Running title: COMPARATIVE VICTIM BELIEFS

The Role of Comparative Victim Beliefs in Predicting Support for Hostile versus Prosocial Intergroup Outcomes

Johanna Ray Vollhardt¹
J. Christopher Cohrs²
Zsolt Péter Szabó³
Mikołaj Winiewski⁴
Michelle Sinayoby Twali¹
Eliana Hadjiandreou⁵
Andrew McNeill⁶

¹ Department of Psychology, Clark University
² Department of Psychology, Philipps-Universität Marburg
³ Department of Ergonomics and Psychology, Budapest University of Technology and Economics
⁴ Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw
⁵ Department of Psychology, Penn State University
⁶ Department of Psychology, Northumbria University

Author Note

Parts of this research were funded by grants from the American Psychology Foundation Visionary Grant, the Diamentowy Grant by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education (095/DIA/2012/41), and the Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NKFI-119433).

We would like to thank several research assistants who helped with programming of the survey or data collection (Lily Torosyan, Nicole Papazian, Miranda Smerling, Jonah Naghi, India Spears, and Emma Goldstein), as well as Mateusz Olechowski and Lucas Mazur for their input on the measures. We also thank numerous anonymous participants and members of the respective communities we worked with for their support and help in disseminating the survey. Finally, we thank Maria-Therese Friehs and Patrick F. Kotzur for advice regarding the data analysis with MPlus.

This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as doi: 10.1002/EJSP.2756

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
The Role of Comparative Victim Beliefs in Predicting Support for Hostile versus Prosocial Intergroup Outcomes

Word count: 10,679 (including Abstract, main text, and Footnotes; excluding References, Tables, Figure, and Appendices).
Abstract
Collective memories of historical ingroup victimization can be linked to prosocial or hostile intergroup outcomes. We hypothesize that such discrepant responses are predicted by different construals of the ingroup’s victimization in relation to other groups (i.e., comparative victim beliefs). Using improved measures of inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs, with a global or regional reference group, multigroup structural equation modeling showed across four different groups (Armenian Americans \([N=265]\), Jewish Americans \([N=297]\), Hungarians \([N=301]\), Poles \([N=468]\)) that inclusive victim beliefs predict prosocial, conciliatory attitudes, while exclusive victim beliefs predict hostile attitudes towards historical perpetrator groups and (in the Polish and Hungarian samples) religious and ethnic outgroups targeted in the present. Moreover, comparative victim beliefs mediated effects of more general psychological orientations (ingroup superiority, universal orientation, perspective-taking) on intergroup outcomes. These findings suggest the importance of considering distinct collective victim beliefs, and different contexts in research on collective victimhood.

Keywords: Comparative victim beliefs, inclusive victim beliefs, exclusive victim beliefs, genocide, attitudes towards refugees, attitudes towards Muslims
The Role of Comparative Victim Beliefs in Predicting Support for Hostile versus Prosocial Intergroup Outcomes

Collective victimization, resulting from “the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group (...) against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives” (WHO, 2002, p. 215), has received increased attention over the past decade (Noor et al., 2017; Vollhardt, 2020). One reason for this is that collective victimization may contribute to cycles of violence when collective memories of victimization are used to mobilize group members for violent conflict (Bilali & Ross, 2012). Yet, people also express willingness to reconcile with the perpetrator groups (Shnabel et al., 2009), or express solidarity with other victim groups (Craig & Richeson, 2016; Vollhardt, 2015). What helps explain this difference between hostile, conflict-perpetuating versus prosocial, conciliatory responses associated with collective victimization? One important factor is how the ingroup’s victimization is construed in relation to other groups’ experiences—which we refer to as comparative victim beliefs (Noor et al., 2017; Vollhardt, 2012a). However, most studies of comparative victim beliefs have been conducted in contexts of ongoing or recent conflict, which shapes perceptions of the past (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). Studies of comparative victim beliefs in the aftermath of violence such as genocide and war, and studies examining intergroup relations beyond those with perpetrator groups and adversaries, are scarce. Additionally, there is almost no research on antecedents of comparative victim beliefs that may help explain different construals of ingroup victimization. The present studies aimed to fill these gaps.

Comparative Victim Beliefs

Comparative victim beliefs are just one way of construing the ingroup’s victimization, but seem particularly relevant for explaining how collective victimhood (i.e., the psychological experience of collective victimization due to structural or direct violence: Noor et al., 2017; Vollhardt, 2012a, 2020) may differentially affect intergroup relations. Specifically, social comparisons (Festinger, 1954) with other groups’ suffering can result in exclusive or inclusive victim beliefs. In line with contrast and assimilation processes in social comparison more generally (e.g., Mussweiler, 2003), exclusive victim beliefs are defined as perceived uniqueness and distinctiveness of the ingroup’s victimization compared to other groups’ suffering (which can also entail the perception that the ingroup suffered more than others; i.e., competitive victimhood: Noor et al., 2012), whereas inclusive victim beliefs refer to perceived similarities
between the ingroup’s suffering and that of other groups (Vollhardt, 2009, 2015). These different construals of ingroup victimization should predict distinct, opposite intergroup outcomes.

**The Reference of Comparison in Comparative Victim Beliefs**

Research on inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs has mostly focused on comparisons between the suffering of groups that are in conflict with each other, such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland or Palestinians and Jewish Israelis (e.g., Noor et al., 2008; Shnabel et al., 2013). In addition to these *conflict-specific victim beliefs*, some research has examined collective victim beliefs with a global reference group (Vollhardt, 2012a), comparing the ingroup’s victimization to other victim groups’ experiences worldwide (e.g., Cohrs et al., 2015; Vollhardt et al., 2016). While the (scarce) literature on *global victim beliefs* usually does not explain the choice of this reference group, we posit that it is particularly relevant in certain contexts. For example, in contexts of genocide and its aftermath, the total nature and extent of the ingroup’s victimization through genocide may make global victim beliefs particularly pertinent. Additionally, in such cases of asymmetric violence with a clear perpetrator and victim group, stating that the perpetrator group suffered—even if less than the victim group—may be seen as irrelevant or even offensive.

There are also cases where comparisons of suffering are salient, but neither conflict-specific nor global victim beliefs make much sense. For example, in some contexts conflict-specific victim beliefs are irrelevant because there is no ongoing violent intergroup conflict, and the scale of the ingroup’s victimization may make it seem unreasonable to agree with statements such as “no other group in the world has suffered as much as my group.” For a more valid and reliable assessment in such contexts, collective victimization through wars or oppressive regimes affecting an entire region may make other nations in the region a more relevant and salient comparison. We therefore argue that in some contexts, *regional victim beliefs* are more appropriate to examine. To our knowledge, only one set of studies has examined regional comparative victim beliefs, in Hungary (Szabó et al., 2020). Both global and, in particular, regional victim beliefs therefore remain understudied compared to the larger body of work on conflict-specific victim beliefs. In sum, inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs can refer to conflict-specific, regional, or global comparisons, and it is crucial to consider which level of comparison is most relevant for each context.

**Exclusive Victim Beliefs**
Exclusive victim beliefs are usually examined in the context of long-standing violent conflicts (i.e., as conflict-specific victim beliefs). In such conflicts, perceiving the ingroup as more severely or uniquely victimized may make people unable to see the ingroup as an active perpetrator of violence due to their victim status (see Gray & Wegner, 2009) and perceived innocence (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). This, in turn, may result in rejecting collective responsibility for harming others (Schori-Eyal et al., 2014; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). With regard to global and regional exclusive victim beliefs, perceived uniqueness or greater severity of the ingroup’s suffering compared to outgroups in the region or worldwide may also predict more negative attitudes towards the perpetrator group, who may be viewed as particularly evil due to the perceived uniqueness of their harmdoing (Campbell & Vollhardt, 2014; Imhoff et al., 2017). More generally, perceived discrimination—which is sometimes used to refer to, and discussed interchangeably with, collective victimization in contexts such as the U.S. (see Craig & Richeson, 2016)—can pose an identity threat and increase negative attitudes towards outgroups (Branscombe et al., 1999), including other victim groups that are targeted for a different identity dimension (e.g., race vs. sexual orientation; Craig & Richeson, 2014). In sum, exclusive victim beliefs should predict negative attitudes and support for hostile policies towards the historical perpetrator group as well as outgroups that also suffered and are unrelated to the ingroup’s victimization (see also Noor et al., 2012; Vollhardt, 2012a).

In line with this theoretical rationale, conflict-specific exclusive victim beliefs (specifically, competitive victimhood) predicted social distance from ethnic outgroups and support for their political and economic exclusion in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015), as well as less forgiveness and decreased willingness to compromise in the conflict in Northern Ireland (e.g., Noor et al., 2008). Experimental manipulations that focused exclusively on the ingroup’s historical victimization and did not mention other groups’ victimization in this context, by reminding Jewish Israeli participants of the Holocaust as a “crime against Jews” (compared to a more inclusive framing of the Holocaust as a “crime against humanity”) increased legitimization of harmdoing against present-day adversaries in a conflict and support for military solutions (Canetti et al., 2018; Hirschberger et al., 2017). Similarly, regional exclusive victim beliefs concerning historical victimization predicted support for current anti-refugee policies in Hungary (Szabó et al., 2020).

Inclusive Victim Beliefs
Conversely, perceived similarity of experiences (shared fate) can be the basis for a superordinate identity (or common ingroup identity; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), which increases prosocial responses towards (recategorized) outgroups (e.g., Levine et al., 2005). Thus, inclusive victim beliefs can be understood as a shared, superordinate social category based on similar experiences of victimization that should predict increased prosocial attitudes towards other victim groups. In contexts of collective violence, inclusive victim beliefs may even be more effective than other common ingroup identities in improving intergroup attitudes toward the adversary or perpetrator group (Shnabel et al., 2013; but see Warner et al., 2014). Awareness of outgroups that were targeted in other contexts (reflected in global or regional victim beliefs) may reduce perceptions of the perpetrator group as uniquely evil, and increase external attributions for the ingroup’s victimization. This, in turn, could be linked to improved attitudes towards the perpetrator group and less support for violent policies to address ingroup victimization (Campbell & Vollhardt, 2014; Imhoff et al., 2017). In sum, inclusive victim beliefs should predict positive, prosocial intergroup attitudes towards other victim groups and support for reconciliation (Craig & Richeson, 2016; Vollhardt, 2015).

In line with this theorizing, conflict-specific inclusive victim beliefs predicted prosocial attitudes towards and political inclusion of other groups in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015), forgiveness of the other conflict party (Noor et al., 2015) and peace activism (Shnabel et al., 2017) among Jewish Israelis. Experimental manipulations of conflict-specific inclusive victim identities in Israel increased forgiveness through less moral defensiveness (Shnabel et al., 2013), and context-specific inclusive victim beliefs increased positive attitudes between different minority groups in the U.S. (Cortland et al., 2017). Among various minority groups in India and in the U.S., global inclusive victim beliefs also predicted or increased prosocial attitudes towards other victim groups that were not responsible for the ingroup’s victimization (Vollhardt, 2013; Vollhardt et al., 2016; Warner et al., 2014), and regional inclusive victim beliefs predicted more positive attitudes towards present-day refugees in Hungary (Szabó et al., 2020).

**Antecedents of Comparative Victim Beliefs**

While the reviewed studies show that inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs predict intergroup outcomes, much less is known about the antecedents of these distinct collective victim
beliefs, and whether they mediate the effects of more general intergroup orientations on prosocial versus hostile intergroup outcomes (see Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011).

We posit that perceived ingroup superiority should predict exclusive victim beliefs, which in turn should mediate the effects of ingroup superiority on negative intergroup attitudes and support for violent policies. Perceiving the ingroup as superior indicates a competitive orientation towards intergroup relations (Roccas et al., 2008). This orientation should predict increased endorsement of exclusive victim beliefs, because the exclusive victim status could imply greater innocence and moral superiority compared to other groups (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Noor et al., 2012; SimanTov-Nachlieli et al., 2015; but see Perez & Salter, 2020), and is also associated with greater power needs and perceived entitlement to resources (Kahalon et al., 2019). Thus, exclusive victim beliefs should mediate the effects of ingroup superiority on negative attitudes towards the historical perpetrator group and present-day victim groups (see Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015, for initial evidence examining conflict-specific victim beliefs).

Similarly, we argue that more general positive intergroup orientations that indicate openness towards others—specifically, a universal orientation and empathy—should predict inclusive victim beliefs. In turn, inclusive victim beliefs should mediate the positive effects of universal orientation and empathy on prosocial intergroup attitudes and conciliatory outcomes. Universal orientation indicates a focus on similarities with others more generally (Philips & Ziller, 1997), which should also be associated with greater perceived similarity between the victimized ingroup and other victim groups. Similarly, empathy—which includes empathic concern (the ability to feel compassion for others: Batson & Oleson, 1991) and perspective-taking (the ability to adopt another person’s thoughts and concerns: Epley & Caruso, 2008)—should facilitate the ability to acknowledge and imagine other victim groups’ experiences and see the similarities with the ingroup’s experiences. It is an exploratory question which of these two components of the broader concept of empathy (Zaki & Ochsner, 2012) are more relevant antecedents of inclusive victim beliefs.

Research Gaps in the Literature on Comparative Victim Beliefs

Despite the promising initial evidence concerning the effects of inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs on intergroup relations, this literature has several limitations and gaps that the present paper aims to address. First, research on global and regional victim beliefs is scarce, and more studies are needed to test their effects systematically and in different contexts. Second,
while separate studies show that comparative victim beliefs predict attitudes towards the historical perpetrator group or towards other victim groups, no research has included these different target groups in the same study to compare the scope of the effects and explore their generalizability across different intergroup relations contexts. Third, many studies include only one type of outcome (e.g., forgiveness or support for violence). This makes it difficult to determine whether inclusive victim beliefs primarily predict support for prosocial outcomes and exclusive victim beliefs support for hostile outcomes, or whether cross-over effects (i.e., inclusive victim beliefs predicting less support for hostile outcomes and exclusive victim beliefs less support for prosocial outcomes) also occur (e.g., Adelman et al., 2016; Noor et al., 2008). Vollhardt and Bilali (2015) demonstrated for conflict-specific victim beliefs in the Great Lakes region of Africa that inclusive victim beliefs predicted more positive, but not less negative attitudes towards former adversaries; while exclusive victim beliefs only predicted negative intergroup outcomes, but not less positive intergroup outcomes. They noted that this pattern is in line with research showing that positive intergroup attitudes are better predictors of positive intergroup outcomes and negative intergroup attitudes better predictors of negative intergroup outcomes (Pittinsky et al., 2011); and with more general research suggesting the “functional independence” of seemingly related positive and negative attitudes, which shows the need for their separate assessment to better understand distinct antecedents and consequences (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). However, this question has not yet been tested for global and regional victim beliefs. Fourth, as noted above, there is very little knowledge about the antecedents of inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs, and their proposed role as mediators of the effects of more general psychological orientations on intergroup outcomes.

Finally, our ability to test these questions adequately depends on good measurement of the constructs of interest. The existing studies have been limited in terms of the conceptualization and measurement of comparative victim beliefs. There is no standard measure of these constructs, and most studies use different measures of inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs, with different conceptual implications. For example, most studies examining exclusive victim beliefs assess competitive victimhood, which is a quantitative comparison of the degree or amount of different groups’ collective victimization—implying that it can be weighed to determine how much people suffered (“we have suffered more”). Conversely, some studies assess perceived qualitative differences in the nature of the groups’ experiences and how they
suffered (“we have suffered in distinct ways”). Similarly, research on inclusive victim beliefs usually assesses perceived similarities—i.e., qualitative comparisons emphasizing the nature of the experiences rather than the degree of suffering—while quantitative, inclusive comparisons capturing the notion that one group suffered as much as the other are rare. This uneven assessment makes it difficult to compare findings on inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs and integrate findings across studies and contexts. The present study therefore included both quantitative and qualitative comparisons in both the inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs measures.

Another limitation concerning measurement is that most studies only assess inclusive or exclusive victim beliefs. However, we argue that these are not mutually exclusive, opposite ends of one spectrum and that one cannot be reduced to the other. Instead, people may endorse both similarities and differences with other victim groups to different degrees. This is especially true for global and regional victim beliefs, where people can have different target groups in mind and think of similarities with some groups’ experiences and differences with other groups’ suffering (e.g., Cohrs et al., 2015; Szabó et al., 2020). Moreover, the need to acknowledge both similarities and differences in superordinate identities (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000) is particularly pronounced in contexts of low intergroup power (Saguy et al., 2008) that often characterize collective victimization (Shnabel & Nadler, 2015). Therefore, we argue that both inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs should be assessed separately and simultaneously. Although there is some preliminary evidence from exploratory factor analyses that inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs load on distinct factors (Cohrs et al., 2015; Vollhardt et al., 2016), this has yet to be tested systematically through confirmatory factor analyses, and across multiple contexts.

**Overview of Study Aims and Procedures**

To address these gaps, the present studies examined global and regional victim beliefs across four different contexts of historical collective victimization, assessing comparative victim beliefs concerning reference groups that were deemed most relevant for each context. We examined global victim beliefs among Armenian and Jewish Americans in the context of their group’s historical genocide (Studies 1A-B), and regional victim beliefs among Hungarians and Poles in the context of the historical wars, occupations, and totalitarian regimes in Central Eastern Europe (Studies 2A-B). We included measures of positive and negative attitudes towards historical perpetrator groups that were responsible for the ingroup’s past victimization, as well as
attitudes towards minority groups that are suffering or being targeted in the present, and that are not responsible for the ingroup’s historical victimization.

Specifically, we chose outgroups that are relevant in all four contexts we examined: Syrian refugees and Muslims. Syrians are the largest group of refugees worldwide, and have resettled in many countries including in Europe and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. (Pew Research Center, 2018; UNHCR, 2021). In addition to the violence suffered during the war and during resettlement, refugees are also often the target of hostility and xenophobic hate crimes in host societies (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2016; Lueders et al., 2019). In the present study, we therefore focus on acceptance of Syrian refugees into one’s community as a measure of prosocial attitudes towards an outgroup that is suffering due to collective violence in the present. To assess hostile attitudes towards a minority group that is targeted in the present, we examined support for surveillance of Muslims. Especially since the attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent wars the U.S. and its European allies waged in the Middle East, Muslims have also been the target of hate crimes and hostility in the U.S. and in Europe (e.g., European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2021; U.S. Department of Justice, 2015). Muslims are among the most dehumanized groups in these contexts (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017), and have been disproportionately targeted by surveillance measures and prosecutions that involve human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2014; Renton, 2018).

We assessed inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs with improved measures, including a balanced assessment of qualitative and quantitative comparisons. Additionally, we tested three potential antecedents of exclusive and inclusive victim beliefs (ingroup superiority, universal orientation, and empathy—including the two components of empathic concern and perspective-taking); and whether, in turn, inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs mediate the effects of these more general orientations on attitudes towards historical perpetrator groups and minority groups suffering in the present.

To enable comparison and direct replication of the findings across contexts, we used the same outcome measures and control variables in all four studies, adapted to the respective context. To conceptually expand the processes we were able to test without overextending the length of the survey, we assessed different general orientations for the mediation analyses involving inclusive victim beliefs in different studies: we examined universal orientation in
Studies 1A-B, and empathy in Studies 2A-B. The raw data files are available as online supplementary materials.

Hypotheses and Analytic Procedures

We hypothesized that exclusive victim beliefs predict hostile intergroup attitudes towards the historical perpetrator group (specifically, resentment) as well as towards a minority group targeted in the present (specifically, support for surveillance of Muslims), while inclusive victim beliefs predict prosocial intergroup attitudes towards the historical perpetrator group (specifically, reconciliation) and a present-day victim group (specifically, acceptance of Syrian refugees). Further, we hypothesized that inclusive victim beliefs are predicted by a universal orientation (Studies 1A-B) or by perspective-taking and empathic concern (Studies 2A-B), and mediate their effects on prosocial intergroup outcomes; and that exclusive victim beliefs are predicted by ingroup superiority and mediate their effects on hostile intergroup outcomes.

We also examined, as an exploratory question, the cross-over effects between constructs associated with prosocial intergroup outcomes and constructs associated with hostile intergroup outcomes: whether exclusive victim beliefs also predict less support for prosocial intergroup outcomes, and inclusive victim beliefs less support for hostile intergroup attitudes; and whether lower levels of ingroup superiority predict inclusive victim beliefs and prosocial intergroup outcomes, while lower levels of universal orientation, empathy, and perspective-taking predict exclusive victim beliefs and hostile intergroup outcomes.

We posit that the hypothesized effects will hold when controlling for ingroup attachment (Roccas et al., 2008) and personal centrality of the ingroup’s victimization (Vollhardt et al., 2016). This rules out that the effects merely reflect differences in perceived importance of the ingroup or its historical victimization. For the same reason, we control for political ideology as another potentially confounding factor, as well as age, gender, and education that often predict intergroup attitudes and policy preferences.

Our analytic procedure for all four studies was as follows. For each sample separately, we cleaned the data by omitting data from participants who did not complete more than five victim beliefs items or more than ten items altogether, showed monotonous or indiscriminate response patterns, or had spent less than five minutes on the survey (Meade & Craig, 2012). The remaining missing values were replaced using the Expectation-Maximization method (Enders, 2010). The resulting sample sizes met the recommendations for exploratory factor and
confirmatory factor analysis ($N = 300$, Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) and for obtaining stable correlation coefficients ($N = 200$-$250$; Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). We used exploratory factor analysis to narrow down our initial larger pool of comparative victim beliefs items and identify items that worked across all contexts (see online supplementary materials for details). We then used Mplus Version 8.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 2018), with robust maximum likelihood (MLM; Satorra-Bentler) estimation of parameters, to test the measurement model and, in the next step, our hypotheses and exploratory research questions. Specifically, for each sample pair (i.e., Studies 1A-B: global collective victim beliefs; Studies 2A-B: regional collective victim beliefs), we first established that the measurement models fit in each sample separately (see online supplementary materials for factor loadings). Next, we used multi-group (i.e., two-group) structural equation modeling to test measurement invariance. At least partial metric equivalence is required to compare structural relations between samples (Byrne et al., 1989). This requirement was met in both studies. Thus, we were able to test the generalizability of structural relations between variables across samples, and account for specific relationships that differed between samples.

We used structural equation models to test our hypotheses that inclusive victim beliefs predict positive intergroup attitudes towards the historical perpetrator group and a minority group suffering in the present, and exclusive victim beliefs predict negative intergroup attitudes towards the historical perpetrator group and a minority group targeted in the present—controlling for ingroup attachment, perceived centrality of ingroup victimization, political ideology, and demographics (age, gender, education). To test our exploratory questions concerning possible cross-over effects, we then tested separately for each possible path whether inclusive victim beliefs also predict negative intergroup outcomes, exclusive victim beliefs predict positive intergroup outcomes, ingroup superiority predicts inclusive victim beliefs or positive intergroup outcomes, and universal orientation (Studies 1A-B) or empathic concern and perspective-taking (Studies 2A-B) predict exclusive victim beliefs or negative intergroup outcomes. The conceptual model is depicted in Figure 1.

**Study 1A and B**

In Studies 1A-B we tested our predictions for comparative victim beliefs with a global reference group (i.e., global victim beliefs), in the context of the aftermath of two historical genocides: the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust.
Turkey’s continued denial of the Armenian Genocide (Akçam, 2007) is often emphasized as a unique characteristic by Armenians (Vollhardt & Nair, 2018). Similarly, the Holocaust is frequently described as a unique event in world history, due to its scale and how systematically it was carried out (Levy & Sznaider, 2006). But scholars and activists have also argued for universal lessons of these genocides (ibid.), and there is rich anecdotal evidence of solidarity with other victim groups in both cases (Klar et al., 2013; Vollhardt, 2012b, 2015). Thus, both global inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs are part of the discourse in Armenian American (Akopyan, 2017) and Jewish American (Vollhardt, 2013) communities. Moreover, research among both communities shows the centrality of these historical traumas for present-day Armenian Americans’ (Azarian-Ceccato, 2010; Vollhardt et al., 2014) and Jewish Americans’ (e.g., Ben-Hagai et al., 2013; Warner et al., 2014) identities and intergroup attitudes.

Method

Participants and Procedure

For Study 1A, 292 Armenian Americans participated online. After data cleaning, data from 265 participants were kept for the analyses. For Study 1B, 370 Jewish Americans participated online. After data cleaning, data from 297 participants were kept for further analyses. Demographic characteristics are reported in Table 1. Armenian American participants were recruited by Armenian American research assistants who posted to mailing lists of Armenian organizations and churches across the U.S. Similarly, Jewish American participants were recruited by Jewish American research assistants through mailing lists, Facebook groups, and newsletters of synagogues and Jewish organizations across the U.S. For each study, a raffle (for a $50 gift certificate) was offered as compensation. Participants were informed that the survey was about Armenian suffering due to the Armenian Genocide or Jewish suffering due to the Holocaust, respectively, and about views on current social and political issues.

Demographic information was assessed first, followed by questions about the ingroup’s victimization, the outcome measures, and other control variables.

Measures

Unless noted otherwise, all items were assessed on 7-point scales from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” A full list of the self-designed items is provided in the Appendix, and all means and standard deviations for all measures are reported in Table 2.
Comparative Victim Beliefs. Inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs were assessed with six items each, including both quantitative and qualitative comparisons (see online supplementary materials for factor loadings). For example, two sample items for the inclusive victim beliefs measure are “Armenians [Jews] have a lot in common with other ethnic, national or religious groups that have been targeted” and “There are other groups in the world that have suffered as much as the Armenian [Jewish] people.” Two sample exclusive victim beliefs items are “No other group in the world has suffered as much as the Armenian [Jewish] people” and “World history never saw anything like the persecution of the Armenian [Jewish] people.”

Outcome Variables. We tested attitudes toward two types of outgroups. To assess attitudes towards the historical perpetrator group, we measured willingness for reconciliation (using five items from Shnabel et al., 2009; e.g., “I am willing to act for promoting reconciliation between Armenians and Turks [Jews and Germans]”), and resentment (using four items from Vollhardt et al., 2014; e.g., “I feel very cold toward the Turks [Germans]).

To examine attitudes toward outgroups that are suffering or targeted in the present, four self-designed items resembling social distance measures and describing increasing levels of proximity (Bogardus, 1928) assessed acceptance of Syrian refugees (e.g., “I would support allowing more Syrian refugees into the United States”) and four items assessed support for a controversial surveillance program by the New York Police department targeting Muslims (e.g., “The threat of terrorism by Islamic groups justifies police surveillance of this kind”), described in a vignette based on a news story (see Appendix).

Antecedents of Comparative Victim Beliefs. We assessed perceived ingroup superiority with four items from Roccas et al. (2008; e.g., “Compared to other communities, Armenians [Jews] are particularly good”). Universal orientation was assessed with ten items (e.g., “I tend to value similarities over differences when I meet someone”) from Philips and Ziller (1997), of which two were dropped due to low factor loadings in both samples.

Control Variables. To control for strength of ingroup identification, we used four items assessing ingroup attachment (Roccas et al., 2008; e.g., “Being Armenian [Jewish] is an important part of my identity”). To control for the perceived personal centrality of ingroup victimization (Vollhardt et al., 2016), we used six self-developed items (e.g., “Understanding our (Jews’) [(Armenians’)] history of victimization is very important to me”).
included a one-item measure of political ideology (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative).

Results

Single-Sample Analyses

In each sample separately, a measurement model with 10 latent variables was specified (inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs, personal centrality of ingroup victimization, ingroup attachment, willingness for reconciliation, resentment, acceptance of Syrian refugees, support for surveillance of Muslims, ingroup superiority, universal orientation). Four manifest variables (age, gender, education, political ideology) were added as covariates. Due to high modification indices that were consistent across samples, we added (1) a secondary loading of an ingroup superiority item on the attachment factor, (2) a residual correlation between two resentment items, and (3) a residual correlation between two universal orientation items. Table 3 shows the resulting correlation matrices for each sample. Model fit was acceptable for both the Armenian American sample: $\chi^2(1340) = 2057.90, p < .001, \text{RMSEA} = .045, 90\% \text{ confidence interval (CI)} [.041, .049], \text{CFI} = .915, \text{SRMR} = .062$, and the Jewish American sample: $\chi^2(1340) = 2239.22, p < .001, \text{RMSEA} = .048, 90\% \text{ confidence interval (CI)} [.044, .051], \text{CFI} = .921, \text{SRMR} = .058$.

Measurement Invariance

We next tested (metric) measurement invariance across the two samples. We followed Chen’s (2007) recommendation that “a change of $\leq -0.005$ in CFI, supplemented by a change of $\geq 0.010$ in RMSEA or a change of $\geq 0.025$ in SRMR would indicate noninvariance” of loadings (p. 501). In addition, we relied on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which is recommended for model selection (Bollen et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2017). Fit was acceptable for both the baseline model assuming configural invariance and the model assuming metric invariance in which all factor loadings were constrained to be equal across both samples (see Table 4). Chen’s criteria for noninvariance were not fulfilled, and the BIC was better for the constrained model. Therefore, we assumed metric invariance between samples.

Structural Invariance

We next tested the equality of structural relations between the predictor and control, mediator, and outcome variables (see Figure 1). We compared a baseline model in which all structural relations (covariances among the predictor and control variables, residual covariances, and the hypothesized directional paths from the predictor, control, and mediator variables to the
mediator and outcome variables) were freely estimated for each sample with a constrained model in which the directional paths were set to be equal across both groups. The fit for both models was acceptable, and the BIC was better for the constrained model (see Table 4). Nevertheless, a large modification index (MI = 22.35) suggested freeing the equality constraint for the path from ingroup attachment to resentment, resulting in an adjusted model (see Table 4). Thus, regarding our first exploratory research question, the hypothesized relations appeared to be generalizable across the two samples of Armenian and Jewish Americans (with one exception involving one of the control variables, ingroup attachment, and resentment).

Addressing the second exploratory research question, we tested for cross-over paths between the constructs assessing or associated with positive intergroup outcomes (universal orientation, inclusive victim beliefs, willingness for reconciliation, support for refugees) and the constructs assessing or associated with negative intergroup outcomes (ingroup superiority, exclusive victim beliefs, resentment, support for surveillance) by adding each respective path (with equality constraint across samples) separately and inspecting the Satorra-Bentler-corrected χ²(1) differences. The path yielding the highest χ² change was kept and the procedure was repeated iteratively until no further improvement (p < .01 due to multiple tests) was possible. This led to a final model that, beyond the hypothesized paths, included four cross-over paths: from universal orientation to exclusive victim beliefs and resentment, and from ingroup superiority to inclusive victim beliefs and acceptance of Syrian refugees (for model fit see Table 4, last row).

**Parameter Estimates**

In the final model, as hypothesized, inclusive victim beliefs predicted willingness for reconciliation with the former perpetrator group and were predicted by increased universal orientation. However, inclusive victim beliefs did not predict support for Syrian refugees, and were additionally predicted by lower levels of perceived ingroup superiority. Consistent with our expectations, exclusive victim beliefs predicted resentment toward the former perpetrator group and were predicted by increased perceptions of ingroup superiority. However, exclusive victim beliefs did not predict support for surveillance of Muslims, and were additionally predicted by lower levels of universal orientation. For results concerning the control variables as well as direct paths from universal orientation and ingroup superiority, see Table 5. Interestingly, one of the control variables, ingroup attachment—the one structural parameter that was invariant across the
two samples—predicted greater resentment among Armenian Americans, but less resentment among Jewish Americans.

Mediation was tested with the INDIRECT option in Mplus. There was evidence of the hypothesized indirect effects of universal orientation on positive intergroup attitudes through inclusive victim beliefs for reconciliation, $b_{\text{ind}} = .039$, $SE = .014$, $p = .007$, but not for acceptance of Syrian refugees, $p = .26$. Also as hypothesized, there was an indirect effect of perceived ingroup superiority on negative intergroup attitudes through exclusive victim beliefs for resentment, $b_{\text{ind}} = .046$, $SE = .013$, $p < .001$, but not for support for surveillance of Muslims: $p = .13$. Additional unpredicted indirect effects were found for perceived ingroup superiority on reconciliation via inclusive victim beliefs, $b_{\text{ind}} = -.019$, $SE = .009$, $p = .025$, and for universal orientation on resentment via exclusive victim beliefs, $b_{\text{ind}} = -.022$, $SE = .009$, $p = .012$.

**Discussion**

Studies 1A-B provided consistent insights across two contexts of historical genocide and its aftermath concerning the role of global inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs—that is, comparisons with other victim groups’ suffering worldwide—in predicting prosocial and hostile intergroup outcomes. First, the analysis shows that the measures of global victim beliefs, which for the first time included a balanced assessment of qualitative and quantitative comparisons, worked in the same way across the two distinct contexts, and that inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs were indeed distinct factors. Second, the findings supported our hypotheses concerning the links between inclusive victim beliefs and reconciliation with the historical perpetrator group (conceptually replicating previous findings from one study in Northern Ireland, Cohrs et al., 2015) and exclusive victim beliefs and resentment towards the historical perpetrator group (extending previous research on global victim beliefs). However, the hypothesized effects were not supported for outgroups that are suffering or being targeted in the present, which we discuss below. Concerning our exploratory question, notably, there was no evidence of inclusive victim beliefs predicting less support for hostile intergroup outcomes and exclusive victim beliefs predicting less support for prosocial intergroup outcomes (replicating previous findings for conflict-specific victim beliefs in a different context: Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015).

A novel contribution of these findings is that they provide first evidence of antecedents of inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs and, in turn, their role as mediators of more general orientations on intergroup relations. Specifically, as hypothesized, across both contexts exclusive
victim beliefs were predicted by perceived ingroup superiority, and in turn mediated its effects on resentment towards the historical perpetrator group (but, unexpectedly, not on attitudes towards an outgroup that is targeted in the present). Additionally, and also as hypothesized, inclusive victim beliefs were predicted by a general universal orientation, and mediated its effects on reconciliation with the historical perpetrator group (but again not on attitudes towards a present-day victim group).

Strengths of this study include the multi-group analysis and replication across two contexts of the aftermath of historical collective victimization through genocide, specifically, among diverse community samples of Armenian Americans and Jewish Americans. The Armenian American context in particular is understudied in research on collective victimhood (Vollhardt & Nair, 2018). Using the same measures across contexts allowed us to systematically compare and replicate the findings, thereby providing more confidence in their generalizability at least to diaspora groups that were historically targeted by genocide. Additionally, by including several conceptually important control variables—above all, political orientation, centrality of ingroup victimization, and ingroup attachment—we ruled out that the observed effects merely reflect individual differences in these more general orientations rather than specific effects of inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs.

Contrary to our expectations, global victim beliefs did not predict attitudes towards outgroups suffering in the present (i.e., Syrian refugees and Muslims targeted by surveillance). This also counters findings in two other contexts (among disadvantaged groups in India, and among Vietnamese Americans), where global inclusive victim beliefs predicted support for refugees (Vollhardt et al., 2016). One possible explanation for why the present study failed to replicate this finding—aside from differences in the measurement and additional variables included in the model—is that Syrian refugees and Muslims might be seen as a threat, or associated with an adversary group in a conflict central to the ingroup today: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for Jewish Americans (Ben-Hagai et al., 2013), or the conflict with Azeris over Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenians (Tonoyan, 2018). This would be in line with Warner et al.’s (2014) findings that perceived moral obligations towards other victim groups that are sometimes perceived as a lesson of the ingroup’s victimization do not (necessarily) extend to groups perceived as adversaries. Another possibility is that attitudes towards present-day refugees and marginalized outgroups in society are much more influenced by political ideology than
attitudes towards historical perpetrator groups are (see Table 5), which could outweigh the effects of comparative victim beliefs. Finally, these present-day groups’ suffering from war or surveillance may be seen as too distinct from the ingroup’s experience of genocide. Perhaps, outcomes focused on outgroups that were also targets of genocide (e.g., Yazidis, Rwandans, Darfuris) would have supported our hypotheses (see Vollhardt, 2013; Warner et al., 2014).

Studies 2A-B tested the hypotheses again in other contexts, where the difference between the ingroup’s and the outgroup’s suffering was not as stark as the contrast with genocide.

Limitations of both studies include the use of convenience samples which, due to the necessity of recruiting minority group samples through ethnic/religious ingroup associations, mostly included rather highly identified ingroup members and people who are interested in their group’s history of victimization (see Table 2). Although we controlled for these variables, the results may differ in a sample of less identified group members. We address this limitation in the next two studies, where we were able to recruit participants from the general population. Additionally, instead of universal orientation, in Studies 2A-B we examine another potential antecedent of inclusive victim beliefs: empathy—with two of its components, empathic concern and perspective-taking.

**Studies 2A and B**

While Studies 1A-B demonstrate the importance of global victim beliefs in the aftermath of genocide, in other contexts the scale of the ingroup’s victimization may make it seem less reasonable to agree with statements such as “no other group in the world has suffered as much as my group.” For a more valid and reliable assessment, collective victimization due to wars or oppressive regimes affecting an entire region may make other nations in this region a more relevant and salient comparison.

In Studies 2A-B, we therefore examine comparative victim beliefs with a regional (rather than global) reference group in two Central Eastern European countries, Hungary and Poland. The comparison of the national ingroup’s suffering with other groups in this region is relevant in Poland and Hungary because of empires, wars, and political regimes that affected numerous countries in the region (e.g., the occupation and division of countries, World War I and II, displacement and ethnic cleansing during and after the wars, oppression under Communism, including the Hungarian refugee crisis in 1956: Szabó, 2020; Szabó et al., 2020).
Hungarian history entails repeated victimization by several outgroups (László, 2013). After the defeat against the Ottoman Empire in 1526, Hungary was occupied for centuries by different empires and countries. The most significant collective trauma in Hungarian history was the Trianon Treaty after WWI, resulting in Hungary loosing a large percentage of its population and land to Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, and others (Romsics, 2002). Poland also has a long history of collective victimization that shapes present-day societal discourse (Bilewicz & Stefaniak, 2013), the most central being: the partition of Poland between Russia, Prussia, and Austria (1795-1918), Poland’s occupation during WWII through Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and the post-war Communist period including Stalinist repression (CBOS, 2015). Due to this history, aside from Germans, Russians are also often perceived as a relevant adversary group (Bilewicz et al., 2019).

**Method**

**Participants and Procedure**

For Study 2A, 311 Hungarians participated in an online survey. After data cleaning, 301 participants (see sample characteristics in Table 1) were included in further analyses. Participants were recruited on social media and via e-mail. We also used snowball sampling, asking participants to forward the link to other potentially interested people. Participants were informed that the survey was about Hungarian suffering during their history, as well as views on social and political issues today. The measures were presented in the same order as in Studies 1A-B. No incentive was offered for participation.

For Study 2B, 537 Poles participated in the online survey. After data cleaning, 468 participants (see sample characteristics in Table 1) were retained for further analyses. Participants were randomly recruited from a respondent panel that is representative of the Polish population (http://researchonline.pl/). We used the same order of measures and instructions as in the previous studies.

**Measures**

The same scale formats were used as in Studies 1A-B. A full list of self-designed items is provided in the Appendix, and all means and standard deviations are provided in Table 2.

**Comparative Victim Beliefs.** We used six items to measure exclusive victim beliefs and four items to measure inclusive victim beliefs, as two inclusive victim beliefs items were dropped due to low factor loadings (see online supplementary materials for a full item list and
factor loadings). These items were adapted from Studies 1A-B, the only difference being that participants compared the ingroup’s victimization with other groups in the region instead of worldwide, and some language was modified to better fit local connotations. A sample item assessing regional exclusive victim beliefs was: “No other Central and Eastern European nation has suffered as much as the Hungarian [Polish] people.” A sample item assessing regional inclusive victim beliefs was: “There are other Central and Eastern European nations that suffered as much as the Hungarian [Polish] people.” Items were translated into Hungarian and Polish, respectively, and back-translated by different translators, to check that the meaning of the items was preserved.

**Outcome Variables.** The same measures as in Studies 1A-B assessed attitudes toward historical adversaries. Specifically, in Study 2A (Hungarian sample), we assessed resentment towards and willingness for reconciliation with Romanians. In Study 2B (Polish sample), the reconciliation and resentment measures focused on Russians, because of the ongoing relevance of collective memories of historical victimization through Russia fueled by more recent, politicized events such as the Smoleńsk air disaster (see Bilewicz et al., 2019). Finally, we used the same measures as in Studies 1A-B to assess acceptance of Syrian refugees and support for a Muslim surveillance program (see Appendix). Participants responded to this vignette with the same four items as in Studies 1A-B.

**Antecedents of Comparative Victim Beliefs.** We assessed perceived ingroup superiority with the same four items as in Studies 1A-B. To assess two components of empathy, four items measured general empathic concern (e.g., “I am often quite touched by things that I see happen”) and three items assessed perspective-taking (e.g., “I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both”; Davis, 1983).

**Control Variables.** We used the same control variables as in Studies 1A-B. Personal centrality of victimhood was measured with only four of the six items used in Studies 1A-B because two items had low factor loadings.

**Results**

**Single-Sample Analyses**

In each sample separately, a measurement model with 11 latent variables was specified (inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs, personal centrality of ingroup victimization, ingroup attachment, willingness for reconciliation, resentment, acceptance of Syrian refugees, support for
surveillance of Muslims, ingroup superiority, empathic concern, perspective-taking). Four manifest variables (age, gender, education, political ideology) were added as covariates. Due to high modification indices that were consistent across samples (and the same as in Studies 1A-B), we added a secondary loading of an ingroup superiority item on the attachment factor, and a residual correlation between two resentment items. Additionally, due to high (sample-specific) modification indices, in the Hungarian sample one residual correlation between two items on surveillance of Muslims was allowed; in the Polish sample four residual correlations between two pairs of items on acceptance of Syrian refugees, two empathy items, and two items on surveillance of Muslims were allowed. Table 6 shows the resulting correlation matrices for each sample. Model fit was acceptable for both the Hungarian sample: $\chi^2(1071) = 1762.44, p < .001$, $\text{RMSEA} = .046$, 90% confidence interval (CI) [.042, .050], $p_{\text{close}} = .943$, CFI = .931, SRMR = .053, and the Polish sample: $\chi^2(1068) = 1958.10, p < .001$, $\text{RMSEA} = .042$, 90% confidence interval (CI) [.039, .045], $p_{\text{close}} = 1.00$, CFI = .933, SRMR = .053.

**Measurement Invariance**

We next tested (metric) measurement invariance across the two samples, following the same strategy as in Studies 1A-B. Fit was acceptable for both the baseline model assuming configural invariance and the model assuming metric invariance in which all factor loadings were constrained to be equal across both samples (see Table 7). However, Chen’s criteria for noninvariance were fulfilled with $\Delta \text{SRMR} \geq .025$. Therefore, we freed equality constraints of factor loadings according to the largest modification index iteratively until $\Delta \text{SRMR} < .025$. This included a superiority item (MI = 19.76) and a reconciliation item (MI = 13.06). We accepted the resulting model as reflecting partial metric invariance between samples.

**Structural Invariance**

We next tested the equality of structural relations between the predictor and control, mediator, and outcome variables (see Figure 1), following the same strategy as in Studies 1A-B. The fit for both the baseline and the constrained models was acceptable, and the BIC was better for the constrained model (Table 7). Thus, in relation to our first exploratory research question, the hypothesized relations appeared to be generalizable across the two samples from Hungary and Poland.

Addressing the second exploratory research question, we tested for cross-over paths between constructs capturing prosocial orientations (empathic concern, perspective-taking,
inclusive victim beliefs, willingness for reconciliation, support for refugees) and constructs assessing or associated with negative intergroup relations (ingroup superiority, exclusive victim beliefs, resentment, support for Muslim surveillance) by adding each respective path (with equality constraint across samples) separately, as in Studies 1A-B. The final model included four cross-over paths: from ingroup superiority to inclusive victim beliefs (as in Studies 1A-B), from ingroup superiority and exclusive victim beliefs to acceptance of Syrian refugees, and from perspective-taking to resentment (for model fit see Table 7, last row).

**Parameter Estimates**

In the final model, as hypothesized, inclusive victim beliefs predicted both willingness for reconciliation with a former perpetrator group and support for Syrian refugees, and were predicted by perspective-taking (but not by empathic concern). An unexpected finding (though consistent with Studies 1A-B) was that inclusive victim beliefs was also predicted by (less) ingroup superiority. As expected, exclusive victim beliefs predicted both resentment toward the former perpetrator group and support for surveillance of Muslims, and were predicted by ingroup superiority. An additional finding concerning our exploratory research question was that exclusive victim beliefs also predicted less support for Syrian refugees. For additional results concerning the control variables as well as direct paths from perspective-taking, empathic concern, and ingroup superiority, see Table 8.

Regarding mediation, as hypothesized there were indirect effects of perspective-taking through inclusive victim beliefs on willingness for reconciliation with the historical perpetrator group, $b_{\text{ind}} = .109$, $SE = .029$, $p < .001$, and acceptance of Syrian refugees, $b_{\text{ind}} = .043$, $SE = .018$, $p = .014$, but the indirect effects of empathic through inclusive victim beliefs were not significant (reconciliation, $p = .36$, acceptance of Syrian refugees, $p = .37$). As hypothesized, there was an indirect effect of ingroup superiority on negative intergroup attitudes through exclusive victim beliefs for both resentment of the historical perpetrator group, $b_{\text{ind}} = .137$, $SE = .028$, $p < .001$, and for support of Muslim surveillance: $b_{\text{ind}} = .181$, $SE = .031$, $p < .001$.

Additional, unpredicted indirect effects were found for ingroup superiority via inclusive victim beliefs on reconciliation, $b_{\text{ind}} = -.135$, $SE = .025$, $p < .001$, and on acceptance of Syrian refugees, $b_{\text{ind}} = -.053$, $SE = .019$, $p = .006$, as well as via exclusive victim beliefs on acceptance of Syrian refugees, $b_{\text{ind}} = -.101$, $SE = .037$, $p = .006$.

**Discussion**

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
Across two samples in different national contexts, we found consistent support for our hypotheses regarding regional inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs. In both the Hungarian and Polish samples, regional inclusive victim beliefs predicted positive attitudes towards both a historical perpetrator group and an outgroup suffering in the present, while exclusive victim beliefs predicted negative attitudes towards both a historical perpetrator group and a minority group that is targeted in the present.

Concerning our exploratory question of whether inclusive victim beliefs also predict less support for negative outcomes, and exclusive victim beliefs less support for positive outcomes, our analysis showed that this was only the case for one path: exclusive victim beliefs predicted less acceptance of Syrian refugees. One possible reason for this is that the current societal discourse about refugees is often framed negatively, focusing on perceived problems created by refugees and strategies to reduce the number of refugees entering society (e.g., Lueders et al., 2019). Thus, rather than merely representing a positive attitude, support for refugees may also entail rejecting these negative attitudes.

The mediation effects from Studies 1A-B were replicated for ingroup superiority, across both intergroup contexts: In both samples, exclusive victim beliefs mediated the effects of perceived ingroup superiority on resentment towards the perpetrator group and on support for Muslim surveillance. Extending Studies 1A-B, we also found support for our hypothesis that inclusive victim beliefs mediate the effects of perspective-taking on positive intergroup outcomes. However, this was not the case for empathic concern. While it was an exploratory question whether empathic concern and perspective-taking would have differential effects on inclusive victim beliefs, it is possible that perspective-taking is more indicative of a prosocial intergroup orientation because it involves trying to understand another person’s different perspective, as opposed to broadly feeling concern for people, which can focus on ingroups and therefore reflect parochiality (Bloom, 2017; Bruneau et al., 2017).

Unexpectedly, inclusive victim beliefs also mediated the effects of perceived ingroup superiority on less support for both positive intergroup outcomes; and similarly exclusive victim beliefs mediated the effects of perceived ingroup superiority on less support for Syrian refugees. While these cross-over effects were not predicted, the direction of the effects is also not inconsistent with our hypotheses, because less support for negative intergroup outcomes reflects the same general orientation as increased support for positive intergroup outcomes. Future
research should continue to examine in replication studies whether the cross-over effects are systematically weaker than the effects of inclusive victim beliefs on positive outcomes and the effects of exclusive victim beliefs on negative outcomes, in line with previous theorizing and empirical findings (see Pittinsky et al., 2011; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015).

A strength of Studies 2A-B is that we were able to recruit through more general routes, because participants were majority group members. This has the advantage that participants who are less strongly identified with the ingroup and their history of victimization were also recruited (see Table 2), which increases the findings’ generalizability. This is particularly true for Study 2B, where we sampled participants from a representative panel.

**General Discussion**

The present studies demonstrate, across four different contexts of collective violence and its aftermath, that distinct types of comparative victim beliefs are important, differential predictors of intergroup attitudes among groups that experienced historical collective victimization. Specifically, we found that inclusive victim beliefs predicted prosocial intergroup outcomes, and exclusive victim beliefs predicted hostile intergroup outcomes towards the historical perpetrator group. Additionally, in two studies (among the Polish and Hungarian samples, but not the Armenian and Jewish American samples), these effects generalized to outgroups suffering in the present that are not responsible for the ingroup’s historical victimization: specifically, predicting support for Syrian refugees and for Muslim surveillance, respectively.

Addressing several conceptual and methodological gaps in previous research, the present studies use measures of inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs that include both quantitative and qualitative comparisons, and extend comparative victim beliefs to global and regional reference groups that may be more relevant than conflict-specific victim beliefs in some contexts, such as in the aftermath of genocide (here: the Armenian Genocide and Holocaust, Studies 1A-B) or war, occupations, and repressive regimes affecting an entire region (here: Poland and Hungary, Studies 2A-B). While global- and conflict-specific victim beliefs have been differentiated theoretically (Vollhardt, 2012a), global victim beliefs are understudied compared to conflict-specific victim beliefs, and to our knowledge only one published study so far has examined regional victim beliefs (Szabó et al., 2020).
A major contribution of the present studies is that they provide first evidence of three antecedents of comparative victim beliefs. Ingroup superiority predicted increased exclusive victim beliefs across all four contexts, as well as lower levels of inclusive victim beliefs. Universal orientation predicted increased inclusive victim beliefs, as well as lower levels of exclusive victim beliefs, in the two samples where this construct was assessed (among Armenian and Jewish Americans). Our hypothesis concerning perspective-taking as a predictor of inclusive victim beliefs was also supported in the two studies where it was assessed (among Poles and Hungarians). However, the other facet of empathy, empathic concern, was not a significant predictor. Additionally, inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs mediated the effects of these more general orientations (ingroup superiority, universal orientation, perspective-taking) on intergroup outcomes. Overall, the present studies contribute theoretically and empirically to the literature on collective victimhood (Noor et al., 2017).

The present studies have several methodological strengths. We used the same outcome measures and control variables across all studies, allowing for more direct comparisons and replications of the findings. Multi-group structural equation modeling provided additional insights into the equivalence of the measurement and processes across different contexts and samples. Considering the range of different political and historical contexts we examined, the use of different reference groups (global and regional comparisons), the scope of outcome measures assessing two types of intergroup relations, as well as different recruitment methods and types of samples, the replication of the findings (for the most part, except for the attitudes towards victimized minority groups in Studies 1A-B as discussed earlier) is noteworthy. Additionally, by controlling for powerful predictors of intergroup attitudes and conflict-related issues—specifically, ingroup attachment, personal centrality of ingroup victimization, and political ideology in addition to demographic characteristics—we ruled out alternative explanations that the effects merely reflect differences in how much people identify with their group and/or their ingroup’s victimization, or that they can be explained with ideological differences that are linked to different intergroup orientations and policy views.

There are also several questions that we cannot yet answer conclusively and that need more research to clarify mixed findings and address limitations of our study designs. First, more research is needed to clarify the robustness of the patterns we observed concerning inclusive victim beliefs also predicting less support for negative intergroup outcomes and exclusive victim
beliefs also predicting less support for positive intergroup outcomes, in addition to the more consistent and hypothesized pattern of inclusive victim beliefs predicting positive and exclusive victim beliefs predicting negative intergroup outcomes. While the cross-over effects were not as consistent as the hypothesized effects that are also in line with previous research (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015), more research is needed to replicate these patterns and examine, with additional outcome measures and in different contexts, under which conditions or for what types of outcomes the cross-over effects do or do not occur. Ideally, these future replication studies should also be conducted with larger samples to ensure higher precision of standard errors and sufficient statistical power to detect smaller effects (see Footnote 1).

Similarly, more research is needed to examine the generalizability of the effects to different target outgroups. While the effects for the historical perpetrator group were consistent across all four studies, they only extended to outgroups suffering in the present in two of the four studies; specifically, for regional victim beliefs in Hungary and Poland. Future research should systematically compare the link between comparative victim beliefs and a broader range of different outgroups suffering from violence, including unrelated groups from different contexts that suffered from the same versus different perpetrator groups (see also Craig & Richeson, 2014), groups that suffered from distinct versus similar categories of violence and oppression (see Cohrs et al., 2015), groups that are associated with a present-day adversary in a conflict or perceived as a threat versus not (see Warner et al., 2014), and other minority groups that could be viewed as competing for acknowledgment and resources (de Guismé & Licata, 2017). This would help establish the boundary conditions and generalizability of the effects of comparative victim beliefs for intergroup relations in different contexts that may be associated with collective memories of historical victimization even decades later, and across seemingly unrelated contexts (Szabó et al., 2020; Wohl & Bransombe, 2008). Comparing the effects of inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs on systematically varied target groups would also provide insights into situational and motivational variation concerning when and why inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs are expressed, which may have different rhetorical functions and occur for different strategic reasons in different contexts (McNeill et al., 2017)—rather than studying comparative victim beliefs merely as individual differences like we did in the present study.

Finally, more research is needed to build on the initial findings presented here on antecedents of comparative victim beliefs, and their potential role as mediators of the effects of
the antecedents on intergroup outcomes. For example, future research should use different measures of empathy, such as intergroup empathy instead of interpersonal empathy, to examine whether the null effects of empathic concern on inclusive victim beliefs in the present studies (Studies 2A-B) replicate or not. Additionally, future research should examine other potential antecedents of comparative victim beliefs, such as intergroup contact with outgroups that share a history of collective victimization (Twali et al., 2020). In this future work on potential antecedents of comparative victim beliefs, it will be particularly important to address another clear limitation of the present studies, which due to their correlational nature do not provide insight into the causal relations between the examined constructs. For example, the observed effects could be bidirectional: while ingroup superiority may give rise to exclusive victim beliefs, the perception of being uniquely victimized could also give rise to perceptions of ingroup superiority in terms of morality and innocence, or perseverance and resilience (Roccas et al., 2008; see also Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Noor et al., 2012; Vollhardt & Nair, 2018). These causal relationships can be tested through experimental work, including longer-term interventions that may be necessary to shift perceptions of collective victimhood that often are not easily manipulated through short-term experimental manipulations (Vollhardt, 2013).

Conclusion

In conclusion, our findings imply several recommendations for future research on comparative victim beliefs. First, researchers should consider the socio-political and historical context as well as the nature of the group’s collective victimization to determine relevant reference groups for comparative victim beliefs. Additionally, rather than just examining one particular victim belief, several different comparative victim beliefs should be assessed that predict different outcomes. This will help avoid a deterministic view of collective victimhood inevitably contributing to cycles of violence (Vollhardt, 2012a) or of victim groups as inherently empathic towards other victim groups (Warner & Branscombe, 2012). Finally, comparative victim beliefs are not the only way in which people construe their ingroup’s victimization. Other relevant dimensions may include temporal perceptions of collective victimhood (Schori-Eyal et al., 2017), a focus on strength and resilience despite collective victimization (Vollhardt & Nair, 2018), or even rejecting collective victimhood as central to the group’s identity (hooks, 1996; Leach, 2020). In sum, to begin to adequately capture the complexity of collective victimhood,
both the historical and present-day context and a fuller range of victim beliefs need to be considered.
References


This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved


This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved


Pew Research Center (2018, January 29). Most displaced Syrians are in the Middle East, and about a million are in Europe. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/29/where-displaced-syrians-have-resettled/


This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved


This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved


Footnotes

1. We also conducted post-hoc power analyses for SEM, using the Monte Carlo approach. We imported the parameter estimates from the final models as population and coverage values, and generated 1000 Monte Carlo replications, with the sample sizes from the actual studies. This allowed us to determine the precision and statistical power of the parameter estimates. According to Brown (2015) and Muthén and Muthén (2002), (1) bias in the estimates and standard errors should be < 10% for all parameters and < 5% for parameters of particular interest, (2) coverage (“the proportion of replications for which the 95% confidence interval contains the true population parameter value”; Brown, 2015, p. 390) between .92 and .98, and (3) statistical power (“the proportion of replications in which [a] parameter is significantly different from zero at the .05 alpha level”; Brown, 2015, p. 390) at least .80 (Cohen, 1988). For Study 1, bias in the estimates was < 5% for all hypothesized paths. Bias in the standard errors was between 10 and 21% ($M = 16.5\%$). Coverage was between .85 and .92 ($M = .89$). Statistical power was between .73 and 1.00 [.73 and .95] for the significant hypothesized direct [indirect] effects. For Study 2, sample sizes were larger, resulting in higher precision and power. Bias in the estimates was < 5% for all hypothesized paths. Bias in the standard errors was between 6% and 16% ($M = 10.8\%$). Coverage was between .89 and .94 ($M = .92$). Statistical power was between .80 and 1.00 [.70 and .99] for the significant hypothesized direct [indirect] effects.

2. Along with inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs, we also attempted to measure a previously unexamined construct, downward comparisons of suffering. However, the two items (see Appendix) showed low internal consistency and led to estimation problems in the SEM analyses in both studies, and thus were dropped from all analyses.

3. We originally assessed a greater range of outcome measures, including several context-specific policies and attitudes towards additional groups relevant to the context. In a previous version of the manuscript, the findings for these outcomes were reported, showing consistent patterns across measures (using multiple regression analyses). However, for this version of the manuscript, we decided to limit our outcome measures to those that were the same across all studies, in order to conduct multi-group SEM and compare findings across contexts.

4. While these four items assessed different, increasing levels of proximity, the very high Cronbach’s alpha suggests that participants did not differentiate their response in this way.
5. We rely on a combination of fit indices that are more sensitive to misspecifications of factor loadings (RMSEA, CFI) or structural relations between factors (SRMR; Hu & Bentler, 1998). We use the following rule of thumb to evaluate model fit as good: RMSEA < .05, CFI > .95, SRMR < .08, or acceptable: RMSEA < .08, CFI > .90, SRMR < .10.

6. Our survey also included the same measures for attitudes towards Slovaks, but to keep the models comparable between the Hungarian and Polish sample we chose only the Romanian target group for this analysis.
Table 1

*Overview of Demographic Characteristics of Each Sample*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study 1A (Armenian Americans, N = 265)</th>
<th>Study 1B (Jewish Americans, N = 297)</th>
<th>Study 2A (Hungarians, N = 301)</th>
<th>Study 2B (Poles, N = 468)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>55.5% female; 44.5% male</td>
<td>60.3% female; 37.7% male; 2.0% other/missing</td>
<td>55.8% female; 43.5% male; 0.7% other/missing</td>
<td>56.6% female; 43.2% male; 0.2% other/missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>17 to 86 (M = 45.56, SD = 17.88)</td>
<td>17 to 92 (M = 50.70, SD = 20.48)</td>
<td>18 to 67 (M = 28.15, SD = 10.53), 11.3% missing</td>
<td>17 to 69 (M = 36.73, SD = 11.84), 0.4% missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.1% no high-school degree or GED, 4.2%</td>
<td>0.7% no high-school degree or GED, 4.4%</td>
<td>8.4% no high-school degree, 41.1% high-school degree, 25.2%</td>
<td>5.3% no high-school degree, 19.9% high-school degree or college degree, 23.6% equivalent, 7.7% some college, 56% 3- or 5-year university degree, 11.2% doctoral degree* or other advanced professional degrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>high-school degree or GED, 10.9% some college, 4.5% 2-year college degree, 37.0% 4-year college degree, 27.2% Master’s degree, 15.1% doctoral degree*</td>
<td>high-school degree or GED, 17.2% some college, 2.0% 2-year college degree, 24.2% 4-year college degree, 31.3% Master’s degree, 19.9% doctoral degree*, 0.3% missing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * including doctor of medicine or law.


Table 2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alpha for Variables in Studies 1A-B and 2A-B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armenian Americans (N=265)</th>
<th>Jewish Americans (N=297)</th>
<th>Hungarians (N=301)</th>
<th>Poles (N=468)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (M)</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>α</td>
<td>Mean (M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality of ingroup victimization</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology (conservative)</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup attachment</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>6.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup superiority</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal orientation</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective-taking</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathic concern</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive victim beliefs</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive victim beliefs</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>5.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Syrian refugees</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>3.73</th>
<th>1.46</th>
<th>.83</th>
<th>2.64</th>
<th>1.20</th>
<th>.84</th>
<th>2.31</th>
<th>1.36</th>
<th>.87</th>
<th>3.72</th>
<th>1.30</th>
<th>.86</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resentment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for surveillance of Muslims</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

**Bivariate Correlations for All Variables for Study 1A (Armenian Americans) and Study 1B (Jewish Americans)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
<th>7.</th>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
<th>12.</th>
<th>13.</th>
<th>14.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Inclusive VB</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.69**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Exclusive VB</td>
<td>-.80**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.38**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Centrality</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Attachment</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Superiority</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Universality</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reconciliation</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.79**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Resentment</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>-.81**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Syrian refugees</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.43**</td>
<td>-.44**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Surveillance</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>-.65**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Pol. ideology</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.60**</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Gender</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.27*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Age</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
| 14. Education | -0.07 | 0.03 | -0.16** | 0.06 | -0.16** | 0.05 | 0.06 | -0.10* | 0.07 | 0.08 | -0.12* | 0.04 | 0.47** | -- |

*Note:* Above the diagonal: Armenian Americans (Study 1A); below the diagonal: Jewish Americans (Study 1B). VB = Victim beliefs.
Table 4

*Model Fit for Two-Group Structural Equation Models, Study 1A (Armenian Americans) and 1B (Jewish Americans)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>90% CI</th>
<th>$p_{close}$</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>SRMR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measurement models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configural invariance</td>
<td>3747.14</td>
<td>2352</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>86080.02</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.043,.049</td>
<td>.993</td>
<td>.926</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metric invariance</td>
<td>3875.81</td>
<td>2404</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>85891.45</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.044,.049</td>
<td>.980</td>
<td>.922</td>
<td>.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline model</td>
<td>4486.49</td>
<td>2752</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>92273.03</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.045,.050</td>
<td>.959</td>
<td>.911</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constrained model</td>
<td>4584.21</td>
<td>2798</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>92084.45</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.045,.050</td>
<td>.940</td>
<td>.909</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted model</td>
<td>4562.14</td>
<td>2797</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>92066.03</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.045,.050</td>
<td>.959</td>
<td>.910</td>
<td>.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final model</td>
<td>4516.05</td>
<td>2793</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>92042.41</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.044,.049</td>
<td>.982</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5

Parameter Estimates in the Final Model (Study 1A-B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Inclusive victim beliefs</th>
<th>Exclusive victim beliefs</th>
<th>Reconciliation</th>
<th>Syrian refugees</th>
<th>Resentment</th>
<th>Muslim Surveillance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive victim beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive victim beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal orientation</td>
<td>.334***</td>
<td>-1.132**</td>
<td>.411***</td>
<td>.127**</td>
<td>.285***</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup superiority</td>
<td>-.169***</td>
<td>.269***</td>
<td>-.167***</td>
<td>-.168***</td>
<td>.218***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality of victimhood</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.265***</td>
<td>-.133*</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.260***</td>
<td>.077*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup attachment</td>
<td>-.089*</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.156***</td>
<td>.138* / -.269***</td>
<td>-.137***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.183***</td>
<td>.079*</td>
<td>-.101*</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.146***</td>
<td>.318***</td>
<td>-.106*</td>
<td>-.169***</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.333***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.055</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.098**</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology</td>
<td>-.107**</td>
<td>.169***</td>
<td>-.133**</td>
<td>-.563***</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.537***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Unstandardized coefficients; variances of latent variables were fixed to 1 and manifest variables were z-standardized within samples before analyses. For ingroup attachment → resentment: the first value is for the Armenian American sample, the second for the Jewish American sample. *p < .08, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Table 6

Bivariate Correlations for All Variables for Study 2A (Hungarians) and Study 2B (Poles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
<th>7.</th>
<th>8.</th>
<th>9.</th>
<th>10.</th>
<th>11.</th>
<th>12.</th>
<th>13.</th>
<th>14.</th>
<th>15.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>- .74**</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td>- .11</td>
<td>- .44**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>- .45**</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>- .36**</td>
<td>- .29**</td>
<td>- .01</td>
<td>- .05</td>
<td>- .01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>- .43**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td>- .09</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td>- .23**</td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>- .47**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>- .09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td>.69**</td>
<td>.70**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>- .19**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>- .03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>- .11*</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.63**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>- .26**</td>
<td>- .24**</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>- .14**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>- .28**</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.55**</td>
<td>- .10</td>
<td>- .10</td>
<td>- .26**</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>- .47**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>- .05</td>
<td>- .15**</td>
<td>- .13*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>- .07</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>- .27**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>- .00</td>
<td>- .11</td>
<td>- .23**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>- .04</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>- .10</td>
<td>.81**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>- .19**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>- .04</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>- .08</td>
<td>- .12*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>- .02</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>- .08</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>- .54**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>- .14*</td>
<td>- .10</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>- .14**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>- .02</td>
<td>- .09</td>
<td>- .56**</td>
<td>- .41**</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>- .08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>- .32**</td>
<td>- .15**</td>
<td>- .19**</td>
<td>- .39**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>- .22**</td>
<td>- .54**</td>
<td>- .46**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>- .21**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>- .26**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>- .07</td>
<td>- .08</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>- .19**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>- .02</td>
<td>- .07</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>- .34**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>- .01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>- .05</td>
<td>- .10*</td>
<td>- .02</td>
<td>- .08</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>- .05</td>
<td>- .08</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>- .04</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>- .10*</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>- .17**</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>- .13**</td>
<td>- .07</td>
<td>- .05</td>
<td>- .07</td>
<td>- .13**</td>
<td>- .01</td>
<td>- .02</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>- .10*</td>
<td>- .03</td>
<td>- .05</td>
<td>- .12**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: above the diagonal: Hungarians (Study 2A); below the diagonal: Poles (Study 2B). VB = victim beliefs.
Table 7

Model Fit for Two-Group Structural Equation Models, Study 2A (Hungarians) and 2B (Poles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>90% CI</th>
<th>$p_{close}$</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>SRMR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measurement models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Configural invariance</td>
<td>3199.38</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>107985.57</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.041,.046</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.940</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metric invariance</td>
<td>3400.94</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>107896.80</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.043,.048</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.933</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial invariance</td>
<td>3368.05</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>107870.95</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.042,.047</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.934</td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline model</td>
<td>3999.44</td>
<td>2210</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>116649.09</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.044,.048</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.924</td>
<td>.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constrained model</td>
<td>4092.82</td>
<td>2259</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>116425.66</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.044,.048</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.922</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final model</td>
<td>4038.84</td>
<td>2255</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
<td>116389.80</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.043,.048</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.924</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8
Parameter Estimates in the Final Model (Study 2A-B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Inclusive VB</th>
<th>Exclusive VB</th>
<th>Reconciliation</th>
<th>Syrian refugees</th>
<th>Resentment</th>
<th>Muslim Surveillance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive VB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.361***</td>
<td>.140**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive VB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.138**</td>
<td>.185***</td>
<td>.245***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective-taking</td>
<td>.300***</td>
<td>.349***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.131</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.153**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathic concern</td>
<td>-.062</td>
<td>.201*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.044</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup superiority</td>
<td>-.374***</td>
<td>.730***</td>
<td>-.173**</td>
<td>.332***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality of victimhood</td>
<td>.188**</td>
<td>.510***</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.224***</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>-.116*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup attachment</td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>-.136*</td>
<td>-.092</td>
<td>-.186**</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.0014</td>
<td>-.082*</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.103**</td>
<td>-.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>.167***</td>
<td>.178***</td>
<td>.094**</td>
<td>-.085*</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>-.097**</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>-.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political ideology</td>
<td>-.112**</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>-.259***</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.183***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported; variances of latent variables were fixed to 1 and manifest variables were z-standardized within samples before analyses. VB = victim beliefs. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Figure 1

*Conceptual Model*

*Note.* Dashed lines indicate exploratory paths, solid lines indicate hypothesized paths. Universal orientation was assessed in Studies 1A-B and empathy in Studies 2A-B. Empathy includes empathic concern and perspective-taking, two separate subscales. Correlations among predictor and control variables, between residuals of inclusive and exclusive victim beliefs, and among residuals of outcomes variables are included but not shown.
Controlling for: Political ideology, ingroup attachment, centrality of ingroup victimization, education, age, gender