Abolishing Cruelty: The Concurrent Growth of Antislavery and Animal Welfare Sentiment in British and Colonial Literature

Pre-proof version of an article accepted on 13 January 2020 for publication in The Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies.

Writing in 1789, Olaudah Equiano recalled a trip to the Spanish city of Malaga, where he took time to visit the cathedral and other attractions. He admired the town but was ‘very much shocked at the custom of bull-baiting, and other diversions which prevailed here on Sunday evenings, to the great scandal of Christianity and morals’. Equiano had no reason to be sentimental about cattle. Multiple references to horses, cattle, hens, and turkeys in his Interesting Narrative show that he spent much time in proximity to domesticated animals whose functions were primarily utilitarian rather than companionate. His friend Thomas Farmer, who had brokered his manumission in 1766, had been killed after being trampled by Equiano’s bullocks while putting them aboard his ship.1 Equiano was, nevertheless, shocked at the spectacle of bullfights and, while the context was Spanish, his audience was British. Spain may have been a watchword for cruelty and backwardness in eighteenth-century Britain, a habit of thought that Spanish historians would later call the ‘Black Legend’, but Britons were no less addicted to blood sports.2 Nevertheless, Equiano’s instincts accorded with a growing number of British abolitionists who, while perhaps accepting the pursuit of fish, fowl, and fox, saw bullfighting and bull-baiting as gratuitous cruelties that should also be eradicated. When it became clear in the mid-1790s that the slave trade was unlikely to be ended as long as Britain remained at war with France, some abolitionists turned their attention to cruelty to animals. The introduction of bull-baiting bills in Parliament in 1800 and 1802 came at the low point of the anti-slave-trade movement. Following abolition of the trade in 1807, abolitionists turned their attention first to ameliorating colonial slavery and then to ending it, but reformers also had other targets in their sights. Brian Harrison reminds us that, in 1807, William Wilberforce asked his friend and fellow abolitionist Henry Thornton ‘what shall we abolish next?’3 Cruelty to animals was one of a range of possible targets. The Society, later the Royal Society, for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) was formed in 1824, just a few years before mainstream antislavery campaigners were shifting their attention from amelioration to emancipation.
The first animal rights legislation was enacted in the 1830s, the decade in which British slavery was finally outlawed. The timetable for legislative change, and the parliamentarians involved, are thus closely correlated with the progress of antislavery legislation. Indeed, the first meeting of the RSPCA was chaired by the leading abolitionist Thomas Fowell Buxton, who would shortly take over from Wilberforce as parliamentary leader of the abolition campaign. Wilberforce himself was also present.4

The cultures, histories, and legacies of slavery and its abolition have given rise to a vast critical and historical literature, numbering tens of thousands of interventions. Studies of the growth of animal welfare in this period are fewer but a sizable literature has nonetheless been generated. Only a few of these works have asked why attitudes towards both enslaved people and animals should apparently change in tandem. Most that do point to a shift in popular sensibility, variously located in the seventeenth, eighteenth, or nineteenth centuries. In one of the earliest studies to examine both together, written in 1980, James Turner locates this movement in the Victorian era, with the convergence of Darwinism, scientism more broadly, and a novel ‘dread of pain’ that created ‘a new, distinctively modern sensibility’. But early modern sensibilities were on the move too.

Although by the early eighteenth-century ‘English literature had surrendered itself to sentimentality’, Turner also notes that ‘of all eighteenth-century flowerings of the new humanitarian sensibility, the most celebrated was antislavery. […] More directly to the point was the extension of benevolence in another direction. This flood of sympathy, embracing all people, could hardly fail to overflow its original bounds and brush with pity the sufferings of other sentient beings’.5 Writing three years later, in Man and the Natural World, Keith Thomas takes a longer view, arguing that, while from the mid-seventeenth century it had ‘become an acceptable Christian doctrine that all members of God’s creation were entitled to civil usage’, in the eighteenth century such views were no longer merely acceptable but ‘much more explicitly backed up by the religious and philosophical teaching of the time’. With the advent of the mid-eighteenth-century man of feeling, ‘kindliness and benevolence had become official ideals’ and ‘although its main implications were for the human species, whether slaves, children, the criminal or the insane, its relevance to animals was inescapable’. Thomas argues that ‘what this new mode of thinking implied was that it was the feelings of the suffering objects which mattered, not its intelligence or moral capacity’. Invoking perhaps the best-known eighteenth-century statement on the matter, he concludes that ‘as Jeremy Bentham observed in 1789 in a famous passage, the question to be asked about animals was neither “Can they reason?” nor “Can they talk?”, but “Can they suffer?” This was a new and altogether more secular mode of approach. It was now possible to attack cruelty to animals without invoking God’s intentions at all. The ill-treatment of beasts was reprehensible on the purely utilitarian grounds that it diminished their happiness’.6 In Animal Advocacy and Englishwomen (1998), Moira Ferguson argues that, for women writers, animal protection ‘was a strategy for engaging in discussions of political ideas, national identity, and foreign policy. Women writers not only attacked cruelty against animals but complicated it to entwine the concerns of slaves and other subjugated
This echoes her earlier *Subject to Others* (1992), in which she suggests that abolitionism also gave British women an opportunity to participate in the public sphere, on an issue that reflected their own lack of freedom in society. The longest view of all is taken by Linda Kalof. In her survey of more than ten thousand years of human-animal interactions, Kalof draws on Thomas in noting that the ‘increasing compassion’ of the eighteenth century was ‘not limited to other animals, but extended to exploited and mistreated humans’ but she also draws attention to the reverse, quoting from the ‘humanitarian reformer’ Henry S. Salt who in 1892 had argued that ‘the present condition of the more highly organized domestic animals is in many ways analogous to that of the negro slaves of a hundred years ago’. Salt is making what the animal-rights activist Marjorie Spiegel has called ‘the dreaded comparison’ between domesticated animals and enslaved people, a comparison which, Rob Boddice contends, is fraught with danger and ‘simply anachronistic’, but which nonetheless continues to complicate attempts to explain the concurrent rise of antislavery and anticruelty sentiment.

Bentham’s series of rhetorical questions applied to animals but similar arguments were made by abolitionist writers on behalf of enslaved Africans, even in the face of overwhelming evidence that African people could indeed reason and speak as well as they could. Although Hannah More was no doubt well aware of the writing of the African belle-lettrist Ignatius Sancho, for example, who was a celebrated member of literary London society in the 1770s, she could still argue:

Plead not, in reason’s palpable abuse,
Their sense of * feeling callous and obtuse:
From heads to hearts lies Nature’s plain appeal,
Tho’ few can reason, all mankind can feel.

The asterisk leads to a footnote asserting that ‘Nothing is more frequent than this cruel and stupid argument, that [Africans] do not feel the miseries inflicted on them as Europeans would do.’ Sancho, who had suffered enslavement as a child, had himself inveighed against cruelty to donkeys as an affront both to reason and to feeling. ‘This is a too common evil’, he argued in a letter to John Meheux, which was widely read after its posthumous publication in 1782, ‘and, for the honor of rationality, calls loudly for redress. . . . I am convinced we feel instinctively the injuries of our fellow creatures’. Earlier, he had observed to Meheux that ‘a jack-ass would have shewn more thought—(are they rationals or not?)’ Bentham, More, and Sancho’s arguments are similar, which becomes clearer when one realises that Bentham’s often-quoted question about the feelings of animals comes in a lengthy but rarely quoted footnote contrasting the rights of animals with those of enslaved people. In many places, Bentham argues, ‘the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing, as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been
withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny’. He ponders where one draws ‘the insuperable line’ between ‘sensitive beings’ deserving the protection of law and other creatures. ‘Is it the faculty of reason’, he asks, ‘or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse, or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’

Building on this long philosophical and critical literature, this article argues that antislavery and anticruelty writers actively and concurrently extended the boundaries of sympathy to promote an anticruelty ethos that encompassed both suffering animals and suffering people. It briefly charts the development of this ethos from the 1680s to the 1770s as it was expressed in pamphlets and novels before exploring in detail the deployment of a rhetoric of anticruelty, rooted in the politics of sensibility as much as in moral sense and utilitarian philosophy, in literature associated with the parallel debates over bull-baiting and the abolition of first the slave trade and then slavery in the British Empire. It shows that abolitionist and animal welfare writers not only extended the boundaries of sympathy to include all creatures capable of experiencing pain, but also demanded that this shift in sensibilities be enshrined in legislation. This article focuses on literary contributors to the debate rather than the high-profile parliamentarians and celebrated members of national campaigning committees who undertook that legislative work. It assesses the complex and divided interests of writers and grassroots reformers in this period, who were never quite as single-minded in pursuit of noble aims as popular historiography has represented them, and who pursued a variety of local agendas as well as agitating for national and colonial reform. Many of these writers, like other reformers of the period, were evangelicals, Methodists, or Quakers. Indeed, as Brian Harrison reminds us, ‘kindness to animals was but one of several early evangelical causes, and ... its advocates were discredited in the eyes of many opponents by their standpoint on several other issues [including] the Sabbatarian and temperance movements’. If many were genuinely sympathetic to the suffering of others, human and non-human, there were also those whose reformism was driven by belief in the moral authority of scripture or by the fear, as it was expressed by the American abolitionist and former slave Harriet Jacobs, that ‘cruelty is contagious in uncivilized communities’. The abolition of the slave trade and then slavery, and the parallel amelioration of the treatment of animals, may have been part of a civilising process, but they also reflected personal and national anxieties about irreligion, disorder, and revolution. These anxieties, as well genuine sympathy, engendered together a persistent and concurrent condemnation of slavery and cruelty to animals in the literature of the period.
Cruelty, Slavery, and Sensibility

Enslaved people had for millennia undergone the deliberately dehumanising experience of being treated like farmyard animals. From the late eighteenth century onwards, some began to recount their experiences in public. Equiano described how, on his arrival at Barbados in the 1750s, he and the other slaves ‘were conducted immediately to the merchant’s yard, where we were all pent up together like so many sheep in a fold, without regard to sex or age’.\(^{15}\) His experience was widely shared. In 1831, in the home of an abolitionist family in London, Mary Prince, who had been born into slavery in Bermuda in 1788, dictated her life story to an amanuensis, Susanna Strickland. Prince recalled the day three decades earlier when, as a twelve-year-old girl, she had been put on sale. ‘The vendue master’, she told her audience of British abolitionists, ‘exposed me to the view of those who attended the vendue. I was soon surrounded by strange men, who examined and handled me in the same manner that a butcher would a calf or a lamb he was about to purchase, and who talked about my shape and size in like words—as if I could no more understand their meaning than the dumb beasts. I was then put up to sale.’\(^{16}\) A few years later, the American fugitive slave Frederick Douglass described a valuation of the plantation on which he laboured. ‘We were all ranked together at the valuation’, he recalled. ‘Men and women, old and young, married and single, were ranked with horses, sheep, and swine. There were horses and men, cattle and women, pigs and children, all holding the same rank in the scale of being, and were all subjected to the same narrow examination. Silvery-headed age and sprightly youth, maids and matrons, had to undergo the same indelicate inspection. At this moment, I saw more clearly than ever the brutalizing effects of slavery upon both slave and slaveholder.’\(^{17}\)

Accounts such as these were deliberately deployed to invoke sympathy for enslaved people and to shock the British and American public into opposing slavery, but the idea that slaves could be treated as cruelly as animals was nothing new, nor was the practice. It was never universally condoned either. The roots of both the anticruelty and the antislavery movements extend far back into history. In an important study, Christopher Brown explores the idea of ‘antislavery without abolitionism’ before 1770. He notes that ‘an antislavery prejudice [...] did percolate below the surface of Anglo-American culture between 1660 and 1760, even as the plantation economy expanded’.\(^{18}\) Likewise, argues Aaron Garrett, Bentham’s 1789 question, ‘although startling, did not emerge \textit{ex nihilo}. A number of British philosophers had argued for the “humane” treatment of animals before him. But, unlike Bentham, they did so via a mixture of theodicy, natural law arguments, practical ethics and theological discussions of the immortality of animal souls.’ This kind of mixture, continues Garrett, is not surprising: ‘a similar combination is to be found in the rise of abolitionism and in the origins of utilitarianism.’\(^{19}\)

Concern for the physical welfare of enslaved people is combined with anti-animal-cruelty arguments as early as the seventeenth century. In his \textit{Friendly advice to the gentlemen-planters of the East and West Indies}, the shepherd turned vegetarian colonist
Thomas Tryon had equated cruelty towards enslaved people with cruelty to animals. Adopting the voice of Sambo, a fictional enslaved African in dialogue with ‘a Christian, that was his Master in America’, Tryon argued that the ‘Christian Doctrine enjoins you to be merciful to all the Inferior Creatures, and to use them with Compassion, and avoid all kind of Oppression and Violence to those of your own kind.’ Christians in Barbados did neither: ‘there is little or no Mercy of Compassion dwells in your Hearts; for on every small occasion you will not only beat and oppress us, but some of you count it no more Sin in their drunken fits to Murther us, than to kill their Horse, or their Dog’. Although contrasting cruel treatment of both people and animals, Tryon is careful not to directly equate enslaved Africans with animals, reminding planters that Africans ‘are humane rational Souls, and as much the Image of God as themselves’. Even the absence of rationality is no justification for cruelty, however, for ‘as for the inferior Creatures, they groan under your Cruelties, you hunt them for your Pleasure, and overwork them for your Covetousness, and kill them for your Gluttony.’ A little further on, Tryon, still speaking as Sambo, argues that, ‘on the other side, I pray observe, there are many honest, compassionate, and truly Christian-spirited Men amongst you, that do not willingly oppress either Man or Beast, and yet see how they are blest, and prosper, and enjoy more true Content and Happiness in one Week, than you whose Minds are continually distracted with greedy Desires, or anxious Fears, do in all your Lives.’

Tryon’s observation that people capable of cruelty to animals are equally capable of cruelty to people may seem axiomatic today, but in an age when animals were rarely treated with much sympathy, and where the most celebrated philosophers could argue that they were machines without feeling, Tryon’s compassion towards animals was relatively unusual. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, his Friendly Advice, while sometimes cited by authors interested in slavery, was no bestseller. He was, however, not alone in his views. John Locke more famously advised in 1693 that ‘children should from the beginning be bred up in an abhorrence of killing, or tormenting any living Creature’ since ‘the custom of tormenting and killing of Beasts will, by degrees, harden their Minds even towards Men; and they who delight in the suffering and destruction of inferiour Creatures, will not be apt to be very compassionate or benigne to those of their own kind.’ Locke’s comment did not lead him, as it did Tryon, towards an active stance against animal cruelty (or, for that matter, against slavery) but it does articulate a growing concern that would become increasingly insistent in eighteenth-century discourse.

By the 1760s, both antislavery and anticruelty sentiment surfaces with increasing regularity and in a wide range of contexts. The impetus for the sudden rise in antislavery literature in the 1760s was probably the decision by Quakers in 1761 to dissociate themselves from slave trading. From this point onwards, the ideas of Quaker abolitionists such as Anthony Benezet and John Woolman (both vegetarians) began to circulate more widely throughout the English-speaking world. The decade also saw a distinct rise in anticruelty sentiment although the reasons for this are less clear. Keith Thomas regarded it as part of a general triumph of sensibility in popular culture, and this is no doubt at least partially true. More recently, Stephanie Howard-Smith has argued that the 1760 cull of feral
dogs ordered by Common Council of the City of London as a measure against rabies incensed public opinion and incited a wave of sympathy for abused dogs among the nation’s growing legions of pet owners. As with the increase in antislavery sentiment in the 1760s, anticruelty literature was no doubt prompted both by broad shifts in popular attitudes and by local and immediate events.

The conflation of both in the 1760s began in earnest not only in pamphlet literature but also in some of the most popular novels of the day. Sarah Scott’s *The History of Sir George Ellison* offers an account of an improbably benevolent man of feeling who marries a Jamaican widow alluringly ‘possessed of ten thousand pounds in money, and a plantation of no less value’. The marriage makes Ellison a slaveholder, and he sets about instituting what he conceives of as a more humane system of management. In a now celebrated passage, in which the Ellisons articulate radically different understandings of humanity: ‘a favourite lap-dog, seeing [Mrs Ellison] approach the house, in its eagerness to meet her jumped out of the window where it was standing.’ The ‘poor cur’, it is soon found out, ‘had broken its leg, and was in a good deal of pain.’ This prompts ‘a shower of tears’ from Mrs Ellison, who, although as tough with her slaves ‘as any man in the island’, remarks to her husband that ‘you will laugh at me for my weakness, but I cannot help it.’ Rather than laughing, Mr Ellison uses the incident as a learning opportunity. ‘It gives me pleasure to observe you can feel for the poor little animal’, he says, ‘but I confess I am surprised, though agreeably, to see such marks of sensibility in a heart that I feared was hardened against the sufferings even of her fellow creatures.’ Mr Ellison may be virtuous, but he is certainly not tactful. Mrs Ellison stops crying, finds ‘indignation taking place of compassion’, and turns on her husband. “Sure, Mr Ellison,” you do not call negroes my fellow creatures?’ ‘I must call them so’, he responds, ‘till you can prove to me, that the distinguishing marks of humanity lie in the complexion or turn of features.’ He concludes by remarking that, at some future point, ‘our lowest black slave will be as great as we are; in the next world perhaps much greater; the present difference is merely adventitious, not natural.’ With that, he attends to the wounded lapdog’s broken leg, and the conversation takes another turn.

The passage has attracted considerable recent criticism. Laura Brown suggests it follows the ‘formal structure’ of ‘the fable of the nonhuman being’, while noting that Mr Ellison calling both pet dogs and enslaved Africans ‘fellow creatures’ calls attention to the ‘violation of the boundary between species’. Brycchan Carey describes the incident as a ‘sentimental parable’ in which Mr Ellison, and indeed Scott herself, rejects ‘false sensibility’. Markman Ellis argues that the story reveals Mrs Ellison as ‘actively racist’ and that her ‘rejection of the commonality of humanity is an implicit rejection of sentimentalism too’. Elsewhere he claims the passage as an example of ‘counter-sensibility’ in which ‘Mrs Ellison’s compassion is shown to be shallow and unfeeling’ and the lapdog a subject of ‘immoderate sympathy’. He concludes that ‘Mrs. Ellison’s failure to identify with the slaves as she does with her lapdogs shows not her belief that they are not human, but rather her failure to imagine herself as human.’ Ramesh Mallipeddi argues that ‘Scott’s novel is a
forerunner not only in its advocacy for reform but in its deployment of a discourse of paternalism’. These critics agree in reading the passage as a formal set piece, but also in seeing in it a close interplay of sympathy, antislavery sentiment, and a critique of inappropriate attitudes towards ‘fellow creatures’, whether human or not. To these, we might add that the lap dog incident brings the animal comparison inside, away from the masculine arena of the stockyard and into the feminine domain of the domestic interior. Polite female readers of the sentimental novel in Britain are forced to confront the treatment of people as chattel not through comparisons with the mules and cattle that in many cases were handled only by their husbands or servants, but instead by comparison with the lap-dogs that many owned and cared for themselves. Scott asks these readers to extend the boundaries of their sympathy while at the same time ensuring that their sympathy is proportionate to the suffering. It is quite right that Mrs Ellison feels for her injured dog, and that Mr Ellison tends to its wounds. If sympathy for lap dogs is possible, she implies, how much more should be offered to the people enslaved and suffering in the plantations of Jamaica.

In the same decade, Laurence Sterne offered a complex assessment of the relationship between sympathy, active or charitable sensibility, and the treatment of animals, epitomised in The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy by Uncle Toby’s refusal to harm a fly ‘which had buzz’d about his nose, and tormented him cruelly all dinner-time’. The treatment of flies is revisited later in Tristram Shandy when Toby and Corporal Trim encounter ‘a poor negro girl, with a bunch of white feathers slightly tied to the end of a long cane, flapping away flies—not killing them’. This compassion towards flies excites in turn the compassion of Toby and Trim and leads them into a metaphysical debate about whether Africans have souls. Since possession of a soul is what, in Christian theology, distinguishes humans from animals, this is in effect a discussion of whether African people are fully human. Its conclusion is a resounding affirmation of African humanity, but also a call for the reader to exercise mercy in the face of persecution and to extend sympathy to all feeling creatures, from flies to people. The following year, in A Sentimental Journey, Sterne offered a vignette about a caged starling. While travelling in France, the narrator Mr Yorick muses on the fate of prisoners in the Bastille when he hears the bird calling ‘I can’t get out’ in English. Sterne sees this as a moment to reflect on slavery rather than on imprisonment in general but, in any case, the commitment either to anticruelty or to antislavery seems fleeting. Mr Yorick exchanges a bottle of Burgundy for the bird, brings it back to England, still in its cage, and sells it to Lord A. ‘In a week’, says Sterne, ‘Lord A gave him to Lord B—Lord B made a present of him to Lord C—and Lord C’s gentleman sold him to Lord D’s for a shilling—Lord D gave him to Lord E—and so on—half round the alphabet—From that rank he pass’d into the lower house, and pass’d the hands of as many commoners.’ Not only does the starling remain a piece of property, but it circulates widely as an article of trade. The passage has all the hallmarks of Shandean whimsy, which suggests that Sterne’s antislavery sentiments did not run particularly deep, but we may also read it as ironic commentary on the extent to which slave trading is embedded within the British establishment, embodied in
both houses of parliament, whose lords and commoners are actively involved in the buying and selling of enslaved people, metaphorically represented by the starling.32

While these novels reached a wide public, pamphlets continued to raise awareness of both issues in less literary terms. When Granville Sharp wrote his legalistic Representation of the Injustice and Dangerous Tendency of Tolerating Slavery in 1769, which would prove to be one of the most important texts of the nascent British antislavery movement, he included a lengthy footnote discussing an Act of the Barbados Assembly. Sharp is outraged that what he calls the ‘unnatural inventory “OF NEGROES, CATTLE, COPPERS AND STILLS, AND OTHER GOODS OR CHATTELS” is repeated, nearly in the same words, no less than six times’ by which he concludes that ‘it too plainly appears, that the Barbadians rank their Negroes with their beasts’.33 Just two years earlier, Benezet had admonished slaveholders with the words ‘your slaves, I believe, work as hard—if not harder—than the horses whereon you ride. [...] Your dogs are caressed and fondled at your tables, but your slaves, who are frequently styled dogs or beasts, have not an equal privilege; they are scarce permitted to pick up the crumbs which fall from their master’s table.’34 For both Benezet and Sharp, the comparison between domestic animals and enslaved people was as outrageous as it was obvious.

The same observation was made by those for whom cruelty to animals was the principal focus. Humphry Primatt, in A dissertation on the duty of mercy and sin of cruelty to brute animals, written in 1776 and addressed to the man of feeling, makes the comparison early on:

> It has pleased GOD the Father of all men to cover some men with white skins, and others with black skins: but as there is neither merit nor demerit in complexion, the white man (notwithstanding the barbarity of custom and prejudice) can have no right, by virtue of his colour, to enslave and tyrannize over a black man; nor has a fair man any right to despise, abuse, and insult a brown man. Nor do I believe that a tall man, by virtue of his stature, has any legal right to trample a dwarf under his foot. For, whether a man is wise or foolish, white or black, tall or short, and I might add rich or poor (for it is no more a man’s choice to be poor, than it is to be a fool, or a dwarf, or black, or tawney,) such he is by GOD’s appointment; and, abstractedly considered, is neither a subject for pride, nor an object of contempt. [...] For the same reason, a man can have no natural right to abuse and torment a beast, merely because a beast has not the mental powers of a man. For such as the man is, he is but as GOD made him; and the very same is true of the beast.35

Primatt neglects to mention whether the same argument applies to both men and women but otherwise his argument is a remarkably comprehensive rejection of prejudice based on physical or mental difference. The twin pillars of his argument are that God has made us what we are, but also that ‘A Brute is an animal no less sensible of pain than a Man’, an observation which, when applied across the human race and beyond, guided both abolitionist poets and utilitarian philosophers. While Primatt’s book may primarily have influenced early anticruelty campaigners, it was also noticed by abolitionists, including one
anonymous writer who quoted this passage in a letter to the *Diary or Woodfall's Register*, called ‘Cruelty to Horses, and Asses, and Negroes’. The author, calling him or herself ‘Old Mingo’, clearly wants animals to be considered at the same moment as enslaved Africans, but it does not appear that he is aiming to distract attention away from one cause by appealing to the supposedly superior importance of another, as sometimes happened. For ‘Old Mingo’, the sufferings of ‘Horses, and Asses, and Negroes’ were, if not equal, then at least equally worthy of attention and amelioration.

**Bull-Baiting and Abolitionism**

Antislavery and anticruelty writing proliferated in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, taking multiple and voluminous forms and directions. The remainder of this article will therefore take as a test case the specific relationship between writing concerned with slavery and literature drawing attention to cruelty to cattle, in particular, the ancient practice of bull-baiting. This was popular since many believed that goading the bull to its death improved the flavour of the meat. Others simply enjoyed the spectacle or the associated fairs and revelry. It was, however, declining in eighteenth-century Britain, seen by increasingly genteel town authorities as a rowdy entertainment of the labouring classes. Indeed, argues Emma Griffin, its decline probably owed more to concerns over public order and the control of public spaces than to any widespread moral concern for animal welfare. Nevertheless, as Robert W. Malcolmson points out, even at the start of the nineteenth it was by no means uncommon in British towns and villages despite ‘considerable concern in respectable society, especially among the increasingly influential evangelicals’. Some of the most committed antislavery writers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries also joined the literary campaign against bull-baiting. This article concludes by looking at three of them: Thomas Day, Percival Stockdale, and Elizabeth Heyrick, to show how alleviating the suffering of both enslaved people and goaded animals formed part of a cohesive anticruelty ethos that transcended their concern for either.

Thomas Day’s contribution was important since he explicitly brought together bull-baiting and slavery in his popular children’s novel *Sandford and Merton*, published in instalments throughout the 1780s. Day was a prominent antislavery poet and pamphleteer whoaw attitudes towards animals were also famous, if sometimes ridiculed. In life, ‘Mr. Day’s humanity was neither confined to his friends, country, nor his own species’, notes his first biographer James Keir, adding that ‘the reflection on the pain to which brutes are often subjected by the avarice and wanton cruelty of mankind used to give him uneasiness’. This is a considerable understatement. Day died after being thrown from a horse he had trained by kindness rather than compulsion in accordance with his belief that domestication was a form of enslavement. Forty years after his death, he was remembered in an anecdote in the miscellaneous weekly publication *The Mirror of Literature, Amusement and Instruction*:
One day, upon removing some books at the chambers of Sir William Jones, a large spider dropped upon the floor, upon which Sir William, with some warmth, said, ‘Kill that spider, Day, kill that spider!’ ‘No’, said Mr. Day, with that coolness for which he was so conspicuous, ‘I will not kill that spider, Jones; I do not know that I have a right to kill that spider! Suppose when you are going in your coach to Westminster Hall, a superior being, who, perhaps, may have as much power over you as you have over this insect, should say to his companion, “Kill that lawyer! kill that lawyer!” how should you like that Jones? and I am sure, to most people, a lawyer is a more noxious animal than a spider.’

Whether this delicious anecdote is true or not is beside the point. It was what readers in 1828 expected to hear about Day since most of them had been brought up reading Sandford and Merton. The book begins and ends as an antislavery novel, contrasting the spoilt Jamaica planter’s son Tommy Merton with the solid and virtuous farmer’s son Harry Sandford. In between, it covers a great deal of ground, much of it concerning cruelty to animals, including an extended episode on bull-baiting and, a little before it, what is possibly one of the earliest arguments in print against commercial whaling. The bull-baiting passage begins with compassionate Harry’s reluctance to attend the spectacle. Tommy and his bullying friend Master Mash verbally bait Harry for not wanting to go, leading to a boxing match in which the larger Mash hits out at random but ‘Harry prudently stepped back, and contented himself with parrying the blows that were aimed at him; till seeing that his antagonist was almost exhausted by his own impetuosity, he darted at him with all his force, and, by one successful blow, levelled him with the ground.’ The rumble prefigures the greater violence to come, but also suggests that, unlike the baited bull, Harry has the option to defend himself on his own terms and the ability to outwit his assailant. Nevertheless, despite winning and magnanimously helping the defeated Mash to his feet, Harry’s opinions count for little when ‘a bull of the largest size and greatest beauty was led across the plain, adorned with ribands of various colours’. The boys are caught up in the excitement and Harry ‘although reluctantly, followed them at a distance’. Day describes the bull-baiting at length, inviting sympathy both for the goaded bull and for the dogs that are set upon him: ‘one was killed upon the spot, while the other, who had a leg broken in the fall, crawled howling and limping away’. Meanwhile, the bull behaves like Harry in the boxing match, exhibiting ‘all the calmness and intrepidity of an experienced warrior; without violence, without passion, he waited every attack of his enemies, and then severely punished them for their rashness’. If both Harry and the bull display that coolness for which Day himself was so conspicuous, they also act violently only in extremis and in self-defence.

At this point, Day unites his vivid commentary on the cruelty of bull-baiting with a story that challenges both the slave trade and emerging racial ideologies. While the boys watch the gruesome spectacle, ‘a poor half-naked black came up, and humbly implored their charity’. The man had served in the Royal Navy, and had been wounded in action, ‘but now he was discharged, and without friends, without assistance, he could scarcely find food
to support his wretched life’. Dissolute Tommy has spent all his money, but prudent and charitable Harry gives the man his last sixpence. ‘At that instant’, writes Day, ‘three fierce dogs rushed upon the bull at once, and by their joint attacks rendered him almost mad’. The moment of sentimental benevolence is transformed into one of sublime terror. The bull ‘roared with pain and fury; flashes of fire seemed to come from his angry eyes, and his mouth was covered with foam and blood’. Tommy falls into the path of the running bull, Harry saves him, then falls and is himself about to be trampled to death—‘But in that instant, the grateful black rushed on like lightning to assist him.’ The boys are saved, and the passage, and Volume 2 of the book, ends with Harry inviting his rescuer back to his father’s home.

The ‘honest negro’ becomes an important figure towards the end of the final volume of Sandford and Merton, telling his life story to the fascinated boys. He was born in the Gambia, he tells them, enslaved, and taken to Argentina where he learned to manage bulls after seeing an imprisoned native American secure his freedom by showing great proficiency with a lasso. Such skills do not, however, rank highly in his estimation: ‘I have been accustomed to several kinds of hunting much more dangerous than this’, he tells them, ‘and considering, how much you white people despise us blacks, I own, I was very much surprised to see so many hundreds of you running away from such an insignificant enemy as a poor tame bull’. The long description of African society that follows is drawn from recent accounts emerging in the context of the abolition campaign but it is the African wildlife, in particular, the lion, the hippopotamus, and the ways in which they are hunted, that fascinate Tommy and Harry. The passage fulfils Day’s pedagogical aim of educating his readers about wildlife—which he does throughout the book—but is also an intervention in the debate about the slave trade. Virtuous, though primitive, African society, symbolised by the free and powerful lion, is contrasted with dissolute, though advanced, European society, represented by the poor tame bull. Day’s crude primitivism may have satisfied the moral sensibilities of most child readers, but he also offers an explicitly antiracist speech. ‘In this country’ says the African, ‘people are astonished at my colour, and start at the sight of a black man, as if he did not belong to their species’. In Gambia, by contrast, ‘every body resembles me’, while ‘In some parts of the world I have seen men of a yellow hue, in others of a copper colour, and all have the foolish vanity to despise their fellow-creatures as infinitely inferior to themselves’. The African pointedly turns the tables. In Gambia and elsewhere, he suggests, ‘they entertain these conceits from ignorance; but in this country, where the natives pretend to superior reason, I have often wondered they could be influenced by such a prejudice.43 Feigned ignorance is a common trope of satirical writing, which Day uses to point out the absurdity of racial prejudice. Moreover, unlike Hannah More, Day believes that all mankind can reason. While the slave trade is not mentioned, it would have been an obvious context for readers in 1789 and beyond. The ‘honest African’s’ antiracist passage is indeed doubly significant, both as an early refutation of racial ideology in children’s literature, and for its legacy. The novel was phenomenally successful and would be read by children across the British Empire throughout the nineteenth century and into
the twentieth. While its message of tolerance and respect for diversity was clearly not widely adopted by Britain’s colonial administrators, in Britain itself, where a generation of voters and legislators were brought up on Sandford and Merton, the book may have helped create the climate for the adoption of both the antislavery and the anti-animal-cruelty legislation enacted across the nineteenth century.

The legislative campaign began in 1800 when William Pulteney introduced an anti-bull-baiting bill into Parliament. This was narrowly defeated by 43 to 42, but it was debated again in 1802, during which Wilberforce argued eloquently that ‘the practice was inconsistent with every manly principle, cruel in its designs, and cowardly in its execution’. This time, the bill was defeated by 13 votes. This second defeat angered many, including the abolitionist, parish priest, and miscellaneous writer Percival Stockdale, a perpetually hard-done-by minor author who spent much of his career venting his spleen against a literary establishment which he felt had unjustly neglected him. According to Adam Rounce, his ‘small but genuine talent’ was often overshadowed by his ‘endless intemperate attacks on anyone who criticised him, and generally disastrous lack of self-awareness’. Nevertheless, says Rounce, ‘Stockdale’s abiding kindness to animals and hatred of the slave trade show his passions at their best’. Stockdale was, indeed, a committed abolitionist writer, even if his influence was limited. He began writing antislavery verse as early as 1773 and remained dedicated to the cause, contributing ‘Verses on the abolition of the slave trade’ in 1804, as well as antislavery lines in poems on other topics. In 1791, on hearing of the revolution in Santo Domingo, Stockdale wrote a public letter to Granville Sharp in which he defended ‘the right which the Negroes inherit, from nature, and from Heaven; from the laws of God, and man, of rising against their oppressors, with a just, and destructive indignation’. Such attitudes put Stockdale on the radical wing of the abolitionist movement and built on his view that, although Africans were both fully human and intellectually equal to Europeans, they were ‘driven like sheep’ from their well-cultivated homes in Africa and, through ‘the harassing, the torturing, of the human body’, slavery effected ‘the perversion of Beings whom the Almighty hath endowed with reasoning, and immortal minds, into mere animals of drudgery; into mere implements of labour’.

The defeat of the anti-bull-baiting bill in Parliament in 1802 gave Stockdale another opportunity to express his view that slavery was unnatural and resistance essential. His 1802 Remonstrance against Inhumanity to Animals, and particularly against the Savage Practice of Bull-Baiting begins wearily with the admission that ‘I have now less hope than ever, of the abolition of the SLAVE TRADE’. It continues by praising Wilberforce at the same time as restating the radical position that ‘If liberty, the sacred, and inalienable right of every human being, is not restored to the AFRICANS by a prudent policy, and by true religion, what they cannot obtain from the deliberate, and calm determination of wisdom, and virtue, they will accomplish for themselves by an irresistible, and desolating force.’ It is doubtful that the conservative Wilberforce would have found this radical intervention helpful even if he and Stockdale agreed in wanting to see an end to the slave trade.
Stockdale, however, moves on, invoking the notion of ‘humanity’ to provide a link from the question of slavery to that of bull-baiting. ‘It cannot be disputed’, he asserts, ‘that universal humanity is an essential part both of natural, and revealed religion. And he must have a blunt understanding, and an insensible heart, who does not see, and feel, that this humanity must attentively extend to the animal creation.’ The blunt and insensible who mistreat animals are afflicted with the ‘natural and severe curse’ of losing ‘our finest, and most exalted feeling; the exquisite sense of moral enjoyment’. The ‘careful’ and ‘tender’ realise that there is also utility in allowing animals ‘all the happiness which their nature admits, when he considers how largely they contribute to his use; to his pleasure; and when he likewise reflects on the amiable, and engaging qualities which many of them possess!’ Stockdale’s arguments are conventionally sentimental, and may have seemed old-fashioned by the first decade of the nineteenth century, but the idea that the humane would relieve suffering wherever they encountered it undoubtedly remained the common denominator of antislavery and anticruelty rhetoric in this period, even if the language had changed somewhat since the heyday of the age of sensibility.48

While Stockdale’s works, his poetry in particular, did find an audience, this pamphlet, published in the remote Northumbrian town of Alnwick and apparently never reviewed, probably had little impact 500 km away in Parliament. Nevertheless, both the antislavery and the animal welfare causes continued their legislative paths, running concurrently and often supported by exactly the same people. The British slave trade was outlawed in 1807, championed by Wilberforce, who in the following years led the parliamentary effort to reform plantation management and ameliorate the working and living conditions of enslaved people—it would be almost another two decades before high-profile British abolitionists publicly called for emancipation. Early in those intervening years, in 1809, Wilberforce also supported the failed introduction of Lord Erskine’s bill to prevent malicious and wanton cruelty to animals. The failure of this bill enraged another author who would later go on to be an active abolitionist, the Leicester Quaker Elizabeth Heyrick. According to Kenneth Corfield, Heyrick developed antislavery sentiments early and when in 1789 she married the Quaker John Heyrick, a relation of the Macaulay family, ‘she was already disposed by her own upbringing to share their anti-slavery views’.49 Clare Midgely notes that, by 1823, when Heyrick switched her attentions primarily to antislavery activism, she was ‘a long-standing member of the Society of Friends with access to a close-knit national network of co-religionists and an awareness of the Quakers’ long commitment to the cause’.50 Her opposition to slavery was most famously expressed by publication of ‘a bold pamphlet’ titled *Immediate not Gradual Abolition of Slavery* in 1824, but, notes Corfield, ‘she wrote four pamphlets demanding immediate emancipation for the slaves in 1824 alone, and three more by 1828’.51 Heyrick’s demand for immediate emancipation was radical in the 1820s, when the majority of abolitionists were still lobbying for amelioration followed by gradual emancipation. To counter this, she asked ‘must it therefore follow, by any inductions of common sense, that emancipation out of the gripe of a robber or an assassin, out of the jaws of a shark or a tiger, must be gradual?’52
Heyrick’s two short pamphlets on bull-baiting are directed towards the ordinary people who participated in the activity. The first, Bull-baiting: A Village Dialogue, between Tom Brown and John Sims, offers a dialogue between Tom Brown, a ‘random, thoughtless fellow’ who enjoys ale and bull-baiting, and John Sims, a sober figure who represents the voice of the author. John rebukes Tom by pointing out that ‘you dragged out these poor unoffending animals, day after day, to be torn and mangled by dogs, whose natural ferocity you had tried every art to increase: and, that they might not escape from their cruel tormentors, you chained them to the ground, and (with worse than savage barbarity) have made sport of their sufferings’. This has some effect on Tom, who admits ‘Why, for the matter of that, now it’s all over, I don’t say as there was altogether so much pleasure in it as I expected—and we’d got all the sport we could out of the poor brutes, and saw the miserable condition they were in, I must confess, for one, that my heart stung me a little.’ Seeing his opportunity, John presses home his case by appealing first to Tom’s patriotism and then to his Christianity. If it was not for the wise men in parliament running the country who were also trying to outlaw bull-baiting, he argues, ‘it’s my opinion that we should have had Buonaparte riding neck and heels over this little island of ours long ago; and then, instead of your bull and bear-baitings, you might have seen nothing but John Bull himself, baited all over his own country, by the French’. This was probably a dig at William Windham, the champion of blood sports, who had argued in Parliament in 1802 that the anti-bull-baiting campaign had been led by a ‘union of Methodists and Jacobins’, that free English labourers worked harder than slaves because of the ‘prospect of pleasure’ afforded by entertainments ‘of the old English character’ such as bull baiting, and that the anti-bull-baiting bill ‘was sufficient to Jacobinize a whole country’. Heyrick inverts Windham’s John-Bullish patriotism to suggest that bull baiting is contrary to English national interests, but she also promotes thereby an alternative vision of Englishness characterised by compassion rather than cruelty. In case patriotism is not enough, John invokes the ‘dreadful sight’ of a baited bull, whose ‘body was covered all over with wounds, and his head was so torn and mangled that it appeared nothing but a frightful, unformed mass of blood, from which the mingled flesh and gore hung, like thick icicles, quite to the ground! And all this to afford pleasure to the lords of the creation!!’ The pamphlet concludes with John reminding Tom that Christ ‘spent his whole life in going about doing good, and taught his disciples not only to be pure and heavenly-minded, but to be gentle, compassionate, and tender-hearted’. Significantly, John backs up this sentimental injunction by a metaphysical threat of enslavement. ‘It is highly reasonable to believe’, he argues, that in heaven ‘the tyrant will be enslaved, and the tormentor be, in his turn, tormented’. Heyrick clearly believed that the two causes were intermingled; that cruelty to animals and cruelty to enslaved people were both sinful and would be equally punished in Heaven.

Heyrick supported Richard Martin’s celebrated Act to prevent the cruel and improper Treatment of Cattle, which became law in July 1822—the first animal welfare legislation enacted in Britain—but she did not consider it went far enough. In 1823, she issued a pamphlet attacking the cruelty she had witnessed at Smithfield, London’s main meat
market. This begins, seemingly, by dismissing concern for enslaved people in favour of action closer to home. ‘We have heard much’, she remarks, ‘of the barbarities and the horrors of slavery—of the savage and brutalizing exhibitions which degrade and disgrace other ages and other countries—of the Spanish bull-fight—of the gladiatorial combats, and other barbarous shows, of the Roman amphitheatre;—but, on no part of the globe, in no age of the world, can I image scenes of more atrocious cruelty, or more fiend-like depravity, than those exhibited in Smithfield market’. This kind of statement was often made by conservative, proslavery commentators who sought to distract attention away from plantation slavery by asking people to focus on child chimney sweeps, distressed agricultural laborers, mineworkers, or other groups of demonstrably suffering people. Heyrick is in danger of straying into such territory, except that she concedes that slavery is barbarous and horrific. Later in the pamphlet, however, she issues a more nuanced comparison in which she laments that some people think that God has authorised them ‘to despise, oppress, and torment all the creatures which he regards as inferiors’. These creatures may be both human and non-human. Thus, she argues, ‘an American republican, a zealot for the rights of man, for liberty and equality, disclaims his relationship to his sable brethren—considers them as creatures of an inferior species, with whom he would not only be disgraced by associating, but whom he may, with impunity, buy and sell, and lash as beasts of burden.’ Heyrick’s invocation of the notorious paradox of American liberty suggests that her thinking is transitional. While in 1823, despite her growing involvement with antislavery activism, her primary literary concern is still animal cruelty, by the following year she had launched herself wholeheartedly into the abolition campaign with publication of Immediate not Gradual Abolition of Slavery. As with Stockdale, Heyrick’s works had a limited circulation and were not widely reviewed, but they clearly reflect a growing and concurrent grassroots dissatisfaction with progress against both animal cruelty and slavery, especially in radical and Quaker circles.

Antislavery and animal welfare legislation continued to be enacted almost in tandem over the coming decades. In August 1833, the Slavery Abolition Act received royal assent, while in 1835, bull-baiting was made illegal by the Act for Consolidating and amending the laws relating to the cruel and improper treatment of animals. Of course, neither slavery nor animal cruelty ended at this point. After 1838, writers continued to draw parallels between enslaved people and domesticated animals, most famously in Anna Sewell’s 1877 children’s classic Black Beauty, which tells the story of a mistreated horse in a form that closely resembles a slave narrative and which was distributed in free or cheap editions by animal welfare organisations throughout the world. Parallels between enslavement of people and domestication of animals had been drawn for centuries, if not millennia, and will no doubt continue to be made in future, but the specific conflation of antislavery and anticruelty rhetoric grounded in the utilitarian understanding that all humanity, and all animals, experienced suffering was a product of the late eighteenth century. Abolitionists and animal welfare activists alike extended the boundaries of sympathy to include all creatures capable of experiencing pain, and then demanded that this shift in sensibilities be enshrined in
legislation. Such demands were not always met for the purely ethical reasons that motivated many reformers. Practical concerns about plantation profitability and public order at bull-baitings played a large part too, while abolitionist ethics rooted in sentimental philosophy came at considerable risk of perpetuating racial ideologies that saw Africans and other non-Europeans merely as feeling rather than as rational individuals. Reformist literature, like the political movements it served, was never homogenous but instead reflected a diverse range of styles, opinions, beliefs, and agendas, only some of which were applauded by later generations. Authors who excoriated slavery, denounced the exploitation of children, and pressed for animal welfare legislation also supported colonial expansion and missionary work overseas as well as a reformation of manners and morals at home that sought to outlaw many popular pleasures and pastimes. As readers and critics, we should remember that the fine distinctions we draw between different categories of campaign that authors supported were not distinct in many of their minds, nor in their writings, and separating them out is often an anachronistic critical procedure. Nevertheless, some facts remain. While the targets were many, often conflated, and sometimes problematic for modern readers, in their eighteenth and nineteenth-century context, reformist writers were indeed effective in mobilising support for some of the earliest humanitarian laws enacted by any legislature.

NOTES


2 The Black Legend thesis is widely articulated but see in particular Julián Juderías, _La leyenda negra y la verdad histórica_ (Madrid: Tip. de la Revista de Archivos, 1914). British blood sports were not confined to bull-baiting. As well as hunting, shooting, and fishing of native species, exotic animals including bears and lions were goaded to death or set against dogs. See, for example, Helen Cowie “‘A disgusting exhibition of brutality’: Animals, the Law and the Warwick Lion Fight of 1825’, in Sarah Cockram and Andrew Wells, eds, *Interspecies Interactions: Animals and Humans Between the Middle Ages and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2018), pp.149–68.


15 Equiano, *Interesting Narrative*, p.43


John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (London: 1693), §110.


Old Mingo, ‘Cruelty to Horses, and Asses, and Negroes’, *Diary or Woodfall’s Register 29* (1789).


‘Sir W. Jones and Mr. Day’, *Mirror of Literature*, 12 (26 July 1828), p.64.


Percival Stockdale, *A Remonstrance against inhumanity to animals, and particularly against the savage practice of bull-baiting* (Alnwick, 1802), pp.1–4.


Corfield, ‘Elizabeth Heyrick’, p.41.


The second, A Christmas-Box for the Advocates of Bull-Baiting, Particularly Addressed to the Inhabitants of Uppingham (London, 1809), is a more polemical tract, aimed directly and personally at the villagers, and abandoning the distancing technique of the dialogue used in the earlier pamphlet.

Parliamentary History, 36, cols 831–44.

