to generate new understandings or stimulate new research questions.

- **Expansion** whereby different methods are used for different components of an inquiry in order to enrich the data or expand the scope and range of the study.

- **Triangulation** whereby different methods are used concurrently, preferably with equal priority, to assess the same phenomena, in order to test the consistency of the findings obtained through different instruments or with a view to providing corroborating evidence in order to increase confidence in the conclusions reached.

In this thesis, triangulation is considered the most appropriate approach for interrogating the research questions from different angles, and for ensuring that there is strong corroborative evidence in support of the key research questions (see Simons, 2009).

The key point with regard to triangulation is the claim that one can be more confident with the results of a piece of research if different methods lead to the same result. Triangulation generally involves the use of at least three methods with the hope that at least two of the methods will produce similar answers.
Denzin (1978) identified four basic types of triangulation

- **Data triangulation** involving time, space, and persons
- **Investigator triangulation** involving multiple researchers in an investigation
- **Theory triangulation** involving using more than one theoretical scheme in the interpretation of the phenomenon
- **Methodological triangulation** involving using more than one method to gather data, such as interviews, observations, questionnaires, and documents.

As discussed above, the researcher collected data from four sources, namely official documents, semi-structured interviews, questionnaire survey and observation. The data was subjected to both data and methodological triangulation so as to corroborate facts and phenomena, thereby improving rigour and strengthening the research results. Methodological triangulation provided a check on the consistency of the findings generated by the different data collection methods, and data triangulation provided a check of the consistency of the different data sources within the same method. According to Patton (1990:244) ‘…by using a combination of observations, interviewing and document analysis, the field worker is able to use different data sources to validate and cross check findings.’ Each type and source of data has strengths and weaknesses. Simons (2009) noted that methodological triangulation (exploring significant similarities between methods) and data triangulation (using different sources to gain understanding of the issues), are common in case study research. They add richness to the description and provide verification of the significance of issues through different methods and sources. Using a combination of data types, increases validity as the strengths of one approach can compensate for the weaknesses of another approach. To also ensure credibility, I used the respondent validation technique by sending back the interview transcripts to the interviewees (see sample of returned copy in the appendix). It is worth
noting that all sources of data were ‘triangulated’ by cross checking and comparing for consistency.

4.2.7. Access

Gaining access to the study area was not an easy process. The author faced problems in terms of gaining knowledge of the formal and informal organisations working within the Chapeltown Estate. However, the process was made easier by establishing a network of informal contacts through socialising in the area. Furthermore, contacts were established through snowballing from the informal to the formal networks, and this worked well. However, some people were reluctant at first to grant an interview, until assurance came from some interviewees who introduced them to the researcher.

4.3. Reflection on the ‘Insider’ and ‘Outsider’ debate

A common feature of qualitative research endeavours is the quest to establish intimate or sustained interaction with research subjects in presumably natural settings (Young, 2004). In essence, the researcher steps into, and to varying degrees, shares in the social world of the individuals under study. Qualitative research on race and ethnicity has been at the centre of the insider-outsider debate. At stake in this debate is the question of the extent to which being socially distant or dissimilar to the people under study affects either the richness or the accuracy of the data being collected, and the subsequent analysis that unfolds (Young, 2004). An initial presumption in this debate was that researchers who share membership of the same social categories as their respondents (the most common being race, gender, and class) were best suited to uncover ideas, arguments and opinions about issues and concerns related to those people or to those social categories (Merton, 1972). A corollary presumption was that
those researchers who do not share such membership, either had to work especially hard to acquire the trust and confidence of the respondents, or else accept that their scholarly analysis and interpretation may not reflect the veracity, depth, or subtlety that emerges from so-called ‘insider’ research (Young, 2004).

Reinharz (1997) asserted that one or more of a researcher’s multiple selves may become relevant in the interactive dynamics of fieldwork. These multiple selves include a researcher’s race, gender, or class status, as well as varied aspects of their personality or personal experiences. Any of these characteristics could ‘become visible’ to respondents or informants, and they may react to them in ways that foster, hinder, or dramatically affect conversations with the researcher. In essence, respondents or informants may use these features and characteristics to determine the ways in which the researcher is an outsider or an insider, and adjust their interaction with the researcher accordingly, throughout an interview or fieldwork encounter. The researcher does not believe that his ethnicity – black African – had any advantage or disadvantage with regard to his interaction with respondents of different ethnicities in Chapeltown. Whereas the African-Caribbean residents and key actors in the area were very receptive to the researcher, there was no reason whatsoever to suspect that the white residents saw the researcher as an outsider. The researcher contends that the insider-outsider debate in research depends largely on the nature of the research and the research methods and data collection strategy adopted. The insider and outsider positions are fluid, as they are continually restructured, retained, and abandoned during the course of interaction between researchers and respondents. There is no singular insider or outsider position that researchers occupy during the course of fieldwork, but rather myriad positions and statuses, that mean that the researcher can be viewed by respondents either as insider or an outsider depending on the social circumstances or conditions affecting the research.
endeavour (De Andrade, 2000; Jackson, 2001). Moreover, the topic under investigation is one that affects the community as a whole.

4.4. Summary

In this chapter, the researcher has reviewed the main methods used for this research, their methodological underpinnings, and the justification for using the chosen methods. In particular the researcher has highlighted:

- The value and benefit of the case study research method in terms of its ability to explore a social phenomenon in an in-depth way, i.e. robustness and richness of data, clear identification of the problematic, holistic, thick description.
- That the case study approach provides for the use of a variety of data collection techniques and methods (leading to data triangulation) thus providing what Hamel et al. (1993) referred to as a ‘wealth of empirical materials’. According to Hamel et al. (1993, 39) case studies have proven to be in complete harmony with the three key words that characterize any piece of qualitative research: describing, understanding and explaining because of the in-depth approach.
- The research instruments used for data collection and the different processes the researcher went through in collecting the data. In addition, issues of validity, reliability, generalisation, access and sampling.

The following chapter will examine the case study area: Chapeltown. It will explore the history of the area and present the views of the residents as expressed through the questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews in terms of sense of community and cohesion, and physical and social disorder.
Chapter Five

Chapeltown, Leeds: The Experience of Regeneration

5.0. Introduction

There are three main sections to this chapter. The first section 5.1 presents the recent picture of Chapeltown, Leeds in terms of the socio-economic challenges and problems associated with the area, drawing on information provided in the Leeds Neighbourhood Index 2010. In addition, it highlights the level of disorder within the area, and examines the extent to which Chapeltown is deprived compared with the rest of the city of Leeds. Furthermore, the section explores the extent to which community cohesion is a problem within the area, as well as ascertaining whether or not there is a correlation between community cohesion or lack of it, and disorder. Also, covered in this section are the issues identified by the residents of Chapeltown as the major problems that plague the area. The second section (5.2.) discusses the key priorities of the North East Leeds District Partnerships Chapeltown Action Plan, and the regeneration projects that have taken place in Chapeltown. This is to ascertain the extent to which the regeneration programme met the needs that the residents of the area have identified to the researcher in 5.1. The final section (5.3.) examines the anomalies in terms of the mix-match between the regeneration projects and the needs of the residents. The point raised in this section reinforces some of the claims made in Chapter Three with regard to the political understanding of urban problems, which is based on a lack of understanding of the problems involved. The chapter is based on information acquired during the field work for this research; including information from the review of the official literature and documents on Chapeltown, observations in the study area, and an analysis of responses from the residents’ questionnaires and from interviews with key actors (see Chapter Four).
5.1. Chapeltown, Leeds

The Metropolitan Borough of Leeds is an extremely diverse English county, covering an area of 55,000 hectares with a population of 715,402 (2001 Census) (Turok et al., 2006). The area comprises of the city of Leeds itself, surrounded by small market towns including Otley, Morley, Pudsey and Wetherby, and an extensive rural area consisting of villages as well as countryside (LCC, 2005; Turok et al., 2006:219). The Borough has an ethnically diverse population, with over 8% of the overall population from ethnic minority groups. This increases to 40% in some communities (LCC, 2005). According to Leeds County Council (LCC, 2006a), Leeds is the fastest growing city in the UK, with the largest employment total outside London. In the Yorkshire and Humber region, Leeds is considered as the capital (LCC, 2005). In 2006, the economic value of the city was valued at £12.0 billion and projected to double by a third in the next ten years (see LCC, 2006a). In terms of business and economic developments, Leeds is one of the UK’s largest centres outside London. It is estimated that there are 30 national and international banks, and a similar number of call centres, based in the city (LCC, 2006a:44). These include the headquarters of First Direct, Direct Line, Halifax Direct and the UK operations centre for GE Consumer Finance. Over 11,000 are employed in the sector, which accounts for 25% of the city’s GDP. Over the last 20 years, Leeds has created more jobs than any other major city outside London. Total employment has grown by 10.5%. Of the largest five cities in the UK (Birmingham, Leeds, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester), only Leeds showed a net gain in employment over this period, creating over 90,700 new jobs. Total employment is expected to grow by a further 7.1% over the next decade, creating 31,500 jobs (LCC, 2006a:44).
Despite the fact that unemployment overall is relatively low in Leeds, there are still pockets of very high unemployment across the city. According to Turok et al. (2006:220) there is a doughnut pattern in Leeds: a thriving city centre and affluent suburbs separated by a ring of deprived neighbourhoods. Unemployment in some inner-city wards is seven times higher than in some outer wards, although this can hide pockets of high unemployment in some particular streets or housing estates. There are variations too between ethnic groups. For example, whereas the average ethnic minority unemployment rate in the city is twice that of the rest of the population, among the Bangladeshi community, it is four times the overall rate (LCC, 2005).

5.1.1. Chapeltown

Chapeltown is an inner city suburb of North East Leeds, approximately one mile from the city centre. Over the centuries, Chapeltown has been described in various ways: ‘An English City Suburb’, ‘little Israel’, ‘metaphor for Hell’ and ‘a site of resistance’ (Farrar, 2001). These metaphors are linked to the history of the place, and to the different events that have occurred in the area such as its immigration history with regard to the arrival and settlement of Jews and Blacks in Chapeltown in the Nineteenth Century and the disorder or riots that occurred in the area in 1975, 1981 and 1985 (see Chapter Two).

Chapeltown is a multi-ethnic area, with over half of its population from BME backgrounds (including the Irish). As shown in Figure 6 below, based on the 2001 census figures, the largest ethnic group is Black Caribbean followed by Pakistanis and Indians. There is also a large percentage from mixed heritage backgrounds. For this reason, Chapeltown is often referred to as the ‘zone of the black other’ (Farrar, 2001). However, whereas the population of the area is 38% white, the popular image of Chapeltown is that of a ‘black ghetto’. Whilst
this label depicts the deprived condition of Chapeltown, it is also a racist comment that emanated, perhaps, from the fact that compared with the rest of Leeds, a disproportionate number of blacks live in Chapeltown (Figure 6 below).

**Figure 6: Chapeltown Ethnic Composition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity (2001 Census)</th>
<th>Chapeltown</th>
<th>Leeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>2,915</td>
<td>38.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean &amp; White</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>4.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African &amp; White</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian &amp; White</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>7.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>11.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>3.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>19.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Leeds Neighbourhood Index: E02002371 (LCC, 2010)*

Geographically, Chapeltown stretches from Scott Hall Road in the west to Spencer Place and Avenue Hill in the east; from Harehills Lane and Potternewton Lane in the North to Roundhay Road in the south (see map below- Figure 7)
There are three primary schools in this area: Bracken Edge Primary School, Hillcrest Primary School and Holy Rosary Catholic School (LCC, 2010). Other key services include Chapel Allerton Hospital, Chapeltown Library, Chapeltown Children’s Centre, Chapeltown Health Centre. The Chapeltown Citizens Advice bureau and the Reginald Centre (opened in October 2010) offer advice to residents of Chapeltown on health, legal and social issues. Chapeltown is also a centre for rich cultural activities in the North of England. The Chapeltown Carnival, held every August bank holiday, is considered second in size to London’s Notting Hill Carnival (LCC, 2006a:44). Chapeltown is also home to the Northern School of Contemporary Dance, the Host Media Centre (a local Recording Studio), the Mandela Centre, the Leeds West Indian Centre and the Palace Community Centre. In addition, the area caters for its multi-ethnic faith groups. Many of its community centres are linked with particular religion,
faith or cultural groups. Figure 8 below shows that, in 2001, the largest non-Christian faith group in Chapeltown were Muslims (17%), while 7% were Sikhs.

**Figure 8: Chapeltown Faith Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faith (2001 Census)</th>
<th>Chapeltown</th>
<th>Leeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>3,481</td>
<td>46.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>16.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>7.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Neighbourhood Index: E02002371 (LCC, 2010: 1)

In 2010, 51% of the households in Chapeltown were owner-occupied, compared to 62% in Leeds and 68% in England as a whole; 21% were rented from the local authority and 12% lived in privately rented accommodation (LCC, 2010). Terraced housing accounted for 36% of the housing stock, compared to 28% in Leeds and 26% in England, while semi-detached house accounted for a further 32%. Just over 25% of houses were flats or bedsits (LCC, 2010). Fifty-nine percent of properties are classified in the lowest Council Tax Band A, and 29% in Band B (LCC, 2010). Figure 9 presents further indicators of Chapeltown’s deprivation. The figure shows that with regard to the indices of poverty listed, Chapeltown has a higher rate compared to the rest of Leeds.
Figure 9: Households and Economic Inactivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Statistics</th>
<th>Chapeltown</th>
<th>Leeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population 2008</td>
<td>8,051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children in Workless Households</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>38.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households Receiving In-Work Benefits</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>7.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households In Receipt of Benefits</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>14.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons receiving Job Seekers' Allowance</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>11.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons on Incapacity Benefit</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>10.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons receiving Lone Parent Income Support</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>3.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Leeds Neighbourhood Index: E02002371 (LCC, 2010: 1)

Furthermore, in the indices of deprivation listed below (Figure 10), Chapeltown’s individual scores were much lower than those recorded for Leeds (lower scores imply higher levels of deprivation). Chapeltown had its lowest scores in terms of Income and Environment. Low scores were also obtained in Health, Economic Activity and Community Safety. Even in Education, where Chapeltown had its highest index score, the score obtained was still much lower than that for Leeds as a whole. Invariably, one can reasonably conclude that Chapeltown was, in 2010, a more deprived area compared with the rest of Leeds.

Figure 10: Domain Summary of Chapeltown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Chapeltown: Score</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Leeds: Score</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Activity</td>
<td>23.04</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>65.33</td>
<td>-42.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income</td>
<td>-5.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61.78</td>
<td>-66.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>49.09</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>56.05</td>
<td>-6.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>25.08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>49.24</td>
<td>-24.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>37.79</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84.22</td>
<td>-46.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>30.76</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>51.36</td>
<td>-20.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Safety</td>
<td>64.64</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>77.06</td>
<td>-12.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds Index</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55.45</td>
<td>-49.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Neighbourhood Index: E02002371 (LCC, 2010: 1)
In addition, Chapeltown suffers from negative media stereotyping as being an area that is plagued with illicit drug use and crime, although police reports in 2006 indicated that these negative perceptions were unfair and not justified (see LCC, 2006b). In contrast to popular opinion, the police noted that Chapeltown is one of the safest areas to live in Leeds, with low car crime and burglary rates, and very little business crime.

Key actors in Chapeltown agreed that the negative stigma that the area has in the popular press was having a great impact on investment in the area. According to the following key actors/residents:

*The [negative] stigma is still affecting Chapeltown because people here just feel like second class citizens... the stigma is still there, when you have unemployment still among some of the black communities still at an all-time high and some of the young boys are still hanging around doing nothing on streets corners and drug dealings and all sort of things, of course the stigma is there [ ] perpetuated by the media and press (Interviewee 7)*

*If an investor looks at the media and talks to people who don’t know Chapeltown, I am sure they will be given a negative impression. The stigma will have an effect and that will take a long time to change (Interviewee 4)*

*There is the stereotype [and] there is also the reality, things like it is difficult to get a taxi here. Part of it is that the taxi drivers are getting mugged. Mugged for the fares and people have run off. There are a lot of really good people in Chapeltown, but people don’t see the really good people. They see a group of particularly African Caribbean of mixed race mostly lads that are involved or caught up in drug dealing (Interviewee 5)*

*The stigma is still there and it’s about the black youths generally; young people driving up and down the corridors. And that will take a long time to get rid of. Also, it is the media as well, the local newspapers in particular, when they portray, a news article: it’s Chapeltown, this is the problem! Most inner city*
areas Middleton, Beeston, Gypton, they also have the same, if not worse issues and problems; [but] they are mainly white areas (Interviewee 6)

Observations carried out in Chapeltown in 2006, as part of the fieldwork for this thesis, revealed that the area has visible signs of physical ‘disorder’ but mainly in terms of the poor quality of the housing stock in some parts. There were no boarded up buildings or ‘broken windows’ as one would expect in places where physical disorder is a major problem; but, there were decaying houses, particularly on Chapeltown Road. The social disorder problems (incivilities) in Chapeltown relate to its reputation for street drug dealing, which, in recent years, has led to an increase in incidents of violence involving the use of weapons, mainly firearms. However, anti-social behaviour accounts for the largest percentage of unlawful behaviour in the area (Police UK, December 2010 – February, 2011). Fear of victimisation is high in the area because of the violence that results from the street drug dealing activities.

The poor public image of the area has greatly affected private sector investment in the area. Properties have fallen into decline and sites remain undeveloped (see LCC, 2006b). The overwhelming perception of the police is that community cohesion in Chapeltown is inextricably linked to the economy, and that if the economy fails, then community cohesion will diminish (LCC, 2006b).

The next section will look at what the residents identified as the major problems confronting them in terms of disorder. This data is generated from the questionnaire survey and supported by statements from the interviews with key actors in the community. This section also questions some of the existing notion that disorderly communities lack community
cohesion. The arguments presented in relation to community cohesion are laced with different theoretical positions on the relationship between community cohesion and disorder.

5.1.2. Social Cohesion, Community Cohesion and Disorder

The concept of social cohesion and disorderly community has a long history in criminological and sociological analysis. As mentioned in Chapter Two, industrialization and urbanization were seen to have produced a social order that undermined the traditional ties of communities. There is often an implicit view that what separates the ‘successful’ neighbourhood from the ‘unsuccessful’ one is the degree to which there is social cohesion - the underlying assumption being that disadvantaged neighbourhoods lack the necessary ingredients which foster social cohesion. Therefore, there is a commonly held view that disorderly communities lack qualities and elements of social interaction as well as integration and, as such, are dislocated from mainstream society (Cars et al., 1998; Forrest and Kearns, 2001). In addition, some studies that have examined social cohesion and disorder in neighbourhoods highlight the fact that cohesive areas are less prone to disorder. As discussed in Chapter One, the work of Shaw and McKay (1942) found that geographic variations in crime and disorder were due to variations in cohesion. Similarly, Sampson and Groves (1989) found that areas which are socially disorganised and lack cohesion, have disproportionately higher rates of crime and delinquency (2009). Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) also stated that social control takes the form of people in cohesive areas being prepared to pull together and to intervene in cases of deviant and criminal activities for the public good. This collective efficacy, as they referred to it, was found to be associated with lower rates of crime and social disorder, even after controlling for the structural characteristics of the neighbourhood (CLG, 2009).
The key argument behind the link between social cohesion and disorder is that a socially cohesive area or an area of high cohesion - that is, an area with a relatively high level of interaction between residents and a strong sense of community - is more likely to have lower rates of crime and disorder than an area of low cohesion. Deprived communities are often presented as communities that are not cohesive, hence their high crime and disorder rates. However, Hirschfield and Bowers (1997), in their study in Merseyside, showed that deprived communities are not exclusively non-cohesive communities; social cohesion can exist in deprived communities. But, as Pitts and Hope (1997) argued, the more a disadvantaged area pulls together as a community, the greater will be its capacity to control crime and disorder.

Social cohesion is a term that is often used to express the strength of the human relationships and stability of a more differentiated society. According to Turok et al. (2006), social cohesion relates to how well people and communities get on together for the benefit of all, through such values as tolerance and mutual support. In some instances, social cohesion is used casually as a label for social success or stable race relations, without any pretence of understanding what lies behind this. The lack of cohesion may be reflected in a weak social fabric, with the relationships between different groups being exclusive, impermeable and susceptible to tension and conflict (Turok et al., 2006).

Social cohesion is also a multi-faceted concept and is potentially very wide ranging (Turok et al., 2006). For instance, the social relations and interactions between different groups, communities and institutions can take many different forms, and can manifest themselves in all sorts of outcomes. These may range from violent disorder at one extreme, to intense social mixing and integration at the other. In addition, there are other aspects of social
cohesion associated with people’s identity, common experiences, shared values, trust, and respect for each other, as well as support for (public) institutions that can find common cause and promote collective action (cf. Turok et al., 2006).

Similarly, issues of spatial scale and social unit add to the complexity, since a social system that is cohesive at one level may not be when considered on a larger or smaller scale. This is important to the distinctions between city and neighbourhood, and ways social groups or communities are defined. For instance, tolerance and cohesion between different ethnic communities can obscure conflicts within them (for example, between young and old, men and women, rich and poor). In addition, highly cohesive neighbourhoods may give rise to a divided or fractured city if they involve segmentation, exclusion and discrimination (Turok, et al 2006).

Buck et al. (2002) made the first attempt to define the concept of social cohesion systematically. They argued that it was too vague and too all-encompassing to be useful for exploring the complex issues involved in urban social change. Instead, they identified three distinct dimensions of cohesion that define the structure of a society:

(I) **Social inequality:** This refers to disparities in immediate material circumstances (for example, wealth or power) or in longer-term opportunities or life chances;

(II) **Social connectedness:** This refers to social contacts and access to knowledge. It can also refer to the openness or closure of societies in relation to outsiders, and their tolerance of difference;
(III) **Social order**: This refers to issues around security, trust and uncertainty, as well as the nature and prevalence of social conflict. Maintaining order may be important to protect the existing stakes and interests of different groups.

Buck et al. (2002) also argued that each of these dimensions are influenced by a variety of economic and social processes affecting cities, including but not limited to industrial composition, their labour and housing markets, their demographic structure, and shared norms and attitudes among the population. The combination of multiple causes, processes and outcomes makes for a highly intricate and interlocking system of social development that is difficult to explicate (Turok et al, 2006).

Kearns and Forrest (2000) came up with a more policy oriented definition of Social cohesion. According to Forrest and Kearns (2001), social cohesion can emphasize:

- the need for a shared sense of morality and common purpose;
- aspects of social control and social order;
- the threat to social solidarity of income and wealth inequalities between people, groups and places;
- the level of social interaction within communities or families; and,
- a sense of belonging to place.

Therefore, a society lacking cohesion would be one which displayed social disorder and conflict, disparate moral values, extreme social inequality, low levels of social interaction
between and within communities, and low levels of place attachment (Forrest and Kearns, 2001:2128). These five dimensions are displayed in Figure 11 below:

**Figure 11: Five Dimensions of Social Cohesion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common values and a civic culture</td>
<td>Common aims and objectives; common moral principles and codes of behaviour;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>support for political institutions and participation in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social order and social control</td>
<td>Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order; absence of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>incivility; effective informal social control; tolerance; respect for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>difference; intergroup co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social solidarity and reductions in wealth</td>
<td>Harmonious economic and social development and common standards; redistribution of public finances and of opportunities; equal access to services and welfare benefits; readiness acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disparities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social networks and social capital</td>
<td>High degree of social interaction within communities and families; civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>engagement and associational activity; easy resolution of collective action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place attachment and identity</td>
<td>Strong attachment to place; intertwining of personal and place identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Community cohesion entered into public policy debate after the 2001 civil disturbances in the northern English cities of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham. Prior to these incidents, political debates about disorder in inner cities had centred on issues of the economic and political marginalisation of the residents in these areas, and the lack of effective engagement with the police (see Chapter Two).

At least five reports were published on the causes of the northern cities’ disturbances. All the reports noted that the causes of the disturbances were multi-layered and complex, and that tackling them would require sustained effort. All of them identified several common factors namely:
severe and persistent social and economic inequalities between different ethnic groups resident in the towns involved;

frustration caused by entrenched poverty and high levels of social and economic deprivation;

lack of social interaction between residents from different ethnic groups (community cohesion) and;

lack of confidence in the fairness and trustworthiness of key public institutions such as local councils (including housing departments) and the police.


Additional factors mentioned in the 2001 Oldham Independent Review (the ‘Ritchie Report’, op.cit.) included widespread perceptions of racially biased reporting in some local media and the efforts of far-right extremists to exacerbate racial tensions.

Taken collectively, these reports presented a picture of these cities as drifting (or as having drifted) into a state of de facto segregation, with residents living separate and parallel lives; retreating into ethnically-based enclaves or – as Ouseley described them – ‘comfort zones.’ - a kind of ‘self-segregation’ (Oldham.gov.uk, op. cit.). For instance, the Cantle Report pointed to high levels of segregation between Asian and White communities in schools and particular neighbourhoods or localities, and that it was this lack of contact that was the central motivating factor for the civil disturbances which had occurred, not issues of right-wing extremist activities, racist violence and inadequate policing, claimed by the predominantly Asian youths at the centre of the disturbances, as the main causes of the disturbances. Less
weight was also accorded to the impact of severe inequalities, and economic deprivation in constraining individual choices and inhibiting efforts to build good inter- and intra-community relations (Oldham.gov.uk, op.cit.). Instead, the reports gave support to popular narratives about South Asian Muslim communities as ‘insular’ and ‘inward-looking’. The reports concluded that this segregation was damaging, and needed to be tackled by policies guided by alternative, positive and indeed a utopian notion of the cohesive community (Wetherell, 2007).

As a result of these reports, the term ‘community cohesion’ was coined. (Turok et al., 2006). The Local Government Association (LGA), the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), the Commission for Racial Equality, and the Home Office, all subsequently developed their own definitions of community cohesion. According to the Home Office (2003) a cohesive community is one where:

(i) There is a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities;
(ii) The diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued;
(iii) Those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and
(iv) Strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods (Home Office, 2003:7; see also Turok et al., 2006:23; LGA, 2000:5).

The above definition of community cohesion emphasises the importance of valuing differences and respecting diversity within the context of a ‘common vision and sense
of belonging’ (Oldham.gov.uk, op.cit.). The Commission for Racial Equality’s (CRE) own definition includes explicit reference to ‘race’:

A cohesive community is one where there is/are:

(i) Shared values that can be upheld despite other differences between groups; a sense of belonging, and an acceptance that this means different things for different groups.

(ii) An intolerance of racial discrimination and harassment.

(iii) People sharing pride in the place where they live.

(iv) Respect for people’s lifestyles, as long as these do not infringe on other’s rights.

(v) Genuine opportunities for everyone in education, employment, health, and civic and democratic activity.


In a nutshell, these definitions of community cohesion emphasise the importance of addressing inequalities, fostering mutual respect for differences in aspects of identity and lifestyle, and promoting interaction between people from different (ethnic) backgrounds. Accordingly, any local or even national initiative to bring about community cohesion would include recognition of the following:

• Awareness of the need to eliminate social, economic and educational inequalities (in particular those related to ethnic group);

• Promotion of good relations between and within communities;

• Promotion of civic and political engagement and;

• Valuing difference (Oldham.gov.uk op.cit.: 5).
The academic and political literature above supports the notion that there is a link between the degree of social or community cohesion, and levels of disorder or crime. The reports into the northern cities disturbances further introduced the idea of blame into the debate; that is, communities that are not cohesive are more likely to be responsible for their lack of cohesiveness by ‘deliberately’ living separate lives. Therefore, disorder could be addressed through a cohesion agenda.

There are some key issues that can be drawn from these definitions. First, they make no mention of social order and lack of conflict, except by implication. Second, they also omit questions of identity, political participation and public services, and play down the role of social networks. Third, there is no mention of social inequalities and redistribution, or the issue of spatial scale and the distinction between interactions within and between communities (see Turok et al., 2006).

One of the key arguments of this thesis is that social or community cohesion does not necessarily produce social order: a community could be socially cohesive and still have a problem of disorder. Similarly, a non-cohesive community, for example, a middle class suburb where there is virtually no sense of community, is most likely to have no problem of disorder.

Furthermore, the above definitions do not put much emphasis on, or undermine, the importance of solidarity or lack of conflict. Strongly cohesive neighbourhoods could be in conflict with one another. Equally, a society in which citizens had a strong sense of place attachment and loyalty to their respective cities could be in conflict with any sense of
common national purpose, or macro-cohesion. In other words, as Forrest and Kearn (2001: 2128-2129) argued, these definitions presuppose that cohesion is everywhere virtuous and a positive attribute, which it may not always be.

As Baumgartner explained:

*People in the suburbs live in a world characterised by non-violence and non-confrontation, in which civility prevails and disturbances of the peace are uncommon. In this sense, suburbia is a model of social order. The order is not born, however, of conditions widely perceived to generate social harmony. It does not arise from intimacy and connectedness, but rather from some of the very things more often presumed to bring about conflict and violence—transiency, fragmentation, isolation, atomisation and indifference among people (Baumgartner, 1988:134).*

According to Forest and Kearns (2001) this statement by Baumgartner makes it clear that some of the features associated with neighbourhood stability or community cohesion are, indeed, contingent rather than necessary. As such, social cohesion at the neighbourhood level is therefore by no means unambiguously a good thing. Indeed, a community may consist of socially cohesive but increasingly divided neighbourhoods. Conversely, the assumed ingredients for social cohesion may be lacking in communities or neighbourhoods which are apparently successful and problem-free, therefore the discourse of cohesion is not only relative, but also contingent based on dominant political or social commentaries (see also Forrest and Kearn, 2001).

Therefore the causes of disorder lie beyond communities, and they exist in the state apparatuses and institutions that regulate social life. It has been shown in the discussion
above that Chapeltown does have a problem of disorder, but is this problem consequent upon a lack of social or community cohesion? This question is discussed in the following section, with reference to the data obtained during the research fieldwork.

5.1.2.1. Community Cohesion and Disorder: The Residents’ Views

Both the 2002-2005 and the 2005-2008 Leeds City Council Corporate Plans state that the community cohesion agenda is important in narrowing the gap that exists between the prosperous and deprived communities and marginalized groups in Leeds (Turok et al., 2006). In order to examine the extent to which community cohesion is central to addressing physical and social disorder in Chapeltown, the researcher asked the residents who took part in the questionnaire survey how they felt about the area, and whether there was some feeling of neighbourliness in the area, whereby neighbours look out for each other. The answers to these questions are presented in Figure 12 below:

Figure 12: Community Cohesion in Chapeltown
Figure 12 indicates that the residents enjoyed living in Chapeltown and saw it as a community of good neighbourliness. These are indicators of attachment to the community. According to one of the key actors (Interviewee 1), this feeling of attachment is predominant amongst the older generation, but less so amongst the younger folk. However, another interviewee, a local activist, thought that the sense of place attachment was widespread in Chapeltown, reinforced by the existence of active community organisations and centres:

"I think there are two things; there is the real sense of community and togetherness, because lots of people have different friends. There are families [that] are linked. There are also links in terms of community organisations and schools. [ ] There is integration because they also have the community centres with potentials like that." (Interviewee 3)

This statement emphasises the strength of locally based networks and associations in bringing about societal cohesion. Another key actor and resident concluded:

"I have read lots of reports, local reports and I have also done research locally. Although [residents of Chapeltown] could complain about some of the things I have said, they will still say it is a lovely place to live. I do not see it as a ghetto. It is a lovely place to live and because of the communal spirits, they have their friends and families close by and things like that and they wouldn’t want to move anywhere else. And in most cases people have moved out and they have met racism and they have moved back. But I think most people are happy, they just want improvements to continue." (Interviewee 2)

So, at times, the more robust and deep-rooted the neighbourhood networks are, the more stable and conflict free is the social order in which they sit. As Interviewee 2 puts it:
In many instances, people think the theme of social cohesion is that we should be all the same and give up our links with the mother home country, I don’t see it like that. I see at like it is pluralist, in that [you] still consider yourself Caribbean, you don’t consider yourself African; you have respect for that community and that respect engenders that cohesion. [You] need to be given priority and equality and [from] that will spring cohesion because you respect each other and understand each other and from that will spring a cohesive society (Interviewee 2)

The above discussions show that highlighting the lack of community cohesion as the reason for social and/or physical disorder (as implied in government pronouncements on disorder) is problematic. Disorder does not flow from a lack of social cohesion as the example of non-cohesive middle class communities cited above shows. However, if, as indicated in the comments of residents and in the light of the key factors discussed above, Chapeltown, at the time of this research, showed evidence of being a cohesive community, what then are the causes of the disorder in the community?

The next section will examine what the residents themselves consider to be the major problems within their area.

5.1.2.2. Community and Disorder: Neighbourhood Perception

The residents of Chapeltown were asked what they considered to be the major problems in the area. Figure 13 below presents their answers to this question:
Unemployment was ranked highest by the residents, accounting for 27% of the responses. This view was supported by the majority of the interviewees (key actors) who were also longtime residents of the area. For example, Interviewees 1, 2 and 7 said:

There’s a lot of African-Caribbean people who [are unemployed]. I wouldn’t like to pin it down to the young; there is also a lot longstanding unemployed black males who are probably now unemployable or regarded as been unemployable. There is an increasing number amongst young Asian males as well. Having said that, over the last five or ten years, [Chapeltown] has become a transitional area; people are moving into the area from other inner-city, deprived areas. And of course the immigration [issue] as well. The diversity is constantly changing, as we are getting more people from Eastern Europe and of
course the unemployment issue is ever constant. [There is] a proportionally high level of unemployment in the area, because of the nature of the area (Interviewee 1)

Unemployment is so obvious, because there are still a lot of people that are unemployed and you can still see people on the streets; but, underneath that if I wanted to be fair, I can say that two minutes from here there is a job centre (Interviewee 2)

You don’t need to ask whether they have jobs or not. There is poverty in Chapeltown. There is poverty. There are no jobs for black people. There is no employment in Chapeltown. There are no factories; no offices. There is no employer in Chapeltown (Interviewee 7)

Research has indicated that there is a strong link between unemployment, disorder and crime (see Chapter One; see also Bradshaw et al., 2004:91-93. On indices indicate high levels of poverty and unemployment in Chapeltown (see Figures 9 and 10 above).

The second most frequently mentioned concern was lack of leisure activities for local youth (23%). According to Interviewee 6, this has led to a problem of idle youths on the streets:

Chapeltown Road has a reputation for being a bad area and being a frontline, where everybody could hangout, until about 10 years ago. [ ] all the nice commuters got sick of having to drive past young black men sitting out on the frontline, and they felt intimidated of having to drive past all these group of people. So what they have to do is put CCTV cameras all the way down Chapeltown Road, and they got all the problems cleared out (Interviewee 6)
Scarman (1981), in his Report on the 1981 inner city disturbances in which black youths were presumably disproportionally involved, mentioned lack of recreational amenities for the local black youths as one of the factors that contributed to the feelings of disaffection amongst this group, culminating in the disturbances (see Chapter Two). It is interesting to note that in 2006, 25 years after the 1980s disturbances, lack of recreational facilities for local youths in inner cities was still considered a key problem by the local residents of Chapeltown – one of the inner city areas that took part in the 1980 disturbances.

Although media representation of Chapeltown has constantly emphasised the drugs problem in the area, it was ranked third by its residents, accounting for 17% of the responses. Related to this was the concern about crime which accounted for 12% of the responses. At the tail end of the list of concerns were Housing (9%), Education (7%) and Health (5%).

However, in slight contrast, the key actors rated education and social amenities in the area as being much higher than did the residents. With regard to Education, many of the key actors (both white and black) maintained that the local schools were failing young black males in particular:

*I would say the schools still have a lot to learn about why black young children are failing and they need to work more with community members. [There are] all kinds of reasons. Institutional racism, poverty, all of those kinds of things that are keeping the family back, particularly those really disadvantaged families and most of us know that they are usually within the BME communities. So I do think educational establishments have got a lot to learn in terms of strategies in terms of supporting our young people, not enough role models; there aren’t enough black teachers within the schools, whether that’s Asian or black that comes under*
that banner, that is, BME. There is not quite enough in terms of that category. You might find that there are Black staff within the school and usually they are not at the senior levels at all. So that has to have an impact (Interviewee 5).

*It is simple.. racism! Racism is still an issue and that is why young people are not achieving. Not achieving in enough numbers. That is why you still have [high] exclusion rates, that is why young people of African Caribbean descent do not have the GCSEs to go on further into higher education and are in low paid jobs or no jobs at all (Interviewee 2).*

There is a problem generally with ethnic minority achievements nationally. It is about different communities and two or three groups in particular. African Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi kids in Leeds certainly are the lowest achievers and there is a lot of good work going on and has gone on in the last couple of years, results are getting better but there is still a long way to go in terms of closing the gap (Interviewee 8).

In terms of the school curriculum with regard to meeting the needs of the minority groups, one of the key actors had this to say:

*The short answer is no and that is why we still have the exclusion rate and the young Caribbean boys are still been excluded, that is why. You don't have the history [of] African Caribbeans on the agenda and those stuff of that we need to push for. And if it is not there, we tend to push for people, coming to schools and try to deliver those things. It is not completely there and that is why you still have supplementary schools (Interviewee 2).*

**Education**, like lack of leisure activities for local youths, was mentioned in the Scarman Report (181). Scarman made reference to exactly the same set of concerns: underachievement in school resulting from truancy or school exclusion, and the irrelevance of school curricula to the needs of black youth (see Chapter Two).
On inadequate public and social amenities in the area, Interviewees 4, 6 and 7 said:

[The area is] not served well in terms of cash machines, post offices. The council, like six years ago had an initiative where shops could get new fronts done, but they pay half the money for the shop front and the shops have to pay half the money themselves, which might only sound like a little thing, but it used to look so tatty coming up here. And like the other side the Roundhay road, you’ve got quite a bit of shopping district there and it’s not strictly Chapeltown, its Harehills, but it is within easy walking distance of anybody who lives here, so it’s a lot better. In terms of banks and ATM there is nothing; there is nothing, they have all been closed down. A friend of mine that was working there got held up at gun point, again probably like 8 years ago. They moved because it was getting too dangerous (Interviewee 4).

Social amenities are very poor for this community; we still have to go further than other people to get things, some of the private shops have to fit ATM, but there is no general ATM where you can go and it is free. The Post Office has closed (Interviewee 6).

There is no decent restaurant; you cannot buy clothes in Chapeltown. We don’t have a Post Office; no banks; you cannot do shoe repairing, you don’t have a tailor, you cannot buy clothes, you cannot buy anything (Interviewee 7).

The picture of Chapeltown painted from the discussions above is that of a community that has within it, signs of being cohesive but is, indeed, a deprived community with a poor public image and reputation for aspects of social disorder such as an illicit drugs problem, as well as a crime problem. A large proportion of its residents are unemployed and/or poor, the schools
and social amenities are generally inadequate, and there are visible signs of disorder in the area. The next section will discuss the extent to which the regeneration programme that took place in Chapeltown in 2005 - 2008 addressed these problems.

5.2. Regeneration Activities in Chapeltown

As mentioned above, the Leeds Corporate Plan for 2002-2005 and the Leeds Regeneration Plan 2005-2008 were focused on ‘narrowing the gap’ between the most disadvantaged people and communities in Leeds and the rest of the city (LCC, 2006a). The first of these, the Leeds Corporate Plan 2002-2005, was explicitly entitled ‘Closing the Gap’. In the forward to this plan, the Leader of the Council stated:

“The Council’s key concerns is that not all people in Leeds are sharing in the success (of a buoyant job market, revitalised city centre and dynamic cultural scene)...the council is dedicated to regenerating (deprived) communities, and in particular doing more to improve the prospect for young people and those from ethnic minority backgrounds” (cited in Turok et al., 2006: 221).

A SWOT analysis conducted on Chapeltown (with specific focus on Chapeltown Road) identified the following ‘Weaknesses’ in the six key areas of the Economy; Physical Environment; Community; Education, Health and Housing; Infrastructure, Transport and Access; and Leisure, Recreation and Open Space. The aim of the SWOT analysis was to provide the basis for a discussion of the possible approaches to addressing the regeneration of Chapeltown in order to “…provide a deliverable and manageable future strategy in the creation of a sustainable community” (LCC 2006a, 2006b:28). For the results of the SWOT analysis, see below
I. Economy:

The problems identified include:

- Commercial, property and labour market failure
- Poor image of the area, poor quality of the environment, and a fear of crime
- Commercial properties not suited to modern commercial and retailing activities
- Vacant under-used derelict properties (commercial and retail)
- Inflexible UDP policy defining a series of fragmented primary and secondary frontages
- One Output Area in Chapeltown is the 3rd worst in terms of income deprivation and 31st worst in terms of employment deprivation out of 32,482 Output Areas nationally
- High percentages of the population are unemployed and have never worked
- Few commercial opportunities and lack of office space in Chapeltown
- Few people working in managerial/professional occupations
- Low proportion of high skilled jobs
- Skills shortages
- Lack of developer confidence in Chapeltown
- Over-representation of voluntary sector organizations using ground floor level properties.

II. The Physical Environment

- Vacant under-used derelict properties (commercial and retail) and boarded-up shops
- Lack of gateway features to Chapeltown Road
• Poor quality of existing public realm combined with obvious neglect of some privately owned properties
• Commercial premises unsuited to modern commercial and retailing activities
• Problems with litter, vandalism and graffiti
• 4 out of the 5 Output Areas in Chapeltown are in the bottom 2% of Output Areas nationally.

III. Community

• Tensions between different groups within the community
• Fear of crime
• Significant problems with drug abuse and drug-related crime
• Lack of cross-cultural community space for meetings and functions (for example, weddings)
• Those outside the community have negative perceptions and a negative image of the area
• Concern over anti-social behaviour
• Public services in inappropriate buildings to meet service requirements
• Chapeltown Road is in the bottom 8% of Output Areas nationally with regard to the crime index of deprivation
• No Post Office or banks on Chapeltown Road
• Community facilities appeal to certain ethnic/faith groups, and this is divisive.

IV. Education, Health and Housing

• Educational attainment in Chapeltown is lower than the Leeds and national averages, with a higher proportion of the population with no qualifications
The general health of the residents of Chapeltown is poorer than across Leeds or nationally

- Schools do not meet the aspirations of all faith communities
- There are significant health problems associated with drug use
- Lack of large family houses
- High proportion of affordable housing for low cost rental, creating issues regarding housing mix
- Backlog of maintenance of old buildings and poor condition of some terraces
- Private landlords exacerbating problems in the area through transient tenants who do not have a stake in the area
- Many homes not achieving decent homes standards
- Current facilities are located in poor buildings.

V. Infrastructure, Transport and Access

- Poor routes across Sheep Scar Junction and into the city centre for cyclists and pedestrians
- Unfriendly pedestrian environment and narrow footpaths (particularly on the eastern side of Chapeltown Road)
- Congestion associated with commuters
- Limited parking
- High accident levels
- Lack of pedestrian crossing facilities
- Poor junctions in some locations.
VI. Leisure, Recreation and Open Space

- Lack of leisure premises
- The various open spaces in Chapeltown each appeal to certain ethnic/faith groups and this is divisive
- Lack of children’s play facilities.

The SWOT analysis, however, detailed and confirmed issues and concerns raised by residents, and reinforced by the key actors interviewed during this study.

The regeneration programme aiming to address the problems highlighted in the SWOT analysis took place in stages, and involved a variety of agencies working in various forms of partnerships, including different housing associations such as Unity, Ridings, East North East and Chevin; the Leeds City Council, Leeds Initiative, Groundwork, Impact, and Community Action and Support Against Crime (CASAC). In addition, there were initiatives going on in the area that were funded by voluntary organisations.

A lot of effort was put into improving the physical environment of Chapeltown, including efforts to improve the image of the area and to make it more attractive to investors and property buyers. For instance Groundwork, which is a community organization, was engaged in the development of the environment in terms of gardening and cleaning up of the main corridor. IMPaCT, a partnership group dedicated to working with residents to improve the quality of life in Chapeltown and Harehills, also embarked on environmental enhancements in the Shepherd’s Lane Area.
As three-quarters of the housing stock in Chapeltown was owned by housing associations and the city council, there was much emphasis on housing improvement as part of the regeneration scheme. The Council and the housing associations identified the key housing problems in Chapeltown to be empty properties and a high turnover of tenants. The need to invest significantly in the housing stock in order to make it more attractive to prospective tenants was, therefore, identified as a priority. Other housing initiatives included redevelopments such as the decommissioning of flats, and converting them into family homes for low cost rental, and the sale of properties (also flats) on the open market in order to attract owner-occupiers who are considered more stable, compared with investment landlords. The programme was aimed at balancing out the proportion of flats and houses, so that there were fewer flats and more family homes, and investing in improving the stock overall so that it was of a high quality and met Twenty-First Century standards. Furthermore, Leeds City Council invested in ‘decent home programmes’ and upgraded its existing housing stock and properties. Between 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, the Council’s investment in housing also included rewiring and kitchen and central heating installation. It is clear that there was considerable investment in the area of housing and infrastructural improvements during the regeneration exercise in Chapeltown during this period.

Voluntary sector organizations operating within the area, such the Chapeltown Enterprise Centre (Unity Service), also provided assistance in terms of employment and housing, targeted mainly at black and minority ethnic communities. With regard to youth work, the YES-Cyber (Youth Enquiry Service) offered a wide range of services and support for young people aged 13 and above. In addition YES-Cyber established a one-stop-shop in Chapeltown
for advice and guidance for young people with regard to careers, employment, housing, advocacy, volunteering and other information essential for young people.

A detailed analysis of the activities above clearly showed that most of the regeneration activities were directed at:

- improving the physical environment, including street appearances, in order to raise the profile of Chapeltown locally
- promoting a positive image of Chapeltown in such a manner that would encourage investors to invest in the area
- Improving the housing stock in the area, to meet decent homes standards, so that home buyers would want to move into the area.

There was no evidence that the majority of the problems identified in the SWOT analysis were tacked effectively. For example

- The problem of unemployment, particularly amongst young people
- The drugs problem
- The negative image or reputation of the area
- The problems of crime, anti-social behaviour and the fear of crime
- Inadequate community facilities such as banks and post offices
- Education – the underachievement of BME pupils; the problem of schools not meeting the needs of all faiths and cultures

- Poor health facilities

- Lack of leisure or play facilities for children and young people.

Considering the fact that most of the concerns of the residents and key actors were related to areas not adequately covered by the regeneration exercise, questions were raised as to whether effective consultation with the residents of Chapeltown took place before the regeneration started, and whether the state’s definition of disorder is narrowly focused on physical disorder, whilst social disorder is, as discussed in Chapter One, regarded by the state as a problem of the communities themselves.

5.3. Summary

There are some issues that stand out from this chapter

1. It is clear the conception that lack of community cohesion can be linked to physical and social disorder is flawed. The fact that a community is disorderly, does not mean that it lacks cohesion. The approach of the government in terms of using community cohesion as a tool for addressing social and physical disorder, is obfuscating the real causes of disorder. The use of the concept of community cohesion tends towards a blame game. The findings also challenges the assertion made by Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) that a disorderly community lacks collective efficacy. For
instance, it can be deduced that in a community that is considered heterogeneous, people still look after each other, but the major problem for them is employment.

2. The regeneration projects in Chapeltown, despite starting off with a detailed analysis of the problems in the area, ended up focusing mainly on improving the physical environment rather than looking at the structural and institutional factors that brought about disorder in the first instance. There was far too much emphasis on housing, without giving much concern to affordability which, in itself, is determined by the unemployment and poverty in the area. There is little evidence of effective work being done in the areas of crime, the community, education, health, employment (especially youth employment), and leisure and recreational facilities for youth. Responses from residents and key actors show that these problems are still on-going in Chapeltown. There is still the problem of stigma in this area, and this is having a ripple effect in terms of investment in this area. This can also be linked to the issues and problems of racism. Racism is still a major factor in terms of investment and government response to the problems of deprived communities.

Point (2) above, which indicates a mismatch between what the residents wanted and what was actually provided, raises important questions as to the extent of consultation or communication that took place between the government and the residents themselves, before the regeneration programme was embarked upon. This point will form the focus of the analysis in Chapter Six.
Chapter Six
Public Participation and Community Engagement in Urban Regeneration

6.0. Introduction

In Chapter Three, the concept of urban regeneration was discussed in terms of its history and underlying principles. In Chapter Five, the practice of urban regeneration was discussed in the context of the experience of an inner city area, namely Chapeltown. A key theme that runs through both chapters is the assumption that ‘urban regeneration’ schemes are pragmatic state interventions, introduced specifically to address social and physical disorder problems in cities, particularly in inner city neighbourhoods. New Labour’s urban regeneration policies were aimed at tackling the multi-faceted problems of deprived neighbourhoods by narrowing the gap between and the rest of the country in terms of (a) poor job prospects (b) high crime levels (c) educational underachievement (d) poor health and (e) problems with housing and the local environment (ODPM, 2003a; 2003b).

New Labour urban regeneration policies were underpinned by the following overarching themes:

(a) Participation and engagement of individuals and groups, especially at the local level

(b) Partnership, both as a new mode of governance and a means of achieving participation and engagement and

(c) Community, both as the pathway for policy interventions and as a site for the development of capacity and ‘social capital’ (Cook, 2006: 121).

Overall, the criminal and social policies of New Labour were driven by the principles of modernisation, effective governance and social inclusion (Cook, 2006).
This chapter examines (a) how community involvement/engagement were achieved during the planning and execution of the urban regeneration programme in Chapeltown, Leeds, in 2006 and (b) the definition of the concept of ‘community’ that was applied. This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section (6.1.) provides a critical review of New Labour’s modernisation agenda, and the concepts of community participation and community engagement as they are often applied to urban regeneration. A critical evaluation of these concepts is essential, and it sets the context for a better understanding of the research findings. The section then presents the views and opinions of residents and key actors in Chapeltown on the types of consultation, participation and/or involvement that took place in the area during the regeneration period. It is important to highlight at the outset that community engagement and community involvement are interchangeably used to cover all activities that claim to support the involvement of residents, community groups, service users and businesses in decision-making processes, to shape policies and inform the way services are delivered. The second section (6.2.) will provide a critical review of the concept of community itself. A third section (6.3.) provides the summary of the arguments presented in the chapter.

6.1. Modernisation, Community Participation and Partnership

“We believe in active government and we believe in public service, but if government is going to be effective at deliberating services in the way people want them for today, it has to be modernised, it has to be updated” (cited in Cabinet Office, 1999:2).

As mentioned above (Cook, 2006), the New Labour’s concept of modernisation is imbued with notions of effective governance and social inclusion. These are the principles that
underpinned New Labour’s urban regeneration policies. The concept of modernisation has been interpreted in different ways. For instance, Newman (2000) argued that the modernisation agenda offers a particular conception of ‘citizen’ as an empowered, active and participating subject; of work as a source of opportunity for the socially excluded; of community as being non-antagonistic and homogenous; and of nation as setting out Britain’s place in the changing global economy. Modernisation is also considered a ‘third way’ of state, society and economic development that is inclusive of, and responsive to, citizens and users of public services (Giddens, 2001). Therefore, embedded within the concept of modernisation is the idea of active collaboration between the private, public, voluntary and community sectors. Bochel et al. (2007) added that New Labour’s agenda for modernisation included a concern for greater ‘inclusiveness’ in policy making, both in making voices heard, which will produce better policies, and consequently, better outcomes.

At the core of New Labour’s modernisation, therefore, was an emphasis on delivering policies that acknowledge the benefits of involving the private sector in certain areas, and developing models of service delivery to better the needs of citizens (Newman et al., 2004; Newman, 2005; Sterling, 2005). Modernisation was considered by the Labour government as a way of tackling the many problems of poor public management and services created by the preceding Conservative party’s 18 years in government. According to Newman (2000), the New Labour government sought to distance itself from the outright assault on public services which took place under previous Conservative administrations. Therefore, discourses of modernisation offered an expanded concept of ‘managing for public purpose’, of going beyond the narrow confines of efficiency-seeking organisations involving restructuring, ‘downsizing’, contracting and quasi-markets, all of which are characteristics of Conservative public policy (Newman, 2000).
Consequently, joined-up government was the cornerstone of New Labour’s modernisation of government (Flinders, 2002). It was considered as a move from government to governance. According to Sterling (2005), the idea of joined-up government is a reflection of unease with the traditional organisation which does not in any way reflect the complex social realities of contemporary society. Invariably, joined-up government is about co-ordinating, joining up and adapting existing structures to reflect modern day reality. Allen (2003) suggests that joined-up government has two interrelated aspects. First, a ‘systematic move’ to fill gaps in governance and welfare stemming from a lack of coordination between vertical policy domains (or silos) and second it reflects an ‘epistemological move’ to integrate knowledge - and thereby reasserting power - across a wide spectrum of domains.

One key aspect of joined up government is the growth of partnership arrangements for developing and delivering policy (Newman, 2000). Partnerships denote a relatively formalised arrangement between two or more organisations in order to achieve a specific set of objectives, generally with a degree of independence on the part of any one partner (Moseley, 2003: cited in Sterling, 2005:139). Partnerships are multi-sector, involving organisations from both the public and the private or voluntary sectors and are area-based, focused on policy or development for a specific geographic area. Partnership was introduced by the New Labour government because of the existence of cross-cutting problems; dissatisfaction with hierarchical, sectorally-organised policy making structures that ignore the interactions across policy areas, the fragmentation of public services and governing institutions, and the declining ability of the state to exert direct control over services and policy (Sterling, 2005:143).
Central to the modernisation agenda was community (public) participation which was considered by the Labour government as crucial to delivering effective governance. Taylor (1998: 822) argued that the community approach has a long pedigree that dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, because it was associated with the problem of new housing estates created by slum clearance. Atkinson and Cope (1997) noted that since the 1980s and 1990s, community participation has been a fundamental theme in UK urban policy (see also Bentley et al., 2003; Rose, 1999). According to Imrie and Raco (2003:8) New Labour promoted community participation and engagement as a mechanism which can:

“break-open systems of governance, making them more responsive, more accountable, and perhaps most importantly, more effective and efficient...giving communities more of a say over what policy priorities should be spent is seen, more broadly as a good thing, something to be nurtured, as an integral part of any strong democracy”.

Hill (1994:32-68) concluded that public participation is all about people ‘taking part in government’. Arnstein (1969:216) added by stating that ‘...citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power; that is, the redistribution of power that enables those have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future’. According to Fung and Wright (2003), this ‘empowered participatory governance’ is based on three principles:

- a focus on practical, concrete concerns (especially the concerns of the most disadvantaged);
- the development of ‘bottom up’ participation (rather than top down control by technical experts/policy makers) and
- deliberative solution generation.

Bochel et al. (2007) further added that user participation is a form of activity shared by both governmental and non-governmental actors, at least some of whom are users in the sense of being directly involved in the process and/or outcomes of the activity. There are different kinds of participation; for example, civil participation, where people participate in non-government organisations and civic participation, and where people participate in governmental decision-making bodies. However, Arnstein (1969) constructed an eight-rung ladder of citizen participation. Figure 13 below, taken from Atkinson and Cope (1997), highlights these gradations of citizen participation.

**Figure 14:** Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation

| Degrees of Citizen Power | 8. Citizen Control  
|                          | 7. Delegated Power  
|                          | 6. Partnership  
| Degrees of Tokenism      | 5. Placation  
|                          | 4. Consultation  
|                          | 3. Informing  
| Non Participation        | 2. Therapy  
|                          | 1. Manipulation  

Source: Adapted from Atkinson and Cope (1997:206)

According to Arnstein (1969:217), therapy and manipulation, at the bottom of the ladder, represent forms of non-participation because their aim “…is not to enable people to participate but to enable power holders to ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the participant”. Higher up the
ladder are ‘placation’, ‘consultation’ and ‘informing’. These are tokenistic forms of citizen participation, as “…citizens may indeed hear and be heard, but lack the power to insure that their view will be heeded by the powerful” (Ibid). At the top of the ladder are: ‘citizen control’ ‘delegated power’ and ‘partnership’. These are “…levels of citizen power with increasing degree of decision- making clout” (Ibid). Nevertheless Arnstein acknowledged that these rungs do not represent purely distinctive and mutually exclusive forms of citizen participation. Arnstein also recognised that the powerless and the powerful are heterogeneous blocs with “…a host of divergent points of view, significant cleavages, competing vested interests, and splintered sub-groups” (Arnstein (1969:217).

As mentioned earlier, New Labour’s urban regeneration policies were oriented towards fostering active citizenship through promoting public participation in decision-making processes. Public policies under New Labour offered an image of modernised public services in which organisations involved their users and local communities in decision-making with regard to local services and policy priorities. Therefore, participative governance was seen as a potential solution to social problems, as the state is considered unable to deal, on its own, with the complexity of policy problems as well as responding to the differentiated needs and identities of citizens (Kooiman, 2000, cited in Newman, 2005).

Accordingly, New Labour’s urban policy established new institutional frameworks and mechanisms that shaped the form, as well as the process, of public participation. Whereas many of these initiatives had a particular focus on locality (Area Based Initiatives), they were imbued with an element of compulsion in the form of a requirement for participation to be demonstrated in bids for funding, and to be reflected in new organisational and community
governance arrangements (Newman et al., 2004; Newman, 2005; Pierson and Worley, 2005). For instance, the Single Regeneration Budget Round 4 (published in January 1998) highlighted the importance of local people, businesses and community groups coming together as partners. Also the guidelines to SRB Round 5 emphasised the importance of community involvement through effective and efficient consultation processes (see Foley and Martin, 2000).

Consequently, the different policy documents provided a powerful incentive to local and community organisations to develop new ways of engaging in dialogue with local citizens (see DETR, 1998, 2000, 2001; SEU, 1998, 2001). However many of the initiatives proposed in New Labour’s policy documents were built on earlier developments under the preceding Conservative government, including those linked to community development and urban regeneration, and those based on the inculcation of a more consumerist or user responsive climate for public services (Newman et al., 2004). Under New Labour, public consultation was viewed as leading to services that were attuned to individual preferences, in contrast to the ‘one size fits all’ approach of the post-war welfare state (Sterling, 2005).

Wilcox (1994), in his book ‘The Guide to Effective Participation’ - a guide for professionals and community activists - identified five levels of community involvement:

1. Information: giving people information about services or plans

2. Consultation: offering some options, listening to feedback, but not allowing new ideas

3. Deciding together: encouraging additional options and ideas, and providing opportunities for joint decision-making
4. Acting together: not only do different interests decide together what is best, they form a partnership to carry it out

5. Supporting community initiatives: local groups or organisations are offered funds, advice or other support to develop their own agendas within guidelines.

In contrast, Newman et al. (2004:206) identified three themes from New Labour’s urban policy documents in relation to participation: first, was Labour’s emphasis on neighbourhood and locality in the emerging multi-level governance system of the UK. Second, was the emphasis on democratic innovation, which introduced new political management structures in local authorities, and directed attention towards more participative forms of democracy, including deliberative forums. Third was Labour’s particular emphasis on policies directed towards enhancing social inclusion and building social capital.

In a nutshell, community participation through engagement and involvement was key to most of the urban regeneration projects in the UK, particularly those initiated under New Labour. The next section will examine how residents in the Chapeltown area were consulted on issues of urban regeneration and renewal.

6.1.1. Research Findings on Community Participation and Engagement

The Leeds Regeneration Plan 2005-2008 stressed the importance of community involvement thus:

‘We will make sure that (1) we work with local community to meet their needs; (2) all our partners involve more local communities more effectively; and (3)
there is better co-ordination between partners on community development across Leeds” (Leeds Initiative, 2005).

In order to explore the extent to which the residents of Chapeltown were consulted and/or involved in the regeneration projects in their area, the survey questionnaire included three specific questions, namely:

(1) Are you aware of the regeneration projects going on in your area?

(2) Were you consulted?

(3) If so, would you say that your views were taken on board?

In addition, the key actors (who technically were consulted), were asked to assess the nature of the consultation that took place, and whether their views were taken into consideration. Figures 15 and 16 present the residents’ responses to the three questions above:

**Figure 15: Are you aware of the regeneration projects going on in your area?**
The graph simply shows that the majority of the respondents were not aware that a regeneration exercise was going on in the area. Those who were aware were asked if they had been consulted. The majority (65%) said that they were, whilst 35% said that they were not (Figure 16). All those who were not aware, also said that they had not been consulted.

Figure 16: Awareness and Consultation

According to documents and information obtained from the Local Council, the consultation process was done through forums that met every four months, where the residents could voice their opinions about what was happening in the area. Examples of the forums were: the Chapeltown Forum, the Chapel Allerton Forum, and the Potternewton Forum.

However, when asked if they thought that their views had been acknowledged and/or taken on board, the majority (87%) said ‘no’ whilst only 13% said ‘yes’. (Figure 17)
The key actors (interviewees) who claimed that they were aware and had been consulted, also felt that the consultation process was shoddy and that their views were not taken on board by the Council. Interviewees 1, 8 and 9 had the following to say about the consultation process:

*I think certainly the local council will argue that the local people are involved in consultation [but] the problem with these regeneration projects is that they instigate it from the top down; the point of consultation is already a rigid structure and action plan, so the intervention in terms of consultation becomes a rubber stamping exercise. Having said that I think it is the bureaucracy. There is a lot about partnership working, statutory agencies working closely with voluntary organisations and groups and in theory that is great, but in practice [it is a different story]... I think people are involved, but it is a small group of people who are actually active, but there is a lot of apathy towards it in the wider community. At times the community activists tend to breach the gap, and be in the middle but on the other hand you are knocking on statutory agencies doors saying this is what people need. These programmes that are being rolled*
out, the people can’t see any benefits. Then again it becomes more difficult to engage people (Interviewee 1)

I don’t think that the black community is involved in the regeneration, it could be better because a lot of the funding is not going directly to the black community for them to improve and again to me, if you have got people actually giving out the funding and managing regeneration and they are white middle class and they have never had to deal with inner-city people, then they are not going to begin to understand them...(Interviewee 8)

No they do not have to consult. Democracy does not say they should consult us. They formulate the policies and then tell you what they are going to do. That is how government run things. Because if they are to ask everyone for his opinion, then they will not reach a conclusion. Area committee is white washing. If you are running an organisation that is why you have the executives make the decisions. When the body that decides puts it to the forum, saying what you see, you know you have to say yes. You cannot say no because it is not your money. If they want to do anything they bring in the professionals to do feasibility studies. What is it says in the book is not how it is been done and it is not how it is meant to be (Interviewee 9)

On the consultation forums, Interviewee 11 said:

There is a consultation mechanism. The councillors have been running a consultative forum since 2001, and they are quite well attended; and it is not helped by the fact that the councillors have changed the structures at least once in that period and the boundaries of where the residents are drawn from has been changed; just as one set of forum was getting going, they change their minds about how to do it, it is rather a confused kind of process and it is entirely unclear what kind of power this forums actually have. So the meetings I have been to do function as sounding boards for what residents think about the issues of the day and the councillor who attend are usually cooperative and
quite responsive and the council officials who attend are normally helpful and responsive, but as far as I can see, they never really debate [ ] and that is one of its defects. So far as I can see, there is no power residing in this forum and they have no decision-making role at all and consultation is consultation, you can listen and talk and debate, and unless there is a kind of proper democratic process, the power residing in local people’s hands and mandating their councillors or the council to make decisions, it is easy to see they will just become a talking shop. And it is certainly not clear to me as an engaged residents that they are significantly effective (Interviewee 11)

Interviewee 11’s concerns highlight the key issue of selection versus election; and of what Newman (2005) referred to as the troubling question of representation and representativeness. According to Newman (2005), people are invited to collaborate in a participation or consultation exercise on the basis that they are somehow representative of a wider public as defined by specific set of characteristics. While some participative initiatives draw on individuals who have been formally elected to represent the interests of a wider membership - for example, tenants’ groups, residents’ associations and so on, more usually this is not the case. Individuals tend to be invited to participate on the basis of characteristics such as age, class or gender, in order to secure a ‘representative’ sample of a wider population. As such, collective or politicised voices are excluded (Newman, 2005). Interviewee 12 added:

You have got the middle section that are interested or may be partially involved but still a bit pessimistic. Then there is the very small elite group who feel that they are part of the process. And they are influencing. To get a common statement out of those three groups, that will be an achievement (Interviewee 12)
Interviewee 11 concluded:

[As a result] you find that it is this same group of people attending these meetings, usually people that have their own agenda. And again I think, it what I was saying before, the things they bring are those things they have agreed already, so it is a case of last minute consultation. And sometimes it’s unavoidable because of budget deadlines (Interviewee 11)

Atkinson and Cope (1997:213) noted that community participation is time consuming, and as many people as possible develop organisation skills and acquire knowledge, there is a very real danger that participation will become too dependent upon a (potentially unrepresentative) few, and if they become exhausted, the consultation activity will collapse. This appeared to have happened in Chapeltown where the main bulk of consultation took place with representatives of agencies and community organisations, as well as umbrella organisations who claimed to have the skills and experience necessary to ‘engage’ with statutory agencies and, more importantly, claimed to have the trust of the various sections of the community they represented. They are then expected to feedback to the groups that they represent. As interviewee 2 puts it:

Sometime we are fed up of being over-consulted. We have to allocate our time to that. But what has happened is that Leeds Voice, which a few years ago started as an umbrella organisation... are the voice of voluntary organisations, and so therefore a lot of consultation in terms of voluntary organisations [is done with them] and they dissipate the information. So they always have something to say, even if the individual voluntary organisation is not consulted (Interviewee 2)
This problem is compounded in deprived communities where there is a sense of powerlessness, abandonment and apathy about community representation. Genuine participation thus requires a fundamental re-think of attitudes by politicians and officials in central and local government. They need to recognise the legitimate right of local people to participate as equal partners in setting the regeneration agenda (Atkinson and Cope, 1997:213). Such a re-think requires both structural change (that is, organisational restructuring and decentralisation to bring government physically closer to communities) and cultural change, that is, the replacement of long established bureaucratic and professional forms with genuinely participative forms of action (see Gaster, 1996).

Two further issues were raised by the key actors (interviewees) about the regeneration consultative process in Chapeltown. First, Interviewee 1 thought that the process was not user-friendly, and perhaps not wide enough:

The consultation process needs to be more user-friendly and proactive. We need to start thinking of different ways of conveying communications about plans and getting people engaged and interested, sending out leaflets and documents explaining what’s going to happen, not to selected numbers of people. We need to be going into the schools, engaging the younger people there and to the community centre where people are, and explain what is happening (Interviewee 1)

When asked whether the approach was top-down, Interviewee 11 said:

It is no longer as simple as that because the whole point of this forum is to give credibility to the claim that there is a bottom-up element to the process and the government says it requires councils to consult and set up partnerships and to work across departmental boundaries. The Council are clearly being forced by the people at the top to produce this mechanism for so called consultation. It is
not simply top-down anymore. What I question is what degree of impact the grassroots organisations can actually have. And to add that, those local organisations whose members do turn up at these events are themselves only tenuously linked to the wide mass of residents, very few of them are particularly democratic themselves, and there is no mechanism whereby the people as a whole can come together as ordinary people debating these issues unless they go to forums which are pretty straight-forwardly run by councillors that don’t set up a process of open debates and democratic decision-making. There is an input from a Council officer about something; people get up and make their comments and the Council officers sits down, so the combination of the structure that the politicians have adopted, and the lack of real engaged grassroots organisations in the communities, both make me worried that all we are getting is a sort of rhetoric of participation, rather than real political power coming into the hands of ordinary people (Interviewee 11)

Second, as perhaps more important, was the allegation that not much feedback, if any, was given to the residents on the outcome of the consultations. According to Interviewee 10:

The feedback that we get from the past is that we have been consulted we have been consulted, but nobody ever feedback to us about what is going to happen and the result of the consultations and that’s the kind of thing I hear all the time (Interviewee 10).

These findings show that public decision-making does not always have clear lines of accountability. More importantly, the views expressed by Interviewee 10 reinforced the point made by the residents who said that they were consulted, but also felt that their views were not taken into consideration (see Figure 17 above). This, perhaps, explains the mismatch between what the residents said that their problems were, and what the regeneration exercise was focused upon (see Chapter Five: sections 5.1.2.2. and 5.2)
Community participation is, indeed, a problematic concept. Ellison and Ellison (2006) highlight a clash of interests, absence of firm central control, and clear performance targets as some of the problems with community participation. They also highlight the tensions within and between communitarian definitions of responsibility and obligation, and the fragmentation arising when there are smaller collectives. Individuals, organisations, parents, schools, hospitals, and housing estates are expected to take on positions of responsibility for solving extensive, intractable social problems (Rose, 2000, cited in Pierson and Worley, 2005:223). Similarly, it has been argued that the way in which policy documents are interpreted and enacted in local organisations, and the construction of the public by officials, produces a form of constraint to the process of engagement and dialogue (see Newman et al., 2004; Newman, 2000; Newman, 2005; Sterling, 2005).

It has been shown that urban regeneration strategies are constrained by wider structural forces combining to severely limit their effectiveness. As shown in the responses of residents and key actors, there are distinct limits to ‘effective’ community participation, particularly in inner cities where the population is diverse and complicated. But the need for greater community participation is recognised, particularly where the issues being considered seriously affect the lives of people and their well-being.

Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation indicates that a citizen may enjoy different degrees of participation in different spheres of influence and in different areas of decision-making, thus making a single ladder a highly generalised measure of citizen participation. However, true community participation involves forms of community power. Consequently a study of community participation is a study of power relations between state, agency and its ‘public’.
6.2. The Concept of Community

Kearns (2003) notes that community has been reconfigured by New Labour, linking it to notions of active citizenship, individual responsibilities to the community, and especially participation in paid work (see, for example, Jordan, 1998) and for Rose (1999) community has become governmental (see also Atkinson, 2003).

Nonetheless, the concept of community is contested and has multiple meanings (Atkinson and Cope, 1997). According to Bauman (2001), the concept of community is itself a highly ambiguous and nebulous term which needs to be treated with caution and care. Similarly, Tonkiss (2004) argued that the language of “community” is both difficult to pin down and unvirtuous to reject; while it has all been pervasive within the “new politics”, it has not always been clearly defined. To Hill (1994:34-5), the idea of community is underpinned by the notion that “people have something in common”. However, that ‘something’ is in fact many ‘somethings’. Also, Plant (1974:13) notes that “…community has been linked to locality, to identity of functional interests, to a sense of belonging, to shared cultural and ethnic ideas and values, to a way of life opposed to the organisation and bureaucracy of modern mass society”. Burns et al. (1994) offered both social and spatial dimensions to the definition of community and argued that

“communities of interest reflect the common material concerns or characteristics of their members, and/ or the issues of common interest around which they group... communities of place can be thought of as a particular kind of imagined community” (Burns et al., 1994: 203).

Arguably, community is relative (see Atkinson and Cope, 1997). For instance, according to Cohen (1985), people:
define themselves by reference to a ‘significant other’... [and]... construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity” (see Cohen 1985: 117-18).

Therefore, people belong to many communities at the same time but with varying degrees of attachment (Atkinson and Cope, 1997) and “have multiple identities and linkages” (Burns et al., 1994:228). Consequently, communities are both inclusive and exclusive, with fluid and overlapping membership (Atkinson and Cope, 1997). To belong to a community, therefore, is dependent on others not belonging. Consequently, membership of a community implies marginalisation and exclusion of others outside that community (Atkinson and Cope, 1997).

As Burns et al. (1994) noted:

“On the one hand, community is a unifying concept, the expression of common interest, solidarity, integration and consensus.... On the other, community is not a singular concept but in reality represents a mere umbrella under which shelter a multitude of varying, competing and often conflicting interests” (cited in Atkinson and Cope, 1997:203-204).

In addition, when looking at communities, there are also multiplicities of issues such as class, race and gender, which inadvertently create conflict and competing interests, that promote both fragmentation and difference (Phillips, 1993). This point was also echoed by Campbell (1993) who argued that even in relatively homogenous single-class spatial communities there are significant divisions of interest based around gender and age.

Furthermore, just as conflicts exist within communities, conflicts exist between communities which may be competing for limited resources within the same urban area (Atkinson and Cope, 1997). Communities are thus constructed within this context of competition and conflict. Phillips argued:
“Neither community nor solidarity will come to us ready-made, both have to be constructed through active involvement of people trying to sort out their differences themselves” (1993: 20).

However, Tonkiss (2004) notes that the New Labour’s approach to community might be thought about in two key ways. On the one hand, notions of community refer to local social spaces as sites for policy intervention, where politics of community provide a means of targeting areas of socio-economic disadvantage in a concerned way. According to Blair (1998:9) the government’s New Deal for Communities was conceived as a means for realizing the rather notional version of community “partnership” that had characterized urban policy in the 1990s, in the form of more effective and inclusive local initiatives (Blair, 1998:9). The politics of community here relates to a local scale of policy development that provides a means for distributing resources and directing initiatives towards specific sites. In this respect, it is consonant with an equity approach within government that seeks to address the effects of inequality through the distribution of public goods, and the public redistribution of private goods (Tonkiss, 2004:596). On the other hand, an extended sense of community has been invoked as an inclusive space for social membership. Thus, community refers not to the local spaces of social life, but to a larger collective of citizens - to an inclusive society itself. At different moments then, “community” involves a local politics of equity, and a broad politics of social cohesion (Tonkiss, 2004). Therefore, politics of community might be seen as a means of extending the range of people’s “active concern” for others by rendering them somehow familiar; brought together within relations of civic trust and mutual responsibility. Tonkiss (2004: 597) argues that “community” functions, not as a euphemism for various social minorities or marginal groups, but as a container for the majority. Community, and increasingly, neighbourhood, becomes a critical element in central government policy, both an instrument for tackling the most difficult social problems and, at
the same time, ‘…a space of emotional relationships through which individual identities are constructed through their bonds to micro-cultures of values and meanings’ (Rose, 2000: cited in Worley, 2005: 223).

In a nutshell, the concept of community is problematic, and the idea that a community is a single homogenous entity, seems to be a fallacy (Frazer, 1999). For instance, there is the issue of power relations in the different communities. Instead, there seems to be an assumption in policy documents of a community of interests or identity among particular groups; for example, travellers, the homeless, lone parents and so on. This fails to take account of the complexity of lives in a neo-liberal world in which employment, residence, and other factors are increasingly transient (Newman, 2000; Newman, 2005; Sterling, 2005). But the process of categorisation tends to construct problems as the property of the groups concerned, rather than of the wider social or political system. ‘Hard-to-reach’ groups are constituted through a double taxonomy of assumed deficits (lack of skills or confidence, unwillingness to participate) and potential assets (in the form of social capital) (see Newman, 2005).

The concept of community as promoted by New Labour is thus to be understood in moral terms, rooting in a discourse which easily slides into an authoritarian one (as exemplified in the policies on tackling youth crime and drugs or unemployment). As Levitas demonstrates, the community appears in different guises, especially when it relates to the issue of crime; ‘it is the locality in which crime occurs, and that which has broken down…it is the victim…and the potential jaded, as well as the instrument of social control crime’ (Levitas 1998:124).
Also, it is important to identify who constitutes the ‘community’. It must be noted that a government agency will have “different relationships” with “different publics” (Stewart, 1983:120). However, there are many different communities representing consumers, producers, citizens, residents, voters, taxpayers, pressure groups, ethnic groups, faith groups and so on. According to Interviewee 10, who is a long-standing member of the Chapeltown community:

"We live together as individual and every individual has a right to emphasise its distinction. When you are talking about community you see that distinction has been blurred. We are individuals, the problems is to be inputting into human dynamics terms like community when we should be talking about society. I prefer to live in a society than to live in a community, because a community is limited. That is the same problem they are facing when they refer to Chapel town community not Leeds society (Interviewee 10)"

Therefore, some interests or places may not form communities (Atkinson and Cope, 1997:207). Similarly, it is necessary that when talking about community, to examine how much weight is attached to the views of communities. Furthermore, given the existence of many ‘publics’, a state agency plays a pivotal role in mediating between the competing and conflicting demands of communities, and in allocating resources between different communities (Atkinson and Cope, 1997:207).

The tendency to associate community with social exclusion, has also been emphasised by New Labour, thus sustaining the ‘tradition’ already mentioned of equating community with the socially excluded. Therefore, community somehow becomes both problem and solution (Fremeaux, 2005; Pierson and Worley, 2005). Thus, the implementation of community as solution takes the form of community-based initiatives, which form the core of social
programmes, most notably urban regeneration schemes, where the ‘involvement of community’ aims to ensure more of a bottom–up approach to the programmes implemented in deprived areas.

Also, the New Labour’s emphasis given to ‘community involvement’ has marked a welcome move towards a better account taken of the social and cultural dimension in programmes such as urban regeneration, after decades of merely structural regeneration and top-down approaches. The debate revolves thus around the necessity of a more fluid understanding of the concept of community, in order to open a space for all citizens to evolve in society, without being essentialised and reduced to a specific and institutionally-defined identity, which inevitably constrains the development of all groups, but most of all, the most deprived ones (Fremeaux, 2005). Nevertheless, Burden et al. (2000) reiterated that policies founded on notions of community are inherently problematic because of difficulties with the concept itself. For example, ‘communities’ can be stifling locations for some groups. The notion of community is invariably fashioned out of a discourse of such examples of urban breakdown, and constructs of ‘abnormality’, serving both as a solution to urban problems and as part of the process of social exclusion (Newman, 2005; Sterling, 2005).

New Labour’s position on communities, also reveals a tension between social inclusion and exclusion which reflects the traditional dominant discourse of the deserving and undeserving (Burden et al., 2000; see also Chapter Seven). On the one hand, there is a concern to ensure, through managerialist means, that residents are ‘included’ in the process affecting their communities. On the other hand, New Labour has enthusiastically signed up to an exclusionary agenda that promotes the punishment and banishment of those found guilty of
breaking the community’s code of conduct (Burden et al., 2000). The dividing line between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, therefore, is being more rigorously drawn in terms of those who are deemed to be deserving or undeserving of inclusion in New Labour’s great new corporate society. Ironically however, the drawbacks to the state of excluding individuals from communities in terms of increased difficulties and costs in managing and controlling the ‘other than’ have not been adequately considered, and this further puts more pressure on disadvantaged groups in the community (See Burden et al., 2000).

Finally, it needs to be mentioned that the use of the concept ‘community’ in the language of ‘community cohesion’, has specific implications for thinking about race and race relations policy. It enables practitioners and policy actors to avoid ‘naming’ which communities they are referring to, even though the reference points are clear. For Burnett and Whyte (2004), the community cohesion framework ‘masks a double-edged sword’ and the sharp end ‘seeks to rid the country of difference’. Kundnani (2005) suggests that these measures represent an attempt to return to a clear sense of “us” and “them” in the face of a world in which sovereignty has been increasingly globalised.

6.3. Summary

Participative governance is a concept that is strongly oriented towards the production of consensus. The ‘partnership’ model of participation is one which assumes that different interests can and should be subsumed by a common goal, as it is with the case of deliberative processes (See Newman, 2005). Young (1990) talks of the value of heterogeneity within the deliberative process, arguing that citizenship may mean organising politically around identities, and then interacting with others, rather than seeking to arrive at a general
perspective which transcends difference. Fraser (1997) also noted the importance of ‘counter publics’ as an essential element of the democratic process because of their capacity to formulate oppositional views. Such groups act as both spaces for withdrawal and for regrouping, and as the basis for engagement with the wider public domain. These arguments suggest the value of enabling, for example, women to meet and deliberate as women, in order to add a gender perspective to public deliberation, rather than inviting them as individuals to forums in which gender issues are not widely acknowledged. Such an argument is forceful in a political context in which (as we have seen) participative governance is viewed as a means of addressing social problems. Inviting women as ‘carers’, ‘mothers’ or ‘pregnant teenagers’ to collaborate with government in addressing issues of care for the elderly, truanting behaviour or childcare, may be viewed as constructive in social policy terms, but at the same time may involve the suppression of more explicit gender politics (Newman, 2005).

In addition, the governance literature suggests a fundamental shift in modern societies, variously labelled as a shift from governing to governance, from hierarchies to networks, from representative to deliberative democracy, and from direct control by the state to strategies designed to engage civil society in collaborative governance (Newman et al., 2004). However, core to governance theory is the idea that state power has become ‘de-centred’, and is now exerted through plural institutions in a dispersed system of power and authority - what Rhodes (1997:7) terms a ‘differentiated policy’. That brings up the issue of co-dependencies which engender frustration and powerlessness. The concept of white governmentality is important in unravelling governments’ rationalities on urban problems. According to Hesse (1997) there are two significant strategies of white governmentality: First, a nationalist political rationality that incorporate directives, an epistemological characterisation of the objectives and subjects of governance and a distinct idiom which make
this amenable to political deliberations. This is mostly achieved through techniques of surveillance which affirms the ‘crushing objecthood’ to the racialised other, which often involves deployment of representational strategies which assume the right to oversee, interrogate, celebrate or include or exclude the racial other in any social field. Second, are racist programmes of government which focuses on rectifying of problems and the practical resolution of problems. According to Patel and Tyrer (2011:158) white governmentality does not just work upon black and minority ethnic people, it also works upon white people, disciplining them to act in ways which subjectify them in terms of hegemonic notions of whiteness.

Furthermore, Sterling (2005) added to the debate by arguing that the conflation of partnership with the language of participation is problematic. According to Sterling (2005), partnerships are sometimes (and arguably erroneously) portrayed as one mechanism of participation, or as a uniquely ‘participative’ arrangement for decision-making. However, like other elements of new governance practice, partnerships largely tend to bypass traditional mechanisms of representative democracy and, as has been argued, partnerships represent a form of elite, non-accountable governance.

It has been shown in this chapter that participatory governance in terms of the consultation process during the regeneration programme in Chapeltown in 2006, fell short of true participation as the majority of residents felt that they were not consulted, and those who were did not think that their views had been taken into consideration. An analysis of the responses from the key actors also supported the views of the residents, further stressing the flaws in attempting participatory governance in a multi-ethnic, multi-faith and, although
cohesive, diversified ‘community’. This also reflects some of the arguments made in Chapter Five, that the regeneration activities undertaken were quite different from the expectations of the community.

It is therefore clear that the Labour government’s approach to community regeneration is characterised by a number of different, and mutually conflicting, regimes of governance in terms of partnership, participation and local capacity building (see Newman, 2000; Newman et al., 2004; Newman, 2005). It must however be noted that these developments have been subordinated to other policy imperatives, linked to a highly managerial form of governance based on a plethora of goals, targets and performance improvement strategies, and direct control from the centre through an intensification of audit and inspection regimes, coupled with the specification of national standards for local services. Each of these involves an extension of control from above, that creates institutional constraints and limits the capacity of participation initiatives to shape policy and practice from below (Newman et al., 2004).

Thus, modernisation can be seen as a managerialist project in which the preoccupations of new public management around performance management, target setting and audit, come to the fore. Flinders (2002) noted that modernisation can also be seen as a reassertion of the central state and, in particular, core executive control over policy-making. Modernisation is based on a set of narratives that constructs the imperative for public services to change (Newman, 2000). Multi-agency working, consultation and engagement, are seen as the tools and channels for governance, but to some extent they can also be regarded as an extension of wider social ‘responsibility’ strategies.
Behind the concept of community is often some notion of citizenship. This will be discussed in the next chapter where it will be pointed out that this is even more problematic where members of a community are come from ethnic minorities.
Chapter Seven
Citizenship, Welfare, Social and Physical Disorder

7.0. Introduction

It is clear from the previous chapter that the attempts to facilitate the participation of residents in the urban regeneration of the case study area (Chapeltown) through consultation and partnership was tokenistic. Despite the fact that participation and involvement in decision-making in local governance has been recognised as a major prerequisite for addressing cross-cutting problems and the disadvantages that permeate inner-city communities, evidence show that attempts to engage residents in these communities have been problematic, either due to poor implementation or to a poor conception of the idea of participation and involvement.

As extensively discussed in Chapter Three, the key initiative behind state regeneration is to reintegrate ‘disorderly’ and deprived communities back into mainstream society. However, what is central to my thesis is that the majority of the residents of these communities are British citizens. Therefore, the approaches that have been taken to their problems by the state raise important questions with regard to how Britain handles the subject of citizenship.

This chapter is divided into two main sections. Section one will focus on citizenship and debates surrounding the use of the concept in the academic literature. In addition, this section will examine discourses on the development of the welfare state in Britain, as well as the matter of social citizenship such as welfare provision and social and welfare rights. In specific detail, section two will examine race and welfare provisions within the context of the debates on citizenship and welfare discussed in section one. It is argued in this section that for exclusion, advanced marginality, and problems of physical and social disorder to be addressed, the government needs to reconsider how citizenship is mainstreamed into public
policy interventions. It is argued that since the 1905 Alien Act, there has been the notion of the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ in the construction of welfare provision and social rights in relation to migrant communities. Furthermore, this section highlights that since its inauguration, the welfare state has operated a dual system of welfare provision, whereby Black and Minority Ethnic peoples have been reduced somewhat to the status of second-class citizens with regard to their access to state welfare, because nationhood has been constructed around the white majority (see Williams, 2008). It is also argued that the definitions of rights and responsibilities based on the notion of ‘active citizens’ under new Labour, influenced by their ‘third’ way politics and coupled with globalization, discombobulated the efforts made to address physical and social disorder within inner-city communities. This chapter argues for anti-racist welfare policies, that is, policies that incorporate provisions based on equality and universal citizenship.

As has been identified by academics such as Bauman and Mullard, citizenship offers a way out of marginalisation and inequality. The argument being put across in this chapter is that citizenship based on universal provisions is a viable way of addressing social and physical disorders which affect most deprived communities, considering the fact that citizenship includes political, social and economic provisions.


The widening inequalities, exclusions and economic dislocations amongst and between social groups, have resulted in a considerable attention being paid to the concept of citizenship, both in social and public policy debates (www mauricemullard co uk). Scholars and public policy analysts note that citizenship offers the opportunities and possibilities for social recovery
which will, in turn, foster not only social cohesion, but also inclusivity that ensures equal opportunity within society. Arguably, citizenship is intractably linked to disorder, because citizenship has to be directed to people as well as place. Citizenship is a practical as well as a philosophical activity (cf. Meller, 1995:64).

It is important to note that, like other social science concepts, citizenship is difficult to define and, in some ways, too broad to have a certain boundary. This is largely due to the fact that citizenship is deployed and used in different contexts and disciplines such as philosophy, politics, sociology and social policy, to justify different actions, opinions and views (Lister, 1998; Dwyer, 2004). According to Mullard (2002), the substantial number of discourses on the meaning of citizenship re-affirms the lack of agreement as to what constitutes citizenship, resulting in an academic impasse because the concept is treated as something static.

Hence, there is no universally agreed definition of citizenship (Connolly, 1983). To Mullard (2002:1), citizenship is not only about involvement, participation, awareness of political process, but also about issues of economic and social rights, such as the right to secure income, including pensions, unemployment insurance, sickness, access to health and education. However, writings on citizenship and the urban life have also emphasised the need to view citizenship in terms of ‘the right to the city’, to stress the intrinsic worth of cities to their inhabitants, not merely their instrumental or economic value, but the right to make full use of the city and to live a richly urban life (cf. Painter, 2005: 2). Furthermore, Bauman (2000) asserts that citizenship proffers a solution to apathy, isolation and quietism, which are reflected in a series of insecurities, including the insecurity of access to public provision.
created by the complexities of modern life (cited in Mullard, 2002, p1). According to Bauman

“The decisive argument in favour of the unconditional social guarantee of a basic livelihood can be found not in the moral duty towards the handicapped and destitute, not in philosophical renditions of equity or justice and not in the benefits for the quality life in common but in its political significance, or its importance for the polity, its crucial role in the restoration of the lost private/public space, and in filling the now empty private/public space. In other words in its being a conditio sine qua non of the birth of fully fledged citizen and republic both being conceivable solely in the company of self-confident people, people free from existential fear- secure people” (Bauman, 2000 cited in Mullard, 2002:1).

Another problematic aspect of citizenship is that of the dual process of welfare provision, that is inclusion and exclusion, whereby certain groups gain rights and become ‘in group’ and others may become the marginalised ‘out group’ (see Alcock, 1989:37; Mullard, 2002). Consequently, Mullard (2002:3) argues that citizenship has to be continuously re-created, re-evaluated and given meaning, in such a way that it reflects people’s expectations, hopes and aspirations at particular point in time. In other words, citizenship should be about a sense of belonging and membership, that is membership that acknowledges differences and pluralities. In addition, it must also reflect and embrace dialogue, involvement and participation that inform change and identify priorities, rather than a series of ascribed state rights (Mullard, 2002).

What is important about citizenship is that it has a direct relevance to people’s lives because it represents the benchmark of personal freedom, dignity, hope, freedom from fear and personal autonomy (Mullard, 2002). Thus, it could be argued that commitment to human rights issues is one of the central pillars in the definition of a citizen. Indeed, the meaning of
citizenship has to involve not only the recognition of universal rights, but must also reflect plurality and diversity and the right to express difference and dissent (Mullard, 2002:2). Having highlighted the contradictions, debates and issues associated with defining citizenship, it is important to examine some definitions in order to identify whether there are common trends that run through them.

Lewis (1998:104) identified three key significant points that should underpin citizenship:

- The citizen is one way of imagining a link between the state and the individual
- The concept of citizenship implies membership of some form of community. In turn, the notion of community opens up questions of inclusion and exclusion
- Citizenship is a social status that allows people to make claims in relation to state-organised welfare services

Marshall (1992) sees citizenship in terms of rights, namely civil (rights to liberty and equality in law; including rights to residence, own property, fair trial), political (the right to vote and participate on the political process) and social (rights to basic welfare and full participation in society). Irrespective of their class position, Marshall asserts that every citizen should share ‘equality of status’ within a (national) community (see also Dwyer, 2004:6). Furthermore, Lister (2008) remarks that citizenship means full participation in society, and everyone having access to the same set of rights, whether civil, political or legal. So to Lister, the principle of university, which implies equality of status, is important in conceptualising citizenship. It is clear from the definitions examined above, that citizenship is primarily about the relationship between the state and individuals, as well as individuals and the communities they live in, respectively.
Similarly, duties and responsibilities have also been identified as key to citizenship. However, this raises a number of questions, including but not limited to how citizenship rights may be linked to those responsibilities (Dwyer, 2004). According to Marshall:

“Citizenship is a status bestowed upon those who are full members of a community. All those who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which that status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those right and duties should be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal of citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is bestowed” (cited in Dwyer, 2004:4)

Indeed, it is important to mention that the notion of responsibility is problematic, and it creates an avenue for blaming the individual in situations where particular expectations are not met.

The next sub-section will examine the creation of the welfare state in Britain, how citizenship was constructed at the inception, and how it has come to dominate welfare provisions in Britain. The following section examines how welfare provisions have impacted on the lives of the Black and Minority Ethnic Communities and on where they live.

7.1.1. The Creation of the Welfare State in Britain

Following the Second World War, the welfare state was established in Britain in an attempt to address the social problems which had been exacerbated by the economic conditions of the 1930s. The establishment of the welfare state brought about a focus on social citizenship, which centred on the notion of the universal right of citizens to a set of state-guaranteed
social and economic provisions for all members of society (Dwyer 2004: 32). The scheme was to provide a wider range of benefits for the poorest sections of the community, as well as to extend the concept of ‘welfare’ to a wider population.

The concept of social citizenship is often attributed to T.H. Marshall. According to Marshall, social citizenship (social rights) refers to the guarantee of “…the right to a modicum of economic welfare and the right to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall, 1950:11). Accordingly, Social Citizenship:

- refers to the social rights, obligation and institutions that play a role in developing and supporting equality of status in the community.
- seeks to correct or remove the economic (material) inequalities or barriers that compromise one’s ability to act autonomously
- views autonomy as a capacity that is hindered only by material barriers.

Accordingly, social citizenship retains a useful purpose. It offers the basis for an exploration of the dynamics of social divisions and inequalities in society, because it has the potential to provide a benchmark against which it is possible to assess the status of certain individuals or groups (for example, individuals of a particular race or ethnicity, the aged, youths, women and the disabled) in relation to access to the agreed welfare rights and resources that are generally available to all those regarded as citizens within society (Dwyer 2004:6). Thus, social citizenship could be said to be at the centre of the debate with regard to the wider notion of citizenship, because the right to welfare and the ability to fully participate in a society continue to be regarded by many as a centrally important aspect of ‘effective citizenship’ (Dwyer, 2004). According to Harrison (1995:20-21):
“Effective citizenship certainly means being included in the systems of rights and welfare provisions that are mediated or managed by state agencies, and having one’s needs met through mainstream political intermediation (Harrison, 1995: 20-1).

Analogously, the principles which underpin welfare rights, such as equality and needs, are of considerable importance to the definition of social citizenship. Dean (2001) offers some useful insights on welfare rights. For instance, he argues that welfare rights, indeed all rights, are socially constructed. Dean defines the essential character of welfare rights as:

‘Distributional’ in the sense that they relate to the social redistribution of resources. They are concerned either to prevent poverty by limiting the extent of social inequality, or to relieve poverty after it has struck (2001:1; see also Dwyer, 2004).

Despite the fact that Marshall (1992) saw the establishment of the welfare state as a universal right of citizens, he realised that there is no fixed consensus about which welfare benefits and services should be available to citizens, or the levels and quality of provision deemed to be necessary. Therefore, welfare rights can be diminished as well as expanded (Dwyer, 2004).

The ideas that underpin welfare rights are based on two schools of thought, namely: universalism and selectivism. Universalism holds that the welfare state must provide services and benefits for all citizens on an equal basis, rather than on a selective basis (see Lewis, 1996: 110; Dwyer, 2004). In view of this, it is envisaged that every citizen should enjoy access to the same set of welfare rights. The intention is that welfare services should be equally available to every citizens, and used by all who need to benefit from them. However,
some critics have argued that there is no such thing as a universal right to social provision. After all, an individual can only claim the so-called ‘universal’ benefits when they meet a stated criteria or contingency (Dwyer 2004). An example used to buttress this point is Child Benefit, which is a universal benefit, but which is only available to those who are the primary carer of a dependent child. Dwyer (2004) claims that such critics are, however, confusing issues of universal availability with universal enjoyment. He reiterated that nobody is suggesting the Child Benefit be paid to people without children, but Universalists would argue that once you have primary responsibility for a child, the benefit should be available to you as a right. In contrast, benefits and welfare services based on selectivism (sometimes referred to as the social assistance principle), are limited to certain specified individuals or groups, usually by the application of a conditionality or means test. This is a mechanism widely used to limit access to benefits or social security to individuals or groups whose income and/or assets fall below a specified level. As Deacon and Bradshaw (1983) note, this promotes a public welfare system which is reserved for those genuinely in need, for example, poor people.

Despite the contentious nature of welfare rights, Jones (1994) argues that they are central to contemporary notions of citizenship for three reasons:

- First, because at the very least a minimum right to material resources is essential for citizens to survive and function within any society

- Second, because the provision of welfare has a collective benefit that reaches beyond the individual and benefits the wider society.
Third, the idea of entitlement to welfare is of a different order to the charitable provisions of the past, and this may help to reduce the stigma felt by welfare recipients (cited in Dwyer, 2004: 9).

Having looked at the nature of welfare rights in Britain, the next section examines whether Britain’s black and minority ethnic peoples have a difference experience of welfare rights compared to their white counterparts.

7.2. Race, Ethnicity, Citizenship and Welfare

The debate about ‘race’ and welfare in Britain has been one about the difference between substantive and formal citizenship (see Brubaker, 1992). Formal citizenship implies citizenship in a legal sense; that is, citizenship that one acquires by being a member of a nation state and, therefore, having access to rights and duties that accrue to all citizens of the state. In contrast, substantive citizenship refers to the extent to which those who enjoy the formal legal status of being a citizen may or may not enjoy rights (including rights to welfare) that ensure effective membership of a national community. Brubaker argues that many minority ethnic citizens often face exclusion in terms of both formal membership and substantive rights. This may be largely due to deliberate policy to exclude or limit access to citizenship, for example, through immigration legislation (see Chapter 2), or because individuals from minority ethnic groups are defined as not belonging because their cultural/religious practices differ from an idealised, and often racially constructed, national norm (Mason, 2000). However, the relationship between formal membership and substantive rights is more complex than a simple process of exclusion. According to Brubaker (1999:36-38):

“That which constitutes citizenship- the arrays of rights or patterns of participation- is not necessarily tied to formal state membership. Formal citizenship is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for substantive
citizenship... That it is not a sufficient condition is clear: one can possess formal state membership yet be excluded in law or in fact from central political, civil or social rights... That formal citizenship is not a necessary condition of substantive citizenship is perhaps less evident.... Often social rights, for example, are accessible to citizens and legally resident non-citizens on virtually identical terms” (Brubaker, 1999, pp36-38).

As the above quotation makes clear, the interplay between formal and substantive citizenship is far from straightforward. Certain individuals who, as Brubaker (1992) notes, are ‘legally resident non-citizens’ may be able to access substantial welfare provisions in spite of a lack of formal citizenship status. Many migrant workers enjoy welfare rights comparable to those of the citizens of their host state, on the basis of their contribution as workers within the paid labour market (PLM). When welfare rights are organised according to a social insurance principle, the legal right to live and work in a particular locale may effectively override the share of formal citizenship status. It is therefore possible to be an ‘outsider’ or non-citizen (that is, excluded from formal legal membership of a nation states) and yet simultaneously be included in collective welfare arrangements (Dwyer, 2004).

Despite the contradiction between both formal and substantive citizenship, ‘race’ and ethnicity continue to have a salience in debates about citizenship. As noted above, immigration legislation can be used to construct an exclusive national identity that is problematic for ‘outsiders’ looking for legal rights of entry/residence. Similarly, substantive citizenship status and the welfare rights of ‘insiders’ who enjoy equal formal citizenship may be affected because they are ‘intractably different’(Mason, 2000:133) in terms of racial characteristics or ethnic practices from the dominant majority population (Dwyer, 2004).
What is clear is that ethnicity and immigration clearly affect the citizen status of Britain’s ethnic minorities (see Howard et al., 2001). At the inception of the welfare state and the introduction of social welfare provisions, eligibility was based, in part, on nationality. According to Williams (2008), the idea of the nation state dominated the early Twentieth Century, with great importance placed on notions of national identity and national unity. The notion of a national society within specified geographical boundaries with an imagined homogenous cultural, linguistic, racial and ethnic community, was increasingly the backdrop against which the social element of citizenship developed. In Britain, the welfare rights of citizenship were, therefore, to be reserved for British citizens, that is, those seen as meeting nationality criteria both in terms of physical location and/or common cultural and racial characteristics (Williams, 2008). As such, notions of Britishness have influenced the development of early welfare practices in Britain, often excluding or controlling those seen to be outside of, or a threat to, the nation, namely ethnic and religious minorities, and other social minorities such as single mothers, refugees, asylum seekers and disabled people (Williams, 2008).

One of the ways in which exclusion from citizenship operated was by making British nationality the condition of eligibility for social rights. For instance, the 1905 Aliens Act is an example of a law that was enacted to limit social citizenship rights according to deserving-undeserving distinctions. The Act stated that immigrants could only land at recognised British Ports, and included strong powers to return ‘undesirables’ to their countries of origin. Aliens entering Britain had no recourse to public funds or welfare provisions, and anyone who became homeless within 12 months of arrival, was liable to be deported. These measures were mainly put in place to address the problem of Jewish immigration into Britain. This Act served to racialise definitions of Britishness, and these definitions were subsequently
institutionalised in immigration and welfare legislation that attempted to formally exclude ‘outsiders’ - that is, those who did not fit the ‘British’ stereotype of white, English speaking and Christian - from access to welfare rights (Dwyer, 2004; Williams, 2008). Indeed the Aliens Acts of 1905 and 1914 set the pattern for much later legislation. Those who were not British subjects were not eligible for certain benefits such as the out of work donation which is explained in the following paragraph.

In the same manner, the 1911 National Insurance Act advocated that non-British residents who had been in Britain for less than five years were entitled to receive only a reduced amount in terms of benefits, despite their contributions through active participation in the labour market. In 1919, the British government introduced a form of unemployment benefit commonly known as ‘Addison’s out-of-work donation’. Its remit covered the unemployed and returning soldiers and their families, and civilian workers unable to work or get employment due to decline in the production industries. Its purpose was to meet the basic needs of those who were not eligible to claim unemployment benefit under the 1911 National Insurance Act. However, the Ministry of Labour refused to allow aliens access to the donation, and secret instructions were sent to the staff at Labour Exchanges stating that black seamen should not be told about their right to access benefit under the scheme (cf. Dwyer, 2004:38). These examples clearly showed that racism underpinned eligibility criteria for welfare rights, since the early days of the establishment of the welfare state. As Jacobs (1988) argued, during the post-war period, racism flowed everywhere, poisoning the entire body, including the institutions of the welfare state.

With regard to housing welfare, Local Authority council housing has played a major role in the exclusion and subjugation of the minority ethnic working class. The public housing
sector’s reaction to the black presence in Britain, for example, has ranged from initial exclusion and hostile reception, to allocation to the worst housing estates (Jacobs, 1988, see Chapter 2 section 2.3). Black people encountered discrimination on many fronts: in employment, education, health and access to social services. The black working class were relentlessly pushed to the end of the queue, being allowed only the worst that society has to offer, and even that, only very begrudgingly. Built upon the solid historic foundations of slavery and imperialism, racism clearly thrived in every corner of the welfare state (cf. Jacobs, 1988; see also Chapter 2). In welfare terms, black people were rendered invisible, amounting to discrimination through wilful neglect, or what Sirvanandan calls ‘laissez-faire discrimination’ (Jacobs, 1988). A Social Exclusion Unit report published in 2000 stated:

“In comparison to their representation in the population, people from minority ethnic communities are more likely than others to live in deprived areas: be poor, be unemployed, compared to white people with similar qualifications; suffer ill health, and live in overcrowded and unpopular housing. They also experience widespread racial harassment and racial crime and are over represented in the criminal justice system... but there is much variation within and between ethnic groups in all of these areas” (Social Exclusion Unit 2000:17).

Labour Force Survey Statistics published in the same year showed that:

“Young white men have the lowest risk of unemployment and the highest earning power, but Indians are very close to them on both indicators. The three other groups included in the analysis (Caribbean, African and Pakistani/ Bangladeshi) are all much worse off than either white or Indian individuals, with substantially higher risks of unemployment and lower average earnings” (Berthoud, 2000:389).

The universalism of the welfare state depended upon a restricted notion of the norms of eligibility and need. At its heart was the image of the white family with a male breadwinner
(Williams, 2008). Black families deviated from this norm; therefore their claims to welfare were cast in pathological terms (see www.mauricemullard.co.uk).

Whereas it could be said that there was no conspiracy amongst the architects of the welfare state to deprive Britain’s black and ethnic minority citizens of access to state welfare, there is no evidence that the notion of racial equality was within their frame of reference. It just never occurred to them that the ‘coloured colonials’, as they were then called, had any rights at all. In these terms, the welfare state never failed the black population; it was never in the first place intended to apply to them (Jacobs, 1988). What is significant is the fact that the blacks and Asians who arrived in Britain after the Second World War were already British citizens (see Chapter Two). Whereas the new arrivals, like their white counterparts, had access to state welfare, as formal citizens, in reality, many of these rights were substantive rights, denied through the process of direct and indirect racism (Jacobs, 1988; Lewis, 1996; Williams, 2008).

To fully understand the exclusion from full citizenship that many minority ethnic peoples face, it is necessary to develop a more complex sociology than one based on biological differences such as skin colour. For Modood (1992), ‘cultural racism’, which may include oppression related to differing religious practices, is often as fundamental an aspect of racism as one based on colour. Modood argues that “…colour, class and culture are the three distinct dimensions of race” (Modood, 1992:54), with those who suffer from a negative mix of all three aspects, effectively excluded from many of the potential benefits of citizenship. Modood asserts that this exclusion is directly related to the degree of difference exhibited by an individual or group from the norms and values inherent in T.H. Marshall’s thinking. “The more distant an individual or group is from a white upper class British, Christain/ agnostic
norm, the greater the marginality or exclusion” (Modood, 1992:54 see Dwyer, 2004). A major handicap for minority ethnic groups in terms of access to welfare, therefore, lies in how Britishness has been constructed around a colonial past that emphasised white superiority (Dwyer, 2004).

The use of the words ‘ethnic minority’ is in itself problematic. According to Mercer, ‘ethnic minority’ connotes the black subject as a minor, an object, childlike figure necessary for the legitimation of paternalistic ideologies of assimilation and integration that underpinned the strategy of liberal multiculturalism (Lewis, 1996:113). Lewis (1996) notes that the use of ‘ethnicity’ in British official and popular discourses position those defined as ‘ethnic minorities’ as ‘in’ but not ‘of’ Britain. As such ethnic belonginess continued to be tied to notion of what it is to be ‘English/British’, with all those whose ethnic ascriptions and/or identity was outside of this spatial, political and cultural ‘imagined community’ being subject to racialisation (Lewis, 1996:114).

7.3 Summary

Welfare is a concept that is subject to political and economic restraints. The provision of a welfare service or benefit depends on a range of factors such as the wider state of the economy, levels of taxation, or popular political support, and the political philosophy of the government in power (Dwyer, 2004:9).

However, since the establishment of the Welfare State in Britain, post-1945, the entitlement to state welfare is often regarded as one of the key indicators of full citizenship, although,
over the years, entitlement to state welfare has been extended to non-citizens who are in Britain, either as refugees or asylum seekers. However, entitlement to state welfare is subject to conditionalities and means tests which, over the years, have served to exclude some citizens from ‘full’ state support.

The main argument offered in this chapter is that welfare rights in Britain have largely been based on a ‘dominant discourse coalition’ that constructs the ‘subject’ as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’, ‘included’ or ‘excluded’. According to Mullard, since the financial crises of the 1970s, Marshall’s notion of citizenship has been increasingly undermined. As such, the ‘entitled citizen’ was seen as making claims that the state could not meet, and this is closely linked to the moral hazard of ‘welfare dependency’, particularly with the ascendancy of neo-liberalism (www.mauricemullard.co.uk/website/viewpage.asp?pageid=130).

It is worth highlighting that limited access to the labour market and to welfare – due to issues around class, ethnicity, gender, disability, sexuality and age (Burden et al., 2000; Williams, 1995) – unreasonably excludes particular groups from the benefits that right of entry entails. It is argued in this chapter that black and minority ethnic peoples are more likely, compared with their ‘white’ counterparts, to be denied access to health care, education, housing and social security. This, in effect, is a denial to full citizenship. Citizenship requires social policies that ensure that, irrespective of income, individuals can realise their rights (www.mauricemullard.co.uk). Social security, health, education and housing should be accessible to all, regardless of ethnicity, culture or religion. According to Alcock (1989), universal rights to welfare can also ensure that welfare services are clearly understood and open to direct access and direct challenge.
In practice, cultural factors such as language, family type and religion have mitigated against BMEs’ full entitlement to welfare, as they are ‘un-British’, and therefore do not fit squarely into the eligibility criteria. It is an understatement to argue that the state system of welfare does not respect diversity. Welfare provisions tend to operate on a crude division of British society into ‘whites’ and ‘non-whites’, with the overall criteria based on ‘needs’ as defined in the ‘white’ context. The introduction of the 16+1 ethnic classification has not changed the approach to welfare entitlement. There is nothing in the welfare entitlement rules that entitle one to some welfare because one is Bangladeshi, for example. This chapter has clearly shown that political thinking around welfare provision has been dominated and moulded by imperialist assumptions about ‘race’.

The notion of deserving and undeserving has been passed on to asylum seekers and refugees. For instance, the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act eroded the rights of asylum seekers, withdrawing their eligibility to social security and work permits. As a result, a new ‘racialised subject’ was reborn: with claims of ‘bogus asylum seekers’ from both the media and the government giving substance to the idea of Britain as part of an emerging ‘Fortress Europe’, rather than the possibility for some sort of ‘post-national citizenship’ (Williams, 2008).

Denial of rights to welfare creates insecurity and disorder. People who are marginalised in terms of access to welfare are more likely to live in the deprived neighbourhoods where disorder is prevalent. The deliberate exclusion of BMEs from the welfare system, particularly
those who are British, questions their citizenship, and reduces them to the second-class citizens of Britain. This accords legitimacy to how they are perceived by the state, and consequently the approach that is taken to ‘regenerate’ their communities (see Chapter Three).

The next section provides a summary of some of the main arguments that have been made in this thesis.
Summary and Conclusion

This thesis set out to examine the historical link between race and disorder, and how the state continues to reinforce particular perceptions of disorder through its urban regeneration programmes. We started by exploring the different theoretical perspectives on neighbourhood disorder, namely the Chicago School’s social disorganisation theory, Albert Hunter’s Symbols of Incivility, Wilson and Kelling’s Broken Windows, Wesley Skogan’s Disorder and Decline and Sampson and Raudenbush’s Collective Efficacy. A critical examination of these theories has revealed that the state is left blameless on issues of physical and social disorder, and that immigration and migrant communities have long been identified as disorderly groups. These positions are particularly noticeable in the postulations of the Chicago School and in Wesley Skogan’s Disorder and Decline theory where ‘disorder’ in terms of incivilities are seen as ‘personal attributes’ of certain social groups, namely the poor, disadvantaged and unemployed, who live in deprived inner cities. In addition, the Broken Windows theory emphasises tackling physical disorder in order to address social disorder. So also, Sampson et al.’s theory of collective efficacy lays the blame for disorder at the door of these communities, rather than a deep rooted analysis of the structural causes of disorder, by arguing that inner city communities are not cohesive, and it is their lack of cohesiveness that is responsible for their high level of disorder. Also, highlighted in Chapter One is the fact that political definitions of disorder are far more moralistic than the academic theories propose, in the sense that they are often underpinned by notions of responsibilisation and moral blame.

How did ‘race’ become associated with disorder? This question was addressed in Chapter Two, where the history of immigration into Britain was discussed from the Nineteenth through to the Twenty-First century. The chapter discussed the arrival of the Irish, the Jews,
‘blacks’, Asians and eastern Europeans, and their settlement in the poor areas of Britain’s industrial cities. The chapter explained the significant part that racial prejudice and discrimination has played in the definition of the areas where these immigrants settled as being criminal and disorderly. Eventually, ‘race’ became a central element in the discourse on inner-city problems in Britain.

Chapter Three highlighted the fact that urban interventions from the Nineteenth Century through to the present times have always been dominated by a moralistic notion of urban problems. Interventions have always been top-down, based on the state’s own definition of the problem. Nineteenth Century urban interventions were mainly health-based, the attempts being to foster healthy living and prevent transferable diseases in working class neighbourhoods. Modern urban interventions (regeneration), particularly post 1977, continued to support and sustain the discourse of ‘pockets of disorderly communities’ which, as in the Nineteenth Century, are predominantly inner city areas with high populations of minority ethnic people. The problems of these communities were deemed to originate within areas concerned and not a problem for the wider society. Thus, urban regeneration programmes, like their Nineteenth Century counterparts, have sought to address ‘problems’ in inner cities as problems that the residents have a part in creating for themselves. As Stone (1989:282) argued “…problem definition is a process of image making, where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame and responsibility”. It is the position of this thesis that in the definition of the ‘problems’ of inner cities, ‘race’ has always played a significant part. ‘Race’ is seen as one of the reason why these problems have occurred and persisted in these places. It is reasonable to assert, therefore, that ‘race’ also has a part to play in the approach that is taken with regard to inner city problems. Thus, the findings from Chapters One, Two and Three highlight the historical legacy of social and public policy
intervention which, to a large extent, stigmatise, exclude and polarize marginal groups and blame them for urban problems.

Chapters Five and Six examine the experiences of regeneration in the study area, Chapeltown. The findings presented in these two chapters highlight the fact that there is a clear misunderstanding on the part of the government with regard to urban problems. It is clear from Chapter Five that inner-city communities do not necessarily lack cohesion, as compared to governments’ understanding of disorder, which is linked to community cohesion. Most importantly, the causes of disorder lie beyond communities; they exist in the state apparatuses and institutions that regulate social life. It has been shown in the discussion in Chapter Five, that Chapeltown is disorderly, but this is not consequent upon a lack of social or community cohesion. It is also highlighted in this chapter that the urban regeneration that took place in the case study area was focused much more on addressing physical disorder than tackling head on the social and economic issues that are responsible for social disorder in the area, such as unemployment, deprivation, lack of educational achievement and lack of amenities and recreational facilities. Thus, it was clear that there was a mismatch between the residents’ expectations and what the state provided in their communities. The reason for this was discussed in Chapter Six, where it was shown that the consultation process which was part of the regeneration itself was largely tokenistic. This chapter, therefore, provided a critical analysis of New Labour’s modernisation agenda, and the concepts of community participation and community engagement as they are often applied to urban regeneration.
How then can one explain Chapeltown residents’ experience of urban regeneration during the period of this study? This thesis posits that the answers lie in the history of the area, particularly the ‘influx’ of immigrants into the area, which has led to a stereotype of the place as being disorderly and criminal. The racialisation of the problem of the community, it is argued, is responsible for the approach that is taken by the state towards its problems. Hence, the story of Chapeltown is the story of a community of second class ‘problematic citizens’ stigmatised, marginalised, ignored and powerless. Their plight can be understood, as discussed in Chapter Seven, in the light of the attitude of the state to BME citizens in terms of their access to welfare and social rights. Therefore, Chapter Seven argues that for disorder to be addressed, the state needs to reconsider its approach to welfare provision and rights as well as how citizenship is constructed. Britain’s non-white minorities continue to face racism and exclusion from welfare provisions and services because of racialised conceptions of belongings, rights and citizenship.

The main arguments of the thesis are:

- The collapse of public institutions, resulting from state policies of urban abandonment and the failure of the welfare state, is the most distinctive cause of entrenched marginality and disorder in inner-city areas.

- Conceptions of the causes of ‘disorder’ as ‘in-built’ within communities, is erroneous and immoral, as it excuses the state from the problem.

- The causes of community disorder are multidimensional and complex, and, in multi-ethnic communities, include a strong element of the experience of racism.
The origin of disorder in communities lies beyond the communities themselves. It resides in state action or inaction or neglect, coupled with social injustices, both of which impact more on disadvantaged communities, resulting in a disproportionate experience of physical and social disorder.

It is important to explore some on the main arguments in this thesis in relation to the new coalition government’s ‘Big Society’. According to David Cameron, “Big Society is about a huge culture change where people in their everyday lives, in their homes, in their neighbourhoods, in their workplace don’t always turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face but instead feel both free and powerful enough to help themselves and their own communities” (cited in Grayson and Harrison, 2011: 6). The three political ideas behind the ‘Big Society’ are:

- Devolving power and budgets from the centre to more local players, be they local authorities, local civil society organisations (CSOs) or individuals;
- Increasing choice as to how consumers of public services spend their entitlement, and encouraging a more diverse set of service providers from whom consumers can choose;
- Increasing the level of responsibility assumed at the local level, and encouraging this to be converted into proactive, positive local civic action (Grayson and Harrison, 2011: 6).

The ‘Big Society’ is intended to be contrasted with the big state that New Labour had advanced and, among other things, is intended as an endorsement of the positive and proactive role that voluntary action and social enterprise could play in promoting improved
social inclusion and ‘fixing Britain’s broken society’ (Alcock, 2010). As such, by ‘returning’
power from the state to the citizen, social change could be put back in the hands of people
and communities (Alcock, 2010). The specific policy details contained in the Cabinet Office
(2010) are as follows:

- Government will make it easier to set up and run charities, social enterprises and
  voluntary organisations and will support the creation and expansion of these.
- Public sector workers will be given a new right to form employee-owned cooperatives
to deliver what are currently public services.
- Unnecessary ‘red tape’ surrounding government support will be removed, and
  organisations delivering public services will be able to fix market prices and generate
  surpluses, to create a ‘level playing field’ within the commissioning process.
- A ‘Big Society Bank’ will be established, funded by the money lying in dormant bank
  accounts, and will operate as a new source of loan funding for the sector.
- A range of measures will be introduced to encourage charitable giving and
  philanthropy.
- A National Citizen Service will be established to give 16-year-olds the chance to
develop skills through volunteering.
- A Big Society Day will be designated to encourage volunteering and involvement in
  social action, and regular community involvement will become a key element in civil
  service staff appraisals (transforming the ‘civil service into a civic service’).
- A new generation of 5,000 community organisers will be trained and support will be
  provided for the creation of neighbourhood groups, although in time these are
  expected to become self-funding.
- More power will be devolved to local government, and driven down further into
  neighbourhoods and communities.
However, these proposals signify another version of the recoiling of the state introduced by the Thatcher government, which led to the withdrawing of support for inner-city communities. Alcock (2010) argues whilst, at one level, devolving power can have an almost a priori appeal, placing responsibilities with others, whilst at the same time slashing the budget that the state previously enjoyed in discharging similar responsibilities breeds resentment and cynicism. It is clear that the level of government support might be reduced rather than enhanced, based on budget cuts and withdrawing. According to Alcock (2010), these cuts will provide challenges for the third sector and those representatives and advocates who wish to promote it. They are also likely to be accompanied by cuts in public support for third sector infrastructure agencies, and cuts in the grants provided directly to third sector organisations by local government as spending restrictions start to bite there too. There are challenges for the sector as a whole in trying to achieve more with less; and this is likely to translate into particular problems for individual organisations, especially those with significant support from the public sector. With a lot of businesses folding up in communities, and people losing their jobs, there will be a less support for the proposals of the Big Society as envisaged by the coalition government.

It also important to move beyond the assumption that a large majority of the adults in an advanced society can or will see their basic needs met by lifelong formal employment (or by the permanent employment of members of their households) in a commodified economy. As such, public policies designed to counter urban problems must go against the slide towards ‘workfare’ which sees (sub) employment a norm of citizenship (see also Wacquant, 2008). The solution to urban problems lies in an effective public policy which should re-establish and/or expand state services, so as to guarantee a minimal equitable provision of basic public goods across all urban areas, in order to alleviate social disinvestment in inner-city areas.
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Appendix 1

Questionnaire

Please answer the questions below. However, you are not under any compulsion to answer any question that you are not comfortable with. Before completing the questionnaire please spend a few minutes to read the information sheet provided (a verbal option was also offered) and if you agree to complete the questionnaire, please sign the consent form provided.

Your Area

Would you say this is an area you enjoy living in?

Yes, definitely ☐
Yes, to some extent ☐
No ☐
Don’t Know ☐

Would you say that this is a place where neighbours care about each other?

Yes, definitely ☐
Yes, to some extent ☐
No ☐
Don’t Know ☐

Which of these do you consider the major problem in the area?

Unemployment ☐
Crime ☐
Housing ☐
Health ☐
Education ☐
Local Amenities for Young people ☐
Drug Misuse ☐

Regeneration Projects in Your Area

Are you aware of regeneration projects going on in your area?

Aware ☐
Not Aware/Don’t Know ☐
If you are aware, were you consulted?

Aware, consulted ☐
Aware, not consulted ☐

If you aware and consulted, do you think your views were taken on board?

Aware, consulted, view taken on Board ☐
Aware, consulted but views not taken on board ☐

Personal Details:

How would you describe your ethnic Origin?

White ☐
White Irish ☐
White other ☐
Mixed-White and Black Caribbean ☐
Mixed- White and Black African ☐
Mixed- White and Asian ☐
Mixed-Any other Mixed Background ☐
Asian or Asian British – Indian ☐
Asian or Asian British – Pakistani ☐
Asian or Asia British – Bangladeshi ☐
Asian or Asian British – Other Asian ☐
Black or Black British – Caribbean ☐
Black or Black British- African ☐
Black or Black British- Other Black ☐
Chinese ☐
Other Ethnic Group_____________________

Are you?

Male ☐ Female ☐

Which age group do you belong to?

(16-24)  (25-39)  (40-49)  (50-59)  (60-74)  (75 years or over)

Thank you for your cooperation
Appendix 2

List of Documents:

1. A future for the granges by Martyn Broadest and Emma Ruane
2. Leeds Crime, Disorder, and Drugs Audit 2004, Leeds Community Safety
3. The Northern Journal
10. Leeds North East Home- a great place to live- Annual Report 2004/05
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