**Introduction**

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Over the last decade or so we have witnessed important changes in how those networks, institutions and individuals tasked with delivering organised forms of policing and security are held to account. A range of innovations intended to ensure more effective accountability have been introduced to keep pace with a fast-changing policing environment, new challenges in terms of crime, security, and disorder, and shifting patterns of governance in society more broadly. Principles of accountability rooted in liberal democratic systems of government have been tested as new demands, relating to the transparency of oversight mechanisms, for example, have emerged. Moreover, established mechanisms for accountability (never wholly effective in early periods) have struggled to adapt to new environments. Social media, for example, makes public monitoring of policing a rapid, direct form of open democracy that competes with administrative and procedural arrangements developed in previous times.

Against a backdrop of increasing complexity in the local and global landscapes of ‘policing’ (as broadly understood), political, legal, economic and technological developments have served to alter the context, methods and processes through which regimes of accountability, oversight and regulation operate. Changes are apparent across different dimensions of policing, including its ‘institutions’ and ‘individuals’, within and between both the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sectors, as well at the ‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ scales of policing. The extent and pace of these changes raises a pressing need for on-going academic research, analysis and debate. While the pluralisation of policing has opened up new fields for academic analysis, the public modern police service has been subject to a series of reforms that have raised important challenges in terms of accountability and governance. In many advanced liberal democracies, public sector reforms have been applied to police organisations often with the express intention of making them more responsive to ‘clients’. New Public Management strategy has led to the proliferation of performance indicators and targets intended to measure efficiency and effectiveness. Principles of community policing have been advanced in an effort to provide for greater engagement between officers and the public in ways that enhance mutual understanding and shore-up police legitimacy.

This book offers a contemporary and comprehensive analysis of the shifting themes of accountability within policing. It considers the key concepts of ‘policing’ and ‘accountability’ in broad terms. Hence, for example, its focus will explore mechanisms of accountability that seek to inform and govern not only the politics, policies and practices of (local) state-funded police forces, but also the activities of private security providers and policing networks, more broadly. Developing forms of constitutional and legal governance of ‘high’ policing are assessed alongside aspects of operational accountability in terms of public complaints against officers as well as internal forms of regulation and oversight of officer behaviour, including debates about ethical and professional policing. As stated, the book explores ‘accountability’ in a broad sense, bringing to the surface the various functions associated with the concept (i.e. whether as a means of providing ‘redress’ or ‘governance’, ‘regulation’ and ‘control’) as well as the way it is invoked and interpreted in different debates in different contexts.

In addition to considering novel and emerging developments, it is recognised that there are also continuities. The contributions explore some recurring themes within contemporary debates surrounding the policy and practice of ‘accountability’ and ‘governance’, as well as the theoretical, conceptual and empirical questions to which these concepts give rise. The book offers a series of contemporary and cutting-edge analyses of the regulation, accountability and governance of ‘police’ and ‘policing’. It takes a broad and comprehensive approach to the subject, seeking to address issues of accountability in various contexts, including the policing of ‘territories’, ‘communities’ and ‘cybercrime’. It includes original perspectives on developments in Europe, North America and Australasia.

Emerging from the contributions it is clear the emergence of plural policing, new technological challenges, and the rise of transnational policing combine to require the development of new approaches to oversight and control of a wide range of agencies and actors engaged in aspects of policing. As a principle of democracy there are moral and ethical imperatives to ensure that policing is conceived as a public good, a social provision with the potential to secure social justice and equity. Of course established mechanisms of accountability focused on the public police service have not consistently or effectively delivered these ends. However, maintaining mechanisms of accountability at least provide a framework around which public interest demands can be articulated and pursued. Alternative scenarios could only mean that policing becomes increasingly removed from public engagement and only accountable through private contract or market relations that offer little scope for social justice.

At the core of this collection of essays, then, is a related series of emerging concerns that the focus, mechanisms, and challenges of police accountability have been rapidly transformed. Against this background the core aim of the book is to provide insight and analysis that can enhance the prospect of effective democratic accountability. Before providing a summary of each of the contributions to the book we continue this introduction by outlining some key principles of democratic accountability. By definition these are established principles of democratic government and are not new in conceptual terms. While revisiting them, however, we also point to various ways in which features of policing in the 21st century pose new challenges that require innovative responses.

**Guarding the guards: why does accountability matter to policing?**

Police officers have a paradoxical relationship with their fellow citizens. On the one hand, in common law liberal democratic societies, police have tended to be regarded as ‘citizens in uniform’. Robillard and McEwan (1986: 2) summarised this conceptualisation in the following terms, in relation to the British model:

The police of this country have never been recognized, either by the law or by tradition, as a force distinct from the general body of citizens. Despite the imposition of many extraneous duties on the police by legislation or administrative action, the principle remains that the policeman, in the view of the common law, is only a person paid to perform, as a matter of duty, acts which if he were so minded he might have done voluntarily … Indeed a policeman possesses few powers not enjoyed by the ordinary citizen, and public opinion, expressed in Parliament and elsewhere, has shown great jealousy of any attempts to give increased authority to the police.

In the three decades since this account was written police powers and responsibilities – the ‘extraneuous duties’ mentioned by Robillard and McEwan – have changed but the underlying principle remains: in *de jure* terms the police continue to few legal powers not available to the average citizen and continue to be personally accountable for their actions. The paradox is, of course, that in *de facto* terms police have considerable powers not available to civilians. In actual terms police officers have considerable power to stop, detain and question members of the public (characterised by former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Robert Mark as the ‘power to inconvenience’ them (Judge, 1986: 175)). Police also have considerable tacit and symbolic power such that citizens might often follow police instructions and requests either through recognition that negative consequences might otherwise ensue or, more positively, because of respect for the authority of the office of constable. This symbolic authority extends across police rank structures from the frontline officer on the street to more senior leaders who collectively and individually have considerable power to identify, articulate and define social problems. Loader and Mulcahy (2001a and 2001b) have described this as the ‘power of legitimate naming’ whereby elite police voices shape and define political and social agendas. The power of the police (and other elites) to act as ‘primary definers’ of social problems has been noted in relation to a range of issues, including juvenile delinquency, urban unrest, drug use and prostitution and is a capacity not readily available to private citizens (Hall et al, 1978). The institutional power and resources of police services also constitute forms of power not available to the general public. While any member of the public might have the legal power to carry out a citizen’s arrest the police are one of the few institutions that have the capacity and resources to make this a viable proposition. That capacity is contained and regulated through internal police management and oversight as well as external mechanisms. While most of the contributions in this collection are focused on political and regulatory practices it must be noted that the legal system provides routine opportunity to scrutinize police activity and avenues to redress malpractice. As Prenzler (2009) noted a fundamental cornerstone of democratic accountability is that police are subject to the rule of law such that operational actions are tested in court. Moreover, citizens are able to bring legal action against police in circumstances where negligence or malpractice are alleged and damages paid where wrong-doing is established. Individual officers can be subject to legal sanctions and police policy and practice can be amended as a result of legal judgement. In practice, the ability of private citizens to bring legal action against the police might be curtailed. The resources, and cultural and social capital required are not equally available to all and many of those who might be most gravely exposed to police malfeasance might be among those sections of the public least able to access justice. Prenzler (2009) also reminds us that citizens need to be able to access information if they are properly to scrutinise the police: reliable information, transparent decision-making and access to senior officers and policy-makers are some of the necessary pre-cursors of democratic oversight.

The complex and institutionally-embedded nature of police power means that accountability mechanisms that extend beyond legal regulations are required for effective oversight consistent with broader principles of liberal democracy. As Reiner argues in his contribution to this volume, democratic policing requires more than just that those who hold the police to account have an electoral mandate. Exercising democratic policing requires transparency, a legal framework, systems to investigate complaints, the promotion of professional integrity, a commitment to human rights but also a broader social framework of social justice and civil liberties.

Robust accountability is important in principle but also in terms of ensuring effective delivery of policing services. Research evidence confirms that police services enjoy greater levels of public trust and confidence in circumstances were they are perceived to act on the basis of procedural justice (Hough et al, 2010). In this context, procedural justice needs to be done, and to be seen to be done, in order to deliver core aspects of the police mandate. Public reassurance and community safety depend in part on the ‘communicative action’ of policing and that the service demonstrates integrity and legitimacy in its activities. This in turn is evidenced through effective accountability that entails services demonstrating their transparency and compliance with norms of governance. That police services are charged with delivering security and reassurance to citizens requires engagement with subjective perceptions of well-being and safety, and so accountability to the public needs to be demonstrated. The core mandate of law enforcement requires public assistance and cooperation in a host of ways and so also depends on police being able to demonstrate accountability to citizens.

A key element of promoting effective policing in diverse communities has been to ensure meaningful community engagement with groups that often might have had relations of tension and conflict with police services. Community engagement might be a ‘soft’ form of accountability. It is often imperfectly conducted on terms established by the police rather than the community, it may tend to follow an established police agenda, and might not easily engage with ‘difficult to hear’ communities. When done effectively, though, it can enable consultation and demonstrate transparency that encourages the public to report crimes and work to co-produce solutions to community problems. As Keith (1993) noted in relation to consultative committees set up in local areas within the Metropolitan Police in the 1980s liaison of this kind can provide a useful conduit to promote communication and dialogue that can diffuse tensions and enhance relations with the public. Nonetheless, however, consultation is distinct from accountability; not least because the former does not disturb established power relations (Keith 1993). The balance of relations surrounding police accountability and consultation in respect of Police and Crime Commissioners is also explored further in Raine’s contribution to this collection.

Other forms of accountability offer the potential to improve police performance through target setting, monitoring and evaluation. Moves to promote evidence-based policing seek to apply scientific methods to identify outcomes and the inputs and mechanisms that characterise effective police interventions. Communication and dissemination, through, for example, in the UK, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary or the College of Policing, seek to embed good practice throughout the police service. Scientific policing remains contested in terms of the blend of methodologies that can provide reliable data, the extent to which practice can be transplanted from one context to another, and the degree to which police ‘outcomes’ can be appropriately identified and measured. While often not expressed in terms of police governance and oversight these practices nonetheless offer a form of accountability. Since the development of New Public Management and its extension into policing and criminal justice much criticism has been made of the distorting impacts that can arise as police managers seek to meet arbitrary targets rather than achieving more appropriate outcomes (McLaughlin, 2007). Clearly there have been many examples of policing practice that has been skewed by a ‘target management’ culture. However, the core problem has stemmed from the politicisation of police practice rather than the fundamental analysis of effective performance on the basis of professional and scientific judgements (Hope, 2009; Tilley, 2009). Accountability in terms of peer-review, professional practice and scientific evaluation offers the possibility of developing greater efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of policing. The challenge of ensuring that this is done in an independent and objective manner is a real one.

Much police practice has remained unquestioned and unexamined in terms of the impact that it might have on the core police mandate. Aspects of policing that are often regarded as central and core to the service – such as patrol work or stop and search – have been subject to little scientific analysis. Partly this may be due to the lack of expenditure on police research. Weisburd and Neyroud (2011) noted that law enforcement contrasts very poorly with sectors such as agriculture and medicine when it comes to investment in technological innovation and evaluation. In the UK, they argued, government investment in medical research amounts to £600 million per year, whereas the annual Home Office budget for crime research amounted to just £2 million. This form of accountability is also hampered by cultural and political contexts of policing. Weisburd and Neyroud (2011) argued that it is the political, institutional and cultural contexts of policing that make the development of a new paradigm of police science challenging. It might also be that the contested and ambivalent mandate of policing makes a scientific evidence-based model difficult. If the role and function of the police service cannot easily be identified then it is difficult to imagine how it can be scientifically evaluated in overall terms. Clearly scientific innovations can contribute to the investigation of crime, enhance police communications, and provide for better health and safety of officers, but not all aspects of policing can easily be subjected to scientific evaluation or the rigours of the randomized control trial. Not only are there significant methodological challenges to be overcome in the development of scientific evaluation of police interventions (Hope, 2009) but many key functions of policing are inherently subjective, open to interpretation and fundamentally contested. This illustrates that an overarching challenge for police accountability relates to the mechanisms by which it is delivered and the standards against which it is judged. Alongside these very broad questions – that are reviewed through the chapters that follow – are some more specific challenges, and it is to those that the chapter now turns.

**What are the challenges for accountability?**

Inevitably, police accountability has been an enduring and complex challenge. Each of the chapters in this collection explores different dimensions of the problems faced. These are considered in terms of trying to deal effectively with public complaints (see chapter by Prenzler and Porter), ensuring that policing that exists beyond the nation-state, whether transnationally (see chapter by Sheptycki and Bowling) or, in the private sector (see White’s chapter), , or the broader question of ensuring effective governance (see Reiner’s chapter, and Lister’s chapter). This broad catalogue of challenges – and this book does not claim to examine all possibilities – can be considered in terms of those intrinsic to the police function and those that are external and relate instead to the broader environment in which police operate. In the former category the paragraphs below consider challenges to accountability that relate to police operational independence (see Raine’s chapter), the inevitability of police discretion, exposure to opportunities for corruption or malpractice (see Rowe, Westmarland and Hougham), and police operational subculture. External challenges relate to debates about the declining capacity of the state to provide for regulation in the light of market provisions of former public services, the political context of policing and public services, and advances in communication technology (see the chapter by Davids and Boyce) that transform the collection, transmission and analysis of data both by police and public.

***Operational independence***

The powers of the police are complex and extended beyond the black letter of the law. To be effective, forms of accountability need to be sufficiently robust to respond to the multifaceted exercise of police power in various forms and at various organisational levels. Several contributions to this collection reflect on problems of avoiding organisational capture such that those tasked with critical oversight become overly dependent on the police and become unable to exercise independent scrutiny. Another concern is that the long-established principle that police have ‘operational independence’ in terms of the discharge of their duties and enforcement of the law becomes very difficult to apply in practice. The boundary between appropriate oversight and inappropriate interference in operational policing tends to be very blurred. Arguments about the provision of equipment such as rubber bullets and water cannons for use in the policing of public order have illustrated these tensions at several points in recent decades. For some the debate is an operational one and so the decision ought to be made on the basis of the efficacy of these provisions in terms of containing disorder. Other elements of these debates focus instead on ethical and political questions about the right of the state to use ‘less-than-lethal’ weapons against the public and the balance between protecting the right to life, free assembly and the right to private property. One consequence of the different types of argument contained in debates about crowd control equipment is that questions are raised in relation to where responsibility ought to rest in terms of deciding whether to deploy or not. If the argument is primarily about tactics and efficacy then this might be an operational matter for senior officers, if it is primarily a political or ethical one then it is more likely to be a matter of governance to be decided by political leaders or the courts. As several authors note in the chapters that follow, the principle of operational independence has been tested in the recent British context since the creation of Police and Crime Commissioners, but these are recent manifestations of an inherent challenge for police accountability.

***The peculiar nature of police discretion***

A fundamental cornerstone of five decades of police research is that officers operate with considerable professional discretion. Early research into police studies demonstrated that the law provided only a limited insight into the ways in which officers approached enforcement and that a host of cultural, political and sociological factors shaped the operational discharge of police duties (Banton, 1964; Skolnick, 1966; Wilson, 1968). Among the many implications of the ‘discovery’ of police discretion is that it gives rise to concerns that officers might overturn the constitutional position whereby they apply laws that are authored through constitutional democratic means. The considerable degree of discretion available to officers risked the possibility that they effectively created law on their own terms as they went about their routine operational duty (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001). The challenges that discretion poses in terms of governance and accountability are exacerbated because it is a particular feature of the operational activity of junior ranks who operate in conditions of relative invisibility. Wilson (1968: 7) noted that ‘the police department has the special property ... that within it discretion increases as one moves down the hierarchy’. For this reason supervisory officers and senior police leaders might find it difficult to effectively monitor frontline staff dealing with the public in difficult or conflicting circumstances. The ‘invisibility’ of police work – often conducted in out-of-the-way places and at all times of the day and night – also makes it difficult to examine the exercise of police discretion. IT systems and administrative procedures can help to make discretion more visible – officer’s actions can be captured on ‘head cam’ technology for example, as subjected to a trial in the Metropolitan Police in May 2014. Requiring officers complete forms to record details and circumstances in which stop and search is conducted is another method of trying to monitor the ways in which officers discharge their duties. Among other things these amount to efforts at internal managerial accountability. Even if such techniques were highly effective, however, the nature of police discretion is sometimes about officers deciding not to intervene or to choose a particular form of intervention over other possible avenues. Monitoring and reviewing such ‘non-decisions’ is extraordinarily difficult and poses a substantial challenge to accountability.

***Opportunities for unethical behaviour and cultural challenges***

Not only do police officers often exercise considerable discretion in circumstances of low visibility they often do so when interacting with ‘service users’ who are engaged in criminal activity who might be inclined to develop opportunities to influence that discretion in corrupt ways. Although effective police governance is about much more than prevention corruption and promoting integrity there are recurring problems of malfeasance and misconduct that arise from officers’ exposure to crime and wrongdoing (Punch, 2003). Many historical cases of corruption have arisen when officers had close long-term relations with organised criminals. Moreover the exposure to such circumstances also shores up the internal solidarity, loyalty and sense of mission that are integral to police occupational culture (Reiner, 1978). It is those experiences that define officers’ sense that they are the ‘thin blue line’ protecting society from lawlessness. In part, these features of police subculture are derived from institutional and functional activities. In some ways they are desirable elements and in many respects they seem inevitable responses to the routine experiences that officers face (Chan, 1997). Nonetheless, they have the potential to pose problems in terms of governance and accountability in a number of ways. Not only can they foster circumstances in which officer misconduct can develop unchecked in an insular occupational subculture they also pose challenges to efforts to investigate complaints and hold officers to account. As a number of contributions to this collection consider, the challenge of developing effective mechanisms to respond to complaints about misconduct often relate to the difficulty of getting behind the ‘blue curtain of silence’: the strong cultural norm for officers not to report concerns about the problematic behaviour of their colleagues and not to cooperate with related enquiries (see Rowe, Westmarland and Hougham’s contribution).

The above discussion has explored three related sets of challenges to police accountability; each of which is presented as an internal feature of the policing role and environment. The following sections discuss a number of challenges to accountability that are related instead to the external social, economic and political context in which policing is delivered.

***The decreasing capacity of the regulatory state***

Analysis of police governance and accountability tends to begin (and usually to end) with those mechanisms and regulations authored and delivered by the nation state. An important emphasis in this collection is the consideration of how non-nation state policing is governed and how this might more effectively be brought into a framework of democratic accountability that preserves policing as a public good that seeks to promote social justice. Just as modern policing expanded as the nation state itself developed in a form that we still recognise, in the British context at least, so too the need to regulate and govern the police has largely been focused on the activities of the state. Offices, laws, regulations, inspectors, complaint investigations, codes of practice, targets, audits and a host of other techniques have been introduced either directly by the state, or have been delivered by agencies closely under its auspices. The capacity of the nation state to continue to deliver these functions has been subject to considerable scrutiny and swathes of public administration literature have reviewed the extent to which liberal democratic states have developed a role of ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’ in terms of delivery of public services (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Milward and Provan, 2000).

The growth of a state that focused on regulation of public services rather than direct delivery might be identified in the context of police pluralisation (Wood and Shearing, 2007). Collectively, the chapters contained here suggest that there are also significant challenges in terms of state systems for regulation. If the state is ‘hollowed out’ then the extent to which it is able to provide effective governance might be seriously reduced (Milward and Provan, 2000). Although research has suggested that the extent to which the state has lost capacity might be have been over-emphasised (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, and Ongaro, 2009), and the chapters below often suggest that regulatory capacity has been re-distributed within state systems rather than abrogated. Nonetheless there are important concerns that a period in which policing has become pluralised and privatised (see White’s chapter) and increasingly occurs within transnational networks (see Sheptycki and Bowling’s contribution) has made the need for effective accountability ever more pressing. At the same time, the very factors that have driven the reorganisation of policing threaten to render the democratic state less able, and perhaps less willing, to deliver that accountability.

***‘Anti-politics’ and the police ‘fall from grace’***

Recent concern about unethical and corrupt behaviour within British policing had occurred against a background of scandal and controversy in respect of a number of other public agencies, as Rowe, Westmarland and Hougham outline in their contribution to this book. Although the post-2010 coalition government couched their policies in terms of transforming a police service that was the ‘last unreformed public-sector agency’ it has clear for several decades that the exalted political position that the police service previously enjoyed has slipped away. Indeed it is more than two decades since Waddington (1993) noted that the police service had ‘fallen from grace’ among political elites. The development of concern about the efficacy of accountability cannot be understood solely as a mechanistic response to identified problems. The particular debates analysed in this book cannot be understood in isolation from broader critiques of police community relations, the quality of leadership, effectiveness in law enforcement, trends in crime and anti-social behaviour, and expenditure.

Against a context of neo-liberal ideological suspicion of public sector provision, publics have been encouraged to take responsibility for their own welfare and well-being, an outcome of which has been a decline in the status of public provisions. In a society characterised by individualism and self-reliance established relationships of collective provision, deference and trust are eroded in ways that affect a broad range of institutions, including but not limited to, the police. Young (2011) argues that a growth in public demand for scrutiny of agencies represents a triumph for advocates of equality and social justice and as such is to be welcomed. What remains a challenge is to ensure that the capacity for citizens to effectively exercise demands is not limited only to those with the financial, social or political capital to articulate and press their case.

***Social media, direct democracy and policing***

The death of Ian Tomlinson at the hands of a Metropolitan Police officer during a protest at the London G20 summit in 2011 has been a significant case in recent controversies about policing and about management and accountability. During proceedings following Tomlinson’s death it became apparent that the officer involved, PC Simon Harwood, had a series of complaints made against him over his career but that these had not been investigated thoroughly as the officer had been able to leave his first force (Surrey Police) and so proceedings had halted. When he then joined the Metropolitan Police this history of complaints had not been identified. Harwood was acquitted of charges arising from Tomlinson’s death but was sacked by the Met for gross misconduct. In many respects this case was one of many in which the effectiveness of complaints against the police and the management of officers was found to be wanting. Similar incidents have occurred periodically for many decades. However, the Tomlinson case was distinct from many earlier incidents since the confrontation was captured on video by an American tourist who happened to be present at the scene. During the long-running fall out from the case, the Metropolitan Police admitted that it had ‘probably’ been one of its officers who had been responsible for striking (and killing) Blair Peach during a demonstration against fascism in 1973. Similar incident in many respects but the early incident had taken nearly four decades to determine who had dealt the fatal blow while the later incident had been widely disseminated within hours of Tomlinson’s death (see Greer and McLaughlin 2012).

It would be simplistic to argue that the only difference between Tomlinson’s death and Peach’s death was that the former was filmed and disseminated on the web in a very short time frame but the two cases illustrate yet another consequence of technological change in contemporary society. The criminogenic potential of social media and cyber-space are much debated, and the challenge of governance of policing in that context is reviewed by several contributors to this book. What is less widely noted is the capacity for ‘citizen journalists’, campaigners and ordinary members of the public to record police activity in authoritative ways that have strong evidential value. Apps are available that enable information to be recorded about problematic encounters with police officers; these include details of the type of evidence to record, GPS tracking, and advice on how incidents can be reported. The potential for ICT to develop the ‘technologically enabled officer’, equipped with data, maps and other resources to respond more effectively to crime and public demand is noted by Innes (2013) and it is inconceivable that such trends will not accelerate in future years. Such technology will also bring to bear new challenges in terms of governance and accountability.

The discussion above has identified a series of challenges that efforts to promote governance and accountability of policing. As was established in the first part of this introduction this is important for reasons of principle and also because police legitimacy is essential for operational effectiveness. The challenges faced were reviewed in terms of emerging internal changes within policing: these included operational independence, the significance of officer discretion, exposure to opportunities for officers to behave corruptly or unethically, and subculture within policing that can encourage misconduct and inhibit oversight and investigation. These challenges develop in a wider context of concern about the capacity of the state to govern policing and other services, the broader politics of policing and criminal justice, and the transformations wrought more widely by communication technology and social media.

**Overview of chapters**

These debates, and others, are addressed through the wide-range of contributions contained in this collection. Offered below is a resume of each contribution.

Young uses recent approaches to accountability in relation to police powers to’ stop and account’ as a means for considering broader debates about the nature of key concepts that underpin much of this book. The experience of efforts to scrutinize police stop and search in the aftermath of the Macpherson Enquiry is reviewed by Young. The potential to increase accountability by requiring officers to record details of stops with the public was significantly undermined by poor record keeping and a failure to extend the recording requirement to all public encounters. Problematically the confused rationale for the operational practice of stop and search undermined efforts to gather information that might enhance accountability. In some cases the public were unwilling to provide data necessary for effective scrutiny because they had assumed it was being used for purposes of intelligence-gathering. For such reasons, Young argues, it is ineffective to require police officers to gather the information required to hold their own behaviour to account. A radical approach is proposed using citizen-recordings as part of a pluralistic regulatory strategy for stop and account. While this strategy will be challenging and requires resources and a robust system to oversee the investigation of material gathered by citizens, Young argues that it provides a creative basis for more effective democratic oversight of police work.

Similarly innovative responses are developed in Prenzler and Porter’s analysis of systems to deal with complaints against police. The chapter explores ways of addressing police behavioural issues through enhanced management of complaints and disciplinary systems. Complaints can be used as a key learning tool to inform improved policing practices by modifying training and procedures in response to patterns of allegations in the context of a problem-solving and complaints reduction program. Prenzler and Porter argue that accountability and fairness can also be improved by supplementing simple investigative and disciplinary approaches to complaints with more restorative responses, including informal resolution and mediation. The chapter will include consideration and analysis of a number of successful cases studies from a range of jurisdictions.

Rowe, Westmarland and Hougham explore emerging strategies intended to respond to police officer corruption and malfeasance. Codes of ethical conduct, disciplinary measures, cultural programmes, training, and professionalization of policing have developed in response to various challenges to police integrity. The chapter explores each of these – drawing on international examples – and considers how they operate in relation to dominant police subcultural values of loyalty and camaraderie that have often amounted to a ‘blue curtain’ that prevents officers reporting concerns about misconduct of their colleagues. Rowe, Westmarland and Hougham argue that responses to misconduct by police have been improved by recent developments but that significant problems still need to be addressed in a pluralised policing environment. In particular the diverse cultural and institutional settings in which challenges to integrity emerge continue to be over-looked in analysis that continues to focus on malfeasance in individualistic terms.

Davids and Boyce begin their analysis of police misuse of confidential information with a discussion of **t**he UK’s Leveson Inquiry, which highlighted issues of media ethics and police/media relations. The unauthorised use of confidential police information was revealed in the Inquiry in relation to matters including information about alleged criminal activity and members of the public (suspects, victims, and others). In the ordinary course of their police duties, officers invariably receive or have access to a wide variety of such information, both from official police databases and other sources. Police officers may also use their position to actively solicit information (unrelated to official duties) in which they have a private interest. Davids and Boyce identify and analyse the problem of unauthorised access and disclosure of confidential information by police. They consider several forms of domestic or private/personal use of information by police officers or their associates. Problems associated with the disclosure of information to outside parties are also analysed (including situations where payment may be involved). In considering the types, sources, and uses of information, Davids and Boyce examine the harms that can arise for individual officers, the community, and the legal system itself. A range of materials are drawn upon to inform the analysis, including both the academic literature and a number of empirical data sources that provide case evidence of the problem. The private use and disclosure of confidential police information strikes at the very heart of public confidence in the integrity of a police force. The chapter explores these issues in the context of police accountability and its interrelation with integrity and public trust in policing.

Raine considers the implications of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) for police accountability. The introduction, in November 2012, of PCCs – one for each police area of England and Wales outside London - had the potential to become the most significant reform in police governance for at least a generation. The new arrangements were highly contested in Parliament during the legislative process and got off to an inauspicious start with disastrously low turn-out at the polls, with controversy about the choice of the electoral method and several chief constables leaving their posts prematurely in response to the change. Allegations of ‘cronyism’ in several areas over the appointment of deputies, and criticism of the cost of the new approach followed the elections, against a background of cuts in police budgets were necessary because of austerity in the national public finances.

Raine examines the early impact of, and prospects for, the new police governance approach of PCCs, and the shifts in policing priorities implemented around the country. The chapter also focuses on the nature of relationships PCCs have with chief constables, local communities, the Home Office, other crime-related agencies and local authorities (especially Police and Crime Panels). Underlying Raine’s analysis is the key question of whether in practice the introduction of PCCs has sharpened accountability in relation to policing, as proponents of the reform intended, or created the conditions for more autocracy in police governance through concentrating so much power and responsibility in a single pair of hands.

The restructuring of police governance is further analysed in Reiner’s chapter. He begins by noting that, unusually, a government’s claim of significant reform of policing is not exaggerated. The Coalition’s restructuring of the arrangements for police governance, are arguably the most radical since the development of the modern British police in the early 19th Century. Reiner notes that although democratic policing has become a mantra to which lip-service is paid around the world, the notion is seldom analysed. Reiner contributes to efforts to rectify this lacuna through the application of T.H.Marshall's seminal analysis of citizenship. On this basis he suggests that democracy in general, and democratic policing in particular, has not one dimension (elections), but three; civil, political, and socio-economic. The Coalition's reforms involve only one of these dimensions, the political, and in the narrowest sense .In the absence of strong civil and socio-economic rights, Reiner argues, voting alone does not achieve democracy in any meaningful interpretation.

Topping analyses how approaches to police accountability in Northern Ireland have plaved a central role in the broader development of the state in the post-conflict period. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has become governed by a host of statutory, governmental and other bodies, to the extent that it is widely conceived as the global ‘gold standard’ of police oversight. However, Topping identifies a number of ‘mediating realities’ that serve to undermine the mechanisms of police accountability. Centrally, Topping’s argument is that accountability for both institutional and operational ‘police action’ in Northern Ireland is itself a ‘site’ of contest and that official ‘accounts’ of policing are but one version of reality. A fundamental difficulty for police accountability in the country is that the continuing need for robust anti-terrorism policing sits uncomfortably with the ‘post-conflict’ reimagining of the Police Servce of Northern Ireland as a community neighbourhood police service. Topping argues that the promotion of police accountability, as part of the country’s transition, has been used in partisan ways weighted toward capturing the ‘positive’ realities of police activity. Problematically, he argues, this means that the harsh realities of the country as a post-conflict society have been conveniently ‘ushered’ to the side.

White examines debates about policing and accountability as they apply in the context of the private security industry, which has become a ubiquitous presence within liberal democracies across the globe during the last few decades. Accompanying this growth has been an increasingly prominent debate about the nature of the accountability mechanisms to which they are subject, how these are implemented and to what effect. White examines four ways in which private security (actors and institutions) may be held to account: generic legal measures; specific legal measures applied directly to private security, through contract compliance; and via ‘public ritual’. White argues that private security actors and institutions are not the passive subjects of accountability measures. Rather these four dimensions are spaces in which accountability is negotiated. This is an important point because it implies that these measures should not be regarded as the ‘solution’ to the pathologies of private security provision. Instead, White argues, they represent institutional structures through which public/private boundaries are made, unmade and remade.

**Jones and Lister …**

Sheptycki and Bowling scrutinize the diffuse phenomenon of global policing. This chapter describes the architecture of global policing and provides a sense of the occupational subculture which has built it up. The chapter shows how representations of global crime and disorder problems have been used to justify global policing in political, legal and social terms. The credibility of this account is sustained by the pervasiveness of certain cultural tropes that have their origins in the transnational subculture of policing, which are given a global reach through the subculture of transnational policing. Sheptycki and Bowling move reflect upon the way in which global policing is politically and legally accountable and to try and advance thinking by considering how it ought to be. The task is difficult, they argue, because our models for structuring police accountability are ill-fitting in the global context. Policing, in the broad sense of regulation, is an inherent feature of any community, Sheptycki and Bowling argue, and is an inevitable feature of transnational global society. Ensuring that it is made accountable is a necessity if global policing is to promote economic activity and respect cultural traditions and safeguard the environment.

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