

Northumbria Research Link

Citation: Dixon, Jill (2016) Decentralised public administration: A comparative analysis of continuities and variations in the governments of Andalusia and Catalonia (1977-2015). Doctoral thesis, Northumbria University.

This version was downloaded from Northumbria Research Link:
<http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/36121/>

Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access the University's research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. Single copies of full items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder. The full policy is available online: <http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html>

**Decentralised Public
Administration:
A Comparative Analysis of
Continuities and Variations in the
Governments of Andalusia and
Catalonia (1977-2015)**

JILL DIXON

PhD

2016

**Decentralised Public Administration:
A Comparative Analysis of Continuities
and Variations in the Governments of
Andalusia and Catalonia (1977-2015)**

JILL DIXON

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of
the requirements of the University of
Northumbria at Newcastle for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy**

**Research undertaken in the
Faculty of Arts, Design & Social Sciences**

October 2016

ABSTRACT

Decentralised Public Administration: A Comparative Analysis of Continuities and Variations in the Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia (1977-2015)

This study brings new empirical research on sub-state government in contemporary Spain, addressing a gap in the literature concerning the approaches taken and choices made by Autonomous Governments regarding their institutional design. It tests the hypothesis that decentralisation to territories with distinct and different characteristics will result in diversity in public administrative institutions.

A multi-method investigation compares the responses of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya to the opportunities of decentralisation and the challenges of the post-2008 economic crisis. It analyses budgets, ministerial and civil servant hierarchies, policies and strategies. It also evaluates the perspectives and statements of key politicians, senior civil servants, academics and trades unionists, obtained through one-to-one interviews carried out in Spain during 2014 and 2015.

The research finds that despite recognisable differences in the characteristics of Andalusia and Catalonia, and constitutional recognition of Spain's nations and nationalities, decentralisation has not resulted in significant divergence between these two Autonomous Governments. Priorities, structures, employment practices and administrative cultures demonstrate more continuities than variation. The constitutional and institutional framework and Spain's political culture have been shown to reduce the scope for differentiation. This case study highlights the Napoleonic administrative tradition as the most significant influence for homogeneity. Self-identity, strong but distinct in each community, has contributed to a divergence in style and emphasis in the Junta and the Generalitat, and also to dissimilarities in their responses to the economic crisis.

This research adds to public administration studies evidence that decentralisation does not necessarily result in variation in governmental institutions at sub-state level. The study concludes that the historical legacy of centralism and in particular the continued influence of the administrative tradition have acted as forces for continuity in the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia.

CONTENTS

	Page
List of Maps	i
List of Tables	ii
List of Figures	iv vi
List of Appendices	vii
Acknowledgement	viii
Declaration	
 Chapter One: Introduction	
1.1 Decentralisation as a New and Significant Development in Contemporary Spain	1
1.2 Research Focus and Questions: Continuities and Variations	2
1.3 Limitations of Existing Literature	3
1.4 Scope and Boundaries: Corporate and Political Management Arrangements of the Junta and the Generalitat	5
1.5 Research Design, Methodology, and Methods	6
1.5.1 Research Paradigms	6
1.5.2 Methodology and Methods	7
1.5.3 Case Study	8
1.6 Issues of Language	13
1.7 Development of the Research	14
 Chapter Two: Theoretical and Historical Context	
2.1 Introduction	16
2.1.1 Purpose of Chapter	16
2.2 Nations, Nationalism and the Nation-State	17
2.2.1 Development of Nations	17
2.2.2 Nation-States in Western European Liberal Democracies	19
2.2.3 Different Forms of the Nation-State	22
2.2.4 Sub-Nationalism and Purinationalisms	24

2.3	History of the Two Spains	27
2.3.1	Fragmentation or Continuity?	27
2.3.2	Multiple Divisions	28
2.3.3	Religious Divisions	30
2.3.4	Territorial Divisions	31
2.3.5	Monarchy versus Republicanism	33
2.3.6	Reform versus Reaction	35
2.3.7	Military versus Civilian Power and the Emergence of Peripheral Nationalisms	37
2.3.8	The Second Republic (1931-6) and Civil War Fragmentation (1936-9)	38
2.3.9	The Two Spains of the Franco Regime	41
2.4	Transition to Democracy and the 1978 Constitution	43
2.4.1	Decentralisation: The Most Contentious Issue	43
2.4.2	Drafting a New Constitution	46
2.4.3	Building the State of the Autonomies	49
2.4.4	Weaknesses of the State of the Autonomies	53

Chapter Three: Public Administration and the Management of Public Services

3.1	Introduction	56
3.1.1	Purpose of Chapter	56
3.2.	Parameters and Typologies of Public Administration	56
3.2.1	Parameters of Public Administration	56
3.2.2	Typologies of Public Administrations	58
3.2.3	Spain and the Napoleonic Model	63
3.3	Public Administrative Reform	70
3.3.1	The Classical Model of Public Administration	70
3.3.2	Reform at the End of the Twentieth Century	73
3.3.3	Decentralisation	78
3.3.4	Responses to Austerity	85
3.3.5	Public Administrative Developments in Modern Spain	87

Chapter Four: Case Study of Andalusia and Catalonia

4.1	Introduction	102
4.1.1	Purpose of Chapter	102
4.1.2	Profiles of Andalusia and Catalonia	102
4.2.	Historical Antecedents to the Current Autonomous Governments	105
4.2.1	Definitional Issues	105
4.2.2	Andalusian Regionalism	108
4.2.3	Catalan Nationalism	116

4.3.	Institutional Establishments	126
4.3.1	Junta de Andalucía	126
4.3.2	Generalitat de Catalunya	132
4.4	Contemporary Financial Context	139
4.4.1	National Financing System of Autonomous Governments	139
4.4.2	The Economic Crisis Post-2008 in Spain	146
4.5	Autonomous Government Budgets	153
4.5.1	2015 Budget of Junta de Andalucía	153
4.5.2	2015 Budget of Generalitat de Catalunya	158

Chapter Five: Comparative Analysis

5.1	Introduction	162
5.1.1	Purpose of Chapter	162
5.2	Territorial Self-Identification	162
5.2.1	Opinion Surveys on Self-Identification	162
5.2.2	Preferred Status for Catalonia	166
5.3	People, Politics and Policies	168
5.3.1	Statutes	168
5.3.2	Political Structures	171
5.3.3	Public Employees	183
5.3.4	Political Appointments	188
5.3.5	Employees of 'Special Purpose Vehicles' (SPVs)	191
5.4	Budgets and Strategies	201
5.4.1	2015 Budgets	201
5.4.2	Strategies	211
5.5	Insights from the Narratives Deployed	220
5.5.1	Nomenclature	220
5.5.2	Thematic Analysis of Interviews	221

Chapter Six: Continuities and Variations: Explanatory Factors and Influences

6.1	Introduction	229
6.1.1	Purpose of Chapter	229
6.2	Key Findings of the Case Study	229
6.2.1	Similarities and Differences	229
6.3	The Influence of History	235

6.3.1	The Inevitability of the Past Determining the Present?	235
6.3.2	The Persistence of the Napoleonic Administrative Tradition	236
6.3.3	The Limitations of Path Dependency Approaches	247
6.4	Spanish Political Culture	249
6.4.1	Corruption	249
6.4.2	Dominance by a Political Party	250
6.4.3	Weak Position of Citizens	251
6.4.4	Weak Consumer Power	253
6.5	National Constitutional and Institutional Context	255
6.5.1	1978 Constitution: Flexibility for Competition Not Diversity	255
6.5.2	Shared Legal Framework	257
6.5.3	The Constraints Imposed by the National Financial Framework	258
6.6	Factors Explaining Differences	260
6.6.1	Differences between the Junta and the Generalitat	260
6.6.2	The Influence of Territorial Differentiation	260
6.6.3	The Influence of Self-Identification	265
6.7	Limited Degree of Public Administrative Differentiation	271
6.7.1	Challenging and Re-evaluating the Initial Hypothesis	271
6.7.2	Factors for Homogeneity	272
Chapter Seven: Conclusion		
7.1	Introduction	275
7.1.1	The Impact of Decentralisation on Autonomous Governments Re-evaluated	275
7.1.2	Multiple Grounds for Academic Interest	275
7.1.3	Development of the Hypothesis	277
7.2	Key Findings	278
7.2.1	Literature Review and Case Study Sourced Findings	278
7.2.2	The Existence of Multiple Nationalisms but the Historic Dominance of Centralism	279
7.2.3	Unresolved End Model for the State of Spain resulting in Continued Tension	280
7.2.4	Spanish Public Administration as an Exemplar of the Napoleonic Administrative Tradition	281
7.2.5	Aspects of Differentiation at Sub-State Level	282
7.2.6	Limited Movement away from the Inherited Model	284
7.2.7	The Influence of Self-Identity on Style and Voice	285

7.3	Contribution to Public Administrative and Hispanic Studies	286
7.3.1	Focus on Corporate and Political Management at Sub-State Level	286
7.3.2	Practitioner Insight	286
7.3.3	Investigation at the Confluence of International Economic Downturn and Catalanist Upturn	287
7.3.4	Testing Models From Multiple Disciplines	288
7.4	Further Research Possibilities	288
7.5	Future Prospects	290
	Appendices	294
	Bibliography	336

LIST OF MAPS

		Page
Map 1	Stages of the Reconquest (Lomax 1984: 243)	30
Map 2	The Iberian Peninsula in 1480 (Martín et al 1998: 213)	32
Map 3	The States of Charles V in Europe (1519) (Martínez Shaw 1998: 253)	34
Map 4	Division of Spain (July 1936) (Payne 2012: 78)	40
Map 5	Autonomous Communities of Spain (Aja 2003: 15)	103
Map 6	Catalan-speaking Regions of Europe	107
Map 7	The Shrinking of Moorish Spain (Fletcher 1992: 130)	109

LIST OF TABLES

		Page
Table 1	Two Ideal Types of State Bureaucracy (adapted from Gualmini 2008: 76)	77
Table 2	Three Approaches to Cutbacks (adapted from Pollitt 2010: 22).	86
Table 3	Key Characteristics of Andalusia and Catalonia (drawn from Spanish Government and INE)	104
Table 4	Chronology of Andalusian Autonomy Process (1977-82) (Adapted from González de Molina Navarro and Cruz Artacho 2011: 10-11)	115
Table 5	Chronology of Catalan Autonomy Process (1977-80)	123
Table 6	Ministries of the Junta (2015)	128
Table 7	Composition of Andalusian Parliament (1982-2015) (Cano Buesco 2011: 33)	131
Table 8	Phases of Political Control of the Junta (1982-2015) (adapted from Cano Buesco 2011: 30-35)	132
Table 9	Ministries of the Generalitat (2015)	135
Table 10	Breakdown of Public Employees by Type of Employment Contract (2015)	137
Table 11	Composition of Catalan Parliament (1980-2015)	138
Table 12	Territorial Distribution of Public Expenditure in Spain (%) (Ruiz Almendral 2013: 198 and Pérez García et al 2015: np)	143
Table 13	Revenue for Autonomous Governments (% of Total National Budgets) (Toboso and Scorsone 2010: 166)	143
Table 14	Measures Taken by the Junta and Generalitat to Tackle Effects of Economic Crisis (adapted from Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell et al 2009: 99-100)	147
Table 15	Budget of the Junta de Andalucía (2015)	154
Table 16	Budget of the Generalitat de Catalunya (2015)	158
Table 17	Reduction in Public Sector Posts in Catalonia (2010-2015)	161

		Page
Table 18	Comparative Sense of Belonging (%) (CIS 2012 and 2015)	163
Table 19	Comparison of 2006 Statutes of Andalusia and Catalonia	169
Table 20	Comparison of Political Hierarchy in Junta and Generalitat (2015)	172
Table 21	Comparison of Ministerial Structures in Junta and Generalitat (2015)	174
Table 22	Ministries of the Generalitat (2016)	181
Table 23	Comparison of Autonomous Government Staffing Levels (January 2015) (adapted from MHAP 2015c and INE)	185
Table 24	Type of Employment Contract Used (2002) (Ramió and Salvador 2002: 120)	187
Table 25	Comparison of Budgets (2015)	202
Table 26	Comparison of Senior Politicians' Salaries (2015)	210
Table 27	Overview of Similarities and Differences between the Junta and Generalitat	232

LIST OF FIGURES

		Page
Figure 1	Autonomous Communities and Statutes (Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: xxi, supplemented by author's research on Autonomous Government websites)	51
Figure 2	Four Variables of Administrative Traditions (adapted from Painter and Peters 2010a: 6-8)	63
Figure 3	Weber's Characteristics of Bureaucracy (Gerth and Mills (1991: 196-8)	72
Figure 4	Distribution of Seats in Andalusian Parliament (2015)	127
Figure 5	Finance Ministry as Exemplar of Junta Political Hierarchy (2015)	130
Figure 6	Distribution of Seats in Catalan Parliament (2015)	133
Figure 7	Ministry of Economy and Knowledge as Exemplar of Generalitat Political Hierarchy Model (2015)	136
Figure 8	Structural Funds Received by Autonomous Governments (2000-2006 and 2007-2013) (M€) (Carmona Contreras and Koelling 2013: 253)	145
Figure 9	Summary of Spanish Government Austerity Measures (July 2012) (adapted from Garea 2015: 10-11)	148
Figure 10	Division of Junta Budget by Main Services (2015)	155
Figure 11	Difference from Mean Resource Levels via the National Financing System (cumulative 2009-2012)	156
Figure 12	Division of Generalitat Budget by Main Services (2015)	159
Figure 13	Sense of Belonging in Andalusia (2005, 2010, 2012) (adapted from CIS 2005, 2010, 2012)	164
Figure 14	Sense of Belonging in Catalonia (2005, 2010, 2012, 2015) (adapted from CIS 2005, 2010, 2012 and CEO 2015)	165
Figure 15	Preferred Status for Catalonia (January 2010 – June 2015) (adapted from CEO 2015)	167
Figure 16	International Work of the Generalitat (2015)	176

		Page
Figure 17	Autonomous Government Foreign Offices Expenditure (2011-14) (Hernández and Gil 2016: np)	178
Figure 18	Number of Special Purpose Vehicles by Autonomous Government (2015) (MHAP 2015b)	194
Figure 19	Reduction in Special Purpose Vehicles by Autonomous Government (MHAP 2014: 14)	196
Figure 20	Catalan Health Service Model (Generalitat 2008)	198
Figure 21	Andalusian Health Service Model (Junta 2009)	200
Figure 22	Drivers and Main Lines of Action (Reform Plan 2014) (Generalitat 2014)	215
Figure 23	Nine Initiatives (Reform Plan 2014) (Generalitat 2014)	215
Figure 24	Application of Hirschman's Exit and Voice Dichotomy to Choices of the Junta and Generalitat (adapted from Hirschman 1970)	268
Figure 25	Spanish General Election Results (2015 and 2016) (El País 2016)	276
Figure 26	General Election Results in Andalusia (2016) (El País 2016)	291
Figure 27	General Election Results in Catalonia (2016) (El País 2016)	292

LIST OF APPENDICES

	Page
A Names and Positions of Interviewees and Dates of Interviews	294
B Key Points from Interviews	297
C Correspondence from the Generalitat (July 2015)	326
D Political Parties (2016)	335

Acknowledgement

The encouragement, guidance and inspiration of many teachers enabled the undertaking of this research. The support of my husband, Will, made its completion possible.

Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges opinions, ideas and contributions from the work of others.

Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this thesis has been approved. Approval was sought and granted by the Faculty Ethics Committee on 2nd September 2014.

I declare that the Word Count of this Thesis is 80,104 words.

Name: JILL DIXON

Signature:

Date: 3rd October 2016

1.1 DECENTRALISATION AS A NEW AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN

Decentralisation was a cornerstone of Spain's transition to a democratic state following the death of Franco in 1975. It was a recognition of, and response to, the demands of some parts of Spain for greater autonomy and the need to create a new territorial distribution of power, and resulted in the creation of seventeen Autonomous Governments covering the whole of Spain. Each Autonomous Government has its own directly elected Parliament and indirectly elected First Minister and Executive. Each is responsible for key public services, and is staffed by public employees. They are now major actors in Spain's public life, accounting (together with local government) for over half of total public expenditure (Del Pino and Pavolini 2015: 249). The creation of this decentralised State of the Autonomies (el estado de las autonomías) was a new departure for Spain, an opportunity to organise public administration in a way which was distinct from the past and which would recognise the differences between the many geographical parts of the country.

This area of study has been chosen not only for its academic merits, the case for which is made in this chapter, but also as a result of the researcher's ongoing fascination with all things Spanish, including the Spanish language, fuelled during a first degree in Spanish, French and Politics. In addition, it seeks to benefit from, and develop, the researcher's skills, experience and keen interest in public administration, built up over a long career in UK local government, culminating in the position of Chief Executive.

1.2 RESEARCH FOCUS AND QUESTIONS: CONTINUITIES AND VARIATIONS

This thesis is an investigation into the extent to which the opportunity has been taken by the new Autonomous Governments to create public administrative structures, policies and strategies appropriate to their territories. Specifically it examines the corporate and political management arrangements, signifying in this context, the ministerial and senior civil servant structures, the policies, and the plans which determine, at a strategic level, how the whole organisation operates. The study of corporate and political management arrangements encompasses the role of politicians, the way in which ministries are defined, the public employment practices adopted and how civil servants and politicians interact. The budget is a key element of this corporate design as the way in which it is constructed is a translation of the relative priorities of functions and responsibilities into funded programmes and activities. The corporate and political management arrangements also encompass an external focus: how the organisation as a whole sees itself and presents itself to the outside world and how it deals with other organisations. Most importantly, the corporate and political management arrangements can be read as an expression of the key values and the culture of an organisation.

This research seeks to examine the degree to which decentralisation has resulted in public administrative differentiation and to analyse the factors affecting that level of differentiation. Administrative differentiation is understood to mean the degree of variation between the sub-state institutional arrangements, in terms of their internal, organisational structures, policies, practices and processes.

By studying two specific Autonomous Governments, those of Andalusia and Catalonia, this research tests the hypothesis that Spain's contemporary decentralisation would result in public administrative differentiation by addressing the following specific research questions:

To what extent have historical, social, economic and political factors influenced the differential development of the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia?

How do these factors help explain the response of these two Autonomous Governments to the austerity regime following the 2008 economic crisis?

Which factors are the most influential in understanding the contemporary corporate and political management arrangements of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya?

1.3 LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING LITERATURE

There is a wide body of literature on the creation of Spain's State of the Autonomies and the Autonomous Governments (notably Heywood 1995 and Moreno 2001 after the first two decades) and on its subsequent development (Subirats and Gallego 2002; Colino 2008; Keating and Wilson 2009). Existing literature covers a range of aspects:

- International comparisons of the Spanish territorial distribution of powers have been made (Giordano and Roller 2004; Fedele and Ongaro 2008; Hooghe et al 2010; Alonso 2012).
- Specific aspects of the system have been examined, such as financing (López Laborda and Monasterio Escudero 2007; De La Fuente 2012)
- Relations with Europe have been explored (Jeffrey 2000; Carmona Contreras and Kolling 2013), along with the impact of the EU on sub-state authorities (Fleurke and Willemse 2006).
- Individual services as they operate across Spain have been investigated (Guillén and Cabiedes 1997 on health; Losada and Máiz 2005 on education).

However, the bibliography at the level of individual Autonomous Governments is less developed. The focus of existing work has largely been on the historical development of peripheral nationalisms,

notably Catalonia and the Basque Country (Guibernau 2004b and Dowling 2013) on Catalan nationalism; Mees 2003 and Muro 2008 on Basque nationalism; Gillespie 2015 on both).¹ International comparisons have been made, again focused largely on Catalonia (Guibernau, Rocher and Adam 2014 on Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland). There has been an understandable increase in recent years of research into Catalan decentralised government in the context of the surge in support for independence of Catalonia (Cramer 2014; Bel 2015).

Similarly, in the field of Public Administration study, extensive research has been undertaken of Spain's bureaucracy, where it is located within the typologies of public administrative traditions (Sotiropoulos 2006; Peters 2008), and the implementation of reform (Kickert 2007; Ongaro 2009; Alba and Navarro 2011). With notable exceptions (Gallego and Subirats 2012 on welfare policy options at sub-state level; Jiménez Asensio 2013 on human resources and ethics and Gallego, Barbieri and González 2016 on health), the focus has predominantly been at state, not sub-state, level (Parrado Díez 2011).

There is limited research on developments within the State of the Autonomies and on comparing specific Autonomous Governments, resulting in a lack of insight in explaining the decisions taken and the choices made about public administrative institutional design at a sub-state level. Academic evaluations of the effectiveness of decentralisation are also limited (Solé-Ollé 2009). In the light of this deficit, this research seeks to investigate the corporate and strategic working of two specific Autonomous Governments, contributing an understanding of their internal dynamics to the existing body of literature on public administration. A comparative method is employed to broaden and maximise the explicative power of this study.

¹ The term 'peripheral' is not used here to mean secondary or less important, but rather in the geographical sense, stressing the distance from Madrid.

1.4 SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES: CORPORATE AND POLITICAL MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS OF THE JUNTA AND THE GENERALITAT

This is not an investigation of specific services, of service delivery or performance. It is an examination of the corporate and political management arrangements in two sub-states. Nor is it a commentary on all Autonomous Governments of Spain. The focus is the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya with analysis of the budgets, structures, policies and strategies as in force during the period 2014 to 2015. The 'cut off' point for the analysis of budgets, structures and policies was the 2015 regional elections in Andalusia and Catalonia, although more recent developments have been incorporated into this research, where they provide a correction or development of the analysis.

By restricting the parameters to a comparison within Spain, the research seeks to reduce the range of variables, enabling a focus on the factors affecting public administration at the decentralised level. The choice of these two specific Autonomous Communities is justified on the grounds that Andalusia and Catalonia offer sufficient similarities and also differences in characteristics to make valid comparisons.

The Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya both serve large populations (at 8.4m and 7.5m respectively) and are both early adopters of autonomy, meaning that they have been responsible for a full range of services, particularly education and social services, for a long period, unlike most other Autonomous Governments. Both operate under the same (Common) financing regime (unlike for example the Basque Country which works within a distinct financing framework, called the Foral regime). Both have a sense of distance from Madrid (both in terms of geography and popular perception) and each a distinct self-identity.

In terms of differences, Andalusia and Catalonia have: dissimilar economies - Catalonia being the more prosperous; different geographies in terms of both location and size (Catalonia's proximity to Europe and Andalusia's land mass covering almost three times that of Catalonia); dissimilar political allegiances, demonstrated by Andalusia's sustained electoral support of the Socialist Party (PSOE) and Catalonia's support for Catalan parties, often though not exclusively of the centre or centre-right; separate cultures and, in the case of Catalonia, languages; and a distinct position in relation to historic nationhood and attitudes to the Spanish nation-state. These characteristics enable a valid examination of public administrative differentiation in the Autonomous Governments of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya.

1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND METHODS

1.5.1 RESEARCH PARADIGMS

There are many methods available to researchers in the execution of their research. However, it is important to locate choices about design within the framework of philosophical science. Ontological and epistemological assumptions define, respectively, the way a reality is conceived and perceived; and how knowledge about a particular view of reality is to be generated, represented, understood, and used (Hallebone and Priest 2009: 26-7). There are numerous classifications of research approaches. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating identify positivist, post-positivist, interpretivist and humanistic approaches as positions on a spectrum in the social sciences (2008: 23). Roger Pierce describes positivism, empiricism, behaviourism, naturalism, feminism and post-modernism (2008: 22-37). A third classification provides the categories of positivist, interpretivist and criticalist to illustrate the range of perspectives in the science of knowledge (Hallebone and Priest 2009: 6).

The positivist approach sees the world existing as an objective entity and in principle knowable in its entirety. It exists outside the mind of the researcher and it is the researcher's task to describe and analyse this reality. The positivist approach can be contrasted with the interpretivist approach in which objective and subjective meanings are linked. Unlike the positivist view that there are rules and laws governing the object of the study which makes it amenable to empirical research, the interpretivist approach sees the limits of these laws and places an emphasis on human beings and society being experienced subjectively. This means that there is no objective foundation for knowledge and the researcher therefore needs to understand human motivations. Humanist approaches focus on the subjective understanding of external reality by the object of the study and the researcher (Della Porta and Keating 2008: 23-5).

There has been much debate in Social Sciences about the appropriate research paradigm for Public Administration, the concept of a paradigm brought to prominence by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) as a 'general orientation to reality and its analysis' (quoted in Rainey 1994: 41). In particular, the conflict has centred on the positivist and post-modernist schools of thought. There is also a view that there can be no one, dominant paradigm. Hal G. Rainey concludes that 'what really matters is the appropriateness of the method to the research problem and, most important of all, the effectiveness of the execution of the method' (1994: 44).

The approach adopted in this research is one which recognises the different epistemological assumptions and one which draws on both positivist and interpretative frameworks in order to address the research questions of this study.

1.5.2 METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

The case study methodology adopted in this research reflects positivist assumptions that the world exists as an objective entity and is knowable. It uses empirical data to test a hypothesis deduced from

theory (that public administrative differentiation would result from decentralisation). It seeks to describe and analyse this reality. It does not aim to develop theory and therefore is not inductive. However, it also adopts an interpretivist approach as the dominant paradigm, as the world is knowable through observation and interpretation. It does not seek to develop theory to address real-world problems (Hallebone and Priest 2009: 45), but rather to engage with, understand and interpret the perspectives, and motivations of key people involved in the Junta and Generalitat. The research does not draw on humanist assumptions which stress the subjective understanding of the external reality of the researcher: the researcher's stance here is that of an outsider to the field of data, not an insider or participant in the generation of that data (Hallebone and Priest 2009: 28-9). It is not an experimental or intuitive methodology. However, the limitations of the researcher's neutrality or objectivity need to be recognised as the methodology draws on the expertise of the researcher as a public sector professional as well as an academic.

The methods used in the case study are predominantly qualitative, usually associated with more interpretivist approaches, obtaining verbal data from in-depth interviews, and document data from existing publications, but some quantitative methods are also employed (in relation to financial analysis for example). The methodology is therefore concerned with describing and interpreting, in a critical way.

1.5.3 CASE STUDY

A case study approach was adopted, given its contribution to scholarship in terms of: answering how and why (process related) questions; capturing the world-view of the participants; and providing an interpretative framework for understanding common practices and actions (Staller 2012: 399).

Data was required on *resources* (national government policies in relation to budgets, the financing regime), *politics and policies* (political composition of the Junta and the Generalitat, policy priorities,

relations with Madrid) and on *organisational capacity* (budgets, staffing, management approaches, corporate strategies, human resources policies and practice). The research design was therefore based on accessing three main sources. The first source was web-based research (predominantly the Junta and Generalitat websites, and also the Spanish Government website and Spanish newspapers on line). Secondly, existing academic studies, both on-line and at Spanish Universities, were investigated. Thirdly, the research centred on including interviews with key actors currently involved in the processes to enable the exploration of their perspectives. The centrality of these interviews to the research demanded the consideration of a wide range of issues to ensure maximum effectiveness as described below.

One-to-one interviews were the most appropriate method for a number of reasons. They would enable the most up-to-date information, provide access to the insights of people directly involved in sub-state government and would offer the opportunity to address shortfalls in information available on line. Semi-structured interviews would offer an opportunity to focus the interviews on the subject matter of this research, whilst allowing flexibility in terms of the exploration of related issues during the interview. The recording of the interviews would ensure the efficient, immediate capture of information (and enable follow-ups by email to secure clarification), and support the capacity of the researcher to interact and pursue points during the actual interview.

One-to-one interviews in a second language and in a second country would demand a number of skills, including language competency, interview techniques, risk assessment and technical skills, and the deployment of very significant logistical abilities. The researcher's language skills needed to be improved (including the acquisition of specialist vocabulary). This aspect of the design and execution of the research was particularly important, with the ability to research and

communicate in Spanish being essential not only in terms of access and communication, but also in the avoidance of 'cultural imperialism':

The loss of the sense of the need, let alone the ability, to read closely in another language, [...] ultimately leads to a position of cultural imperialism, the assumption that everything can be done in English, so that cultural difference is little more than an exotic adornment to our own comfortable space. (Buffery, Davies and Hooper 2007: 12)

Risk assessments were carried out of the planned programme of interviews and new skills in recording and transcribing voice data learnt. Drawing on the researcher's extensive experience of management, interview skills were further refined using 'dry runs' in both English and Spanish prior to the study visits to Spain. A conscious discipline was needed to ensure that the researcher did not bring into the research her own professional values, based on her working experience in the UK. Rather, it was vital that the behaviour of the researcher was as an independent, objective researcher, with heuristic motives. However, as recognised above, there are limitations to the neutral, objective stance: the interactive nature of the semi-structured interview is influenced by the personality and perceived personality of the researcher in terms of their knowledge and skills. The requirements of the University's research ethics framework were also addressed and met.

The design of the study visits took into consideration timing, ensuring the avoidance of major festivals and holidays as well as election periods. The decision to plan a repetition of the 2015 visits in 2016 was taken to investigate developments, clarify issues and fill gaps which may have arisen, and crucially to test emerging findings. It would also enable follow-up with the same interviewees as well as adding in new people (including new incumbents of the same post, enabling a comparison of different perspectives from the same post). Not foreseen, but beneficial to the research, a gap of twelve months

offered opportunities to interview leading members of newly emerging political parties.²

Securing the views of high-level individuals was crucial to the quality of the research. Rather than seeking a large number of interviews, in-depth and extended interviews were organised with a smaller number of key, knowledgeable and influential actors. The interviewees included politicians of all parties (in executive, ministerial roles and in opposition leadership roles), senior civil servants, academic experts in the field of Spanish public administration studies, and leading trades unions officers operating in the public sector, to secure a rounded view of operations within the two Autonomous Governments. A gender balance was also secured.

Resources did not permit the inclusion of other, important perspectives such as those of service users, front-line staff or middle managers (although the interviews with trades unionists and academics avoided an exclusively internal focus). Nor was it possible to include interviews with personnel based outside of the capital cities of Seville and Barcelona. Focusing on the two Autonomous Government headquarters was the most efficient way of meeting with a significant number of people in a restricted time period. A major task was the identification of the right people and obtaining their contact details. Contact was made well in advance of the study visits, to explain the nature of the research and its aims and also stress the researcher's credentials not only as an academic but also as a practitioner with many years' executive management experience in the UK public sector. Persistence was needed to achieve the high level of success in securing acceptance to interview requests. A schedule of meetings was organised for study visits to Seville (September/October 2014 and November 2015) and to Barcelona (October 2014 and November 2015).

² A list of the main political parties is given at Appendix D.

Careful consideration was given to the drafting of questions in terms of the subject matter, including consistency to enable comparisons between Andalusia and Catalonia and to obtain alternative perspectives on the same issue. Questions were drafted to be open-ended, not to be leading, and to demonstrate appropriateness and sensitivity to the interviewee's role. Whilst benefitting from a background of managerial experience, it was important to maintain a neutral approach, bringing no normative tendencies to the interviews and the research. Interviewees were sent copies of the questions before the meeting. At the meeting, the nature of the research was explained and issues relating to confidentiality and the use of material clarified. The aim of the interviews was to advance from anecdotes and stereotypes of Andalusia and Catalonia and of Spanish bureaucracy by detailed, analytical examination.

The semi-structured interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed, with the key points summarised in English (See Appendix B). A thematic analysis of the interviews was also undertaken, based on the interviews, the results of which informed the research (see Chapter Five, Section 5.5). The consent of interviewees to specific quotations was obtained at a later stage of the research.

Conducting case study interviews in a second country brings a number of challenges, including travel, language, time and resources. The cultural and structural differences between UK and Spanish public administration had to be charted, to secure meetings with the right people. Carrying out interviews over the course of more than one year offered opportunities to revisit and develop particular aspects of the research. It also increased the potential impact on the research of the shifting sands of political life in Spain, with for example, two general elections, four regional elections and one voluntary referendum taking place over the period of this research, as well as the shift in the official position of the Generalitat in relation to independence.

1.6 ISSUES OF LANGUAGE

English translations are given of Castilian and Catalan terms in this study, with the exception of titles such as the names of the Junta de Andalucía, the Generalitat de Catalunya, the two Autonomous Governments under examination. Some words translate more happily than others: Comunidad Autónoma, for example, translates directly as Autonomous Community which does not convey the governmental institutions which are the focus of this research and so the term adopted here is Autonomous Government. The term Autonomous Community is used to relate to the territory and people only (and not to the organ of government). The English names of Andalusia and Catalonia are used. The decentralised state model is called the 'Estado de las autonomías', translated here as the State of the Autonomies, where the term Autonomies is understood as Autonomous Governments. Where adequate translations do not exist, the original Spanish term is used and explained.

Discussion of autonomy, decentralisation and federalism in Spain is particularly fraught with value-laden terminology. Desires for self-determination have been called 'decentralising', 'regionalist', 'nationalist' and 'secessionist'. Catalonia, for example, has been described as a 'region', a 'nation', a 'nationality', a 'nation without a state', a 'peripheral nation'. Use of the term 'the Spanish state' rather than Spain (see Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 12, for example) reflects a questioning by some of the existence of Spain as a nation. Certain terms used, such as 'plurinational' and 'multinational', do not always translate comfortably into English. These issues are considered in greater depth in Chapter Two, but to avoid repeating the debates throughout this thesis, when discussing the Autonomous Government level of Spain, I will use the term 'sub-state' as a neutral term to denote the level of territorial organisation below that of Spain.

1.7 DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH

This research recognises the significance of context, particularly in relation to comparative research. Christopher Pollitt's 2013 publication is devoted specifically to the importance of context in public policy and management. Context influences how things are understood, how things work now and the nature of how things may change in the future. Context affects the content and process of public administrations. It is therefore important to understand the many layers and the interconnection between the many elements that make up the context to any research area. 'The cultural, societal, politico-institutional and administrative "context" in which public services organizations operate is a remarkably significant feature' (Ferlie and Ongaro 2015: 121). The first two chapters, therefore, of this study are devoted to providing an appreciation of the context in terms of concepts of nation and identity, the impact of history, public administrative disciplines and contemporary politics.

The first chapter examines the conceptual framework of nationalisms and the formation of the nation-state before placing Spain's current decentralised state into an historical context. It reflects on Spain's past through a prism of divisions and tensions, providing the framework for a more detailed examination of the Transition to Democracy and the creation of the new State of the Autonomies. Chapter Three provides the public administrative context to this research, examining relevant parameters of public administration, typologies of public administrative cultures and international developments in reform. It also examines the policy of decentralisation as it relates to public administration and impact of Spanish membership of the European Union.

The results of the case study work on the Junta and the Generalitat are covered in Chapter Four. It scrutinises the historical antecedents to the current Autonomous Governments, the key elements of their institutional establishments, the contemporary financial context in

which they operate as well as analyses of their 2015 budgets. A comparative analysis of the two Autonomous Governments is given in Chapter Five, focusing on territorial self-identification; the corporate and political management arrangements (people, politics and policies; budgets and strategies) and the words and phrases used by interviewees to describe themselves, their territories and their institutions.

Explanations for the findings are set out in Chapter Six, with an examination of the factors influencing homogeneity and heterogeneity in the corporate political and management arrangements. This enables a comprehensive response to the research questions posed at the outset in relation to public administrative differentiation.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions summarises the study, charting the development of the hypothesis and research questions, and outlining the justification for the research. It states the key findings in relation to the limited degree of administrative differentiation between these two Autonomous Governments in terms of their corporate and political management arrangements and sets out explanations for this conclusion. The case is made for this study's original contribution to knowledge. The chapter identifies areas for further research and concludes with a commentary on future prospects in the light of the June 2016 Spanish general elections.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

2.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and historical context to the development of the modern-day State of the Autonomies in Spain. A review of the literature concerning theories of nationalism is undertaken, contrasting primordial and modernist approaches. Consideration is given to the nation-state in Western European liberal democracies, including debate over whether the dominance of the nation-state is now in decline. The federal and unitary models of territorial organisation of power are briefly outlined, and attention given to the concepts of sub-nationalism and pluri-nationalism, particularly as they pertain to Spain.

The historical context is written from the perspective of a series of divisions or fragmentation in Spain's past. It assesses religious and political divides, the conflict between monarchism and republicanism, between military and civilian rule as well as territorial divisions. The fragmentation of the Civil War and the repression of the Franco period are examined, particularly in relation to regionalism.

Analysis of the period of the Transition to Democracy focuses on the 1978 Constitution, the product of a consensus not to revisit the divisions of the past. The constitutional provision for the creation of the State of the Autonomies was a key element of this compromise and is discussed here. The initial establishment of the State of the Autonomies is documented, a critique of the weaknesses of the model given, and its relationship to earlier definitions of federal and unitary models analysed.

2.2 NATIONS, NATIONALISMS AND THE NATION-STATE

2.2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS

The study of nations and nationalism can be considered from the perspective of three main categories of explanation: primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism. Primordialists contend that the nation is something natural – the result of the human race being naturally divided into different tribes or groups. They therefore stress common descent and an underlying emotional bond of territorial belonging, shared language and symbols. The nation is not a creation of man, but rather the result of an organic evolution (Hearn 2006: 20). Montserrat Guibernau describes this as an ‘essentialist’ conception, which regards the nation as a ‘natural, quasi-eternal entity’ (2013: 2). Descent is the central theme of primordialism, with blood, kinship and ancestry as key factors in explaining national bonds. Landscape and the geography of place is integral to the primordialist view of belonging. The term ‘homeland’ has been used to describe the intermeshing of land with notions of ancestry and family (Connor 2001: 53). A fundamental element of the inter-connection of primordialism is that of language. Johann Gottfried Herder, writing in the latter half of the eighteenth century, saw language as central to a nation’s identity, without which a nation could not exist (Mar-Molinero 1996: 71). This view of the importance of language is supported by Elie Kedourie:

The test, then, by which a nation is known to exist is that of language. A group speaking the same language is known as a nation, and a nation ought to constitute a state. (1993: 62)

The alternative perspective is that of modernists such as Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm who view nations as creations of the modern world, recent phenomena arising before, during or in the wake of the French Revolution. Nations and nationalism are not natural, permanent features of the human condition, but came into being with the transition to industrialisation: ‘the age of Transition to industrialism was bound [...] also to be an age of nationalism’ (Gellner 2006: 39).

Nations are thus seen as inevitable outcomes of a modern industrial society, not rooted to the past. Gellner summarised the difference between the primordialists and modernists as follows:

While primordialists consider that nations have existed forever and therefore the past is very important, modernists point to the end of the eighteenth century as the crucial point of creation, before which there is nothing to help understand present nations. (Gellner 1996: 367)

John Breuilly, a leading proponent of modernism, does 'not regard the nation as having a significant pre-modern history, or as a 'real' group with an identity and consciousness which produces political effects such as nation-states' (2001: 32). Importantly, modernists see the modern state (not any primordial historical inheritance) as the institution which generates the ideal of the nation, using education and linguistic homogeneity as drivers of a mass culture and unified national identity (Hearn 2006: 67). Benedict Anderson (2006) sees nations as modern creations. Membership of a nation requires an act of imagination which is only possible under the conditions of modernism, stressing in particular the role of the printed word in promoting and developing a shared national identity.

Anthony D. Smith's ethno-symbolism can be seen as a third approach – although he has been described by Breuilly as a primordialist (Hearn 2006: 45). Smith points to modernism's failure to recognise the cultural or ethnic ties of those nations that had developed before the modern era. Specifically, he points to three limitations: a neglect of the powerful affective dimensions of nations and nationalism, a concentration on elite actions at the expense of popular beliefs and actions, and a failure to distinguish genuine constructs from long term processes and structures in which successive generations have been socialised (1999: 9). Smith's ethno-symbolic alternative focuses on the persistence of ethnic communities, or *ethnies*. He argues that the formation of nations needs to be seen over a long period of time, not necessarily the result of the process of modernisation. Whilst many nations did emerge in the modern period, they also referred back to

an older, 'ethnic' past for cultural traditions, those traditions being used as cultural sources for later nation building. Ethno-symbolists stress the importance of myths and symbols in the development and persistence of ethnic identity. John Hutchinson criticises modernist frameworks' inability to 'easily explain the intense historical identification of populations with older ethnic cultures in the modern world' (Hutchinson 2001: 74).

Ethno-symbolism is not without critics. Smith has been criticised for overstressing the ethnic element of nations. Ethnicity and territory are components of all political identities and can be 'construed on the basis of diverse materials' not solely from ethnies' shared memories, myths and territorial belongings (Eriksen 2004: 49). Of particular relevance to this thesis is the criticism that Smith's theory does not distinguish between the concepts of nation and state. Guibernau argues that the attribution of common legal rights and duties for all members is part of a state not a nation (2004a: 125-141). This flaw is particularly relevant in relation to national identity in nations without states, a category into which Catalonia falls.

2.2.2 NATION-STATES IN WEST EUROPEAN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

The nation-state emerged as the dominant form of political organisation in Western Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as 'a way of organising the political system (the state) and of relating this to society (nation)', particularly in the context of industrialisation (Loughlin 2011: 46). Centralised states developed in Europe between the sixteenth and nineteenth century 'successfully claiming a monopoly of law making and law enforcing over a unified geographical territory, and independence from any external authority' (Beetham 1984: 208). Beetham dates the subsequent acceptance that state boundaries should coincide with a given people, a nation, as late as the nineteenth century and concludes that the nation-state has become the dominant political formation, being 'so central a feature of the political landscape that it is difficult to imagine its absence'

(Beetham 1984: 208). The received view is that the state and the nation 'should cohere within a single, sovereign territory and that the nation-state thereby constituted should express [...] a determinate national culture or identity' (Breen and O'Neill 2010: 1). This assumption that the nation-state is the obvious focus has been called 'methodological nationalism' in social science analysis (Jeffrey 2014: 1). The focus of debate in recent years has been whether the nation-state remains the primary political unit or whether it is being superseded. This post-nationalist debate does not deny national identity or its endurance, but rather points to the impact of globalisation and cosmopolitanism (Breen and O'Neill 2010: 1).

In terms of the challenges of globalisation, these can be broken down into three main elements: global capitalism, global threats and supra-national institutions. The increasingly inter-dependent international economic activity, the growth of multi-nationals and global operation of financial markets all threaten the pre-eminence of nation-states, as key decisions are taken outside of national governments. Ohmae Kenichi's view is that nation-states are not and should not be the primary actors in today's global economy. His theory is that the globalisation of world markets will continue, moving towards a borderless economy. Modern nation-states are unnecessary middlemen. The mobility of investment, industry, IT and individual consumers means that 'nation-states no longer have to play a market making role' and further 'often just get in the way' (Kenichi 1996: 4). Rather, small economies, linked to region states, possibly crossing national boundaries, will be fast and flexible enough to prosper in this new world economy (1996: 5). The growing importance of economic interventions at sub-state levels of governance in the context of globalisation and the rise of multi-national corporations are also highlighted by Ray Hudson (2007), a perspective particularly pertinent to Catalonia and the role of Barcelona in a City Region.

The second challenge presented by globalisation relates to climate change, disease and international terrorism, threats which do not

respect national boundaries. Thirdly, there has been a growth in supra-national institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, whose decisions can reduce the ability of nation-states to determine their own economic policies.

Cosmopolitanism, the global movement of people, is the other challenge, particularly as it relates to identity. Cosmopolitanism is wider than migration as it includes diaspora and transnationalism, so embracing cultural, political and ethical considerations (Sutherland 2012: 11). It is argued that national identity is diminished because of increasing pluralisation and affiliation within a nation-state through the assertion of minority national and ethnic groups and because of increased immigration and the diversification of population (Breen and O'Neill 2010: 3). In a European context, and particularly a Spanish one, all these challenges can be witnessed and indeed supplemented by the existence of the EU and its measures towards greater economic and political integration and by tensions with the emergence of sub-state level movements.

Despite these challenges, many commentators contend that the demise of the nation-state in Europe is not imminent. The European Union, for example, continues to be a nation-state led institution, used by nation-states to enhance their own powers rather than be subsumed in a supranational state of Europe (Hutchinson 1994: 160). Guibernau argues that the 'age of the nation-state is by no means exhausted' (2013: 103). Claire Sutherland's examination of the impact of the challenge of cosmopolitanism concludes that nationalism is a flexible ideology, capable of adapting to the changes of the twenty-first century (2012: x). Helen Thompson looks at the nation-state in the context of the global financial crisis, arguing that the claims of globalisation about the powerlessness of nation-states are overstated.

The dominance of the globalisation discourse has distorted understanding of states which:

do have considerably more economic power, and the diplomatically and military (sic) most powerful states are more robust in the face of international organisations and networks than the variants of globalization literature supposed. (Thompson 2010: 147)

Despite its late arrival to the 'club' of Western European liberal democracies, Spain has equally seen these threats against the pre-eminence of the nation-state. Membership of the European Union, the impact of economic globalisation and the cosmopolitan movement of people and, above all in the context of this research, the growth in sub-state movements, can all be argued as reducing the dominance of the Spanish nation-state. The tension between Central Government and sub-state government in Spain is a theme which will be explored in the course of this study of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya. However, it is fair to conclude at this stage that whilst European integration and decentralisation may have drawn some important competencies away from nation-states like Spain, 'they have by no means negated the immense resources still concentrated in the hands of central state executives' (Llamazares and Marks 2006: 241).

2.2.3 DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE NATION-STATE

There are two broad models of territorial organisation of power in nation-states: unitary and federal. In unitary models there is a single source of sovereignty. There is a dominant centre, administration is centralised and standardised and all territories are treated the same. Within a unitary model, however, power can be distributed away from the centre, creating multiple levels of government. The form and nature of decentralisation as it relates to public administration is addressed in Chapter Three. A decentralised model still fits within the unitary model as, unlike in federal states, these powers can be removed or changed by Central Government. This power to remove

lower tiers is possible.³ However, as Tim Bale points out, ‘the idea that [the powers of the Autonomous Governments] can be taken back [...] is fanciful’ (2008: 46).

In federal states sovereignty is shared between the national government and the sub-national level. The allocation of specific roles to each tier is usually set out in the constitution and neither tier can abolish the other. The sub-national level has a role in national policy-making, normally through an upper chamber. Federalism is usually described as being either dual or co-operative, reflecting, respectively, a distinction in approach between the US and European states (Hague & Harrop 2007: 285-88). Underpinning dual federalism is the view that the national and state governments operate independently of each other, each acting separately and autonomously in their own sphere of responsibilities. In contrast, co-operative federalism rests on the idea of co-operation between levels. Subsidiarity is key, with the assumption that decisions should be taken at the lowest level feasible and the view that the work of governing is a division of tasks rather than a separation.

Both the UK and Spain have been described outside this dichotomy as unions or union-states rather than nation-states (Keating 1998: 37; Loughlin 2011: 54). The development of these union-states allowed for degrees of autonomy to be agreed for the constituent parts, whilst retaining centralised and state-wide administration. The union-state therefore reflected the variations that existed pre-union. As will be explored in the next section, ‘variations’ did exist pre-union in Spain, not least in Catalonia, the ramifications of which are a central feature in understanding sub-state government in Spain today. The extent to which Spain can be considered federal following the 1978 Constitution is addressed in the Section below. Concepts of sub-nationalism and

³ As evidenced for example in the case of the UK Government abolishing the Greater London Council and the Metropolitan County Councils in 1986 (King 1989).

pluralism are particularly relevant to Spain and its Autonomous Communities and so are considered at this point.

2.2.4 SUB-NATIONALISM AND PLURI-NATIONALISM

As anticipated in the introduction to this thesis, definition of sub-national territories is fraught with difficulties. The term 'region' is used, at one end of the spectrum, to describe supra state territorial entities (Philomena B. Murray 2011, for example sees Europe as 'the region'), to, at the other end, relatively small sub-national areas such as the North East of England. This problem is equally reflected in the terminology of nationalism and regionalism. The tendency is to see nationalism as separatism and secession, and anything less as sub-nationalism or regionalism (McCrone 2006: 238). The term nation-state also makes problematic the consideration of nations not formally independent and states in which different territorial cultural groupings (or nations) are present. A failure to distinguish between nation and state, with the use of the hyphenated term 'nation-state' can give rise to a 'fusing of two analytically distinct spheres', aligning the political (state) and the cultural (nation) (McCrone 2006: 237). The existence of more than one nation within a state is therefore complex. Ferran Requejo and Miquel Caminal seek to address this failure, advocating the use of the term 'plurinational', preferring it to the term 'multinational', giving two reasons:

First, "plurinational" refers both to the descriptive side of the concept (the fact that some democracies include different national societies within them) and to the prescriptive side of the concept (the claim for recognition and protection of plurination in liberal democracies – national pluralism in this case). In contrast, the term multinational only covers the descriptive side of the concept. (2011: 9 n1)⁴

They contend that the liberal democracies developed in a period that predates today's complexities and which cannot accommodate pluri-

⁴ The use of the term 'multinational' is an inadequate translation of the Spanish term 'multinacional' as the term in English usually refers to a large business which operates in several countries. In this case Requejo and Caminal (2011) use it to denote the existence of more than one national society.

nationalism. Economic globalisation and multiculturalism and emerging national pluralism mean that more plural responses are needed than liberal democratic nation-states have traditionally provided. They argue that the values underpinning liberal democracies, such as equality, have failed to recognise the many political voices, especially those of minorities or minority national and cultural groups.

This discourse needs to be understood as emanating from a Catalan perspective. An alternative view is one in which the evolution of nation-states can accommodate multiple nations. Luis Moreno concludes that Spain's State of the Autonomies has overcome the internal confrontation of regional diversity in Spain. With the Constitution of 1978, he argues, territorial politics have developed 'multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence', a concept of the relationship between state and sub-state levels underpinned by a lack of compulsion to eliminate other concurrent participants, due to the dual identity or 'compound nationality' that individuals can hold (Moreno 2001: 154). In other words, he considers that it is possible to be a both a Spaniard and a Catalan, both a Spaniard and an Andalusian, without those identities conflicting. The limits of this conclusion are revealed when ETA separatist violence and Catalan secessionist demands are considered. It is however a useful construct in the examination of other parts of Spain, including Andalusia, where dual identity is strong.

A second strand of debate in relation to multiple nations is that of 'nations without states', defined as 'those territorial communities with their own identity and a desire for self-determination included within the boundaries of one or more states, with which, by and large, they do not identify' (Guibernau 2004b: 9). The recognition of nations without states, such as Catalonia, does not necessarily involve them becoming independent. Back in 1999 Guibernau considered that most 'are likely to achieve greater political autonomy within the political institutions [of the EU] which are currently being developed'

(Guibernau 1999: 27). The limited evolution of the Europe of the Regions (discussed in Chapter Three, Section 3.3.5) would, however, suggest limited prospects of the EU delivering greater autonomy at a sub-state level in member states. Furthermore, the European Commission demonstrated its reluctance to enter into any discussion about membership conditions for secessionist regions (Humblebaek 2014: 213-4). This has not however prevented speculation on the future of Catalonia as a new, independent state in Europe (see Cuadros Morató 2016).

David McCrone (2006: 243) rejects as too simple the conventional view of sustainable options for nations without states. Namely, that sooner or later they will emerge into statehood as the natural end game, or they are not nations, merely regions, in which case statehood is not being sought. Like Requejo and Caminal (2011) he believes that this view is too bound by nineteenth-century visions of statehood and that the context is more complex today. Unlike Requejo and Caminal, he sees the desire for greater autonomy as one not driven by political beliefs but rather dictated by globalisation and internationalisation of the economy. He coins the term 'understated nations' in recognition that most now have some form of governmental institutions. He argues movements such as those in Catalonia and Quebec have 'outgrown their historic relationships with their core states' and want to shape the new international order 'in a way more conducive to the business of alternative territorial formations' (2006: 243). The term 'core state' used here suggests that the state of Spain pre-dates that of Catalonia, an assertion which would be hotly contested in Catalan circles, and illustrates the dangers of terminology in this debate.

From a different, legal and constitutional perspective, Stephen Tierney, was able to conclude back in 2005 that nationalist movements such as in Catalonia and Quebec were not separatist (although this is no longer the case in Catalonia). Sub-state nationalism was increasingly concerned with 'demands for improved

accommodation *within* the State rather than the threat of secession' (Tierney 2005: 164). An international dimension to pluri-nationalism is considered by Giden Gottlieb. Gottlieb, professor of international law and diplomacy, rejects that national sovereignty must be absolute and that in every state there must be one nation. However, he sounds caution at secession movements and argues for 'a society of nations **alongside** (my emphasis) the systems of state' (Gottlieb 1999: 123). Pointing out that the current concept of sovereignty was developed in and for a period very different from today, he argues for a new constitutional framework to 'conciliate between the notions of absolute sovereignty and state unity – between the integrity of states and the claims for separation.'

This brief review of existing literature on the concept of multiple nations within a state highlights the complexity of notions of the nation and of the state. The concept of pluri-nationalism can be challenged in the context of Spain: can pluri-nationalism be used to describe a state like Spain where some parts, for example Catalonia, may see themselves as nations, but others, such as La Rioja, clearly do not? Also highlighted is a view that the pre-eminence of nation-states is being challenged, and that what may have developed in the past is no longer appropriate for current times. The fact that the nation-state is changing in the context of current challenges is undeniable, but it is still the dominant paradigm in Western Europe and in Spain. The following section examines Spain's history as a nation and a state to provide a further part of the framework for the consideration of public administration in Andalusia and Catalonia.

2.3 HISTORY OF THE TWO SPAINS

2.3.1 FRAGMENTATION OR CONTINUITY?

The term 'Las dos Españas', or 'The Two Spains', is a widely used phrase in Spain, reflecting the existence of divisions within Spain. The national award-winning 2004 work by Santos Juliá was entitled

'Histories of the Two Spains'. More recently, a national newspaper article about dogmatism as a feature of Spanish society, cites the 2016 general election results as a prime example of issues becoming black and white, recalling Antonio Machado's verse:

Españolito que vienes al mundo, te guarde Dios, una de las dos Españas ha de helarte el corazón'. ['Little Spaniard who is coming into this world, may God keep you safe, for one of the two Spains will freeze your heart.'] (Amón 2016)

Nicholas Manganas uses the term as the title for his 2016 publication. He concludes that the narrative of 'the Two Spains' still has a discursive power in contemporary Spanish politics, being used since the late 1990s as 'a vehicle for political elites to settle political scores and to narrativize their respective national histories' (Manganas 2016: 4).

The term has usually been deployed to describe the modern versus the traditional ideals of Spain. However, there are a number of fractures within Spanish history, including those along territorial lines, which have influenced the development of Spain as a nation and the way in which it is governed. This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive commentary on the history of Spain. There is a wealth of authoritative works in this field, in English and in Spanish, including the aforementioned work by Santos Juliá.⁵ The purpose here is to provide a historical context to the framing of the 1978 Constitution and the establishment of the State of the Autonomies.⁶

2.3.2 MULTIPLE DIVISIONS

The view of a Spain historically divided is, to many modern eyes, most vividly illustrated by the Civil War (1936-39). However, the divisions in

⁵ For example, in English, Raymond Carr (1980, 1982, 2000) and Stanley Payne (2011). Focusing on the period 1808 onwards, see José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (2000) and Carsten Humlebaek (2014); from 1900, Julián Casanova and Carlos Gil Andrés (2014) and Stanley Black from 1939 onwards (2010). In Spanish, works include Manuel Tuñón de Lara et al (1991), Fernando García de Cortázar and José Manuel González Vega (1994), Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurúa & Jordi Palafox Gámir (1997), Luis González Antón (1997) and Fusi Aizpurúa (2000).

⁶ The dates used in this section are all taken from Garcia de Cortázar and González Vesga (1994), unless otherwise stated.

Spanish society were not new phenomena of the twentieth century. The concept of 'the Two Spains' has been in the public domain for many years. Dacia Viejo-Rose (2011: 30) refers to José Ortega y Gasset's often cited quote from 1914:

Two Spains, Sirs, are caught in an incessant fight: a dead and hollow Spain riddled with wormwood and a new Spain, industrious, aspiring that tends towards life and all is arranged so that the former triumphs over this one.⁷

Viejo-Rose states that the idea of two irreconcilable visions of Spain was often repeated during the Franco regime and 'came to have a significant hold on the Spanish political imagination'. José Álvarez Junco refers to 'the two Spains' in his 2001 work, describing a popular, Catholic Spain versus a liberal, secular and elitist Spain.⁸ Omar G. Encarnación (2008: 5) identifies the two halves as traditional and modern: a "Traditional" Spain in which the historical, social and political order are embodied by the Spanish monarchy, the military, the Catholic Church and the rural oligarchy, and a "Modern" Spain bringing together the Spaniards' reputation for individualism, rebellion and revolution with the liberal ideas of the eighteenth and nineteenth century of egalitarianism, republicanism and federalism. Fernando León Solís also points to the strength of ideological divisions epitomised by the two Spains, the conservative and the liberal, in his case study of Spanish media coverage in the 1990s (2003: 1).

It can be too simplistic however to divide Spain according to a dichotomy of modern and traditional. As Encarnación's description above shows, there have been many lines of division, and a reading of Spanish history reveals a range of schisms along religious and political lines. Differences in the view of territory have also been manifest throughout Spain's history. The application of this approach does not claim that conflict is unique to Spain and Spanish history. It

⁷ This first line of an often cited quote is from a text entitled 'En defensa de Unamuno' in *Obras Completas, Vol VII (1902-1925)*, published by the Fundación José Ortega y Gasset (2007: 391).


⁸ See also Raymond Carr (1986: 5).

is not. However, the divisions have been intense, continuous and recent, as evidenced by the extreme manifestation of civil war between 1936 and 1939. This means that the divisions in Spanish history continue to have a significant impact on the State of the Autonomies and the sub-state Autonomous Governments today.

2.3.3 RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS

From the end of the tenth century, Spain was divided along religious lines: Christian and Muslim. The Peninsula had been invaded by the Muslim Berbers in 711 from North Africa and conquered within seven years. The Berbers replaced the Visigoths (409-711) and the Romans (197BC to fourth century) (Carr 2000: 289). The Reconquista or Reconquest of Spain by the northern Christians took place in stages, as described in detail by Derek W. Lomax (1984) and summarised in the map below, with a movement south, re-gaining territory from Islamic rule.

Map 1: Stages of the Reconquest



Source: Lomax (1984: 243).

The Reconquista was not achieved gradually or town by town, but rather as a spasmodic progression and, importantly for the future

territorial debate in Spain, by region, such as Aragon, New Castile or Andalusia. This emphasised the importance of such regions as the 'basic units of Spanish life' (Lomax 1984: 228). There were Muslim counter attacks but by the late fifteenth century, the Muslims had been defeated. In 1492 Granada, the last Moorish kingdom (or taifa) fell to the Christians and in the words of Moreno 'the first modern state in Europe' was created (2001: 36).

Divisions along religious lines did not end in 1492, however. The Catholic Monarchs, Isabella and Ferdinand introduced the Inquisition into both kingdoms, which was pursued by subsequent monarchs to expel and eradicate Moors and Jews in the pursuit of religious uniformity. The division between religion and secularism added to the fragmentation of Spanish society and continued into future generations. In particular, the pre-eminence of Christianity came to form a pivotal part of the Franco regime's ideology of National-Catholicism.

2.3.4 TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS

The claim of the Spanish modern state being created at the end of the fifteenth century is made because all the lands of the Peninsula came under the crowns of the Catholic Monarchs, Isabella and Ferdinand (Isabella I of Castile 1474-1504 and Ferdinand II of Aragon and V of Castile 1474-1516). The following map shows how the Iberian Peninsula was divided into six kingdoms.

Map 2: The Iberian Peninsula in 1480



Source: Martín et al (1998: 213).

This was the result of gradual territorial acquisition. Following their marriage in 1469, Isabella was victorious in the Castilian civil war, and Ferdinand acceded to the Aragonese throne. They added Granada (1492) and Navarre (1515) and created 'a political conglomeration whose borders have remained basically stable for the last half millennium' (Álvarez Junco 2002: 13).

It is important to stress, however, that the Catholic Monarchs did not rule their territories as one united kingdom. Rather, their marriage was a personal union of crowns. Andrew Dowling describes the royal union as more akin to 'an Austro-Hungarian confederation than [...] the English incorporation of Wales [and] of Brittany by France' (2013: 2). Castile and Aragon came together in the persons of their rulers, but were otherwise separate. It is illuminating to note how Isabella, in particular, fought to rule in her own right over her own lands (Weissberger 2004), with serious limitations being placed on Ferdinand's governance powers in Castile via their marriage contract. Each monarch continued to rule their own dominions separately and each kingdom was distinct. In Isabella's Castile only the Basque

province of Vizcaya kept some degree of autonomy, but the rest were ruled by the same royal institutions, laws, taxation and parliament. The Crown of Aragon was different, consisting of several legal and political entities. The kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Sicily, and later Naples each had their own legislation and taxation (Edwards 2000: 39). Within the monarchs' dominions, historical *fueros* continued to apply. *Fueros* were the statutes of towns and villages in medieval Spain which recognised the privileges enjoyed by their inhabitants.⁹ The *fueros* continued to play a role in the dispute over territory in subsequent centuries.

In contrast, Andalusia did not conform to the general norm of government between monarch and kingdoms being set by ancient *fueros* in this period. As the last lands to be taken in the Reconquista and occupied by Castilian nobles, Andalusia was governed directly from the Crown of Castile and run according to Castilian laws (Moreno 2001: 40).¹⁰

2.3.5 MONARCHY VERSUS REPUBLICANISM


Since Isabella and Ferdinand, monarchical rule has been largely continuous in Spain. The Habsburgs ruled from 1516 to 1700. Charles of Ghent became Charles I of Spain in 1516 (later in Europe as the Emperor Charles V), with sons successively inheriting the crown until Charles II died childless in 1700. The Habsburg reign was not, however, untroubled by divisions – particularly by territorial disputes – both at home and abroad. With a huge empire, as illustrated in the following map, the Habsburg monarchs were forced to embark on a series of military campaigns: 'During the reigns of all

⁹ *Diccionario de Historia de Espana*, 2^o edn. (1968)

¹⁰ The antecedents and development of sub-state movements in Andalusia and Catalonia will be covered in more detail in the case study chapters of this thesis. However, reference to key events, particularly in Catalonia, will be made in this chapter to demonstrate the recurring factor of territorial division throughout Spanish history.

the Habsburgs and the first four Bourbon kings, the Catholic Monarchs participated in *all* the European military conflicts of importance' (Álvarez Junco 2011: 23).

Map 3: The States of Charles V in Europe (1519)



Source: Martínez Shaw (1998: 253).

Philip IV (1621-65) sought to spread the burden of his war costs by demanding men and money from the Catalans (who were exempt thanks to their *fueros*). He was met by the Catalan Reapers Revolt of 1640 (Carr 2000: 7). The revolt has been described as 'one of the earliest expressions of incipient nationalism in Europe and contributing to the rise of Catalan identity' (Guibernau 2000: 56).

The successor to the last Habsburg was the grandson of the French King, becoming Philip V of Spain (1700-46). He introduced the House of Bourbon to Spain which lasted until the beginning of the nineteenth century. His accession to the throne was the outcome of the War of Succession in which many Catalans had supported the (unsuccessful)

Austrian pretender, Charles, fearing not only the impact of French imports on the Catalan economy, but also the import of the French (centralised) model of government (Smith 2015: 15). In 1714 Philip V abolished the fueros of Catalonia and Valencia, imposed Castilian as the official language in administration, reorganised the judiciary and took control of the taxing system in the territory of the Aragon Crown. In particular, Bel dates the development of Spain's current centralised model of infrastructure to the Bourbon rule, beginning with the creation of a series of royal routes radiating from Madrid (the 'Radial State') (2012: 34). For the first time, Castile and Aragon 'became one political unit, sharing the same administration, laws and taxes' (Kamen 1973: 97). However, as Henry Kamen goes on to point out, this did not end the schism: the defeat of the Catalans in Barcelona in 1714 symbolised for the Catalans the defeat of regional or national separatism by a centralising Castilian power. This self-perception as the victim of a centralising Castile was to resonate for future generations of Catalans.¹¹

Republicans triumphed over monarchists in the creation of the First and Second Republics (in 1873 and 1931 respectively). Both periods were short-lived, but the underlying division between these two beliefs of monarchism and republicanism ran throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Franco's Succession Law of 1947 defined Spain as a kingdom, without determining the identity of any future monarch (Heywood 1995: 84). Juan Carlos acceded to the throne on the death of Franco in 1975, and reigned until 2014 when he abdicated in favour of his son.

2.3.6 REFORM VERSUS REACTION

The War of Independence of 1808 has been described as a key point in the development of a unified Spain. Raymond Carr for example

¹¹ The symbolism of 1714 is still strong in Catalonia. See, for example, the 2015 work by Ricard Torra, entitled 'Catalonia (and the Catalan-speaking lands) before and after the eleventh of September 1714'.

states that 'modern Spanish nationalism of a type comparable to nationalism in other European countries was created by the opposition to Napoleon' (1982: 105). Andrés De Blas describes the War of Independence as a national war fought to defend Spanish sovereignty (2006: 30). The war was a 'landmark whose resolution would determine nation-building in Spain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Moreno 2001: 44). The subsequent 1812 Cadiz Constitution was devised along French Jacobin centralising lines, reflecting the liberal drafters' view of the provinces as entities tied to the feudal past (Moreno 2001: 45).

Restoration of the monarchy (with Ferdinand VII in 1814) brought royal absolutism but not peace. Rather it was the beginning of a period of revolts and civil wars. During the years 1808-1875 'Spain did not experience one large scale revolution but rather a period of short-lived episodes' (Hummelbaek 2014: 13). Short-term revolutionary take-overs by the Liberals in 1810-14, 1820-3, 1839, 1854 and 1868-74 were replaced by a dominance of conservative and reactionary powers (Hummelbaek 2014: 13). The Carlist civil wars (three during the period 1833-75) reflected the division between liberal, modernising republicans and those supporting a Catholic traditionalism, rural and monarchic. Cutting across this division was that of territory. For many liberals, centralism was an aid to modernisation, seeing Basque and Catalan nationalisms as 'backward looking' (Muro and Quiroga 2005: 16). On the contrary, the Carlists, whose main strongholds were the Basque Country, Navarre and Catalonia, supported regional fueros and communal agrarian customs. In addition to the Carlist wars, there were widespread and different types of civil war and disturbances during the 1800s: peasant revolts in Andalusia (1856, 1861, 1873, 1876 and 1892) and urban uprisings (in 1827, 1835, 1840-42 and 1871-73) (Vilar 1977: 66).

Paul Heywood describes this period as one where two antagonistic blocs began to crystallise – reform versus reaction (1995: 3). The short-lived First Republic (1873-74) was faced with the Carlist wars,

with war against Cuban rebels and the wave of political and social disorder, including the declaration of 'self-governing, independent cantons' in many towns of Andalusia (Carr 2000a: 220). The uneven industrialisation of Spain at the end of the 1800s, principally in the Basque Country and Catalonia, was a further division within Spain, particularly in the last decades of the nineteenth century (Muro and Quiroga 2005: 15). There was a mismatch between Madrid, the political centre of Spain, and the peripheral economic centres of Barcelona and Bilbao, an incongruity between the values of 'the pre-modern rural oligarchs, the conspicuous bureaucratic classes and the frustrated military hierarchies' and those of the industrial periphery' (Moreno 2001: 49).

2.3.7 MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN POWER AND THE EMERGENCE OF PERIPHERAL NATIONALISMS

The military reaction to unrest in the late 1800s reflected the Spanish 'tradition' of *pronunciamientos* or military uprisings with the overthrow of the Republic and restoration again of monarchy in 1874. The collapse of the First Republic in 1874 has been seen as signalling an important shift in the attitude of the military towards politics: for the first time military leaders saw themselves as defenders of Spanish society and the Fatherland (or patria). In the past, generals had intervened on the side on one political party or another (Barton 2009: 208). This change would have repercussions at the beginning of the following century.

The so-called 'desastre del 98' (the disaster of 1898) was also a turning point in the history of Spain. Centred on the loss of the colonies of the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico, following a humiliating defeat in the Spanish-American war, it marked the end of Spain's status as a world power and provoked soul-searching in Spain about its role and identity (Carr 2000: 224). From a conservative point of view, Spain had lost the empire because it had abandoned the virtues which had made it great – unity, hierarchy and militant

Catholicism. A more widespread view was that the decline was due to a failure to modernise (Balfour 1995: 25-6).

One political response to the perceived problem of the Spanish State at this time was the emergence of Basque and Catalan nationalisms as political movements. Whilst the self-questioning arising from the disaster of 1898 and the emergence of the peripheral nationalist movements both 'had cultural and social roots that had been apparent since the mid nineteenth century' it was in the final decades, during the industrialisation of parts of the Basque Country and Catalonia, that these movements became politicised, developing into a threat for the centralised regime of Spain (Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: 20). By 1898, nationalisms in the Basque Country and Catalonia, the areas of industrialisation, had emerged as alternatives to Spanish nationalism (Muro and Quiroga 2005: 15). The spiralling violence and unrest (including the popular uprising of 1909 in Barcelona, subsequently called the *Semana Trágica* or Tragic Week) was brought to an end by General Primo de Rivera by another pronunciamiento in 1923.¹² By 1931 the pendulum had swung back from dictatorship with the proclamation of the Second Republic.

2.3.8 THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1931-6) AND CIVIL WAR FRAGMENTATION (1936-9)

The Second Republic sought to modernise Spain, introducing democracy for the first time. There were high expectations from the landless labourers in the south for agrarian reform; from industrial workers for better wages and conditions; and from those seeking recognition of sub-national aspirations. In the 'other' Spain – that of the military, Church, landowners and traditional sections of society - many feared the widespread violence in cities and countryside and the Second Republic's ambitious reform programme. This programme included reforms that affected the state, the Church, the army and

¹² Pons-Altés and López-Morell's 2016 study argues that the Tragic Week was a more organised and more widespread revolutionary uprising than previously considered.

almost every sector of society, opening ‘a chasm between Church and State, employers and workers, defenders of traditional order and supporters of the Republic’ (Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: 107).

In terms of territorial divisions, the Second Republic recognised the need to reorganise the state but chose a gradual policy of decentralisation to meet the demands of sub-states, especially Catalonia, while retaining centrally the powers of the state seen as essential to regenerate the nation (Fusi Aizpurúa 2000: 249). The resulting ‘Estado integral’ model was neither unitary nor federal. Statutes of autonomy were agreed for the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia but only the Catalan statute went into operation before the outbreak of the Civil War. However, there remained deep-seated divisions in Spain which became more polarised during this period. Under the Second Republic, the political centre ‘effectively disappeared and extremism and violent tactics [took] hold of both ends of the political spectrum’ (Encarnación 2008: 20). The pronunciamiento in 1936, led by Franco, may well have been the catalyst of civil war, but ‘the political hatreds which polarized the Second Republic [...] were a reflection of the deep-rooted conflicts of Spanish society’ (Preston 2006: 18). Referring to the tradition of civil strife in Spain, Sheelagh M. Ellwood (1991: 5) calls conflict the ‘leitmotiv of Spanish history’.¹³


The division of the country under the Civil War was more complex than the frequently adopted simplistic view of the two bands of Republicans and Nationalists.¹⁴ The Nationalist side incorporated monarchists, fascists and the Catholic Church as well as the most of the Army. The Republic side was even more complex, with liberal-democratic republicans, anarchists, socialists and communists. There was also a geographical dimension. Helen Graham describes the on

¹³ See Preston (2016) for a meticulous reconstruction of the final days of the Second Republic.

¹⁴ The classic works on the Spanish Civil War are still Hugh Thomas (last re-printed 2001); Raymond Carr (1986), the updated work of Paul Preston (2006), supplemented more recently by works by Helen Graham (2012) and Stanley Payne (2012).

the one hand th ‘burgeoning professional, entrepreneurial and commercial middling strata’ of the medium-sized industrial coastal cities and on the other, the ‘rural fastnesses and inward looking, socially locked-down provincial market towns of the central heartlands and northern interior’ (2012: 19). The following map shows the geographical division of Spain at the beginning of the Civil War, the shaded areas showing support for the Nationalist side.

Map 4: Division of Spain (July 1936)



Source: Payne (2012: 78).

Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (2005: 1) seek to move consideration away from any black and white division of Spain, and explore the themes of violence, nationalism and religion to conceptualise the Civil War. They develop their argument by pointing at the complex interaction of the national scene and importantly the local factors and events. They describe the war as ‘a process of fracturing’ or ‘splintering’, an interpretation which more adequately reflects the many cleavages in Spanish society as outlined in this literature review. Over the course of three and half years of bitter fighting, Spain suffered death and destruction on both sides until the victory of the Nationalist forces in April 1939.

2.3.9 THE TWO SPAINS OF THE FRANCO REGIME¹⁵

Following his victory in 1939, Franco did not seek to heal those fractures in society. There was no national reconciliation, and ‘the country was divided between winners and losers’ (Black 2010: 14). Franco reinforced the idea of ‘The Two Spains’, by promoting the exact opposite of what the Second Republic had sought to achieve. In contrast to the society based on separation of church and state, on promotion of multi-party democracy and recognition of autonomous demands, Franco declared Spain a Catholic confessional state, statutes of autonomy were declared void and all political parties and trades unions were banned. Catholic ascendancy within the regime was defined in legislation, promoting Spain as ‘a Catholic, social and representative state’ (Townson 2007: 3). Franco’s first priority was to eradicate any remnant of republican opposition. Measures such as the purge of the judiciary, the imposition of a military jurisdiction, the Law of Political Responsibilities (which sought to punish, retrospectively, ‘the subversive Red opposition’) and the Law for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism, ensured that ‘never before had any civil conflict in Spain ended with such persecution of the vanquished’ (Tusell 2011: 20-1).¹⁶

Alongside communism, regionalism was seen by Franco as a major threat to Spain. In fact, the dual threat of socialism and separatism has been identified as the reason Franco initiated his coup against the Republican government (Alonso 2012: 77). Any deviation from the ‘espíritu nacional’ or national [Spanish] spirit was considered ‘dangerous, illegitimate and punishable’ (Giner and Moreno 1990: 182).¹⁷ The Franco regime therefore ‘consecrated the hegemony of a Catholic and traditionalist version of Spanish nationalism (National-

¹⁵ There is an extensive literature on the Franco regime, including Javier Tusell (1989); Paul Preston (1993); Sheelagh M. Ellwood (1994); Nigel Townson (2007) and Antonio Cazorla Sánchez (2014).

¹⁶ For further consideration of repression under Franco see Michael Richards (1998), Julius Ruiz specifically on repression in Madrid (2005), Jordi Cornellà-Detrell (2011) in relation to Catalonia, and Richard Barker (2012) on Andalusia.

¹⁷ ‘peligrosa, ilegítima y punible’ in the original.

Catholicism), which centred its nationalist discourse around the essentialist affirmation of a Catholic Spain basically identified with Castile' (Núñez 2001: 720). Measures of the military regime after the Civil War to repress territorial plurality included the abolition of the Basque and Catalan statutes of autonomy, the quashing of the 1878 economic freedoms of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, the repression of sub-state nationalist movements and the shooting of their leaders, the banning of symbols of regional identity, the systematic application of unitary policies and the centralisation of administration (Fusi Aizpurúa 2000: 256). In terms of public administration, the Government's bureaucracy was used as an instrument of control over the periphery, with administrative (but not political) control devolved to the provinces, not the regions (Solé-Vilanova 1989: 207). It was through this centralised and heavily bureaucratic political structure that Franco aimed to enforce his vision of a unified Spain – 'una, grande y libre' ['one, great and free']. The word 'one' referred not only to a single, centralised administrative structure, but also to the absence of all peripheral nationalisms (Hummelbaek 2014: 81).

However, to some degree, the linguistic and cultural oppression by the Franco regime served to stimulate and strengthen sub-state nationalisms. The imposition of Castilian as the state language reinforced the social and political cohesion of the nationalist communities in Catalonia and the Basque Country (Núñez 2001: 721). A legacy of Franco was to forge a link between sub-state nationalisms and democratic opposition to the regime. By the early 1970s:

The whole Spanish opposition agreed that the Catalan struggle for recognition was inseparable from the Spain-wide struggle for democracy, and vice versa. (Conversi 2002: 225)

The appropriation of Spanish nationalism by Francoism, on the other hand, meant that during the Transition to democracy, 'any explicit affirmation of Spanish nationalism was automatically delegitimized and identified with the defence [...] of Francoism' (Núñez 2001: 721).

This brief review of the history of Spain has illustrated the many dimensions of division which have characterised and influenced the development of the Spanish nation-state. Religious differences, competing territorial claims, the clash between republicanism and monarchism, tensions between reform and reaction and between military and civilian power, have all played a part. However, it is also possible to identify a strong thread of continuity over the past five centuries. A dominant paradigm has been that of a single Spanish State, predominantly Catholic, ruled by a monarch, based on a largely centralised distribution of territorial power. This observation does not diminish the historic tensions within Spain, not least of which relates to sub-state nationalisms. Nor does it suggest that such a paradigm has been the wish or preferred model for all Spaniards. The experience of the Civil War and the repression of the Franco regime provide absolute evidence to the contrary. However, the context in which the Transition to Democracy took place and the State of the Autonomies was created was an environment characterised by a long-standing tradition of centralised government, over many centuries. Despite its historical internal conflicts, Spain is 'an entity clearly identifiable as a historic unity' (Moreno 2001: 78).

2.4 TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND THE 1978 CONSTITUTION

2.4.1 DECENTRALISATION: THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE

Most commentators have described Spain's Transition from dictatorship to democracy as a success (see for example Conversi 2002; Encarnación 2008; Tusell 2011). A key element of that success was the addressing of the tensions of Spanish nationalism and sub-nationalisms – an issue widely acknowledged as one of the most contentious issues of the Transition to be resolved (Heywood 1995: 142, Black 2010: 96) and described as 'the greatest danger to the Transition' (Linz & Stepan 1996: 99). It is not my purpose to provide a comprehensive commentary on the years immediately following the

death of Franco in 1975. Nor do I seek to comment on the full content of the Constitution of 1978. Rather, I wish to consider this period inasmuch as it provided the context to the drafting of the Constitution and to examine the specific provisions in the Constitution in relation to the State of the Autonomies.

Contributory factors in Spain's successful Transition to democracy were leadership and a consensus not to repeat the mistakes of the past. This focus on leadership is not to underplay the role of grass-roots activism in the Franco and immediate post-Franco period. Joe Foweraker (1989) highlights the connection between grass-roots political activity at the local level with the nationally organised democratic struggle, arguing convincingly the case for the popular contribution to the democratic process in Spain. Paloma Aguilar (2000: 303) stresses that the consensus-making of the Transition period can only be understood against the backdrop of the activities of the various groups opposing the Franco regime. Monica Threlfall's work on the concept of co-construction disputes the common perception that the Transition was a top-down process (2008).

However, the pivotal leadership role played by King Juan Carlos I has been universally stressed (Tusell 1995; Preston 2003; Black 2010), with the King being later popularly described as 'the motor of the Transition' (Humblebaek 2014: 78). Within seven months of Franco's death, Juan Carlos used his visit to the United States to announce to an international audience his intention to introduce democracy to Spain (Tusell 2011: 279). Acting as a bridge between the past and the future, he engineered the appointment of Adolfo Suárez, a senior bureaucrat of the Franco regime, as President of the Government in July 1976.¹⁸ The King was later to play a decisive role in the aftermath of the attempted coup of February 1981. He also gained

¹⁸ Works on Suárez include Carlos Abella (2006), (tellingly sub-titled 'The Key Man of the Transition') and Luis Herrero (2007).

some credibility in sub-states, speaking Catalan on his first official visit to Barcelona (Conversi 2002: 230).

Suárez had credibility with the establishment created under Franco and had an in-depth knowledge of the workings of the institutions of state. Decisive steps were taken to halt rising tensions by quickly extending freedoms of assembly and association before proposing legislative change:

- In November 1976 the Law of Political Reform was approved to create a bi-cameral system based on universal suffrage
- The Basque flag was legalised in January 1977 (the Catalans being allowed from the previous September to celebrate their national day)
- A law of Political Association legalised political parties (including some regional parties) in was passed in February (the Communist Party being legalised in April 1977)
- A new amnesty was granted in March
- General elections were held in June 1977 (Carr & Fusi Aizpurúa 1981: 218; Black 2010: 82).

Whilst recognising the need to address sub-state demands, Suárez was mindful of the need to achieve national government legitimacy before that of the sub-states.

Spain was able to manage its stateness problem by successful devolution only because it created ... legitimate state power with the authority and capacity to restructure the polity. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 99)

National elections were therefore held before creating the new sub-state bodies. However, from the Basque and Catalan nationalist perspective, state power was not legitimised, and their demands for national recognition continued to be made.

The key role of the King, and that of Suárez, is stressed by many observers. Without an equal pragmatism on the part of the wider political leadership (particularly that of the Communist Party) at the

time, it is debatable that the Transition would have been successful. Leadership was also being exercised at the sub-state level. Suárez was 'skilled and lucky enough to secure the co-operation of Josep Tarradellas, First Minister of the (Catalan) Generalitat in exile' (Carr and Fusi Aizpurúa 1981: 234). They negotiated the formal re-establishment of the Generalitat in September 1977. 'Long and painful' negotiations with the Basques were partially successful in establishing the Consejo General del País Vasco (Basque General Council) in December 1977 (Carr and Fusi Aizpurúa 1981: 234). Three months later the Junta de Andalucía was established.

This period was characterised by dialogue and compromise between party political leaders and with the involvement of the trades unions and employers. Daniele Conversi (2002: 238) considers that:

This attitude of bargaining and agreement seeking can in part be related to the memory of the Civil War. During the Transition process, an enormous effort was made to establish a policy of reconciliation based on a sense of collective guilt over the errors of the past: the mistakes which destroyed the Second Republic should be avoided at all costs.

The process of 'forgetting' the Civil War during the Transition to democracy was the result of a political consensus 'to avoid reviving the armed conflict and reawakening the 'ghost' of the permanently irreconcilable two Spains' (Núñez 2005: 45).¹⁹ This consensus was evident in the process of drawing up a new constitution.

2.4.2 DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION

The environment for the drafting of the 1978 Constitution was very different from previous attempts to produce a new model for Spain. Not only was it seeking to produce a new territorial structure but also to advance the country from an authoritarian state to a liberal-democratic one, build a responsive bureaucracy, develop a welfare state and integrate Spain into Europe (Agranoff 1996: 386; Requejo

¹⁹ Memory and amnesia have been key aspects of study of the Transition period – see for example works by Resina (2000); Aguilar (2002) and Encarnación (2014).

2005: 82). Importantly, the environment was also different in terms of style. Unlike previous Spanish constitutions, the 1978 Constitution was negotiated, not imposed by the 'victors'. It was to be a negotiated settlement involving all the major parties (Encarnación 2008: 39). In the post-Franco Transition, the approach was one of consensus and compromise.²⁰ This consensual approach should not be understood as a unification of the two previously opposing visions of Spain as a nation. Rather it was a temporary sharing of a common goal to transform Spain to a modern, democratic and European country.

In retrospect, the period of consensus and search for a common ground seems more like a truce than a lasting solution to the problem of division. (Humblebaek 2014: 83)

However, consensus was the basis of the constitutional process, exemplified by the establishment of a cross-party group of senior figures by the Government to draft proposals for the Constitution.²¹ The success of this commission and its consensual approach can be gauged in the overwhelming support the Constitution subsequently won in Parliament, where it was approved by 325 votes in the lower house with only six votes against and fourteen abstentions (Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: 314).

The broad party political consensus which made the drawing up of the 1978 Constitution possible also brought with it an element of ambiguity, particularly in the formulation of the territorial organisation of the Spanish state – the section with 'the greatest amount of imprecision' (Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: 315). Article Two of the Constitution encompasses the unity of Spain and, at the same time, the right to autonomy of the sub-states:

²⁰ It is acknowledged that this consensus did not include the separatist movement in the Basque Country and in Catalonia, the separatist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, was not legalised until after the 1977 general elections because of the party's republicanism (Hanley and Loughlin 2006: 89). The Basque Country was the only area not to vote in December 1978 in support of the new Constitution (Colomer 1998a: 43).

²¹ The group was made up of seven people: three of the centre, one socialist, one communist, one Catalan nationalist and a representative of the right (Tusell 2011: 296).

The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the solidarity amongst them all. (Presidencia del Gobierno 1982: 13)²²

Article Two was therefore ‘a veritable synthesis of all the contradictions looming during the Constitution-making process, [...] an authentic point of encounter between different concepts of the Spanish nation. [...] In it, two great notions of Spain merge’ (Solé-Tura 1985: 100). It is contestable whether they merged in the Constitution, but the Constitution does reflect two different conceptions of Spain: Spain as one unified nation, a community of people sharing a common culture and history, and a Spain where Catalans and Basques are ‘independent, historically conditioned and justified communities’ (Humblebaek 2014: 87).

Ambiguity played a role in the process of compromise and is reflected in the Constitution. Javier Tusell refers to the Constitution’s ‘apocryphal compromises ... a layering of statements that tried to satisfy a range of contradictory requirements at one and the same time’ (Tusell 2011: 297). Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga consider the Constitution to be ‘sufficiently broad or ambiguous in its definitions for [...] contradictory meanings about nation and identity to co-exist or at least to be read into the text’ (2007: 47-52). For example, use of terms ‘nación’ and ‘nacionalidad’ (nation and nationality). Any reference to another ‘nation’ (in addition to Spain) would not have been acceptable to some (notably the Army) and the demotion to status of ‘region’ would equally have been unacceptable to the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. So the use of the term ‘nacionalidad’ allowed those fearful of the threat to Spanish unity to read ‘nacionalidades’ as historical cultural nations not seeking to

²² ‘La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas’ (Original version).

establish themselves as states. Those wanting greater recognition of sub-nations' legitimacy could read it as nations without a state. Similarly the word 'federal' was avoided in this phase, either by supporters of a unitary state who feared it would give recognition to independent states and by Catalan and Basque who felt it would de-emphasise their distinct status (Agranoff 1996: 390).

An open model of decentralisation was the result. Moreno asserts that the political parties involved in the drafting agreed 'an unwritten pledge' to continue the constructive political dialogue into the future (2001: 61). This open model of asymmetrical decentralisation did not predetermine how the different parts of Spain would express themselves, allowing significant flexibility to the nationalities and regions. The Constitution's guidelines for territorial organisation of the state were less than precise, with 'the advantage of not closing off any options and leaving open for a future time the possibility of further change, but only on the basis of a consensus' (Tusell 2011: 298). This view is supported by one of the authors of the 1978 Constitution. Miquel Roca Junyent (2000: 79) states the 'Constitution was not only created out of a consensus but also aimed to further it'. He defends the influence of consensus at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, as a positive alternative to the past 'take it or leave it' approach where the majority forced their view on the minority, and as a positive alternative to the 'all or nothing' postures of the past, obliging the act of bargaining.

2.4.3 BUILDING THE STATE OF THE AUTONOMIES

Title VIII of the 1978 Constitution allowed any number of Autonomous Communities to be self-governing, depending on the will expressed by the inhabitants or their political representatives. No map with proposed territorial boundaries was included in the Constitution. Neither was the degree of self-government specified, which was also left to the wishes of each nationality and/or region:

In this way, [...] the constitutional model permitted regions, following different procedures justified on historical and political grounds, a broad leeway to choose, through their regional statutes of autonomy, the degree of devolution they desired among the possibilities offered by the Constitution. (Colino 2009: 263)

The Constitution set out three routes to and levels of autonomy:

- For the 'historic nations', the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia (although they were not named in the Constitution), there would be an immediate step to full autonomous status, based on an absolute majority of the members of the pre-autonomous regional assembly.
- Article 143 was to provide the easier, more gradual path to autonomy. The consent of two thirds of municipal councils in each province was needed to initiate the process. However full autonomy could only be obtained five years later and with the consent of the Spanish Parliament.
- Accelerated access to full autonomy was provided to other regions via article 151. In the event, only Andalusia acquired the status of an Autonomous Community by this route.

An early step had been made to establish pre-autonomous bodies in the Basque Country and Catalonia by the end of 1977 in recognition of their historic demands. Opposition to the widening of the autonomous model beyond the 'historic nations' came from Catalonia and the Basque Country who feared it diluted their special status. It also came from some in Suárez's party, the UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático), who wanted it to be restricted to the historic nations, some on the left who wanted federalism and those on the right who wanted reorganisation based on provinces. Some provinces (Santander, Logrono) wanted uni-provincial solutions (Fusi Aizpurúa 2000). However, the autonomy fever which followed the approval of statutes of self-government in the Basque Country and Catalonia resulted in all parts of Spain securing autonomous status by 1983 as the figure overleaf shows.

Most followed the slower article 143 route. Andalusia however pursued the accelerated route of article 151, arguing special grounds of economic deprivation. Strictly speaking, Andalusia failed to meet the criteria of the article 151 route as one of the provinces did not return a majority in support. A solution was reached however through interparty negotiation (Keating and Wilson 2009: 539).

Figure 1: Autonomous Communities and Statutes

Region	Government Title	Date
Basque Country	Gobierno Vasco	18 Dec 1979
Catalonia	Generalitat de Catalunya	
Galicia	Xunta de Galicia	6 April 1981
Andalusia	Junta de Andalucía	30 Dec 1981
Asturias	Principado de Asturias	
Cantabria	Diputación Regional	
La Rioja	Consejo de Gobierno	9 June 1982
Murcia	Consejo de Gobierno	
Valencia	Generalitat Valenciana	1 July 1982
Aragon	Diputación General	10 Aug 1982
Castile-La Mancha	Junta de Comunidades	
Canary Islands	Gobierno Canario	
Extremadura	Junta de Extremadura	25 Feb 1983
Balearic Islands	Gobierno Balear	
Madrid	Gobierno de la Comunidad	
Castile and Leon	Junta de Castilla y León	
Navarra	Diputación Foral	10 Aug 1983

Source: Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: xxi, supplemented by author's research on Autonomous Government websites).

The decentralisation process was not universally welcomed. The centuries-old divisions in Spain were reflected in the attempted military coup, in February 1981, when those in support of a

centralised, unified country, especially in the military, saw the developing State of the Autonomies as a threat to Spanish national identity. Although unsuccessful, the coup did provoke (or was portrayed as provoking) a desire amongst leading politicians nationally to slow down moves to regional autonomy. Following the political deal to allow Andalusia to proceed to autonomy via the fast track, legislation was passed to 'place a check on the proliferation of requests for devolution' (Black 2010: 98). The Statutory Law for the Autonomy Process (Ley orgánica de armonización del proceso autonómico or LOAPA) was subsequently, and successfully, challenged (notably by the sub-states) through the Constitutional Court. The establishment of a devolved state in the Constitution and the approval of Statutes of Autonomy proved to be the beginning of the process, not the end.

Many challenges to the decentralised model were to be made by the sub-states, as the State of the Autonomies developed over the following two decades. The 1980s saw the major political parties collaborating to develop key measures to underpin the decentralised state model, including the Interregional Compensation Fund (Fondo de compensación interterritorial) and the Statutory Law of the Funding of the Autonomous Communities (Ley orgánica de financiación de las comunidades autónomas). However, there were recurring points of conflict (Tusell 2011: 359). The Basque Country and Catalonia in particular each sought recognition of their own special historic nationality, wanting this to be reflected in the relative powers of their institutions compared with the other sub-states. This resulted in numerous appeals to the Constitutional Court. At the same time the Autonomous Governments with fewer powers demanded equality. The Statutory Law on the Transfer of Powers (Ley orgánica de transferencia) of December 1992 raised the level of powers of all Autonomous Governments.

2.4.4 WEAKNESSES OF THE STATE OF THE AUTONOMIES

In addition to the demands of some sub-state nationalists for greater autonomy, a number of weaknesses of the State of the Autonomies as established by the 1978 Constitution can be identified. The ambiguity described above in the drafting of the Constitution is reflected in some confusion over the division of functions between Central Government and the Autonomous Governments. This has led to overlap and duplication. It has been calculated that in the period 1990-1999 for every civil servant post lost by Central Government, two were created at regional and local level (Chislett 2002: 72). Some regions were artificially created or lacked any strong sense of identity and some were thought to be too small to function effectively.

From the outset, the system did not encourage co-operation between Autonomous Governments. Rather, the asymmetry of routes to autonomy and allocation of competencies can be said to have contributed to tensions between communities as well as causing inefficiency from a national perspective because of the numerous and different processes. The development of the State of the Autonomies has been described as a race for greater competencies (Barbería 2012), each Autonomous Government wanting as many as the others, looking enviously at Catalonia who looks enviously at the special financial arrangements agreed for the Basque Country and Navarre.

Central to the weaknesses of the State of the Autonomies as established by the 1978 Constitution is the unresolved issue of whether Spain was meant to be a federal state. The need for consensus can help explain why the political leaders in the immediate post-Franco period side-stepped the issue as a tactical manoeuvre. However, it has continued to be a significant source of conflict. Whilst some authors have categorised Spain as a federal state (Aja 2003; Sala 2014), many do not. Josep Colomer describes the model as 'non-institutional federalism', referring to the lack of appropriate institutions, particularly in relation to promoting cooperation between

central and autonomous governments (1998a: 49). Heywood argues that Spain is not a federal state as there is no transfer of state sovereignty and Autonomous Governments do not participate in national decision-making (1995: 162). Requejo describes Spain not as a federal state but as a 'regional state' (2005: 82). According to Balfour and Quiroga (2007: 59), the Constitution established a semi-federal state. For Salvador Parrado Díez, the Spanish system is a 'regional state with quasi-federal status' (2011: 243).

Based on the defining characteristics of a federal state and the provisions of the 1978 Constitution, both outlined earlier, it is possible to argue that Spain is not a federal state on a number of grounds. In summary, sovereignty is not shared, the two tiers do not operate independently or cooperatively, and the role for Autonomous Governments in national policy-making is limited.

First, the Autonomous Governments are not constituent elements, meaning that the principle of autonomy is derived from the State, not the Constitution (Canel 1994: 47). Article 1 of the Constitution establishes the Spanish people as subject of the 'National sovereignty' and article 2 'the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation' (Requejo 2005: 82). Balfour and Quiroga (2007: 13) point to what they call the Constitution's clear definition of Spain as 'a nation of nationalities and regions', the implication being that 'there is only one nation and the regions with historic claims to autonomy have no political status as nations, merely that they are cultural nations and therefore do not qualify for statehood.'

Article 145 explicitly prohibits the federation of Autonomous Communities (Presidencia del Gobierno 1982: 90). Federalism 'implies a commitment to a contractual arrangement between political units that decide to create a new political space' (Gagnon 1993: 17). Such a pact amongst partners was difficult to achieve given that some areas that became Autonomous Communities in Spain did not even exist before the Constitution and so clearly could not have been party

to their creation. Arguments that federations are contractual, assuming that any contracting party is free to withdraw from the association (King 1982: 108), would also suggest that Spain is not a federation.

The open-ended nature of the Constitution's division of powers is not a federal distribution of power (Giner & Moreno 1990: 187). The senate does not have a territorial representation role like that of the US or Germany. Autonomous Governments have no role in the judiciary and are not involved in the appointments to the Constitutional Court. They have no formal role in constitutional reform (see Elisa Roller [2002] on the failure to reform the Senate) and a limited role in relation to European issues.

In conclusion, there is a high level of decentralisation to the sub-state level in Spain and, as in a federal state, powers are devolved to all its territorial sub units, not just for some. There are however a number of features of the Spanish model, as described above, which differentiate it from a federal state. The classification of a highly decentralised 'union state' better describes Spain's devolved model and reflects the existence of nations prior to the union (namely, nations such as Catalonia and the Basque Country).

Many have regarded the State of the Autonomies as transitional, seeing the Constitution as providing the first steps (Solé-Tura 1985:15), or as an evolving model (Moreno 2001: 2), or a product of special circumstances, namely the Transition (Erk and Gagnon 2000: 100). The model has undoubtedly continued to be challenged, notably by separatists in the Basque Country, and more recently by the heightened secessionist debate in Catalonia. Challenges have also been mounted by other, 'non-historic' Autonomous Governments, such as Andalusia, as evidenced by the multiple cases taken to the Constitutional Court by the Junta (Ramajo 2013). These continued challenges suggest that the State of the Autonomies has not reached its final state.

<p style="text-align: center;">CHAPTER THREE: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES</p>
--

3.1 INTRODUCTION

3.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical context to the formation and reform of public administration in Spain today. It seeks to achieve this by considering the parameters of public administration and by outlining the main typologies, welfare states and public administrative traditions, which have been developed, with particular emphasis on the Napoleonic tradition and its applicability to Spain. It then analyses recent (post-1970) public sector reforms in an international context (as measured against the classical model of public administration) and considers the academic treatment of the concept of administrative decentralisation and public sector responses to austerity. The chapter turns to an analysis of how public administration has developed and changed in contemporary Spain, examining the early implementation of the decentralised state and taking into account the influence of European Union membership.

3.2 PARAMETERS AND TYPOLOGIES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

3.2.1 PARAMETERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The existence of public administration is so evident, so widespread, that few studies feel the need to define this activity. Where this issue is considered, there is agreement on the difficulty in defining public administration, pointing to the various interpretations that can be made, such as it being the civil service, or the structure of government

or the study of the two (Greenwood et al 2002: 2).²³ Many studies cover the difference between public administration and public management (Greenwood et al 2002: 6; Lynn 2003: 14; Hughes 2012: 3) without defining public administration. Key critical framework texts fail to give a definition (Maor and Lane 1999; Lane 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), while Christopher Hood limits his definition of administration to the 'deliberate processes of implementation and control' (1976: 5). In some cases, the terms public administration and bureaucracy appear to be almost interchangeable (Peters 1995).

However, to provide some clarity for the forthcoming examination of the public sector and public sector reform as it relates to Spain, it is important to describe the parameters of the term public administration at this point. Using a starting point of general administration as 'determined action taken in pursuit of a conscious purpose', Ferrel Heady adds two further elements: *cooperation* between two or more individuals, seeing administration as a cooperative human effort towards a shared goal; and public administration as that sector of general administration found in a *political setting*, 'concerned primarily with the carrying out of public policy decisions made by the authoritative decision-makers in the political system' (2001: 2). Public administration can be defined succinctly as involving 'the co-ordination of all organized activity, having as its purpose the implementation of public policy' (Gortner 1981: 5). Harold F. Gortner then highlights key differences between the public and private sectors which are vital to understanding public administration and public administrative culture. These differences include elements such as the nature of many public services which operate like a monopoly, the lack of profit motivation and the added scrutiny that the actions of public officials attract as opposed to their private sector counterparts (Gortner 1981: 13). As will be revealed in the case study, these aspects will have an impact

²³ Reflecting this multiple interpretation, there is a convention of referring to the academic discipline of Public Administration (P.A.) in upper case and to the practice of public administration (pa) in the lower case (Brans 2007: 280).

on the running of services by the Autonomous Governments. In particular, the issues of scrutiny and transparency are central to an understanding of public administration in Spain.

The term used here is 'public administration'. (However, the word 'bureaucracy' is similarly used to describe public administration and is subject to many interpretations in popular culture.²⁴) David Beetham (1996: 1) points to the difficulties in agreeing a definitive meaning, contrasting the use of the term 'public administration' in different academic disciplines to show the breadth of interpretation. Standard usage in the nineteenth century was to indicate the system whereby ministerial positions were occupied by career officials, usually answerable to a hereditary monarch. In the study of sociology, the term derives from the work of Max Weber for whom bureaucracy meant a system of administration, not a type of government, undertaken by trained professionals, according to written rules. (This school of thought is expanded upon in Section 3.3.1 below.) Public Administration studies use the term to distinguish public administration from administration in a private organisation, highlighting the differences between the two. Political economists use the term to define a non-market organisation, which is financed not from the sale of its products, but from its parent organisation (Beetham 1996: 2-4). For the purposes of this thesis, public administration is considered as the broader activity, and bureaucracy as the methodology by which the tasks of the organisation are achieved (Lawton and Rose 1994: 29).

3.2.2 TYPOLOGIES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS

Esping-Anderson's Typology

Public administrations exist throughout the world, but take many different forms. A number of typologies have sought to categorise

²⁴ The term 'bureaucracy' is commonly used both as a neutral term, to describe a complex organisation, especially in the public sector and pejoratively, to describe an 'impenetrable, ponderous and unimaginative organization' (Hill 1997: 155).

ideal types in order to assist the understanding of why different forms have developed in different places and at different times. A particularly rich seam, especially for administrative systems, is that of typologies of welfare states.²⁵

One of the best-known and most frequently referenced typologies of developed countries' welfare states is Gosta Esping-Anderson's 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism' (1990), described as 'the gold standard' of comparative welfare state studies (Kettunen and Peterson 2011:1). Using the two dimensions of decommodification and social stratification, he identifies three clusters of regime types.²⁶

- The first, the liberal cluster, as exemplified by the USA, focuses on individualism and the primacy of the market. Public assistance is means-tested and limited. Welfare benefits cater mainly for (the minority) low-income groups and the majority of people provide for themselves through private social insurance policies.
- The second, exemplified by Germany, is described as the corporatist or conservative regime. The welfare state relies not on the market, but on compulsory public insurance for workers. Rights are in this way attached to class and status. The influence of Catholicism is seen in the focus on preserving the traditional family.
- The third group, social democratic, is the smallest group and limited to the Scandinavian countries. Fundamental to this final type are the principles of universalism and social rights for all citizens (Esping-Anderson 1990: 26-8).

²⁵ See for example Leibfried 1992, Castles and Mitchell 1993; Siaroff 1994, Ferrera 1996, Bonoli 1997, Korpi and Palme 1998 – usefully summarised by Arts and Gelissen (2002: 143-4).

²⁶ Decommodification refers to the degree to which individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participation. Stratification refers to the different impact of welfare states on social structure, for example whether it cultivates hierarchy or status, or dualisms or universalism (Esping-Anderson 1990: 37, 58).

A key criticism of the Esping-Anderson typology, of particular relevance to this study, was the charge that the Mediterranean countries were inaccurately categorised. Italy is included by Esping-Anderson in the corporatist cluster, whereas Spain, Portugal and Greece are not covered at all. This omission by Esping-Anderson has led to a number of commentators debating whether Southern European countries constitute a separate cluster rather than belonging to the corporatist cluster or forming a sub-set of the corporatist cluster (Rhodes 1997: 1-22; Moreno 2001a; Arts and Gelissen 2002: 145). In particular, Maurizio Ferrera (1996) argues convincingly that Southern European countries differ from both the highly homogeneous, standardised and universal welfare states of northern Europe and from the more fragmented continental systems. The Southern Model of Welfare has been characterised by a high degree of polarisation in terms of welfare support: generous pensions exist alongside non-existent support for unemployed young people for example. This dualism of protection differentiates Southern European states not only from the universalism of social democratic European states but also from continental corporatist countries characterised by a smaller spread between high and low protection (Ferrera 1996: 21).

A second defining characteristic of Southern European model has been the nature of health services. Portugal, Greece and Spain have all aimed to establish fully fledged national health services, based on taxes rather than contributions, as is the case in the corporatist model. However, there is a mix of agencies involved, including a high proportion of private sector provision – a characteristic of the liberal cluster. The persistence of clientelism also differentiates the Southern European model from Esping-Anderson's western state clusters. Political clientelism – favours exchanged for support of a particular party - exists in all democratic countries, but the relationship is usually general and impersonal.²⁷ In Southern Europe, however, a real

²⁷ Clientelism can be differentiated from patronage as follows: 'Political clientelism (selective distribution of state resources by political parties to win client's electorate support) and

exchange of individual votes takes place accruing benefits to individuals (Ferrera 1996: 25; Kickert 2011: 810).²⁸ This thesis will return to the issue of clientelism later in this chapter.

More recently, this type of comparative welfare state typology has been criticised for its focus on national specificities. The argument is made for a 'more fluid transnational conceptualisation', recognising that welfare states are not created in national isolation but are heavily influenced by transnational economic, political and cultural interdependencies (Kettunen and Peterson 2011: 1). This criticism is made specifically in regard to welfare states, but highlights the dangers in focusing on individual nations in comparative study.

Painter and Peters' Administrative Traditions

The Esping-Anderson categorisation is useful as a method of examining a particular aspect of public administrations, that of the welfare state. The addition of the Southern European model enhances the understanding of the public sector in Spain as it draws out differences and in particular highlights the issue of clientelism. A more helpful typology in considering different public administrative regimes is one which considers public administrative traditions.

Administrative tradition is defined as:

An historically based set of values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate public administration within society. (Peters 2008: 118)

Martin Painter and B. Guy Peters (2010a: 10-12) argue that whilst it is problematic to systematically analyse administrative functions, it is justified as it aids comparison, helps understand reform, management and governance capacity and assists the interpretation of administrative systems. They understand administrative tradition as

patronage (unequal, hierarchical, personalized exchange of favours between patron and client) are basic characteristics of southern politics and so is corruption (abuse of public power for private personal or party gain)' (Kickert 2007: 50).

²⁸ There are counter views of the pervasiveness of clientelism in Southern European countries. Hopkin (2001) in his study of the extent to which governing parties in post-Franco Spain have followed clientelist strategies, found little evidence of 'votes for exchange'.

containing ideas and structures, and as a discernible pattern in the style and substance of public administration. Four variables assist this analysis of administrative traditions and are set out in Figure 2 overleaf. These are the state's relationships with society; relationships with political institutions; the relative importance of law versus management; and the nature of accountability (Painter and Peters 2010a: 6-8).

Using this framework, nine families or groups of countries are identified, each sharing some common administrative inheritance: Anglo-American; Napoleonic; Germanic; Scandinavian; Latin American; Postcolonial South Asian and African; East Asian; Soviet and Islamic (Painter and Peters 2010b: 19).

There is a danger when grouping together countries in this way, that one overlooks or minimises the institutional complexity of each country. There is also the risk noted earlier regarding a focus on national specificities (Kettenun and Peterson 2011: 1). However, the model does enable the development of a framework for the examination of the similarities and differences between Autonomous Governments in Spain and as will be seen in later chapters of this thesis is a particularly relevant construct in the investigation of the Junta and the Generalitat. Spain, together with France and other Southern European countries, is located in the Napoleonic Tradition, which is explored more fully in Section 3.2.3 below.

Figure 2: Four Variables of Administrative Traditions

1. The first variable, relationships with society, is defined first in macro terms. Where does the relative permanence and power lie – in the state or the society? Is the state a product of agreement in society (contractual) or are the state and society intertwined to the extent that it is impossible to separate them (organic)? State and society are also related at a micro level: in some countries the state is closely bound to society through networks, in others the relationship is more personal and individual.
2. The second dimension, the relationship of politics to administration, considers how far there is political involvement in the bureaucracy. In particular, it focuses on how much contact there is between politicians and civil servants. Is there a strict separation of their roles? This can have an impact on the level of commitment of civil servants to government programmes and raises the question of whether merit or political criteria dominate recruitment and promotion and therefore affect competency. A further aspect is the extent to which the bureaucracy becomes a 'general purpose elite for the state'.
3. The third variable, of "law versus management", contrasts the public administrator and the public manager. The public administrator is someone whose task is to identify the legal foundations of public actions and to implement that law. The public manager's job is to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of government programmes.
4. The fourth variable, concepts of accountability can differ significantly. Does accountability depend on law as the primary mechanism for controlling public bureaucracies or are political actors, especially parliaments, the instrument to be relied upon?

Source: adapted from Painter and Peters (2010a: 6-8).

3.2.3 SPAIN AND THE NAPOLEONIC MODEL

Aspects of the Napoleonic Model

The Napoleonic administrative tradition reflects the approach of Napoleon I (1804-1814, 1815), whose model of the public sector spread throughout much of southern Europe, including Spain. It can be described as legalistic and formal. Its roots are in the French Revolution (1789-1799) after which Parliament became the highest authority in France. Legislation became fundamental to state and administration, locating the constitution, laws and regulation as the exclusive sources of administrative action (Kickert 2011: 807). In terms of Painter and Peters' four variables, the organic nature of the relationship between state and society allows citizens a less autonomous role in relation to the state and also makes the state less open to change (contrasted with a contractarian relationship where either party can seek change). The state is centralised and unitary, with an emphasis on uniformity. There is a greater blurring of the roles between civil servants and politicians than in other administrative traditions (Peters 2008: 123). Under the Napoleonic tradition, civil servants are public administrators, applying the law, rather than managers for whom the law is the starting, not the end point (Peters 2008: 122). Public administration is held to account not by citizens or parliament, but via the courts.

Roots in Spain

Spain has been cited as the closest adherent to the Napoleonic model (Alba and Navarro 2011: 783), demonstrating many of the characteristics outlined above, and as will be explored further in this section. Paradoxically, adoption of the model in Spain is usually dated to the beginning of the nineteenth century, specifically to the time of the 1808 War of Independence when Spaniards rejected French rule.

Spain was therefore at war with Napoleon I and

at the same time adopted the Napoleonic model for everything: its legal codes, its administrative law, its public administration model, its administrative corps. (Alba and Navarro 2011: 783)

However, it can be argued that the foundations for a Napoleonic model were already in place in Spain before 1808. It seems likely that the French influence prior to Napoleon may well have created fertile ground for the establishment of the model in the nineteenth century. It is possible to trace the influence of France and French thinking over Spain and Spanish systems and culture to the Habsburg and Bourbon empires of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Bourbons sat on the thrones of both France and Spain. Charles III of Spain (1759-1788) brought advisers from other parts of his empire to Madrid. A family compact was signed between the Bourbon monarchs of Spain and France in 1761. Spain and France (as well as Portugal and Naples) collaborated in the expulsion of the Jesuits. These examples show a high degree of shared history, cooperation and influence, not only in terms of the relations between the countries but also in terms of the development of Spanish domestic policy-making (Paquette 2009: 5).

A powerful bureaucracy to administer the Empire had already been developed under the Habsburgs (1517-1668) and when the Bourbons took the Spanish throne in 1714, the French mode of centralisation was reflected in a series of steps to bring about a similar centralised public administration to Spain - notably with the abolition of the Catalan fueros by Philip V (the grandson of the French King Louis XIV) in the same year (Moreno 2001: 42-3). Philip V emulated French centralisation and developed a state bureaucracy fashioned on the French model (Magone 2004: 2). The French influence after the War of Independence was reflected in the Cádiz Constitution of 1812 which revealed clear objectives to centralise and apply uniformity (Moreno 2001: 45).

In this way, the foundations were set for the development of a centralised (that is, a Castilian), law-based public administrative model

in nineteenth century Spain. Three key elements of the Napoleonic model then became the basis of the Spanish administrative tradition. Firstly, centralism was used to manage a country which was not a unified state. Secondly, uniformity was adopted to combat the differences between provinces, to counterbalance old privileges and to apply legal principles equally. Finally, a professional civil service was introduced to replace the old 'spoils systems' and political manoeuvrings (Alba and Navarro 2011: 783). The term 'spoils system' refers to the practice of a political party, having won an election, filling public sector jobs from its supporters (Hughes 2012: 45). It is predated in Spain by the system of 'cesanías' during the nineteenth century whereby new governments carried out purges to guarantee the loyalty of public employees (Molina Álvarez de Cienfuegos 1999: 35).

The Southern European Model

Spain has therefore been located in the 'Napoleonic family'. It also shares an additional set of traits as part of the 'New Southern European' cluster as distinct from, or as a sub-set of, the Napoleonic model. This Southern European model has been described in terms of two enduring and contrasting structural characteristics: heaviness and weakness (Diamandouros et al 2006: 9-24). This use of heavy and weak is useful as it captures an inconsistency inherent in these regimes.

On the one hand, they are heavy in terms of their heavy-handed relations with their citizens and society, with large and often extensive state structures. State power is centralised and is used to intervene extensively in the economy. Such state intervention has included economic protectionist efforts and regulation of the labour market. These states also traditionally provided state jobs, especially for the middle classes, via political patronage. It is important to recognise that such patronage was not exclusive to Southern European states, but it has been argued that it was more extensive and entrenched in

these countries in the nineteenth century than in other parts of Europe and, moreover, actually increased during the twentieth century (Diamandouros et al 2006: 19).²⁹

However, this dominant presence of the state does not necessarily correspond with a characteristic of strength. On the contrary, Southern European regimes have been traditionally weak. The state may have had large and extensive state structures, but historically they have been under-resourced – both financially and in terms of relevant expertise. The influence of local elites meant there was inadequate taxation of the wealthy to fund public services and the provision of jobs via local political patronage often meant unqualified people filled public sector posts. The resulting uneven development of the administrative apparatus, coupled with inadequate social services and under-developed general state education, meant for a weak state, with widespread, and well founded, perceptions of administrative inefficiency and corruption (Sotiropoulos 2006: 201). In terms of today's public administration in Spain, some of these characteristics can be discerned, such as the presence of corruption. Others including the under-resourcing of state structures and inadequate welfare services, are no longer the case (at least before the post-2008 economic crisis). These issues will be examined in the specific cases of the Junta and the Generalitat.

Grands Corps and Politicisation

Two related aspects of Spain's adoption of the Napoleonic administrative tradition have been particularly influential in the period of reform to be considered in the next section and therefore merit further examination at this point: the grands corps or civil service elite and the wider politicisation of the administration.

²⁹ Corruption continues to be a significant issue – see for example Heywood's article on corruption during the González governments (Heywood 1995a) and more recent work on political corruption and the construction boom (Jiménez and Villoria 2012).

A significant element of the Napoleonic tradition is a highly trained and qualified civil service organised into professional corps. Within Spain, specialised groups of officials were appointed and a powerful elite corps (also called the *grands corps*, special corps or *cuerpos*) of top officials developed.³⁰ The roots of the *grands corps* are not clear, but Carlos Alba and Carmen Navarro (2011: 785) state that at the start of the twentieth century some civil servants, especially in the Ministry of Finance, initiated a special corps based on the French model of *grands corps* in defence of their job security because they were faced with administrative reform. Carlos Alba (1997: 178) had earlier argued that until 1918, under the spoils system, some civil servants had taken over the running of the state, achieving a protected position. This enabled them, through establishing special corps, to become a powerful elite structure within government which has remained to the present day.

The public administrative structures, processes and ethos in Spain remained largely unchanged throughout most of the twentieth century, including during the Franco regime. At the conclusion of the Civil War, the Franco regime appointed army personnel to the civil service with ministries 'split between several political families' (Alba and Navarro 2011: 789). During the 1940s and 1950s when the regime needed technical experts, these were filled by the traditional bureaucratic elite. The *grands corps* secured its power in three ways:

- They had a self-financing capacity through special taxes, as they charged citizens for the services they provided;
 - They had a self-governing capacity to protect their interests; and
 - They could veto proposals of politicians in personnel matters.
- (Parrado Díez 2011: 248)

³⁰ The terms 'grands corps' and 'grand corps' are used in the plural and the singular in different texts. In this thesis, the term 'grands corps' is normally used to reflect the existence of numerous elite groups of civil servants.

Attempts to reform public administration in Spain from the 1950s onward 'collided with the authoritarian essence' of the Franco regime, obstructing its modernisation (Giménez Martínez 2014: 1). The grands corps continued to maintain its well established position, despite in the 1960s some opening up of what had been a closed recruitment system, and legislation in 1965 ending the charging for services.

There have been two key characteristics of the power of the Spanish grands corps which have rendered them so influential. Firstly, they have controlled the recruitment and promotion of new members. New members are recruited to the service of the corps, not into the general administration service – presumably with the expectation of loyalty to the corps primarily and not to the civil service in general. Secondly, members of the grands corps have enjoyed high levels of influence over politics. The administrative elite is strongly intertwined with the political elite, with many ministers and members of parliament in Spain being former top officials and members of the professional corps. For example, civil servants have benefited from 'leave of absence' from administrative functions to take on political roles, whilst remaining linked to (and arguably loyal to) the corps (Alba 1997: 181). Members of the grands corps still occupy the majority of top positions in the civil service, including posts which are political appointments such as the Director-Generals (Kickert 2011: 809). Former Prime Minister José María Aznar is an example of a politician drawn from the high-ranking officials of the grands corps (Magone 2004: 74). Mariano Rajoy, Prime Minister, is also a former civil servant.

This politicisation of the administration is one of the key differences between Spain and the New Southern European states on the one hand and their Northern European neighbours on the other.

Politicisation takes place at the top and the bottom of the civil service. At the lower level, it can take the form of political parties offering voters jobs in the public sector (Kickert 2011: 810), a practice often

referred to as 'caciquismo'.³¹ Under the Napoleonic system public jobs can only be obtained officially via competitive entrance examinations. However, a number of methods are used to bypass this barrier, such as the use of temporary contracts which are then converted into permanent positions. At the top level is the politicisation of senior officials. While the practice of political appointments to top jobs formally exists in the US and informally in others, the degree is higher in Southern European countries, including Spain. The election victory of the Socialist Party in 1982 in particular saw a huge wave of new appointments to senior positions. This was repeated by successful parties in subsequent elections (Kickert 2011: 810).

These dimensions of the Napoleonic model and the New Southern European model are useful therefore to illuminate the tradition in Spanish public administration, with its state-centric view (of particular importance in the context of the establishment of the Autonomous Governments), its emphasis on administrative law and formalism, the blurring of the distinction between the roles of politicians and civil servants, the heavy but weak state apparatus and the inheritance of political clientelism. These features clearly have had implications for the capacity and enthusiasm for change in Spain, particularly in the late twentieth century, which this chapter will now address.

3.3 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

3.3.1 THE CLASSICAL MODEL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

This section begins with a consideration of the key present day debates in public administration and bureaucracy in western

³¹ 'Caciquismo' is a form of corruption based on the clientelistic practices of local notables (or caciques) (Moreno-Luzón 2007: 417).

democracies in order to contextualise public sector reforms beginning in the 1970s.

From the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1970s, public administrations in developed countries had been predominantly organised according to the 'classical' model of bureaucracy.³² This model was greatly influenced at the outset by the work of three key individuals: Max Weber (1864-1920), Woodrow Wilson (1856-1920) and Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915).

Weber outlined a number of principles of modern bureaucracy in his "Essays in Sociology" which are reproduced overleaf. In summary, under the classical Weber model only the law, and the rules made in accordance with the law, provide authority. A strict hierarchy maintains and organises that authority. Power is held not by an individual but by the position they hold in the hierarchy. The organisation is impersonal and written documents ensure consistency in the application of the rules. People work in the bureaucracy as a full-time occupation. Office management, because it follows rules, can be learnt (Hughes 2012: 48-9). This model was in contrast to the earlier public administration which had been carried out by 'amateurs bound by personal loyalties to their leaders' (Hughes 2012: 43). In essence, personal administration was replaced by an impersonal system.

³² The term 'classical model' is used here. However, as well as classical (used by Lane 2000), the model has been labelled 'Weberian', 'traditional' (Hughes 2012), 'modern', 'legal-rational' (Gofii 1992: 64), bureaucratic and 'ancien regime' (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 71).

Figure 3: Weber's Characteristics of Bureaucracy

- Modern officialdom functions in the following specific manner:
- I. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations.
 - II. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.
 - III. The management of the modern office is based upon written documents ('the files'), which are preserved in their original or draught form.
 - IV. Office management, at least all specialized office management – and such management is distinctly modern – usually presupposes thorough and expert training.
 - V. When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited.
 - VI. The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned.

Source: Gerth and Mills (1991: 196-8).

The classical model was also heavily influenced by Woodrow Wilson, Professor at Princeton University for many years before becoming President of the USA (1913-1921). Wilson's interest was to overcome 'the corrupt and confusing administrative circumstances in the US with a public administration based on scientific research', arguing for the installation of a 'scientific, professional, meritocratic, clear-cut, rule-based and therefore trustworthy bureaucracy' (Sager and Rosser 2009: 1138). Focused on the relationship between political and administrative roles, he made the case for a clear separation of politics from the administrative and a separation of policy from the administrative task of carrying it out. 'Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics' (Wilson 1887: 209-10, cited in Peters 1995: 3).

The third major contributor to the classical model in public administration was Frederick Winslow Taylor. Frederick Winslow Taylor was an American mechanical engineer, efficiency expert and management consultant, and is widely regarded as the father of Scientific Management. His seminal work, 'The Principles of Scientific Management', published in 1911, laid out the process of scientifically studying work to increase worker and organisational efficiency. The principles underlying his theory contributed to a wide array of management practices during the twentieth century including task specialisation, assembly line production practices, job analysis, work design, and production quotas and control (Giannantonio and Hurley-Hanson (2011: 7).

3.3.2 REFORM AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The classical Weberian model dominated twentieth century public administration in the developed world, described as 'the original and "default" form of organisation in the public sector' (Ferlie and Ongaro 2015: 3). However, by the 1970s criticisms were being made that the classical model was out of date, not suited to the rapidly changing end-of-century world. This view is encapsulated in the introduction to David Osborne and Ted Gaebler's key 1992 work:

The kind of governments that developed during the industrial era, with their sluggish, centralised bureaucracies, their preoccupation with rules and regulations and their hierarchical chains of command, no longer work very well. [...] They are like luxury ocean liners in an age of supersonic jets: big, cumbersome, expensive and extremely difficult to turn around. (1992: 11)

The basis of the criticisms reflected wider changes in society – in terms of politics, society and economics. The late 1970s and early 1980s saw a decline in the deference to authority, questioning 'the legitimacy of bureaucratic decisions and actions' (Pierre 1995: 1), and a 'growing customer mindedness displayed by increasingly affluent and educated consumers within public services as in their private consumption' (Ferlie and Fitzgerald 2002: 344). In the private sector,

IT developments made new forms of performance measurement possible and there was a 'dramatic and sustained rise of management functions, knowledge and authority' (2002: 344).

Significantly, there were major changes to the politico-economic context. The middle class grew and taxpayers were challenging the size of the public sector (Ferlie and Fitzgerald 2002: 343). Changes in income levels and distribution triggered a new tax consciousness (Hood 1991: 7), and the economic downturn required governments to reassess the role and function of the public sector. The bureaucracy was increasingly seen as an obstacle to social change and no longer a facilitator (Pierre 1995: 2). Unlike the technical or legal changes made in the 1960s, public sector reform became a key political and economic matter. Epitomised by the Thatcher government in the UK and Reagan administration in the USA, a market-based ideology was embraced, with private sector techniques and privatization seen as the solutions. This change, based on the widespread adoption of private sector approaches, was to become a fundamental shift away from the legal-rational bureaucracy of the classical model.

Initially focused on economic liberalisation and privatisation in the 1980s, the governments of the UK and USA moved to wider administrative reforms of core state functions in the 1990s, including contracting out of public services, downsizing the public sector and reforming civil service employment practices (Kamarck 2000: 235-49). By the 1990s these types of reforms were being grouped together under the label of 'New Public Management' (NPM). Many authors published work on NPM at that time.³³ Christopher Hood is generally recognised as one of the first adopters (but not advocate) of this term for the group of reforms. NPM was a rejection of the previous concentration of public administration on hierarchy and the elimination of overlap. Rather, it championed contestability, user choice and

³³ See, for example, Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Ferlie et al 1996; Lane 2000; McLaughlin et al 2002. More recently, the focus has been on the demise of NPM (see comments later in this section).

transparency (Hood 1991: 5). Hood defines NPM in terms of a number of doctrines as follows:

- NPM reforms stress private sector styles of management practices and a shift to greater competition in the public sector.
- They involve a shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, breaking up former 'monolithic' units, to create manageable units based on the separation of provision and production.
- 'Hands-on professional management' means active control by senior named persons who are 'free to manage'.
- Greater emphasis is placed on explicit standards and measures of performance and on output controls, stressing results not procedures.
- Overall there is a focus on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use (1991: 4).

A wave of public sector reforms inspired by NPM was triggered across many parts of the world, assisted by supra-national bodies such as the OECD, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre 2011: 2). The extent and depth of change in the past four decades marks a significant shift away from the classical model. Indeed, the end of the twentieth century saw:

a revolution in public administration that is every bit as profound as that which occurred at the turn of the nineteenth century, when Weberian bureaucratic principles began to influence many governments around the world. (Kamarck 2000: 251)

NPM can be described as the opposite to the classical model of public administration. Gualmini (2008: 76) contrasts the old, hierarchical, Weberian bureaucracy with the new, entrepreneurial or NPM bureaucracy, using three aspects of formal structure; civil service organisation; and administrative procedures and processes. Rather than the formal hierarchical structure with limited autonomy under the classical or Weberian model, the new entrepreneurial model places

greater emphasis on decentralised agencies with significant autonomy. Under the new entrepreneurial model, civil servants are organised according to professions, not on a formal-legal basis. Recruitment is decentralised, flexible employment contracts are favoured and there is a higher degree of mobility between private and public sectors. In terms of rules and procedures, compliance and the imposition of ex ante controls is replaced by management by objectives and outcome measures. A lack of customer and citizen focus is addressed with the adoption of codes of practice designed to improve relations with citizens. This comparison is summarised in the table below.

The value of Elisabetta Gualmini's analysis to this thesis is the highlighting of the strong parallels between the Napoleonic administrative tradition as it has pertained to Spain and the Weberian or classical model of public administration which was being challenged at the end of the twentieth century. Moreover, it demonstrates the very significant gap between the public administration operating in Spain at the time of the Transition on the one hand and the NPM model on the other. This gap, and its implications, will be discussed in the case study.

Table 1: Two Ideal Types of State Bureaucracy

← Entrepreneurial bureaucracy (organized by product)	→ Weberian bureaucratic model (organized by function)
<p><i>(1) Formal structure</i> 'Departments' as main organizational units Structural decentralization Administrative agencies with significant autonomy Mutual (or even conflicting) relationships between departments and agencies</p>	<p>'Directorates General' as main unit Hierarchical centralization Administrative agencies with limited autonomy Relationship of dependency between agencies and ministries</p>
<p><i>(2) Civil service organization</i> Careers organized on a professional basis Specialist and managerial training High degree of public/private mobility Decentralized recruitment Wide use of flexible employment contracts Minimal bureaucratic ethos Merit system Widespread use of collective bargaining</p>	<p>Careers organized on a formal-legal basis General and legal training Low degree of public/private mobility Centralized recruitment Limited use of flexible employment contracts Significant bureaucratic ethos Seniority system Limited use of collective bargaining</p>
<p><i>(3) Administrative procedures & processes</i> Management by objectives and result orientation Performance audits and measurement Instruments for the evaluation of results Simplification and de-bureaucratization Instruments for citizens participation and open government</p>	<p>Compliance to formal rules and procedures Prevalence of <i>ex ante</i> controls No evaluation of civil servants Strong normative/legal regime Lack of instruments for the promotion of citizens' participation</p>

Source: Adapted from Gualmini (2008: 76).

This section has focused on NPM-inspired reforms. However, it is recognised that more recently (since the end of the 1990s) there has been a movement away from NPM as the dominant paradigm in management studies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre 2011). The 'governance' approach, for example, has gained prominence, highlighted in particular by Rod Rhodes (1996). Rhodes emphasised 'self-organizing, interorganizational networks' and partnerships between government and non-government organisations, arguing that these networks would 'complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination' (Rhodes 1996: 652). Nevertheless, the consideration of NPM-inspired reform has been significant in Spain, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, and so an examination of this concept in some detail is required as part of the context-setting for the examination of the practices of the Junta and the Generalitat.

Before examining contemporary public administrative developments in Spain, two specific features of public service management research, relevant to the study of contemporary sub-state government in Spain, need to be considered: decentralisation and the response of public administrations to austerity.

3.3.3 DECENTRALISATION

Definition, Motivations, and Typologies

Chapter Two examined the different forms of territorial distribution of power within a nation-state, highlighting the unitary and federal models. It recognised Spain as a 'union state', a hybrid which reflects variation within the territory which existed pre-union. In this Section, consideration is given to the concept of decentralisation as it relates to public administration in Spain. Decentralisation is defined as the:

transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from the Central Government and its agencies to field units of Central

Government ministries or agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or non-governmental private or voluntary organizations. (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986: 5)

Spain is not alone in decentralising. The number of countries transferring authority and resources from Central Government to sub-national tiers of government has multiplied over the last three decades (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008: 54; Guinjoan and Rodon 2014: 23).

Three core dimensions of the concept can be defined as fiscal, administrative and political. Fiscal decentralisation refers to the extent to which Central Government transfers fiscal powers to sub-state bodies. Administrative decentralisation refers to how much autonomy sub-state bodies enjoy in relation to Central Government. Political decentralisation refers to the degree to which Central Government allows sub-state bodies to undertake the political functions of governance, such as representation (Schneider 2003: 33). Using these dimensions, it is possible to identify the main variants of decentralisation as follows:

- *Deconcentration* - the dispersal of responsibility by Central Government for a policy to its own staff in its own field offices. Deconcentration allows only moderately more autonomy than centralised systems.
- *Delegation* - the transfer of policy responsibility to sub-state governments or semi-autonomous organisations which are not controlled by Central Government but remain accountable to it.
- *Devolution* - Central Government allows quasi-autonomous sub-state units of government to exercise power and control over the transferred policy. Devolution provides the greatest degree of autonomy for the local unit.³⁴ The local unit is only accountable to

³⁴ The term devolution is not to be confused with the Spanish term 'devolución', which refers to the concept of powers being handed back to Central Government by the Autonomous Government. This was mooted by several PP-controlled Autonomous Governments in the

the Central Government insofar as the Central Government can impose its will by threatening to withhold resources or responsibility from the local unit. (Schneider 2003: 38)

The first wave of administrative decentralisation related to the creation of the first federal system, that of the US, in which the main concern was 'to constrain the malevolence of public officials' and keep governments small and separate (Ahmad and Brosio 2009: 3). However, subsequent proponents have emphasised the positive features of decentralisation, rather than solely 'remedying the defects of centralisation' (Smith 1985: 4). The four main arguments in favour of decentralisation can be summarised as follows:

- It can enhance accountability and the responsiveness of government by increasing citizen voice and making local officials accountable locally rather than to Central Government.
- It can improve political stability by giving minorities more control over issues that affect them directly.
- It can reduce abuses of power by transferring Central Government functions and resources to lower levels.
- It can increase political competition by expanding the number of arenas in which politicians can participate. (Faguet 2014: 2)

Of particular relevance to this study are the first two arguments, those of improving accountability and recognising diversity.

Arguments that decentralisation can improve public sector output by improving accountability and responsiveness are based on the following view:

Greater local participation and transparency in the production of public services should result in services that are better suited to the real needs of local people, and also of higher quality or lower cost. (Faguet 2014: 8)

wake of the post-2008 economic crisis, although whether it is legally possible has been debated (González García 2014: 477).

According to John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates, decentralisation can make government more responsive to local needs by 'tailoring levels of consumption to the preferences of smaller, more homogeneous groups' (1988: 5).

Claims that decentralisation can promote political stability are based on a view that it can accommodate diversity, recognising ethnic and cultural differences in different parts of the territory. It can preserve and promote cultural and ethnic identity (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008: 56).

However, there are criticisms of decentralisation on both efficiency and identity grounds. Efficiency is not enhanced, but rather it is reduced because of duplication through multiple tiers of government and the loss of economies of scale. The argument has been made in relation to the first in the Spanish case (Chislett 2002: 72), but the claim of a loss of economies of scale is questionable given the scale of operation of most Autonomous Governments.³⁵ In terms of claims for accommodating diversity, decentralisation can be accused of encouraging parochialism and separatism:

It threatens the unity of the general will. It reinforces narrow, sectional interests. It is anti-egalitarian through its support for regional variation in the provision of public goods. (Smith 1985: 5)

The quotation from Brian Smith also highlights a potential tension between decentralisation and equality, a key issue in the Spanish debate over the creation of the State of the Autonomies.

Research has shown that decentralisation both improves and worsens policy outcomes in terms of service, finances and political power (Faguet 2014: 10). The purpose of this study is not to argue for or against this model, but to enhance the understanding of the way in which decentralisation has been used by two sub-state governments

³⁵ The annual budgets of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya are in the region of 30,000M€.

in Spain to make improvements on the previous regime for the benefit of local people. Consideration of the different types of models is instructive in this context.

Different forms of decentralisation exist along a continuum from strong, authoritative regional governments which 'play a decisive role not only in their respective regions but also in the country as a whole' (Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010: 152) such as the Länder in Germany, to countries where there is no regional level of government at all (such as Portugal and Ireland). John Loughlin's typology of central-local relations in EU member states identifies four models: federal; regionalized unitary; decentralized unitary; and centralized unitary (Loughlin 2000: 25). He develops his analysis by considering the degree of autonomy enjoyed by sub-states in terms of a number of dimensions. These are:

- the legal position – whether this is defined constitutionally or through ordinary legislation
- the political competencies accorded to the sub-national level
- the degree of participation in national policy-making - the possibility of engaging in activities beyond the frontiers of the national territory
- the degree of control over other sub-national levels
- the degree of financial autonomy from, or dependence on the national government.

Thus, a sub-state with a high degree of autonomy would have: its legal position guaranteed by the constitution; its own extensive competencies which are those powers not reserved to the central state; an important influence in national policy-making, including the right to participate in national policy-making; the ability to participate in external state activity, including a role in European policy-making and even foreign treaties; substantial financial resources and its own tax-raising powers.

A criticism of this type of categorisation is that countries are treated as the units for comparison, failing to recognise the variation amongst sub-state governments. Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arian H. Schakel (2010) produced a Regional Authority Index to address this latter gap in research, based on the two domains of authority, self-rule and shared rule. The former is the capacity of a regional government to exercise authority autonomously in its own region and the latter the capacity to co-determine the exercise of authority for the country as a whole (2010: 6).

An area of research which is outside the remit of this study, but which is relevant to note, not only in terms of decentralisation but also in terms of the European context considered later, is that of multi-level governance. The term is used to describe 'the increased interdependence of governments operating at different territorial levels' and 'the growing interdependence between governments and non-governmental actors at various territorial levels' (Bache and Flinders 2004: 3). Whilst it has been criticised for being descriptive rather than explanatory, it is an important concept (adopted as a framework of reference by the Committee of the Regions and other EU institutions, for example, Ongaro 2015: 13) and continues to be the source of academic debate (see Diamond, Liddle and Ongaro 2015).

Decentralisation in Modern Spain

The Spanish model of decentralisation is located towards the higher end of the spectrum in terms of autonomy, Autonomous Governments scoring relatively highly in the previously cited Regional Authority Index. Compared with forty-one other democratic states, the Spanish sub-states are surpassed only by Belgium, Bosnia-Hertzegovina, Germany and Italy (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010: Appendix A). Spain's Autonomous Governments possess significant competencies and their own tax-raising powers. They have a foundation in the Constitution. They can pass their own laws which have the same

force as those of the Spanish State (Gunther et al 2004: 302). However, they have a limited role in national policy making and in terms of engaging in external state activity and, as will be explored in this study, they are still reliant on Central Government for resources. The sharing of some key competencies has also been the source of conflict between the two tiers of government.

The decision to pursue decentralisation is 'above all, a political one' (Smith 1985: ix). This was the case in post-Franco Spain, where the need to accommodate sub-state demands, notably from the Basque Country and Catalonia, could not be ignored. It also reflected a wish to reverse the centralism of the Franco regime, and was seen as 'a crucial ingredient of a decentralizing package' (Solé-Ollé 2009: 257).

Decentralisation:

signalled a broader public desire to reverse Spain's recent legacy of economic and political centralism as a way of delivering democracy and better governance and extending economic development opportunities to less favoured areas. (Colino 2008: 578)

Whilst the early motivations were political, observers have commented on increasingly economic motivations amongst regional elites in Spain, particularly since the late 1990s, because of the need to compete in global and European markets and to respond to fiscal pressures (Colino 2008: 579-80; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008). It is a model of decentralisation which originally enjoyed public approval in Spain, but polls started to show falling support following the financial crisis post-2008. This fall has been attributed, in part, to the scapegoating by the PP Government of the Autonomous Governments (Guinjoan and Rodon 2014: 22). As noted elsewhere in this study, Central Government has apportioned blame for the economic crisis to the spending (and borrowing) by the Autonomous Governments (Del Pino and Pavolini 2015: 255). Spain is a highly decentralised state, a development which represents a significant shift from previous territorial structures.

3.3.4 RESPONSES TO AUSTERITY

Prior to the financial crisis post-2008, public and private sector organisations, world-wide, had faced financial and economic crises on a number of occasions. Studies of responses to such periods of reduced resources can be grouped into three main streams. The first is the literature referring to the crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s (which was concerned about the passive role of management in the conduct of cutback management and was heavily influenced by the work of C. H. Levine [1978]). Secondly, contemporary Public Administration literature deals with managing austerity (related to the recent economic crisis which is the context of this research) (for example, Kitson, Martin and Tyler 2011; Meegan, Kennett, Jones and Croft 2014). Thirdly, there is generic management literature on coping with environmental shocks (for example, Cepiku and Bonomi Savignon 2012). It is the second stream of literature within which this study is located.

A number of categorisations exist within the second stream (related to the recent economic crisis) to describe the type of responses made and measures taken. J. F. A. Overmans and Mirko Noordegraaf use four concepts to consider the responses to austerity: decline, cutbacks, retrenchment and downsizing (2014: 101-2). The use of the term '*decline*' in this context is generally attributed to Levine's work of 1978, and relates to the failure of organisations to anticipate, recognise, avoid or adapt to pressures which threaten the organisation's long term survival. Typical measures include reducing capacity, such as closures. The term '*cutbacks*' is mainly used in the public sector and usually refers to temporary measures to restore fiscal balance. Focused on preservation, measures have a strong fiscal orientation, such as hiring freezes, and percentage across-the-board cuts. *Retrenchment* involves the generation of new resources, typically by taxation and the focus is on expenditure levels instead of policy change. Finally, *downsizing* is a term used in both public and private sectors and is a strategy for improving organisational

performance and restoring organisational-environmental fit. It is understood to be a proactive measure, not just a reaction to something (external) happening to an organisation.

One of the most widely cited contributions in this field is that offered by Pollitt (2010). He describes three broad strategies for managing public fiscal austerity that range from uniform percentage reductions (also called ‘salami slicing’ or ‘cheese slicing’ in this case) to prioritised cuts. ‘Cheese slicing’ or across the board cuts refers to the practice of applying a percentage reduction across all budget heads. ‘Efficiency gains’ are savings as a result of reducing inputs to achieve the same outputs. ‘Prioritised cuts’ are the application of a greater level of reductions in one area than in another. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach are summarised in the table below.

Table 2: Three Approaches to Cutbacks

Approach	Advantages	Disadvantages
Cheese slicing	Sounds egalitarian and politicians avoid directly choosing which programmes will be most hurt	Programme specialists may make self-interested choices which hurt effectiveness, but protect service providers (themselves)
Efficiency gains	Sounds less threatening/more technical; modern and managerial and so appealing across party political lines	Usually requires considerable innovation (which may or may not work and will take time) Probably will not yield enough by itself
Centralised priority setting	Looks more strategic and leaves politicians in direct control	Politicians become visibly and directly responsible for painful choices, the consequences of which may not be foreseen

Source: Adapted from Pollitt (2010: 22).

Classifications of this nature help draw out the different types of responses. They do not suggest discrete, mutually exclusive,

approaches. In reality, strategies often 'combine [the] features of all three approaches' (Pollitt 2010: 22).

Studies have also considered the relationship between public management reforms and periods of financial austerity. Sometimes economic crises have precipitated major reform, other times not. In some scenarios, financial crises are managed by cuts alone and without fundamental reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 26). It seems then that a financial crisis can either make reform more difficult to achieve, because there are restricted resources with which to make change happen, or make reform easier, because the consideration of more radical options has become more possible. The choice of strategy will be examined in the case of the Junta and the Generalitat as part of this research.

3.3.5 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN MODERN SPAIN

The Context of the Transition to Democracy

The international trend in public sector reform, as described in Section 3.3.2 above, coincided with Spain's Transition to Democracy. With the Transition's agenda of democratisation, unprecedented decentralisation and expansion of the welfare state, it is unsurprising that administrative reform was not a priority for the Spanish politicians in the 1970s and early 1980s. Furthermore, there were also concerns that major reform in this area would threaten the necessary but fragile consensus of this period as previously discussed (see Chapter Two).

However, that is not to say that reform was not considered necessary (Kickert 2007: 43). Under the Franco regime, 'the Wilsonian division between political and administrative spheres lost all meaning ... Politics was bureaucratized and the bureaucracy was politicized' (Bañón and Tamayo 1997: 90-91). Specifically, in relation to the legacy of the authoritarianism of the Franco regime, it is illuminating to consider again the previously described 'heaviness and weakness' dimensions of the administrative tradition of Southern European

states. For example, in terms of the heavy-handedness of the state, the rigid state control of labour in Spain made the flexible reassignment of workers difficult, undermining productivity and competitiveness. The new post-Franco regime would also need to deal with large parastatal companies similarly ill-suited for open competition.³⁶ In terms of weakness, the Transition would have to cope with low levels of public spending on social services and education as well as a regressive and evasion-prone taxation system (Diamandouros et al 2006: 25-27).

There were numerous problems and tensions latent in the bureaucracy not caused by the Transition to democracy but which would hinder, not help, the Transition. These included restrictive practices in the civil service such as the backdoor entrance to recruitment and the lack of discipline and impunity of civil servants. The so-called 'bronze law' was 'the custom in which civil servants adjusted their efforts to their perceived salaries; if they thought that it was 50 per cent of what it should be, they would work half as hard' (Alba and Navarro 2011: 792). Democratic change itself brought its own challenges. A new form of clientelism developed within the administration through a 'nepotistic network' of the political parties and trades unions, undermining recruitment and promotion. The transfer of staff and services to the new Autonomous Governments brought duplication and the need to reconfigure Central Government structures and personnel (Alba and Navarro 2011: 792).

This chapter has focused so far on the national position in Spain, to provide the context to public administration at a sub-state level. In particular, it is important to recognise it as the environment of the majority of civil servants who had been operating under the Franco

³⁶ The Spanish term "paraestatal" does not translate easily into English. It is used to describe an institution or organisation which, via its delegated powers from the State, cooperates to achieve the goals of the state, without forming part of the Government (<<Dicho de una institución, de un organismo o de un centro: Que, por delegación del Estado, coopera a los fines de este sin formar parte de la Administración Pública.>>) Online Dictionary of the Real Academia Española <http://lema.rae.es/drae/?val=paraestatal>. Accessed 01.07.13).

regime, individuals who were then transferred from Central Government to the Autonomous Governments with the constitutional transfer of competencies. From 1990 to 2001 the proportion of civil servants in central administration was almost halved and in Autonomous Governments doubled (Magone 2004: 74). This redeployment was one of the greatest difficulties of the decentralisation process (Parrado Díez 1996: 265) – and was badly managed (Alba 1997: 185). Most civil servants opted to stay in Madrid where there were perceived to be better jobs, despite the incentives offered. This meant that the new sub-state bodies were staffed with relatively inexperienced and lower grade personnel (Parrado Díez 1996: 265). This inherited group of staff, would bring their existing administrative culture which, when added to the Constitution's stipulation that there was only one civil service model (Molina Álvarez de Cienfuegos 1999: 38), would significantly reduce the new bodies' ability to develop their own, new, model of administration.

Central Government Initiatives

The need for change was recognised by politicians and by civil servants alike. For example, a survey of civil servants in 1982 found that 94% felt that reform was necessary (Beltrán Villalva 1990: 343). Attempts have been initiated by each and every Central Government to reform public administration in Spain, unleashing an 'unending process of administrative reform' (Alba and Navarro 2011: 790). The discussion below of the main Central Government initiatives is in broadly chronological order, and focuses particularly on the first two decades of democracy.³⁷ Immediate changes were made to remove

³⁷ Raj Chari and Paul M. Heywood (2009) reject the use of time periods as an organising framework for analysis of the policy process in Spain because it fails to draw the distinction between policy choices and outcomes on the one hand and the policy process on the other. This is a valid approach in order to examine institutional factors influencing the policy process such as the economic model and design of contemporary Spanish democracy. However, I am interested in the outcomes in as much as they reflect the administrative tradition of Spain and influence the subsequent framework for the establishment of the Autonomous Governments.

the very visible Fascist elements of the Francoist regime: between 1976 and 1982 the official trade union and the National Movement were dismantled, the 'mass media' structures and repressive Interior Ministry, propaganda and censorship departments were abolished. Approximately 30,000 public employees of the former Francoist administrative structures were converted into regular civil servants. There was no purge of civil servants (Ongaro 2009: 210) and top hardliners were allowed 'to gradually fade away to the backstage of the Spanish political scene' (Sotiropoulos 2006: 213). New legal procedures, the right to strike and freedom to form unions among civil servants were established (Alba 1997: 184). The 1978 Constitution 'provided for the political neutrality of civil servants, the submission of the public administration to the elected government, the principle of merit in the recruitment of administrative personnel and the principle of administrative decentralization' (Sotiropoulos 2006: 213).

Under the Socialist Governments (PSOE) of Felipe González, there was a series of initiatives to bring about change to the public administrative system. Indeed, the very first policy of the newly elected government in 1982 was a decree on public administrative reform. It was to be the first of a number of announced reforms, which were rarely fully implemented – the reasons for which will be addressed shortly – and was seen as more symbolic than effective.³⁸ Parrado Díez describes the 1984 Act as a first step to introducing rationality into the civil service promotion system (1996: 265).

Included in the 1984 legislation were measures which:

reduced the number of *cuerpos*, introduced a new 30-level grade scale, modified pay scales, standardized and modernized recruitment and in service training practices, made the transfer of civil servants from one sector of the public administration to another more flexible, lowered the retirement age from 70 to 65 and introduced new technology and modern management practices. (Sotiropoulos 2006: 226)

³⁸ 'Despite the frugal content of the 1982 decree, its explanatory preamble describes administrative reform as one of the fundamental political objectives of the Government' (Beltrán Villalva 1990: 342).

In particular, it tried to weaken the power of the corps by establishing a 'post system' whereby career and remuneration depended on the post occupied and not on the internal rules of the corps (Ongaro 2009: 210). The earlier 'Ley de Incompatibilidades' (1983) had however outlawed the ability of civil servants to hold more than one job in the public sector and restricted their access to jobs in the private sector (Sotiropoulus 2006: 226).

In 1986 a new Ministry was created for public administration – a first for Spain (Alba and Navarro 2011: 794). The Minister for Public Administration (MAP) was charged with evaluating past failures and proposing changes, and, importantly, with the coordination of relations between central and sub-state administrations. 1989 saw the publication by the MAP of 'Reflections on Modernising the State Administration' (MAP 1989). In keeping with the international context of public administrative reform (outlined above), the diagnosis was a need to change the administrative culture from one focused on the legality principle to one more focused on results and outcomes. The three main aspects of reform were *organisational aspects* (particularly to reflect the newly created Autonomous Governments); *procedural and functional aspects* (to promote the responsibilities of managers through targets, rationalisation of procedures and the introduction of IT); and *human resources aspects* (to introduce efficient management of civil servants) (Alba 1997: 188).

Little had changed by the time of the presentation of the 'Plan of Modernisation of the State Administration' in 1992. Containing 204 elements, it sought to improve information and communication with citizens as customers; enhance the quality of services; and introduce new management techniques (Alba 1997: 190). Parrado Díez is dismissive of the Plan as failing to create new public managers, merely putting 'administrative reform on the agenda' (1996: 269). However, it is clear from the above commentary that reform was already on the Government's agenda.

Public sector reform was central to the support by sub-state parties for the minority right-wing Partido Popular (PP) Government in 1996. The Governability Pact between the PP and the Catalan nationalists (CiU), the Basque nationalists (PNV) and the Canaries Coalition (CC) was based on PP promises to consolidate the decentralised State of the Autonomies by carrying out the statutory reforms already agreed; to draft bills on the structure of government and the central administration; and to review civil service statutes (Gallego and Barzelay 2010: 286). By 1997 Parliament had agreed the Law on the Organisation and Functioning of the General Administration of the State (LOFAGE) and the Law on Government, rationalising the central administration of the state and of quangos, and reserving the senior posts of the administration to civil servants only.³⁹

The PP Government was keen to modernise public administration, changing 3,000 high ranking offices: in the political-administrative structures, 91% of secretaries of state, sub-secretaries and director generals were changed (294 out of a total of 322); in the high ranking administrative structures, 554 out of a total of 1,185 (sub director and equivalent) were substituted by new people and at the provincial and regional level 2,200 posts changed hands (Magone 2004: 73-4).⁴⁰ The prefectorial post of Gobernador Civil or Civil Governor was abolished in 1997. This was a significant step for the Autonomous Governments given the historical position of the Civil Governors as 'the presence of the central state in the provinces'. At the rank of Director Generals, these had been highly politicised posts (Molina Álvarez de Cienfuegos 1996: 35).

³⁹ This legislation was supported by the PSOE in parliament – both having been initiated during the earlier PSOE administrations (Gallego and Barzelay 2010: 289). However, fieldwork for this research suggested that in reality exceptions are allowed from this requirement (author's interview with an academic, University in Barcelona 2015).

⁴⁰ This contrasts with the continuity of elites from the Franco regime reported in the early Transition period: 'Between 1975 and 1982 996 appointments to high ranking positions within the public administration were made, of which 57.6% included civil servants who had served under the Francoist regime.' (Magone 2004: 73).

This section has focused on Central Government initiatives taken in relation to public administration at the end of the twentieth century during the period of the establishment and consolidation of the new State of the Autonomies. The most important pieces of legislation subsequently passed are examined in Chapter Four: Reforms to the financing of the Autonomous Governments, Central Government measures taken in relation to managing the post-2008 crisis, and Constitutional Court rulings in relation to the status of the Catalan Statute.

Limitations in Early Implementation

Few commentators have argued against the view that public sector reform initiated at national level has been largely unsuccessful in Spain – especially in terms of new public management reforms.⁴¹ Parrado Díez (1996: 275) argued that ‘the old public administration has not yet given way to a new public management in the Spanish public sector’. More recently, Edoardo Ongaro (2009: 263) concluded that the main features of the administrative tradition had not undergone significant change. Explanations offered for this failure have included the context for reform in Spain being different, the impact of the administrative law tradition, the obstruction of civil servants, the lack of skills on the part of civil servants and ministers, the lack of political will and the crowding out of the reform agenda by devolution. These explanations for the early period of implementation are expanded on below, providing a national context to the case study of public administration at a sub-state level at the heart of this thesis.

⁴¹ Some improvements have been recognised. Parrado Díez (2008: 230) for example points to a degree of modernisation of central public administration, particularly through ‘layering’ of policies and institutions (meaning the creation of new ones without the elimination of the old ones). Ana M. Guillén and Laura Cabiedes (1997: 335) in their analysis of the reform of the Spanish health-care system, refer to positive improvements cited by some health economics experts due to the devolution process. They conclude that competitiveness has increased, as has dynamism and innovation. However, these findings need to be read alongside increased administrative costs and greater difficulties in coordination.

Lourdes Torres and Vicente Pina (2004: 447) conclude that whilst Spain may have implemented many 'ingredients of the NPM recipe, there are few visible changes'. Comparing the experience in Spain and the UK, and focusing on why similar concepts and initiatives could produce such different results, they suggest that it is probably due to the different context in which these initiatives have been developed: In the UK, NPM changes were a package of reform to minimise the state, viewing the private sector as superior to the public sector and placing trust on the effectiveness of markets and competition. By way of contrast, support for NPM-inspired reforms arose in Spain as a response to citizens' views of public administration as bureaucratic and inefficient (Torres and Pina 2004: 447). Carles Boix similarly compares the concern of countries such as Britain about the inefficiencies of the public sector with the majority of Spaniards wanting an expansion of public services (1997: 276).

The administrative law-based culture of the public service is repeatedly given as a key reason for the failure to reform (Parrado Díez 1996; Alba 1997; Peters 2008; Ongaro 2009), with civil servants not developing the necessary change management skills. The delay in introducing NPM reforms can be explained by 'the dominance of a red tape philosophy, traditional compliance to formal rules, and the extensive presence of *ex ante* controls' (Gualmini 2008: 92). The emphasis of the Napoleonic model on law, formality and uniformity can make the implementation of NPM reform difficult if not impossible (Peters 2008: 129). An additional factor cited is the lack of an academic knowledge in the country to 'inspire and sustain any managerial reform' (Boix 1997: 276), a reference to the dominance of legal academics.

It is important to note that public sector reform, including international trends such as NPM, takes place within the national context, being 'filtered, interpreted and modified through the combination of nationally based processes' (Carboni 2010: 104). NPM can be perceived as having 'cultural, ethical and political features' which do

not 'fit' certain countries - notably those with Napoleonic administrative traditions (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 10). This thesis will examine whether this issue of variation and distinctiveness between nations is also true between different parts of the same country, at sub-state level.

Any reforms had to be implemented by the very bureaucracy which was the object of the proposed changes. Bureaucrats throughout the world are very capable of frustrating reforms they believe are to their detriment.⁴² In particular, the Spanish grands corps have kept their position of power, setting the agenda on policy and continuing to be the main recruiting ground for both the administrative and political elites (Alba and Navarro 2011: 799).⁴³

The ability and commitment of politicians with regard to reform are also questioned, in the light of the repeated failure to secure the passing of regulation and legislation and, just as importantly, to manage the subsequent implementation of reform. It is interesting to note that while the majority of civil servants in 1982 agreed with the need for reform, only 57% believed the Government was really interested in public administrative reform (Beltrán Villalva 1990: 343-4). Referring specifically to the period 1986-1991, Ongaro reflects on the loss of momentum in reform due to the lengthy process of defining that reform (2009: 210). Felipe González in 1992 described the delays in administrative reforms as the greatest frustration of his premiership (Heywood 1995: 138). However, the PSOE governments in particular have been criticised for not only failing to clarify the administrative from political roles (a key aim of the modernisation), but

⁴² Eduardo Zapico Goñi (1992: 47-8) equates Spanish civil servants with Sancho Panza: like Sancho Panza remaining agnostic and passive about confronting the windmills, civil servants do not try to stop the reformers, they accept instructions. They do not however actively propose alternatives.

⁴³ Mariano Baena del Alcázar's study of the governing elites and institutional power in Spain between 1939 and 1992 confirms that 'elites circulate': 37% of the people who made up the elite during the Franco period continued in power in the following political period and 19% of the people who formed the elite during the Transition and the time of the UCD Government were still members of the elite in the period of the PSOE Government (2002: 333).

actually accentuating the blurring of the administrative/ political divide with their 'one of ours' approach.⁴⁴

Finally, it is difficult to overestimate the dominance of the national political agenda by the actual creation of the new State of the Autonomies, the scale of which squeezed out reform of administrative procedures, processes and human resource policies. The magnitude of the change involved in such a massive decentralisation programme would have made huge demands on change management skills – attributes not previously highly rated nor covered in civil servants' training (Parrado Díez 2008: 248). It is also likely that politicians at the sub-state level were more interested in making sure that the new bodies had political legitimacy and in transferring powers, than in the need to establish the means, via the civil servants and public administrative structures, to develop better public services. The tensions and uncertainties of the process of creating the State of the Autonomies put the construction of administrative apparatus very much into second place (Ramió and Salvador 2002: 101).

Influence of the European Union

A fourth aspect to be considered in terms of developments in contemporary Spain with an impact on public administration is that of Europe. The perceived importance of EU membership was clear from the beginning of the Transition. As Prime Minister Suárez stated within two weeks of the first democratic election in 1977, 'Spain is in Europe and forms part of it' (MacLennan 2000: 147). The contribution of Europe to Spain's democratisation is still held to be important four decades later. According to Mariano Rajoy, Spain's Prime Minister in 2013:

⁴⁴ The phrase 'one of ours' is used to describe the desire of incoming governments to appoint senior civil servants who are more sympathetic to their party's policy objectives and is not a phenomenon exclusive to Spain. However, for the newly legalised parties, the long association of the civil service, especially of senior civil servants, with the Franco regime, and then the UCD, gave the PSOE a strong motivation to appoint different senior advisors (Sotiropoulos (2006: 226).

For Spain, European integration has been a success, one of the best things that has ever happened to us. For us, who lived with 40 years of an authoritarian regime [under Franco], Europe means democracy, freedom, and progress.⁴⁵

EU membership was thus perceived by Central Government to add legitimacy to the new democratic state. It was also the source of significant funds. The opportunities of EU membership were also recognised by the sub-states of Spain. During the Transition, Europe was seen by some sub-states as 'a new framework in which their aspirations to self-government could be realised, without confronting the Spanish state head-on' (Keating 2000: 32).

Spain's accession to the European Union coincided with a growing debate in Europe about the role of regions in European governance. The EU was widening and deepening: enlargement by countries such as Spain and greater integration, notably the 1992 Single Market. At the same time there was lobbying from within Europe by those who wanted to see further European integration with greater federal elements (Loughlin 2001: 24). Two key changes were made at the end of the 1980s or early 1990s reflecting this new interest in a 'Europe of the Regions'. Firstly, the 1988 reform of European Regional Policy and the Structural Funds increased the budget and introduced the principle of subsidiarity (Bache and Jones 2000: 1). Secondly, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created the Committee of the Regions (COR), enshrining the principle of subsidiarity in policy making and making it possible for regional ministers to participate in Council (of Europe) meetings (Coates 1998: 268).⁴⁶

However, claims of a new Europe of the Regions need to be qualified.⁴⁷ The reform of the 1988 Structural Funds was a

⁴⁵ http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/12/08/actualidad/1386520536_280805.html. Accessed 19.12.13.

⁴⁶ The Committee of the Regions is a consultative body which allows local and regional representatives to take part in EU legislative work (<http://ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/glossary>). Accessed 14.12.13.

⁴⁷ It has been argued that the failure of the EU to create this regional tier across Europe added to the frustration of Catalans with the EU and central government post-2008, contributing to the growing demands for independence from Spain (Dowling 2013: 6).

regionalisation policy – in other words, a top-down policy to address regional imbalances. It was not a policy of regionalism. The COR was considered to be a marginal force and the Assembly of European Regions, which had been a major lobbying organ, had lost profile because of the creation of the COR (Jeffrey 2000: 4). Fundamentally, the EU remains an organisation based on member states. Andrea Noferini, for example, points to the continued gatekeeper function of Central Government, particularly in relation to the participation of the Autonomous Governments in meetings of the Council and European Commission (2012: 378).

Reflecting on the Europe of the Regions in 2014, Michael Keating considered that the concept was overplayed in the first instance and adds four further points to explain the failure of a third tier in Europe:

- The minimum response of the European Union, with the Maastricht Treaty the only measure to offer something substantial.
- The weakening of the Committee of the Regions by the diversity introduced by the municipalities.
- The use of subsidiarity to the states, not to the regional level; the linking of regional policy to social policy ‘which has now almost disappeared’.
- The domination of the European Commission by a neo-liberal ideology which does not recognise the concept of market intervention (author’s interview with Micheal Keating 06.01.14).

EU entry also posed threats as well as opportunities to sub-state governments. Some competencies newly acquired by the Autonomous Governments were transferred to the EU level at the same time as the Spanish Government, as representative of state interests in the Council of Ministers, participated in decision-making in areas of Autonomous Government competencies (Morata 2007:

151).⁴⁸ Furthermore, Autonomous Governments were to be the main implementers of EU policies in whose formation they were not involved (Noferini 2012: 368). European membership exposed tensions in the provisions of the Spanish Constitution. The shared competencies, lack of clarity and ambiguities in the Constitution (previously covered), and the provisions of individual Statutes of Autonomy, some of which amplified the role of the Autonomous Government in relation to Europe, provided for a complexity leading to conflict between centre and periphery in Spain.⁴⁹

The opportunity for lobbying in Europe was taken up by most Autonomous Governments. By 1989, twelve (out of the seventeen) had established their own offices in Brussels for this purpose (Coates 1998: 266). Many have been active in collaborative interregional groups across Europe such as Medcities, REGLEG or the Atlantic Arc.⁵⁰ Some Autonomous Governments have been more proactive in the EU than others. Arguably Catalonia has been the most proactive, being involved for example in the creation and in the subsequent operation of key associations such as the Four Motors of Europe, the Trans-Pyrenees Euro-region and the High-technology Route.⁵¹ Jordi Pujol (First Minister of the Generalitat 1980-2003) was described as one of the leaders of the Europe of the Regions concept, 'losing no opportunity to press the cause of regionalism within the European Union' (Keating 2000: 33).

⁴⁸ The loss of key competencies to Europe included the areas of agriculture, fisheries, industrial policy, environment, regional planning, transport, energy policy, fiscal policy and culture (Closa and Heywood 2004: 85).

⁴⁹ This conflict was resolved, in part, by a pragmatic response of the Constitutional Court which authorised the activity of Autonomous Governments in international affairs so long as it did not compromise the unity of Spanish foreign policy (Closa and Heywood 2004: 85).

⁵⁰ Medcities is a network of Mediterranean coastal cities. REGLEG is a political network for EU regions with legislative powers. Atlantic Arc is a network of regions with Atlantic coasts in Ireland, UK, France, Spain and Portugal. www.medicities.org; www.regleg.eu; www.arcatlantique.org. All accessed 22.12.13.

⁵¹ The Four Motors of Europe was created in 1988 by Catalonia, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhone-Alpes and Lombardy as a lobby group; the Trans-Pyrenees Euro-region, created in 1989 by Catalonia, Languedoc-Roussillon, Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur, Liguria, Piedmont and Lombardy; and the High-technology Route, created in 1990, to act as an alternative to northern technological dominance (Closa and Heywood 2004: 92).

A wider component of the study of Europe from a public administration perspective is the 'europeanisation' of public policies. This is understood to be the process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making (Borzel 2000: 18). More broadly, it encompasses the institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, styles, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of the domestic public administrative arena (Radaelli 2003: 30). This field of academic study is outside the remit of this research, other than to acknowledge the existence of EU influence inasmuch as it affects all Autonomous Governments in Spain, as significant implementers of EU legislation and policy by dint of their competencies.⁵² The political stances taken by the Junta and the Generalitat towards Europe are however considered in this research.

This chapter has placed Spain in the Napoleonic administrative tradition, highlighting the gap between this form of bureaucracy and one underpinned by NPM-inspired reforms. It has demonstrated that the model of decentralisation in Spain is a highly devolved one. The Autonomous Governments have a foundation in the Constitution, their own law-making and tax-raising powers, and have extensive competencies in key areas of public administration. The limitations of early public administrative reforms by Central Government have been examined and, to complete the context-setting, public administrations' approaches to austerity and the impact of EU membership have been explored.

The next two chapters examine in detail the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia, providing an overview of key characteristics of the territories and the historical antecedents to

⁵² See for example works by Andrew Massey (2004) on the impact of the EU on public administrations; César Colino et al (2014) on the adaptation of sub-national governments to Europe and the impact of the EU on inter-governmental relations and Federica Cacciatore et al (2015) on the relationship between europeanisation and national reform programmes.

the sub-state administrations. The institutional establishments and budgets are studied to investigate the extent to which the opportunities have been taken to be different from Central Government and other Autonomous Governments.

4.0 INTRODUCTION

4.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of the investigation of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya. It sets out a brief profile of the two territories in terms of their key demographic, geographical and economic characteristics. Definitional issues are addressed regarding the nature of regionalism and nationalism as they relate to Andalusia and Catalonia. The development of Andalusian regionalism and Catalan nationalism is then outlined, concluding with a summary of key events after 1975 in relation to the State of the Autonomies in these two territories.

An examination is made of the corporate and political management arrangements in the Junta and the Generalitat, scrutinising the institutions of Government, the role of politicians, the organisation of ministries and public employees and changes in political control. The analysis of the 2015 budgets is undertaken within the context of the national financing system of the Autonomous Governments and the post-2008 economic crisis.

4.1.2 PROFILES OF ANDALUSIA AND CATALONIA

This section presents an introductory, outline profile of the contemporary territories of Andalusia and Catalonia, in terms of geographical and socio-economic characteristics, providing context to the subsequent comparative analysis of regional government in these two areas of Spain. The following map shows Spain's seventeen Autonomous Communities.

Map 5: Autonomous Communities of Spain



Source: Aja (2003: 15).

Andalusia and Catalonia share a number of similar characteristics: they are the two largest regions of Spain in terms of population, are both peripheral regions in terms of their distance from the seat of national government in Madrid, and both have their own widely recognised identity. Both were early adopters of autonomy as will be developed in this chapter. Both have embraced active membership of the European Union, although with distinct foci as will also be considered in due course. Both have developed very significant service and tourist industries, and construction has been a major element of the economy for both. However, there are also key differences. Andalusia is characterised by significant rurality and low density of population compared with Catalonia. It is a poorer region in terms of per capita income, and levels of unemployment have historically been and are currently higher.⁵³ Catalonia is a more urbanised area and has a larger industrial sector than Andalusia. It

⁵³ Juan Antonio Lacomba (1992: 34) points out however that in 1865 in some aspects the Andalusian economy was in line with that of Catalonia, the most developed part of Spain.

has its own language, Catalan, and a history of independent institutions. These characteristics are summarised in the table below:

Table 3: Key Characteristics of Andalusia and Catalonia

	Andalusia	Catalonia
Population (2011)*	8,371,270	7,519,843
Surface area (km ²)*	87,597	32,091
Population density (2011)*	95.6	234.3
% GVA by sector (2011)*		
• Agriculture	4.5	1.2
• Industry	11.9	20.7
• Construction	11.0	8.8
• Services	72.5	69.2
Unemployment rate (%)** (2014)	34.94	22.1
GDP per capita (€)** (2013)	16,666	26,666

Sources: *Spanish Government;
**Instituto Nacional de Estadística.⁵⁴

Placing these two areas in a Spanish context, Catalans enjoy a higher GDP capita than the national average (22,518€), a similar level of unemployment (22.37%) and an economy with a greater reliance on the industrial and construction sectors than the national picture (16% and 5.1% respectively). In contrast, Andalusians have a lower GDP per capita than the national average and a higher unemployment level. Agriculture and services are more significant contributors to the Andalusian economy than the national economy (2.3% and 67.9% respectively) (Spanish Institute of Statistics 2015).⁵⁵

⁵⁴ www.lamoncloa.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/644B9A54-87E6-46AF-8E6E-C542D84C59F9/0/Spain_Today_1172013.pdf and <http://www.ine.es/FichasWeb/RegComunidades.do?fichas=49&buscador=&botonFichas=Go+to+Table+of+results>. Both accessed 10.06.12.

⁵⁵ www.ine.es/prodyser/espa_cifras/2015/index.html#30/z. Accessed 03.08.15.

4.2. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE CURRENT AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENTS

4.2.1 DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

This section considers the historical antecedents to the current establishments of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya. This is examined under the categories of Andalusian regionalism and Catalan nationalism, a distinction which merits elaboration in advance. The sense of territorial identity in Andalusia has predominantly been articulated as existing within the context of a unified Spain. No incompatibility is recognised in the dual identity as Andalusian and Spanish at the same time. The most up-to-date comparative data shows that in Andalusia, 67% consider themselves to be as Spanish as Andalusian (CIS 2015).

This is not to suggest that there is not a strong sense of Andalusian identity. There is no lack of commentators pointing to the clear personality or identity that is Andalusia. Manuel Clavero Arévalo (1984: 121) gathers a range of commentators to support this: Caro Bayora describes Andalusia as ‘the most famous slice of Spain’. Julián Marias states that ‘of all the parts that make up Spain, Andalusia has the most distinct and unmistakable personality’. José Ortega y Gasset propounds that Andalusia is the Spanish region which ‘most fundamentally possesses its own culture’. However, it is not separatist in nature. Unlike other regions, Andalusia has wanted more involvement from Madrid (in the sense of the demands for support in addressing centuries long underdevelopment and poverty), not less and in this sense can be described as anti-separatist (Gilmore (1981: 60).⁵⁶

⁵⁶ A notable exception to this view of an andalucismo **within** a unified Spain was that expounded by the nationalist Partida Andalicista, which became defunct in 2015 (Gómez 2015). The Director of the Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados de Andalucía (IESA), Manuel Pérez Yruela, foresaw the end of the Party in 2008 when he opined that the Socialist Party had taken on the role of defender of Andalusia, seeing andalucismo in its broadest sense as a movement to tackle underdevelopment (Pedrote 2008).

In the immediate post-Franco period, andalucismo (or Andalusian regionalism) was defined in terms of freedom and equality, not ethno-cultural differences. It was

aimed at achieving self-government for the Andalusian people, on an equal footing with the rest of Spain, ... and the overcoming of the conditions of alienation, underdevelopment and subordination from which it suffers. (Cruz Artacho 2011: 6)

The economic underdevelopment aspect is a particularly important point. The mobilisation prior to the 1980 referendum for autonomous status was not only the expression of regional pride but also a reflection of the sense of grievance, borne of history (Moreno and Trelles 2005: 525), an aspect which will be expanded upon below. Andalucismo therefore is viewed as a regionalist rather than a nationalist movement.⁵⁷

However, the case of Catalan identity is different. More than half of Catalans (meaning those living in Catalonia) consider themselves to have a separate identity: 66% declare themselves either to be a Catalan living in Catalonia or a Catalan living in Spain, whereas 24% state they are Spaniards living in either Catalonia or Spain (Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió [CES] 2016). The two key issues for consideration of Catalan nationalism in the context of public administration are: geographical boundaries and separatism. In terms of geography, the area that is the remit of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia is clearly defined (see Map 5 at the beginning of this chapter). However, as the following map shows, a wider Catalonia, 'Països Catalans', has been claimed not only beyond this boundary into neighbouring regions of Spain, but also across the border into Andorra, France and Italy, where Catalan is spoken. The 1979 monograph of Fernando Soldevila and Miquel Coll i Alentorn covers this subject.

⁵⁷ A feature particular to Andalusia is the sentiment of an Andalusian stereotype being used, or 'stolen', by the state, especially under Franco, to promote a united Spain. Isidoro Moreno describes this appropriation by state powers to try and construct a generic Spanish culture as a 'process of vampirisation' as it 'emptied the Andalusian culture of its most important meanings and possibilities' (2002: 141).

Map 6: Catalan-speaking Regions of Europe



Source: www.helpcatalonia.cat/2014/10/about-catalan-language.html. Accessed 18.05.15.

This thesis is not the place to debate the legitimacy of these claims to a wider Catalonia, but rather to note its existence as part of the broad historical context to Catalan identity. Its impact on regional governance has been limited. Whilst there is acknowledgement by others of linguistic and cultural links, today ‘there is little indication of enthusiasm for the political project of a ‘Greater Catalonia’ (Payne 2009: 10). It is interesting to note however that the new political party CUP which won ten seats in the 2015 Catalan elections is one based on the independence of the Països Catalans.⁵⁸

Of greater relevance is the debate about the extent to which current Catalan nationalism is a separatist movement, one seeking independence from the rest of Spain. Historically, Catalan nationalism has concerned itself with Catalonia’s place within Spain (Crameri 2015: 104). The shift from a movement predominantly about greater autonomy from, and greater influence over, Spain to a situation where there is significant stated support for independence will be discussed later in this chapter. The term Catalan nationalism and not

⁵⁸ <http://cup.cat>. Accessed 10.01.16.

regionalism is used here to reflect the fact that most Catalans see Catalonia as a nation and not a region. The latest survey data by the Generalitat's Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió states that 41.6% of Catalans would prefer independence for Catalonia, compared with 26.5% in favour of Catalonia as an Autonomous Community of Spain (CEO 2016).

4.2.2 ANDALUCIAN REGIONALISM

The Accelerated Drive for Self-government

At the time of the preparation of the 1978 Constitution, Andalusia was not recognised as a historic nation as was the case with the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia and therefore not entitled to rapid elevation to full autonomy status via article 151. However, Andalusia did achieve autonomy via this fast route, despite a lack of a distinctive language and limited history of independent government institutions. This accelerated drive for self-government in Andalusia after the death of Franco is a reflection of a number of factors. Some are common with the rest of Spain such as the shared identification of pro-democratic opposition with regionalism (Conversi 2002: 225). Others are more specific to Andalusia, notably a history of neglect generating a sense of grievance, a fear of 'falling behind', and of being seen as second-class citizens, and secondly a more recent and forceful political mobilisation, based on a strong sense of identity.

Historic Colonisation and a Sense of Grievance


Andalusia is one of the largest regions of Spain in terms of geographical size and population. However it has also historically been one of Spain's poorest regions.⁵⁹ A history of colonisation can be traced from as early as the Roman occupation (300 years BC to 500 years AD), involving an exploitation not only of resources but also

⁵⁹ This relative poverty has continued in current times with the relative buying power of Andalusians consistently lower than the Spanish average (Alcaide Guindo 2011).

in terms of preventing 'any evolution of an indigenous culture' (Machado Santiago and Kurs 2000: 172).

The name 'Andalusia' derives from 'Al-Andalus', the name originally used to describe the Muslim territory which, by the year 720, covered almost the entire Iberian Peninsula (Barton 2009: 23). As the map below shows, Al-Andalus gradually reduced its scope from the eleventh century, following waves of Castilian conquests, to the area recognised as Andalusia today (Lacomba 1992: 25):

Map 7: The Shrinking of Moorish Spain



Source: Fletcher (1992: 130).

The incorporation of all Moorish lands into the kingdoms of the Catholic Monarchs by 1492 brought a new period of colonisation. Unlike the *fueros* enjoyed in other parts of Spain, Andalusia was ruled from Castile, according to Castilian laws (Moreno 2001: 40). Nobles from the north of Spain, together with the Church and the military order, obtained huge tracts of cheap land in the south following the Reconquest, creating vast estates (Lomax 1984: 230; Barton 2009:

73). This system of large landed estates (or latifundios) was to have repercussions for Andalusian development – or lack of it – in future centuries. The end of Al-Andalus has been described as the moment in history when Andalusia lost ‘its political autonomy and became subjugated to an external, dominant, centre’ (Acosta Sánchez 1978: 9).

The continuation of this phenomenon of colonisation can be traced over the following centuries. Despite its position as the doorway to the Americas in the sixteenth century, the ‘encrucijada cósmica’ or universal crossroads of the new world (Machado Santiago and Kurs 2000: 176), Andalusia did not emerge from its dependence on Castile. Goods and silver imported from the Americas did not stay in Andalusia, but were transported on to other parts of Europe, whose greater development meant that they profited from the market exchange, not Andalusia (Sánchez Mantero 2001: 89).

Spain’s decline from being central to the world order in the sixteen century to being semi-peripheral in the seventeenth century, was reflected in Andalusia, as it suffered

from agricultural regression, de-industrialisation and under-investment as well as three waves of famine. In the eighteenth century, the centralisation by the Bourbons imposed a territorial organisation in Andalusia by and for the centre, leading to a drain of the region’s agricultural, mineral and commercial resources. (Machado Santiago and Kurs 2000: 176)

Throughout its history, Andalusia has been, for significant periods, occupied, colonised, and made dependent by those who have controlled its geostrategic position and its resources (Machado Santiago and Kurs 2000: 188).

Early Development of andalucismo

This is not to say that there was no regionalist movement in Andalusia prior to the Transition to Democracy in the 1970s. During the second half of the nineteenth century alternatives were developed across Spain, including in Andalusia, to the Spanish centralist liberal vision,

which was deemed to have failed. In Andalusia, a group of ethnologists and folklorists in the late 1860s developed a ‘theory that the Andalusians were an amalgam of Arab and Christian blood, and therefore of an entirely separate national category from their Castilian neighbours’ (Moreno 1981: 233). These anti-state nationalists took a primordial perspective to nation-building (see Chapter Two), appealing to a past Golden Age before the fall brought about by the conquest by Castile. In Andalusian terms, the Moorish period could be portrayed as a time of arts, culture, and civilisation – an age ended by Castilian conquest (and not re-conquest as depicted in the Spanish nationalist narrative). This period has been described not as an Arabisation as is conventionally held, but a synthesis of Roman (Baetica) culture, Arabic traditions and Islamic Berbers culture (Moreno, no date, no page).

Most notably, however, andalucismo made marked advances in the early twentieth century under the impetus of intellectuals including Blas Infante Pérez (1885-1936), considered subsequently to be the father of modern Andalusian regionalism. Key developments at the beginning of the twentieth century included the publication by Blas Infante of *El ideal Andaluz* in 1915, and the Ronda and Córdoba meetings of 1918 and 1919, at the first of which the claim for autonomy was made and the symbols of andalucismo (the flag and shield) were fixed (Acosta Sánchez 1978: 204). These developments took place in a wider context of the national crisis of 1898 and a rejection of the centralist Bourbon state in many parts of Spain. This was also the period of Catalan nationalist developments (specifically la Mancomunitat) and the attempt to establish the Integral State of the Second Republic (Acosta Sánchez 1978: 189).

Blas Infante promoted three objectives: autonomy for the Andalusian people to determine their own future, recovery of the Andalusian identity, history and culture, and the liberation of the day labourers, described as ‘a stain on Andalusian society’ (Acosta Sánchez 1978:

193). During the Second Republic a campaign began to support a Statute of Andalusia, with Blas Infante heading the pro-Statute Junta (Cruz Artacho 2011: 5). However, a start on a definitive Statute was not made until April 1936, by which time the outbreak of civil war and the murder of Blas Infante rendered the effort futile (González Antón 1997: 595).

Unlike nationalist movements in other parts of Spain during this period at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the Andalusian movement had been unable to build a significant social base. Smith and Mar-Molinero (1996: 15) highlight two factors to explain the lack of development, both related to the pattern of land ownership. Firstly, the Andalusian landholding elite, as one of pillars of the Restoration regime (1874-1931) and later during the Second Republic (1931-36) as supporters of right-wing nationalist parties, was fearful of losing its privileged position and so was unlikely to be sympathetic to regionalism. Secondly, the anarchists and socialists had greater success in securing support amongst the landless peasants, who were more interested in working conditions and land ownership than regionalism (Córtes Peña 1994: 219).

The bourgeoisie at that time was inadequate in terms of quality and quantity to influence the Andalusian discourse, with a series of factors preventing the intellectuals and professionals from joining with the working classes and advancing andalucismo. An Andalusian bourgeoisie did not exist as was the case in Catalonia and the Basque Country where the emerging regional identity was used as a way of safeguarding their own interests. The social structure was so polarised in Andalusia that the small bourgeoisie could only side with the working classes, but it was unable or unwilling to be 'popular, emancipatory or radical' in order to win over the working classes and replace the anarchists. In addition, the advocates of the andalucismo discourse did not have a programme of institutional change which differentiated itself from the general federalism for the whole of Spain (González de Molina and Sevilla Guzmán 1987: 91-3).

A further factor to be considered in the weak development of andalucismo is the internal socio-cultural diversity within Andalusia. It has no single centrifugal city, is geographically vast (triple the size of Catalonia), and considerable economic and social disparities exist across the region (Gilmore 1981: 59). It has been argued that historically the Andalusians have not shared a unified regional sentiment and that localisms and provincialisms have superseded any regionalist feeling (Bernal 1978). However, all regionalisms, including andalucismo, were left in suspense with the outbreak of the Civil War and were actively suppressed during the Franco regime. The suppression of the Andalusian identity under Franco ranged from the suborning of its images for a Spanish stereotype to encouraging the consolidation of sub-regional structures within Andalusia (Lacomba 2001: 471).⁶⁰

Contemporary Steps to Autonomy

As in other parts of Spain in the late 1970s, regional autonomy was seen in Andalusia as part of the democratic opposition equation:

social and economic progress + political autonomy = democracy
(Cruz Artacho 2011: 5, author's translation)

Andalusian regionalism in the final decades of the Franco dictatorship is overshadowed in most literature by consideration of activity in the Basque Country and Catalonia. For example, Stanley G. Payne (1993: 106) makes a single reference to the raising of the Andalusian flag before the town hall of Seville to symbolise the mobilisation of an Andalusian movement in November 1932. However, Javier Tusell does recognise the existence of Andalusian political nationalism in his coverage of peripheral nationalisms at the end of the Franco period, tracing it to the 1966 elections when Alejandro Rojas Marcos became a councillor in Seville. His activism and that of others led to the creation in 1972 of the Socialist Alliance of Andalusia (Alianza

⁶⁰ For accounts of Andalusia and the Civil War see works by Lacomba (1987); Álvarez Rey (2006); Cobo Romero (2012).

Socialista de Andalucía or ASA), the forerunner of today's pro-Andalusian movement (Tusell 2011: 241).

An important consideration in the development of an Andalusian consciousness is the impact of the migration of many Andalusians to other parts of Spain during the 1960s and 1970s. This economically forced migration not only highlighted the economic disadvantage of Andalusians but also brought about

for the first time for many Andalusians the awareness of their own identity such that Andalusia was a people culturally defined by a specific characteristic. (Moreno 1984: no page)

As early as June 1979, the pre-autonomous Junta resolved to seek full autonomy via article 151. Following a popular referendum and royal ratification of the Statute, the first elections to the new Junta were held in May 1982. The key steps are shown in the table overleaf.

The decision to opt for the fast route reflected the fear in Andalusia of falling behind the historic nations of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia.⁶¹ It also reflected a sense of grievance, based on a history of past failures.

⁶¹ This was not exclusive to Andalusia. Leaders in the "non-historic regions" sought to 'ask for everything, if only to see, in the next moment, what this everything would consist of' (Acosta España 1981: 15).

Table 4: Chronology of Andalusian Autonomy Process (1977-82)

Oct 1977	Andalusian Parliamentary Assembly created
April 1978	Pre-autonomous body created
June 1979	Pre-autonomous Junta agrees to pursue autonomy via art 151
Feb 1980	Voters support route 151 in the referendum
Oct 1981	Referendum approves Statute
Dec 1981	King ratifies Statute
May 1982	First elections held to the Junta

Source: Adapted from González de Molina Navarro and Cruz Artacho (2011: 10-11). (Author's translation)

The Junta's 2011 publication to celebrate thirty years of autonomy describes these manifest historic failures in all aspects of Andalusian history: in terms of agriculture, industry, society, politics and identity:

- Agricultural failure was manifest in terms of low productivity, an inefficient and unequal structure of cultivation and ownership which condemned thousands of peasants to misery.
- A failed industrialisation showed the limitations of Andalusian industry, the scarcity of available resources and the lack of market competitiveness.
- An economic failure led to social failure, shown in persistent poverty, extreme inequality and stark social polarisation making social modernisation impossible.
- A political failure was evident since the mid nineteenth century with the continuation of clientelist behaviour and the establishment of caciquismo, making difficult the modernisation of custom, practices and politics, and turning Andalusia in the twentieth century to a land little prepared for a popular democratic culture.⁶²

⁶² Both clientelism and caciquismo are defined earlier in Chapter Two, Section 2.

- A failure of identity was due to the lack of a political project specifically to defend the Andalusian identity and prevent the stigmatisation of the Andalusian culture as an inferior culture (González de Molina Navarro and Cruz Artacho 2011: 6-9).

This background helps explain the rejection by Andalusians of any attempt to force Andalusia to accept 'second class' status in terms of level or speed of their autonomy in the 1970s.

[A] very clumsy presentation of the issue [of Andalusia's path to autonomy] on the part of the UCD and a certain demagoguery from the opposition, resulted in an outright rejection by the majority of Andalusians of any delay in bringing in the Statute. (Tusell 2011: 305)

The double standard (of a slower path to less autonomy for Andalusia compared with a faster route to greater autonomy for the Basque Country and Catalonia) was perceived as an injustice. In this context, 'the Andalusians felt the urgent need to assert themselves as full equals of the Basques and Catalans. A new Andalusian national consciousness was generated' (Pérez-Díaz 1998: 201). Andalusians may have shared a regional consciousness for a long time, but it can be argued that it was not politicised until the post-Franco period (Gilmore 1981: 60).

4.2.3 CATALAN NATIONALISM

Long Historical Roots

Catalonia's historical roots date back centuries. There is a library of books dedicated to this theme, in English, Spanish and Catalan, written before the more recent surge in publications regarding secession post-2006 (for example, Hernández 2007; Payne 2009; Balcells 2011). Other authors have concentrated on Catalan nationalism: most recently, Dowling (2013) on Catalonia since the Civil War and Smith (2014) on the origins of Catalan nationalism. This brief summary concentrates on the political and governance aspects of Catalan history. It does not examine cultural and linguistic aspects.

However, it is clearly acknowledged that these are vital aspects which make up the Catalan identity today. Works which give prominence to cultural aspects and the use of culture for nation building include Conversi (1997) and Crameri (2008). Of particular importance is the Catalan language which is arguably at the centre of all claims for nationhood (Kedourie 1993: 62). Its repeated suppression over the centuries by Bourbons, by Primo de Rivera and by Franco demonstrates its significance (McRoberts 2001: 6). For consideration of the importance of the Catalan language to identity, see Miquel Strubell (1999 and 2011) who makes no claim for impartial objectivity.

The Diada on the eleventh of September is the Catalan national day and it commemorates the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1714. The victor, Philip of Bourbon, had defeated Charles of Austria, the claimant backed by the Catalans. Philip V of Spain subsequently passed a decree (the Nueva Planta), which abolished the distinctive institutions and laws of Catalonia, replacing them with direct rule from Madrid and required the use of Castilian, not Catalan, as the official language. This defeat and the subsequent imposition of a unitary state has symbolised for many Catalans all that is wrong with the centralising Castilian power.

Catalonia's distinctive laws and institutions pre-dated the eighteenth century. Catalans claim that the Generalitat can draw on over 600 years of history. José Montilla, in 2009, then First Minister of the Generalitat, for example, speaks of the country's 'deep rooted historical desire for self-government', pointing to the longevity of the Generalitat as a governing body stating that 'very, very few institutions of government in Europe [...] have six and a half centuries of history behind them and are still alive today' (Montilla 2009: 221). The Catalan Statute of Autonomy (Preamble) made it clear that the Generalitat is not a newly created institution, but one established in 1359.

Catalonia's history as a separate entity is usually recorded from the end of the first century. During the late Middle Ages Catalonia became a major economic and political power in much of the Western Mediterranean (McRoberts 2001: 11). In 1137 the crowns of Aragon and Catalonia were united (into the Crown of Aragon) and, later, the Aragon sphere of control was expanded into the Mediterranean lands of Majorca in 1229, Valencia in 1238 and then on to Montpellier, Sicily and Sardinia (Sobrer 1992: 6). These lands had their own institutions and laws which were not abolished by the union of the Aragonese and Castilian crowns in the fifteenth century. As has been stated earlier, the two kingdoms of the Catholic Monarchs continued to be ruled separately, according to their own historic laws (Kamen 1973: 52). However, the focus of the new Spain was not the Mediterranean but the Americas, and was a Castilian-led enterprise, driven from Madrid, not Barcelona. Catalonia, from being central in the Mediterranean-focused world in medieval times, became marginalised with the rise of the Spanish empire and the shift of trade to the Atlantic (Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer 2003: 43).

Madrid's pre-eminence over Barcelona extended through the Habsburg rule of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when royal focus was more on imperial development, beyond Spanish borders. The Catalan Reapers' Revolt in 1640, which was a rejection of the demand of Philip IV for money and men to spread the burden of his war costs, demonstrated the challenges in managing such an extensive empire (Carr 2000: 7). With Philip V's Nueva Planta referred to above, 'seven centuries of Catalan self-government had been ended. [...] Catalonia's descent from its golden age was complete' (McRoberts 2001: 15).

Following the War of Independence (1808-14), Spanish liberals planned a French-inspired Jacobin, centralised state. This included the creation of provinces as an administrative unit, a measure rejected in areas such as Catalonia and the Basque Country (Moreno 2001: 44). The Carlist civil wars of the nineteenth century were in part a

reflection of this conflict, with the Carlist movement being particularly strong in these two regions:

It may well be that Carlism at that time owed its strength to a combination of the remoteness of Central Government and the proximity of industrial production, superimposed on the strong ethnicity of those regions. (Moreno 2001: 46)

Industrialisation at the end of the 1800s and beginning of the 1900s has been linked with growing nationalist movements (Esenwein and Shubert 1995: 49; Keating et al 2003: 47). This economic development was uneven across Spain, concentrated in Catalonia and the Basque Country. A key driver for Catalan industrialists was their poor view of the ability of Spain to run and develop the national economy. In contrast to Basque nationalism, which could be seen as a reaction against modernisation, Catalan nationalism was 'an affirmation of modernity against the failure of the Spanish state to bring about political and cultural modernization' (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 9). Tensions arose between Catalonia and the rest of Spain following the loss of empire in 1898 and the refusal of Spain 'to support a series of ideas designed to compensate for the loss of the crucial market for Catalan textiles' (Esenwein and Shubert 1995: 50). Catalan nationalism was also strengthened by Catalan frustrations with the Spanish state's domination by large land-holding southern agrarian elites, and also by the impact of xenophobia directed at large numbers of internal migrants at the end of the nineteenth century (Miley 2013: 9). Catalonia's sense of responsibility to teach Spain how to govern is a theme of the work of Fernando León Solís (2003: 142-5) and is captured by Keating et al: 'For the early Catalan movement, the dream was to 'Catalanise' Spain, converting it to Catalonia's modernising and industrial values' (2003: 47). This pedagogical attitude, based on a self-image of the superiority of Catalonia, is reflected in a number of this author's interviews, carried out for the case study, with Generalitat politicians and civil servants.

Following male universal suffrage in 1890 the Catalan regionalists achieved electoral success in 1901 and again in 1908 (Moreno 2001: 50). Strengthened demands for greater autonomy were reflected in the formal elaboration of Catalan nationalism in the writings of Enric Prat de la Riba (*La nacionalitat catalana* of 1906) (McRoberts 2001: 26). The turbulence of this period was demonstrated by 'Tragic Week' in 1909 when a week of general strike and riot against the sending of Catalan reservists to fight in the Moroccan War was met by repressive action by the army. However, it was also during this period that the highly symbolic Mancomunitat (or Commonwealth) was established in 1914, but then abolished by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in 1925 (Buffery and Marcer 2011: 229). The functions of the Mancomunitat were administrative but importantly it covered the whole territory of Catalonia (Moreno 2001: 51). More substantial in governance terms was the Statute of 1932 during the Second Republic in which the Generalitat had authority over local government, courts, public works, roads, law and order, but not education (Esenwein and Shubert 1995: 55). The Catalan language was given co-official status with Castilian (McRoberts 2001: 34).

As discussed earlier, the different visions of Spain, including the territorial distribution of power, were at the heart of the conflict which became the Spanish Civil War. It was reflected in Catalonia in the fact that the Generalitat was re-established in 1931, suspended in 1934 by the right-wing Spanish Government, and then re-established in 1936 following the election of the Popular Front Government (Payne 2009: 98-100). Following the Civil War a significant number of the Catalan Government fled into exile. Josep Tarradellas, who had been the First Minister and Minister of Finance in 1937, was chosen by the exiles to be First Minister of the Government of Catalonia.⁶³ Franco abolished sub-state government institutions, banned the Catalan language and other symbolic elements of Catalan identity and imposed a Castilian

⁶³ http://web.gencat.cat/en/generalitat/historia/historia_4/index.html#72453940-fac4-11e3-a5dd-005056924a59-5. Accessed 22.05.15.

centralised state, denying the validity of any kind of peripheral nationalism. This repression continued throughout the regime, valthough it 'proved incapable of destroying regional-nationalist consciousness' (Miley 2013: 9).

In summary, therefore, when Franco died in 1975 and Spain's Transition to Democracy began, Catalan nationalism had much to draw on: a political entity since the late 900s, a medieval empire, early parliamentary institutions and a literary tradition based on a distinctive language (McRoberts 2001: 44). To this list can be added the dynamics of a long-standing relationship between centre and periphery characterised on the Catalan side by either frustration with and/or resentment of the central authority for repressing their language and culture and a sense of superiority over Madrid in terms of management of the economy.

Catalonia during the Transition

Catalonia was at the forefront, with the Basque Country, in voicing its demands for autonomy at the end of the Franco period. An early act of Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister of Spain was to recognise the strength of Catalan demands, with the return of Josep Tarradellas from exile in France as the guardian of the Catalan Government in October 1977. Pre-autonomous status was granted to Catalonia, and also to the Basque Country and Galicia, acknowledging the special status of these areas which had held plebiscites in favour of their own statutes under the Second Republic. With its fast route to full autonomy for the three historic nationalities, Spain's decentralised model of Autonomous Government began as a 'differentiating' one. Its subsequent implementation moved Spain towards a 'homogenising' model, making no distinction between the different Autonomous Governments (Guibernau 2004b: 75).⁶⁴ This

⁶⁴ It should be noted however, that the special financial agreement extended only to the Basque Country and Navarre, a continued point of contention for Catalonia.

homogenising model has subsequently been a source of conflict as it is at odds with Catalonia's self-image as 'different'.

In this early period of the Transition, the 1979 Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia reflected the national context of compromise and fear of renewed conflict. It was not a statute of independence or separatism. It placed Catalonia as part of Spain, explicitly rejected federation, preserved the provincial councils and did not refer to claims for a 'Greater Catalonia'. Nor did it position Catalan as the exclusive language of Catalonia. It did however stress continuity over time and differentiation from others. In terms of continuity, it included reference to 'regaining democratic freedom' and 'recovering institutions of self-government'. Differentiation from others was emphasised through references to the collective identity of Catalonia, its collective life and the collective freedom of Catalonia (McRoberts 2001: 56-7). As Jordi Pujol, the First Minister of the Generalitat following the 1980 elections, commented much later: 'a willingness to compromise existed in 1978-9. It made it possible to restore democracy and Catalan self-government after the dictatorship' (Strubell 2011a: 56).

The Generalitat's central role in the national reconstruction of Catalonia in the late 1970s was a recognition not only of the symbolic importance of the Generalitat as an institution, but also of the fact that the pre-Franco society dominated by the Church and the old bourgeoisie no longer existed. Furthermore, the influx of immigrants and the expectations of a new welfare state were beyond the means of the extensive civil society traditional in Catalonia (McRoberts 2001: 115).⁶⁵ This issue of the civil society and its role in public services will be explored in Chapter Six.

The elections to the Generalitat of 1980 returned the Convergence and Unity Coalition, *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) as the largest party.

⁶⁵ Migration into Catalonia was significant. Between 1950 and 1975 net migration added almost 1,400,000 to Catalonia's population. Largely because of immigration, Catalonia's population increased by 75% (1962-75), 52% of immigrants coming from Andalusia (McRoberts 2001: 31).

The CiU was a centre-right coalition, made up of two parties – the *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* and the *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*.⁶⁶ Jordi Pujol was elected First Minister – a position he was to hold for over twenty years. The key stages of this period are summarised in the table below.

Table 5: Chronology of Catalan Autonomy Process (1977-80)

Sept 1977	Pre-autonomous Catalan Government created
October 1977	Josep Tarradellas sworn in as First Minister of the Generalitat
October 1979	Statute approved by referendum
Dec 1979	Ratified by King Juan Carlos
March 1980	Elections held to the Generalitat

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya.⁶⁷

2006 Revision of the Statute of Autonomy

Pujol and the CiU dominated Catalan politics at the end of the twentieth century. Indeed the CiU has been described as ‘the most important nationalist formation in the Spanish state and the most electorally successful representative of state-less nationalism in western Europe’ in the period up to 2003 (Dowling 2013: 6).⁶⁸ Their stance had been very much one which saw Catalonia as part of Spain. Catalonia had a ‘dual position [...] within Spain as a region

⁶⁶ See Dowling (2001) for an in-depth analysis of how CiU became the dominant force after Franco’s death, rather than the historic parties of Catalonia, the *Lliga Regionalista* and the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC). The CiU has now been disbanded (2016) and its constituent parties re-emerged as new parties DCD and PDC (Orquín 2016).

⁶⁷ http://web.gencat.cat/en/generalitat/historia/historia_4/index.html#72453940-fac4-11e3-a5dd-005056924a59-5. Accessed 20.05.15.

⁶⁸ Potential rivals in Catalonia, the ERC, had a more radical position in terms of independence, but were less electorally successful at this time. The ERC was organisationally weak due to persecution during the Franco era and had to compete with other parties on the left. State-wide parties, the PSOE and UCD/AP, were less able to present a credible territorial political agenda and so the CiU’s moderate territorial strategy, based on increasing autonomy within the existing Constitutional framework was successful (Elias 2015: 85-6).

with a strong sense of identity but also with strong economic and political interests in Spain' (2005 speech by Duran, then CiU leader, quoted in León Solís 2010: 77). At this time, the CiU promoted itself as a nationalist party, but not one seeking independence from Spain. It reflected its base in the Catalan bourgeoisie who were 'usually hostile to anything that would weaken their position within the Spanish state' (Cramer 2008: 18). This non-separatist stance would also underpin the role sought and played by the CiU in national politics as evidenced by pacts with minority governments of the PSOE and PP (1993-96 and 1996-2000 respectively). It was an approach described as 'nationalist progressive consolidation of greater degrees of self-government via political negotiation' (Bel 2015: 62).

The major shift in support for independence in Catalonia, and with it a shift in the stance of the CiU (and the Generalitat), began in the first decade of the current century. This section provides an overview of the key events. (Commentary on the significance of the shift in the CiU and in the wider population towards Catalan independence is given in Chapter Six.) Responding to the opportunity offered by the newly elected Prime Minister Zapatero, the Catalan Parliament produced and approved a revision to their Statute. The main objectives of reform were to increase the symbolic and political recognition of Catalonia as a distinct national reality within the Spanish state, increase the level of self-government of the Catalan institutions and improve the financial settlement for Catalonia (Requejo 2010: 159).

Negotiations with Central Government watered down the revision but it received majority support at a popular referendum in June 2006 (albeit on a low turnout). However, the PP challenged the revised statute, 'hoping that the [Constitutional] Court would repeal no fewer than 128 of its 223 articles' (Cramer 2014: 44). After deliberations of four years, the Constitutional Court made its ruling, finding 14 articles unconstitutional and ordering the re-interpretation of 27 others. Fundamentally, the Court rejected the Generalitat view that their

statute was 'a quasi-constitutional instrument with the capacity to indirectly define and regulate the distribution of powers and finances across the country' (Colino 2013: 89). It rejected the positioning of the Catalan language as the 'preferred' language and Catalonia's determination not to give unconditional financial support to other Autonomous Governments. Reference to Catalonia as a nation was not accepted as having any legal effect, as Spain was the only nation recognised by the Constitution (Crameri 2014: 44).

The reaction in Catalonia to the ruling was popular demonstrations in support of the Statute. Over 1 million people were reported to have protested in Barcelona on tenth of July 2010.⁶⁹ Many Catalans saw the ruling as a demonstration of a lack of respect to the Catalan people, a feeling subsequently voiced also by former Catalan First Ministers José Montilla and Jordi Pujol (Strubell 2011a: 50 and 59 respectively). The 2010 regional elections returned the CiU to the Generalitat, under Catalan First Minister Artur Mas, and the 2011 general elections replaced the PSOE with the PP, under the leadership of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. The rapid and continued deterioration in relations between the Governments of the Generalitat and the Rajoy Government have been comprehensively covered elsewhere (Martí 2013; Serrano 2013; Crameri 2014; Bel 2015). Highlights of this antagonistic relationship have included the legality of a 'right to decide' referendum (November 2014) (Serrano 2013: 531), the election of a pro-independence coalition to the Generalitat in 2015 and the subsequent approval of a road map to independence (Piñol 2016). Relevant to this thesis is an understanding of this context of political dispute and the Catalan sentiments regarding their relationship with Spain. To be explored in this study is the extent to which this affects the corporate and political management arrangements of the Autonomous Government.

⁶⁹ www.lavanguardia.co./politica. Accessed 04.06.15.

The next section presents a profile of the institutional features of the Autonomous Governments of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya.

4.3 INSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS

4.3.1 JUNTA DE ANDALUCÍA


Parliament

The original Statute of Autonomy of 1981 was replaced by the Statute of 2006. The Junta is made up of a Parliament, First Minister and Government.⁷⁰ Other sub-state authorities include the Andalusian Public Prosecutor, Consultative Council, Accounts Court, Audio-Visual Council and Economic and Social Council, but these bodies are outside the remit of this study.

The Parliament is made up of 109 elected representatives, each with a term of office of four years. Its role is to represent the people of Andalusia, approve the annual budget, act as legislative body and elect the First Minister. Its composition following the March 2015 elections was Socialist Party 47 seats, Popular Party 33 seats, Podemos 15 seats, Ciudadanos 9 seats and United Left 5 seats and is shown in the following figure.

⁷⁰ The source for the information in this section is largely the Junta's website www.juntadeandalucia.es.

Figure 4: Distribution of Seats in Andalusian Parliament (2015)



Source: Parliament of Andalusia website.⁷¹

Presidency/First Minister

The First Minister's role is to represent the Autonomous Community of Andalusia, and to direct and co-ordinate the activity of the Government. The current incumbent is Susana Díaz (PSOE) and it is the First Minister who chooses the ministers for the Government.

Government and Ministries

The Government is the collective which exercises the executive and administrative functions of the Junta. It is made up of the First Minister for Andalusia, the Deputy First Ministers and Ministers. There are thirteen Ministries including that of the First Minister:⁷²

⁷¹<http://www.parlamentodeandalucia.es/webdinamica/portal-web-parlamento/composicionyfuncionamiento/gruposparlamentarios.do>. Accessed 15.08.15.

⁷² The number of ministries was increased from ten following the 2015 elections.

Table 6: Ministries of the Junta (2015)

La Presidencia y Administración Local	Presidency/First Minister and Local Administration (headed by Deputy First Minister)
Hacienda y Administración Pública	Finance and Public Administration
Economía y Conocimiento	Economy and Knowledge
Salud	Health
Igualdad y Políticas Sociales	Equality and Social Services
Educación	Education
Cultura	Culture
Empleo, Empresa y Comercio	Employment, Business and Commerce
Justicia e Interior	Justice and Home Affairs
Fomento y Vivienda	Public Works and Housing
Agricultura, Pesca y Desarrollo Rural	Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development
Medio Ambiente y Ordenación Territorio	Environment and Planning
Turismo y Deporte	Tourism and Sport

Source: Author's translation and elaboration from information on the website of Junta de Andalucía.⁷³

⁷³ www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos.html. Accessed 15.08.15.

Each Minister is responsible for a government department. Political appointments are made to the most senior levels as shown below, in hierarchical order:

Consejero/a	Andalusian Minister
Vice Consejero/a	Andalusian Deputy Minister
Secretaría General	Andalusian Secretary General
Director/a General	Andalusian Director General

The figure overleaf shows the hierarchy at the highest levels of the Finance and Public Administration Ministry as an example of the structure adopted across the Junta.

The most senior civil servant (which is not a political appointment) is the Assistant Director General (or Sub Director) level. Below this level, staff are organised into Directorates, Departments, Sub-departments, Services and Sections. It has not been possible to identify from the Junta's information the total number of staff and the types of contracts under which they are employed. However, national statistics state that as at January 2015, the Junta employed 237,549 staff (Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas 2015).

Figure 5: Finance Ministry as Exemplar of Junta Political Hierarchy (2015)



Source: Author's translation and elaboration from information on the website of Junta de Andalucía.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/haciendayadministracionpublica/consejeria.html. Accessed 15.08.15.

Political Control

The first elections to the Junta were held in 1982 when the PSOE won an absolute majority. The composition of the Andalusian Parliament following subsequent elections is shown below:

Table 7: Composition of Andalusian Parliament (1982-2015)

	PSOE- A	AP/PDP/ UL/PP	PCA/PCE/ IU-CA	PSA/PA	UCD
1982	66	17	8	3	15
1986	60	28	19	2	-
1990	62	26	11	10	-
1994	45	41	20	3	-
1996	52	40	13	4	-
2000	52	46	6	5	-
2004	61	37	6	5	-
2008	56	47	6	-	-
2012	47	50	12	-	-

Source: Cano Buesco (2011: 33)

supplemented by information from Junta de Andalucía website.

The PSOE have therefore controlled the Junta throughout its existence, either with an overall majority or as the largest party in coalition, provoking some national commentators to describe Andalusia as 'pathologically' of the left (Barbero 2015). This is summarised in the table overleaf.

Table 8: Phases of Political Control of the Junta (1982-2015)

- 1982-1994: Hegemony of PSOE – three absolute majorities following elections in 1982, 1986, 1990
- 1994-1996: Loss of overall majority for first time. PSOE continue in power with increased pressure from opposition
- 1996-2004: Coalition government for the first time (PSOE and Partido Andalucista)⁷⁵
- 2004-2012: PSOE absolute majority again.
- 2012-2015: PSOE in coalition with Izquierda Unida (IU)

Source: Adapted from Cano Bueso (2011: 30-35)
(author's translation) supplemented by author.

A breakup of the coalition with IU in 2015 resulted in the calling of fresh elections by the First Minister, Susana Díaz. The PSOE retained 47 seats and remained the largest party, albeit without an overall majority. Díaz was eventually voted in as First Minister three months later after three failed votes with the support of Ciudadanos. Partido Popular, Podemos and Izquierda Unida opposed her investiture (*El País* 11.06.15).

4.3.2 GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA

Parliament


The original statute of Autonomy of 1979 was replaced in 2006, a document subsequently amended by the Constitutional Court ruling of

⁷⁵ The roots of the (now defunct) Partido Andalucista, a centre-left party, date back to the 1960s when the Alianza Socialista de Andalucía was founded by Alejandro Rojas Marcos (Tusell 2011: 241).

June 2010 (see Section 4.2.3 above). The Generalitat is made up of a Parliament, First Minister and Government.⁷⁶ Other sub-state authorities exist, including the Catalan Court of Auditors, Ombudsman and Anti-Fraud Office, but these are outside of the remit of this study.

The Parliament is made up of 135 elected representatives (diputats), with a term of office of four years. Its role is to represent the people of Catalonia, approve the annual budget, act as legislative body and elect the First Minister. Its composition following the September 2015 elections is as follows and is shown in the diagram below: Together for Yes (Junts pel sí) 62 seats, Ciutadans 25 seats, Socialist Party 16 seats, Yes We Can (Catalunya sí que es Pot) 11 seats, Popular Party 11 seats and Popular Unity (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular) 10 seats.

Figure 6: Distribution of Seats in Catalan Parliament (2015)



Source: Parlament de Catalunya.⁷⁷

Junts pel sí is a coalition created for the 2015 elections. Its platform is 'full sovereignty' and is supported by the CDC (Catalan Democratic Convergence) (formerly one of the two leading parties of the CiU) and

⁷⁶ The source for the information in this section is largely the Generalitat's website www.gencat.cat.

⁷⁷ http://resultats.parlament2015.cat/09AU/DAU09999CM_L2.htm. Accessed 29.12.15.

the ERC (Catalan Republican Left).⁷⁸ CUP (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular) is a new, left-wing party, supportive of an independent Catalonia.⁷⁹

Presidency/First Minister

The First Minister's role is to represent the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, and to direct and co-ordinate the activity of the Government. The current incumbent is Carles Puigdemont (from January 1016) and it is the First Minister who chooses the ministers of Government.

Government and Ministries

The Government is the collective which exercises the executive and administrative functions of the Generalitat. It is made up of the First Minister for Catalonia, the Deputy First Minister and Ministers (or Secretaries of State). There are twelve Ministries, including that of the Presidency, as shown in the table overleaf:

⁷⁸ www.juntspelsi.cat. Accessed 01.01.16.

⁷⁹ <http://cup.cat>. Accessed 10.01.16.

Table 9: Ministries of the Generalitat (2015)

Presidència	Presidency/First Minister
Governació i Relacions Institutionals	Government and Institutional Relations
Economia i Coneixement	Economy and Knowledge
Ensenyament	Education
Salut	Health
Interior	Home Affairs
Territori i Sostenibilitat	Planning and Sustainability
Cultura	Culture
Agricultura, Ramaderia, Pesca, Alimentació i Medi Natural	Agriculture, Fisheries, Food and Environment
Benestar Social i Família	Social and Family Welfare
Empresa i Ocupació	Enterprise and Employment
Justícia	Justice

Source: Source: Author's translation and elaboration based on information on the Generalitat website.⁸⁰

Each Minister is responsible for a government department. Political appointments are made to the most senior levels. The following figure shows the hierarchy within the Economy and Knowledge Ministry as an example of the senior, political organisational structure within the Generalitat.

⁸⁰ www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/govern/consell-executiu/index.html. Accessed 10.01.16.

Figure 7: Ministry of Economy and Knowledge as Exemplar of Generalitat Political Hierarchy (2015)



Source: Author’s translation and elaboration based on information on the Generalitat website.⁸¹

⁸¹ <http://sac.gencat.cat/sacgencat/AppJava/organigrama.jsp?codi=1103&jq=200001>. Accessed 10.01.16.

The most senior civil servant (excluding those who are political appointments) is the Assistant Director General level. Under the Secretary General, staff are organised into Directorates, Departments, Sub-departments, Services and Sections. The table shows the overall number of staff and the type of contract under which they are employed.

Table 10: Breakdown of Public Employees by Type of Employment Contract (2015)

	Generalitat Ministries	ICS Institute of Catalan Health	Others, notably SPVs	Total
Altos cargos	141	0	23	164
Other directors	3	46	266	315
Advisors	135	0	0	135
Civil servants	92,607	21,508	3,510	117,645
Temporary civil servants	21,760	9,112	1,095	31,314
Permanent labour	2,887	174	36,253	39,314
Temporary labour	3,773	2,390	5,238	11,401

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya⁸²

Political Control

The first elections to the Generalitat, post-Franco, were held in 1980 when the CiU became the largest party, but did not achieve the absolute majority of 68 seats. The composition of the Catalan Parliament following elections is shown overleaf.

⁸² <http://analisiocupaciopublica.gencat.cat/default.aspx>. Accessed 29.12.15.

Table 11: Composition of Catalan Parliament (1980-2012)

	CiU	ERC	PSC/PSOE	UCD/AP/ PP	Other
1980	43	14	33	18	27
1984	72	5	41	11	6
1988	69	6	42	6	12
1992	70	11	40	7	7
1995	60	13	34	17	11
1999	56	12	52	12	3
2003	46	23	42	15	9
2006	48	21	37	14	15
2010	62	10	28	18	17
2012 ⁸³	50	21	20	19	25

Source: Parlament de Catalunya⁸⁴

The results of the 2015 elections, previously detailed, reflect the arrival of new parties to the Spanish political scene and a new electoral coalition in Catalonia. It resulted in a pro-independence coalition in control of the Generalitat.

Jordi Pujol of the CiU was First Minister 1980-2003. Coalitions of PSC-PSOE, ERC and IVC were led by Pasquel Maragall of the PSOE between 2003 and 2006 and by José Montilla (PSOE) between 2006 and 2010.⁸⁵ Artur Mas of the CiU was First Minister from 2010 to 2015. After failed attempts by Mas to be re-elected First Minister following the September 2015 elections, Carles Puigdemont (CDC, formerly CiU) was elected in January 2016.

⁸³ Snap election called by Mas following demonstrations in Barcelona on Diada in September 2012.

⁸⁴ www.parlament.cat/composicio/dades_electorals.pdf. Accessed 25.08.14.

⁸⁵ A list of the main political parties in Andalusia and Catalonia is shown in Appendix D.

4.4 CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL CONTEXT

4.4.1 NATIONAL FINANCING SYSTEM OF AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENTS

A key element of any decentralised state is the way in which the devolved levels of government are funded. This section analyses the funding regime of the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia and the way Central Government policies in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis have affected the Junta and the Generalitat.

Developments in the Common System of Financing

The possible sources of income permitted (by the Constitution and subsequent laws) for the Autonomous Governments include income from their own taxes, income from fees and charges, shares of central revenues, totally or partially ceded taxes, grants from Central Government and from borrowing (Toboso and Scorsone 2010: 161). As will be seen later in this section, own taxes have not been significant. The key issue, in terms of scale, and the one to be considered here, is that of Central Government grants and ceded taxes.

Underpinning the financing model of the Autonomous Governments from the outset has been two distinct systems of financing: a charter or special system and the common system – the latter introduced by the 1980 LOFCA (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas or Statutory Law for the Financing of the Autonomous Communities). The charter system is applicable only to Navarre and the Basque Country, and provides for much greater autonomy as both these regions are able to establish and regulate their own fiscal system.⁸⁶ The following analysis of the national system relates to the common system under which both Andalusia and Catalonia operate.

⁸⁶ The Basque Country and Navarre have full powers over all personal and corporate income taxes and extensive control over VAT and other excise duties. Central Government transfers are not required to fund Autonomous Government expenditure in these two

Since the establishment of the State of the Autonomies, Autonomous Governments have increasingly taken on a wider range of responsibilities and the common system of financing has been progressively modified accordingly. The initial differences in terms of higher levels of responsibilities between the historic nations and the rest, have now been largely equalised (López Laborda and Monasterio Escudero 2007: 423). Some asymmetries do remain – for example, policing responsibilities in Catalonia are shared between the Generalitat and Central Government. These powers rest exclusively with the State in Andalusia. However, the key services, including education and health, are competencies which are held at a sub-state level across the country (Gil-Serrate et al 2011: 2632, Colino 2013: 83).

Three main phases can be traced during the period since the establishment of the State of the Autonomies of changes to the way in which the Autonomous Governments are financed:

- The initial focus was on ensuring continuity of public services during the asymmetrical devolutionary process when regions were largely funded by state transfers.
- The second stage concentrated on seeking equality across the country and adopting a more objective method of calculating expenditure needs.
- The third stage involved the ceding of taxation from central to regional governments to bring about a re-balancing of funding (De la Fuente 2012: 4). The taxes, now transferred and controlled by Autonomous Governments for which they receive 100% of the collection, include tax on net wealth, inheritance and gift tax, capital transfer tax, gaming tax, vehicle excise and hydrocarbons retail sale tax. In addition, following a further

regions. Rather, they both negotiate a single payment with Central Government as a contribution to the cost of providing federal services. (Gil-Serrate et al 2011: 2635; López Laborda & Monasterio Escudero 2007: 443).

agreement, increases were made to the percentages transferred, with regional governments receiving 50% (up from 33%) of personal income tax. Furthermore, sub-state governments share tax income with the Government on the following taxes: VAT (50% up from 35%), alcohol, tobacco and petrol (58% up from 40%) and electricity (100%) (Gil-Serrate et al 2011: 2633, updated from Treasury website).⁸⁷

As part of the 2009 reform of the financing system which significantly increased the assignment of taxes to the Autonomous Governments, three new funds were created: Convergence Fund, Competitiveness Fund, and Cooperation Fund (Fondos de Convergencia, de Competitividad, de Cooperación). Together with the Sufficiency Fund (or Fondo de Suficiencia) (the Government instrument to guarantee an equal level of public service in all parts of Spain), they transfer state funds to the regional bodies (De la Fuente 2012: 6). The Basic Public Services Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantía de Servicios Públicos Fundamentales) seeks to reinforce equality by ensuring equal basic per capita financing in each Autonomous Governments for health, education and social services, determining

the global financing amount to distribute, its financing sources, and the distributional and updating criteria according to the needs and characteristics of the population. (Díaz de Sarralde 2011: 85)

An analysis of the resources allocated to each Autonomous Government according to the 2009 legislation reveals a differential impact. Whilst Catalonia receives the largest amount in ceded income taxes and VAT (Andalusia being third after Madrid), Andalusia is the largest beneficiary of the Basic Public Services Guarantee Fund (with Catalonia one of the lowest). Catalonia and Andalusia are the top recipients of the Sufficiency Fund (first and second out of seventeen) and significant recipients of the Convergence Fund (first and fifth

⁸⁷ www.minhap.gob.es/es-ES/Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica/Paginas/Regimen%20comun.aspx. Accessed 16.06.14.

respectively) (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública 2009).

The 2009 changes sought to increase the amount of money for Autonomous Governments but also to alter the balance of tax revenues so that more tax would be raised regionally, not nationally, thus improving transparency and aiding accountability to citizens (De la Fuente 2012: 8). However, others have argued that the arrangements adopted at the end of 2009 retained the basic features of the previous model (Colino 2013: 86). Government publications state that the proportion of all Autonomous Governments' resources coming from taxes transferred partially or fully from the State, would increase from 70% to around 90%.⁸⁸ This thesis does not examine the veracity of these claims, but does consider below the reaction of the Junta and Generalitat to the calculations and the impact of those calculations within the financing system.

The Impact of Financial Decentralisation

The argument has been that the original form of decentralisation established in Spain provided Autonomous Governments with significant levels of spending and borrowing autonomy, but limited responsibility for taxation. Autonomous Governments expected Central Government to bail them out if necessary, risking fiscal indiscipline amongst those Autonomous Governments (Gray 2014: 22). The following table shows the rise in spend of regional (and local) governments which made this issue of an accountability gap significant.

⁸⁸ www.minhap.gob.es/es-ES/Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica/Paginas/Regimen%20comun.aspx. Accessed 16.06.14.

Table 12: Territorial Distribution of Public Expenditure in Spain (%)

	1982	1996	2009	2011
Central Government	53.0	37.5	20.9	21.6
Autonomous Governments	3.6	22.3	35.6	34.3
Municipalities	10.6	11.6	13.6	12.3
Social Security	32.5	29.2	29.9	31.9

Sources: Ruiz Almendral 2013: 198
and Pérez García et al 2015.

In this way, reforms to the financial system have progressively shifted the balance of revenues for Autonomous Governments from Central Government grants as the table below shows. During the 1980s and 1990s Autonomous Governments were very reliant on external (Central Government) grants but by the mid-2000s, their 'own revenue' exceeded 50%.

Table 13: Revenue for Autonomous Governments
(% of Total National Budgets)

	1988	2000	2005	2006
Own revenue				
Own taxes	0.85	0.98	0.83	0.83
Ceded taxes	28.65	36.31	53.59	59.30
Total	29.49	37.29	54.42	60.13
External sources				
Grants	70.25	57.28	36.63	39.88
Borrowing	0.26	5.43	8.95	(-0.01)
Total	100	100	100	100


Source: Toboso and Scorsone (2010: 166).

So does this mean that Autonomous Governments are in charge of their own income streams? Powers have increased substantially and so has financial autonomy, largely due to ceded taxes. However, the Autonomous Governments have only some control over some of the shared taxes and no control over others. Whilst the financial autonomy of Autonomous Governments has increased, 'financial

autonomy places emphasis on the degree of security of [income received], not on their legal capacity to settle and regulate taxes' (Toboso and Scorsone 2010: 165). Moreover, whilst there has been a high level of decentralisation and regional autonomy, it is still overwhelmingly at Central Government level that the policy making and legislative powers still reside (Medizabal 2014: 7).

As a final point in relation to the income of Autonomous Governments, reference must be made to the impact of the EU. Since its accession, Spain has received significant funding from Europe, particularly in the form of structural funds. However, not all parts of Spain have benefitted equally. Andalusia has been the recipient of significant EU funds – both structural and cohesion funds – estimated to exceed 28,000M€ in the period 1989-2013 (Sosvilla Rivero 2009: 99). Not only is this financial support considerable in comparison with the rest of Spain as the table overleaf shows (in relation to structural funds only), it is also markedly higher than many if not most other parts of the EU in this period.

Figure 8: Structural Funds Received by Autonomous Governments
(2000-2006 and 2007-2013) (M€)



Source: Carmona Contreras and Koelling (2013: 253).

4.4.2 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS POST-2008 IN SPAIN

Spanish Government Policies

To place the analysis of the 2015 budgets of the Junta and the Generalitat into a wider context, this section examines the Spanish economy, specifically the response of the Spanish Government to the economic crisis which unfolded from 2008. The economic crisis of the beginning of the twenty-first century was a global one and affected all members of the Euro Zone. Some countries were more affected than others, with Spain, Portugal and Greece facing the greatest challenges. Spain for example suffered the greatest fall in public revenues in the Euro Zone, experiencing a drop of 5.4% in GDP in the period 2007-2011 (Conde-Ruiz and Marín 2013: 21).

The reasons for this economic crisis are beyond the scope of this study, but of relevance is that it exposed underlying weaknesses in Spain's various economies, because of their heavy reliance on the property and construction sectors. Some parts within Spain were more affected than others. Worst affected have been those with greatest proportion of industry, those with economies based on services and construction and those reliant on tourism – Andalusia and Catalonia being prime examples. Amongst the regions with the biggest falls in employment have been Andalusia and Catalonia (Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell et al 2009: 93). The response of the Spanish government has been similar to other European states inasmuch as there have been two phases – firstly stimulus packages (August 2008 – April 2010), followed by a regime of austerity (from May 2010 onwards) (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 167). The expansive fiscal policy measures of the Spanish Government in the first phase included increased public spend to stem the sharp decline in the economy, such as the 8M€ Plan E of public investment, as well as measures to stimulate private spending such as personal income and corporation tax cuts (Conde-Ruiz and Marín 2013: 22-3). In parallel with Central Government actions to stimulate the economy, Autonomous

Governments also introduced measures in this first phase, particularly to stimulate house building. The emphasis on stimulating house building is clear in the table below, reflecting the fact that Autonomous Governments already had powers in this area and the importance of the sector to job creation and/or job retention (Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell et al 2009: 100).

Table 14: Measures Taken by the Junta and Generalitat to Tackle Effects of Economic Crisis

Measure		Catal'a	And'a
Income	• Income tax changes	✓	✓
	• Reduced tax on animal inspection	X	✓
Spend			
Investment	• Bidding for public works	✓	✓
	• Other housing and infrastructure works	✓	✓
	• Boats and industrial equipment	X	✓
Grants to businesses	• Restoration of housing	✓	X
	• Construction of housing	✓	✓
	• R&D projects	✓	X
	• Car sales	✓	X
Payments to families	• Buying social housing	X	✓
	• Education grant	X	✓
Other	• Training for employment	✓	✓

Source: Author's elaboration and translation from Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell et al (2009: 99-100).

However, by 2009/10 the stimulus measures began to be withdrawn by Central Government, to be replaced by austerity measures, largely in response to external factors, notably from the EU, the IMF and international financial markets, to reduce the public deficit (Muñoz de Bustillo and Antón 2013). Measures were taken to bolster Government revenue including increases to VAT, corporation and personal income taxes. In terms of expenditure, a pay cut was imposed on public sector workers and reductions made in public

investment programmes (Conde-Ruiz and Marín 2013: 23). In total, tax increases and spending cuts 'added up to one of the most severe austerity packages in Europe designed to cut the budget deficit from 11.2% in 2009 to 3% in 2013' (Salmon 2010: 85). These government measures are summarised in the table below.

Figure 9: Summary of Spanish Government Austerity Measures (July 2012)

- Increase in VAT from 18% to 21%
- Public employees' Christmas bonus payment removed for 2012, 2013 and 2014
- Number of public employees' 'personal days' reduced
- Unemployment benefit reduced
- More taxes, particularly environmental taxes
- Tax Reform
- Reduction in number of councillors
- End of housing purchase tax relief
- Reduced spend in ministries
- Reduction in number of public sector companies
- Reduction in financing of political parties and trades unions

Source: Author's elaboration from Garea (2015: 10-11).

Impact on Autonomous Governments

The downturn in the economy had a direct impact on the finances of the Autonomous Governments in a number of aspects. First, there was a significant drop in their own income from property taxes and stamp duty as a direct result of the housing crash. Secondly, the income from their share of national taxes such as income tax and VAT fell. The impact of severe reductions in the Sufficiency Fund was to

some extent reduced by additional Government resources as part of the reform of the system of financing of Autonomous Governments. Andalusia had been by far the biggest beneficiary of the Sufficiency Fund, receiving 8,248M€ in 2010 (whilst the next highest was Galicia at 3,279M€) (Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell et al 2009: 105). Thirdly, whilst public spending nationally was being reduced, the devolution of welfare responsibilities continued, leaving Autonomous Governments faced with growth in demand for health and education services at a time of reduced resources (Mendizabal 2014: 8).

Autonomous Governments were also affected by the delay in the public finance system, contributing to a build-up of deficits. The 'payment on account' mechanism by which Central Government transfers to Autonomous Governments (accounting for approximately 80% of their revenue) did not work well. The delay of two years between estimates and actual for 2008 and 2009 contributed to the swelling of Autonomous Governments' deficits in 2010 and 2011 (Conde-Ruiz and Marín 2013: 25).⁸⁹

The Government's stimulus package did not provoke much opposition amongst the Autonomous Governments. As seen above, a number of them introduced similar measures. In addition, the Government injected resources into the sub-states through the 2009 reform of the financing system, made grants for public works and social services, provided subsidies to regional industries and bailed out some regional banks. Moreover, it allowed Autonomous Governments to continue to spend and borrow. However, Autonomous Governments were at the same time being bypassed by these Central Government grants and, in the enforced mergers of banks, being excluded from the new boards (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 171).

⁸⁹ Both Andalusia and Catalonia were amongst the Autonomous Governments who experienced a significant drop in the level of resources per capita between pre and post equalisation, ending up in the bottom half of the table of resources per capita (Gray 2014: 28).

One of the consequences of the delay in adjusting for Central Government transfers, referred to above, was that ‘the spirit of austerity was late in filtering through to the regions’ and while Autonomous Governments revenues had started to reduce in 2008, reaction to adjusting expenditure accordingly did not start until 2010 (Gray 2014: 28). The impact of the ‘fiscal irresponsibility’ built into the financing system of the State of the Autonomies referred to earlier meant there was little incentive for Autonomous Governments to reduce spending (a bail out by the Government was assumed) or raise their own taxes (consistently preferring to increase their percentage of revenue sharing with the centre rather than use their discretion to raise revenues by taxing their citizens) (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 168). But phase two – austerity – meant Autonomous Governments were faced with major reductions in funding, increased demands on their services and significant, new, Central Government controls over spending and borrowing.

Most symbolic of the renewed primacy of Central Government in economic and financial policy-making was the constitutional amendment (article 135) of 2011 to implement the obligations of the European financial sanctions, and which required all public authorities to follow the principle of budget stability. Importantly in this context, it gave Central Government powers to curb deficit, debt and growth rates of all public authorities, including those of Autonomous Governments. Moreover, it:

created a constitutional mandate to meet repayments and servicing debts as a first priority, effectively transferring all tensions and conflicts that could arise (e.g. in terms of implementing public cuts) to primarily regional and local authorities. (Mendizabal 2014: 12)

Autonomous Governments therefore sought to reduce their expenditure, in line with Central Government requirements. However, Autonomous Government expenditure on staffing at 55% makes this more difficult than at a national level where spend on personnel accounts for only 22% (Gil Ruiz, Luisa and Quintana 2007: 200).

Furthermore, two-thirds of Autonomous Government spend is on health, education and social services, services which can be difficult to control and hard to cut painlessly and without public opposition. Caroline M. Gray contrasts this task with the easier solution open to Central Government of cutting infrastructure works, civil servant salaries and the foreign office budgets (2014: 28).

Autonomous Governments have been successful in delivering significant reductions. A Government report released in April 2014 summarised how they had achieved savings of 7,000M€. The biggest budget items were increased income from taxes (2,235M€), reduced salary costs (2,407M€) and current and capital transfers (2,908M€).⁹⁰ The very significant salary reductions have been achieved by HR policies to reduce pay, freeze posts, filling posts only on a temporary or agency basis and restricting rights or conditions of employment (Jiménez Asensio 2013: 78). A significant, but unquantified reduction in the budgets of Autonomous Governments has been through the use of agencies to spread the debt burden – displacing debt and responsibilities down from central to regional and local government followed by a lateral displacement from regional and local government to arm's length bodies (Mendizabal 2014: 9).

There has been much debate about 'the use of the crisis' by the Rajoy Government to re-assert Central Government dominance in relation to the Autonomous Governments. 'Both de jure and de facto centralisation has taken place in Spain' (Muro 2015: 40). The Partido Popular based its campaign for the 2011 general election on 'the need for austerity and **control of the profligate regions**' (author's own emphasis) (Del Pino and Pavolini 2015: 255). Both stimulus and austerity measures have strengthened the state in relation to the Autonomous Governments (Viver Pi Sunyer 2010: 80). An obvious example would be the introduction of Central Government

⁹⁰ http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2014/04/02/economia/1396458448_214346.html. Accessed 03.04.14.

equalisation grants and liquidity loans to fund deficit spending and to service debts. Both were based on strict financial conditions and monitoring. So without changing the division of powers as set out in the 1978 Constitution, centralisation has increased, as Autonomous Governments became significantly more dependent on Central Government (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 173).

An undeniable characteristic of this period has been the rise of 'executive government' in Spain – via the use of law decrees, which bypass Parliament. Government measures with a very direct impact on Autonomous Governments include the reform of the labour market, increases in VAT, raising the retirement age to 67, introducing co-payment in health services, making cuts in the legal system and in investment in infrastructure, and reducing education spending, and have all been made under decree. In terms of measures regarding administrative and public institutions, the funding of political parties was reduced and the decision was taken to rationalise local government bodies (Mateos and Penades 2013: 162-6).

4.5 AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT BUDGETS

4.5.1 2015 BUDGET OF JUNTA DE ANDALUCÍA⁹¹

Budget

The 2015 budget of the Junta was 29,625M€. The largest proportions of the budget are allocated to health, 8,413M€ (28%) and education, 6,584M€ (22%), followed by local government, social services, debt, and agriculture and farming. The major budget heads and relative share are summarised in the table and figure overleaf.

The Junta frames its 2015 budget in the context of an improved macro-economic climate for Andalusia. It cites a general economic growth rate higher than those of the Euro Zone and the rest of Spain (1.8% for Andalusia compared with 1.3% and 1.7% respectively), (but notably lower than that of the world economy at 3.8%) and growing business confidence as 'clear signs' of the recovery of the Andalusian economy (Junta de Andalucía 2014a). For the first time in three years there is growth in the construction industry – a key sector in the Andalusian economy (Junta de Andalucía 2014b). Whilst employment prospects are also improving, caution is sounded by the Junta at the quality of employment (in terms of stability and pay levels) (Junta de Andalucía 2014b).

⁹¹ This section on the budget draws on two key source documents from the website of the Junta de Andalucía: 'Proyecto de Presupuesto de la Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía www.juntadeandalucia.es/presidencia/portavoz/resources/files/2014/10/28/1414496551952_C.pdf. Accessed 12.11.14 2015' (cited here as Junta de Andalucía 2014a) and www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/planif_presup/presupuesto2015/estado/estado.html (cited here as Junta de Andalucía 2014b). Accessed 26.11.14.


Table 15: Budget of the Junta de Andalucía (2015)

	€
Public Debt	2,642,964,000
Health	8,413,908,000
Education	6,584,442,000
Social Services	2,856,413,000
Agriculture and Fishing	2,276,197,000
Infrastructure and Transport	841,902,000
Research and Development	456,438,000
Community Services	406,117,000
Justice	393,445,000
Economic & Financial Regulation	369,404,000
Business Development	347,930,000
Housing	207,442,000
Info and Telecomms	146,516,000
Culture	144,234,000
Administration	162,475,000
Local Government	3,178,689,000
Other	196,650,000

Source: Author's elaboration from data on Junta de Andalucía website.⁹²

⁹² www.juntadeandalucia.es/economiayhacienda/planifpresup/proy_presupuesto2014/IEF/ief-3.pdf. Accessed 15.01.2014.

Figure 10: Division of Junta Budget by Main Services (2015)




Source: Author's elaboration from data on Junta de Andalucía website.⁹³

The financial settlement from Central Government is deemed by the Junta as inadequate with the recent reforms to the system and changes to the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund described as 'very prejudicial' to Andalusia (Junta de Andalucía 2014b). A figure published by the Junta is reproduced below and contrasts Andalusia's net loss as being greater than that any other Autonomous Government. Government grants and income from the sale of assets has dropped by 180 M€ and 292 M€ respectively and expenditure on salaries has increased by 447 M€ (Junta de Andalucía 2014a). However for the first time since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008/9, the Junta approved a budget without fresh overall reductions, and with modest growth in education and health.⁹⁴ Strategies to enable this budget have been two-fold: a reduction in financing costs (interest charges by 274 M€) and an increase in income from taxes (235 M€) as well as an increase in European Fund income (325 M€) (Junta de Andalucía 2014a).

⁹³ www.juntadeandalucia.es/economiayhacienda/planifpresup/proy_presupuesto2014/IEF/ief-3.pdf. Accessed 15.01.2014.

⁹⁴ www.ccaa.elpais.co/ccaa/2014/10/28/andalucia. Accessed 31.10.14.

Figure 11: Difference from Mean Resource Levels via the National Financing System (cumulative 2009-2012) (€M)



Source: Website of Junta de Andalucía (Junta de Andalucía 2014b).

Priorities

As in previous budgets, frontline services are given as priorities for the Junta, with benefit payments being maintained and the range of health and education services being protected. (This is a slight reordering of priorities from 2014, which were jobs and the economy, welfare services and education (Junta de Andalucía.)⁹⁵ A restructuring of ministries following the 2015 elections gave a greater emphasis on education, health and culture by creating three single-focus government departments in these areas.⁹⁶ An emphasis on care services reflects Andalusia's relatively high levels of dependence and a wider social inclusion focus is reflected across a number of departments including in education (with family support programmes), in the re-statement of the no co-payment policy in health services (which are to be 'public, universal and free') and in specific guarantees (such as minimum income levels) (Junta de Andalucía 2014a). Spending in health and education is increased by 2.5% (Junta de Andalucía 2014a). The budget addresses a contentious public employment issue by re-instating employees' bonus payments, previously withheld. Employment is also stated as a priority, with funding for specific programmes to tackle unemployment.

The budget signals a focus on efficiency and budget control with measure to tackle fraud and improve income collection. Officials are being given six months to justify grants, with recipients required to provide auditors with information. The Audit function benefitted from an increase of 10% to recruit more staff (*El País* 28.10.14).⁹⁷

Expenditure by the arm's length agencies or Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) is to be reduced by 1.5% (Junta de Andalucía 2014a). A specific innovation announced with the budget was the creation of a

⁹⁵ www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/planifpresup/presupuesto2014/IEF/ief.pdf. Accessed 15.01.14.

⁹⁶ http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/06/17/actualidad/1434555962_897558.html. Accessed 18.06.15.

⁹⁷ www.ccaa.elpais.co/cca/2014/10/28/andalucia. Accessed 31.10.14.

public credit agency (ente público crédito) to provide loans to promote economic growth, innovation and job creation (*ABC* 27.10.14).⁹⁸

4.5.2 2015 BUDGET OF GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA

Budget

The 2015 budget of the Generalitat was 32,483M€. The major budget heads and relative share are summarised below and overleaf.

Table 16: Budget of the Generalitat de Catalunya (2015)

	€
Public Debt	7,004,765,000
Health	8,313,925,000
Education	5,116,143,000
Social Services	2,446,416,000
Infrastructure and Transport	1,293,468,000
Civil Protection	1,111,238,000
Justice	799,610,000
Information and Telecomms	268,504,000
Research and Development	218,221,000
Culture	173,052,000
Housing	161,018,000
Administration	1,441,745,000
Local Government	3,330,522,000
Other	805,458,000


Source: Generalitat website.⁹⁹

Health and education are the biggest service budgets with 8,314M€ (26%) and 5,116M€ (16%) respectively. A significant budgetary provision is made for public debt at 7,005M€.

⁹⁸ <http://sevilla.abc.es/andalucia/20141027/sevi-acuerdo-presupuestos-junta-andalucia-201410271931.html>. Accessed 01.11.14.

⁹⁹ http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf. Accessed 04.08.15.

Figure 12: Division of Generalitat Budget by Main Services (2015)



Source: Author's elaboration from data on Generalitat website.¹⁰⁰

In presenting the budget for 2015, the Generalitat emphasises the failure of the Spanish State to provide sufficient funding to Catalonia, demanding that the State's historic debts and other income due to Catalonia be paid:

The 2015 accounts show once again that the resources available to finance the necessary expense that come mostly through Spain in the form of transfers, are insufficient and do not reflect the fiscal reality of Catalonia.¹⁰¹

The Generalitat strategy, faced with financial constraints, is not to increase local taxes further: changes have already been made to some devolved taxes including income taxes, wealth taxes and stamp duty and new own taxes have been created such as the tourist tax. Nor is the strategy based on anticipated income from the sale of assets (although the Generalitat is committed to seek to maximise the latter). Rather, its alternative strategy is to seek the following key measures from the Spanish Government: payment of historic debt,

¹⁰⁰ http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf. Accessed 04.08.15.

¹⁰¹ Press release of Generalitat released on the approval of the budget. <http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres-fsvp/AppJava/notapremsavw/detall.do?id=277081>. Accessed 05.01.15. Author's translation.

negotiation of a new financing model, a share of the State's additional income due to the economic recovery and a fairer deficit target.¹⁰²

Policy Priorities¹⁰³

The primary commitment of the 2015 budget is to maintain a similar level of spending on services to that of 2014. Social spending is highlighted as a priority, with the protection of social services and services for those most affected by the economic crisis. Social spending is calculated to absorb over 71% of total spend on services – reflecting expenditure in education, health and social services, as well as in other departments' programmes such as minimum income guarantees and housing support to families. This continues the commitment of the 2014 budget to maintain spending levels, protect social and welfare spending and support the economic recovery. Fiscal consolidation measures highlighted in 2014 included the reduction of running costs and increasing income (Generalitat de Catalunya 2014).¹⁰⁴

Whilst spending on services is up by 4.2%, a significant proportion of this is to meet increased salary costs, due to the commitment to reinstate the bonus for public sector employees and the pay and hours of temporary staff imposed three years ago.

A second major priority is supporting the economic recovery via the Catalan 2020 Strategy such as promoting research and innovation as drivers of job creation, initiatives to support youth employment and infrastructure improvements, especially the airport connection.

¹⁰² The payments due under this heading of historic debt are calculated by the Generalitat as 759M€ which should have been paid in 2011, an advance from the Competitiveness Fund for 2015 (789 M€) and compensation for tax on deposits in banks (635 M€). <http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres-fsvp/AppJava/notapremsavw/detall.do?id=277081>. Accessed 05.01.15.

¹⁰³ This section draws on the Generalitat's document 'Projecte Pressupostos 2015' http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf. Accessed 04.08.15.

¹⁰⁴ Powerpoint presentation entitled 'Pressupostos 2014'. www.20.gencat.cat/docs/economia/Modul%20Multimedia/DocumentsPOWERPOINT%2014.pdf. Accessed 24.02.14.

2015 sees a reduction in the number of SPVs to 204 (down from 268 in 2011) as part of the Generalitat's plan to simplify, streamline and redefine the public sector. Total spend however has increased from 26,209M€ to 27,317M€. A significant policy development is the creation of the Catalan Health Services as a SPV. The use of SPVs is expanded upon in the following chapter.

Reductions in executive posts, advisory and civil service posts are shown below:¹⁰⁵

Table 17: Reduction in Public Sector Posts in Catalonia 2010-2015

	2010	2015	Reduction
Executive posts	247	201	18.6%
(Temp) Advisory posts	303	187	38.3%
Other Executive posts (in SPVs)	161	124	23.0%
Civil servants	167,418	162,005	3.2%
Public employees on labour contracts	58,193	58,138	0.1%

Source: Generalitat de Catalunya.¹⁰⁶

The following chapter develops and analyses these findings in a comparative context to determine the extent of continuities and variations.

¹⁰⁵ A difference exists between the total number of posts in this set of figures and those in Table 10, both provided by the Generalitat. However, the scale of the difference (10%) was not considered significant to the argument in this study and so was not further explored.

¹⁰⁶ http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf. Accessed 04.08.15.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to compare and analyse the responses of Andalusia and Catalonia to the decentralisation opportunities offered by the creation of the State of the Autonomies, examining the choices and decisions made in relation to their corporate political and management arrangements. The chapter begins with an examination of the issue of territorial self-identification as a potentially key influence in the way in which these two Autonomous Governments have developed since their creation. It continues with an analysis of the similarities and differences between the Junta and the Generalitat under the principal headings of political structure and control, human resources, budgets and strategies. Finally, consideration will be given to the narratives deployed to describe these two Governments by those involved, including a thematic analysis of the interviews, to illuminate differences and similarities.

5.2 TERRITORIAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION

5.2.1 OPINION SURVEYS ON SELF-IDENTIFICATION

This section examines survey data on self-identification in Andalusia and Catalonia. Reference in Chapter Four was made to the distinction between what has been called Andalusian regionalism and Catalan nationalism. This differentiation was made to help explain the context in which public administration at a sub-state level operates. Both areas have a strong sense of their own identity. However, the impact of that territorial identification manifests itself differently when set in its relationship with Spain. This difference is evident in the politics of secession (referred to in Chapter Four) but also in the nomenclature adopted by the two Autonomous Governments and the

terminology deployed in the interviews, which are analysed at the end of this chapter.

National surveys undertaken by the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research (CIS) enable a comparison of the sense of belonging declared in different parts of Spain. The results for Andalusia and Catalonia are extracted and summarised below and show that there is a stronger sense of dual identity in Andalusia than in Catalonia. A greater proportion of Catalans than Andalusians consider themselves to have a single identity. Andalusians and Catalans share the characteristic of each feeling a stronger sense of their own identity than is the case across the rest of Spain: only 10-13% of people in Andalusia and Catalonia considered themselves to be 'only Spanish' or 'more Spanish than Andalusian or Catalan'. This compared with 24% across Spain.

Table 18: Comparative Sense of Belonging (%)

	Andalusia 2012	Catalonia 2012	Spain 2015
Only Spanish	3.7	5.7	18.8
More Spanish than region/sub-nation	6.6	7.2	5.5
As Spanish as region/sub-nation	67.1	34.3	49.4
More region/sub-nation than Spanish	19.9	29.9	12.4
Only region/sub-nation	1.3	21.9	6.9
None of the above/no answer	0.8	1.7	7.0

Source: CIS 2012 and 2015.¹⁰⁷


A significantly greater proportion of Andalusians consider themselves to be as Spanish as Andalusian, than in the Catalan case. In contrast, a significant proportion of Catalans consider themselves to be only Catalan, compared with those Andalusians who consider themselves

¹⁰⁷ This section used the most up-to-date, published comparative data as at September 2015. There was no comparable national survey in 2012 with these questions and 2012 is the most recent survey broken down by autonomous community.

to be only Andalusian (CIS 2012). When these proportions are contrasted with national statistics we can see that the proportion of all Spaniards placing their Spanish identity on a par with the regional/sub-state identity is lower than in Andalusia and higher than in Catalonia (CIS 2015). Furthermore, the proportion of all Spaniards who consider themselves to be ‘only Spanish’ is significantly higher than in both Andalusia and Catalonia, suggesting a stronger sense of regional or sub-state identity in these two areas.

Examining the trends over time for Andalusia and Catalonia, it is possible to identify differences. It is clear that the strong sense of dual/equal Spanish and Andalusian identity has been consistent during the past decade in Andalusia. This is demonstrated in the following figure which shows almost 70% of Andalusians self-identifying as much Spanish as Andalusian over the course of at least the past seven years.

Figure 13: Sense of Belonging in Andalusia (2005, 2010, 2012) (%)




Source: Author’s elaboration based on CIS (2005, 2010, 2012).

In contrast, a changing picture emerges in Catalonia. The same period (2005-2012) saw a significant drop in the proportion of Catalans who felt equally Catalan and Spanish and an even greater increase in the proportion identifying themselves as ‘only Catalan’ or

‘more Catalan than Spanish’. A more recent survey by the Generalitat-funded CEO shows that while the ‘equally Spanish and Catalan’ group has increased since 2012, it has not regained its 2005 level. It also shows that the ‘only Catalan’ group has further expanded, whereas the ‘more Catalan than Spanish’ group has declined. These changes are shown in the figure below.

Figure 14: Sense of Belonging in Catalonia (2005, 2010, 2012, 2015) (%)



Source: Author’s elaboration based on CIS (2005, 2010, 2012) and CEO (2015).

This dynamic in the sense of belonging is a reflection of the wider debate in Catalonia and in Spain about the future of Catalonia and its status within or outside of Spain. This debate was heightened in 2010 with the Constitutional Court ruling on the 2006 revision of the Statute of Catalonia (addressed in Chapter Four above). A recent (2014) study on the collective identity of Andalusians concluded that the development of the State of the Autonomies had had a favourable impact on the Andalusian and Spanish-Andalusian identities. It contrasts the Spanish-Andalusian identity as inclusive or dual, whereas the Spanish-Catalan identity had failed to ‘build bridges’ with the Catalan identity (Echavarren Fernández 2014: 29-30).


5.2.2 PREFERRED STATUS FOR CATALONIA

Opinion surveys specifically in relation to the preferred governmental/constitutional status of Catalonia, have recorded significant changes among the population. There has been a significant increase in support for independence (specifically following the conflict over the revision of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 2010).

When January 2010 is compared with June 2015, preference for status as a region (blue line), already low, has dropped as has support for Catalonia as a state within a federal Spain (green) or for the status quo (red). Support for a Catalan independent state has increased (purple). This is shown in the figure overleaf.

These findings can be placed in a national context. A survey across the population of all Spain recorded stronger support for the status quo in terms of the current system of Autonomous Governments at 32%, and less support for independence for their own area at 10% (CIS 2014). Thus Catalans are less supportive than all Spaniards of the status quo. Interestingly, the national survey included an option of a centralised state with no Autonomous Governments, which was supported by 19% of Spaniards. This option was not included in the Catalan CEO survey, evidence of a lack of interest in such a model in Catalonia. The sense of Catalonia being special and different from other parts of Spain is reflected in many aspects of Catalan public life as demonstrated throughout this analysis.

Figure 15: Preferred Status for Catalonia (January 2010 – June 2015)



Source: Author's elaboration based on statistics from Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (2015).

Stereotypes about communities of people can offer powerful representations, influencing the way people think about others and about themselves. This is shown in the later analysis of narratives in this chapter. In addition to many Catalans feeling themselves to be different, they are also perceived to be different by other parts of Spain. Andalusians arouse the most positive attitudes from other Spaniards whilst Catalans are the group viewed with least sympathy (Bel 2015: 26). According to Bel, this is the equivalent of being seen as ‘the most distant, *most different* group’, a negative image making the integration of the Catalan people within a Spanish State problematic (Bel 2015: 26 and 38). This may be a self-fulfilling argument from a Catalanist perspective.¹⁰⁸ However the image exists and has implications for the way in which each Autonomous Government operates, as will be addressed later in this chapter.

5.3 PEOPLE, POLITICS AND POLICIES

5.3.1 STATUTES

Consideration of a sense of identity provides a necessary context for an examination of the legal and constitutional manifestations of Andalusia and Catalonia in terms of sub-state statutes, political hierarchies and party political control. This section also considers the different public employment models adopted before analysing budgets, priorities and strategies.

Both the Junta and the Generalitat revised their own Statute of Autonomy in 2006. The structure of the two statutes is shown in the summary table overleaf:

¹⁰⁸ In this context, it is relevant to note that Germà Bel, in addition to being an academic, is also an elected member for Junts pel Sí. http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/03/10/catalunya/1457617140_307880.html. Accessed 14.03.16.

Table 19: Comparison of Statutes of 2006 of Andalusia and Catalonia

	ANDALUSIA		CATALONIA
	Preamble		Preamble
1	Social Rights, Public Policies and Duties	1	Rights, Obligations and Governing Principles
2	Powers	2	Institutions
3	Territorial Organisation	3	Judicial Powers
4	Institutions	4	Powers
5	Judicial Powers	5	Institutional Relations
6	Economy, Employment and Finance	6	Funding
7	The Environment	7	Reform of the Statute
8	Communications		
9	Institutional Relations		
10	Reform of the Statute		

Source: Author's elaboration of information on the websites of Junta and Generalitat.¹⁰⁹

This thesis does not provide a legalistic and detailed analysis of the statutes. However a significant degree of similarity in overall structures is evident, with seven chapters covering the same ground. This is not surprising given the apparent replication of the Catalan Statute structure by many Autonomous Governments (Porras Nadales 2007: 31). However, it is interesting to note the greater prominence given by the Catalan Statute to institutions. This reflects the existence of long-standing Catalan governmental institutions not shared by others, including Andalusia. Andalusia specifies 'social rights, public policies and duties', rather than the Catalan's 'rights, obligations and governing principles', signalling a greater emphasis in Andalusia on community solidarity and the importance of government intervention. The Catalan Statute devotes a chapter to funding, reflecting an

¹⁰⁹ www.Parlamentodeandalucia.es/opencms/export/portal-web-parlamento/comentarios_ea/articulo/PART_000.html. Accessed 31.08.15.
<http://web.gencat.cat/es/generalitat/estatut/estatut2006/preambul/index.html>. Accessed 09.08.15.

emphasis on the financial status of the Autonomous Government. In the Andalusian Statute funding is linked with the economy and employment. This could indicate a fundamental difference in overall emphasis, with the Generalitat focused on “being”, with identity as the most important driver, in contrast with the Junta where the focus is on “doing”, on delivering public services.

An analysis of the Preamble texts reveals differences in emphasis. In the case of Andalusia, the Preamble defines Andalusia as an historic nationality within the framework of a unified Spanish nation. It stresses the strong identity of Andalusia forged throughout its history, with its social and cultural heritage being an essential part of Spain. It refers to the struggle of the people of Andalusia, which has been ‘rewarded in the recent democratic era’ with autonomy. It also refers to the mass demonstrations of December 1977 and the referendum of February 1980 when Andalusians rejected being a second-class autonomy, demanding access to autonomy via the fast route (the ‘vía rápida’ or route via article 151). Moreover, this route, the Statute argues, has given Andalusia a unique legitimacy, having its ‘own identity and an undeniable position in the territorial configuration of the State’.

The values given prominence in the Preamble are liberty, justice, equality and political pluralism. The first three are the same as in the Catalan Statute. The fourth however is purely Andalusian.¹¹⁰ This may signal remembrance by the Socialists of their opposition status during the Franco period when Spain was a single-party state.¹¹¹ Finally, Andalusia’s determination not to fall behind others (principally Catalonia and the Basque Country) is demonstrated with a statement

¹¹⁰ Pluralism (although not political pluralism) does however appear later, in article 4 of the Catalan Statute, as one of a number of values to be promoted by the Catalan public authorities: freedom, democracy, equality, pluralism, peace, justice, solidarity, social cohesion, gender equity and sustainable development www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_preliminar.htm. Accessed 31.03.2014.

¹¹¹ However, this is not the case in the other Socialist-controlled Autonomous Government, that of Asturias. www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1982-634&p=20100717&tn=1#ti. Accessed 04.02.16.

that, whilst differences in Spain are to be respected, 'such differences cannot serve as excuses for special privileges' which allow inequality between Spaniards.

The Preamble to the Catalan statute refers to the long history of Catalonia and specifically its 'constant will for self-government', thus separating Catalan history from Spanish history. Unlike Andalusia, Catalonia draws on long-standing self-government institutions, notably the Generalitat created in 1359. The Preamble also refers to the multiple attempts after 1714 to restore the institutions of self-government including highlights such as the Mancomunitat of 1914 and the 1932 Statute. The Preamble does not position Catalonia as part of a unified Spain in the same way as the Andalusia statute. Rather, it describes a wish 'to develop its political personality within the framework of a State which recognises and respects the diversity of identities of the peoples of Spain'. Catalonia is considered as a nation, a definition which reflects 'the feelings and the wishes of the citizens of Catalonia'. This definition in the Statute is placed next to a reference to the 1978 Spanish Constitution's recognition of Catalonia as a nationality, possibly to reinforce the vagueness of the term 'nationality' or to make synonymous the terms 'nation' and 'nationality'.

There are two further differentiating elements referenced in the Preamble: civil society and language. The role of the civil and associative tradition of Catalonia is emphasised, described in the context of the way it 'underlines the importance of the Catalan language and culture'.

5.3.2 POLITICAL STRUCTURES

Political Hierarchy

The organisational structures of both Autonomous Governments reflect the Central Government structures existing at the time of their creation, structures which have not changed significantly

subsequently. The current hierarchy of Central Government is based on Ministers or Secretaries of State, Secretary Generals and Director Generals.¹¹²

Both Autonomous Communities have established a directly elected Parliament for a four-year term, which elects a First Minister, who then appoints a Cabinet and a Government. Both have adopted the same political hierarchy, as summarised in the table below, based on a President or First Minister, then Ministers, supported by Secretary Generals and then Director Generals.

Table 20: Comparison of Political Hierarchy in Junta and Generalitat (2015)

English translation	Andalusia	Catalonia
First Minister	Presidente/a Vicepresidente/a	President/a
Minister	Consejero/a	Conseller/a
Deputy Minister Secretary General	Viceconsejero/a Secretaria General	Secretari/a General
Director General	Director/a general	Director/a general

Source: Author's elaboration based on information from websites of Junta and Generalitat.

This structure is similar to that of the UK Government with a Prime Minister, Ministers and Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State.¹¹³ It also bears similarities with UK local government. For example, Birmingham, the largest UK local authority outside London, with a population of over one million, is led by a Leader and eight cabinet members, organised by function.¹¹⁴ In Scotland, the Scottish Government is led by a First Minister and Cabinet Secretaries.¹¹⁵

¹¹² www.minhap.gob.es/en-GB/EI%20Ministerio/Organigrama/Paginas/OrganigramaFlashMHAP.aspx. Accessed 03.01.16.

¹¹³ www.gov.uk/government/how-govt-works.html? Accessed 19.10.15.

¹¹⁴ www.birmingham.gov.uk. Accessed 02.01.16.

¹¹⁵ www.gov.scot/about/people/ministries. Accessed 04.01.16.

However, the most significant difference in terms of management of public services between the Spanish and UK establishments is the extent to which politicians are placed in positions of executive authority. In Spain, including the Junta and the Generalitat, these politicians with executive authority ('altos cargos') extend much further into the public administrative structure: 183 in the Junta and 144 in the Generalitat. When the senior appointments in the Special Purpose Vehicles (considered below) are added, the totals rise to 277 and 479 respectively.¹¹⁶ This politicisation of what are, in other models of public administration, civil servant roles, is a significant element of the Napoleonic tradition. There is no 'public service bargain' (or PSB) in Spain whereby senior civil servants give up overt partisanship and offer professional obedience and in return politicians give up their right to appoint and dismiss civil servants and change working conditions (Hood and Lodge 2006: 7). This reciprocal arrangement has no place in the Spanish public administrative tradition and so the idea of the most senior civil servant serving all incoming Governments, be they of the left or right or coalition, as is the case with the UK Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, is inconceivable in Spain.

Ministries

The table overleaf compares the ministerial structures in the two Autonomous Governments in 2015.

As all Autonomous Governments now have broadly the same competencies, it is not surprising that there is a similarity between the two sets of Ministerial portfolios. However, a number of observations can be made.

¹¹⁶ www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/rdac-ptr/publico/buscarAltosCargosActivos.html. Accessed 14.01.16.
<http://analisiocupacionpublica.gencat.cat/default.aspx>. Accessed 29.12.15.

Table 21: Comparison of Ministerial Structures in the Junta and Generalitat (2015)

Junta de Andalucía	Generalitat de Catalunya
	Presidency
Presidency/First Minister and Local Administration	Government and Institutional Relations
Finance and Public Administration	
Economy and Knowledge	Economy and Knowledge (including Finance)
Employment, Business and Commerce	Business and Employment
Equality and Social Services	Social and Family Welfare
Education	Education
Health	Health
Culture	Culture (including language and tourism)
Justice and Home Affairs	Home Affairs
	Justice
Public Works and Housing	
Environment and Planning	Planning and Sustainability, including Housing
Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development	Agriculture, Fisheries, Food and Environment
Tourism and Sport	

Source: Author's elaboration based on information from the websites of Junta and Generalitat.

The Generalitat's Presidency/First Minister is stand-alone, without departmental responsibilities, whereas in Andalusia it is linked with the local administration function, signifying relationships with the Andalusian Parliament and with local councils. This suggests in the Generalitat a greater external focus for the whole organisation, working outside of Catalonia, whereas the Junta's focus is more inward-looking within Andalusia, suggesting a greater community-based emphasis. Equality features specifically in the Junta's ministerial portfolios, as does tourism, potentially reflecting the influence of the PSOE values in the former, and the importance of the tourism sector to the Andalusian economy in the latter. In the

Generalitat, tourism and language are part of the Culture portfolio. This is not to ignore the importance of language in Catalonia. The Generalitat devotes 23,000M€ annually to this activity, and spend by the Culture ministry is some 20% higher in Catalonia than in Andalusia (2015).

The combination of finance and public administration in an Andalusian Government ministerial portfolio supports the earlier suggestion of the focus of the Junta being very much on the delivery of public services. The way finance and public administration are linked views resources as an enabler of public administration, of public service delivery. In contrast, finance is seen as part of the Economy and Knowledge portfolio in Catalonia, thus relating finance to the operation of the whole economy, public and private. Thus public provision of services by the Generalitat is not seen as the primary focus.

A notable difference in functions lies in the respective international work by the Autonomous Governments. Whilst the Junta has a presence in Brussels, in Madrid and in Gibraltar, the Generalitat places a greater emphasis on international work. The function of Andalusia's office in Brussels is described in terms of 'tracking' developments in the EU, and 'supporting the socio-economic, sectoral and professional interests of our community'.¹¹⁷ In the case of the Generalitat's Delegation in Brussels, its role is described in more proactive terms, seeking to promote 'the international projection of Catalonia' and to influence decision making. As the following figure demonstrates, the Generalitat and its agencies have a presence in all continents.

¹¹⁷ www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/presidenciayadministracionlocal/areas/accion-exterior/delegacion-bruselas.html. Accessed 04.01.16.

Figure 16: International Work of the Generalitat (2015)



Source: Generalitat de Catalunya.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/monografics/287263/catalunya-nacio-global.html. Accessed 03.09.15.

The Generalitat has ten delegations including in the USA, Germany and the UK, offices of representation (three), offices of ACCIÓ (Agència per a la competitivitat de l'empresa, or Agency for Business Competitiveness) to promote the internationalisation of Catalan businesses (36), Tourist Offices (12), Agencies for the promotion of Catalan cultural businesses (four), Ramon Llull (cultural) Institutes (four) and Agencies for Development Cooperation (three). It is significant that Madrid is included in those places regarded as 'exterior'. A national audit report in 2016 on the work of Autonomous Governments on external affairs highlighted Catalonia as the clear frontrunner in terms of levels of expenditure on delegations abroad, as the figure overleaf shows.


This international presence reflects the Generalitat's view of Catalonia as a nation, with an international profile to maintain and a language and culture to promote.¹¹⁹ It may also reflect the nature and size of the Catalan economy, sections of which operate in the international market. A comparison of the stated roles of the Madrid offices of the Junta and the Generalitat also reveal a difference. The Junta's office is an 'institution providing provides services to the general public, and particularly to those Andalusian citizens who are permanently or temporarily outside their Autonomous Region'. The emphasis is therefore on providing support to its citizens.¹²⁰ In contrast, the Generalitat's office focus is on the representation of the Catalan Government and on public relations. Notably, Madrid is referred to by the Generalitat as the capital of the state, not of the nation.

¹¹⁹ As evidenced in the interviews carried out for this thesis and included in the narrative analysis at the end of this chapter, the Generalitat does not believe that the Spanish State does or can meet the needs of Catalonia, including its overseas interests. This is despite the existence of a much larger network of Spanish bodies working in an international context such as the Spanish Cervantes Institute, whose aim is to promote Spanish language **and** the co-official languages of Spain. It has centres across the world as well as centres in the principal cities of Spain, including Barcelona and Girona.

www.cervantes.es/sobre_instituto_cervantes/informacion.htm. Accessed 22.01.16.

¹²⁰ www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/presidenciayadministracionlocal/areas/accion-exterior/delegacion-bruselas.html. Accessed 04.01.16.

Figure 17: Autonomous Government Foreign Offices Expenditure (2011-14)



Source: Hernández and Gil 2016.

The Generalitat has also entered into international cross-border cooperation with France in relation to some services, whereas cooperation with neighbouring Autonomous Governments is less evident (see Harguindéguy 2007 and García-Álvarez and Trillo-Santamaría 2013 for example). Based on the results of research on transborder networking, it has been suggested that Catalonia's approach to Europe is one based on the involvement of 'many and numerous prominent actors, integrating the local, regional, national and transnational spaces of engagement' (Hakli 1998: 93).

Policy towards Europe across Autonomous Governments has been largely positive. As discussed earlier, membership of the EU was widely seen as a fundamental element of the Transition - democracy, decentralisation and EU membership. The perspective in Spain at that time of Europe and the EU was as 'the promised land', 'a model of everything the new Spain wanted to incarnate' (Boix Palop 2013: 5). Generalitat policy towards the EU has also been influenced by the desire to deploy European institutions to promote the Catalan identity. For Andalusia, Europe has been a significant source of funding. Back in 1999 it was claimed that for Catalonia a key objective was the recognition and strengthening of Catalonia's position vis-à-vis Madrid, thereby enhancing claims for greater autonomy (Squires 1999: 37). More recently, Andrew Dowling has suggested that:

Political Catalanism has invested hugely in Europeanisation as a project that would provide an inter-mediate space which would allow Catalonia to by-pass Spain. (2013: 149)

Enthusiasm for the EU may have declined post-2008 in many Autonomous Governments because of EU-imposed fiscal consolidation targets which have especially affected this tier of government (Colino, Molina and Hombrado 2014: 290). However, the perceived lack of support for Catalan independence claims from the EU will only have added to disappointment in the failure of the EU to

deliver on the Committee of the Regions (Giordano and Roller 2002: 111).¹²¹

Following the election of the new First Minister in January 2016, Carles Puigdemont, a new Cabinet was appointed. Whilst the majority of the posts shown previously in Table 9 were retained, a number of important changes were made, changes which bear out the above comments regarding the Generalitat's view of Catalonia as a nation. Firstly, a Catalan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Institutional Relations and Transparency was appointed for the first time, illustrating the importance the Catalan Government has given to the field of foreign affairs. This Ministerial portfolio also includes the task of setting out 'a road map for the constitution of a new state'.¹²² The second key change has been the creation of a Deputy First Minister with responsibility for the Economy and the Treasury. The use of the term 'hisenda' or treasury rather than (public) finance, which is usually associated with state rather than sub-state government, is also indicative of the style and self-image of the Generalitat. The incumbent of the Deputy First Minister is the leader of the ERC, a major coalition partner with the CDC (formerly half of the CiU) forming the electoral coalition Junts Pel Sí.¹²³

For completeness and because of the key changes elaborated upon above, the full list of Ministerial Departments is shown below (as at February 2016). It has not been used for comparative purposes (see earlier Table 21) because it is still a Transitional structure, showing both pre- and post-January 2016 departments.¹²⁴

¹²¹ As an example of the 'lack of support from the EU', see statements of consecutive EU Presidents that a newly independent territory [such as Catalonia] would have to apply for EU membership (Martínez 2015).

¹²² www.catalangovernment.eu/pres_gov/government/en/pressnotice/290172/raul-romeva-takes-office-minister-foreign-affairs-institutional-relations-transparency.html. Accessed 17.01.16.

¹²³ www.govern.cat/pres_gov/AppJava/govern/govern/consell-executiu/84/oriol-junqueras-vies.html?mode=static. Accessed 22.01.16.

¹²⁴ It also post-dates the 'cut-off date' for the gathering of information as explained in the introduction to this thesis.

Table 22: Ministries of the Generalitat (2016)

Departament	Ministry
La Presidència	The Presidency
La Vicepresidència i d'Economia i Hisenda	Deputy First Minister and Economy and Treasury (Subsumes part of former Ministry for the Economy and Knowledge)
Afers Exteriors, Relacions Institucionals i Transparència	Foreign Affairs, Institutional Relations and Transparency (Subsumes part of the former Ministry of Government and Institutional Relations)
Governació, Administracions Públiques i Habitatge	Governance, Public Administrations and Housing (Subsumes part of the former Ministry of Government and Institutional Relations)
Ensenyament	Education
Salut	Health
Interior	Home Affairs
Territori i Sostenibilitat	Planning and Sustainability
Empresa i Coneixement	Business and Knowledge
Cultura	Culture
Agricultura, Ramaderia, Pesca, Alimentació i Medi Natural	Agriculture, Food, Fishing and Environment
Treball, Afers Socials i Famílies	Labour, Social Affairs and Families (Subsumes former Social and Family Welfare)
Justícia	Justice

Source: Author's elaboration of information from the website of Generalitat de Catalunya.¹²⁵

¹²⁵ www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/govern/consell-executiu/index.html. Accessed 19.01.16.

In terms of gender balance, there are more male Ministers than female Ministers in both Autonomous Governments. However, in Andalusia women occupy six compared with five posts and they occupy not only the posts of First Minister but also the Minister with responsibility for finance. In contrast, Catalonia has male incumbents not only as First Minister, but also as Deputy First Minister (which includes responsibility for finance) and the newly-created and high profile Minister for Foreign Affairs, charged with leading the move towards independence. Further analysis, beyond the scope of this thesis, would be needed to examine the extent of this pattern within the structure and the implications.¹²⁶ However, it is noteworthy that the three leading political roles in the Generalitat are all held by men. In contrast, the prominence of women in Andalusia may be a reflection of the PSOE's long-standing involvement in gender parity issues, in continuous gender monitoring and a willingness to publish such data (Threlfall 2000: 31).

Political Control

In terms of political control, the Socialists have held power in the Junta of Andalusia since its establishment. In Catalonia until 2015, the CiU controlled the Generalitat throughout, with the exception of a period of coalitions between 2003 and 2010, led by the Socialists.

Furthermore, in addition to a domination by a specific party/electoral coalition, both organisations have had stability in term of the First Ministers. Just two incumbents, Jordi Pujol and Manuel Chaves, account for over 40 years between them: Jordi Pujol of the CiU in Catalonia for 23 years (1980-2003) and Manuel Chaves of the PSOE in Andalusia for 19 years (1990-2009). Both have been powerful politicians regionally, nationally and certainly in the case of Pujol, at a European level, securing benefits in terms of financial assistance in the case of Andalusia and using the stage of the EU to promote the

¹²⁶ Research by Monica Threlfall (2000: 31) comments on the difficulties in comparative analysis of the participation of women in such diverse bodies as the seventeen Autonomous Governments.

case for the identity and status of Catalonia as a nation (Squires 1999: 34). However, equally clear from recent corruption cases involving both Jordi Pujol and Manuel Chaves, the longevity of these leaders has not assisted transparency nor public confidence in public administration at the level of Autonomous Governments (Cañizares 2014; Sanz 2015). Single-party domination of the organs of government, the PSOE in Andalusia and the CiU until 2015 in Catalonia, over a long period of time can be considered as a factor in the incidence of corruption (see for example work on party finance and political scandal by Veronique Pujas and Martin Rhodes 2002: 739-760). Political parties in power have been described as increasingly functioning like cartels, employing the resources of the state to limit political competition and ensure their own electoral success (Katz and Mair 2009: 753). Party system competitiveness, which shapes the effectiveness of elections as tools to select and control politicians, plays a critical role in conditioning the scope for governmental corruption (Schleiter and Voznaya 2014: 675). It is recognised that party system competitiveness is only one aspect of a wider range of party system features but it is not unreasonable to expect that party system institutionalisation may affect the scope for corruption (2014: 684). These interesting and important questions are however outside the scope of this study.

5.3.3 PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

Staffing Structures

Both Autonomous Governments are staffed by public servants. Civil servants are organised in professional corps. The most senior non-political appointment in the civil service is that of the Assistant Director General in both the Junta and the Generalitat. The hierarchy in both Autonomous Governments is similar, with Assistant Director Generals reporting to the Director Generals and being supported by Heads of Service (Jefe de Servicio in Andalusia, Cap de Servei in Catalonia). National terms and conditions exist for employees, including terms set

out in a basis statute for civil servants (Parrado Díez 2011: 243). This model replicates the structure of the Napoleonic tradition existing at Central Government level. There is no overall head of the civil service, nor is there the equivalent of a Chief Executive Officer in either sub-state body.

This model has implications for reform as will be explored in Chapter Six. However, in terms of staffing structures, the departmentalism of the Autonomous Governments is worthy of comment here. The development and implementation of organisation-wide, corporate programmes of change are particularly challenging in a structure which is so fragmented, based on individual and separate departments – known as fiefdoms in English public administration and ‘reinos de taifas’ in Spanish (Porrás Nadales 2005: 479). Recruitment is still dominated by the corps, as noted in Chapter Three, which can add to departmentalism. There is little evidence to suggest that there is a strong corporate centre coordinating such activities, in either the Junta or the Generalitat, indicating that the large departments of Health and Education have a great deal of autonomy (author’s interview with Coordinator, Department of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2015 and Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). Corporate functions such as Human Resources and Communications are replicated in each principal Ministry in the Generalitat (but recently centralised in the Junta). It has been suggested in the case of the Generalitat that each department has its own values, based on professional corps, in the place of an organisation-wide set of values and rules for the institution (author’s interview with Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, 2014).¹²⁷ As has been noted earlier, there is no overall head of the civil service in

¹²⁷ Throughout this thesis, the job title and date in brackets after citations refer to the author’s interviews. A full list of interviewee name, title and date of interview is given at Appendix A.

either Autonomous Government. It is difficult to detect where the ‘co-ordinating brain’ for the whole system resides.

Numbers of Employees

Using statistics from the Spanish Government’s Personnel Register, it is possible to state that the Junta of Andalusia has a greater number of employees than Catalonia - 237,549 compared with 164,586 (Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas [MHAP] 2015c). Furthermore, a calculation of workforce to population size of these two Autonomous Government highlights that the Junta employs almost 50% more than the Generalitat, whilst serving less than 15% more inhabitants. Expressed differently, these figures suggest that there is one Autonomous Government employee for every 35 Andalusians, and one for every 45 Catalans. The national average is one for every 36 Spaniards. These figures are shown in the table below:

Table 23: Comparison of Autonomous Government Staffing Levels (January 2015)

Autonomous Community	Autonomous Government employees	Population	Inhabitants to employee
Andalusia	237,549	8,401,567	35
Catalonia	164,586	7,391,133	45
All Spain	1,284,026	46,449,565	36

Source: Author’s elaboration using data of MHAP 2015c and INE.¹²⁸

This difference is striking: similarities may have been expected given that both are large in terms of population, thus potentially benefiting from economies of scale and both were early adopters of the devolved services in the decentralisation process and so have been operating the same services for the same length of time. Moreover, higher employment figures in the Generalitat could be anticipated as a result

¹²⁸ www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Datos.htm?t=9681. Accessed 10.11.15.

of the additional police and prison competencies particular to Catalonia.

Whilst both the Junta and the Generalitat publish their own workforce details, the lack of a consistent classification between Autonomous Governments makes a comparative analysis extremely problematic. This lack of nationally based comparative information is an issue to which this thesis will return in later chapters. However, it is possible to make a number of observations about the difference in the level of public employment based on the available information. The economic situation and the structure of the labour market can play a role in the design of public sector staffing structures (Ramió and Salvador 2002: 117). The Generalitat may have opted for a model based on a smaller number of employees, reflecting the fact that other sources of employment were available in Catalonia. This contrasts with the situation in Andalusia where there have historically been higher levels of unemployment, and where public sector jobs have been more important. Jobs with the Junta would have been seen as a source of secure and if not well-paid jobs, then salaries that are 'with dignity' (author's interview with Secretary General of Podemos in Seville interview 2015, also a civil servant). However, a more convincing explanatory factor is the model of service provision adopted in each of these two Autonomous Governments. In Catalonia, a higher proportion of public services have been delivered by the private sector or by third sector organisations. In Andalusia the dominant model is that of directly managed and delivered public services, with directly employed staff.

Contracts of Employment

A further difference in employment patterns between the two Autonomous Governments relates to the use of labour contracts as opposed to civil servant contracts. In both Autonomous Governments, the principal distinction is between civil servants or funcionarios on the one hand, and on the other, those on labour contracts with fewer

rights or guarantees. However, under the Junta's model more people were employed under labour contracts than under civil servant contracts and a greater number than the average of all Autonomous Governments. The Generalitat employed significantly more civil servants than labour employees and more than the average. This is summarised in the table below:

Table 24: Type of Employment Contract Used (2002)

Autonomous Government	% civil service contracts	% labour contracts
Andalusia	44	56
Catalonia	68	32
All Autonomous Governments	60	40

Source: Ramió and Salvador 2002: 120).

The choice of private or public sector can help explain this difference. Front-line services, in which labour contracts dominate, are still delivered in-house in Andalusia. In contrast, in Catalonia there is greater private or third sector involvement in these services, resulting in fewer Generalitat-employed people on labour contracts. This distinction between types of work has been described as white-collar and blue-collar: white-collar civil servants commission or authorise services and blue-collar workers or those on labour contracts deliver services. It is a terminology commonly used in the context of the UK Compulsory Competitive Tendering regime from 1980 onwards (Wilson 1999: 38; Shaw et al 1994) and can be applied to help illuminate the difference here. A similar, albeit somewhat value-laden, definition can be found in a Spanish context, with civil servants undertaking 'key administrative and executive functions' and those on labour contracts carrying out 'secondary type functions' (Sánchez-Motos 2007: 2).

Recent comparable figures on use of employment contracts are not available to conduct a more up-to-date comparison. However, given the continuation of the chosen model by each Autonomous Government, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the differentiation has also continued. More recent figures for the Generalitat alone suggest not only a continuation of this feature, but an accentuation: the ratio of civil servant to labour is 94:6 for Generalitat employees only and for all public employees 75:25.¹²⁹

5.3.4 POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS

Numbers and Types of Political Appointments

A third important group of public employees are the political appointees (not the political hierarchy of altos cargos in earlier Section). They are similar to the posts of ‘Special Advisors’ in UK Government, who are described in the Cabinet Office Code of Conduct for Special Advisors as adding ‘a political dimension to the advice and assistance available to Ministers’ and who ‘are exempt from the general requirement that civil servants should be appointed on merit and behave with impartiality and objectivity, or that they need to retain the confidence of future governments of a different political complexion’ (UK Government Cabinet Office 2015). These posts also exist in the Scottish Government, but are not permitted in local government in the UK.¹³⁰

In Spain, these political appointments are usually made to advisory positions, communications posts and as ministerial aides. They are described as ‘de confianza’, the literal translation of which is ‘insider’, ‘friend’, or ‘intimate’, reflecting the expectation that these individuals are trusted in political terms by the ministers. There is a clear link with

¹²⁹ <http://analisiocupaciopublica.gencat.cat/default.aspx>. Accessed 29.12.15.

¹³⁰ The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 introduced the principles of ‘politically restricted posts’ (PoRPs), restricting the activities of local authority employees. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/42/part/I/crossheading/political-restriction-of-officers-and-staff. Accessed 20.02.16.

the Minister's career as when the tenure of the Minister ends, so does that of the advisor. Sharing the same political goals, their role is to bring policy expertise to ministerial consideration. Their expertise, it is argued, makes up for any lack of direct experience a Minister may have in their portfolio in taking up their post. An alternative perspective on this 'compensation' for lack of ministerial experience is that they 'rely on their team of civil servants', although it is unclear how effective this arrangement is (author's interview with Coordinator, Department of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2015). These large Ministerial Cabinets staffed with political appointments are common to both the Junta and the Generalitat and are characteristic of the previously described Napoleonic administrative model.

This group of political advisors is a phenomenon has been described as a 'nube de cargos eventuales', or 'cloud of political appointees', reflecting not only the large number but also their hidden or shadowy nature (author's interview with an academic, a University in Barcelona, 2014). It is not possible to state unequivocally that the statistics for this category of staff published by each Autonomous Government are calculated on the same basis. However, an interrogation of the two websites suggest that there are 135 such advisory posts in the Generalitat, almost equal to the number of executive politicians or altos cargos at 144. In the Junta, web pages of each ministry suggest that there are between six and eight advisory posts for most ministries, but with Health employing 48 and the Presidency and Local Administration Ministry employing 111, making a total of 178. These figures for Andalusia also appear to include some appointments to the Special Purpose Vehicles considered in the section below. By way of comparison, there were twelve Special Advisors in total for Scottish

Government and less than one hundred for the UK Government.¹³¹ In terms of this comparative analysis, it is concluded that both the Junta and the Generalitat deploy significant numbers of political appointments, characteristic (although not exclusively so) of the Napoleonic tradition.

Deployment Issues

As recognised earlier, political appointments in public administrations is not a phenomenon exclusive to Spain. However, the extent of their deployment in the sub-state governments does expose a number of issues in relation to the management of public services.¹³² Potential problems relate to accusations of clientelism as these posts are not filled through normal recruitment processes, but are direct nominations by politicians. (This reduced level of transparency also applies to the posts in the Special Purpose Vehicles discussed below.) Relations with civil servants can also be problematic, thus hindering effective management of the whole organisation. The existence of political appointees may mean that the civil servants are excluded from strategic decision-making at ministerial level, having a negative impact on the quality of policy development and decision-making processes: civil servants can offer constructive challenge and produce balanced options based on scientific or technical knowledge as opposed to what can be the more short-term, politically driven options likely to be considered in an exclusively political circle. Exclusion could also be de-motivating for civil servants, and a lost opportunity for non-political civil servants to experience and therefore understand how politicians work and the constraints within which they operate. In summary, the danger is that actions are based solely on

¹³¹ Response to Scottish Parliamentary Question S4W-10032 on 04.10.12 and www.gov.uk/government/publications/special-adviser-data-releases-numbers-and-costs-october-2013. Both accessed 20.02.16.

¹³² The Andalusian Union of Civil Servants was reported to have claimed that at the end of 2014 the Junta employed 2,300 senior civil servants, appointed by 'libre designación' (or 'free appointment', without going through formal appointment processes). www.libertaddigital.com/c.php?op=imprimir&id=1276511232. Accessed 15.10.14.

political criteria and public managers are relegated to merely 'mechanical labour' (Porrás Nadales 2005: 469-70).

It is important to note the difference in the role of the Special Advisors in the UK. Whilst both have a role in providing advice from a political perspective, the UK code of conduct adds that this should respect the neutrality of civil servants:

Special advisers are a critical part of the team supporting Ministers. They add a political dimension to the advice and assistance available to Ministers while reinforcing the political impartiality of the permanent Civil Service by distinguishing the source of political advice and support. (UK Government Cabinet Office 2015)

Furthermore, Special Advisors can 'help Ministers on matters where the work of government and the work of the government party overlap and where it would be inappropriate for permanent civil servants to become involved' (UK Government Cabinet Office 2015). This is not the role deployed in Spanish Autonomous Governments.

5.3.5 EMPLOYEES OF 'SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES' (SPVs)

Definition and Use of SPVs

A final group of employees paid for by public funds are those engaged in Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) or arm's length organisations. The main forms taken in Spain are public companies, foundations and consortiums. These SPVs carry out specific public functions and are publicly funded. They are however seen as separate, and existing with some independence, from the main administrative body (in other words, from Autonomous Government bodies such as the Junta and the Generalitat) (Fernández Llera 2014: 225).¹³³ These types of organisations are not unique to Spain. Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations or quangos are deployed across the world at regional and Central Government levels as well as at the European and international level. Quangos are not new, but there has

¹³³ For a more detailed exploration of the definition of a quango in an international comparative context, see Greve et al 1999.

been a 'quango explosion' in recent years, associated with public sector reforms (Greve et al 1999: 130). Specifically, the transfer of functions to a wide range of quasi-autonomous, task-specific bodies has been associated with, although not exclusively, NPM-type re-organisations with their focus on delegation, disaggregation and privatisation (Greve et al 1999: 129-30). This is certainly the case in terms of Autonomous Governments as is explored below.

Arguments presented by interviewees in both Andalusia and Catalonia for the creation of SPVs centre on the view that they are more flexible, and therefore more effective in delivering public services. The expectation is that these agencies are more agile and can provide a more rapid response (author's interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2014). This view is largely based on the belief that they can operate outside of the rigid administrative law framework of civil servants, the so-called 'huida del derecho administrativo' or 'flight from administrative law' (author's interview with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the President and Local Administration, Junta de Andalucía 2014). Notably, they employ staff on the basis of labour contracts, which provides an easier way to appoint and dismiss people. A contrary view is that the perception of inflexibility in civil service contracts is ill founded and that the collective agreements with those on labour contracts may prove more rigid. Furthermore, the perceived inflexibility in the civil service is a reflection of the necessary bureaucratic processes and procedures when dealing with public money and public services. It is not the result of civil service terms and conditions (author's interview with Assistant Director General of Inspection of Personnel Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). It might be expected that a more right-wing leaning Autonomous Government would favour the use of such arms' length bodies, or SPVs, as it is in keeping with the perceived value of a smaller public sector and of private sector management skills and so there would be

more in Catalonia than in Andalusia. However, as the next section demonstrates, the PSOE-led Junta has also favoured their creation.

Numbers of SPVs


SPVs are especially prevalent at the sub-state level of government in Spain. In 2009 there were over 4000, nearly half of which were created by Autonomous Governments (Fernández Llera 2014: 241). The figure overleaf shows how Andalusia and Catalonia have created significantly more SPVs than any other Autonomous Government.

Deployment Issues

The extensive use of SPVs indicates a view that the existing model of public administration in the Junta and the Generalitat can not deliver public services as well as SPVs. Moreover, it suggests that neither the leadership of the Junta and Generalitat believe that it is possible to reform the existing model to achieve those improved ways of working. Internal reform may be deemed too difficult and the creation of an additional body operating outside of the existing model is a more effective approach.

Whilst these bodies are accountable to the Autonomous Government which established them, the concern about SPVs across Spain has been the lack of transparency and financial control over this very large sector of public spend. The scope for corrupt practices in this sector as well as the scale of their operations has led to a lack of public confidence in these institutions and by extension to the 'parent' Autonomous Government.

Figure 18: Number of Special Purpose Vehicles
by Autonomous Government (2015)




Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (2015b).

One of the most notorious corruption scandals in Andalusia has been the so-called ERE scandal. Implicating former Junta First Ministers Griñán and Chaves as well as leading to the resignation of at least one Junta Deputy Minister, this case involves the alleged payment of millions of euros by the Junta to a SPV to make fraudulent early retirement payments (Rincón 2015; Martín-Arroyo 2016).¹³⁴ A second line of criticism has been the sheer number of SPVs and the view that they duplicate existing arrangements, a so called 'parallel administration' (author's interviews with Member of Andalusian Parliament and Secretary General of Podemos in Seville, 2015 and President of Ciudadanos Group, Parliament of Andalusia, 2015).

The reduction of SPVs has featured in Central Government reforms of the public sector (in the wake of the financial crisis post-2008) and is reflected in the current plans of the Junta and the Generalitat. However, as the figure overleaf shows, Andalusia and Catalonia will continue to have the largest number of all seventeen Autonomous Governments, even after the Spain-wide programme of reductions. The first bar (orange) reflects the situation in 2010, the second (yellow) is the situation in 2014 (including action underway) and the third (green) the predicted position after the reduction (MHAP 2014: 14). Savings from the restructuring of continuing SPVs are estimated for the period 2011-15 to be 19,499,43M€, including 6,376,440M€ in Catalonia (the highest) and 1,625,125M€ in Andalusia (third after Madrid) (MHAP 2014: 25).

¹³⁴ There has been extensive coverage of this case nationally. The articles cited here are from *El País*, details included in the bibliography.

Figure 19: Reduction in Special Purpose Vehicles by Autonomous Government



Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (2014: 14).


Health – An Example of the Application of SPVs

The choice of SPVs as a delivery mechanism in both Andalusia and Catalonia illustrates a similarity and a difference between the two governments. Both Autonomous Governments justify the creation of SPVs in similar ways, but each locates them differently: in the public sector in the case of the Junta or in the private/third sectors as in the Generalitat. In this section, health services are used to illustrate the different approaches adopted in the use of SPVs by each Autonomous Government.

Catalonia has in its health services a mutual tradition which favoured the creation of private health centres (Ramió and Salvador 2002: 117). The current Catalan model of health care is distinctive in Spain. It is based on a purchaser/provider split, a SPV and the involvement of the private and third sectors as the figure overleaf shows.

In brief, the Generalitat's role in relation to guaranteeing public health in Catalonia is carried out by a SPV, the Servei Català de la Salut or CatSalut (the Catalan Health Service). This operates outside of the public (administrative) law and is the purchaser of health services. CatSalut purchases services on behalf of the citizens of Catalonia from public, private and voluntary sector providers. This model also recognises the significant role of the private sector in the purchasing of health care, another distinguishing feature of the Catalan system. These private health care insurance companies commission health services directly on behalf of their customers. The purchaser/provider split is characteristic of NPM initiatives to increase efficiency by reducing the size of the public sector and introducing market forces and private sector practices.

Figure 20: Catalan Health Service Model




Source: Author's elaboration based on Generalitat de Catalunya (2008).¹³⁵

¹³⁵ Although this figure is based on a document from 2008, the model illustrated is still valid, as confirmed in the 2015 article by De Lara et al (2015: 52-3).

In Andalusia health is predominantly a public sector service. It also uses a SPV, but this is a public sector body and provision is delivered by the predominantly public sector as the figure overleaf demonstrates.

The health care system in Andalusia is therefore a model based on public provision, reflecting the commitment of the PSOE-led Junta, whereas the Catalan model reflects the pre-existing tradition of hospitals and health institutions being run in the private and third sectors. It can be debated whether the private/third sector model is a positive choice by the Generalitat, reflecting a Catalan trait, or the making of a virtue out of a necessity, given the poor state of the public health service inherited by the Autonomous Government in the 1980s. Whatever the reason, while both use SPVs, there is a very real difference between the two in the way they operate. In Andalusia, SPVs are not independent, they operate within the Ministries. **‘They are still part of the public sector’** (author’s emphasis, author’s interview with Director General of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Junta de Andalucía, 2014). The operation of such a large network of SPVs requires robust mechanisms to control spending, monitor operation and evaluate performance, not least of which to address undoubted tensions between civil servants and the SPVs (author’s interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2014). However, this demands a new set of skills on the part of civil servants and is recognised as an area in need of development (author’s interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015). An added complication exists in Catalonia of managing across the sectoral boundaries of the private and public spheres (author’s interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). This means that more sophisticated systems of regulation, monitoring and payment are needed than would be required if all activities were carried out ‘in-house’.

Figure 21: Andalusian Health Services Model



Source: Author's elaboration based on Junta de Andalucía (2009).

The challenge of re-orientating the organisation to address the needs of such new NPM-type structures is not unique to Spain. It has been suggested that the creation of quangos or the contracting out of services has ‘allowed the introduction of a variety of new management styles and procedures’ (Greve et al 1999: 130). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine whether this opportunity has been taken up within the SPVs. However, evidence uncovered in this comparative analysis suggests that fundamental change to the way in which the ‘core’ of the Junta and the Generalitat operate has been limited.

5,4 BUDGETS AND STRATEGIES

5.4.1 2015 BUDGETS

Overall Dimensions and Similarities

This section contains a comparative analysis of the budgets, looking at the macro level in terms of overall size, biggest budget heads, and ‘rankings’ in term of which services command the most resources. It examines similarities and variations and offers explanations. The table overleaf summarises the main budget heads for each Autonomous Government in 2015.

Overall total budget levels for 2015 were similar: 29,625,000,000€ in Andalusia against 32,483,000,000€ in Catalonia. However, when this is divided by the respective populations (of 8,401,567 and 7,391,133), per capita spending by the Generalitat is higher at 4,395€ compared with 3,526€. Expenditure by public authorities is a function of a number of factors including statutory responsibilities, local needs and political decisions. At a macro level, the higher level of per capita spend in Catalonia may reflect the aspiration that Catalans want better services than in other parts of Spain and are willing to pay for it (author’s interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).

Table 25: Comparison of Budgets (2015)

	Junta de Andalucía	Generalitat de Catalunya
	€	€
Executive Management	125,027,768	95,064,100
General Administration	37,447,222	1,341,482,600
Institutional Relations and elections	0	5,199,000
Justice	393,445,433	799,609,900
Civil Protection	47,732,539	1,111,237,600
External Relations	0	18,583,600
Social Services	2,856,412,949	2,446,416,300
Health	8,413,908,288	8,313,924,600
Education	6,584,442,076	5,116,143,500
Housing	207,441,562	161,017,800
Culture	144,233,602	173,052,300
Catalan Language	0	23,457,800
Community Services	406,116,508	0
Consumer Services	0	6,841,800
Sport	31,294,277	52,969,900
Transport and infrastructure	841,902,489	1,293,468,000
Info Society and Telecoms	146,515,874	268,503,800
Land and Planning	0	5,908,100
Environment	0	120,599,100
Research and Innovation	456,438,231	218,221,300
Economic Development	0	32,407,900
Agriculture, Food and Fishing	2,276,197,046	106,008,200
Industry	0	55,035,500
Energy and Mining	0	9,867,900
Commerce	17,099,334	34,490,400
Tourism	100,523,803	51,468,200
Business Development	347,929,567	65,045,500
Credit and Financial Sector	0	22,774,800
Local Government	3,178,688,846	3,330,522,000
Contingencies	0	200,000,000
Public Debt	2,642,963,767	7,004,764,600
Economic & Fin Regulation	369,403,787	0
TOTAL	29,625,164,968	32,483,086,100

Source: Author's elaboration based on information from websites of Junta and Generalitat.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf. Accessed 04.08.15.

www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/planif_presup/presupuesto2015/IEF/ief-3.pdf. Accessed 26.11.14.

In presenting the 2015 budget both the Junta and the Generalitat emphasised the priority of protecting front-line services, maintaining spending levels on social services, on education and health. Both made a feature of re-instating the bonus payments for employees, reducing SPVs or reducing expenditure in SPVs. The Generalitat focused on supporting the economic recovery while the Junta stressed the priority of tackling unemployment. As reported in Chapter Four, both Autonomous Governments retained the similar top priorities from 2014 into 2015.

In terms of the overall balance of key service budgets within each Autonomous Government, it can be seen that their relative share has remained largely consistent over this period, with the exception of debt. In Andalusia, the distribution has stayed at 32%/25%/8% for health, education and social services respectively, with debt provision falling from 12% to 10%. In Catalonia, the relative shares of these key budgets have also stayed the same, with the exception of debt provision falling from 27% to 24% (Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas [MHAP] 2015a: 32, 94).

Viewing the budgets as a manifestation of policy priorities, the following similarities can be seen:

- Total annual expenditure (2015/6) is similar in overall scale at 30,000,000,000€ each.
- In terms of ranking, health is the single largest budget head in both, at 8,413,908,288€ in Andalusia and 8,313,924,600€ in Catalonia.
- Subsequent rankings (excluding debt which is discussed below) are mirrored in both with education being the second largest, local government third and social services fourth.
- Absolute figures in these top-ranking service budgets are comparable - local government is allocated 3,178,688,846€ in Andalusia and 3,330,522,000€ in Catalonia and Social Services at 2,856,412,949€ and 2,446,416,300€.

It is unsurprising that these key services command such a significant proportion of the overall budgets in both Andalusia and Catalonia (from 70% to over 80% of total spend depending how spend on health, education and social services is calculated), as is the case in all Autonomous Governments. The similarity in scale is indicative of the fact that these are national services, with national standards – the ‘national menu of services’ (author’s interview with Director of Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015). Although they are managed at a sub-state level, the scope for variance is limited compared with wholly discretionary services such as culture or sport. ‘In the case of health, education and social services, the menu of services is set by Central Government’ (author’s interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).

There are differences however in the model of service delivery for the key service areas of education and health. In Catalonia, there is a greater reliance on the private and voluntary sectors. Health was examined earlier in this chapter. In the case of education, the new democratic state of Spain inherited a poor education system, heavily reliant on the private and third sector provision. It was characterised by great shortages: in 1976 there were more than one million children without a ‘compulsory’ school place (Bonal 2000: 203). The reality was that ‘there were not enough public schools [at the time of the Transition] and using the existing network of private schools was a ‘cheap and quick’ way for the new State to ensure universal access’ (Olmedo 2013: 62). This was true across Spain. However, the picture has changed over subsequent years, leaving significant territorial differences, with areas like Catalonia continuing to operate with a large number of private and publicly-funded private schools. Andalusia does not. Of 1,480 secondary schools in Catalonia 772 are

state and 708 are private, an almost 50:50 split.¹³⁷ To put this pattern into context, the proportion of secondary age pupils in Andalusia in private education was 20%, 37% in Catalonia, and 27% across all Spain (Bonafant 2000a: 19).

Differences

There are however some significant differences between the two Autonomous Government budgets. In terms of variations:

- Catalonia spends more on administration, external affairs, transport, language, civil protection (policing and prisons).
- Andalusia spends more on tourism, community services, education and on agriculture, food and fishing.
- Contingency and particularly debt provision are very different.

Some differences are straightforward to explain:

- Policing and prison provision are not competencies of the Junta and therefore only appear in the Generalitat's budget.
- The Catalan language is a very visible manifestation of the role of the Generalitat in the promotion and protection of Catalan culture, with 23,457,000€ allocated to this function.
- The heading 'external affairs' in the Generalitat budget which does not appear in the Junta budget, may reflect the use of different budget codifications. However, it is reasonable to suggest that it reflects the significant activity in promoting Catalonia in the international arena (as discussed in Chapter Four and also earlier in this chapter).
- Different approaches to codification of budgets may account for the 'internal relations and elections' provision in the Generalitat. However, it may also reflect the anticipation of additional elections (one which was realised in September 2015) and the holding of an

¹³⁷ Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya. www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=742&lang=en. Accessed 08.03.16.

official referendum (one which was not realised, being replaced by a voluntary, non-binding referendum in November 2014).

- The greater investment/expenditure in agriculture, food and fishing by the Junta can be explained by the greater importance of the rural economy in Andalusia, in terms of the economy and especially jobs.
- Spending on tourism is higher by the Junta, again reflecting the importance of this sector in Andalusia. The role and spending of the Barcelona City Council with regard to tourism may also help to explain the lower level in the Generalitat budget. Barcelona City Council spends over 4M€ on tourism development and promotion.¹³⁸
- The greater level of spend by the Generalitat on transport has been, in part, explained by the fact that the city metro in Barcelona is funded by the Generalitat unlike in other areas, for example the Madrid metro, which is funded by the City Council (see correspondence from the Generalitat dated 21.07.15 and attached as an appendix). However, an interrogation of the websites of the City Council of Madrid reveals annual expenditure of over 100M€ on public transport which is comparable to that of Barcelona City Council at 133M€.¹³⁹ Furthermore, the budgetary provision of the Autonomous Government of Madrid for Infrastructure and Transport at 1,451,090,090€ is comparable with that of the Generalitat at 1,293,468,000€.¹⁴⁰ The Generalitat also argues that the high level of spend reflects the inadequate investment of the State in transport in Catalonia particularly given its position next to

¹³⁸ <http://w28.bcn.cat/pressupostos2015/en/>. Accessed 20.02.16.

www.madrid.es/portales/munimadrid/es/Inicio/El-Ayuntamiento/Hacienda/Presupuestos?vnextfmt=default&vnextchannel=15d74706945b8210VgnVCM1000000b205a0aRCRD. <http://w28.bcn.cat/pressupostos2015/en/>. Both accessed 20.02.16.

¹³⁹ www.madrid.es/portales/munimadrid/es/Inicio/El-Ayuntamiento/Hacienda/Presupuestos?vnextfmt=default&vnextchannel=15d74706945b8210VgnVCM1000000b205a0aRCRD. <http://w28.bcn.cat/pressupostos2015/en/>. Both accessed 20.02.16.

¹⁴⁰ www.madrid.org/presupuestos/index.php/politicas-y-programas. Accessed 20.02.16.

France and also in the toll motorways (author's interview with Head of Communications, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).

- The Junta's budget includes a significant provision for 'community services' which is not replicated in Catalonia. Investigation of the Junta website would suggest this is to fund services aimed at communities as a whole rather than services for individuals, such as supporting community activities to tackle social exclusion, promoting participation and volunteering.¹⁴¹ The Generalitat may consider that less input of public resources in this field is necessary given the tradition of civil association in Catalonia.
- A significant proportion of the contingencies budget head in Catalonia was to provide for the reinstatement of employees' bonus payment. Although this reinstatement was also a feature of the Andalusian budget, it had not been agreed in Catalonia by the time of the budget, reflecting a self-described 'character of prudence' in the Generalitat's setting of the budget (see correspondence from Generalitat dated 21.07.15 and attached as an appendix).
- The very significant variation in administration is more difficult to explain. The scale of the difference suggests that it is a function of the way in which some expenditure is coded, namely that a wider range of activities are accounted for under this heading in the Generalitat than in the Junta (author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). Further analysis is problematic given the complexity of public sector accountancy.
- A number of factors have been put forward to explain the Generalitat's higher debt levels, including the poor state of infrastructure in Catalonia inherited from the state, the impact of the Sufficiency Fund and the less favourable basis of transference of competencies of earlier adopters (although this latter point

¹⁴¹ www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/igualdadypoliticassociales/areas/inclusion/servicios-comunitarios/paginas/presentacion-servicios-sociales.html. Accessed 05.01.16.

would also impact on Andalusia). However, it is the national financing system which is blamed above all for the debt levels. Specifically, the Generalitat argues that Catalonia was disadvantaged because of the predication of the 2009 financing model on 2007 data, that is the use of figures from before the economic crisis (author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). This model assumed that the 'Mediterranean half' of Spain (Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia and Andalusia) would receive significant funds from taxes related to the construction industry. Government guarantees of compensation for the lack of such anticipated income for the Autonomous Governments in the other half of Spain were built into the model. When the economic crisis hit, Catalonia's tax income plummeted. However, again this would also apply to Andalusia whose debt levels are not so high.

- In terms of education, it can be seen that by placing the two budgets in a national context, Catalonia spends less on education per head of population than the national average. Andalusia spends above average, which has been a consistent picture for Andalusia over the past five years.¹⁴² This may reflect the greater financial contribution of Catalan parents given the higher proportion of children in private or third sector schools. However, one of the features of the Generalitat's 2015 budget has been a significant increase in education spend, an increase surpassing the other Autonomous Governments (Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas 2015b: 21). Between 2014 and 2015 budgets, Catalonia's spending on education increased by 6.8%, compared with 2.3% in Andalusia and 2.4% across all Autonomous Governments. This may be the result of demographic pressures: Catalonia's population growth is due to

¹⁴² http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/05/12/media/1431452440_395334.html. Accessed 20.05.15.

both natural increase and positive net migration (Bonifazi and Crisci 2013: 230). Catalonia also increased its Social Services spend at a greater rate, with a 10.5% increase, compared with 0.1% in Andalusia and 4.8% across all Autonomous Governments. The growth in the aging population may be a factor, but this is not a phenomenon exclusive to Catalonia. It may be a function of regional costs of living as covered in the following section.

Analysis of Expenditure on Staffing, Goods and Services

In addition to examining budgets from the perspective of spend on specific services such as education or social services, it is possible to analyse spending across all services on staffing, goods and services. Such a comparison of the type of expenditure can reveal aspects of how the Autonomous Governments operate. Based on a comparison of spend between 2010 and 2014, the Generalitat spent significantly more per head of population on personnel costs (staffing) than the average of Autonomous Governments and more on goods and services.

The Junta, on the other hand, spent in line with the average on personnel, but significantly less on goods and services.¹⁴³ This may appear surprising given the earlier evidence of higher staffing levels at the Junta than at the Generalitat. It may reflect the Generalitat's greater proportion of civil servants to those on labour contracts: the total civil servant wages bill is likely to be higher due to the wider range of benefits to which they are entitled, compared with those on labour contracts (see earlier discussion of the differences). Higher expenditure on goods and services may be a reflection of the higher costs of living Catalonia than in Andalusia. A study by the Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, confirms that the price index for Catalonia is 108.5 with respect to the national indicator of 100, while

¹⁴³ http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/05/12/media/1431452440_395334.html. Accessed 20.05.15.

the index for Andalusia is 92.7 (see correspondence from Generalitat dated 21.07.15 and attached as an appendix).

The difference in cost of living may also be a factor in explaining the difference in the annual remuneration for each senior political position as shown in the following table. Figures suggest that there are more senior political posts (altos cargos) in the Junta than in the Generalitat (183 compared with 144) and so the argument could be made that each Generalitat politician carries a greater set of responsibilities.¹⁴⁴ However, even when taking into account the inclusion of two extraordinary payments, senior Catalan politicians are being paid significantly more than their Andalusian counterparts: the First Minister's salary is 92% higher, that of Ministers around 58% higher, General Secretaries 42% higher and Director Generals 50% higher.

Table 26: Comparison of Senior Politicians' Salaries (2015)

Position	Junta de Andalucía €	Generalitat de Catalunya* €
First Minister	63,808	144,030
Deputy First Minister	62,800	
Minister	62,800 59,564 53,770	108,576
General Secretary	59,564	84,078
Director General	53,770	80,589

*includes two extraordinary payments

Sources: Author's elaboration based on information from websites of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/rdac-ptr/publico/buscarAltosCargosActivos.html. Accessed 14.01.2016.

<http://analisiocupacionpublica.gencat.cat/default.aspx>. Accessed 29.12.15.

¹⁴⁵ www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/ap_profesionales/altos_cargos/retribuciones.html. Accessed 28.09.15.

www15.gencat.net/ecofin_wpres14/pdf/VOL_L_ANP.pdf. Accessed 28.09.15.

Income

In terms of income derived by the Autonomous Governments from the national financing system in 2015, Andalusia benefits from the Sufficiency Fund, the Competitiveness Fund and the Basic Public Service Guarantee Fund to a larger extent than Catalonia: at 3,806M€ it is the top recipient, whilst Catalonia receives one of the lowest amounts at 2,468M€. Given the aim of these Funds is to ensure greater equality across Spain, this outcome is not surprising.¹⁴⁶ In terms of (ceded) income tax and VAT, Catalonia and Andalusia, together with Madrid, receive the largest amounts, reflecting the size of their economies compared with the rest of Spain. However, the difference in income taxes received between, on the one hand Catalonia and Madrid (12,671M€ and 12,943M€ - first and second highest) and Andalusia (third) on the other (8,915M€) is significant, again reflecting the wealth and economic vitality of these areas and not just their size relative to the other fifteen Autonomous Governments (Ministro de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas 2015a: 15).

5.4.2 STRATEGIES

Budget Strategy and Tactics

Reference has already been made to the responses of Autonomous Governments to the economic crisis which began in 2008. During its first stage, the Spanish Government implemented a number of stimulus measures, as did the Junta and Generalitat (see Chapter Four, Table 14). The response of the two Autonomous Governments to the second phase, that of national austerity measures, was to implement incremental, tactical steps to reduce spending, such as freezing posts, eliminating duplication and reducing running costs. In this way, both the Junta and the Generalitat adopted a combination of the three main approaches to austerity identified previously: uniform

¹⁴⁶ These funds were described in Chapter Three, section 4.

percentage reductions; efficiency gains; and prioritised cuts (Pollitt 2010: 22). Financial crises can precipitate public sector reforms, as it can be easier to consider radical options than in a period of stability (Pollitt and Bouchaert 2011: 26). However, it does not appear to have been the case in the Junta or the Generalitat (notwithstanding the Generalitat's secessionist demands which have used economic and financial arguments).

One of the most salient features of the strategies of the Junta and the Generalitat has been public and damning criticism of Central Government, or to use a more accurate description 'distancing and blaming' (Ongaro 2012: 119). The resources provided by the State financing system are deemed to be inadequate by both the Junta and the Generalitat (as evidenced in Chapter Four), with both being vociferous in their opposition to the impact of the austerity programme, shifting blame and pointing to failures in the financing system. This opposition has continued, for example with First Minister Susana Díaz in 2016 claiming that Andalusia has been 'badly treated financially by Central Government'.¹⁴⁷ However, in Catalonia, this opposition has contributed to a strengthening secessionist movement, an evolution not replicated in Andalusia.

Modernisation Strategies

An analysis of the modernisation strategies by the Autonomous Governments was undertaken for two purposes. Firstly, given the context of an inherited and shared public administrative tradition, modernisation strategies may indicate future paths of variation or adaptation to local needs and aspirations. Secondly, modernisation plans can indicate the values and the type of organisation desired by the organisations' leaders.

¹⁴⁷ www.juntadeandalucia.es/presidencia/portavoz/gobierno/110094/diaz/tiende/mano/grupos/politicos/reforma/financiacion/autonomica/defienda/intereses/andalucia. Accessed 05.05.16.

In Andalusia, the Junta has been working on a Reform Plan for a number of years. It was reported to be in progress, with a release date of December 2014 (author's interviews with Director General of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Junta de Andalucía and Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, both 2014). A revised release date of July 2016 was then given in 2015 (author's interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015) and then a possible date of the end of 2016 offered in the summer of 2016. There can be a number of reasons for the delay in producing the Plan, including the snap election in 2015, the subsequent hiatus in electing the First Minister and the need to include staff in its development (author's interview with Director of Andalusian Institute for Public Administration, 2015).

This is not to say that there have been no modernisation reforms. One of 'the most comprehensive reforms of the administration of the Junta' was that of the creation and subsequent reorganisation of the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) (Ramos 2011: 13). The model behind the re-organisation was that of the purchaser-provider split, and more specifically the creation of special purpose vehicles to carry out public sector activities. It sought to distinguish between functions appropriate to a central bureaucratic sphere and those functions involved in service delivery and therefore more appropriate as SPVs (Ramos 2011: 20). This type of approach has been characteristic of NPM reforms, and as the Minister in charge at the time stated, seeks to achieve agility and efficiency, key words for NPM (Justice and Public Administration Ministry, Junta de Andalucía 2004). The proposal related to a wide range of bodies including autonomous organisations, public enterprises, consortiums and foundations, active in as diverse a spectrum of activities including statistics, health, contemporary arts, energy, radio and television, individual hospitals and schools, tourism and sport. Investigation into the effectiveness of these changes is not possible within the scope of this thesis. However recent research failed to find extensive evidence of the

operation of such an evaluative framework. The change in status was described as nominal in some cases – so-called agencies did not claim to be separate, but rather continued as part of the Junta (González Espinosa 2013: 53).

In contrast, the Generalitat's proposals for modernisation were set out in their 'Reform Plan for the Administration of the Generalitat de Catalunya and its Public Sector' in 2014 (Generalitat de Catalunya 2014). In setting out the need for reform, it asserts that 'the modernisation of public administration has gone from being an option to a necessity' (2014: 6). The Plan refers to the reforms being made along similar lines by other (unnamed) countries to respond to the demands of citizens, technological advances and the international context. It encapsulates the aim as follows: 'The Catalan Government wishes to introduce change to bring about an administration of and for the twenty-first century' (2014: 6).

Based on 'points of convergence' identified in three separate expert reports commissioned by the Generalitat, the Reform Plan identifies drivers and main lines of action, and nine delivery initiatives.¹⁴⁸ These are set out in the two tables overleaf.

¹⁴⁸ The three expert reports cited in the Generalitat's Reform Plan are: the Consejo Asesor para la Reactivación Económica y el Crecimiento (Advisory Council for Economic Recovery and Growth), the Comisión de Expertos para la Reforma de la Administración Pública y su Sector Público (Expert Commission on Public Administration and Public Sector Reform) and the Forum de Entidades para la Reforma de la Administración (Forum of Organisations for Administrative Reform).

Figure 22: Drivers and Main Lines of Action (Reform Plan 2014)

- Boosting mechanisms for transparency and accountability
- Establishing a senior public management profession
- Modernising the workforce
- Enhancing the flexibility of human resources management
- Increasing support for private-public partnerships
- Using IT in government more intensively
- Simplifying and rationalising the public sector

- Establishment of a new relationship model with citizens
- Installation of HR and management systems in the Administration
- Establishment of the bases of a new model of governance and organisation.

Figure 23: Nine Initiatives (Reform Plan 2014)

1. Transparency: To encourage and promote transparency in all actions of the Generalitat and its public sector as a key element to inspire and guide its reform and modernisation.
2. Ethics: To develop an ethical infrastructure, through the promotion of codes of ethics, training and a unified framework of management, enabling the assessment of management and accountability in this area.
3. Human Resources: To develop a model of progressive policies in this field, in which the Generalitat, through appropriate regulatory changes, can introduce greater flexibility and facilitate the professionalism and mobility of staff.
4. Senior Public Management: To create a senior public management system which ensures professional competence and the adequate supervision of people, including open recruitment procedures.
5. Digital Government: To simplify administrative procedures through the promotion of technological solutions.
6. Innovation and talent: To design and implement a corporate programme to promote innovation and talent, valuing the potential and abilities of staff.
7. Organisation of the Government of Catalonia: To streamline and simplify the organization of departments and the public sector.
8. Public sector the Government of Catalonia: To reorganise the public sector, in keeping with the values of public service, focused on the effective development of public policies, added value and accountability.
9. Private public partnerships: To promote public-private collaboration processes, ensuring minimum quality standards and strengthening internal capacity to manage those processes.

Source: Author's translation from Reform Plan, Generalitat de Catalunya (2014).

The key elements of the Reform Plan are well researched, and based on a range of independent advice (as referenced above). The proposed actions address the areas in need of reform as set out in the diagnosis underpinning the Reform Plan. They are corporate in their scope, to be applied across the whole of the organisation and not to specific ministries or functions. Most are in keeping with wider NPM tenets, including for example streamlining and simplifying structures, private-public partnerships and exploiting information technologies. Not part of NPM, but specifically in relation to the realities of public administration in Spain today, the Plan highlights issues of transparency and ethics and sets out proposals for codes of ethics and measures to improve transparency and accountability. Human resource issues are prioritised, promoting the need for what it calls 'professional public management'. By this the Generalitat means the establishment of a new layer of management between the political and administrative spheres of professionally qualified managers, recruited through open advertisement and short-listed on the basis of merit. This is a very significant, and very ambitious, reform in personnel practices for a Spanish public authority.

Progress was reported in July 2015.¹⁴⁹ Significant advances have been made in terms of enabling laws, agreements and decrees. In fact, no less than ten separate pieces of the regulatory framework were reported as approved. There is also evidence of working parties being established (such as the Interdepartmental working group for Public-Private Partnership) and the creation of Commissions such as the Commissioner for Transparency and Access to Public Information. Codes, guidelines and plans have been written such as the ethics code for senior officials, for procurement procedures and for the police. Training plans for the promotion of innovation are cited. The Transparency Portal has been launched. These processes are all

¹⁴⁹http://governacio.gencat.cat/web/.content/funcio_publica/documents/pla_reforma_administracio/Documents/Pla-de-reforma-de-lAdministracio-Informe-anual-de-progres-2014-2015.final.pdf. Accessed 17.12.15. As at August 2016 no further progress report had been published.

very necessary to ensure the consistent and corporate implementation of this type of change.

Less evident are measures of outcome, indicators of performance and success. A good example of this is a separate and more detailed report on progressing the e government agenda.¹⁵⁰ Significant increases are recorded in the volume of digitised transactions since 2012 but limited reporting is made on quality of transactions (feedback on customer experience for example), about financial or time gains and efficiency improvements. Comparisons are not made with other bodies or comparison with pre-set targets, and no future targets are set out in terms of numbers or percentages. This information may be reported elsewhere, but without this type of information being reported in the context of a progress report, the monitoring information on numbers suffers from being one-dimensional and therefore of limited assistance to good management.

In terms of customer orientation, the Generalitat's plans do not highlight citizen engagement. By way of contrast, the Modernisation Plan 2014-2016 of the Basque Autonomous Government emphasises a focus on citizens, not just in terms of their rights to receive and expect efficient and effective services, but also to be involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of those public services.¹⁵¹ It is beyond the scope of this research to examine whether this variation is due to a differential impact of the administrative tradition, to the characteristics of the Basque Government or to the political and social culture of the Basques. However, customer service is a key element of NPM-inspired reforms, and a particular challenge to administrations with a Napoleonic model.

¹⁵⁰ 'Transaccions a PICA gener-setembre 2015', Oficina de Processos i Administració Electronica, Generalitat de Catalunya.

¹⁵¹ https://www.euskadi.eus/r47-edukia/es/contenidos/plan_programa_proyecto/xleg_plangub_07/es_plang_07/adjuntos/pipes.pdf. Accessed 17.03.16.

The drafting and approval of a strategy or a plan of action is not the same as the implementation of change. The disconnect between policy and implementation has been considered within the research community, pioneered by Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1984), but further developed in three main phases, looking at implementation as an administrative competency, to implementation as a top-down and bottom-up decision making process and more recently as an inter-organisational negotiation (Watson 2014: 449). During the course of this research, a number of comments have been made to the author about this disconnect and the failure to implement reform in both Autonomous Governments. There can be little doubt about the commitment of the lead Secretary General to reform the Generalitat, nor about her recognition of the need for internal and external consensus to drive this long-term change to make the Generalitat 'fit for the twenty-first century' (author's interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014). However, there are significant threats to successful implementation of reform in both Autonomous Governments, the principal ones being considered below.

Individual interviewees have pointed to the political and economic crises in both places slowing down the process of reform. The specific example of the freeze on recruitment preventing the implementation of changes to recruitment was given (author's interview with Assistant Director General of Inspection of Personnel Service, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). These crises have also been cited as a reason for politicians' focus to be taken away from reform (author's interview with Director General of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2014). This point is even more valid in the case of Catalonia, where the secessionist debate is seen to have overtaken any other debate within the Generalitat (author's interview with

Member of Catalan Parliament and Assistant Spokesperson, Socialist Group, 2015). This is a good example of how situations of conflict impose high functioning costs on organisations (Bel 2015: 50).

The reported lack of active cross-party involvement and support for the reform programme also threatens its implementation (author's interview with Modernisation Policy Officer, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). Equally, the opposition of trades unions and civil servant corps can impede implementation (author's interview with General Workers' Union of Catalonia spokesperson, 2014). A lack of consensus and broad-based support within the Autonomous Government risks the continuation of the modernisation programme in the event of a change of political control in the Generalitat (author's interview with Head of e government, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). The very limited resources dedicated to modernisation imperil meaningful and corporate progress, particularly in Catalonia where an ambitious plan has been clearly articulated. Most telling has been a frequent refrain about the lack of political will to change, both in Andalusia (author's interview with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2014; Member of Andalusian Parliament and Secretary General of Podemos in Seville, 2015) and in Catalonia:

The [administrative reform of the Generalitat] is more than necessary. The current culture is very bureaucratic, hierarchical and fundamentally focused on process and not on outcomes. It needs to be more centred on the citizen. However there is no political will to change, to modernise. They say a lot, but don't deliver. (Author's interview with Member of Catalan Parliament and Assistant Spokesperson, Socialist Group, 2015)

A particular criticism made of the Generalitat's reform plans has been that they are 'superficial, box-ticking' (author's interview with Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, 2014), a 'discurso aprendido' (understood as a way of talking about something rather than it

necessarily being the reality) (author's interview with an academic, a University in Barcelona, 2015). Public administrative reform in Catalonia, it is alleged, is about 'aesthetics and image' and not about values, analysis and planning (author's interview with General Workers' Union of Catalonia spokesperson, 2014). These sentiments echo observations made in relation to Central Government reforms, described as attempts to change the image rather than the structure (Torres and Pina 2004: 447). Even if these comments are ill founded, and many (but not all) were made by opposition politicians, they are genuinely held. The lack of awareness or of credibility of the Autonomous Governments' programmes of reform and the lack of involvement of key players such as the trades unions or staff, seriously undermine the embeddedness of the changes.

5.5 INSIGHTS FROM THE NARRATIVES DEPLOYED

5.5.1 NOMENCLATURE

In addition to the previous points of comparison, for example budget heads and employment contracts, it is possible to consider a less quantifiable but equally important aspect, namely a difference in style between the two Autonomous Governments. In the case of Catalonia, its self-image as a nation is evident in the promotion of the Catalan language. It is also very discernible in the nomenclature deployed by the Generalitat. For example, the web domain is not .es, as would normally be the case for Spanish authorities and is the case for the Junta de Andalucía (www.juntadeandalucia.es) , but .cat, for Catalonia (www.gencat.cat).

The counterpart of the Andalusian Government departments 'Presidency and Local Administration' and 'Finance and Public Administration' in Catalonia is not administration but 'Government and Institutional Relations'. Reference has already been made to the use by the Generalitat of the term 'hisenda' or treasury rather than (public)

finance, which is usually associated with state rather than sub-state government. A senior civil servant in the Junta interviewed for this study pointed out that the term 'ministry' was reserved for Central Government, and that the term 'departments' was usually deployed in Autonomous Governments.

The importance of the international work of the Generalitat has been referred to above and the different stance taken by the Generalitat and the Junta towards the EU. It would be overly simplistic to suggest that for the Junta, the EU is seen solely as a source of funding. However, as demonstrated earlier, Andalusia has been a major beneficiary of EU funding. In contrast, for the Generalitat, the EU is an arena to promote the Catalan nation. This self-image as a Catalan nation is reflected in the interviews conducted for this thesis and expanded upon in the analysis below. In the words of a Member of the Catalan Parliament, 'we conduct ourselves as a state' (author's interview with Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015). The lyrics of the anthems of Andalusia and Catalonia demonstrate long-standing contrasts: Andalusia talks of freedom, as part of Spain, whereas Catalonia talks of Catalonia being triumphant again, fighting off the oppressors (Sobrequés i Callicó 2007: 165).¹⁵²

5.5.2 THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS

For the purpose of this research, almost thirty, in-depth, one-to-one, interviews were conducted in Spanish, over a period of two years, with leading politicians, civil servants, academics and trade unionists in Andalusia and Catalonia.¹⁵³ A number of themes emerged during the course of these interviews in the way in which these individuals spoke about public administration in their area. These themes are in addition to the specific insights and data they provided about budgets, priorities and management structures, which have informed this

¹⁵² www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/sobre-junta/simbolos.html. Accessed 10.12.15.

¹⁵³ Throughout this section, the title and date in brackets after citations refer to the author's interviews. A full list of interviewee name, title and date of interview is given at Appendix A.

research. This section reflects on the discourses themselves as sources of understanding of the wider societal and cultural perspective of the individuals involved in public administration as it operates today. The analysis of these interviews reveals differences and some similarities in terms of the dominant discourse in Andalusia and Catalonia.

Amongst the Andalusian participants, there were a number of common themes. The most frequent thread was that of the needs of Andalusia – a poverty that is historical and which requires the support of the rest of Spain to help redress and overcome. This has been described by some commentators as a victim mentality (see recent example of Gutiérrez-Rubi 2015). It has often been framed within Andalusia as a belief in solidarity and equity across the Spanish State. Catalans are frequently, but not universally, criticised for a lack of solidarity in this context. One interviewee talks of Andalusia ‘only wanting what it needs’ and Andalusia ‘wanting the same rights for all, irrespective of where they live. Andalusia does not seek advantages for itself, rather that the needs of all are covered, perhaps this is not understood in Catalonia. Catalonia wants advantages for itself’ (author’s interview with Secretary for Institutions and Employment, Workers Commissions, 2014). Another interviewee laments how Andalusia is ‘a place with a wealth of resources, which should be at the forefront’, the clear implication being that it is not (author’s interview with Secretary General of Podemos in Seville, 2015).

When Andalusians and Catalans describe themselves or others stereotypes are repeated. Andalusian culture is described by Andalusians as ‘working to live, whereas Catalans are more likely to live to work’ (author’s interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015). Another Andalusian talks of Andalusians ‘knowing how to enjoy themselves, but also working hard’ (author’s interview with Secretary for Institutions and Employment, Workers Commissions, 2014). Catalans celebrate their own culture as ‘open, hard-working and entrepreneurial’ (author’s interview with

Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015). This self-promotion may be a reflection of self-image or a rejection of the negative views of others of the Catalan character. As previously noted, survey data suggests that Catalans 'generate an intense and unanimous dislike' in all other parts of Spain. Catalans may or may not want to be different, but are definitely perceived to be different (Bel 2015: 47).¹⁵⁴

Also notable in Andalusian discourse is a frequent equating of the PSOE with the Junta and vice versa. The spokesperson for Podemos in Andalusia talks of the arrival of Podemos (and Ciudadanos) as 'putting the brake on the PSOE [in the Junta]'. This is an acceptance of the dominance of the PSOE in the Junta, not an expectation of usurping them. Recent election results (in 2012 and 2015) have removed the PSOE's absolute majority, but it has continued to be the dominant political force in Andalusia.

In terms of the Catalan discussants, the conflictual relationship with Central Government is a dominant theme. They see an unfairness in the treatment of Catalonia by the Government and the rest of Spain. Interviewees in Catalonia speak of the unfair financing system, summed up as 'Espanya ens roba' (Spain robs us) – also the name of a Facebook page.¹⁵⁵ Catalans complain of how they have provided financial help to other parts of Spain in the past, but now 'Spain is not willing to help us' (author's interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014). Complaints about the unfairness of the financing system is not exclusive to Catalonia, however in Catalonia a perceived element of inadequacy on the part of Spain is added. This inadequacy is woven into the complaint. The (Spanish financial) system 'is unable to accommodate the needs of the Catalan people' (author's interview

¹⁵⁴ Work by Carol Galais et al counters the view of Catalans lacking solidarity with the rest of Spain. Survey work into citizenship discovered that although Catalans are less supportive of principles of fiscal solidarity than in Galician and Castilla la Mancha, most Catalans do agree with inter-regional fiscal transfers (2014: 76-77).

¹⁵⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/Espanya-ens-roba-136434949725026/>. Accessed 12.02.16.

with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).

The interviews took place in Autumn 2014 and Autumn 2015 when there was a heightened atmosphere of dispute between the Generalitat on the one hand and the Rajoy Government on the other. However, as explored elsewhere in this thesis, this discourse has long-standing, historical perspective, dating back to the end of the 1800s and beginning of the 1900s when many Catalan entrepreneurs shared a view of a self-governing Catalonia within a weak Spanish state (Keating et al 2003: 52). It is a perspective that clearly still informs the judgements of some Catalans. For example, Generalitat officials justify as necessary their network of offices abroad because State embassies do not meet the needs of Catalan businesses (author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). State-run services are criticised for being old-fashioned and bureaucratic, still stuck in the eighteenth century (author's interview with Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). This latter point appeared to be made in a light-hearted way, but the emphasis on Catalonia being different from Spain was underlined with a banging of a hand on the table.

There is a clear shared sense that Catalonia is different, and a confidence that Catalonia is more advanced than other parts of Spain and that it deserves, if not special treatment then, recognition of that difference. 'We have a different language, culture, history and geography. We want this to be recognised – and it isn't' (author's interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014). The Generalitat wanted a model (of public administration) different from the rest of Spain (author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). Another interviewee pointed out with pride that while the display of photos of (post-Franco) former ministers in public buildings was common across

Spain, in Catalonia, this also includes portraits of ministers from the 1930s, referring to Catalonia's long-standing institutions of self-government (author's interview with Head of e government, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).

All Catalan interviewees pointed to the tradition of civil society in Catalonia in positive terms, and as a phenomenon particular to them. One describes it as 'tejido de asociaciones', literally a fabric or web of voluntary organisations, reflecting the view that the many organisations in the third sector are part and parcel of Catalan life (author's interview with Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015). Another points to the Generalitat's collaboration with the private sector as 'part of our individuality' (author's interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014).

In the context of the perceived unfairness of the financing system, one interviewee stated that Catalonia needed more resources, because Catalonia 'did not want average' (author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015), a sentiment echoing one made by another Catalan that Catalonia 'wants more and deserves more' (author's interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014). This sense of being special, some might argue better, is strong, indicating a clear and separate identity.

Reference needs to be made to the alternative Catalan discourse of those not supportive of independence. Spokespersons of Ciutadans, the Catalan branch of the Spain-wide Ciudadanos political party, use the term 'territory' when referring to Catalonia, rather than the term nation or region. (This was also the case of the Andalusian Ciudadanos Group Leader and the PP spokesperson in the Junta). The significance of terminology in this area has been discussed earlier. In this case, the use of the term territory may be seen as more

neutral, avoiding the nation/nationality debate. An indication of the strength of feeling against Catalan nationalism is demonstrated in the Ciutadans' description of the work of the Generalitat to promote the Catalan language and culture as 'radicalisation'. This is emotive terminology. On the other hand, and also deploying emotive language, Catalanists point to the use by Central Government of the term 'indoctrination' to characterise the Generalitat's public communications work. This is forcibly rejected, and described as 'a bad joke' (author's interview with Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).

As is to be expected, corruption is declaimed by opposition politicians, and others, in both Andalusia and Catalonia, but it is criticised in a very blunt and strong way. There is no denial of its existence. Rather than using the term 'libre designación' (or free appointment) to describe the appointment by politicians of senior positions, the more pejorative term 'a dedo' (literally, appointment by pointing a finger) is used to denote the subjective nature of this method of selection (author's interviews with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, Junta de Andalucía 2014; Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015). The blurring of the line between civil servant and politicians is condemned as 'the invasion of administration by politicians and the invasion of the political sphere by professionals' (author's interview with Professor, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, 2014).

Emotive language is used. Corruption in public administration is described by an insider as 'a cancer', offering an image of a body being eaten away, making healthy cells non-functional (author's interview with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2014). The proliferation of SPVs have been created 'for reasons of political clientelism' (author's interview with

Ciudadanos Group Leader, Parliament of Andalusia, 2015), organisations which are 'full of party appointees' (author's interview with Spokesperson for Popular Party of Andalusia, 2014).

A theme common to both Andalusian and Catalan interviewees is that of 'the other' or the sense of being separate from the rest of Spain. Thus Catalan interviewees speak of Madrid and that '**they** want us to change our system' (author's interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014), whilst in Andalusia one interviewee referred to some in Spain treating Andalusia as a cliché - 'a place of sunshine, fiestas and beaches, a place of leisure' (rather than investing in developing industry) (author's interview with Secretary for Institutions and Employment, Workers Commission, 2014). In the context of the 2014 budget settlement, the Andalusian Minister for Finance and Public Administration is reported to complain of the Spanish Government's willingness to sacrifice lower income Communities due to pressure (not from Catalonia but) from Madrid 'who wants to maintain its status and the benefits of being the centre' (González-Santiago 2013).

Evidence of the history of Andalusian regionalism and Catalan nationalism discussed earlier suggests that this sense of 'other' is not new in either place, but it is differently experienced and described. In Andalusia, the work of the Junta is seen in the context of Spain. For example, a question about public administrative reform during the author's interviews elicited a response about the national programme of reform agreed between Central Government and Autonomous Governments (Coordinator, Department of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Junta de Andalucía, 2015). This is not the case in Catalonia, which is more assertive about difference and autonomy – 'The [Spanish] Government wants to interfere in our business' (author's interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014).

Irrespective of the individual interviewees' personal positions (and the interviews covered a wide range of types of positions), there is a clear divergence between Andalusia and Catalonia along the axes of drivers: political in the former and identity in the latter. In Andalusia, the focus is on the building of the Andalusian economy, on getting a 'fair share' of prosperity and about equality and solidarity. Andalusia is frequently described as a community not a nation, with the role of the Junta to defend the interests of the Andalusians.¹⁵⁶ It is about public services and has been consistently so since the creation of the State of the Autonomies. In Catalonia the impulse is one of identity protection and promotion. Catalonia should be recognised, it is felt, for its differences and its successes. One might have expected that financial disputes between the Spanish Government and the Generalitat would have become more important in the context of the post-2008 economic crisis. However, the strengthening secessionist movement suggests that identity has become just as, if not more, important. The individuality of the interviewees in each locale produced a range of opinions and standpoints. However, this does not negate the dominance of key themes in the discourse. This analysis helps the interpretation of the specific comments made and the understanding of the meaning behind the words.

Chapter Five has examined a number of aspects of the corporate and political management arrangements of the Junta and the Generalitat, finding continuities and variations. It has also reflected on similarities and differences within a thematic analysis of the interviews. The following chapter seeks to explain the findings of the case study.

¹⁵⁶ <http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/presidencia/portavoz/gobierno/110094/diaz/tiende/mano/grupos/politicos/reforma/financiacion/autonomica/defiende/intereses/andalucia>. Accessed 05.05.16.

<p style="text-align: center;">CHAPTER SIX: CONTINUITIES AND VARIATIONS: EXPLANATORY FACTORS AND INFLUENCES</p>
--

6.1 INTRODUCTION

6.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the findings from the case study of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya. It provides a summary of the findings and analyses those factors which have been found to generate uniformity and those which encourage or have influenced differentiation.

As Chapter Five demonstrated, there are limited differences between the Junta and the Generalitat in terms of their organisational structures, the roles of politicians, public employment patterns, tactical responses to the economic crisis, respective policy priorities and budget profiles. These similarities have arisen, and been maintained, despite apparently strong forces for variation as explored in earlier chapters of this thesis. Significant differences have existed between Andalusia and Catalonia and the rest of Spain in terms of their geography, history, wealth and economy, politics and culture. The establishment of the decentralised state in the 1978 Constitution was a very explicit recognition of the variations within Spain. However, this case study has revealed more similarities than differences between the two Autonomous Governments of the Junta and the Generalitat.

6.2 KEY FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDY

6.2.1 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

The organisational structures of both sub-state governments demonstrate 'mimetism', a term used by a number of authors when writing about Spain (Peters and Painter 2010: 235; Alba and Navarro

2011: 795). The use of this term denotes the mimicking or copying of what others have done. In the context of the Autonomous Governments, it reflects the copying of the Central Government structures existing at the time of their creation, structures which have not changed significantly since then and which are not dissimilar from each other now. They are both based on directly elected parliaments, and on First Ministers with cabinet governments. Political hierarchies in terms of Ministers, Secretary Generals and Director Generals, are alike and the executive roles of politicians are configured in the same way. Departments are similarly structured around functions, a major difference being the greater prominence of an external focus in the Generalitat.

Civil service structures and practices reflect national patterns of employment, although there are more civil service contracts than labour contracts in the Generalitat than in the Junta. Political appointments and the use of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) are prevalent in both. Statutes are similar in their provisions and structure, but there are important differences in emphasis. Explicit, corporate modernisation strategies may be more developed in Catalonia than in Andalusia, but progress over the two year period of fieldwork on the Generalitat's plans has been limited (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4). In the Junta's case, the publication date of a modernisation plan has been repeatedly deferred. The attitude of the Junta and the Generalitat towards Europe has been largely positive – albeit for slightly different reasons.

Budget totals and profiles are similar in each Autonomous Government. Clear priority is placed on health and education services, and these functions are allocated the lion's share of resources in both Andalusia and Catalonia. However, in terms of the specific services of education and health, a significant difference is the use of the non-public sector in the **delivery** of public services.

Initial responses to the economic crisis were similar, as both Autonomous Governments pursued stimulus measures in the early years of the crisis. In the following period of fiscal consolidation, budget reductions have been largely tactical or incremental. Both the Junta and the Generalitat have deployed a similar combination of approaches to the reduced availability of resources, namely, 'cheese-slicing', 'efficiency gains' and 'some priority setting' (Pollitt 2010: 22). Less evident have been fundamental reappraisals or radical realignments of resources:

The economic crisis has not been used to reform the Generalitat. Reductions have been made by salami slicing rather than a reappraisal of priorities. (Author's interview with Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, 2015)

In terms of a more strategic response in relation to finance, both the Junta and Generalitat have complained vociferously to the Government, seeking to shift the blame for their financial difficulties to Madrid. In the case of the Generalitat however, this vociferous complaining has been transformed into a strengthening of its secession stance since 2010. The table overleaf summarises the differences and similarities between the Junta and Generalitat revealed in this research.

The thematic analysis of the interviews covered in Chapter Five, Section 5.5 demonstrated a strong self-identification amongst both Andalusians and Catalans, each expressing a clear sense of being distinct from others. However, a significant difference is revealed in how that identity relates to Spain as a whole. The Generalitat's view of Catalonia is as a potentially separate state, whereas the Junta sees Andalusia as an integral part of Spain. This difference is also reflected in the nomenclatures of the websites of the Junta and Generalitat, their titles of ministries, and the use and promotion of the Catalan language.

Table 27: Overview of Similarities and Differences between the Junta and the Generalitat

Comparative feature	Junta de Andalucía	Generalitat de Catalunya
STATUTES		
Content	Similar chapter headings	Similar chapter headings
Preamble	Locates Andalusia within a unified Spain. Greater emphasis on solidarity and 'doing not just being'	Sees Catalonia as a nation within a (Spanish) State. Greater prominence given to international work and 'being not just doing' Catalan language is emphasised
POLITICAL STRUCTURES		
Political Hierarchy	First Minister, Government and Ministers, Secretary Generals and Director Generals	First Minister, Government and Ministers, Secretary Generals and Director Generals
Ministries	Based on functions	Based on functions, greater focus on external activities
Political Control	PSOE since creation of Junta. Long-standing leaders with national influence	Predominantly CiU (until 2015). Long-standing leaders with national influence
Role of politicians	Extensive use of executive roles	Extensive use of executive roles
Gender issues	Greater profile of women	Less of a profile

Comparative feature	Junta de Andalucía	Generalitat de Catalunya
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES		
Structures	Assistant Director Generals, Heads of Service, no Chief Executive post	Assistant Director Generals, Heads of Service, no Chief Executive post
Contracts of Employment	Civil service national terms and conditions	Civil service national terms and conditions
Numbers of Employees	Public employment seen as a priority role for the Junta. One employee for every 35 Andalusians	Public employment not seen as a priority role. One employee for every 45 Catalans
Political Appointments	Extensive use made across all functions	Extensive use made across all functions
SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL		
Private or public sector	Predominantly public sector	Greater role of private and third sectors
Use of SPVs	Extensive use made, predominantly within the public sector	Extensive use made, especially in the third sector
2015 BUDGETS		
Overall Dimensions	Total revenue budget of 30,000,000€. 3,526€ per capita spending by Junta	Total revenue budget of 32,000,000€. 4,395€ per capita spend by Generalitat

Comparative feature	Junta de Andalucía	Generalitat de Catalunya
Priorities	Biggest budget heads are health, education and social services. Higher spend on tourism and agriculture than in Catalonia	Biggest budget heads are health, education and social services. Higher spend on language and culture, debt, transport, policing and prisons than in Andalusia
STRATEGIES		
Budget Strategies and Tactics	Incremental reductions made. Vocal opposition to Central Government policy	Incremental reductions made. Complaints about Central Government policy. Opposition to Government economic policies contributed to secessionist demands
Modernisation Strategies	Strategy being prepared, but not yet published.	Reform plan developed and published, reflecting NPM ideas. Partial implementation

6.3 THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY

6.3.1 THE INEVITABILITY OF THE PAST DETERMINING THE PRESENT?

This research has revealed a striking lack of variation between the Junta and Generalitat. A diachronic approach can help explain how this situation may have arisen as it considers the subject through its historical development (Kay 2005: 553). Specifically, a path dependency perspective suggests that previous actions in one direction elicit further moves in that same direction:

In other words the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point *constrains* the trajectory after that point. (Kay 2005: 553)

History matters:

It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society's institutions. Today's and tomorrow's choices are shaped by the past. And the past can only be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution. (North 1990: vii)

It is an approach which has been particularly associated with historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism embraces the idea that individuals act within institutional arrangements, and that a historical perspective is needed to understand the present structure and how it functions (Kay 2005: 555). Institutions are understood to include both the formal organisations and the informal rules and procedures that underpin relationships within those organisations (Thelan and Steinmo 1992: 2).

[HI] scholarship is *historical* because it recognizes that political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time. It is *institutionalist* because it stresses that many of the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions - whether these be formal rules, policy structures, or social norms. (Pierson 1998: 29)

This is a useful approach in considering how the institutional arrangements and the people operating in those institutions have been influenced by historical developments, how the individuals

influence and are influenced by the institution in which they operate. It is particularly relevant in the comparative study of the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia, where not only are formal structures examined, but the way in which the institutions function. Knill, for example, uses a historical institutionalist approach to explain different outcomes in terms of public administrative reform. Contrasting Germany and Great Britain, he emphasises the impact of the type of relationship between politicians and senior civil servants (Knill 1999: 116).

The evidence of this thesis supports a historical institutionalist explanation in the case of Spain. Chapter Two of this thesis shows that, whilst there have been multiple divisions over the course of Spanish history, including that of territory, the dominant paradigm has been that of centralism. A particularly influential element of this centralising legacy in terms of Spanish public administration has been the Napoleonic Administrative Tradition.

6.3.2 THE PERSISTANCE OF THE NAPOLEONIC ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITION

Post-Franco and Post-Transition Periods

The Napoleonic Administrative Tradition (as analysed in Chapter Three, Section 3.2) has influenced the political structures, employment patterns and organisational cultures of the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia. But as the name suggests, this tradition dates back to the early 1800s. The question is why has it persisted, and how has it resisted change?

It persisted into the immediate post-Franco decentralised State of the Autonomies because of the special set of circumstances pertaining in Spain at the time of its establishment in the 1980s. The transfer of powers from Central Government to Autonomous Governments was accompanied by the transfer of existing civil servants. Those civil servants inevitably brought with them their own processes, structures

and culture. Politicians at the time were more interested in creating the new political governance structures, less interested in the management arrangements of the public services for which they were to become responsible (Ramió and Salvador 2002: 101). There was also a time imperative. A completely new tier of government had to be established quickly and in a context of heightened political tension. So despite the opportunity to create a completely new body of sub-state government, or in the case of Catalonia, a modern version of the Generalitat, civil servants opted for the safer option and created structures in line with their own experience – those of the Napoleonic Model. This is a rational decision as it was the model they knew (Alba and Navarro 2011: 795). It is the one which also would have been considered feasible to deliver the new Autonomous Governments in a time-critical context, as confirmed in interviews carried out for this case study (see, for example, author's interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014).

However, over three decades have elapsed since the creation of the new Autonomous Governments, prompting questions as to why they have not subsequently changed to reflect the specific needs, priorities and cultures of the different Autonomous Communities. The Napoleonic Model was defined and discussed earlier in this thesis (Painter and Peters 2010). It has persisted for two sets of reasons. Firstly, taking a functionalist view, it worked, in terms of supporting the creation, almost from scratch, of multi-million euro organisations delivering key public services, with new democratic governance arrangements. Despite initial reservations, there has been no collapse of the new territorial system (Beltrán Villalva 1990: 342). On the contrary, Autonomous Governments were established successfully across the whole country and they have been part of Spain's success story in establishing a modern, universal welfare

system, comparable to the rest of Europe, in a relatively short period of time.

Secondly, this research has highlighted a number of the characteristics of the Napoleonic Model which make it, if not impervious, then, resistant to reform. These include the capacity of the civil service to obstruct change, the legal focus which can be incompatible with managerial reform and the blurred line between politicians and senior civil servants making for shared interests and the impact of clientelism (the form of corruption related to the exchange of favours for votes). These aspects, as they relate to the Junta and the Generalitat, are expanded upon below.

Bureaucratic Resistance

Resistance to change by civil servants is a feature of most, if not all, bureaucracies. However, features of the Napoleonic system relating to public employment can exacerbate a tendency to minimise change, including the formal tenured appointments for civil servants which reinforces the closed nature of the bureaucracy. Although the 'jobs for life' guarantee has been eroded in part by the use of labour contracts, the majority of core personnel in the Junta and the Generalitat still operate on tenure. It is a practice which can engender 'a culture of lack of consequences for the actions of civil servants' (author's interview with Professor of Political Science, Pablo de Olavide University, 2015). The method of appointment is via entry examinations which have traditionally tested the ability to memorise and reproduce facts, and not test problem-solving skills or aptitudes to public service. It is a problem acknowledged by the leaders of both the Junta and the Generalitat:

We want to change the way in which staff are recruited. The system of entry examinations tests things not aptitudes. We have many long-term employees. To advance we need not only knowledge but also different abilities and attitudes. (Author's interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014)

The current approach to recruitment has major implications for the design of the organisation. It is the opposite of the 'position-based approach' practised in the US and the UK under which the position is the key component in the design of the entire organisational system (Gamarra et al 2014: 7-8). The focus in the position-based approach is on the suitability of the candidate to a particular post, based not only on their qualifications but also their experience. It seeks to fill the positions with the best people, a concept which was found in the fieldwork interviews to be unknown, and, whilst attractive to some managers, even preferable, would 'not be possible in Spain' due to resistance within the system (author's interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015). These recruitment practices of the Junta and the Generalitat also have the potential to restrict the introduction of new ideas from outside the organisation. Internal promotions, the norm, are less likely to challenge the status quo. The reverse is more likely, reinforcing existing patterns and cultures. The 'revolving door' phenomenon was illustrated within the fieldwork for this research: the holder of the post of Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration in 2014 had been appointed in 2015 as the Director General for Human Resources in the Junta's Ministry of Finance and Public Administration.

Appointments are made to professional groups not to specific posts. This has the potential to perpetuate departmentalism, with loyalty and values specific to professional groups and not to the overall corporate organisation. The impact of this lack of corporate approach was evident in the structures and working practices of the Junta and the Generalitat. In the Generalitat, 'Ministries are autonomous' with 'coordination by agreement' (author's interview with Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). In the Junta where the HR function is centralised, 'there is a lot of [HR] autonomy in [the departments of] Health and Education' (author's interview with

Coordinator, Department of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2015).

A Legal Focus

The emphasis on the law in the Napoleonic Model can make public administrations formal and bureaucratic. Civil servants in Spain are seen as public administrators applying the law, not managers of public services. Statements gathered in the fieldwork for this research support this conception of the role of civil servants, confirming the focus on process and the law: 'the tradition brings codification, a systematic integration of rules' (author's interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015). 'Civil servants are there to ensure things are done in accordance with the law and with the rules' (author's interview with Secretary for Institutions and Employment, Workers' Commissions [Trades Union], 2014).

Managerial ideas can be mistrusted by the dominant legal scholars and practitioners who insist 'on the principles of (top-down) bureaucratic rationality' (Boix 1997: 276). Managerial ideas have to show they are compatible with the existing legal framework (Bovaird and Loffler 2009: 45). Whilst this research did not reveal a dominance of lawyers in the current ministerial positions of either the Junta or the Generalitat, evidence of the legal focus in the progress report on the Generalitat's Reform Plan was found, with its heavy reliance on the passage of a series of new laws necessary before implementation can take place (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4).¹⁵⁷

Politicisation of the Bureaucrats and Bureaucratisation of the Politicians

The blurring of the line between politicians and senior civil servants under this model can make for powerful shared interests, a scenario

¹⁵⁷ Interrogation of the websites of Junta and Generalitat (accessed 20.04.16) did not permit further analysis into the incumbents of the lower tiers of management, making an examination of the extent of this phenomenon beyond the remit of this research.

more likely to support the status quo. A career in the civil service is often a precursor to a career in politics in Spain, the most current and relevant example being Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy.¹⁵⁸ The interconnection of politicians and senior civil servants has the potential to enable more radical reform because of a shared interest and ownership (Ongaro 2009: 225). However, the case study does not bear this out in terms of administrative reform in the Junta or the Generalitat. It is just as realistic to believe that civil servants would be less likely to challenge politicians under this model than under a system based on meritocratic recruitment of civil servants which separates the careers – and the interests – of elected officials and professional bureaucrats.

In both the Junta and the Generalitat senior politicians are given executive roles, meaning that they are more involved in day to day decision making than, for example, in the UK arrangements. The occupation of executive roles by politicians who may or may not possess relevant professional skills and/or experience to manage public functions can have an impact on the quality and quantity of management staff and therefore the capacity of the organisation to manage its functions efficiently and effectively. The blurring of roles can lead to potential confusion and de-motivation of civil servants (Ramió 2012: 94-105). The interviews in this research of senior civil servants and leading politicians of the Junta and the Generalitat, did not reveal confusion or de-motivation. Their senior positions would suggest success in their career and therefore indicate they are more likely to be supportive of the system. However, a statement from a Trades Unionist offers a different view:

There is a high level of clientelism in the Generalitat, via “libre designación”, ... leading to the entrance of a large number of altos cargos [senior executive politicians], many of whom have little professional experience or background. This generates a lack of leadership, management capacity and a high

¹⁵⁸ After graduating with a law degree, Rajoy became a Property Registrar in the Civil Service before embarking on his career in politics. www.rajoy.es/en-confianza-biografia.html. Accessed 11.04.16.

dependence and complicity with political power. It results in a lack of confidence amongst staff in these bosses and gives rise to frustration. (Author's interview with spokesperson for General Workers' Union of Catalonia, 2014)

A statement from a leading Trade Unionist in Andalusia pointed to the failure to implement, on the grounds of cost, proposals to improve the accountability and mobility of civil servants through sideways moves thereby improving motivation (Secretary for Institutions and Employment, Workers' Commissions [Trades Union], 2015). Whilst this is a recognition of the problem, the failure to implement a solution could suggest a lack of political will, obstruction by civil servants or trades unions, or the lack of a strategic plan for human resources.

Clientelism

The extent of clientelism, a particular feature of the Southern European variation of the Napoleonic Model (discussed in Chapter Three), can also reinforce the status quo and militate against change. This phenomenon can reduce capacity, by not employing the best people to do the work and by not deploying scarce human resources in the most effective way: 'So we have people without the relevant knowledge or necessary experience in charge of important services. It is awful, shocking' (author's interview with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2014). People appointed in this way may not believe further career prospects will be based on merit, nor will they be likely to be supportive of modernising reforms (Ongaro 2009: 228).

This case study found widespread recognition of the problem of clientelism in both the Junta and the Generalitat. In particular, and not surprisingly, opposition members were most vehement in their criticism of 'jobs for friends' (author's interviews with Member Andalusian Parliament and Popular Party Spokesperson, 2014 and Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015). It was not within the remit of this research to quantify the extent of clientelism, but the high

profile corruption cases involving former First Ministers and senior members of Autonomous Governments confirm its existence in Governments of Andalusia, Catalonia, and other regions.

Resistance to Reform

In France, the origin of the Napoleonic Tradition, public administration today is also still shaped by this legacy, sharing key characteristics with Spain such as the linkage between the careers of politicians and bureaucrats, the presence of a system of corps and the centrality of the law (Rouban 2008; Bezes 2010; Ongaro 2009). A potential difference between France and Spain is the conception of public employment as social policy. In the case of France, it has been seen as a means of combatting unemployment. In Southern European countries this deployment of public employment as social policy is often used to satisfy 'clientelistic interests' (Ongaro 2009: 223). In the case of Andalusia, employment has been demonstrated in this research to be an important role of the Autonomous Government, given 'the low presence of the private sector in many fields, such as health' (author's interview with an academic, a University of Barcelona, 2014).

This study has so far examined the ways in which the Napoleonic tradition, as reflected in the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia, can impede change and how this contributes to the persistence of the model. The following concluding discussion on the tradition focuses specifically on public administrative reform and the adoption or otherwise of NPM-inspired reforms. A normative argument about desirable strategies of reform is not being made here. It is however particularly important to consider the propensity to change and to produce variation in this context, given the near homogeneity of the public administrative pattern adopted at the creation of the Autonomous Governments.

Resistance to change has been particularly highlighted by academics in relation to the weak implementation of NPM-inspired reforms in

countries sharing the Napoleonic administrative tradition (Parrado Díez 1996; Alba 1997; Torres and Pina 2004; Gualmini 2008).

More recent research suggests that there has been an intensification in the implementation of NPM reforms in the four Southern European Governments (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) as a result of the economic crisis, suggesting that economic crisis has acted as a 'critical juncture', forcing the implementation of delayed administrative reforms (Sotiropoulos 2015: 235). The reforms referred to are the reduction in public employment, a shift to a performance criteria and results-based culture, greater use of IT and, in the case of all but Spain, decentralisation (2015: 238). Sotiropoulos also points to a centralisation of government decision-making, describing it as government 'almost by fiat' (2015: 241). The focus of Sotiropoulos' work is on Central Government, and this thesis would certainly support the argument, in the context of relations with the Autonomous Governments, of centralisation by the Spanish Central Government as part of their response to the economic crisis.

In terms of the two studied Autonomous Governments, there is evidence of some NPM reforms, particularly the reduction in public employment. However, the implementation of reforms at a sub-state level, such as performance management and a results-orientated culture have not be found in this case study.¹⁵⁹ The weak introduction of NPM reform is despite the fact that the ideology of market solutions underpinning NPM have become widely institutionalised within the public sector in Europe, including Spain (Christensen and Laegreid 2007: 2). Statements by the leaderships of the Generalitat, in particular, have extolled reforms based on NPM elements such as supporting public-private partnerships and establishing a new model of organisation based on effectiveness, efficiency and coordination

¹⁵⁹ The reporting by Sotiropoulos (2015: 234) of similar responses to the crisis by the four Southern European governments (and thereby differentiating themselves from other EU member states) supports the validity of the typologies of public administrative traditions considered earlier and the argument that the Napoleonic tradition has continued to be a force in shaping these public bureaucracies.

(Reform Plan, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014). Developments such as the creation of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), a feature of NPM, have been embraced by the Junta, an acceptance or acknowledgement of NPM claims of improved efficiency:

The Special Purpose Vehicles belong more to the Anglo-Saxon tradition [than the Napoleonic tradition]. In Andalusia they were not common in the 1980s, but now operate across the fields of health, culture and infrastructure. The perception at the time of their proliferation was that they were more agile and provided a more rapid response. (Author's interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2014)

The quotation reveals a stated view of the merits of this feature of the Anglo-Saxon tradition and how it was not part of the administrative tradition of Spain. A more recent update from the former Director of Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, points out that the SPVs are increasingly becoming subjected to the same rules and controls as the public law regime (correspondence from the former Director's office dated July 2016). This 'return to the fold' probably reflects a public demand for greater transparency and overall control of these bodies, but does not undermine the assertion that the SPVs were seen as a (positive) modernising import.

Explanations for the less than enthusiastic implementation lie in the mismatch of values of the Napoleonic Model and those of NPM as explored, both in terms of the theory (Chapter Three), and in terms of actual practice outlined in this case study. The Napoleonic tradition's formal hierarchical structures, emphasis on process, and limited autonomy for employees are contrasted with the focus of NPM on managers being given the freedom and accountability to manage, and on its championing of competition, user choice and transparency. As analysed earlier in this thesis (see Chapter Three, Section 3.2) there is a significant gap between the two models, suggesting the extent of the challenge in introducing NPM reforms.

Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert's seminal work identified a number of dimensions of the politico-administrative context which may

affect reform: the basic structure of the state; the nature of executive government; relations between ministers and senior civil servants; the philosophy and culture of governance; and the sources of policy advice (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 48-67). These features are 'likely to exert a significant influence over the *choice* of reform to be adopted and the *feasibility of implementing* certain types of reform' (2011: 73). The argument is clear that the public administrative context is a key factor in explaining which countries are more or less likely to adopt NPM-inspired reforms. This research has demonstrated that the greater the consistency between the values underpinning the reform and the values of the existing administrative culture, the more likely the reform is to be successful. The lack of consistency in the case of the Autonomous Governments provides an explanation of the relatively weak implementation of reform.

A 'new institutionalist' approach can help to explain the dissonance between what an organisation states as its aims, objectives, priorities, and the actual behaviour and actions of that organisation as it is concerned not only with what is formally stated but also with the informal conventions and coalitions that shape political behaviour. It sees institutions not as physical organisations but as stable, valued and recurring patterns of behaviour, otherwise known as the 'rules of the game' (Lowndes 2009: 92-4). The reality of implementing reforms, publicly advanced by the Autonomous Governments, has been described succinctly in the course of this research as 'buying the formula, implementing half' (author's interview with Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, 2015). This case study shows that it is not solely the Napoleonic tradition which does not offer conditions conducive to reform, but it is the way in which that tradition is practised in the Autonomous Governments today which has prevented change and therefore variation in the way in which the Junta and the Generalitat organise themselves and their services. This analysis reflects the research considered earlier in this thesis regarding the constraints on reform at a national level. Similar forces

for continuity have been demonstrated including the administrative tradition's focus on the law, the obstruction of civil servants and the lack of political will to change.

However, there are dangers in an exclusive adoption of path dependency as 'the concept of administrative traditions tends to emphasize the continuities in governing and in the organizational life of the public sector' (Painter and Peters 2010b: 234). The limitations of adopting this approach are discussed in the next section, after which an analysis of other influences is offered.

6.3.3 THE LIMITATIONS OF PATH DEPENDENCY APPROACHES

A focus on the past does not offer predictions of future choices: 'It is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future' (North 1990: 98–9). It is a concept that has attracted criticism. It can lack explanatory power and crowd out other perspectives, and it is also better at explaining stability than change. As Ongaro points out in his study reflecting on reform in Napoleonic systems, administrative traditions are not immutable and 'the influence of administrative traditions cannot be intended statically' (2012: 109). A further set of criticisms centres on the 'implicit assumption that a policy would be "better" without path dependent processes acting as a barrier to effective reform' (Kay 2005: 561-8). In the case of the Autonomous Governments, the evidence gained through the fieldwork for this thesis is that past policy decisions and actions in the public administrative arrangements of Spain have constrained more recent past and present choices. The impact of previous decisions on the method of recruiting employees, the executive roles of politicians and the pre-eminence of the law can clearly be seen today. Thus current structures and cultures continue to be influenced strongly by the Napoleonic administrative tradition.

There are changes which can not be explained by the past, however, such as the adaptation to EU membership. Studies have examined the europeanisation of sub-state public administrations (see for

example Bursens and Deforche [2008]; Cole et al [2015]). This case study has highlighted a difference between the two Autonomous Governments, outlining the Generalitat's more proactive role in relation to the EU institutions from a representation perspective (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4). Another change, of particular profile in recent years, has been the greater focus on transparency in governmental activities. The fieldwork confirmed the relatively recent promotion of the Transparency Portals for both the Junta and the Generalitat following the passage of legislation in 2014.¹⁶⁰ These are two examples of change not driven by past choices. Rather, they are driven by current forces - external, in terms of EU membership in the former, and internal, Spanish political and societal demands relating to corruption in the latter.

The most significant public administrative reform is arguably that of Spain's decentralisation. The creation of the State of the Autonomies has been described as the 'most important transformation of Spanish administration since 1918' (Beltrán Villalva 1990: 342). It is certainly a development which is diametrically opposed to the Napoleonic tradition's focus on uniformity and centralisation. This tension can be seen in the many conflicts between central and regional government over the territorial distribution of powers. In his study of the implementation of NPM in Spain (and other Southern European countries with Napoleonic systems), Ongaro concludes that reform has occurred, mainly at the institutional level in the re-designing of the state on regional bases (2012: 115). Moreover, such reforms were triggered not by external NPM drivers but by 'endogenous dynamics', a reference to the political pressures of the Transition period considered earlier in this research.

An area for further research would be to examine the extent to which the Autonomous Governments have exercised decentralisation within

¹⁶⁰ <http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/transparencia/transparencia-andalucia/tus-derechos.html> and <http://transparencia.gencat.cat/ca/acces-a-la-informacio-publica>. Both accessed 27.06.16.

their own responsibilities. A statement made in the fieldwork interviews suggested that private health services are more decentralised in Andalusia than in Catalonia (author's interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015). This may be a reflection of rurality in the case of Andalusia and historic reasons in Catalonia.

6.4 SPANISH POLITICAL CULTURE

In terms of drivers of uniformity, one group of factors which can help explain the lack of variation is the wider political culture prevalent in Spain today. Aspects revealed in this research with a direct impact on the lack of change from inherited patterns include corruption, the dominance by individual political parties, the state's relationship with the citizen, and the weakness of consumer power.

6.4.1 CORRUPTION

Reference has been made earlier in this thesis to the existence of corruption within public administration in Spain. Corruption continues to be a major feature of Spanish political life with recent scandals involving political leaders in Andalusia and Catalonia. In 2015 Spain was 36th out of 168 countries (higher ranking indicating lower corruption) in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2015.¹⁶¹ To put this in a European context, Spain's performance is worse than that of Portugal and France (who share the same administrative tradition) and significantly poorer than all Scandinavian countries, Germany, the Benelux countries and the UK. Greece and Italy, sharing the Napoleonic or South European administrative tradition, score worse. Spaniards' perception of the extent of corruption in their country is high: 95% believed the problem

¹⁶¹ <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table>. Accessed 09.04.16.

to be very or fairly widespread (compared with an EU average of 76%).¹⁶²

The relevance to this research is that clientelism in particular is such an engrained aspect of Spanish life, that there are many more people, beyond the politicians and civil servants, who have a vested interest in the status quo and so are less likely to put forward any challenge to the current system. Anti-corruption stances have certainly featured strongly in the national manifesto positions of the two recently emerged parties of Podemos and Ciudadanos.¹⁶³ Tackling corruption was cited as a top priority and described as ‘recovering the institutions’ by the Secretary General of Podemos (Seville), 2015. Corruption was recognised as a problem by a wide range of interviewees during the course of the fieldwork, from opposition politicians, to trades unionists, academics, civil servants and senior executives within the Junta and the Generalitat (see notes from author’s interviews in Appendix B). The problem of corruption also featured in the investiture speech of Susana Díaz to the Andalusian Parliament in 2015:

Few can doubt that one of the main problems of our society is corruption and that it is not only regrettable for all of us who believe in honourable public administration, but it is also an unacceptable burden on democracy. (Junta de Andalucía 2015)

6.4.2 DOMINANCE BY A POLITICAL PARTY

A second aspect of political culture is that of the dominance by a single /political party. Political leadership of the Junta and Generalitat has been dominated since their creation by, respectively, the PSOE and, until recently, the CiU. Party cartelisation, as previously discussed (Chapter Five) reinforces and develops the dependency of

¹⁶² http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_399_380_en.htm. Accessed 29.03.16.

¹⁶³ The leader of Podemos, for example, set out five priorities in 2015: electoral reform, independent judiciary, anti-corruption measures, social and environmental rights guaranteed by the constitution, and the recognition of the pluri-nationality of Spain and the right to decide (*El País* 10.12.15).

individuals and society on the political parties controlling the Autonomous Governments (Katz and Mair 2009). This form of clientelism does not challenge the status quo. Rather it underpins and continues it. 'There is no political will to change things. Spain can be considered as a State of [Political] Parties' (author's interview with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2014).

Political life in Andalusia and Catalonia has also been dominated by a small number of powerful individuals. Autonomous Government First Ministers such as Manuel Chaves and Jordi Pujol, and, more recently, Susana Díaz and Artur Mas, have been much more than figureheads.¹⁶⁴ Throughout their tenure, they have been influential nationally and regionally and have been very much part of 'the permanent state of bargaining and bilateralism with the Central Government, of the horizontal competition between Autonomous Governments and the 'blame shifting' that have characterised inter-governmental relations in Spain (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 166). The implications of this competitive relationship are considered in the section below on the National Constitutional and Institutional Context.

6.4.3 WEAK POSITION OF CITIZENS

A third aspect of the Spanish political culture which can hinder change is the relatively weak position of citizens. This is not to be conflated with earlier consideration of the importance of the third sector, particularly in Catalonia, which relates to the charitable and voluntary sector and not to individual citizens. As discussed earlier (Chapter Three), Spanish political culture has historically been characterised by an asymmetrical relationship between the state and the citizen. This

¹⁶⁴Whilst the high profile of Mas has been clear during the secession debate, the importance of Díaz has also been evident, being frequently quoted in the national media in relation to national politics. See for example http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/04/30/actualidad/1462009770_259974.html. Accessed 30.04.16.

relationship allows citizens a less autonomous role in the state and also makes the state less open to change and variation. The relationship is organic, rather than contractual, meaning that the state is independent of any particular agreement with society and ‘thus, the state [...] is a more powerful and enduring actor, which has inherent powers and is entitled to exercise those powers in the name of the public’ (Painter and Peters 2010a: 6). It is a relationship where ‘interest groups are often considered almost as illegitimate interventions into the governing role and autonomy of the state’ (Peters 2008: 118). As explained by one civil servant during this research:

One of the differences between Spain and Anglo-Saxon countries is that in the latter citizens and the state are equal before the law. In Spain, this is not the case, the State is in a privileged position with respect to the citizen, from superior to inferior. Citizen participation in public affairs is very low. (Author’s interview with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2014)

Levels of satisfaction with local public services in Spain are lower than in countries such as Germany, Great Britain, Belgium and France.¹⁶⁵ A combination of low satisfaction levels, high incidence of corruption, lack of confidence in public authorities and ‘the feeling of a lack of responsiveness of the authorities to the demands of the Spanish public’ (Villoria 2015: np) can contribute to a lack of engagement. This view of the Spanish political culture was borne out in the fieldwork, even though it is recognised that many of the interviewees were ‘inside’ the system. Public cynicism about government, at all its levels, can translate into low expectations and a disinclination to agitate for reform and change. This is not to ignore recent developments such as the protest movement of the ‘Indignados’ (or ‘indignant ones’) and the rise of Podemos and Ciudadanos. It is revealing that these protest movements are frequently termed ‘antisistema’ (or against the system) in the press.

¹⁶⁵ www.ipsosglobaltrends.com/local.html. Accessed 11.04.16.

The ability of citizens to hold those in power to account, to know what is being done and to be involved, all impact on their power to influence public administrations. The existence of the gap between aspirations for transparency and the reality is reflected in this research. The First Minister of the Generalitat has referred to the need for a route map to 'construct a more transparent and more open public administration so that citizens can involve themselves more actively in the governance of their institutions' (Villoria 2014: 7). As an opposition member in the Andalusian Parliament stated, 'administration should be at the service of the citizen, not the other way round' (author's interview with Member of Andalusian Parliament and Popular Party Spokesperson, 2014).

6.4.4 WEAK CONSUMER POWER

A related aspect to the limited influence of the citizen on the state in the context of public administration is that of weak consumer power in Spain. The consumer power which was part of the neo-liberal surge of the 1980s in other western countries was not so evident in Spain and its absence or weak presence continues to be a factor in public administrations' resistance to change. This can be explained in part by the focus in Spain at that time of growing the welfare state, not seeking to reduce the size and scope of the public sector as was the case in the US and many countries in Western Europe. While there was a focus on efficiency elsewhere, in Spain there was majority public support for the expansion of public services and for the universal provision of welfare goods (Boix 1997: 276).

In addition to criticisms of Southern European bureaucracies for their rigidity and inefficiency, a 'lack of customer orientation' is also key to understanding the impact of citizen-state relationship (Kickert 2007: 48). As part of the fieldwork for this research a simple test was undertaken of how a citizen could make a complaint about a service via the website. It revealed a limited customer focus: Both the Junta and Generalitat offer telephone contact numbers, but information on

the website is opaque, hard to find and is not written with the user in mind. This is in contrast with the typical website of local authorities in the UK, for example, where such information is usually clear, concise and customer oriented.¹⁶⁶

Customer engagement was not revealed in the fieldwork as a priority in terms of the development of the Generalitat's e-government plans (author's interview with Head of e-government, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). When the concept of 'front office/back office' was discussed in the case study interviews, it was not translated by the interviewees into Spanish or Catalan. This suggests that the notion of organising services to be customer facing on the one hand supported by 'invisible' efficient support operations is not an established one within Spanish public service. A similar conclusion can be arrived at in relation to the term 'one stop shop'. These are described as 'ventanillas únicas' or single hatch windows (Porrás Nadales 2005: 477). It is an indication of a different approach, where a 'shop' is part of NPM use of private sector terms and tools, and a window hatch is a place at which applicants applied. It supports the comments made earlier on the mismatch between the Napoleonic administrative tradition and NPM reforms.

It is not only citizens who find 'doing business' with Spain's public administrations difficult. The World Bank's 'Doing Business 2012' report compared regulation for domestic firms in 183 countries. It ranked Spain at 45, lower than the US, the UK, Denmark, and Norway (all in the top ten) and also lower than fellow Napoleonic states such

¹⁶⁶ The word 'queja' or complaint was entered into the websites, returning the following pages: http://consum.gencat.cat/temes_de_consum/reclamacions/index_es.html; http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/ciudadania/procedimientos?p_p_id=catalogoProcedimientos_WAR_catalogoProcedimientosportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=1&catalogoProcedimientos_WAR_catalogoProcedimientosportlet_idProcedimiento=675&catalogoProcedimientos_WAR_catalogoProcedimientosportlet_cmd=detaIle; <http://www.northumberland.gov.uk/About/Contact/compliments.aspx#makeageneralcomplimentcomplaintorsuggestion>. All accessed 14.04.16.

as France at 29 and Portugal at 30. Customer engagement in Spain would be a fruitful area for further research, but it is reasonable to suggest that that citizen/customer demand experienced in other countries for enhanced services, more customer choice and improved efficiency in public services has not so far had the same impact on Spanish public services.

6.5 NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

6.5.1 1978 CONSTITUTION: FLEXIBILITY FOR COMPETITION NOT DIVERSITY

The contemporary Spanish constitutional and institutional context has had a major influence on the lack of diversity amongst Autonomous Governments – both at the outset and to date. The 1978 Constitution was a permissive vehicle in as much as it allowed, from the 1980s, each part of Spain to determine its boundaries and the degree of autonomy it wished to assume, leaving the territorial institutions to sub-constitutional regulations such as statutes of autonomy (Colino 2009: 263).

However, it can be argued that the flexibility for Autonomous Governments was only in relation to each other. There was a race to maximise competencies by all Autonomous Governments, including the Junta and the Generalitat as described in earlier chapters. The phrase ‘café para todos’ was widely used in Spain to describe an expectation of the same arrangements for everyone, or ‘home rule all round’. It should be noted that at the same time for some, notably the historic nationalities, ‘café para todos’ was seen to threaten their own claim for greater levels of self-government. On the other hand, some regions, notably Valencia, felt threatened by Països Catalans encroachment. Although the rate and pace in the transfer of competencies varied across the Autonomous Governments, by the

second decade of the twenty-first century there was near homogeneity (Giordano and Roller 2004: 2163-8).

The pursuit of equal competencies has been part of a continued competitive relationship between Autonomous Governments, which has not assisted co-operation, the sharing of good practice, or the joint development and dissemination of new ideas and approaches. A competitive rather than collaborative relationship may in some circumstances be expected to lead to a rivalry for excellence in governance and performance. However, in the case of Spain, the competition appears to have been focused on acquiring competencies, and having more (in the case of Catalonia) and not less (in the case of Andalusia) than the rest (as attested in the interviews carried out for this case study).

The need for reform of the Spanish territorial system may therefore need to be framed in terms not of greater self-government but in terms of the need for better co-ordination between the different parts (Porrás Nadasles 2007: 45). The fieldwork discovered that in some cases there was an awareness of reform developments in other Autonomous Governments to be considered if not copied. There was no formalised approach to sharing best practice (author's interview with Director of Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015). Interviewees consulted in this research, including academic experts in political science, confirmed the limited benchmarking available and the difficulties in obtaining comparative information. The limited nature of a Spain-wide bank of comparative information can also be seen as a consequence of the extensive decentralisation of competencies and resources: 'National systems have lost their capacity to offer comparative information on indicators or outputs' (author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).

This substantiates the absence of a culture of collaboration or even helpful competition for the practitioners in public administration. It also suggests a lack of evidence to enable citizens to make comparative judgements on their local public services and hold them to account. The approach contrasts with the UK practice, for example in local government, now no longer adopted, whereby the national Audit Commission, until it was abolished in 2014, was the source of extensive comparative management information and best practice advice. It organised peer reviews of local services and corporate management arrangements carried out by officers and politicians of similar councils, the results of which were made public.¹⁶⁷

6.5.2 SHARED LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The decentralised State of the Autonomies is based on a shared legal framework, which contributes to uniformity in the Autonomous Governments. Many functions are shared between Central Government and the Autonomous Governments (including health and education) and so the discretion of Autonomous Governments in running these services is circumscribed (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 163). This restriction was confirmed in the field work:

We do not enjoy a high level of autonomy. In the case of health, education and social services, the set of services are laid down by Central Government and decisions such as which medicines to prescribe or the salaries of hospital staff, are made by the State, not by the Catalan Government. (Author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015)

Recent research on the development of the welfare state in Spain found 'a remarkable shared corpus of main values, benefits and service', and any divergence in public or private sector provision (for example, health services) categorised as a 'consequence of path dependence' (Gallego and Subirats 2012: 286). The extent of Central

¹⁶⁷ <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150421134146/http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/>. Accessed 29.05.16.

Government intervention in the running of these services has however been the source of repeated dispute between the two levels of government. An example would be the dispute over the structural changes to the health service introduced by decree by Central Government in 2012 as part of its budget cuts. The proposed changes, to exclude undocumented migrants for all but basic emergency care, prenatal care and paediatric care as well as extending co-payment were denounced by some Autonomous Governments, including those of Andalusia and Catalonia, to be unconstitutional (Legido-Quigley et al 2013: 18). However, Central Government has the framework legislative powers and sets minimum standards, thereby limiting Autonomous Governments' discretion. The balance of power in favour of Central Government in relation to the Autonomous Governments prior to the 2008 crisis can explain why the economic crisis did not fundamentally alter the system of political decentralisation in Spain. The system of distributing competencies is strongly 'deconstitutionalised', meaning they are largely at the discretion of the state (Viver Pi-Sunyer 2010: 88-9). This unequal relationship was recognised in the fieldwork:

The transfers of competencies are not protected by the Constitution. The State can take them back whenever they want. (Author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya 2015)

The current secession debate in Catalonia, however, is a very direct challenge to the territorial distribution of power.

6.5.3 THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK

The national financial framework has reinforced homogeneity for those Autonomous Governments under the common regime. The reliance on Central Government for a significant proportion of revenue and the reticence of Autonomous Governments to introduce local taxes (as discussed at Chapter Four, Section 4.4) has not engendered

variation. Post 2008, the financial dependency of the Autonomous Governments on Central Government has increased, as a result of the fiscal policy adopted nationally, and there has been evidence of recentralising tendencies in the Rajoy Government going beyond fiscal management (see Chapter Four, Section 4.4).

Conflict situations impose 'high functioning costs' on organisations (Bel 2015: 50). In the context of heightened inter-governmental tensions, this research revealed a perception that the politicians of the Autonomous Governments are indeed being challenged to manage the financial constraints as well as maintain a focus on service improvement or reform.

In Catalonia, the Generalitat is also preoccupied with the secession question. Statements by civil servants and politicians obtained in this research attest how it is overriding other necessary changes:

The economic crisis and political crisis has slowed down reform. (Author's interview with Assistant Director General of Inspection of Personnel Service, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015)

The debate about secession has overtaken all other interests. (Author's interview with Member of Catalan Parliament and Assistant Spokesperson, Socialist Group, 2015)

The Plan of Reform is not being implemented. It has our support but nothing is happening. Everything is being overwhelmed by the nationalist debate. (Author's interview with Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015)

The financial constraints have not resulted in a fundamental reappraisal of the way in which the corporate and political management arrangements of the Junta and the Generalitat are organised. The economic crisis has not brought about a significant movement away from the inherited public administrative paradigm, although principles of modernisation are espoused in both, and in the case of the Generalitat, have been incorporated into an ambitious set of plans for future reform.

It is possible to interpret this lack of divergence from a path dependency perspective. In most instances governments do what they have always done. More particularly, the way in which governments operate is heavily influenced by the past because 'governance patterns are supported not only by ideas but also institutions that reinforce the status quo and have employees and clients' (Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv 2011: 16). It can be argued that crises offer opportunities to make change, to consider options which may not otherwise be palatable to the institution or the wider public. However, the evidence of this research suggests that the Junta and Generalitat have taken the view that the economic crisis may not be the best time to reorganise to create new structures, procedures, and processes.

6.6 FACTORS EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES

6.6.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE JUNTA AND THE GENERALITAT

The previous chapters identified a number of differences between the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia which included different budget priorities, per capita spend levels, models of service delivery, policies towards Europe and, modernisation and inter-governmental strategies. Explanations for these variations are now considered.

6.6.2 THE INFLUENCE OF TERRITORIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Economic Differences

This case study has demonstrated that the differences in the way in which the Junta and the Generalitat have established themselves and how they operate are reflective of the different characteristics of the territories of Andalusia and Catalonia. It is, for example, the nature of the respective economies that has led to the greater emphasis on

agriculture and tourism in the Junta's budget.¹⁶⁸ The importance of the public sector in Andalusia, both as a key employer and, as described by one senior civil servant in the Junta, as 'a motor of the Andalusian economy', is not mirrored in Catalonia where the private sector is more developed (author's interview with the Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015). In Andalusia, in re-establishing the extra payment for public employees, the Minister for Finance recognised this measure not only in terms of workers' rights, but also in terms of the contribution of public sector wages to the local economy (Lucio 2014).

The relative wealth of Catalonia, previously referenced, can be seen in the ability (and wish) of many Catalans to make financial contributions towards their own medical and educational services, via health insurance premiums or school fees. This is less evident in Andalusia, where the Junta budget includes provision for community-support activities, such as tackling social exclusion and promoting participation (see Chapter Five Section 5.4). The relative wealth of the Catalan economy is also seen in the apparent citizen acceptability of a higher level of Autonomous Government spending per capita than in Andalusia (author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge and Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).

Civic Tradition

The greater importance to the Generalitat of the private and third sectors has been evidenced in this research. The third sector, in particular, has been described as what makes public services in Catalonia different:

¹⁶⁸ A 2012 report on the Andalusian economy confirmed that activity in services, construction and primary sectors was higher as a proportion of the economy in Andalusia than in Spain overall and that the industrial sector counted for a lower proportion (Junta de Andalucía 2012).

A further differentiating factor, in the case of Catalonia, is the pre-existence of models of service delivery. In our case, the high level of involvement of civil society in public services has influenced our form of government. Our system is 'singular'. (Author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015)

At the time of the Transition, all governments relied on the existing non-public sector networks to continue these services (Del Pino 2015: 25). In Catalonia, however, a further dimension can be added: it has been an important feature 'where the state has for decades been either absent or hostile' (Roca 2000: 89). In a similar vein, the traditional importance of the organisations of civil society to the Catalan identity and to Catalonia as a stateless nation can be seen in the following statement:

The people of such small advanced stateless nations [as Catalonia] must find their collective identity by falling back on the institutions of their civil societies, as public and state institutions are alien and often hostile to them. (Giner 1980: 12)

Whilst this quotation is relatively historic, the case study has revealed that the centrality of civil society to the Catalan culture is still valid. It can be seen in claims that Catalonia's rich network of private institutions and a strong tradition of citizen participation enabled it to persist as a nation without a state, especially during the Franco period (McRoberts 2001: 117).¹⁶⁹ It is indicative of the importance of this sector to note that some Catalan Foundations, created at the beginning of the twentieth century, continued their activities in exile after 1939 (Roca 2000: 98). This continued activity would have been seen by some as part of the opposition to the Franco regime, helping to explain their continued popularity.

The role of the non-public sector in the delivery of 'public' services such as health and education is a key element of the Generalitat's view of Catalonia as special and different. The current scale of the

¹⁶⁹ There is a rich bibliography, largely in Catalan, on the history of associations and voluntary sector bodies in Catalonia, see for example Risques, Duarte, de Riquer and Roig Rosich (1997: 416-7) on associations' response to cultural repression under Franco.

not-for-profit sector in Catalonia is beyond the scope of this research, although there is some evidence that the private sector is overtaking the third sector in the provision of public services, especially regarding care for the elderly (Del Pino 2015: 26). In terms of variation between the two Autonomous Governments, the third sector is not a feature which figured significantly in the Andalusian profile of provision of public services. A contributory factor in a perceived weaker social fabric in Andalusia could be the negative impact of mass migration out of Andalusia from the 1970s (Porrás Nadales 2005: 468). The development of philanthropy in Spain and in particular in Catalonia is likely to have been influenced by the early industrialisation and associated development of the entrepreneurial class in Catalonia which did not happen to the same degree in Andalusia (González de Molina and Sevilla Guzmán 1987: 91-3).¹⁷⁰

Party Politics

Territorial party politics has also influenced the development of the two organs of sub-state government. PSOE policies prioritise the delivery of public services by publicly employed workers. The preference for public SPVs in Andalusia is not replicated in Catalonia where the dominance of the Generalitat by right-leaning coalitions (CiU) has favoured private and third sector delivery mechanisms. Fieldwork also revealed a more explicit focus on women's issues in the PSOE-led Junta, where gender impact assessments are carried out, for example, as well as public health funding for sex-change operations (author's interview with Coordinator, Department of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Junta de Andalucía 2015). The turbulence in the political system of 2015/2016 resulting in the PSOE gaining fewer votes than the PP in Andalusia for the first time and the ECP winning more seats than the ERC-CATSI election coalition in Catalonia may

¹⁷⁰ The differential industrialisation of parts of Spain is noted in Chapter One, Section 3.0, but a discussion of the development of philanthropy is beyond the scope of this research.

change this pattern in the future.¹⁷¹ However, these patterns have been well established and were clearly recognisable during the case study research.

Geography

The geographical landscape can influence the character of an area such as Andalusia and Catalonia and their respective identities. For example, the physical geography of Andalusia clearly influenced the pattern of agricultural organisation of the latifundios with its social-economic reverberations to the present day. The physical location of Catalonia on the Mediterranean with its proximity to the rest of Europe has influenced the way in which Catalonia developed as a sea-faring community, not only in terms of its trading relations, but also the Catalan culture (Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer 2003: 43).

Equally, cultural geographers, with their concern with human/environmental relationships, point to the impact of people on landscape as the shaping of the earth over time. In this way, landscapes reflect the combined impact of a society's beliefs, practices and technologies (Crang 1998: 15). Space is understood to play an active role in the constitution and reproduction of social identities (Valentine 2001: 7). Humans seek to 'endow landscape, space and place with specific meaning, including that of national or regional specificity' (Davies 2012: 2).

However, there are dangers in adopting such an approach when considering such large and diverse areas such as Andalusia and Catalonia. Its analytical potential can be lost in over-generalisations and gross stereotypes. Local identity can often be lost or ignored. Landscape influences over identity may also have been overshadowed by political and social-economic factors such as industrialisation, democratisation, globalization and the movement of

¹⁷¹ 2016 General elections results in Andalusia and Catalonia
<http://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2016/generales/congreso/01/>. Accessed 17.07.16.

people. Even the physical, geographical borders are not fixed. In the case of Catalonia there are different views of the extent of Catalonia, beyond the constitutional boundaries of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia and into neighbouring regions and across national borders into France.

The Catalan First Minister's announcement (in March 2016) of the need to put pressure on the Spanish Government to complete necessary infrastructure works to the Mediterranean corridor is a useful illustration of the geographical closeness of Catalonia to the rest of Europe and the related infrastructure issues (Gilbert 2016). The same announcement also confirms points made earlier in the discourse analysis of this thesis about the Generalitat's relationship with Spain as it includes references to the failures of the Spanish Government, uses the term 'Spanish State', not 'Spain' and describes Catalonia as a 'country'.

6.6.3 THE INFLUENCE OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION

Both Andalusia and Catalonia have been shown in this research to possess strong identities. This section reflects principally on how that identification has influenced the Junta and Generalitat. It is also true that the activities of the Junta and Generalitat have had an impact on identity, not only in terms of 'external' policy, how they project their territory and community, but also in terms of specific policies such as education.¹⁷²

Both Andalusian and Catalan identities are strong, but the drivers behind those identities are distinct and thus the impact of this factor was shown to be differential. In the Junta the principal driver is one about community well-being. The priority is for Andalusia not to be left behind, or seen as second class. It is about addressing centuries of under-development and economic disadvantage. The Junta's focus is on 'doing' and not just 'being'. Service delivery is important for the

¹⁷² See for example the 2005 study of Losada and Máiz of the impact of Autonomous Governments' education policies on collective identity.

Junta as well as being the representational organ of government for the Andalusian community. This is evidenced in the Statute's content and preamble, in the configuration of the ministries and in the Junta's policy towards the European Union. In terms of Andalusia's relationship with the rest of Spain, it sees itself as part of Spain, finding little contradiction between being Andalusian and Spanish (Echavarren Fernández 2014: 29). In Catalonia the picture is different.

The view of the Generalitat is of Catalonia as a country and as a nation. (A clear distinction is being made here is that it is the stated position of the Generalitat. The position of the people of Catalonia is less clear and continues to fluctuate.) The Generalitat's view is demonstrated in the analysis of the Catalan Statute's content and preamble, in the prominence given to 'external affairs' in the ministerial structure, (Madrid being seen as 'external' alongside New York or Brussels for example), and the positioning of the Generalitat's international work and its activities in the EU. Catalonia's status as a nation is underpinned by the Generalitat's financial support of the Catalan language and promotion of Catalan cultural activities. The cultural policy's primary function has been described as a 'nation-building tool' (Crameri 2008: 42).

Catalans see themselves as different, and want to be recognised as different. Higher per capita spend by the Generalitat is justified by the desire for Catalans for not only more, but for better public services. This driver can be detected in the aspirations for its public administrative modernisation policies ('we looked for a model different from that of the Spanish state' – author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, and Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). 'Being' and not just 'doing' is important to the Generalitat. Being recognised as the Government of Catalonia is pivotal to the Generalitat, as well as ensuring the delivery of services.

This sense of identification has influenced the way the Generalitat operates, and even if secession had not come to dominate current debate would continue to be influential.

It is in the Central Government-Autonomous Government relationship that the greatest differentiation can be seen. As previously indicated, both the Junta and the Generalitat voiced their complaints about the unfairness of the financing system and the impact of Central Government macro-economic decisions on their respective territories. The failure, as perceived by the two Autonomous Governments, of vocal protest to bring about an improvement in the financial settlement, has been followed by a divergence in response by the Junta and the Generalitat. Albert O. Hirschman's model (1970) helps illustrate this divergence and provides a framework for explaining the different strategic approaches.

This classic work of economics, which is based on a choice dichotomy of exit or voice, has been applied to a wide range of subject areas, from employees' decisions to leave an employer, to the re-location of football fans, to investment decisions and nuclear responses to Fukushima.¹⁷³ Although published almost fifty years ago, its prolonged relevance is evidenced by its continued use in these many areas of research including, and of particular relevance to this thesis, its application to public choice in relation to government institutions.¹⁷⁴ The Hirschman model is based on the dichotomy that a dissatisfied customer can either articulate their dissatisfaction (so as to achieve change or reform) or withdraw their patronage (Hirschman 1970: 4). This choice of 'voice' over 'exit' is related to the availability of alternative suppliers, the ease of switching suppliers, and the certainty or otherwise of success of the 'voice' option in securing reform. The


¹⁷³ Whitford and Lee (2015); Kiernan (2015); Katselas (2014); and Ramana (2013).

¹⁷⁴ See Hirschman's own application to the case of East Germany leaving the Soviet bloc (1995), and also as deployed by others to this case such as Brubaker (1990).

customer's choice of response is influenced by 'loyalty', with the propensity to 'exit' reduced as loyalty increases (Hirschman 1970: 77).

In applying this model to this case study, it is argued that the key determinant of the choice of strategic positioning by the Autonomous Governments in relation to Central Government is that of self-identification. Bel applied Hirschman's model to Catalonia, arguing that for many Catalans the voice option was deemed ineffective and alternatives were reduced to either assimilation within Spain or secession (Bel 2015: 67). The application of the model in this research extends its use in a comparative framework of the Autonomous Governments of Catalonia and Andalusia. In this context, the Generalitat is choosing exit because it sees itself not only representing a nation but also a state. The Junta chooses voice as it **does** see itself as part of Spain. This argument is summarised in the figure below.

Figure 24: Application of Hirschman's Exit and Voice Dichotomy to Choices of the Junta de Andalucía and Generalitat de Catalunya



Source: Author's elaboration, using Hirschman (1970).

Whilst there are limitations to this model, its use does highlight the impact of self-identification on the relationship between Central Government and the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia. The strategic responses of the Junta and the Generalitat reflect the influence of a range of factors, not only self-identification but also allegiances to political parties, locally and nationally. The PSOE, as the dominant force in politics in Andalusia for example is clearly a national political party, with interests across the whole of Spain, not just in Andalusia. It is unsurprising therefore that they are not advocating secession from the rest of Spain (despite the weak position that an isolated PSOE-controlled Autonomous Government has in relation to a PP Central Government). The economic position of Andalusia, as previously discussed, is the background from which the Junta has always argued for 'solidarity' across Spain. The Junta seeks recognition of the need for support from the rest of Spain to address their historically underdeveloped economy.

The opposite is the case for Catalonia, both in terms of the economy and the dominant political party. In contrast with the dominance of the PSOE in the Junta, the Generalitat has been dominated by Catalonia-only parties and party coalitions. The CiU entered into numerous pacts with successive national governments of all political ideologies, including support for the PSOE Governments between 1993 and 1996 and the PP Governments of 1996-2000 (Llamazares and Marks 2006: 250). This focus on Catalonia has continued after the dissolution of the coalition in 2015 (when one of the partners, *Unió*, lost all 13 of its seats in Catalan regional elections in 2015 following its split from CDC) with the creation of a new pro-secession electoral coalition of ERC-CATSI.¹⁷⁵ The size and relative wealth of the Catalan economy is such that secessionists have made the argument that Catalonia would be financially advantaged as a separate state. In particular, dissatisfaction in Catalonia with the Madrid Government has been

¹⁷⁵ http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/06/18/catalunya/1434618723_909552.html. Accessed 13.07.16.

intensified by controversy over the fiscal imbalance between tax revenues transferred out of Catalonia to Madrid and the resources transferred back to Catalonia from Madrid (Burg 2015: 293).

In the use of Hirschman's model in this way, consideration also needs to be given to changes over time. In the period before the 2016 General Elections the economy of Spain continued to be weak, having failed again to meet the 2015 budget deficit target agreed with the European Commission.¹⁷⁶ The outcome of the 2016 general elections and its impact, particularly in relation to Catalonia, is unclear. 'The Catalan question' has been a key negotiating – and sticking – point in agreeing any coalition government.¹⁷⁷ Moreover the level of public support for secession may fall or rise in the future. The dichotomies of such models also ignore 'mid-way' points. The voice option is still being used by groups in Catalonia, making calls for a better deal for Catalonia within Spain: 'We want to renegotiate the financial settlement with Central Government, but within the Spanish state framework. We want to continue to be Spaniards' (author's interview with Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015).

The question within the context of this research is what impact does this strategic positioning have on the management of public services of the Junta and the Generalitat? This case study, and specifically the statements of individuals involved in both Autonomous Governments, provide evidence that the strategic positions taken by the leaders have had limited impact on the way services are currently run. The exception to this evaluation is the stated uncertainty felt by employees for their futures, for their pensions for example (author's interview with Assistant Director General of Inspection of Personnel Service,

¹⁷⁶ <http://www.blog.riecano.org/en/spains-failure-yet-again-to-meet-budget-deficit-target-strains-relations-with-brussels/>. Accessed 25.04.16.

¹⁷⁷ A commitment not to hold a referendum on independence for Catalonia was one of the points of a possible agreement between PSOE and Cs during the negotiation period following the December 2015 elections and the calling of further national elections in June 2016. www.ciudadanos-cs.org/var/public/sections/page-home/acuerdo-gobierno-reformista-y-de-progreso-2016.pdf?v=204_0. Accessed 22.05.16.

Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).

6.7 LIMITED DEGREE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFERENTIATION

6.7.1 CHALLENGING AND RE-EVALUATING THE INITIAL HYPOTHESIS

The initial hypothesis for this research was that Spain's contemporary decentralisation would result in public administrative differentiation. The study has argued that differences do exist between the two sub-state Governments of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya. Divergence in relation to some spending priorities and service delivery models have been shown to exist, influenced by a range of factors, particularly territory, relative wealth, culture and self-identification. However, this research demonstrates that there is limited variation between the Junta and the Generalitat in terms of their organisational structures, the roles of politicians, public employment patterns, tactical responses to the economic crisis, respective policy priorities, and overall budget profiles.

This is an initially surprising finding for three reasons. Firstly, the territories and identities of Andalusia and Catalonia exhibit their own distinctive characteristics as outlined earlier in this thesis. Secondly, it is anticipated that the decentralisation of public services is an enabler of adaptation to local needs (see Chapter Three, Section 3.3.3). Furthermore, the nature of the services for which Autonomous Governments are responsible, including health, social services and education, are highly 'person-centred' services, and so could be expected to be tailored to local need. Thirdly, the degree of decentralisation to the State of the Autonomies is widely recognised as extensive, Spain being described as 'one of the most decentralised [countries] in Europe' (Colomer 1998: 40). In theory, decentralising public services would have allowed for significant scope for variation, if so desired.

6.7.2 FACTORS FOR HOMOGENEITY

The lack of variation has been attributed in this research to the homogenising effect of a range of factors. Those factors include the national constitutional and institutional framework, the financing regime and the Spanish political culture. The dominant factor was found to be the Napoleonic tradition. This administrative tradition pertained at the time of the creation of the State of the Autonomies and has continued to be the underlying paradigm in Spain's public administration to the current day, despite stated aspiration by the Autonomous Governments for reform.

The response of both Autonomous Governments to the early stages of the economic crisis post-2008 has been shown to have been influenced by these homogenising factors, revealed in the implementation of a similar range of economic stimulus measures, followed by a series of incremental budget reductions, rather than a fundamental review of priorities and working practices. Indeed, it has been argued that there has been a re-centralisation following the post-2008 crisis (Colino, Molina and Hombrado 2014; Muro 2015), suggesting even greater homogeneity. In the case of the Generalitat, its identification of Catalonia as a nation without a state has been fundamental to a subsequent divergence of the Generalitat from other Autonomous Governments in its response to the economic crisis. Its self-identity has been instrumental (although not the only factor) in transforming a general opposition to Central Government macro-economic policies, an opposition it shared with other Autonomous Governments including the Junta, into a rejection of the territorial distribution of power in Spain and a determination for secession.

This case study also examined the approach to and progress with public administration reform within the Junta and Generalitat to assist the analysis of the differences and similarities between the two Autonomous Governments. Specifically it examined the prospects for adaptation to local needs and variations from the public administrative

pattern shared with other Autonomous Governments. The case study found progress on reform to be limited in terms of corporate and political management. In the case of a corporate and strategic reform plan for the Junta, its publication was deferred three times during the course of this research. The Generalitat's Reform Plan is published and elements are being implemented. However, with limited dedicated resources and the current uncertainty about the future constitutional status of Catalonia, it is difficult to envisage rapid progress being made. Implementation of change, as demonstrated in this research, is constrained by a number of the features of the Napoleonic Administrative tradition as applied in the Junta and Generalitat,

In conclusion therefore, whilst differences do exist in terms of some spending priorities, per capita spending levels, preferred service delivery models and modernisation strategies, the hypothesis that Spain's contemporary decentralisation would result in public administrative differentiation in the corporate and political management arrangements has been not been proved. In the words of a leading opposition politician in Andalusia:

Each territory may have its own culture, its own history but this does not mean that there should be differences in our public services. (Author's interview with First Minister of Ciudadanos Group, Parliament of Andalusia, 2015)

The most significant factors influencing the lack of variation evidenced have been the continued effect of the inherited administrative tradition, operating within the Spain-wide constitutional, financial and institutional context. These factors also explain the initial (and in the case of the Junta, the continued) response of the two Autonomous Governments to the post-2008 economic crisis and Central Government's macro-economic policies. The influence of strong self-identity as a nation can be seen in the subsequent, and divergent, development of the Generalitat's response as the financial dispute contributed to the growth of the secession movement. This research

provides explanations for the unexpectedly high degree of homogeneity in the corporate political and management arrangements across two Autonomous Governments, despite the fact that they each serve a very different community.

7.1 INTRODUCTION

7.1.1 THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENTS RE-EVALUATED


This research brings an original focus on the corporate and political management arrangements of the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia, re-evaluating the impact of decentralisation. Through means of a comparative framework, it highlights the differences and similarities between the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya, and analyses the factors which have influenced the structures, policies, procedures, overall budget profiles, and priorities which make up the strategic architecture of these sub-state governments. It interprets the public administrative features of these two territories, placing this interpretation in an historical context and within the academic study of public administration. The research examines to what extent the post-Franco decentralisation of decision-making powers has resulted in different approaches and configurations of sub-state government. It tests the initial hypothesis that Spain's contemporary decentralisation would result at sub-state level in public administrative differentiation, as defined in the introduction, 'the degree of variation between the institutional arrangements, in this case, of the Junta and the Generalitat, in terms of their internal, organisational structures, policies, practices and processes'.

7.1.2 MULTIPLE GROUNDS FOR ACADEMIC INTEREST

The focus of the research is justified on a number of grounds. First of all, it is an under-researched area, as set out in the introduction to this thesis. Studies have already been carried out of the overall system of decentralised government in Spain, as well as of individual Autonomous Governments or specific services, but a comparison of

the core corporate functions (the ‘corporate and political management arrangements’ as defined in the introduction) of two similar Autonomous Governments has not previously been undertaken. Secondly, the Autonomous Governments of Spain constitute an important new tier of the country’s public administration. They possess substantial powers and resources, are responsible for a significant proportion of public expenditure and for the delivery of key public services including health, education and social services, and are major employers. Thirdly, Spain is currently in a time of political and administrative turbulence, following the post-2008 economic crisis which has brought new challenges to the politicians and civil servants who run the Autonomous Governments and the inconclusive general elections of 2015 and 2016. As can be seen from the figure below, the two-party dominance of the political system has been broken, the PP and PSOE winning just 222 out of 350 seats, by the emergence of the new parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos (Rodon and Hierro 2016). By way of contrast, back in 1982, the two leading parties won 309 out of the 350 seats.

Figure 25: Spanish General Elections Results (2015 and 2016)



Source: *El País* (02.07.16).

The ‘Catalan question’, regarding the future governance of a Catalonia in or out of Spain, is a dominant theme of public debate and

the economic outlook continues to be challenging (González 2016). All of these factors suggest that it is now timely to reflect on the operation of the Autonomous Governments after a period of almost forty years' existence.

The examination of public management at sub-state level also provided an opportunity to utilise the researcher's personal experience of senior, strategic management in the UK public sector, enabling an 'insider' expertise, albeit from an Anglo-Saxon administrative perspective, to be exploited in the investigation of policy and practice in a Southern European state.

7.1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS

A review of existing literature on the development of Spain as a nation and a state, and on public administrative studies, provided an historical and theoretical context to the case study of the Junta and the Generalitat (Chapters One and Two). An initial investigation of existing literature about these two Governments suggested that the original thesis was in need of reshaping, enabling its development into the following research questions to be tested through field work over two years in Andalusia and Catalonia:

To what extent have historical, social, economic and political factors influenced the differential development of the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia?

How do these factors help explain the response of these two Autonomous Governments to the austerity regime following the 2008 economic crisis?

Which factors are the most influential in understanding the contemporary corporate and political management arrangements of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya?

The information derived from the fieldwork has been analysed and interpreted (Chapters Three and Four), the research questions discussed and conclusions drawn (Chapter Six) and the key findings are summarised below.

7.2 KEY FINDINGS

7.2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CASE STUDY SOURCED FINDINGS

The findings of this research are derived firstly from the review of existing literature, which provided the basis for further, and more specific, exploration through the case study and secondly from the case study itself. In summary, the investigation of existing literature undertaken from the perspective of public administration in today's decentralised Spain demonstrated a history of multiple nationalisms but a dominant paradigm of centralism, making the decision as part of the post-Franco Transition to decentralise government functions a break with the past. The Spanish model is a union-state rather than a federal one, albeit with a high level of decentralisation to the sub-state level. Whilst the current State of the Autonomies is now well established, the ambiguity of the 'end state' has undoubtedly been the source of conflict. Existing literature revealed strong evidence of Spain's location within the Napoleonic public administrative tradition, but a lack of focus on sub-state level government. It also revealed stated aspirations on the part of Central Government to bring about administrative reform, but variable success in its implementation.

The case study provided evidence of the influence of the Napoleonic administrative tradition at sub-state level, finding it to be the dominant factor in the limited degree of variation between the two Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia. Using a combination of some quantitative, but predominantly qualitative methods, the research has identified some divergence in the corporate and political management arrangements, due to the different characteristics of

these two areas, but the striking finding is the degree of similarity. The case study has provided evidence of limited trajectories of reform, despite stated aspirations for change, in both the Junta and the Generalitat. It has isolated strong self-identity as a major influence, resulting in distinctive emphases in the way in which the two sub-state organs of government operate and present themselves.

7.2.2 THE EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE NATIONALISMS BUT THE HISTORIC DOMINANCE OF CENTRALISM

While there are different perspectives on the origins of nations (predominantly between primordialist and modernist explanations as expounded by Smith 1999 and Gellner 2006), Spain has been a component part of a Western European political landscape dominated by nation-states from the nineteenth century (Loughlin 2011: 46). The concept of plurinationalism is relevant to Spain as it seeks to capture the existence of different national societies within a nation-state and is recognised in the 1978 Constitution (Requejo and Caminal 2011: 9). This concept does not fully reflect the Spanish paradigm, which is made up of regions as well as nations – large parts of Spain, such as Extremadura or La Rioja, have no aspirations to nationhood. Spanish history has been characterised by a series of divisions, including monarchism versus republicanism and liberalism versus conservatism, as well as territorial cleavages.

Despite the recent reduced dominance of the two main political parties, the well-established view of the “Two Spains” continues to resonate. Spanish dogmatism has been described as a factor in the 2016 elections, turning issues into black and white, encouraging a culture of confrontation and tension rather than dialogue (Amón 2016). Territorial cleavage has been a particular aspect of Spanish history in relation to the Basque Country and Catalonia and these parts of Spain have enjoyed periods of autonomy in the past. In the case of Catalonia, the *fueros* or local laws from medieval times, were not abolished until 1714 when self-government ended (McRoberts 2001:

15). For other territories such as Andalusia, historically there was little autonomy (except as a kingdom in the fifteenth century). Rather, in the case of Andalusia, the relationship between centre and periphery has been described in terms of colonisation (Machado Santiago and Kurs 2000: 172). Although strong sub-state identities have existed in some parts of Spain, as demonstrated in the case study, centralism has been the dominant paradigm in terms of the territorial pattern of government, up to and including the Franco period.

7.2.3 UNRESOLVED END MODEL FOR THE STATE OF SPAIN RESULTING IN CONTINUED TENSION

The decentralisation of political decision-making, of resources and competencies, commencing in the late 1970s, is therefore a relatively recent phenomenon for Spain. Devolution is not unique to Spain: the number of countries transferring authority and resources to sub-state government has multiplied in recent decades (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008: 34; Ahmad and Brosio 2009: 1). However, decentralisation was controversial during the Transition, and the creation of the State of the Autonomies was the result of compromise, a reflection of the widespread desire to reach political agreement (Moreno 2001: 60).

The ambiguity deployed in the Constitution to allow co-existence of views about nations and identity (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 46) left the final model of the state undefined and so open to debate, challenge and conflict. During the course of this research, these tensions have been shown to continue, particularly in the case of the Generalitat, as covered in earlier chapters on the controversy surrounding the Constitutional Court's 2010 ruling on the revised Catalan Statute. Most recently, the negotiations following the inconclusive general elections of December 2015 and June 2016 exposed the divisive nature of the 'Catalan question'. The case study interviews revealed strong emotions on both side of the debate in both

Andalusia and Catalonia, demonstrating that the territorial distribution of power in Spain is still unfinished business.

7.2.4 SPANISH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS AN EXEMPLAR OF THE NAPOLEONIC ADMINISTRATION TRADITION

The study of comparative public administration provides a number of typologies, including a typology of administrative traditions. Spain is firmly located within the Napoleonic Tradition, 'the closest copy of the original model' (Alba and Navarro 2011: 783), due to its characteristics of centralism, uniformity and a legal formality. A newly decentralised Spanish state, reflecting a desire to accommodate the strongly articulated aspirations of some territories for autonomy and the desire to reverse the centralism of the Franco to deliver democracy (Colino 2008: 578), could be expected to result in distinctive configurations in each Autonomous Government. The case study does not support this hypothesis. When key features of the institutions of the Junta and Generalitat, both structural and cultural, are examined, they demonstrate the continuation of key elements of the Napoleonic tradition including its emphasis on administrative law and formalism, the blurring of the distinction between the roles of politicians and civil servants, its recruitment and employment practices and the inheritance of political clientelism.

Mimetism, the mimicking or copying of the Central Government structures and administrative culture existing at the time of their creation, was found to be an appropriate description of the approach adopted by the Autonomous Governments. The research confirms the overriding and continued influence of the inherited administrative tradition on these two Autonomous Governments, placing them squarely, alongside Central Government, in both the Napoleonic administrative tradition, characterised by formalism and the politicisation of bureaucracy, and, to a lesser degree, in the Southern European 'sub-set', particularly in relation to clientelism.

7.2.5 ASPECTS OF DIFFERENTIATION AT SUB-STATE LEVEL

The research revealed points of divergence between the corporate and political management arrangements of the Junta and the Generalitat. In particular, it highlighted a difference in the preferred model of service delivery, with a greater reliance on the private and third sector for the delivery of public services in Catalonia. In Andalusia the public sector is seen as the motor of the economy, underpinned by a PSOE-led Junta commitment to the public provision of public services by (predominantly) public employees. Other differences include specific spending priorities, per capita spending levels and relations with European institutions. Many of these variations are explained by distinctive cultural and historical influences, including different political allegiances (as seen in the private/public sector debate for example) or dedicated spending on the Catalan language. Differential geographical and economic characteristics of Andalusia and Catalonia can explain a greater focus in the Junta's budget on supporting agriculture and tourism or the Generalitat's cross-boundary work with neighbouring France. The greater prosperity of Catalonia is an explanation offered in the case study research of the willingness to fund higher per capita spend by the Generalitat.

Despite these divergences, greater homogeneity than heterogeneity is found in terms of structure, policies, budgets and employment practices. The case study uncovered similarities in terms of democratic institutions, statute content, ministerial hierarchies, executive roles of politicians, definition of departments, civil service functions and practices, ministerial-senior civil servant relations, and the use of political appointments and arms-length Special Purpose Vehicles. Budget totals and profiles are similar in key aspects (priority being given to health, education and social services). Thus it can be stated that corporate and political management arrangements do not diverge significantly between the Junta and the Generalitat.

This research attributes these continuities to three main groups of factors. Firstly, the Spain-wide institutional and constitutional framework within which Autonomous Governments operate were found to reduce the scope for variation. This has been a framework for competitive relations between Autonomous Governments, as well as between Central and Autonomous Governments, reflected in the race for competencies and the limited culture of benchmarking and sharing of best practice. It is also a context of shared competencies between Central Government and Autonomous Government, in which Central Government has the framework legislative powers and sets minimum standards, thereby limiting Autonomous Governments' discretion. The financial regime is a further factor in favour of homogeneity and has been the source of much intergovernmental conflict. Claims have been made, and are reflected in the case study, that the control of finances and the macro-economic policies of the Rajoy Government in the wake of 2008 has led to a re-centralisation of power, and thereby an enforced greater uniformity.

Secondly, the political culture in Spain fails to challenge the status quo and reduces the influence of individual citizens in relation to public administrations. Factors contributing to this culture include the historic dominance of a single political party or coalition (PSOE in the case of the Junta and CiU/Catalan coalitions supporting greater autonomy in the case of the Generalitat), party cartelisation, corruption, a lack of transparency, and the relatively weak customer orientation.

Thirdly, the case study revealed the public administrative culture to be the most powerful force for continuity. Decentralisation may have been a departure from the administrative tradition for Central Government, but the devolution of competencies has been shown not to have led to significant differentiation to reflect local need and aspirations at the sub-state level.

7.2.6 LIMITED MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE INHERITED MODEL

Not only has it been demonstrated that the Autonomous Governments copied the Spanish State's administrative model at the outset, this study also proves the absence of subsequent significant movement away from those inherited, pre-decentralisation, patterns of public administration, even when aspirations for change are voiced. Globalisation and europeanisation have influenced the operation of public administrations in Spain, but have not altered core characteristics. Reform initiatives have been made by successive Central Governments to change or modernise Spanish public administration. While it is clearly possible that slow-moving processes of reform may be cumulative and therefore be less obvious (Pierson 2004: 61), it is widely acknowledged that success in implementation has been variable in Spain (Parrado Díez 1996; Ongaro 2009). The case study has provided evidence to extend this conclusion about Central Government to the sub-state level.

Although the Junta and Generalitat have both presented themselves as being at the forefront of modernisation, evidence of a fundamental reform being implemented has not been found. The Generalitat has stated its wish to move away from the model inherited from Spain and has developed a researched, comprehensive and ambitious Reform Plan to bring about fundamental change, explicitly stating its intention to distinguish itself from the rest of Spain ('we looked for a model different from that of the Spanish state', author's interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, and Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). In Andalusia, specific initiatives such as improvements to transparency have been introduced. A more wide-ranging and corporate reform plan has been under preparation for a number of years but is yet to be published. It is not known therefore what aspects will be covered, but the drive for fundamental reform in the Junta was not uncovered during the case

study. Even the extreme test of the post-2008 economic crisis does not appear to have brought about a challenge to the status quo in terms of the public administrative paradigm, confirming the validity of a historical institutionalist interpretation of the influence of the past over Spain today.

7.2.7 THE INFLUENCE OF SELF-IDENTITY ON STYLE AND VOICE

The interviews carried out for this research, and the thematic analysis of those interviews, in addition to an interrogation of the websites, provide evidence of how the Generalitat and the Junta demonstrate different styles and emphases. An obvious example is the preferred use of Catalan as the official language by the Generalitat, another is the distinct web domains (.es for the Junta, .cat for the Generalitat). The naming of government departments also reveals differences. For example, the counterpart of the Andalusian Government departments 'Presidency and Local Administration' and 'Finance and Public Administration' is not in Catalonia 'Administration' but 'Government and Institutional Relations', revealing the Generalitat's articulation as a body of government, alongside other governments. This research attributes the differences to the distinctive self-identity of each territory, with the Autonomous Governments giving voice to the distinctive Andalusian and Catalan communities.

Themes of community well-being, provision of services, and solidarity with the rest of Spain dominate the Junta discourses, reflecting the socio-economic history and political allegiances of Andalusia. In contrast, the Generalitat is directed by a view of Catalonia as a nation, where the imperative is to ensure that national status is recognised. This difference in approach has been encapsulated in this research as a focus on 'doing' and not just 'being' in the case of the Junta and 'being' and not just 'doing' in the case of the Generalitat. A driver for decentralisation policies is the recognition of communities with different linguistic and cultural traits (Guinjoan and Rodon 2014: 23). The Junta and the Generalitat have each been shown to play a

decisive role in relation to identity. They each provide a vehicle for that identity and new political arenas for debate. In particular, they have been instrumental in shaping a debate other than that provided by Central Government.

7.3 CONTRIBUTION TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE AND HISPANIC STUDIES

7.3.1 FOCUS ON CORPORATE AND POLITICAL MANAGEMENT AT SUB-STATE LEVEL

This research provides new analysis of the public administrative bodies of the sub-state governments of Andalusia and Catalonia in terms of their corporate and political management arrangements, creating a synthesis of features not previously collated, examining them in detail and testing them in a contemporary comparative Spanish framework. To the comparative literature on public management, it adds the consideration that whilst decentralisation may have reinforced and enhanced some distinctive identities between territories in Spain, it does not necessarily result in public administrative differentiation. Other factors, in particular a strong administrative tradition, have been shown to exert a powerful influence for continuity with the past resulting in greater homogeneity than could be expected in such territories so clearly differentiated by geography, culture, wealth and party political allegiance. The main analytical contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate how sub-state institutions in Spain take their place within the classification of the Napoleonic model alongside the widely recognised inclusion of Spanish Central Government.

7.3.2 PRACTITIONER INSIGHT

The methodology adopted of one-to-one, semi-structured interviews is not new. However, the exploitation of the researcher's executive management experience enabled an informed interviewer, with an

objective and independent, non-Spanish perspective, to not only gain access to high-ranking politicians and senior civil servants but also, with the ability to speak Spanish, to probe responses from a position of knowledge of real practice. This research therefore enriches previous academic public administrative studies with a new perspective, grounded in first-hand experience. This new empirical work into the detail of strategic operation, not previously undertaken, brings insights offered to both the academic world and, as credible commentary, to practitioners in Spain.

7.3.3 INVESTIGATION AT THE CONFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND CATALANIST UPTURN

The timing of the fieldwork, over two years, in the post-2008 economic crisis, as well as the escalated tensions in Catalonia, also enabled new, up-to-date insights into the impact on public administration of external factors in the former and political factors in the latter. This research found how existing tensions in inter-governmental relations were exacerbated in the context of the financial crisis, with the competitive nature of the State of the Autonomies and the Constitution's ambiguous territorial division of powers providing fertile ground for conflict. The strategy of vocal opposition and blame transference has continued in Andalusia. The First Minister of the Junta, in rejecting the Government's requirement to freeze spending in April 2016, accused the Finance Minister of having an 'attitude of intimidation' towards Andalusia.¹⁷⁸

In Catalonia, the dispute over finances has contributed to the rise in support for the Catalan independence movement, tapping into a sentiment held by many Catalans that Spain does not respect Catalonia for its difference and that separation would be financially advantageous. The bringing of criminal charges against the former

¹⁷⁸ http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2016/04/07/actualidad/1460046427_984705.html. Accessed 30.04.16.

Catalan First Minister, Artur Mas, for the Catalan independence referendum can only have exacerbated those sentiments. Deputy First Minister Ortega described the action as 'a big mistake. They are pushing us further and further away from Spain' (Burgen 2014).

7.3.4 TESTING MODELS FROM MULTIPLE DISCIPLINES

This research tested the Napoleonic administrative model, taken from the discipline of Public Administration, in an original way, comparing in detail two sub-state Governments in Spain, focusing on corporate arrangements, and providing evidence of the model's continued dominance. It also tested the specific aspect of public administrative reform at a sub-state level, identifying how key characteristics of that tradition make the current arrangements highly resistant to reform. This analysis adds to published work on the resistance of the state-level model to NPM-inspired reform (for example, Torres and Pina 2004), demonstrating the existence of a sub-state level gap between expressed aspiration for modernisation and actual implementation, and attributing that gap to a mismatch of cultures. The application of Hirschman's economic model to the strategic responses of public bodies in relation to the post-2008 economic crisis creates new understanding of existing issues. Hirschman's model highlights loyalty as the main driver of divergence in responses to dissatisfaction. This case study research has demonstrated that, in this case of the two Autonomous Governments, self-identity has been a major determinant of the response of voice or exit.

7.4 FURTHER RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES

New and emerging issues worthy of investigation have arisen as a result of this study, at both a macro and micro level. Given the centrality of the inherited administrative tradition identified in this case study, further research areas present themselves within a Spanish context and also an international one. Within Spain, a comparison of

the conclusions of this case study with an Autonomous Government controlled by the Partido Popular would reveal whether a congruity between the political party of the Autonomous Government and the Central Government resulted in a different approach, particularly in relation to responses to the post-2008 austerity programme. The evidence of this case study could also be used as the basis for a comparative examination of the impact of decentralisation on the institutional design of Central Government corporate and political management arrangements. An international canvas offers a comparison with developments in France, source of the Napoleonic tradition and, a country where decentralisation is also a relatively new development (Bezes and Parrado 2013). A focus on corporate management at the sub-state level would contribute to knowledge, testing the tension inherent between the unitary, centralised state associated with the Napoleonic Tradition and the decentralisation policies adopted at the end of the twentieth century. Similarly, the extent to which this inherited tradition has been continued or adapted in the former Spanish territories of Latin America, where there was a corresponding increase in decentralisation initiated in the same time period (Willis, da C. B. Garman and Haggard 1999: 7), would also be a focus of fruitful study.

In addition to providing evidence of the organisational culture of the two Autonomous Governments, this research has demonstrated a gap between administrative reform aspirations and implementation. An area for further research would be the exploration of any mismatch between the evidenced organisational culture at the heart of the Junta and Generalitat as reflected in the corporate and political management arrangements and the culture pertaining in the actual delivery of services. Is there a different set of values, practices, and procedures operating at the 'sharp end', demonstrating a distance between the centre and the periphery of the Autonomous Government? There is also an interesting geographical dimension to be explored within the existing case study subjects: Andalusia and

Catalonia are large territories, with distinct areas. Cádiz is very different from Málaga. Barcelona is not the same as the areas of National Park near the border with France. Is the impact of place differentiated within each sub-state government?

A third area of research, potentially of interest to practitioners in Spain, is performance management. Central to performance management is robust data on activity, including customer feedback. The case study revealed limited comparative information for performance management purposes. Similarly, customer feedback and engagement in the activities of the Autonomous Government is a key component in the management of modern public services, but was found to be under-developed at a corporate level in the Junta and the Generalitat. An area for investigation is the extent to which these performance management systems are being used not only at an individual service level but across the organisation as a whole.

7.5 FUTURE PROSPECTS


This thesis has argued that the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia, created in the wake of the 1978 Constitution, inherited and have largely retained the administrative tradition of the pre-democratic Spanish state. Spain's constitutional, financial and institutional framework and political culture have also been factors in this homogeneity, ensuring limited differentiation despite multiple and distinct territorial identities.

Recent elections have shown that the PP/PSOE dominance at state level has been broken and the Constitution's territorial distribution of power has been seriously challenged. The fact that Rajoy's team has referred to the 'defence of the unity of Spain and equality for all Spaniards' as a proposed (but unaccepted) shared position for the PP, PSOE and Ciudadanos in the post-general elections discussions is an indication of the continued importance of the decentralisation

project (Casquiera 2016). The economic recovery is still fragile with analysts forecasting that Spain will miss its deficit targets again for 2016 (González 2016). Significant changes are also possible at sub-state level. As the following tables show, the 2016 general elections results may also herald a time of change for Andalusia and Catalonia: for the first time in Andalusia, the PP won more votes than the PSOE. In Catalonia, ECP (En Comú Podem) won more votes than the ERC-CATSI coalition.

If the PP's success in Andalusia is repeated at the regional elections, then the control of the Junta could pass from PSOE hands for the first time. This might have significant ramifications not only for the way in which the Junta is run but also for the extensive network of public bodies, organisations, and SPVs built up over many decades based on a PSOE-led infrastructure.

Figure 26: General Election Results in Andalusia (2016)




Source: *El País*.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ <http://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2016/generales/congreso/01/>. Accessed 17.07.16

In Catalonia, the future holds a wider range of possibilities.

Figure 27: General Election Results in Catalonia (2016)



Source: *El País*.¹⁸⁰

The former CiU coalition parties, Unió and Convergència, have disappeared, replaced by new parties (CDC and PDC respectively) (Orquín 2016). New national parties of Podemos and Ciudadanos, with Catalan variants ECP and Ciutadans have emerged. Conflict between the Generalitat and Central Government continues over sovereignty. An early indication of the approach of the new pro-independence coalition, which was successful in the 2015 elections to the Generalitat, was the creation of new ministerial post for Foreign Affairs. This Ministerial portfolio included the task of setting out 'a road map for the constitution of a new state'.¹⁸¹ In July 2016 the Catalan Parliament's resolution to advance the process for independence (Unilateral Disconnection Plan) was suspended by the Constitutional Court, a decision described as 'unacceptable' by the

¹⁸⁰ <http://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2016/generales/congreso/01/>. Accessed 17.07.16.

¹⁸¹ www.catalangovernment.eu/pres_gov/government/en/pressnotice/290172/raul-romeva-takes-office-minister-foreign-affairs-institutional-relations-transparency.html. Accessed 17.01.16.

Catalan First Minister (Piñol 2016). However, a recent opinion survey by the Generalitat showed that between the summer of 2015 and the summer of 2016 support for Catalonia as an independent state had not shifted from around 40% (CEO 2016). Support for Catalonia as a state within a federal model of Spain, on the other hand, had gained increased support (22.2% to 26.5%), at the expense of the option of the status quo.

In the event of secession, what public administrative model will be adopted? What will the implications be for the remaining parts of Spain? The emergence of new political parties has prompted discussion about the need for a second Transition in Spain, forty years on from the death of Franco (Kassam 2015; Wheeler 2016). The second decade of the twenty-first century may be the time for a second Transition, not only in terms of party politics, but also in terms of public administration in Spain.

APPENDIX A NAMES AND POSITIONS OF INTERVIEWEES AND DATES OF INTERVIEWS

Name	Location Position	Date
	Barcelona	
Daniel Garcia	Spokesperson, General Workers' Union of Catalonia	29.09.14
Anonymous	Academic, a University in Barcelona	30.09.14
Carles Ramió	Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona	01.10.14
Meritxell Masó i Carbó	Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat of Catalonia	02.10.14
	Seville	
Jean Baptiste Harguindéguy	Professor of Political Science, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville	29.10.14
Luis Escribano del Vando	Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, Junta of Andalusia	29.10.14
Rafael Ruiz Canto	Member Andalusian Parliament and Popular Party Spokesperson	30.10.14
Nuria López	Secretary for Institutions and Employment, Workers' Commissions	31.10.14
María Teresa Castilla	Director General of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Junta of Andalusia	03.11.14
María Concepción Becerra Bermejo	Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration (in post during 2014)	03.11.14

Name	Location Position	Date
	Seville	
Javier Escalera Gámez	Coordinator, Department of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Junta of Andalusia	26.10.15
Begoña Gutiérrez	Member of Andalusian Parliament and Secretary General of Podemos in Seville	26.10.15
Jean Baptiste Harguindéguy	Professor of Political Science, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville	28.10.15
Núria López	Secretary for Institutions and Employment, Workers' Commissions	29.10.15
José María Sánchez Burson	Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration (in post during 2015)	29.10.15
Juan Marín	President of Ciudadanos Group, Parliament of Andalusia	29.10.15
	Barcelona	
Alícia Romero	Member of Catalan Parliament and Assistant Spokesperson, Socialist Group	16.11.15
Anonymous	An academic, University in Barcelona	16.11.15
Isidre Estivill Galdón	Assistant Director General of Inspection of Personnel Service, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat of Catalonia	17.11.15
Carles Ramió	Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona	18.11.15
Esther Vera	Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat of Catalonia	18.11.15
Ivan Planas	Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat of Catalonia	18.11.15

Name	Location Position	Date
Joan Xirau Serra	Head of e government, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat of Catalonia	19.11.15
Olinda Ania	Modernisation Policy Officer, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat of Catalonia	19.11.15
Laura Vílchez	Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament	20.11.15
Elisabeth Valencia	Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament	20.11.15

APPENDIX B KEY POINTS FROM INTERVIEWS
--

DANIEL GARCIA

Impact of the budget

- Impact of cuts has been enormous, not only in the short term but in the medium to long term
- For public employees there has been a direct reduction in salaries, plus a freeze of salaries since 2011 which will continue to 2015 and also the complete withdrawal of the extra payment (unilaterally by the Generalitat in 2013, 2014 and possibly 2015)
- Also seen the elimination of extras such as productivity bonuses, meal payments etc
- Temporary staff have been particularly hard hit – in addition to the above, reduction of 15%
- Significant loss of jobs, approx. 35,000 posts
- Also seen significant externalisations and/or privatisations of services
- CiU were the first to make cuts and most aggressive
- All without a Plan, a lack of social priority nor attention to demand or needs of vulnerable people

Impact of independence movement on services

- None

Public administrative reform

- Primarily understood PAR in structural terms
- Reform is more about aesthetics, image than about value, decisions, analysis and planning.
- There are no strategies, objectives, and a real lack of will to put into action
- Trades unions not been involved, not seen any documentation regarding reform
- There is a need to look at objectives, models of service delivery, prioritisation, evaluation, and control to permit a dynamic and flexible model, able to adapt and transform to respond to demands and changes

Political/administrative divide

- High level of clientelism in the Generalitat, via libre designación, designación directa (assessors, de confianza), establishment of false structures, leading to the entrance of a large number of altos cargos, many of whom have little professional experience/background
- This generates a lack of leadership, management capacity and a high dependence and complicity with political power
- Lack of confidence amongst staff in these bosses and a frustration

- Only employees' professionalism and public service ethos stops the worst impact on public services
- The public are demanding greater transparency, following many cases of corruption
- To do things differently [from current model] in future, there will be a need for greater transparency

Citizens' perception of public employment

- Varies according to time and circumstances, but currently has a high value because of its stability (albeit less than before)
- Seen as a desirable job to have because of job security, fixed salary
- Clarifies that it is not that working conditions in the public sector are wonderful, it is just that conditions in the private sector in Spain are so poor

Difference between civil servants and those on labour contracts

- Civil servants operate in an administrative regime which guarantees values of impartiality, independence, neutrality, freedom of action and security
- Those on labour contracts, under the Statute of workers, have fewer rights, are subject to political decisions, fewer guarantees and less security
- Big gap between theory and practice
- Situation is not changing – same as it was 10, 20 years ago
- Some jobs such as teachers have the same conditions, irrespective of the part of Spain in which they work. Others are different according to the Autonomous Government in which work

ANONYMOUS

Public administrative structures

- Made the point that public administration existed in regions before decentralisation and what changed after transfer of competencies in the 1980s/90s was not a change in structures but political bosses
- So structures have stayed the same – due not only to this path dependency but also the shared legal framework in which the services operated
- Ramió and Salvador study found structures were the same across Autonomous Governments but there were some differences

Public employment

- Employment base: % of funcionario to laboral contracts in public employment (Andalusia employs more funcionarios than laborales, Catalonia has the reverse)

- Some of this is due to the view of the Autonomous Government of the role of public employment in the local economy. For example Andalusia sees public employment as important in the low presence of the private sector in many fields, such as health
- Use of eventuales. Catalonia has a 'nube de cargos eventuales'. A category which allows greater freedom in recruitment

Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia

- Differences in services of the welfare state, despite being subject to national legislation. Central Government sets minimum national standards, beyond which it is up to each Autonomous Government. NB after the transfer of competencies there was an expansion of the welfare state, the decisions about these services resting with the Autonomous Governments.
- So following transfer can see differences in 'catalogue of services and coverage' (but none contradictory to national regulations). For example, sex change operation is covered by public health system in Andalusia but not in Catalonia
- Also difference in the way in which services are managed. All Autonomous Governments expanded health service following transfer, but each followed structure they had inherited. In terms of hospitals for example, in Andalusia only had Central Government run hospitals and so with transfer, continued as direct public provision. In Catalonia, majority of hospitals were in the 'not for profit' sector or private sector and so there continues to be indirect provision of public health services in Catalonia. So path dependency very strong
- In addition to universal primary health provision, individuals can also choose to pay for additional services (parallel) via health (mutual) assurance. In Catalonia this is 23% of citizens, in Andalusia around 5%
- In services such as social services, which are wholly a competence of the Autonomous Governments and not shared with Central Government, there is significant variation. There are no national norms
- Government legislation in 2012 sought to change basis of universalism – for example, no access for illegal immigrants, citizens who have been out of the country for more than 6 months to pay extra on return, most significant is the loss of rights for over 26 year olds if they have not, by that age, made (the equivalent of NI) contributions. Aspects are being implemented, but slowly
- 'Variation between Autonomous Governments is more about models of management than catalogues of services'
- Also a function of level of Government – so Central Government is more concerned with regulation, Autonomous Government and local government with service delivery, so Central Government less likely to be interested in privatization
- Ideological stance of party in power is not always determinant of model of management

Impact of secession debate

- No evidence that the independence movement is having any impact on the running of services – not mentioned in debates

CARLES RAMIÓ

Blurred line between politics and administration

- Absolute confusion between politicians and civil servants
- No *dirección pública profesional* exists
- Not regulated by law
- The political culture, the administrative culture and legal incentives lead to a confusion of the political and strictly professional space
- Leads to bad politics, bad administration and bad governance
- Invasion of administration by politicians and invasion of political sphere by professionals
- Very many political posts, relatively few professional posts (many DGs have less than 20 employees)
- Especially in Ayuntamientos political posts extend down to operational levels and so politicians get involved in operational delivery
- Also an issue in smaller Autonomous Governments like Rioja

Grandes cuerpos

- Aznar in 1996 wanted to reduce the political sphere, wanted to adopt a system similar to the British one
- But in fact grandes cuerpos so powerful that they colonised the political posts
- As a lot of the politicians were civil servants easier to do
- In Rajoy's government there are 15 (former) civil servants

NPM

- Grands corps model – French/European continental model – old fashioned
- Advantages – well educated, prestigious, meritocratic
- Disadvantages – fragment public administration, own interests first, internecine warfare
- Transfer of staff at time of transfer of functions – mostly front-line staff, not senior civil servants, especially in Catalonia
- Central Government did not want to transfer their top people – only 4 people in top ranks of central departments
- Also issue of status, some did not want to go
- Less of issue for those Central Government staff already working outside of Madrid
- Path dependency – still copied the central model – it was the only one they knew

- Despite passage of 30 years, Central Government model still very influential
- State has improved since 1980s, Autonomous Governments have not – stagnated
- As an institution, Catalonia is one of the worst examples, due to:
 - ‘anthropological optimism’ – the view that ‘everything is fine here’
 - Lack of capacity to look elsewhere (for example Europe)
 - No tradition of public administration in Catalonia
- In terms of EU ranking, Catalonia lowest, Andalusia second lowest and Madrid next – biggest are the worst
- Staff are not trained in the values of the organisation, so employees don’t have shared values
- ‘La Generalitat de Catalunya no es una institució pública, es huérfano’ because the concept of an institution encompasses shared rules values and rules of the game
- In fact each department has its own, and values are professional, not institutional
- His article in 2001 in the Revista Democrática de CLAD was very critical of NPM in its implementation in Latin countries
- NPM is based on an assumption that public administration is excessively institutionalized and rigid and needs to be relaxed. May be OK for UK and USA but in Spain where institutions are weaker it is more complicated

Response to austerity

- Lot of privatisation in Spain – been reactive, not proactive
- Do it because they consider the private sector delivers highest quality at lowest cost
- Started from wrong point – ‘got problems, so privatise’
- Don’t consider plan of costs, additional controls etc
- Response is not part of public administrative reform, not a CiU policy priority (was the same under PSOE)
- Gap between aspiration and delivery – ‘buy the formula, implement half’
- Only 50% of education and health in public sector hands – tradition in Catalonia
- No transparency in Catalonia, no accountability
- Citizens see inputs not outputs, don’t see how decisions are made, how resources are applied
- Questions claim of Generalitat that transparency developments (eg website) are a ‘great innovation’ – means every 2 months information is published on the budget which no one can understand
- Imbalance between heavy focus on NPM strategies, privatisation, less on public arm with focus on transparency, participation
- No difference between parties of left and right
- Politicians are not taking advantage of the austerity to reform, or to do things differently

- Work of the 5 experts was not taken seriously

MERITXELL MESÓ I CARBÓ

Response to the austerity regime

- Upon election in 2010 discovered budget in poor state
 - Much debt
 - Many long-term commitments that had to be paid for
 - Investments lasting 50 years
- Cuts were the only answer
 - Made reductions of 4.6%
 - 20% cut in spending across all ministries (4,000M €)
 - 23% cut in alto cargos (DG, SG)
 - 43% cut in eventuales (confianzas, staff, gabinete)
 - 29% in empresas publicas
 - Stopped all capital investment (roads, schools etc)
 - Cut 7,000 public sector posts in 3.5 years
- Prioritised social spend, maintaining welfare state
- For 3 years did not make extra salary payments and removed 'perks' such as luncheon vouchers
- Generalitat made greater level of cuts [than other Autonomous Governments]
- We are a rich country and in the past we have helped other parts of Spain, but Spain not willing to help us now
- Government has passed the EU deficit reduction target to the Autonomous Governments

Reform of public administration

- When Autonomous Governments were created in 1980 had no choice but to copy state model
- In times of expansion model was adequate but in times of reduction need greater flexibility
- Need to move with the times
- Problem now is that the model is rigid
 - Employees not playing multiple roles
 - Not orientated towards citizens
 - Not orientated towards results
 - Still paper based – need to use technology more
 - Still duplication of functions with Central Government (eg culture)
- Need to reform to adapt to the 21st century
- 3 June 2014 agreed plan for reform, based on 9 axes
- Each has actions – short, medium and long term
- Need consensus internally, externally and in parliament because long term change
- Not about tackling the current economic crisis but making it fit for 21st century

- Cuts made so far have been made within framework of current model, not the new model we want for the future
- Characteristics of new model include:
 - Transparency
 - Ethical standards
 - Multi skills (flexible workforce)
- Part of our individuality is the collaboration with the private sector
- For example in education, have 3 types of school, 100% private, 100% public, “concertadas” – part funded by the Generalitat and part funded by parents
- This mixed system is “a very good system”
- Private and public sector each has something to teach the other
- Eg trying to change the system so that headteachers can choose some of their own staff – idea imported from the private sector
- Also want to change the way in which staff are recruited. System of oposiciones tests things, not aptitudes
- Got a lot of long term employees. For them to advance need not only knowledge but also abilities and attitudes. Changing ‘poco a poco’
- Catalonia is different from others because the Generalitat has a package of reform, not just a range of small changes

Territorial differences

- At outset most just copied the state
- Wanted consensus, not rupture
- Worked for past 20 years, but not anymore
- We want more, we deserve more
- Hecho diferencial continues – different language, culture, history and geography. Want this to be recognised and it is not

Separation of politicians and civil servants

- We want to reform the model to establish ‘dirección pública profesional’
- An intermediate layer between the political and bureaucracy, between political direction and public management
- Would have the confidence of the politicians but also be knowledgeable about the service
- What causes conflict now is that the law does not prevent the nomination of a alto cargo to a portfolio about which he or she knows nothing
- Different methods of recruitment exist but prefer open advert from which a shortlist of professionally qualified candidates would be put forward to the politicians for selection.
- No party affiliation is required, but politicians would have to have confidence in the appointee

Relations with Central Government

- Central Government wants to interfere in our business
- Passing a series of laws which affect our services, eg education
- Our system based on the Catalan language has worked well for 30 years, but now they want to change this
- Collaboration is limited as so many Autonomous Governments are run by the PP
- Senate could be reformed in many aspects.

JEAN-BAPTISTE HARGUINDÉGUY

Response of Junta to financial crisis

- Is radical reform suppressed by politicisation of bureaucracy and by bureaucratisation of politics, thus leading to maintenance of status quo?
- Response of Junta is more of the same
- Andalusia uses blame avoidance strategy – its all the fault of the PP Government in Madrid and accuse them of using crisis to recentralise the state
- Europe is seen as the political arm of the Troika but Junta still blames PP Government for its financial problems
- Andalusia has been most favoured region in terms of European investment, and even with the Eastern European accession, still is lobbying and obtaining grants.
- Concludes that the crisis has exerted not only economic and social pressures on Andalusia but also political ones:
 - Limits efficiency of the PSOE to maintain its clientelistic networks
 - Isolated Andalusian Government in Spain
 - Modified its vision of Europe
- But NOT a paradigm shift, rather a recycling of old behaviours, specifically the mindset of conflict
- Junta will not or can not change – whole system is based on the clientelistic model based on the protection of the welfare state
- No willingness to raise local taxes (unpopular) [plus can local people afford it is a legitimate question]
- Domination by PSOE for 35 years
- PSOE frequently criticised for its clientelist behaviour – most obvious example being the ERE scandal when the Junta sought to soften the impact of the cuts, allegedly helping their friends and family
- Corruption of the left is seen as very much about distributing money to buy votes. Corruption of the right is seen as being about commissions for public works
- Are we seeing the end of the PSOE Junta model/dominance of 2 parties? Left undermined by loss of TTV channel, savings banks, ERE, right by Gurtel corruption

State of the Autonomies

- Despite all Autonomous Governments now having same powers, competition still exists – viz Catalonia wanting same economic settlement as Basque
- Lack of effective inter-governmental mechanisms (Senate inadequate, sectoral conferences unilateral, conflict via Constitutional Court) means reliance on intra party relations which only work, in case of Andalusia, if Central Government is PSOE
- CiU influence increased when Central Government needed CIU support in the Cortes
- Historically been lack of fiscal responsibility on part of Autonomous Governments – capacity to decide on spending but not in control of income
- Huge growth in quangos, public businesses etc in all Autonomous Governments

Re-centralisation

- Re-centralisation by budgetary instruments – FLA to provide Autonomous Governments with huge deficits with loans at low interest, negotiated with each; CORA to reduce duplication
- Central Government hold the money so they call the shots
- Andalusia does not seek new financial powers (as is the case in Catalonia), Andalusia and other poor regions are not lobbying for that but rather for more money
- Big difference between Spanish and British system is the politicisation of the bureaucracy. At the top of the hierarchy there is little difference in Spain between politicians and civil servants so little challenge from civil servants about service/policy decisions, great deal of scope for corruption
- No rule (or least not adhered to) like the restriction on UK public servants re involvement in party political activity
- No “Public service bargain”
- Measures of recentralisation include;
 - Article 135 – change to Constitution – achieved in 15 days in August to address financial stability requirements of Germany
 - FLA to assist Autonomous Governments
 - Some bonds issued
 - PPP – Plan de Pagadores Proveedores – public sector very slow to pay so this loan to facilitate speedier payments
 - EI FROB – not a recentralisation measure really but a state agency to rationalise the bank system
- Is national variation possible? Have a national health service in Spain but there are variations in quality and quantity. Benchmarking info is not really available

LUIS ESCRIBANO

Administrative culture

- Inherited Napoleonic tradition but major difference between France and Spain is the level of decentralisation in Spain following 1978 Constitution
- Yes bureaucratic, but has to be because it involves the spending of public money and the decisions taken affect citizens lives (big companies have the same processes)
- One of the differences between Spain and Anglo-Saxon countries is in latter citizens and Government are on an equal footing before the law. In Spain citizen participation is very low
- Libre designación is a 'cancer'
- At outset (early 1980s) expectation was that DG level would be civil servant but in 1988 PSOE Government changed this, allowing each public admin (at all territorial levels) to determine where line fixed, allowing parties to nominate posts
- So people without relevant knowledge can be running services – 'un horror' 'una barbaridad'
- There is no political wish to change things
- No public outrage because they are unaware of what goes on (should make it like military service and require all citizens to spend a month inside a public administration)
- 'la huida del derecho administrativo'
- Public companies, foundations, agencies – public law does not apply, not subject to same controls, no transparency
- Influence of cuerpos was positive for the citizen – first law of PSOE was to eliminate cuerpos, so resulted in unqualified people in charge of technical services
- Issue of capacity in public sector – need experts in Junta, to control the work contracted out to private sector
-

Corruption

- Why so much corruption? Widespread corruption in society and fear
- "Corruption is a cancer here"
- According to Interpol guidelines, there are 10 elements of organised crime. Andalusia meets 9, excluding only physical violence
- Much apathy amongst the public
- If you create a system of weak administrative and financial control, will allow corruption
- Austerity should be an opportunity to reform, but not taken. Cartelisation is so strong, society so dependent

Special Purpose Vehicles

- Salaries in Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs hereafter) are much higher than in civil service

- Table showing the number of SPVs in each autonomous community – high levels in Andalusia and Catalonia, more than Madrid
- Some SPVs such as ambulance service are useful – can respond quicker, but questions the value of the rest
- There have been a number of modernisation plans but nothing happens
- SPVs should follow the same rules but they do not, for example recruitment should be according to the Constitution, ie by merit, ability and open to the public. In fact ‘a dedo’

RAFAEL RUIZ CANTO

PP priorities

- Principal challenge to Junta is same as all other Autonomous Governments and as Spain as a whole – to create employment and guarantee the principal of equality in terms of social rights
- Argues for separation of political direction from management of services
- Citizen have to go through many hoops to get access to services, they get fed up
- ‘administration should be at the service of the citizen, not the reverse’
- Lack of IT skills/usage generates inefficiency/duplication, things take too long/months

SPVs

- Describes high number (‘infinity’) of businesses outside of public law but created by Junta (foundations, public companies,) which do not appoint on the basis of the Spanish Constitution (principles of equality, merit, ability and open to the public) and which are in competition with real private sector businesses
- At the outset less than 3000 civil servants created the framework of competencies, but over the years the number of civil servants has been reducing while the number in the parallel administration of SPVs has been increasing
- SPVs are full of party appointments, on higher salaries = use of public money to ensure votes
- Transparency is via Camara de Cuentos, but not all aspects are mandatory and many things are hidden
- This model is not illegal, but politicisation is the norm not the exception in Andalusia
- SPV sector is large and salaries are higher than in civil service, growing at the expense of the public administration
- There is a need for the Junta to justify each and every post, ask whether they are necessary

Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia

- The only thing that makes Andalusia different from other Autonomous Governments is that it has been ruled from day one by the Socialists
- With regard to secession debate in Catalonia, “I think Catalonia is the same as Andalusia, it is Spanish territory”

NÚRIA LÓPEZ

Financial crisis

- 2 phases to the response of the Junta to the economic crisis – measures to stimulate employment and then after 2012, acceptance of cuts
- Great dependence on Central Government transfers – approx. 80%
- Industry and big companies do not exist here - agriculture and tourism dominate
- Tactic of Junta of complaining to Government re finances has not been successful. Andalusian Government do not achieve anything in talks with Central Government

Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia

- Unlike Catalonia, Andalusia only wants what it needs (generosidad, solidaridad). For Catalonia it is different – fundamentally it is about money
- Andalusia wants the same rights for all, irrespective of where they live. Catalonia wants advantages for itself. Question of money not competencies
- Salaries always been lower in Andalusia than other parts of Spain
- Comments on the underdevelopment of Andalusia’s economy. There is a Spain which wants to keep Andalusia as its stereotype – sun, fiesta and beach, as a place of leisure.
- Concerns re return of slavery in the countryside in Andalusia as a result of the economic climate

Public employment

- Understands public administrative reform as relating to structural reform of the levels of government
- Gave example of payment of funeral costs for civil servant’s family following death in service – condition now removed
- More work, fewer employees create poorer service, enabling privatisation
- Ratio of public employees to population is lower in Spain than the EU average
- SPV sector is not a parallel administration, it is to cover different functions (those needing rapid response) and so is complementary. Used where bureaucratic apparatus impedes rapid response
- Employees of this sector are treated differently by the Junta

- However, unlike in other parts of the country where this sector is privatised, in Andalusia it is still in the public sector
- Accepted that Spanish public administration could be slow, lacking agility and focused on the law, but there are mechanisms that could improve things
- However not got enough people and service depends on resources
- Also sector has weak controls, few inspectors
- Problem based on the lack of order in the development of the Autonomous Governments. No minimum was set in order not to upset the Basques and the Catalans and so each Autonomous Government expanded according to its own interests, taking up the maximum competencies
- Description of different employment contracts – no answer as to why different contracts apply, recognises that there could be two employees doing a similar job, employed on different contracts
- Only civil servants have potestad administrativa – meaning that they can sign or authorise
- All civil servants share same terms and conditions as covered by statute, but there are differences between Autonomous Governments. Example given of flexi-working in Andalusia, but this is not a national right

Altos cargos

- In terms of the blurred line between politicians and civil servants the biggest problem is that people can be in position of responsibility for services they do not know how to manage
- Political parties, legitimately want to implement their plans post-election, and want their own people to make them happen.
- The job of civil servants is to make sure the rules are followed
- Political appointees, once no longer de confianza, return to their posts in the civil service (or an equivalent is found for them)

Corruption and transparency

- Not everyone is corrupt. If politicians were paid a proper salary there might be less corruption
- A law on transparency will not end corruption. Longer term issue of education, of values. Citizens need to respect what is theirs.
- Law on transparency is only about information giving, not involvement or participation of the public

MARÍA TERESA CASTILLA

Budget

- Priorities of the budget are to promote employment and maintain public services and to reduce the deficit each year

- Income from Central Government is insufficient. Drive is to increase income by reducing fraud
- Impact of corruption on reputation. Usually issue of poor management not personal enrichment
- It is not a problem that politicians without technical knowledge are responsible for services – they have a nucleus of public employees to help
- SPVs are valuable to deliver specific government functions, but they are still part of the public sector
- Was the source of conflict in 2010-12 period when civil servants saw the SPVs as usurping their jobs
- Created for specific purposes. Now in process of reducing and increasing controls over them

Public administrative reform

- We have different processes of modernisation, plans for quality and simplification. “We are pioneers in reform”
- Crisis took away our focus on reform. Want to create a culture of continuous improvement, with a focus on the citizen. Need greater focus on evaluation
- Need groups within each ministry to push change. Public employees are well educated, but need to do more, to improve processes, be more efficient. Want to be more dynamic, creative
- It’s the civil servants job to plan, evaluate, modify. The task of those on labour contracts, in the SPVs, is the direct provision of services. Our challenge is to make the connection between the two.
- Difficult to break the inertia
- New reform document should be available at the end of this year (December 2014)

Differences between Autonomous Governments

- Two phases: in first phase no difference, in second phase we created SPVs, different to rest of Autonomous Governments
- SPVs are public sector not private sector. Wanted to protect services and employment
- Only consider using private sector as way of supporting local businesses to improve their competitiveness not because they believe private sector is better/preferable to the public sector
- Not so different now – largely a question of size, but also of politics and socio-economic factors

MARÍA CONCEPCIÓN BECERRA BERMEJO

SPVs

- Agree that Spanish public administration can still be described as part of the Napoleonic tradition and that the Autonomous Governments

inherited it from Central Government when they were created in the 1980s

- Considers that the agencies are more part of the Anglo Saxon tradition – didn't exist in the 1980s but do now
- Agencies operate in health, culture and infrastructure, not education
- Difference in contracts – civil servants have job for life and operate in a more rigid contractual regime. Labour contracts are not so rigid
- Now operate throughout Spain, but esp in Andalusia. Unlike in Anglo-Saxon model, they are not independent, operate within the Ministries and are kept close. Are in the public sector
- Perception when they were created was that they would be more agile, provide a more rapid response,.
- Now they are increasingly being subjected to the same control and rule of public law
- 3 years ago a reform law sought to reduce the number of SPVs

Public sector employment

- Numbers of posts: 40,000 fixed contracts, including 8000 in health, 18,000 in others
- Same conditions for all civil servants across the country
- Grandes cuerpos more influential in Central Government than in Autonomous Governments – not had so long to organise (centuries compared with 30 years)
- In Madrid, with the exception of the minister, all politicians need to have been civil servants. In the event of a change of political power, these political appointees return to the civil service
- In the Junta, some political posts need to have been civil servants (especially technical posts) but most do not require it

Modernisation

- Junta gone through process of revising costs, what is necessary/what is not
- Need to change – more transparency, less paper
- Andalusia's constitution has values (justice, liberty, security and political pluralism)
- There has been tension between the SPVs and the institution of the Junta and the SPVs
- 238,000 employees of the Junta, 26,000 in the SPVs
- Includes 99,000 in health, 95,000 in education
- National survey of satisfaction for all Autonomous Governments
- We are working on a revised plan of modernization – but not ready yet

JAVIER ESCALERA GÁMEZ

Reform and cuts

- Places reform in context of the national programme agreed between Central Government and all Autonomous Governments to reduce public spending
- References in Junta budget to sustainability and efficiency measures are part of the required plan of savings in each Autonomous Governments in context of national programme
- Lots of cuts to civil servants pay and benefits
- Focus now is on maintaining the delivery and quality of public services and developing social policies in the context of severe financial restrictions since 2008.

Altos cargos

- Legal definition of *altos cargos*, including those top executives responsible for SPVs
- *Eventual* and *de confianza* are the same. *Libre designación* is the way appointments are made. When *alto cargo* tenure ends, so does that of *eventual*
- In situation where *alto cargo* is in charge of a function in which they have no expertise 'they rely on the team of civil servants'
- Eventuales support the alto cargos but they are not civil servants in that they cannot make authorisations such as grants, contracts etc
- Legal requirements that all alto cargos have background in civil service
- Information in a press release of July 2015 - There is a commitment to reducing alto cargos by 10% over the life of this parliament

Policies

- In terms of coordination, HR function was centralised in 2010 so strategic HR decisions are taken corporately but 'there is a lot of autonomy in health and education'
- When asked about joining up services for citizens, response concentrated on access issues
- Zero privatization – priority is direct provision and direct management of services
- Rejects R&S view of more public employees, very few labour contracts (26,000)
- Strategy viz Government has been one of protest but also compliance with deficit targets

Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia

- Andalusian hymn includes reference to belonging to Spain
- Partido Andalucista has disappeared and PSOE has taken over as nationalist party of Andalusia

- Only differences cited apart from *copago* [payment by the public towards cost of medical treatment] is public funding for transsexual operations, and (sex) equality implications. Plus Catalan model of contracting out in education and health

BEGOÑA GUTIÉRREZ

Podemos priorities

- Priorities are unemployment, housing, education and health
- Tackling corruption is described as ‘recovering the institutions’
- Podemos are putting forward bills re transparency, civil service, independence of judiciary and guarantee for housing
- Services like health are very good but badly managed
- There is a parallel administration (instrumental, SPVs, libre designacion)
- Describes their approach of one of consensus – what unites us rather than what divides us

Reform

- Over 30 years never been changed – there would be a conflict of interest for them
- ‘political’ posts work for government not for citizens
- The Junta is ‘una casa desorganizada’
- Wages of civil servants are not great but ‘with dignity’
- Since the arrival of Podemos and Ciudadanos, we can put a brake on the PSOE as they no longer have a majority
- ‘no hay voluntad política para cambiar’
- Completely against privatisation as citizens end up paying twice
- Model should be focused on citizens
- Andalusia is a place of riches, it should be first

JEAN-BAPTISTE HARGUINDÉGUY

- Attempts to change things have been thwarted by powerful inertia (both within political party and trades unions)
- Revolving doors is an issue
- Concursos are ineffective – not about problem solving but the regurgitating of facts
- In terms of impetus for improvement INAP [National Institute of Public Administration] exists to promote civil service, but no interaction between Autonomous Governments
- Intergovernmental relationships are horizontal (with Central Government) not horizontal with other Autonomous Governments
- There are no agents for change [not the politicians, civil servants, public, lobby groups or professional associations] [TU mixed motivations]

- EGovernment works relatively well –see UN Public admin network rankings
- No sense of competition between Autonomous Governments in terms of management/performance
- Finding comparative data is difficult
- Part of public administrative culture is lack of consequences for actions of civil servants

NÚRIA LÓPEZ

Public sector employment

- Civil servants still have not received the re-instated extra pay – although it has been announced a number of times!
- Conditions for civil servants have reduced, but they have maintained a quality of employment not shared by other sectors of the economy in Andalusia – eg, construction and agriculture
- Not all public services are provided by public employees (eg home helps, emergency control centres)
- The administrative culture is very conservative. Interests of some of those involved will hinder reform
- No improvement to the problem of the lack of accountability and mobility of civil servants (eg of sideways moves of civil servants to improve motivation and productivity not implemented on grounds of costs)

Inter governmental relations and comparisons

- Lot of tension between political parties and between Autonomous Governments
- Lack of governmental capacity to coordinate etc following transfer of competencies to Autonomous Governments. Central Government machinery old fashioned
- Reason some PP controlled Autonomous Governments have offered to re-centralise functions is because of a lack of resources but economic crisis has also been used to promote a political wish to re-create a more centralised model of the state
- Sees no difference in services as a result of the different characteristics of the various autonomous communities
- (Compared with the Catalans) Andalusians enjoy themselves but also work hard. More generous, have a greater sense of solidarity. We work hard and capable of achieving great things, but we don't publicise it. We would be embarrassed to do that. Catalans and Madrid people are much better at self-publicity and marketing.

JOSÉ MARÍA SÁNCHEZ BURSON

Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia

- Andalusian culture is more focused on living, on working to live well. Catalans are more likely to work to live. But it is a cliché
- Low participation of private sector in public services is because too weak in Andalusia
- There are limited businesses in health and education to provide alternative
- Furthermore, low average incomes in Andalusia mean less disposable income to buy private services
- Plus 30 years PSOE policy based on equality and solidarity
- Comparisons between Autonomous Governments on services such as health are invalid because of involvement of private sector. Private sector only provides services not covered by public sector and so is incomplete.
- E Government is a real success in Andalusia - 'nearly all services are digitized'
- Using the sociability of Andalusians – esp young peoples' use of social networks
- Public sector is a motor of the Andalusian economy [unlike in Catalonia]

Administrative culture

- Our tradition, our training is based on the legal Napoleonic model. It brings codification and systematic rules
- DGs are not politicized – all are trained as civil servants
- Libre designacion – can only choose from civil servants, and still via concursos. Only the appointment of 'eventuales' is a free choice
- There is very little change with the change of politicians
- Would prefer recruitment and selection process of UK local government but would not be possible in Spain
- Policy diffusion is possible, of País Vasco Autonomous Government as they have more resources/research capacity

Reform

- SPVs are necessary as they are more flexible than civil servants, 'significantly facilitate management'. Problem is the necessary complex control mechanisms
- Junta is working on a reform programme, but going for maximum staff participation so publication will be July 2016
- Civil servant terms and conditions are broadly the same across the country. An improvement in one Autonomous Government is quickly spread by the trades unions to others
- More difference in health at primary level not hospital. In Andalusia health services are more decentralised than in Catalonia where 80% of provision is in Barcelona. Reflects rural nature of Andalusia

- National menu of health services exists onto which a Autonomous Government can add

JUAN MARÍN

Ciudadano perspective on decentralisation

- In the past regional political parties (such as PNV and CIU) have used their position in the national Parliament to secure privileges for some autonomous communities.
- These inequalities are not right for a country such as Spain
- Not a question of centralising services, but of guaranteeing the same service for all citizens – same quality, same rights in all Autonomous Governments
- Time for change since the Constitution of 1978 – society has developed, the system of two political parties has now been broken
- Reform of electoral law needed, as is a consensus in education (referred to multiple reforms over past years). In education Spain is 20 years behind the rest of Europe
- “Spain is a single nation, not 17 taifa kingdoms”
- Multiple languages hinder mobility (in terms of jobs, education)
- Wants reform in Spain (electoral system, education), but that does not mean that everything has to change
- Each territory may have own culture, history etc but that does not mean that there should be differences in public services
- NB Use of term ‘territory’ for the sub-state level in Spain

Administrative culture

- Duplication of administrative work, incompatibility of systems between public administrations in national services such as health
- Administrative culture of Junta is slow and bureaucratic and reform needed of structure, HR, staff training and innovation
- Processes are slow, expensive
- Politicisation of the bureaucracy is a factor – greater professionalization is needed
- Duplication with SPVs
- SPVs created for reasons of political clientelism
- Confirmed weakness of private sector is reason for direct provision of public services in Andalusia

ALÍCIA ROMERO

Reform

- Generalitat has received plenty of expert advice about need for reform, but no progress made
- (Referring to Plan de Reforma) 'Dicen mucho pero no hacen'
- It is much needed as the current culture is very bureaucratic, slow
- Lot to do, but there is no political appetite for change, for modernisation
- Politicians need to be braver
- The crisis has been an excuse to reduce the public sector, not used to reform
- The new parties' solutions are too simplistic, they want to remove levels of government – it is easier to tear something down than create/build something
- Work/presence of ayuntamientos has meant there is no pressure on the Generalitat to reform (as they deliver many services, public may be happy with their public services)
- Third sector is very important – especially in social services

Impact of secession debate

- The debate about secession has overtaken all interest
- For nationalist parties, all other issues (including administrative reform) are secondary. Also used as a way of hiding responsibility for cuts
- "Spain is the problem" is the mantra of the Generalitat

ANONYMOUS (2)

Reform of health

- Health services have changed significantly since Transition – the model was created by the Generalitat, it was their 'political project'
- In 1981 there were fewer actors than exist now, the Generalitat acted to create new players in the private sector. As the number/range of activities for externalisation increased, new businesses have emerged for this work, businesses linked politically
- This development was not an institutional re-design – it does not need to be. Generalitat does not use laws to change things
- Comparative literature distinguishes between southern European countries which legislate a lot and do nothing and Anglo Saxon countries which are more agile, less dependent on legislation. The existence of a plan is not an indication that something is happening
- Nothing has happened on the Plan of Reform. The existence of a document does not equate with reform taking place. It could be called a 'discurso aprendido'
- Use of private sector is not necessarily an indicator of modernisation

- Catalunya is headed by someone on same level as DG (and so libre designacion) but not required to operate within public (administrative) law
- LOFAGE was a PP 1997 law requiring director generals to have CS experience (but exceptions are allowed as long as the case is made in the decree to justify exceptions)

Comparison and competition between Autonomous Governments

- There is limited means for collaboration between Autonomous Governments and limited national comparative information
- Eg of lack of comparative information: when Ministry of Health (Central Government) was asked for copies of the health plans of all Autonomous Governments, the researcher was told that they would need to apply to each Autonomous Government, as the Ministry could not require the submission of such plans
- Autonomous Governments are distrustful of Central Government and each other – there are no formalised mechanisms for collaboration (no federal institutions such as a chamber of territorial representation)

ISIDRE ESTIVILL GALDÓN

Reform

- Administrative culture here was very influenced by Central Government at time of transfer/creation
- Confirmed the key problems are as identified in the Plan of Reform
- Economic crisis and political crisis has slowed reform (eg freeze of posts meant unable to bring in new recruitment proposals)
- A number of necessary bills are not yet passed to implement the reform
- There have been opportunities to change, but these have not been taken
- High level of externalisation in Catalonia. Tradition of third sector has influenced party policy

Public sector employment

- Perceived lack of flexibility in civil service led to use of labour contracts, but in fact the collective agreements can make the labour contracted staff more rigid
- Problem of civil servants' inflexibility is not just about conditions of service, but processes
- Negative influence of trades unions and cuerpos and politicians on reform/change
- Impetus for change is from politicians
- Comparison of staff numbers – difficult to comment when unclear whether comparing like with like.

- No network for collaboration between Autonomous Governments exists

Impact of secession debate

- Forward planning is not possible in context of political crisis. Short termism – impossible to plan beyond 2 years.
- Impact on staff of independence debate is not on day to day operations, but staff are fearful given uncertain future (pensions etc)

CARLES RAMIÓ

Comparisons between Autonomous Governments

- Higher level of university level employees in Catalonia. Andalusia has more administrative (clerical) posts. This has happened because Andalusia used public administration as a employment centre and for clientelism
- At institutional level little difference between Autonomous Governments. Despite higher technical ability Generalitat ‘has no superior institutional refinement, no greater transparency, no greater sophistication in terms of public accountability. But the discourse is much more modern.’
- All have copied the (Spanish) State. Catalonia wanted a model different from the State, but did not know what model, so ended up copying but not wanting to.
- No formalised network for collaboration between Autonomous Governments, but series of conferences, meetings etc
- It is the municipalities in Catalonia, esp Barcelona, who are leading the way in terms of reform, not the Generalitat
- Clearly big difference between Catalonia and rest of Autonomous Governments is collaboration with private sector in all service areas, especially health and education
- This difference was not driven by the Generalitat, but reflects pre-existing provision: Health service was poor under Franco, but wealth of area made it possible for Catalans to self organise and self provide. So at time of Transition, less public provision to transfer
- Extensive externalisation, but poor design in terms of capacity for planning and control within Generalitat
- Differences between Autonomous Governments exist but they are in the detail, not the substance because they all share the same political and administrative culture

Reform

- Economic crisis has not been used to reform. Reductions have been made by salami slicing rather than a reappraisal of priorities
- Plan of Reform is not really happening. Reform rarely gets past being a document in most countries, and it is true in this case too

- Reforms that have happened are not real – just want to look good, a box ticking exercises (eg transparency)
- No national comparative analysis
- Lack of post entry training for civil servants – especially on institutional values
- Public perception is negative about all institutions (including private sector ones like El Corte Ingles) so expectations are low of public services too
- Lack of strategic planning at the Generalitat – should be thinking about the model needed for after the economic crisis

ESTHER VERA and IVAN PLANAS

Differences between Autonomous Governments

- Differentiates between two categories of Autonomous Governments: those achieving autonomy via the rapid route and those via the slower route. The former group have had responsibility for services for a longer period and so have greater level of development (that is, cannot really compare Andalusia and Catalonia with, for example, la Rioja)
- A further differentiating factor, in the case of Catalonia, is the pre-existence of models of service delivery. 'In our case, the high level of involvement of civil society in public services has influenced our form of government.' Our system is 'singular'.
- The challenges are also different: coordination across the Catalan system is more complex because of the different nature of the bodies involved – the legal basis is not the same (unlike in Andalusia where all are public sector bodies). There are cultural and organisational barriers
- In social services, both the Junta and Generalitat need to coordinate across two levels of government, given the fact that Ayuntamientos have competencies in this field
- In terms of describing the administrative culture of the Generalitat, there is no difference in culture [from that of the Junta], but there is a difference in the model of service delivery. Private/public sector model is more developed in Catalonia

The Generalitat's approach

- We looked for a model different from that of the Spanish state, especially the NPM as operating in the UK. This does not exist in the rest of Spain
- Catalan society is characterised by high levels of associations, with multiple organisations in health, education and social services
- This dates back to industrial revolution. Also means of resistance to Franco regime - reference made to Escuela Catalana during the Republic – Franco may have eliminated the schools, but not the associations (neighbours, parents etc)

- The financing system does not provide sufficient resources to fund the level of services to which Catalans aspire. They do not want the average level of Spain. So have looked for alternative ways to fund this.
- We do not enjoy a high level of autonomy. In the case of health, education and social services, the set of services are proscribed by Central Government and decisions such as which medicines to prescribe or the salaries of hospital staff, are made by the State, not by the Catalan Government.
- Central Government relies on its function to ensure territorial equilibrium – and so limit the autonomy of Autonomous Governments
- Level of autonomy limited by Government action in terms of menu of services and level of funding. Limited scope for varying ‘service menu’ in health and education – set by government (and enforced via financing system)
- Competencies are not shared – they are 100% CCAA but State can take back competencies whenever they want – transfers are not protected by the Constitution

Arguments for greater autonomy

- The issue for Catalonia is not just about culture and language but also about economics. We explain the financial system to people, they see that they give the most through their taxes but receive in return the least. So they are clear that the system is unjust. Other Autonomous Governments may have offered to return some competencies to Central Government, but we will never return any functions.
- “The State tries to characterise the Generalitat’s public communications as indoctrination. This is a joke in bad taste. There is no policy of one directional communication in the Generalitat. When we explain, people understand that they pay their taxes and they don’t get the services. Much progress was made after the Transition but people feel things are now going backwards.”
- People can tell who is responsible (State or Generalitat) for which service by the language used (in other words, Catalan or not). Also a difference in style – the State is more bureaucratic, reflects the 18th century, housed in big imposing buildings. Generalitat is more modern
- Example given of overseas work. Generalitat has offices of commerce abroad (not embassies) because the state embassies do not meet the need of Catalan companies (who by the way are responsible for a large percentage of Spain’s exports). So there is some duplication of effort, because the original State ones are ineffective.
- Employees are not affected by the nationalist debate in their day to day work. Long term planning is impossible right now
- Functions such as communications, HR, budgets, are carried out in each ministry (at different scales). Ministries are autonomous. Coordination is by agreement (pactar)

Comparative information

- There is limited comparative information available on a national basis. In terms of the production of the annual budget there is a national framework, but then it is up to each Autonomous Government to determine how it classifies its expenditure (eg administration)
- National systems have lost their capacity to offer comparative information on indicators or outputs for example. Therefore, Generalitat looks for its own (as varies so much from Autonomous Government to Autonomous Government to render them unusable) and use own historic data for efficiency comparisons

Budget

- Affected by infrastructure investment by the state and by the difference between budgets and liquidations. More accurate to work with the latter but by then analysis is out of date
- Explanation of debt levels – all about the financing system
 - Date of transfers and financing system – earlier ones did not get same rate of inflation as later ones
 - State of infrastructure inherited from the state
 - Impact of sufficiency fund
 - Unable to accommodate/address Catalans' aspirations for higher levels of service
 - 2009 model was based on 2007 (pre crisis) figures and predicated on the 'Mediterranean' half of Spain (Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, Andalucía) getting significant funds from taxes linked to the construction industry. The other half got guarantees of compensation. They continued to get compensation when the crisis hit and Catalonia, along with above others, experience plummeting of tax income.
 - So Catalonia had a deficit before, but doubled with the economic crisis
- Catalans want higher level of service and as funding from Government is inadequate, they have to support that level with their own money

JOAN XIRAU SERRA and OLINDA ANIA

Reform

- Plan of reform agreed in July 2014 so too early to see change
- The diagnosis of the Plan is that the culture is bureaucratic, not focused on results, poor on evaluation, lacking in transparency, not focused on citizens

- No explicit cross party support - Parliament described as neutral in as much as no significant opposition, is really a Generalitat project [calls into question the embeddedness of the change and the lack of consensus building]
- However, two out of four necessary laws have been approved – transparency and simplification. DPP (senior public management) is a bill in parliament now
- Trades unions not supportive – difficult context of cuts, pay reductions, deletions of posts etc. TU perspective is short term, this reform is long term
- If change of political control, do not know if the plan would continue – different priorities – lack of building of consensus
- Uncertain context – politically and in terms of financing
- Lack of progress also due to change in minister – so lost 2/3 months
- Some reform work can continue, others not
- In terms of collaboration with other Autonomous Governments, reference made to commissions for discussion, exchange at different levels and in each section, but not in area of reform
- But CORA just about reducing spend
- Recognition that lack of own indicators hinders confidence about progress. Need to systemise more to check on track
- Describe plan of reform as not being about efficiency (for which can have measures). More complicated as it is about changing perceptions and culture. Do not have clear outcomes
- Limited dedicated resources in terms of budget or staffing. Reform can not cost anything, must be met within existing budgets
- Recognition that without people and budget at centre, progress will be made at the pace of the slowest
- ‘Need to convince the politicians that we have to change not so much to save money but to be better’.

E govt

- There has been a big increase in the use of IT for transactions
- No formalised way to get citizens’ views on e administration changes
- Use English terms to describe concept of front office/back office

Differences in Catalonia

- In terms of the Catalan identity, it is the importance of civil society which makes Catalonia different from other Autonomous Governments and from the state, particularly in terms of delivery of public services
- Has historic basis – history of poor public investment, so when transfer of competencies started, civil society started to self organise, creating bodies within the church and the private sector. These were then incorporated
- No tradition of Catalans seeking a civil service career as in other parts of Spain
- Responsibility for police and prisons adds a further difference

- History matters – self Government, culture, language, and impact of Barcelona as a big, modern city
- Photos of ministers on walls of public offices across Spain. Have these in Catalonia, only here they include photos of ministers from the 1930s too, the first period of autonomous government.

LAURA VÍLCHEZ and ELISABETH VALENCIA

SPVs

- Very critical of duplication of levels of local government, of duplication with SPVs and of corruption levels. This overlapping needs to be reformed
- SPVs are just there to provide jobs and advance [Catalan] nationalist argument
- Referred to previous context of the domination by two political parties in which 'structures were created to give jobs to people linked to the parties in government'
- A case for SPVs can be made, but need proper control mechanisms over spend, management and potential conflicts of interest

Ciutadan priorities

- Their focus is on the citizen and the services they receive – this is not a territorial issue
- First step is the reform of public administrations
- Nationalist debate has been used to divert attention away from the failings of the Generalitat
- Want to renegotiate financial settlement with Central Government, but within Spanish state framework. 'We want to continue to be Spaniards'
- Culture of Catalonia is open, hard-working, entrepreneurial
- Only Catalan is taught in schools, pupils only get 2 hours of Castilian per week
- In describing the culture of Catalonia, they refer to it as a país or country (not a region or a nation) and use the term 'radicalisation' to refer to the work of the Generalitat in recent years (5) to convince the public of the value of independence
- Ciutadans' model is one of solidarity with the rest of Spain. They want a model similar to that of Germany, with a Central Government and autonomous communities, based on cooperation between Autonomous Governments
- Generalitat does not favour cooperation. Narrative is of 'Spain robs us', 'Spain treats us really badly', 'life will be better under independence'. Independence is seen as the magic bullet

Reform

- Nothing is happening in terms of plan of reform – all too busy with nationalist debate
- Got no support from other parties for their 10 point plan – so nothing happened, but now they are “a force for opposition”
- Describe the Catalan Parliament as paralysed, not properly constituted [during negotiations between parties on the position of the Presidency]
- Want to eliminate most ‘puestos a dedo’
- These posts are not just a financial problem, but also a problem of transparency
- Despite nationalist debate, workers get on with delivering services
- Plan of Reform is not being applied. It has our support but nothing is happening. Everything overwhelmed by the nationalism debate and culture of nationalism
- Catalonia has a ‘tejido de asociaciones’ – important part of the Catalan culture. In describing the culture of Catalonia, they refer to it as a país or country (not a region or a nation) and use the term ‘radicalisation’ to refer to the work of the Generalitat in recent years (5) to convince the public of the value of independence

APPENDIX C
CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE GENERALITAT (July 2015)

From: Vera Garcia, Esther <everag@gencat.cat>
Sent: 21 July 2015 12:27
To: jill.dixon
Cc: Giles Tremlett
Subject: los presupuestos de la Generalitat 2015

Estimados Gilles i Jill,

Adjunto el documento que hemos preparado contestando las preguntas iniciales y aportando algunos datos que creemos que son de interés. Si queda algo por responder lo haremos encantados. Los técnicos del departamento de economía estan a vuestra disposición. Si necesitais las respuestas en inglés os las traducimos. Os las envío en castellano para ir más rápido, porque es como me las acaban de pasar desde la Dirección General de Presupuestos.

Cordialmente

Esther

Esther Vera Garcia

Cap de l'Oficina de Comunicació

Gabinet del Conseller

Departament d'Economia i Coneixement

Rambla de Catalunya, 19-21 | 08007 Barcelona | Tel. 933162271 | Fax 933162140
everag@gencat.cat | <http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/economia>

De: jill.dixon [mailto:jill2.dixon@northumbria.ac.uk]
Enviat: dimarts, 21 / juliol / 2015 12:40
Per a: Vera Garcia, Esther
A/c: Giles Tremlett
Tema: los presupuestos de la Generalitat 2015

Estimada Señora Vera García

Mi colega, Giles Tremlett, le envié mi análisis, muy preliminar, de los presupuestos de la Generalitat y de la Junta de Andalucía. Adjunta, para facilitar la referencia, es la tabla comparativa. Las fuentes originales son:

<http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/QRESUM.pdf>

http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/planif_presup/presupuestos2015/IEF/ief-3.pdf

Mis preguntas son las siguientes:

Los gastos de administración general de la Generalitat parecen significativamente más altos que los de la Junta y me interesarían mucho las razones.

¿Es la diferencia de gasto en de la protección civil y la justicia un reflejo de la competencia catalán para la policía y las prisiones (la que no se ejerce la Junta)?

En cuanto a los transportes, me interesarían las razones por la diferencia importante entre la Generalitat y la Junta. ¿Es que las carreteras andaluzas siguen financiadas por subvenciones de la UE, por ejemplo? ¿O se refleje la financiación de las autovías de peaje en Catalunya?

¿Son los gastos 'credit oficial i sector financer' en Catalunya igual a 'regulación económica y financiera' en Andalucía? Si es así, ¿por qué hay una diferencia tan grande?

Por último, la deuda pública es mucho mayor que la de la Junta (y más alta que la provisión catalana de 2014). Además, no sé si la contingencia de la Generalitat (de nuevo significativamente más altos que el año pasado) sea para necesidades desconocidas o si hay una razón específica.

No soy contadora, y entiendo que hay un montón de detalles bajo las cifras grandes en mi tabla sumaria. Lo que me interesa es como los presupuestos se reflejan las prioridades de la Generalitat y de la Junta, y donde existen las diferencias importantes.

Muchas gracias por su ayuda

Atentamente

Jill Dixon (Sra)

Comparación entre los presupuestos de Catalunya y Andalucía

Introducción

Para comparar los presupuestos de Catalunya y Andalucía es importante tener en cuenta algunos aspectos:

Resultados del modelo de financiación 2012^(*)

	M€		€/hab		Índice		Ranking	
	Capacidad tributaria	Total	Capacidad tributaria	Total	Capacidad tributaria	Total	Cap. tribut	Total
Madrid	16.728	13.208	2.574	2.032	135,7	94,5	1	12
Baleares	2.627	2.407	2.347	2.150	123,7	100,0	2	9
Catalunya	17.056	16.091	2.253	2.125	118,7	98,8	3	10
Aragón	2.941	3.363	2.180	2.492	114,9	115,9	4	4
Cantabria	1.270	1.592	2.139	2.681	112,8	124,7	5	1
Asturias	2.208	2.607	2.049	2.420	108,0	112,5	6	6
La Rioja	635	820	1.963	2.535	103,4	117,9	7	2
Castilla y León	4.867	6.335	1.911	2.488	100,7	115,7	8	5
Valencia	9.055	10.354	1.765	2.019	93,0	93,9	9	13
Galicia	4.896	6.634	1.760	2.385	92,8	110,9	10	7
Castilla-La Mancha	3.408	4.710	1.606	2.219	84,6	103,2	11	8
Murcia	2.312	2.966	1.568	2.012	82,7	93,6	12	14
Andalucía	12.703	17.215	1.503	2.037	79,2	94,7	13	11
Extremadura	1.600	2.786	1.444	2.514	76,1	116,9	14	3
Canarias	1.674	4.085	790	1.928	41,6	89,7	15	15
TOTAL	83.980	95.174	1.897	2.150	100,0	100,0		

^(*) En términos normativos y competencialmente homogéneos

- **Los ingresos derivados del modelo de financiación autonómica.** A pesar de que en términos per cápita los recursos del modelo de financiación son similares para las dos comunidades, en términos de aportación de recursos Catalunya ocupa la 3ª posición de la ordenación de las CCAA de régimen común, mientras que Andalucía ocupa la posición 13ª. Ambas CCAA tienen unos recursos per cápita inferiores a la media, pero en el caso de Catalunya la situación es incoherente, ya que su capacidad fiscal es un 19% superior a la media, mientras que la aportación de Andalucía es muy inferior.

- **El impacto del gasto financiero.** Hay que tener en cuenta que el gasto financiero (capítulos 8 y 9) y, muy especialmente, el capítulo de pasivos financieros (deuda), altera las cifras reales del presupuesto, entendidas como el gasto efectivo de los departamentos (nóminas, inversiones, gastos corrientes de funcionamiento de la administración, etc). Así, mientras que en el presupuesto consolidado de Catalunya el capítulo de deuda asciende a 6.468 millones de euros, en Andalucía éste es sólo de 1.875 millones. Si excluimos los dos capítulos de gasto financiero, el presupuesto consolidado de Catalunya es de 29.878M, mientras que el de Andalucía es de 27.653M.

Cabe destacar que, desde el año 2011, y gracias al esfuerzo sostenido para reducir su déficit público, Catalunya ha logrado contener considerablemente el ritmo de crecimiento de su deuda.

Incremento anual de la deuda de la Generalitat (ESA terms)					
2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
24,3%	36,6%	32%	19,4%	14,7%	12,3%

- **El pago de intereses de la deuda.** Como consecuencia del elevado volumen de su deuda, el gasto en intereses (capítulo 3 del presupuesto) de la Generalitat de Catalunya en 2015 (2.055M), también es mucho más elevado que el de la Junta de Andalucía (869M).

- **Los compromisos de financiación diferida.** En los últimos años Catalunya apenas ha realizado nuevas inversiones en infraestructuras, ya que todavía está pagando los compromisos de inversiones efectuadas en el pasado con métodos de financiación diferida (por ejemplo, los "shadow tolls"). Entre 2011 i 2014, el Gobierno de la Generalitat pagó 4.620M por este concepto y, en 2015, el gasto presupuestado es de 874 millones. Este año, el 43% del presupuesto del Departamento de Territorio

y Sostenibilidad, responsable del grueso de las inversiones del Gobierno catalán, se destina a pagos de inversiones realizadas en el pasado.

- **El compromiso con el proceso de consolidación fiscal.** Hay que destacar que, entre 2010 y 2014, Catalunya ha reducido su gasto no financiero no finalista un 18,9%, i un 23,2% si se excluyen los intereses de la deuda. En el proceso de consolidación fiscal se ha priorizado el gasto social: los gastos de Salud, Educación y Servicios sociales se han reducido un 15%, 18,9% y un 19,1% respectivamente, mientras que el resto del gasto se ha reducido un 22,4% de media. Después del enorme esfuerzo de contención de gasto efectuado entre 2011 y 2013, el Gobierno de la Generalitat concluyó que un ajuste superior perjudicaría la prestación de servicios básicos a la ciudadanía. Por esta razón, el Gobierno se comprometió a no reducir el gasto departamental no financiero en sus presupuestos de 2014 y 2015.

- **El carácter de prudencia con el que se elabora cada presupuesto,** y ello es especialmente relevante en el caso de los ingresos y gastos finalistas. Así, entre los presupuestos iniciales de Andalucía y Catalunya, por ejemplo, Andalucía incluye en su presupuesto inicial los Fondos europeos de política agraria y la Generalitat no. En el caso de la Generalitat, el presupuesto se modifica mediante una generación de crédito una vez se reciben estos fondos. Por ello, la comparativa de los presupuestos iniciales de estas dos CCAA no es homogénea, al considerar de forma distinta los ingresos y gastos finalistas.

- **El diferencial de precios regionales.** Al realizar comparaciones de gasto público per cápita, otra cuestión relevante es el diferencial de precios regionales, es decir, el coste de la vida en cada región. En este sentido, un estudio encargado por el Departamento de Economía y Conocimiento a la Universidad Pompeu Fabra (UPF) confirma un índice de precios para Catalunya de 108,5 respecto al índice nacional, mientras que Andalucía se sitúa en 92,7. La siguiente tabla muestra la posición de las comunidades de régimen común en el ranking recepción de recursos del modelo de financiación autonómica antes y después de aplicar la variable del coste de la vida.

	Total per cápita	ranking	Total per cápita PPA	ranking PPA
Cantàbria	2.681	1	2.705	5
Rioja	2.535	2	2.804	3
Extremadura	2.514	3	3.131	1
Aragó	2.492	4	2.585	6
Cast. Lleó	2.488	5	2.934	2
Astúries	2.420	6	2.753	4
Galícia	2.385	7	2.581	7
Cast. Manxa	2.219	8	2.522	8
Balears	2.150	9	2.174	11
Catalunya	2.125	10	1.959	14
Andalusia	2.037	11	2.198	10
Madrid	2.032	12	1.775	15
València	2.019	13	2.171	12
Múrcia	2.012	14	2.122	13
Canàries	1.928	15	2.321	9
rati màx/min	1,390		1,764	

Se presentan a continuación las respuestas a las preguntas planteadas, a partir de la comparación entre los enlaces facilitados:

La clasificación por funciones de los presupuestos de las distintas comunidades autónomas no sigue siempre los mismos criterios y se observan divergencias en algunas políticas de gasto. El apartado “Servicios de Carácter General” es uno de los casos en que, comparando Catalunya con otras CCAA, encontramos divergencias importantes que no se explican por la dimensión real de sus estructuras administrativas, sino por la forma de clasificar los gastos.

En la comparación específica de Andalucía y Catalunya, teniendo en cuenta sus estructuras administrativas, podemos deducir que las diferencias se deben principalmente a la inclusión de distintos tipos de gastos en la función “Servicios de

carácter general”. En el caso de Catalunya, el presupuesto del 2015 para “Administración y servicios generales” es de 1.330M. La mayor parte de este importe son gastos de las unidades de dirección y administración de los departamentos y organismos (por ejemplo, el personal de los departamentos, aunque éste gestione programas específicos). Catalunya sólo distingue en programas distintos a la Administración General al personal de colectivos específicos (policía autonómica, bomberos, administración de justicia, docentes, penitenciarios o estatutarios sanitarios). En cambio, Andalucía únicamente incluye en su presupuesto de Administración general 37M€ de gastos concretos de modernización y gestión de la función pública y selección y formación del personal, principalmente.

De hecho, si consultamos los datos homogéneos de los presupuestos de las CCAA para el 2014 publicados por el Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones públicas¹⁸², comparando el gasto por el concepto “Políticas” se observa que en la política “Servicios de Carácter General” para Catalunya el importe es de 589 M€, y para Andalucía 388 M€.

<http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/publicacionpresupuestos/asp/inicio.aspx>

Por estos motivos no consideramos relevante la comparación de este programa en concreto.

Catalunya tiene transferidas las competencias de Servicios Penitenciarios y Policía, y Andalucía no. Por eso, Catalunya tiene un mayor gasto en Justicia y Seguridad y Protección Civil, respectivamente. El gasto de la Generalitat de Catalunya en el presupuesto 2015 para estos programas es de 1.552,56 millones, 378,71M€ en servicios penitenciarios y justicia juvenil y de 1.173,85M€ en seguridad y protección civil (policía).

El presupuesto de Transportes de Catalunya incluye un gasto importante en infraestructuras ferroviarias (el 46% del presupuesto de transportes) y en apoyo del transporte público de viajeros (39% del presupuesto). Estos importes corresponden básicamente a la línea 9 del metro de Barcelona, que realiza la Generalitat, mientras que las inversiones del metro de Madrid, por ejemplo, las realiza el ayuntamiento.

Por otro lado, hay que tener en cuenta que el nivel de inversiones del Estado en Catalunya es muy bajo. En el año 2013 las inversiones realizadas por el Ministerio

¹⁸² Últimos datos disponibles

de Fomento en Catalunya representan el 11% del total, mientras que la población de Catalunya representa un 16% y su PIB un 18%. Al margen de estos porcentajes, la posición estratégica de Catalunya como puerta de entrada al resto de Europa ya justificaría un nivel de inversiones superior.

En general, el problema de las autopistas de peaje en Catalunya se resume en un problema de falta de inversión estatal. La lentitud y escasa contribución del Estado en las inversiones en carreteras en Catalunya, unido a la necesidad de Catalunya de contar con infraestructuras que le permitan mantener su dinamismo económico, han obligado a la Generalitat a suplir la falta de inversión estatal asumiendo las inversiones. El alto coste de las mismas y la dificultad para financiarlas ha obligado a recurrir, en muchas ocasiones, al pago de peajes en las autopistas.

Al igual que en la primera pregunta, en este caso encontramos diferencias que se explican por la forma de clasificar los gastos.

El presupuesto de Catalunya en “Crédito oficial y desarrollo financiero” no es equiparable al presupuesto de Andalucía en “Regulación económica de carácter general” porque incluyen gastos distintos. En Andalucía este tipo de gasto se incluye en la función “Regulación económica de la actividad y los sectores productivos”.

El programa “Crédito oficial y sector financiero” de Catalunya es de 974 M€, de los cuales 459 M€ son variaciones de activos financieros, principalmente concesiones de préstamos a empresas de fuera del sector público y avales. El resto son cancelaciones de préstamos a largo plazo y deuda pública del Instituto Catalán de Finanzas, entidad financiera de la Generalitat encargada de dar crédito al sector empresarial.

En el caso de Andalucía, la función “Regulación económica de carácter general” supone un gasto de 369M e incluye un conjunto de actividades de unidades dedicadas a la gestión y administración de las finanzas y el patrimonio público que en el presupuesto de Catalunya se incluyen en la función de “Administración y servicios generales”.

En cambio, en el presupuesto de Andalucía, en la función “Regulación económica de la actividad y los sectores productivos”, encontramos 108M de variaciones de activos financieros, principalmente para el “Desarrollo industrial y sociedad de la información” y “Planificación, desarrollo energético y fomento de la minería”.

Los gastos de la función deuda pública (intereses y amortizaciones) de Catalunya son superiores a los de Andalucía, porque la deuda viva es mayor.

- La deuda pública de Catalunya en el primer trimestre del 2015 es 127,1% superior a la de Andalucía.
- El presupuesto en deuda pública de Catalunya para el 2015 es un 118,5% superior al de Andalucía.

La evolución del presupuesto también depende de forma importante del calendario de vencimientos de la deuda, y concretamente de la refinanciación de la deuda pública y el vencimiento de deudas a corto plazo.

En cuanto al fondo de contingencia: El presupuesto de Catalunya para el 2015 del fondo de contingencia se incrementa hasta 200 M€ porque incluye una provisión de 140 M€ para una medida retributiva no contemplada inicialmente y que motivó una revisión de los presupuestos. Concretamente, el importe está destinado a la devolución de una parte de la paga extraordinaria de los empleados públicos del 2012, eliminada entonces, correspondiente a los primeros 44 días de devengo. En el momento de elaborar el proyecto de presupuesto la medida no estaba aprobada y por este motivo se incluyó su previsión en el Fondo de Contingencia. La Generalitat de Catalunya legisló el 11 de marzo una medida para hacer efectiva esta devolución.

**APPENDIX D
POLITICAL PARTIES (2016)**

Abbrev	Spanish/Catalan name	English translation
National parties		
C's	Ciudadanos	Citizens
PP	Partido Popular	Popular Party
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero de Espana	Socialist Workers Party
UP	Unidos Podemos	United We Can
Catalonia only Parties		
CDC	Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia
CSQP	Catalunya Sí que es Pot	Catalonia Yes We Can
CUP	Candidatura d'Unitat Popular	Popular Unity
ECP	En Comú Podem	In Common We Can
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	Republican Left of Catalonia
IVC	Iniciativa Per Catalunya Verds	Greens
JxSí	Junts Pel Sí	Together for Yes

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abella, Carlos (2006), *Adolfo Suárez: El hombre clave de la transición* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe).
- Acosta España, R (ed.) (1981), *La España de las Autonomías (Pasado, Presente, Futuro)* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe).
- Acosta Sánchez, José (1978), *Andalucía: Reconstrucción de una identidad y la lucha contra el centralismo* (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama).
- Agranoff, Robert (1996), 'Federal Evolution in Spain', *International Political Science Review*, 17 (4), 385-401.
- Aguilar, Paloma (2000), 'The Opposition to Franco, the Transition to Democracy and the New Political System', in José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (eds), *Spanish History Since 1808* (London: Arnold), pp. 303-14.
- (2002), *Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy* (New York: Berghahn).
- Ahmad, Ehtisham and Giorgio Brosio (2009), 'Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?', in *Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?*, ed. by Ahmad and Brosio (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 1-22.
- Aja, Eliseo (2003), *El estado autonómico: Federalismo y hechos diferenciales* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial).
- Alba, Carlos (1997), 'Modernising Spanish Public Administration: Old Inertias and New Challenges', in W. J. M. Kickert (ed.), *Public Management and Administrative Reform in Western Europe* (Cheltenham: Elgar), pp. 177-95.
- Alba, Carlos and Carmen Navarro (2011), 'Administrative Tradition and Reforms in Spain: Adaptation versus Innovation', *Public Administration*, 89 (3), 783-800.
- Alcaide Guindo, Pablo (2011), *Balance Económico Regional (Autonomías y Provincias) años 2000 a 2010* (Madrid: Fundación de las Cajas de Ahorros), www.funcas.es/publicaciones/sumario.aspx?idRef=8-07026. Accessed 05.08.15.
- Alonso, Sonia (2012), *Challenging the State: Devolution and the Battle for Partisan Credibility – A Comparison of Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Álvarez Junco, José (2001), *Mater Dolorosa: La idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus).
- (2002), 'The Formation of Spanish Identity and Its Adaptation to the Age of Nations', *History & Memory*, 14 (1), 13-36.
- (2011), *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Álvarez Junco, José and Adrian Shubert (2000), *Spanish History Since 1808* (London: Arnold).
- Álvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.) (2006), *Andalucía y la guerra civil: estudios y perspectivas* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla).
- Amón, Rubén (2016), 'The Thick Blooded Spaniards', *El País*, 27 June, http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/06/27/inenglish/1467024044_143933.html. Accessed 29.06.16.

- Anderson, Benedict (2006), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso).
- Arts, Wil and John Gelissen (2002), 'Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report', *Journal of European Social Policy*, 12 (2), 137-58.
- Bache, Ian and Rachel Jones (eds) (2000), 'Has EU Regional Policy Empowered the Regions? A Study of Spain and the United Kingdom', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 10 (3), 1-20.
- Bache, Ian and Matthew Flinders (2004), 'Themes and Issues in Multi-level Governance', in *Multi-level Governance*, ed. by Bache and Flinders (Oxford Scholarship Online), pp. 1-12, <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199259259.001.0001/acprof-9780199259250>. Accessed 22.07.16.
- Baena del Alcázar, Mariano (2002), 'On The Nature of Power: An Examination of the Governing Elite and Institutional Power in Spain, 1939-92', *Public Administration*, 80 (2), 323-38.
- Balcells, Albert (ed.) (2011), *Història de Catalunya* (Barcelona: l'esfera dels llibres/edició labutxaca).
- Bale, Tim (2008), *European Politics: A Comparative Introduction*, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Balfour, Sebastian (1995), 'The Loss of Empire, Regenerationism, and the Forging of a Myth of National Identity', in Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi (eds), *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction: The Struggle for Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 25-31.
- Balfour, Sebastian and Alejandro Quiroga (2007), *The Reinvention of Spain: Nation and Identity since Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Bañón, Rafael and Manuel Tamayo (1997), 'The Transformation of the Central Administration in Spanish Intergovernmental Relations', *Journal of Federalism*, 27 (4), 85-114.
- Barbería, José Luis (2012), 'El Estado autonómico, contra las cuerdas', *El País*, 8 July, http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2012/07/08/vidayartes/1341770195_120279.html. Accessed 29.08.12.
- Barbero, Luis (2015), 'Y el PSOE ganó otra vez', *El País*, 23 March, http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/03/23/actualidad/1427135098_469122.html. Accessed 26.03.15.
- Barker, Richard (2012), *Skeletons in the Closet, Skeletons in the Ground: Repression, Victimization and Humiliation in a Small Andalusian Town. The Human Consequences of the Spanish Civil War* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press/Cañada Blanch).
- Barton, Simon (2009), *A History of Spain*, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Beetham, David (1984), 'The Future of the Nation State', in Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall (eds), *The Idea of the Modern State* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press), pp. 208-22.
- (1996), *Bureaucracy*, 2nd edn (Buckingham: Open University Press).
- Bel, Germà (2012), *Infrastructure and the Political Economy of Nation Building in Spain, 1720-2010* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press/Cañada Blanch).

- (2015), *Disdain, Distrust and Dissolution: The Surge of Support for Independence in Catalonia* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press/Cañada Blanch).
- Beltrán Villalva, Miguel (1990), 'La Administración pública y los funcionarios', in Salvador Giner (ed.), *España: Sociedad y Política* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe), I, pp. 315-52.
- Bernal, Antonio Miguel (1978), 'Andalucía: En busca de una conciencia histórica', *Historia 16* (extra V), 134.
- Bezes, Phillippe (2010), 'Path-Dependent and Path-Breaking Changes in the French Administrative System: The Weight of Legacy Explanations', in Martin Painter and B. Guy Peters (eds), *Tradition and Public Administration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 158-73.
- Bezes, Phillippe and Salvador Parrado (2013), 'Trajectories of Administrative Reform: Institutions, Timing and Choices in France and Spain', *West European Politics*, 36 (1), 22-50.
- Black, Stanley (2010), *Spain Since 1939* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Blas Infante (1976, originally printed 1915), *El ideal andaluz* (Sevilla: Tucar Ediciones).
- Boix, Carles (1997), 'Searching for Competitiveness: The Role of the Spanish Public Sector in the 1980s and 1990s', in Jan-Erik Lane (ed.), *Public Sector Reform: Rationale, Trends and Problems* (London: SAGE), pp. 257-82.
- Boix-Palop, Andrés, (2013), 'Spanish Administrative Traditions in the Context of European Common Principles', in M. Ruffert (ed.) *Administrative Law in Europe: Between Common Principles and National Traditions* (Europa Law Publishing), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2756983>. Accessed 23.02.16.
- Bonal, Xavier (2000), 'Interest Groups and the State in Contemporary Spanish Education Policy', *Journal of Education Policy*, 15 (2), 201-16.
- (2000a), 'El balance público-privado en el sistema de enseñanza español: evolución y efectos sobre las desigualdades educativas', *Educación* 29, 11-29.
- Bonal, Xavier, Xavier Rambla, Eduardo Calderón and Núria Pros (2005), *La descentralización educativa en España: una mirada comparativa a los sistemas escolares de las comunidades autónomas*, Colecció Estudis 18 (Barcelona: Fundació Pi y Sunyer).
- Bonifazi, Corrado and Massimiliano Crisci (2013), 'Demography, Migration and the Economy at a Regional Level: Recent Evidence from Catalonia', *Applied Spatial Analysis and Policy*, 6 (3), 229-49.
- Bonoli, G. (1997), 'Classifying Welfare States: A Two-dimension Approach', *Journal of Social Policy*, 26 (3), 351-72.
- Borzel, Tanja A. (2000), 'From Competitive Regionalism to Cooperative Federalism: The Europeanization of the Spanish State of the Autonomies', *Publius*, 30 (2), 17-42.
- Bovaird, A. G. and Elke Löffler (2009), *Public Management and Governance*, 2nd edn (London: Routledge).
- Brans, Marleen (2007), 'Comparative Public Administration: From General Theory to General Frameworks', in B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre

- (eds), *The Handbook of Public Administration* (London: SAGE), pp. 269-84.
- Breen, Keith and Shane O'Neill (2010), 'A Postnationalist Era?', in *After the Nation? Critical Reflections on Nationalism and Postnationalism*, ed. by Breen and O'Neill (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1-20.
- Breuilly, John (2001), 'The State and Nationalism', in M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson (eds), *Understanding Nationalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 32-52.
- Brubaker, R (1990), 'Frontier Theses: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in East Germany', *Migration World*, 18, 12-17.
- Buffery, Helena, Stuart Davies and Kirsty Hooper (2007), 'Introduction', in *Reading Iberia: Theory/History/Identity*, ed. by Buffery, Davies and Hooper (Oxford: Peter Lang), pp. 9-21.
- Buffery, Helena and Elisenda Marcer (2011), *Historical Dictionary of the Catalans* (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press).
- Burg, Steven L. (2015), 'Identity, Grievances, and Popular Mobilization for Independence in Catalonia', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21 (3), 289-312.
- Burgen, Stephen (2014), 'Catalan president faces multiple charges after independence referendum', www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/21/catalan-president-face-several-charges-after-unofficial-independence-referendum. Accessed 14.09.16.
- Bursens, Peter and Jana Deforche (2008), 'Europeanization of Subnational Polities: The Impact of Domestic Factors on Regional Adaptation to European Integration', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 18 (1), 1-18.
- Cacciatore, Federica, Alessandro Natalini, and Claudius Wagemann (2015), 'Clustered Europeanization and National Reform Programmes: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22 (8), 1186-211.
- Canel, María José (1994), 'Local Government in the Spanish Autonomous State', *Local Government Studies*, 20 (1), 44-59.
- Cañizares, María Jesús (2014), 'Jordi Pujol: «Yo era un hombre con dinero, pero mi proyecto era construir Cataluña»', *ABC*, 26 September, www.abc.es/catalunya/politica/20140926/abci-jordi-pujol-solei-explica-201409261643.html. Accessed 04.01.16.
- Cano Buesco, Juan (2011), 'Tres décadas de vida parlamentaria andaluza', in Centro de Estudios Andaluces, *Andalucía, 30 años de su historia*, (Sevilla: Fundación Pública Andaluza), pp.30-35.
- Carboni, Nadia (2010), 'Changing Relationships between Politicians and Bureaucrats in Contemporary Democracies: An Analysis of the Italian Experience', *International Public Management Review*, 11 (1), 90-109.
- Carmona Contreras, Ana M. and Mario Koelling (2013), 'La participación de las CCAA en la negociación de la política de cohesión: Ambitions beyond capacity?' *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 161, 239-78.
- Carr, Raymond (1980), *Modern Spain 1875-1980* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- (1982), *Spain 1808-1975*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon).
- (1986), *The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective*, 2nd edn (London: Phoenix Press).
- (2000) (ed.), *Spain: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

- (2000a), 'Liberalism and Reaction, 1833-1931', in *Spain: A History*, ed. by Carr (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 205-42.
- Carr, Raymond and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurúa (1981), *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy*, 2nd edn (London: Allen & Unwin).
- Casanova, Julián and Carlos Gil Andrés (2014), *Twentieth-century Spain: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Casquiera Javier (2016), 'Rajoy ofrece negociar 125 puntos del pacto firmado entre el PSOE y Ciudadanos', *El País*, 1 August, http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/08/01/actualidad/1470030216_352663.html. Accessed 01.08.16.
- Castles, F.G. and D. Mitchell (1993), 'Worlds of Welfare and Families of Nations', in F. G. Castles (ed.), *Families of Nations: Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company), pp. 93-128.
- Cazorla Sánchez, Antonio (2014), *Franco: The Biography of the Myth* (Abingdon: Routledge).
- Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió (CEO) (2015), *Barometre d'opinió política, 3a onada* (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya).
- (2016), *Barometre d'opinió política, 2a onada* (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya).
- Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) (2005), *Barómetro autonómico*.
- (2010), *Barómetro autonómico*.
- (2012), *Barómetro autonómico*.
- (2014), *Barómetro de junio 2014*.
- (2015), *Barómetro de julio 2015*.
- Cepiku, Denita and Andrea Bonomi Savignon (2012), 'Governing Cutback Management: Is there a global Strategy for Public Administrations?', *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 25 (6/7), 428-36.
- Chari, Raj and Paul M. Heywood, (2009), 'Analysing the Policy Process in Democratic Spain', *Western European Politics*, 32 (1), 26-54.
- Chislett, William (2002), *The Internationalization of the Spanish Economy* (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano), [Online], www.realinstitutoelcano.org. Accessed 12.02.13.
- Christensen, Tom and Per Laegreid (2007) 'Theoretical Approach and Research Questions' in *Transcending New Public Management: The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms*, ed. by Christensen and Laegreid (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 1-17.
- Clavero Arévalo, Manuel (1984), *El ser andaluz* (Madrid: Ibérico Europea de Ediciones).
- Closa, Carlos and Paul M. Heywood (2004), *Spain and the European Union*, The European Union Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Coates, Crispin (1998), 'Spanish Regionalism and the European Union', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 51 (2), 259-71.
- Cobo Romero, Francisco (ed.) (2012), *La represión franquista en Andalucía* (Sevilla: Centro de Estudios Andaluces).
- Cole, Alistair, Jean-Baptiste Harguindéguy, Ian Stafford, Romain Pasquier and Christian de Visscher (2015), 'States of Convergence in Territorial Governance', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 45 (2), 297-321.

- Colino, César (2008), 'The Spanish Model of Devolution and Regional Governance: Evolution, Motivations and Effects on Policy Making', *Policy & Politics*, 36 (4), 573-86.
- (2009), 'Constitutional Change Without Constitutional Reform: Spanish Federalism and the Revision of Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy', *The Journal of Federalism*, 39 (2), 262-88.
- (2013), 'The State of the Autonomies between the Economic Crisis and Enduring Nationalist Tensions', in Bonnie N. Field and Alfonso Botti (eds), *Politics and Society in Contemporary Spain: From Zapatero to Rajoy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 81-100.
- Colino, César and Eloísa Del Pino (2014), 'Spanish Federalism in Crisis', in Paul Peterson and Daniel Nadler (eds), *The Global Debt Crisis. Haunting US and European Federalism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press), pp. 159-178.
- Colino, César, Ignacio Molina and Augustias Hombrado (2014), 'Responding to the New Europe and the Crisis: The Adaptation of Sub-national Governments' Strategies and its Effects on Inter-governmental Relations in Spain', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 24 (3), 281-99.
- Colomer, Josep (1998), *La transición a la democracia: el modelo español* (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama).
- (1998a) 'The Spanish "State of Autonomies": Non-institutional Federalism', *West European Politics*, 21 (4), 40-52.
- Conde-Ruiz, J. Ignacio and Carmen Marín (2013), 'Austerity Measures in Crisis Countries – Results and Impact on Mid-term Development: The Fiscal Crisis in Spain', *Intereconomics*, 48 (1), 21-26.
- Connor, Walker (2001), 'Homelands in a World of States', in M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson (eds), *Understanding Nationalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 53-73.
- Conversi, Daniele (1997), *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation* (London: C. Hurst).
- (2002), 'The Smooth Transition: Spain's 1978 Constitution and the Nationalities Question', *National Identities*, 4 (3), 223-44.
- Cornellà-Detrell, Jordi (2011), *Literature as a Response to Cultural and Political Repression in Franco's Catalonia*, Colección Tàmesis Serie A: Monografías 295 (Woodbridge: Tamesis).
- Cortés Peña, Antonio Luis (1994), 'El último nacionalismo: Andalucía y su historia', *Manuscripts*, 12, 213-43.
- Cramer, Kathryn (2008), *Catalonia: National Identity and Cultural Policy, 1980-2003* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press).
- (2014), *Goodbye Spain? The Question of Independence for Catalonia* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press/Cañada Blanch).
- (2015), 'Political Power and Civil Counterpower: The Complex Dynamics of the Catalan Independence Movement', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21, 104-20.
- Crang, Mike (1998), *Cultural Geography* (London: Routledge).
- Cruz Artacho, Salvador (2011), *1981-2011: 30 aniversario del Estatuto de Autonomía para Andalucía* (Sevilla: Centro de Estudios Andaluces).
- Cuadras Morató, Xavier (2016) (ed.), *Catalonia: A New Independent State in Europe? A Debate on Secession Within the European Union* (Abingdon: Routledge).

- Davies, Ann (2012), *Spanish Spaces: Landscape, Space and Place in Contemporary Spanish Culture* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press).
- De Blas, Andrés (2006), 'Las bases históricas del Estado Autonómico', in L. López Nieto (ed.), *Relaciones intergubernamentales en la España democrática: interdependencia, autonomía, conflicto y cooperación* (Madrid: Dykinson), pp. 29-37.
- De La Fuente, Ángel (2012), *El nuevo sistema de financiación de las comunidades autónomas de régimen común: un análisis crítico y datos homogéneos para 2009 y 2010*, [www.fundacionsepi.es/ciea/Financiacion%20Autonomica%20\(Angel%20de%20la%20Fuente\).pdf](http://www.fundacionsepi.es/ciea/Financiacion%20Autonomica%20(Angel%20de%20la%20Fuente).pdf). Accessed 20.05.14.
- De Lara, Lutiane, Lluís Camprubí, Neuza Maria de Fátima Guareschi and Carme Borrell (2015), 'Discursos de movimientos sociales sobre la privatización de los servicios de salud catalanes', *Athenea Digital*, 15 (2), 51-80.
- Del Pino, Eloísa (2015), 'Country Study: Spain' in Eurofound, *Delivering Public Services: A Greater Role for the Private Sector? An Exploratory Study in Four Countries* (Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union), pp. 25-39.
- Del Pino, Eloísa and Emmanuele Pavolini (2015), 'Decentralisation at a Time of Harsh Austerity: Multilevel Governance and the Welfare State in Spain and Italy Facing the Crisis', *European Journal of Social Security*, 17 (2), 246-70.
- Della Porta, Donatella and Micheal Keating (2008), 'How Many Approaches in the Social Sciences? An Epistemological Introduction' in their (eds), *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 19-39.
- Diamond, John, Joyce Liddle and Edoardo Ongaro (eds) (2015), *Multi-level Governance* (Emerald), <https://www.dawsonera.com/readonline/9781784418731>. Accessed 22.07.16.
- Diamandouros, P. Nikiforos, Richard Gunther, Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos and Edward E. Malefakis (2006), 'Democracy and the State in the New Southern Europe', in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos (eds), *Democracy and The State in The New Southern Europe*, Oxford Studies in Democratization, 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 1-41.
- Díaz de Sarralde, Santiago (2011), 'La garantía de servicios públicos fundamentales en el nuevo sistema de financiación de las comunidades autónomas', *Presupuesto y Gasto Público*, 62, 85-99.
- Dowling, Andrew (2001), 'The Reconstitution of Political Catalanism 1939-75', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 14 (1), 17-25.
- (2013), *Catalonia Since the Spanish Civil War: Reconstructing the Nation* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press/Cañada Blanch).
- Dunleavy, Patrick and Christopher Hood (1994), 'From Old Public Administration to New Public Management', *Public Money and Management*, 14 (3), 9-16.
- Ealham, Chris and Michael Richards (2005), *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*,

- <http://prism.talis.com/northumbria-ac/items/1498984>. Accessed 01.02.13.
- Echavarren Fernández, José Manuel (2014), *Identidad colectiva en Andalucía desde una perspectiva comparativa* (Sevilla: Centro de Estudios Andaluces).
- Edwards, John (2000), *The Spain of the Catholic Monarchs, 1474-1520* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Elias, Anwen (2015), 'Catalan Independence and the Challenge of Credibility: The Causes and Consequences of Catalan Nationalist Parties' Strategic Behaviour', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21 (1), 83-103.
- Ellwood, Sheelagh M. (1991), *The Spanish Civil War* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- (1994), *Franco, Profiles in Power* series (Harlow: Longman).
- Encarnación, Omar G. (2008), *Spanish Politics: Democracy After Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- (2014), *Democracy Without Justice in Spain: The Politics of Forgetting* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), <https://muse.jhu.edu/>. Accessed 17.09.16.
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (2004), 'Place, Kinship and the Case for Non-ethnic Nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, 10 (1/2), 49-62.
- Erk, Can and Alain-G. Gagnon (2000), 'Constitutional ambiguity and federal trust: Codification of federalism in Canada, Spain and Belgium', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 10 (1), 92-111.
- Esenwein, George and Adrian Shubert (1995), *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939* (London: Longman).
- Esping-Anderson, Gosta (1990), *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Eymeri-Douzans, Jean-Michel and Jon Pierre (eds) (2011), *Administrative Reform and Democratic Governance* (Routledge), www.dawsonera.com/readonline/9780203820339. Accessed 15.09.16.
- Faguet, Jean-Paul (2014), 'Decentralization and Governance', *World Development*, 53, 2-13.
- Fedele, Paolo and Edoardo Ongaro (2008), 'A Common Trend, Different Houses: Devolution in Italy, Spain and the UK', *Public Money and Management*, 28 (2), 85-92.
- Ferlie, Ewan and Louise Fitzgerald (2002), 'The Sustainability of the New Public Management', in Kate McLaughlin, Stephen P. Osborne, and Ewan Ferlie (eds), *New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects* (London: Routledge), pp. 341-54.
- Ferlie, Ewan, Andrew Pettigrew, Lynn Ashburner and Louise Fitzgerald (1996), *The New Public Management in Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Ferlie, Ewan and Edoardo Ongaro (2015), *Strategic Management in Public Services Organizations: Concepts, Schools and Contemporary Issues* (Abingdon: Routledge).
- Fernández Llera, Roberto (2014), 'La mitosis institucional como fenómeno de descentralización interna del sector público', *Gestión y Política Pública*, XXIII (1), 219-65.

- Ferrera, Maurizio (1996), 'The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe', *Journal of European Social Policy*, 6 (17), 17-37.
- Fletcher, Richard (1992), *Moorish Spain* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson).
- Fleurke, Frederik and Rolf Willemsse (2006), 'The European Union and the Autonomy of Sub-national Authorities: Towards an Analysis of Constraints and Opportunities in Sub-national Decision-making', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 16 (1), 83-98.
- Foweraker, Joe (1989), *Making Democracy in Spain: Grass-roots Struggle in the South 1955-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Fusi Aizpurúa, Juan Pablo (2000), *España: La evolución de la identidad nacional* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy).
- Fusi Aizpurúa, Juan Pablo and Jordi Palafox Gámir (1997), *España, 1808-1996: el desafío de la modernidad* (Madrid: Espasa).
- Gagnon, Alain G. (1993), 'The Political Uses of Federalism', in M. Burgess and A. G. Gagnon (eds), *Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf), pp. 17-44.
- Galais, Carol, Enric Martínez-Herrera and Francesc Pallarés (2014), 'A Comparative Study of Citizenship in Three Spanish Autonomous Communities', in Ailsa Henderson, Charlie Jeffrey and Daniel Wincott (eds), *Citizenship after the Nation State: Regionalism, Nationalism and Public Attitudes in Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 52-79.
- Gallego, R. and M. Barzelay (2010), 'Public Management Policymaking in Spain: The Politics of Legislative Reform of Administrative Structures, 1991-1997', *Governance - An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions*, 23 (2), 277-96.
- Gallego, R. and J. Subirats (2012), 'Spanish and Regional Welfare systems: Policy Innovation and Multi-level Governance', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 22 (3), 269-88.
- Gallego, Raquel, Nicolás Barbieri and Sheila González (2016), 'Explaining Cross-regional Policy Variation in Public Sector Reform: Institutions and Change Actors in the Health Sector in Spain', *Public Policy and Administration*, 31 (2), 1-21.
- Gamarra, Oscar Briones, Joaquim Filipe Ferraz Esteves de Araújo and Enrique José Varela Álvarez (2014), 'Crisis and Civil Servants: A Comparative Analysis of Portugal and Spain', Paper presented to ECPR General Conference, Glasgow 2014.
- García-Álvarez, Jacobo and Juan-Manuel Trillo-Santamaría (2013), 'Between Regional Spaces and Spaces of Regionalism: Cross-border Region Building in the Spanish "State of the Autonomies"', *Regional Studies*, 47 (1), 104-15.
- García de Cortázar, Fernando and José Manuel González Vesga (1994), *Breve historia de España* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial).
- Garea, Fernando (2015), 'Rajoy lanza el mayor ajuste contra la crisis', *El País*, 12 July, http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/07/11/actualidad/1342039254_993732.html. Accessed 14.06.15.
- Gellner, Ernest (1996), 'Do Nations Have Navels?', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2 (3), 366-70.
- (2006), *Nations and Nationalism*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell).

- Generalitat de Catalunya (2008), *From the Catalan model of health to the Catalan healthcare system*, http://www.healthacross.eu/fileadmin/root_healthacross/healthacross/results/cerdanya/CatalanHealthSystemTresseras.pdf. Accessed 02.07.15.
- (2014), *Plan de reforma de la Administración de la Generalitat de Cataluña y su sector público*, September.
- (2015), *Transaccions a PICA gener-setembre 2015*, Oficina de Processos i Administració Electrónica.
- Gerth H. H. and C. Wright Mills (1991), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 4th edn (London: Routledge).
- Giannantonio, Cristina M and Amy E. Hurley-Hanson (2011), 'Frederick Winslow Taylor: Reflections on the Relevance of *The Principles of Scientific Management* 100 Years Later', *Journal of Business and Management*, 17 (1), 7-10.
- Gilbert, Josep (2016), 'Puigdemont impulsa un frente común en defensa del corredor mediterráneo ante la UE', *La Vanguardia* 16 March, http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20160316/40471178893/carles-puigdemont-corredor-mediterraneo.html?utm_campaign=botones_sociales. Accessed 16.03.16.
- Gillespie, Richard (2015), 'Between Accommodation and Contestation: The Political Evolution of Basque and Catalan Nationalism', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21 (1), 3-23.
- Gilmore, David D. (1981), 'Andalusian Regionalism: Anthropological Perspectives', *Iberian Studies*, X (2), 59-67.
- Gil-Ruiz Gil-Esparza, Carmen Luisa and Jaime Iglesias Quintana (2007), 'El gasto público en España en un contexto descentralizado', *Presupuesto y Gasto Público*, 47, 185-206.
- Gil-Serrate, Ramiro, Julio López-Laborda and Jesús Mur (2011), 'Revenue Autonomy and Regional Growth: An Analysis of the 25-year Process of Fiscal Decentralization in Spain', *Environment and Planning A*, 43, 2626-48.
- Giménez Martínez, Miguel Ángel (2014), 'Autoritarismo y modernización de la Administración Pública española durante el franquismo', *Revista de Estudios de la Administración Local y Autonómica*, 1, 1-19.
- Giner, Salvador (1980), *The Social Structure of Catalonia* (Sheffield: The Anglo-Catalan Society Occasional Publications).
- Giner, Salvador and Luis Moreno (1990), 'Centro y periferia: La dimensión étnica de la sociedad española', in Salvador Giner (ed.), *España: sociedad y política*, Tomo 1 (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe), pp. 169-97.
- Giordano, Benito and Elisa Roller (2002), 'Catalonia and the "Idea of Europe": Competing Strategies and Discourses within Catalan Party Politics', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 9 (2), 99-113.
- (2004), '¿Té para todos? A Comparison of the Processes of Devolution in Spain and the UK', *Environment and Planning A*, 36, 2163-81.
- Gómez, Alberto (2015), 'El Partido Andalucista pone fin a cuatro décadas de historia', *El Diariosur*, 12 September, www.diariosur.es/andalucia/201509/12/pone-cuatro-decadas-historia-20150912195656.html. Accessed 09.12.15.

- González, Jesús S. (2016), 'Los expertos tampoco creen que España cumpla el déficit este año', *El País*, 14 June, http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2016/07/14/actualidad/1468527149_480843.html. Accessed 04.08.16.
- González Antón, Luis (1997), *España y las Españas* (Madrid: Alianza).
- González de Molina Navarro, Eduardo and Salvador Cruz Artacho (2011), 'Pasado y presente de tres décadas de autogobierno', in Centro de Estudios Andaluces *Andalucía, 30 años de su historia* (Sevilla: Fundación Pública Andaluza), pp. 6-9.
- González de Molina, Manuel and Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán (1987), 'En los orígenes del nacionalismo andaluz: reflexiones en torno al proceso fallido de socialización del andalucismo histórico', *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 10, 73-95.
- González Espinosa, Carmen (2013), 'Reordenación del Sector Público Andaluz: Las Agencias', Proyecto Fin de Grado de Gestión y Administración Pública, <http://repositorio.ual.es:8080/jspui/bitstream/10835/2418/1/Trabajo.pdf>. Accessed 15.02.16.
- González García, Ignacio (2014), 'La Devolución Unilateral de Competencias por las Comunidades Autónomas', *Teoría y Realidad Constitucional*, 34, 477-504.
- González-Santiago, Lalia (2013), 'No podremos recortar mil millones más el año que viene', *El Diariosur* 22 December, www.diariosur.es/v/20131222/andalucia/podremos-recortar-millones-viene-20131222.html. Accessed 20.02.14.
- Goñi, Eduardo Zapico (1992), 'Financial Management Development in Spain: Who is Playing Sancho Panza?', *Public Budgeting and Finance*, 12 (4), 47-69.
- Gortner, Harold F. (1981), *Administration in the Public Sector*, 2nd edn (New York: Wiley).
- Gottlieb, Gidon (1999), 'Between Union and Separation: The Path of Conciliation', in E. Mortimer and R. Fine (eds), *People, Nation and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism* (London: I. B. Tauris), pp. 118-24.
- Graham, Helen (2012), *The War and Its Shadow: Spain's Civil War in Europe's Long Twentieth Century* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press/Cañada Blanch).
- Gray, Caroline M. (2014), 'Smoke and Mirrors: How Regional Finances Complicate Spanish-Catalan Relations', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 27 (1), 21-42.
- Greenwood, John R., Robert Pyper and David J. Wilson (2002), *New Public Administration in Britain*, 3rd edn (London: Routledge).
- Greve, Carsten, Matthew Flinders and Sandra Van Thiel (1999), 'Quangos - What's in a Name? Defining Quangos from a Comparative Perspective', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, 12, (2), 129-46.
- Gualmini, Elisabetta (2008), 'Restructuring Weberian Bureaucracy: Comparing Managerial Reforms in Europe and the United States', *Public Administration*, 86 (1), 75-94.

- Guibernau, Mònica (1999), *Nations Without States: Political Communities in a Global Age* (Oxford: Wiley).
- (2000), 'Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53 (1), 55-68.
- (2004a), 'Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment', *Nations and Nationalism*, 10 (1/2), 125-41.
- (2004b), *Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Transition and Democracy* (London: Routledge).
- (2013), *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Polity), <http://www.dawsonera.com/search?q=monserrat+guibernau&sType=AUTHOR&searchFrom=0&sortBy=0&windowScroll=12>. Accessed 04.09.16.
- Guibernau, Mònica, François Rocher and Elisenda Adam (2014), 'Introduction: A Special Section on Self-Determination and the Use of Referendums: Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 27 (1), 1-3.
- Guillén, Ana M. and Laura Cabiedes (1997), 'Towards a National Health Service in Spain: The Search for Equity and Efficiency', *Journal of European Social Policy*, 7 (4), 319-36.
- Guinjoan, Marc and Toni Rodon (2014), 'Beyond Identities: Political Determinants of Support for Decentralization in Contemporary Spain', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 24 (1), 21-41.
- Gunther, Richard, José Ramón Montero and Joan Botella (2004), *Democracy in Modern Spain* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
- Gutiérrez-Rubi (2015), 'Andalucía y Cataluña: ¿La nueva alianza?', *El País*, 26 March, http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/03/26/catalunya/1427389508_740833.html. Accessed 31.03.15.
- Hague, Rod and Martin Harrop (2007), *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 7th edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Häkli, Jouni (1998), 'Cross-border Regionalisation in the 'New Europe': Theoretical Reflection with two Illustrative Examples', *Geopolitics*, 3 (3), 83-103.
- Hallebone, Erica and Jan Priest (2009), *Business and Management Research: Paradigms and Practices* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Hanley, David and John Loughlin (2006), *Spanish Political Parties* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press).
- Harguindéguy, Jean-Baptiste (2007), 'Cross-border Policy in Europe: Implementing INTERREG III-A, France-Spain', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 17 (3), 317-34.
- Heady, Ferrel (2001), *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, 6th edn (New York: Dekker).
- Hearn, Jonathan (2006), *Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Hernández, Francesc Xavier (2007), *The History of Catalonia* (Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau).
- Hernández, José A. and Joaquín Gil (2016), 'Artur Mas gastó 18,5 millones en "embajadas" en plena crisis', *El País*, 2 July, http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/08/01/actualidad/1470066880_944583.html. Accessed 04.08.16.

- Herrero, Luis (2007), *Los que le llamábamos Adolfo* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros).
- Heywood, Paul (1995), *The Government and Politics of Spain* (London: Macmillan).
- (1995a), 'Sleaze in Spain', *Public Affairs*, 4, 726-37.
- Hill, Michael (1997), *The Policy Process in the Modern State*, 3rd edn (London: Prentice Hall).
- Hirschman, Albert O. (1970), *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press).
- (1995), *A Propensity to Self-subversion* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press).
- Hood, Christopher (1976), *The Limits of Administration* (London: Wiley).
- (1991), 'A Public Management For All Seasons?', *Public Administration*, 69, 3-9.
- Hood, Christopher and Martin Lodge (2006), *The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty - And Blame* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Arian H. Schakel (2010), *The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study of 42 Democracies* (Abingdon: Routledge).
- Hopkin, Jonathan (2001), 'A "Southern Model" of Electoral Mobilisation? Clientelism and Electoral Politics in Spain', *West European Politics*, 24 (1), 115-36.
- Hudson, Ray (2007), 'Regions and Regional Uneven Development Forever? Some Reflective Comments upon Theory and Practice', *Regional Studies*, 41 (9), 1149-60.
- Hughes, Owen E. (2012), *Public Management and Public Administration: An Introduction*, 4th edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Humblebæk, Carsten (2014), *Spain: Inventing the Nation*, (London: Bloomsbury Academic), <http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474210980.ch-001>. Accessed 05.09.16.
- Hutchinson, John (1994), *Modern Nationalism* (London: Fontana Press).
- (2001), 'Nations and Culture', in M. Guibernau and M. Hutchinson, *Understanding Nationalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 74-96.
- Jeffrey, Charlie (2000), 'Sub-National Mobilization and European Integration: Does it Make Any Difference?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38 (1), 1-23.
- (2014), 'Regional Public Attitudes beyond Methodological Nationalism', in Ailsa Henderson, Charlie Jeffrey and Daniel Wincott (eds), *Citizenship after the Nation State: Regionalism, Nationalism and Public Attitudes in Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1-30.
- Jiménez, Fernando and Manuel Villoria (2012), 'Political Finance, Urban Development and Political Corruption in Spain', in Jonathan Mendilow (ed.), *Money, Corruption and Political Competition in Established and Emerging Democracies*, pp. 109-27, Lexington ebook, [http://reader.ebilib.com/\(S\(ajkiat0tsraetw5hddb00ok4\)\)/Reader.aspx?p=1037793&o=1066&u=LnEPWX3Ose7HcDXyvHBZf4WfPfe%3d&t=1474037207&h=AA275E2A7D9FB7339682CFA038C6EE5E44D1E7B](http://reader.ebilib.com/(S(ajkiat0tsraetw5hddb00ok4))/Reader.aspx?p=1037793&o=1066&u=LnEPWX3Ose7HcDXyvHBZf4WfPfe%3d&t=1474037207&h=AA275E2A7D9FB7339682CFA038C6EE5E44D1E7B)

[3&s=48010791&ut=3487&pg=109&r=img&c=-1&pat=n&cms=-1&sd=2#](#). Accessed 16.09.16.

- Jiménez Asensio, Rafael (2013), 'Estrategias para modernizar la gestión pública de recursos humanos en un contexto de contención presupuestaria: efectos de las medidas de ajuste, instrumentos de planificación y medidas de innovación', *Revista Vasca de Gestión de Personas y Organizaciones Públicas*, 4, 76-96.
- Juliá, Santos (2004), *Historias de las dos Españas* (Madrid: Taurus).
- Junta de Andalucía (2009), *Sistema Sanitario Público Andaluz*, www.iasist.com/files/Eloisa_Fernandez.pdf. Accessed 19.12.15.
- (2012), *Informe Económico de Andalucía 2012*, www.juntadeandalucia.es/export/drupaljda/2013%20%20Informe_Economico_Andalucia_2012.pdf. Accessed 18.04.16.
- (2014a), 'Proyecto de Presupuesto de la Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía', www.juntadeandalucia.es/presidencia/portavoz/resources/files/2014/10/28/1414496551952C.pdf. Accessed 12.11.14.
- (2014b), 'Presupuesto de la Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía 2015', www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/planif_presup/presupuesto2015/estado/estado.html. Accessed 26.11.14.
- (2015), Discurso de Investidura de Susana Díaz ante el Parlamento de Andalucía, 4 de mayo de 2015.
- Kamarck, Elaine Ciulla (2000), 'Globalization and Public Administration Reform', in Joseph S. Jnr Nye and John D. Donahue (eds), *Governance in a Globalizing World* (Washington, DC: Visions of Governance for the 21st Century/Brookings Institution Press), pp. 229-52.
- Kamen, Henry (1973), *A Concise History of Spain* (London: Thames and Hudson).
- Kassam, Ashifa (2015), 'Spaniards aim for a new democracy and end to Franco's long shadow', *The Guardian*, 20 November, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/spaniards-aim-for-a-new-democracy-and-end-to-francos-long-shadow. Accessed 20.11.15.
- Katselas, Anna T. (2014), 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration', *Nebraska Law Review*, 93 (2), 313-69.
- Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair (2009), 'The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement', *Perspectives on Politics*, 7, 753-66.
- Kay, Adrian (2005), 'A Critique of the Use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies', *Public Administration*, 83 (3), 553-71.
- Keating, Michael (1998), *The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
- (2000), 'The Minority Nation of Spain and European Integration: A New Framework for Autonomy?', *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies*, 1 (1), 29-42.
- Keating, Micheal, John Loughlin and Kris Deschouwer (2003), *Culture, Institutions and Economic Development* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
- Keating, Michael and Alex Wilson (2009), 'Renegotiating the State of Autonomies: Statute Reform and Multi-level Politics in Spain', *West European Politics*, 32 (3), 536-58.
- Kedourie, Elie (1993), *Nationalism*, 4th edn (Oxford: Blackwell).

- Kenichi, Ohmae (1996), *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (London: Harper Collins).
- Kettunen, Pauli and Klaus Peterson (2011), 'Rethinking Welfare State Models', in *Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy*, ed. by Kettunen and Peterson (Elgar Online), www.elgaronline.com/view/9781848445697.xml. Accessed 16.09.16.
- Kickert, Walter (2007), 'Public Management Reforms in Countries with a Napoleonic State Model: France, Italy and Spain', in Christopher Pollitt, Sandra van Thiel and Vincent Homburg (eds), *New Public Management in Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 26-51.
- (2011), 'Distinctiveness of Administrative Reform in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Common Characteristics of Context, Administrations and Reforms', *Public Administration*, 89 (3), 801-18.
- Kiernan, Annabel (2015), 'Exit, Voice and Loyalty: The Dislocation of Football Fan Communities', *Soccer & Society*, DOI: 10.1080/14660970.2015.1067795. Accessed 02.03.16.
- King, Desmond S. (1989), 'Political Centralization and State Interests in Britain: The 1986 Abolition of the GLC and MCCs', *Comparative Political Studies*, 21 (4), 467-94.
- King, Preston (1982), *Federalism and Federation* (London: Croom Helm).
- Kitson, Michael, Ron Martin and Peter Tyler (2011), 'The Geographies of Austerity', *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 4, 289-302.
- Knill, Christoph (1999), 'Explaining Cross-National Variance in Administrative Reform: Autonomous v Instrumental Bureaucracies', *Journal of Public Policies*, 19, 113-39.
- Korpi W. and J. Palme (1998), 'The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equalities: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality and Poverty in the Western Countries', *American Sociological Review*, 63 (5), 661-87.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press).
- Lacomba, Juan Antonio (1987), *La represión en Andalucía durante la guerra civil: el asesinato de Blas Infante* (Sevilla: Fundación Blas Infante).
- (1992), 'Algunas consideraciones sobre la historia de Andalucía', in *Andalucía y los Andaluces: Propuestas para un debate*, ed. by Lacomba (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga), pp. 23-35.
- (ed.) (2001), *Historia de Andalucía*, 2nd edn (Málaga: Editorial Ágora).
- Lane, Jan-Erik (2000), *The Public Sector: Concepts, Models and Approaches*, 3rd edn (London: SAGE).
- Lawton, Alan and Aidan Rose (1994), *Organisation and Management in the Public Sector*, 2nd edn (London: Pitman).
- Legido-Quigley, Helena, Laura Otero, Daniel La Parra, Carlos Alvarez-Dardet, José M. Martín-Moreno and Martin McKee (2013), 'Will Austerity Cuts Dismantle Spain's Healthcare System?', *British Medical Journal*, 346 (7914), 18-9.
- Leibfried, Stephan (1992), 'Towards a European Welfare State? On Integrating Poverty Regimes into the European Community', in Z. Ferge and J. E. Kolberg (eds), *Social Policy in a Changing Europe* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag), pp. 245-80.

- Léon Solís, Fernando (2003), *Negotiating Spain and Catalonia: Competing Narratives of National Identity* (Bristol: Intellect Books).
- (2010), 'Revealing the Truth: Catalonia, the Self-Sacrificial Victim of Spain', *Ámbitos*, 19, 77-96.
- Levine, C. H. (1978), 'Organizational Decline and Cutback Management', *Public Administration Review*, 38 (4), 316-25.
- Linz, Juan J. and Alfred C. Stepan (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press).
- Llamazares, Iván and Gary Marks (2006), 'Multi-level Governance and the Transformation of Regional Mobilization and Identity in Southern Europe, with Particular Attention to Catalonia and the Basque Country', in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos (eds), *Democracy and The State in The New Southern Europe*, Oxford Studies in Democratization, 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 235-62.
- Lomax, Derek W. (1984), *La Reconquista* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica).
- López Laborda, Julio and Carlos Monasterio Escudero (2007) 'Regional Governments: Vertical Imbalances and Revenue Assignments', in Jorge Martínez-Vázquez and José Félix Sanz-Sanz (eds), *Fiscal Reform in Spain: Accomplishments and Challenges* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 422-52.
- Losada, Antón and Ramón Máiz (2005), 'Devolution and Involution: Decentralization Politics through Education Policies in Spain (1996-2004)', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 15 (4), 437-51.
- Loughlin, John (2000), 'Regional Autonomy and State Paradigm Shifts in Western Europe', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 10 (2), 10-34.
- (2001), 'The Transformation of the Democratic State in Western Europe', in *Subnational Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. by Loughlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.1-33.
- (2011), 'The Transformation of the Democratic State in Western Europe', in Ferran Requejo and Miquel Caminal (eds), *Political Liberalism and Plural Democracies* (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 44-68.
- Lowndes, Vivien (2009), 'New Institutionalism and Urban Politics', in Jonathan S. Davies and David L. Imbus (eds), *Theories of Urban Politics*, 2nd edn (London: SAGE), pp. 91-105.
- Lucio, Lourdes (2014), 'La Junta estudia recurrir a los tribunales el aplazamiento de la financiación', *El País*, 28 July, http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2014/06/28/andalucia/1403974574_257779.html. Accessed 29.06.16.
- Lynn Jr, Laurence E. (2003), 'Public Management', in B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (eds), *Handbook of Public Administration* (London: SAGE), pp. 14-24.
- Machado Santiago, Rafael and Ott Kurs (2000), 'Andalucía y Estonia: Diferenciación espacio-territorial de dos regiones periféricas en Europa', *Cuadernos Geográficos*, 30, 165-91.
- MacLennan, Julio Crespo (2000), *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85*, St Antony's Series (Basingstoke: Palgrave).

- Magone, José M. (2004), *Contemporary Spanish Politics* (London: Routledge).
- Manganas, Nicholas (2016), *Las dos Españas: Terror and Crisis in Contemporary Spain* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press/Cañada Blanch).
- [http://reader.ebib.com/\(S\(sfatek12ym51pzo5ufv4z1qg\)\)/Reader.aspx?p=4649456&o=1066&u=LnEPWX3Ose7HcDXyvHBZf4WfPfe%3d&t=1473083538&h=B44977E8D1F0DD218C1D8B33C3EAFE394D16B716&s=47710167&ut=3487&pg=1&r=img&c=-1&pat=n&cms=-1&sd=2#](http://reader.ebib.com/(S(sfatek12ym51pzo5ufv4z1qg))/Reader.aspx?p=4649456&o=1066&u=LnEPWX3Ose7HcDXyvHBZf4WfPfe%3d&t=1473083538&h=B44977E8D1F0DD218C1D8B33C3EAFE394D16B716&s=47710167&ut=3487&pg=1&r=img&c=-1&pat=n&cms=-1&sd=2#). Accessed 05.09.16.
- Maor, Moshe and Jan-Erik Lane (eds) (1999), *Comparative Public Administration: Volume 1 Analytical Frameworks and Critiques* (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Mar-Molinero, Clare (1996), 'The Role of Language in Spanish Nation-Building', in Clare Mar-Molinero and Ángel Smith (eds), *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford: Berg), pp. 69-87.
- Mar-Molinero, Clare and Ángel Smith (eds) (1996), *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford: Berg).
- Martí, David (2013), 'The 2012 Catalan Election: The First Step Towards Independence?', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 23 (4), pp 507-16.
- Martín, José-Luis, Carlos Martínez Shaw, and Javier Tusell (1998), *Historia de España* (Madrid: Taurus).
- Martín-Arroyo, Javier (2016), 'Dimite un alto cargo del Gobierno andaluz tras su imputación en los ERE', *El País*, 31 January, http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/01/30/actualidad/1454168410_933693.html. Accessed 09.02.16.
- Martínez Shaw, Carlos (1998), 'Segunda Parte: La Edad Moderna', in José-Luis Martín, Carlos Martínez Shaw and Javier Tusell, *Historia de España* (Madrid: Taurus), pp. 211-405.
- Martínez, Silvia (2015), 'Bruselas reitera que una Catalunya independiente quedaría fuera de la UE', *El Periódico*, 17 September, <http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/politica/comision-europea-catalunya-independiente-fuera-union-europea-4515410>. Accessed 15.02.16.
- Massey, Andrew (2004), 'Modernisation as Europeanisation: The Impact of the European Union on Public Administration', *Policy Studies*, 25 (1), 19-33.
- Mateos, Aranceli and Alberto Penadés (2013), 'España: crisis y recortes', *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 33 (1), 161-83.
- McCrone, David (2006), 'Nations or Regions: In or Out of the State?', in G. Delanty and K. Kumar (eds), *The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalisms* (London: SAGE), pp. 238-47.
- McLaughlin, Kate, Stephen P. Osborne and Ewan Ferlie (eds) (2002), *New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects* (London: Routledge).
- McRoberts, Kenneth (2001), *Catalonia: Nation Building Without A State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

- Mees, Ludger (2003), *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: the Basque Clash of Identities* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Meegan, Richard, Patricia Kennett, Gerwyn Jones and Jacqui Croft (2014), 'Global Economic Crisis, Austerity and Neoliberal Urban Governance in England', *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 7, 137–53.
- Mendizabal, Nagore Calvo (2014), 'Crisis Management, Re-centralization and the Politics of Austerity in Spain', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 27 (1), 3-20.
- Miley, Thomas Jeffrey (2013), 'Blocked Articulation and Nationalist Hegemony in Catalonia', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 23 (1), 7-26.
- Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas (MAP) (1989), *Reflexiones para la modernización de la Administración* (Madrid: MAP).
- Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (MHAP) (2014), *Informe sobre la reordenación del sector público autonómico*, <http://cdrportal.minhap.gob.es/Documentacion/Publico/PortalVarios/FinanciacionTerritorial/Autonómica/InformeReordenacion01-07-2014.pdf>. Accessed 03.09.15.
- (2015a), *Boletín Estadístico del Personal al Servicio de las Administraciones Públicas*, January 2015, http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/dms/es/web/publicaciones/centro_de_publicaciones_de_la_sgt/Periodicas/parrafo/Boletin_Estadis_Personal/BEP-ENERO-2105.PDF. Accessed 23.10.15.
- (2015b), *Informe sobre el impacto del sector público autonómico en la actividad económico-financiera de las Comunidades Autónomas*, <http://serviciostelematicos.minhap.gob.es/ISPANET/index.aspx?pub='ISPANET'>. Accessed 24.09.15.
- (2015c), *Presupuestos Generales de las Comunidades Autónomas, 2015*, http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/publicacionpresupuestos/html/Menu_REP.htm. Accessed 17.8.15.
- Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública (2009), *Informe Económico-Financiero de las Administraciones Territoriales en 2009*, http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/dms/es/web/areas/politica_autonomic_a/info_basica/2anaeco/iefaatt/texto_completo_09/IEFAT-2009. Accessed 07.08.14.
- Molina Álvarez de Cienfuegos, Ignacio (1999), 'Spain: Still the Primacy of Corporatism?', in Edward C. Page and Vincent Wright (eds), *Bureaucratic Elites in Western European States: A Comparative Analysis of Top Officials* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 32-54.
- Montilla, José (2009), 'Spirit of Catalonia Today', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 22 (3), 219-31.
- Morata, Francesc (2007), 'La europeización del Estado autonómico', in Francesc Morata and Gemma Mateo (eds), *España en Europa – Europa en España (1986-2006)* (Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB), pp. 149-178.
- Moreno, Isidoro (1981), 'Primer descubrimiento consciente de la identidad andaluza, 1868-1890', in Antonio-Miguel Bernal (ed.), *Historia de Andalucía, vol VIII, La Andalucía contemporánea, 1868-1981* (Madrid/Barcelona), pp. 233-51, cited in Clare Mar-Molinero and

- Ángel Smith (1996: 8), *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford: Berg).
- (1984), *Identidad cultural y dependencia. Orígenes, bases, bloqueos y desarrollo del nacionalismo andaluz*, www.nacionandaluza.info/biblioteca%20andaluza/IsidoroMoreno-IdentidadCulturalydependencia.pdf. Accessed 30.07.15.
- (no date), *La identidad histórica y cultural de Andalucía*, www.nacionandaluza.info/biblioteca%20andaluza/IsidoroMoreno-LaidentidadhistoricayculturaldeAndalucia.pdf. Accessed 21.08.14.
- (2002), 'La cultura andaluza en el comienzo del tercer milenio: balance y perspectivas', *Revista de Estudios Regionales*, 63, 137-57.
- Moreno, Luis (2001), *The Federalization of Spain* (London: Frank Cass).
- (2001a), 'La vía media española del modelo de bienestar mediterráneo', *Papers* 63-64 (Barcelona: Universidad Autónoma), 67-82.
- Moreno, Luis and Carlos Trelles (2005), 'Decentralization and Welfare Reform in Andalusia', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 15 (4), 519-35.
- Moreno-Luzón, Javier (2007), 'Political Clientelism, Elites, and *Caciquismo* in Restoration Spain (1875–1923)', *European History Quarterly*, 37 (3), 417-41.
- Muñoz de Bustillo, Rafael and José-Ignacio Antón (2013), 'Those were the days, my friend. The public sector and the economic crisis in Spain', in D. Vaughan-Whitehead (ed.), *Public Sector Shock: The Impact of Policy Retrenchment in Europe* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), www.elgaronline.com/view/9781781955345.xml. Accessed 27.06.16
- Muro, Diego and Alejandro Quiroga (2005), 'Spanish Nationalism: Ethnic or Civic?', *Ethnicities*, 5 (1), 9-29.
- Muro, Diego (2008), *Ethnicity and Violence: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism* (London: Routledge).
- (2015), 'When Do Countries Recentralize? Ideology and Party Politics in the Age of Austerity', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21 (1), 24-43.
- Murray, Philomena B. (2011), 'Ideas of Regionalism: The European Case', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 12 (2), 305-22.
- Noferini, Andrea (2012), 'The Participation of Subnational Governments in the Council of the EU: Some Evidence from Spain', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 22 (4), 361-85.
- North, Douglass C. (1990), *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Núñez Seixas, Xosé M. (2001), 'What is Spanish Nationalism Today? From Legitimacy Crisis to Unfulfilled Renovation (1975-2000)', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24 (5), 719-52.
- (2005), 'Nations in arms against the invader: on nationalist discourses during the Spanish civil war', in Chris Ealham and Michael Richards, *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939*, pp. 45-67, <http://prism.talis.com/northumbria-ac/items/1498984>. Accessed 01.02.13.
- Olmedo, Antonio (2013), 'Policy-makers, Market Advocates and Edubusinesses: New and Renewed Players in the Spanish Education Policy Arena', *Journal of Education Policy*, 28 (1), 55-76.

- Ongaro, Edoardo (2009), *Public Management Reform and Modernization: Trajectories of Administrative Change in Italy, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
- (2012), 'From Reluctant to Compelled Reformers? Reflections on Three Decades of Public Management Reform in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain', in John Diamond and Joyce Liddle (eds), *Emerging and Potential Trends in Public Management: An Age of Austerity* (Bingley: Emerald), pp. 105-27.
- (2015), 'Multi-level Governance: The Missing Linkages', in John Diamond, Joyce Liddle and Edoardo Ongaro (eds), *Multi-level Governance* (Emerald), <https://www.dawsonera.com/readonline/9781784418731>. Accessed 22.07.16.
- Orquín, Carlos (2016), 'El nuevo partido de Mas dice que no renunciará a su nombre', *El País*, 14 July, http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/07/14/catalunya/1468487201_613616.html. Accessed 14.07.16.
- Overmans, J. F. A. and Mirko Noordegraaf (2014), 'Managing Austerity: Rhetorical and Real Responses to Fiscal Stress in Local Government', *Public Money and Management*, 34 (2), 99-106.
- Osborne, David and Ted Gaebler (1992), *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley).
- Painter, Martin and B. Guy Peters (2010), *Tradition and Public Administration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- (2010a), 'The Analysis of Administrative Traditions', in *Tradition and Public Administration*. ed. by Painter and Peters (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 3-18.
- (2010b), 'Administrative Traditions in Comparative Perspective: Families, Groups and Hybrids', in their (eds), *Tradition and Public Administration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 19-30.
- Paquette, Gabriel B. (2009), 'Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies in the Long Eighteenth Century', in *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c.1750-1830*, ed. by Paquette, ebook dawsonera.com/abstract/9781409281, pp. 1-20. Accessed 28.06.13.
- Parrado Díez, Salvador (1996), 'Spain', in David Farnham (ed.), *New Public Managers in Europe: Public Servants in Transition* (Basingstoke: Macmillan), pp. 257-77.
- (2008), 'Failed Policies but Institutional Innovation through "Layering" and "Diffusion" in Spanish Central Administration', *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 21 (2), 230-52.
- (2011), 'The Development and Current Features of the Spanish Civil Service', in Frits M. van der Meer (ed.), *Civil Service Systems in Western Europe* (Elgar), www.elgaronline.com/view/9781848442436.xml, pp. 243-70. Accessed 16.09.16.
- Payne, John (2009), *Catalonia: History and Culture* (Nottingham: Five Leaves Publications).
- Payne, Stanley G. (1993), *Spain's First Democracy: the Second Republic, 1931-1936* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press).
- (2011), *Spain: A Unique History* (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press).

- (2012), *The Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), [online]
<http://northumbria.ebib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=977146>.
 Accessed 06.09.16.
- Pedrote, Isabel (2008), *La extinción del andalucismo*, http://elpais.com/diario/2008/03/17/andalucia/1205709725_850215.html. Accessed 01.01.16.
- Pérez-Díaz, Victor (1998), *The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Pérez García, Francisco, Vicent Cucarella Tormo and Laura Hernández Lahiguera (2015), *Servicios públicos, diferencias territoriales e igualdad de oportunidades*, [http://www.fbbva.es/TLFU/dat/INFORME_SERVICIOS_PUBLICOS_FUNDAMENTALES%20 FFBVA-IVIE.pdf](http://www.fbbva.es/TLFU/dat/INFORME_SERVICIOS_PUBLICOS_FUNDAMENTALES%20FFBVA-IVIE.pdf).
 Accessed 12.01.16.
- Peters, B. Guy (1995), *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, 4th edn (London: Routledge).
- (2008), 'The Napoleonic Tradition', *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 21 (2), 118-32.
- Peters, B. Guy and Martin Painter (2010), 'Administrative Traditions in an Era of Administrative Change', in *Tradition and Public Administration*, ed. by Peters and Painter (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 234-8.
- Peters, B. Guy, Jon Pierre and Tiina Randma-Liiv (2011), 'Global Financial Crisis, Public Administration and Governance: Do New Problems Require New Solutions?', *Public Organization Review*, 11, 13-27.
- Pierce, Roger (2008), *Research Methods and Politics: A Practical Guide* (London: SAGE).
- Pierre, Jon (1995), 'Comparative Public Administration: the State of the Art', in *Bureaucracy in the Modern State: An Introduction to Comparative Public Administration*, ed. by Pierre (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 1-17.
- Pierson, Paul (1998), 'The Path to European Integration: A Historical-institutionalist Analysis', in Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), *European Integration and Supranational Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 27-58.
- (2004), *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Piñol, Àngels (2016), 'La CUP abunda que desacatará al Constitucional para seguir desplegando el proceso', *El País*, 1 August, http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/08/01/catalunya/1470057633_816102.html. Accessed 20.08.16.
- Pollitt, Christopher (2010), 'Cuts and Reforms – Public Services as we move into a new era', *Society and Economy*, 32, 17-31.
- (ed.) (2013), *Context in Public Policy and Management: The Missing Link?* (Elgar Online), www.elgaronline.com/view/9781781955130.xml.
 Accessed 16.09.16.
- Pollitt, Christopher and Geert Bouckaert (2011), *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis: New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State*, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

- Pons-Altés, Josep M. and Miguel A. López-Morell (2016), 'Barcelona and the Tragic Week of 1909: A Crazy Mob or Citizens in Revolt?', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 29 (1), 3-19.
- Porrás Nadales, Antonio J. (2005), 'La reforma de la administración andaluza y los desafíos de la segunda modernización', *Revista de Fomento Social*, 60, 463-90.
- (2007), 'El Nuevo Estatuto de Autonomía de Andalucía', *Revista de Fomento Social*, 62, 31-48.
- Prat de la Riba, Enric (1998), *La nacionalidad catalana/La nacionalitat catalana* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva).
- Presidencia del Gobierno (1982), *Spanish Constitution* (Madrid: Presidencia del Gobierno).
- Pressman, Jeffrey L. and Aaron Wildavsky (1984), *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes*, 3rd edn (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
- Preston, Paul (1993), *Franco: A Biography* (London: HarperCollins).
- (2003), *Juan Carlos: el rey de un pueblo* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janés Editores).
- (2006), *The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge* (London: Harper Perennial).
- (2016), *The Last Days of the Spanish Republic* (London: Williams Collins).
- Pujas, Veronique and Martin Rhodes (2002), 'Party Finance and Political Scandal: Comparing Italy, Spain, and France', in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (eds), *Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts*, 3rd edn (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers), pp. 739-60.
- Radaelli, C. M. (2003), 'The Europeanization of Public Policy', in K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 27-56, <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3052703>. Accessed 05.08.16.
- Rainey, Hal G. (1994), 'On Paradigms, Progress, and Prospects for Public Management', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 4, 41-8.
- Ramajo, Javier (2013), 'La disputa política entre Andalucía y Madrid suma ya 19 batallas abiertas en el Constitucional', *El Diario* 7 May, www.eldiario.es/andalucia/Gobierno-Junta-cuentas-pendientes-Constitucional_0_129837584.html. Accessed 19.05.16.
- Ramana, M. V. (2013), 'Nuclear Policy Responses to Fukushima: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 69, 66-76.
- Ramió, Carles (2012), *La extraña pareja: La procelosa relación entre políticos y funcionarios* (Madrid: Catarata).
- Ramió, Carles and Miquel Salvador (2002). 'La configuración de las administraciones de las comunidades autónomas - entre la inercia: la innovación institucional' in Joan Subirats and Raquel Gallego (eds), *Veinte años de autonomías en España* (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), pp. 99-133.

- Ramos, Severiano Fernández (2011), 'La reordenación del sector público andaluz: reflexiones para el debate', *Revista Andaluza de Administración Pública*, 80, 13-80.
- Requejo, Ferran (2005), *Multi-National Federation and Value Pluralism* (London: Routledge).
- (2010), 'Revealing the Dark Side of Traditional Democracies in Plurinational Societies: The Case of Catalonia and the Spanish 'Estado de las Autonomías'', *Nations and Nationalism*, 16 (1), 148-68.
- Requejo, Ferran and Miquel Caminal (2011), 'Liberal Democracies, National Pluralism and Federalism', in *Political Liberalism and Plural Democracies*, ed. by Requejo and Caminal (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 1-10.
- Resina, Joan Ramon (ed.) (2000), *Disremembering the Dictatorship: The Politics of Memory in the Spanish Transition to Democracy* (Amsterdam: Rodopi).
- Rhodes, Martin (1997), 'Southern European Welfare States: Identity, Problems and Prospects for Reform', in Martin Rhodes (ed.), *Southern European Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform* (London: Frank Cass), pp. 1-22.
- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996), 'The New Governance: Governing without Government', *Political Studies* 44 (4), 652—667.
- Richards, Michael (1998) *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936-1945*, Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Rincón, Reyes (2015), 'El Supremo cree que Chaves y Griñán prevaricaron en el 'caso de los ERE'', *El País*, 25 June, http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/06/25/actualidad/1435232645_795454.html. Accessed 09.02.16.
- Risques, Manel, Angel Duarte, Borja de Riquer and Josep M. Roig Rosich (1997), *Història de la catalunya contemporània de la guerra francès al nou estatut* (Barcelona: Mina).
- Roca, Francesc (2000), *Teories de Catalunya: Guia de la Societat Catalana contemporània* (Barcelona: Pòrtic).
- Roca Junyent, Miquel (2000), 'To Reform or Not to Reform the Constitution? A Catalan View', in Monica Threlfall (ed.), *Consensus Politics in Spain: Insider Perspectives* (Bristol: Intellect Books), pp. 77-88.
- Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés and Richard Sandall (2008), 'From Identity to the Economy: Analysing the Evolution of the Decentralisation Discourse', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 26, 54-72.
- Rodon, Toni and María José Hierro (2016), 'Podemos and Ciudadanos Shake Up the Spanish Party System: The 2015 Local and Regional Elections', *South European Society and Politics*, 3, 1-19.
- Roller, Elisa (2002), 'Reforming the Spanish Senate: Mission Impossible?', *West European Politics*, 25 (4), 69-92.
- Rondinelli, Dennis A. and John R. Nellis (1986), 'Assessing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: The Case for Optimism', *Development Policy Review*, 4 (1), 3-23.

- Rouban, Luc (2008), 'Reform without Doctrine: Public Management in France', *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 21 (2), 33-149.
- Ruiz Almendral, Violeta (2013), 'The Spanish Legal Framework for Curbing the Public Debt and the Deficit', *European Constitutional Law Review*, 9, 189-204.
- Ruiz, Julius (2005), *Franco's Justice: Repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War*, Oxford Historical Monographs Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell, Jesús, Myriam Benyakhlef Domínguez and Carmen Vizán Rodríguez (2009), *Las comunidades autónomas ante la crisis económica: impacto territorial de la recesión, políticas autonómicas de reactivación y tensiones en las cuentas públicas*, http://idpbarcelona.ub.edu/docs/public/iccaa/2009/actividad_ccaa_2009.pdf. Accessed 09.03.15.
- Sager, Fritz and Christian Rosser (2009), 'Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy', *Public Administration Review*, 69 (6), 1136-47.
- Sala, Gemma (2014), 'Federalism without Adjectives in Spain', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 44 (1), 109-34.
- Salmon, Keith (2010), 'Boom to Bust – Reconstructing the Spanish Economy: Part One: Into Recession', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 23 (2), 83-91.
- Sánchez Mantero, Rafael (2001), *Historia Breve de Andalucía* (Madrid: Silex).
- Sánchez-Motos, Enrique Miguel (2007), 'Civil Service Salary System in Spain and Recent Reform Trends', paper to conference on Civil Service Salary Systems in Europe, Bucharest, 25th April.
- Sanz, Gabriel (2015), 'Chaves y Griñán dejarán de ser diputados si el Supremo les imputa delito en los ERE', *ABC*, 17 February, <http://www.abc.es/espana/20150217/abci-chaves-grinan-codigo-etico-201502171247.html>. Accessed 04.01.16.
- Schleiter, Petra and Alisa M Voznaya (2014), 'Party System Competitiveness and Corruption', *Party Politics*, 20 (5), 675-86.
- Schneider, A. (2003), 'Decentralisation: Conceptualisation and Measurement', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38 (3), 32-56.
- Serrano, Ivan (2013), 'Just a Matter of Identity? Support for Independence in Catalonia', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 23 (5), 523-45.
- Shaw, Keith, John Fenwick and Anne Foreman (1994), 'Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Local Government Services: The Experiences of Local Authorities in the North of England 1988-1992', *Public Administration*, 72 (2), 201-17.
- Siaroff, A. (1994), 'Work, Welfare and Gender Equality: A New Typology', in *Gendering Welfare States*, ed. by Diane Sainsbury (London: SAGE), pp. 82-100.
- Smith, Ángel (2014), *The Origins of Catalan Nationalism, 1770-1898* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Smith, Ángel and Clare Mar-Molinero (eds) (1996), 'The Myths and Realities of Nation-Building in the Iberian Peninsula', in *Nationalism and the*

- Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities*, ed. by Smith and Mar-Molinero (Oxford: Berg), pp. 1-30.
- Smith, Anthony D. (1999), *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Smith, B. C. (1985), *Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State* (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- Sobrequés i Callicó, Jaume (2007), *History of Catalonia* (Barcelona: Editorial Base).
- Sobrer, Josep Miquel (1992), *Catalonia: A Self Portrait* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press).
- Soldevila, Fernando and Miquel Coll i Alentorn (1979), *Resum d'història dels Països Catalans*, 4th edn (Barcelona: Editorial Barcino).
- Solé-Ollé, Albert (2009), 'Evaluating the Effects of Decentralization on Public Service Delivery: The Spanish Experience', in Ehtisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio (eds), *Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 257-86.
- Solé-Tura, Jordi (1985), *Nacionalidades y Nacionalismos en España: Autonomías federalismo autodeterminación* (Madrid: Alianza).
- Solé-Vilanova, Joaquim (1989), 'Spain: Developments in Regional and Local Government', in Robert Bennett (ed.), *Territory and Administration in Europe* (London: Pinter), pp. 205-29.
- Sosvilla Rivero, Simón (2009), 'El impacto de los Fondos Europeos en la economía andaluza: 1989-2013', *Revista de Estudios Regionales*, 85, 97-118.
- Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. (2006), 'Old Problems and New Challenges: The Enduring and Changing Functions of Southern European State Bureaucracies', in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos (eds), *Democracy and The State in The New Southern Europe*, Oxford Studies in Democratization, 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 197-234.
- (2015), 'Southern European Governments and Public Bureaucracies in the Context of Economic Crisis', *European Journal of Social Security*, 17 (2), 226-45.
- Squires, J. (1999), 'Catalonia, Spain and the European Union: A Tale of a Region's Empowerment', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 12, 34-42.
- Staller, Karen M. (2012), 'Epistemological boot camp: The politics of science and what every qualitative research needs to know to survive in the academy', *Qualitative Social Work*, 12 (4) 395-413.
- Strubell, Miquel (1999), 'Language, Democracy and Devolution in Catalonia', in Sue Wright (ed.), *Language, Democracy and Devolution in Catalonia* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters), pp. 4-38.
- (2011), 'The Catalan Language', in Dominic Keown (ed.), *A Companion to Catalan Culture*, Colección Tàmesis, Serie A: Monografías, (Woodbridge: Tamesis), pp. 117-42.
- (2011a), *What Catalans Want: Could Catalonia Become Europe's Next State?* (Ashfield, MA: Catalonia Press).
- Subirats, Joan and Raquel Gallego (eds.) (2002), *Veinte años de autonomías en España* (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas).

- Sutherland, Claire (2012), *Nationalism in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Thelan, Kathleen and Sven Steinmo (1992), 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds), *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-32.
- Thomas, Hugh (2001), *The Spanish Civil War*, 4th edn (London: Penguin).
- Thompson, Helen (2010), 'The Character of the State', in C. Hay (ed.), *New Directions in Political Science: Responding to the Challenges in an Interdependent World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 130-47.
- Threlfall, Monica (2000), 'Women and Political Participation', in Lesley Twomey (ed.), *Women in Contemporary Culture: Roles and Identities in France and Spain* (Bristol: Intellect Books), pp. 29-46.
- (2008), 'Reassessing the Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Transition to Democracy in Spain', *Democratization*, 15 (5), 930-51.
- Tierney, Stephen (2005), 'Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the Nation-State', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 54 (1), 161-83.
- Toboso, Fernando and Eric Scorsone (2010), 'How Much Power to Tax do Regional Governments Enjoy in Spain since the 1996 and 2001 Reforms?', *Regional and Federal Studies*, 20 (2), 157-74.
- Torra, Ricard (2015), 'Catalonia (and the Catalan-speaking lands) before and after the eleventh of September 1714. The International Congress organised by the History-Archaeology Section of the IEC in Barcelona as part of the Tricentennial (1714-2014)', *Catalan Historical Review*, 8, 83-7.
- Torres, Lourdes and Vicente Pina (2004), 'Reshaping Public Administration: The Spanish Experience Compared to the UK', *Public Administration*, 82 (2), 445-64.
- Townson, Nigel (2007), 'Introduction', in *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-75*, ed. by Townson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 1-29,
www.dawsonera.com/readonline/9780230592643. Accessed 05.09.16.
- Tuñón de Lara, Manuel, Julio Valdeón Barúque and Antonio Domínguez Ortiz (1991), *Historia de España* (Barcelona: Editorial Labor).
- Tusell, Javier (1989), *La España de Franco: el poder, la oposición y la política exterior durante el franquismo* (Madrid: Historia 16).
- (1995), *Juan Carlos I: La restauración de la Monarquía* (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy).
- (2011), *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy, 1939 to the Present* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell).
- UK Government Cabinet Office, (2015), *Code of Conduct for Special Advisers*, [www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468340/CODE_OF_CONDUCT_FOR_SPECIAL_ADVISERS - 15 OCTOBER 2015 FINAL.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468340/CODE_OF_CONDUCT_FOR_SPECIAL_ADVISERS_-_15_OCTOBER_2015_FINAL.pdf). Accessed 19.01.16.
- Valentine, Gill (2001), *Social Geographies: Spaces and Society* (Harlow: Pearson Education).

- Viejo-Rose, Dacia (2011), *Reconstructing Spain: Cultural Heritage and Memory after Civil War* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press).
- Vilar, Pierre (1977), *Spain: A Brief History*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Pergamon Press).
- Villoria, Manuel (2014), *Govern Obert 2014: La publicidad activa en la ley de transparencia, acceso a la información y buen gobierno - posibilidades e insuficiencias* (Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya), http://transparencia.gencat.cat/web/.content/pdfs/governobert_1_es.pdf. Accessed 13.04.16.
- (2015), 'La corrupción en España: rasgos y causas esenciales', *Cahiers de civilisation espagnole contemporaine*, <http://ccec.revues.org/5949>. Accessed 03.03.16.
- Viver Pi-Sunyer, Carles (2010), 'Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the Political Decentralisation in Spain', *L'Europe en Formation*, 358, 61-90.
- Wallis, John Joseph and Wallace E. Oates (1988), 'Decentralization in the Public Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local Government', in Harvey S. Rosen (ed.), *Fiscal Federalism Quantitative Studies* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), pp. 5-32.
- Watson, Nigel (2014), 'IWRM in England: Bridging the Gap Between Top-down and Bottom-up Implementation', *International Journal Of Water Resources Development*, 30 (3), 445-59.
- Weissberger, Barbara F. (2004), *Isabel Rules: Constructing Queenship, Wielding Power* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press).
- Wheeler, D. (2016), 'Letter from Madrid: An Audience with Alfonso Guerra', *The Political Quarterly*, online doi: 10.1111/1467-923X.12253. Accessed 16.07.16.
- Whitford, Andrew B. and Soo-Young Lee (2015), 'Exit, Voice, and Loyalty with Multiple Exit Options: Evidence from the US Federal Workforce', *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 25 (2), 373-98.
- Willis, Eliza, Christopher da C. B. Garman and Stephan Haggard (1999), 'The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America', *Latin American Research Review*, 34 (1), 7-56.
- Wilson, John (1999), 'From CCT to Best Value: Some Evidence and Observations', *Local Government Studies*, 25 (2), 38-52.
- World Bank (2012), *Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World* (Washington, DC: World Bank Group).