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Citation: Nasiri, Nima, Zeynali, Saeed, Najafi Ravadanegh, Sajad and Marzband, Mousa (2022) A tactical scheduling framework for wind farm-integrated multi-energy systems to take part in natural gas and wholesale electricity markets as a price setter. IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution, 16 (9). pp. 1849-1864. ISSN 1751-8687

Published by: IET

URL: https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12423 < https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12423 >

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A tactical scheduling framework for wind farm-integrated multi-energy systems

A tactical scheduling framework for wind farm-integrated multi-energy systems to take part in natural gas and wholesale electricity markets as a price setter

ISSN 1751-8644 doi: 000000000 www.ietdl.org

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Engineering and Technology

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Fundina: None

Conflict of Interest: No conflict of interest is declared by the authors

Permission to reproduce materials from other sources: None

Data Availability statement: All data and their source is included in the manuscript

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Abstract: The wind integrated multi-energy systems (MES) have gained significant momentum in recent years on account of their self-sufficiency and attractive clean attributes. This study puts forward a bi-level multi-follower optimization framework to study the tactical response of a wind integrated MES in the wholesale electricity market (WEM) and the natural gas market (NGM) as a price setter. At the upper level, the MES endeavors to minimize the overall operational costs by giving the best offer/bid in WEM/NGM, and by utilizing thermal energy storage (TES), compressed air energy storage (CAES), and natural gas storage (NGS). When the MES submits offers/bids in WEM and NGM, the NGM and WEM operators, as individual followers, clear their respective markets to maximize public welfare and announce the ultimate market-clearing price (MCP). Additionally, Risk-averse and risk-seeker information gap decision theory (IGDT) have been deployed to provide various decision-making options for MES operators considering wind underproduction and overproduction scenarios. Standard 6-node natural gas network (NGN) and 6-bus transmission system (TS) have been deployed to model WEM and NGM, respectively. The results testify to the capabilities of the MES in influencing the decisions of WEM and NGM.

Nomenclature

Nomenclature		P ^R , H ^R	Power/heat generation in feasible operation
WT MES	Abbreviations wind turbine Multi-energy system	$\gamma_{\mathfrak{p}}, \gamma_{\mathfrak{H}}$	Power/heat conversion factors of CHP for con- verting gas to electrical and thermal energy
WEM NGM	Wholesale electricity market Natural gas market	C_h^{SU}, C_h^{SD}	(MW) Coefficients of fuel used to startup and shut- down the CHP units (Kcf)
CAES NGS	Compressed air energy storage Natural gas storage	R_{h}^{UP}/R_{h}^{DN} T_{h}^{U}, T_{h}^{D}	Ramp up/down limits of the CHP (MW) Minimum up and down times of the CHP (h)
MCP KKT	Market-clearing price Karush–Kuhn–Tucker	$T_h^{U}e, T_h^{D}e$	Minimum up and down times in the beginning of the study horizon (h)
IGDT TS	Information gap decision theory Transmission system	$\eta_h^{ch}, \eta_h^{ats}, \eta_h^{st}$	Charge/discharge/simple cycle efficiency of the CAES (%)
NGN CHP	Combined heat and power	$E_{h,t}^{\min}, E_{h,t}^{\max}$	Minimum/maximum storage capacity of the CAES (MW)
EB	Electrical boiler	$P_h^{cn,min}, P_h^{cn,max}$	Minimum/maximum charge rate of the CAES (MW)
t, h h n	Indices of time period, MES	$P_{h}^{dis,min}, P_{h}^{dis,max}$	Minimum/maximum discharge rate of CAES (MW)
R	nods Indices of feasible operation region	$E_{h,t=24}^{min}, E_{h,t=1}^{min}$	Initial and final values of stored energy in the CAES (MW)
g, w lg, c	Indices of Genco's, gas producer Indices of non-active, active natural gas pipelines	η ^{ch} ,η ^{dis} B ^{Min} ,B ^{Max} B ^h ,B ^h	Charge/discharge efficiency of the TES (%) Minimum/maximum storage capacity of the TES (MW)
A _n ^m	Set of m equipment's located at TS bus's or NGN nodes n Tr Set of power system brunch	H ^{ch} _{h,Max} , H ^{dis} _{h,Max}	Maximum charge/discharge rate of TES (MW)
$C_{h,t}^{ch}, C_{h,t}^{dis}, C_{h,t}^{si}$	Parameters Charge/discharge/simple cycle costs of CAES(\$/MWh)	$\begin{array}{c} B_{h,t=1}^{HSS}, B_{h,t=24}^{HSS}\\ \eta_{h}^{GSS,ch}, \eta_{h}^{GSS,dis} \end{array}$	Initial and final storage state of TES (MW) Charge/discharge efficiency of NGS (%)
$C_{h,t}^{out}, C_{h,t}^{Hdis}$	Discharge cost of NGS and TES (\$/MWh)	$GS^{Min}_{h},GS^{Max}_{h}$	Minimum/maximum storage capacity of NGS (KCf)

$\overline{GS_{h}^{ch}},\overline{GS_{h}^{dis}}$	Maximum charge/discharge rate of NGS (KCf)
η_h^{EB}	Conversion factor of EB to convert electrical power to thermal energy(MW)
P ^{EB,max} h	Maximum thermal power generation rate of EB (MW)
$P_{h,t}^D, H_{h,t}^D, G_{h,t}^D$	forecasted electrical/thermal/gas loads of MES (MW)
C ^G	Offered price of Gencos in WEM (\$/MWh)
C_{W}^{gus} pGMax CMax	Offered price of gas producer in NGM (\$/KCt)
g,t ,C _{b,b} ,	(MW)
RU_g, RD_g	Ramp up/down limits of Gencos (MW)
P _t , MES, Max	Minimum/maximum power exchanged
CMax	Maximum transferable power from the power
6,6,	transmission lines (MW)
q_w^{\max}, G_h^{\max}	Maximum gas producer limit, maximum limit
$q_{l\alpha}^{max}, q_{c}^{max}$	Maximum transferable gas from the non-
-D	active and active pipeline (KCf)
$P_{b,t}^D, q_{dg,t}$	Forecasted electrical and gas loads in power system and natural gas system
OF	Variables
PMES GMES	Amount of electricity and gas exchanged
, h,t , h,t	between MES and WEM .NGM
$P_{h,t}^{CHP}, H_{h,t}^{CHP}$	Amount of electricity and heat generated of
OCHP	Amount of gas consumed by CHP unit (KCf)
$SU_{h,t}$, $SD_{h,t}$	Amount of fuel gas consumed by the CHP unit
D	to Startup/shutdown (Kcf).
α ^κ τCAFS pHSS	Combination coefficient of corner points
L _{h,t} , D _{h,t}	(MW)
$GS_{h,t}^{GSS}$	Amount of stored gas in NGS (KCf)
Pch, Pdis, Psi h,t, Ph,t, Ph,t	Amount of charge/discharge/simple cycle of the CAES (MW)
GCCAES h,t	Amount of gas consumed by CAES (KCf)
$H_{h,t}^{ch}, H_{h,t}^{dis}$	Charge/discharge rate of the TES (MW)
$G_{h,t}^{cn}, G_{h,t}^{uis}$	Charge/discharge rate of the NGS (KCf)
$H_{h,t}^{LD}, P_{h,t}^{LD}$	Amount of neat generated by EB, amount of electricity consumed by EB(MW)
PWind h,t	Amount of electricity generated through wind
pG.	Amount of electricity generated through Gen-
g,t	cos (MW)
δ _{b,t} cMFS	Bus's voltage angles in power system (MW)
C _{h,t}	Bid of the MES in the NGM $(\$/KCf)$
$\mathcal{Q}_{k,t}$	Amount of gas produced of gas wells (KCf)
q _{lg,t} , q _{c,t}	Amount of transferable gas at the non-active,
	active pipeline (KCf)
μ, ν, ξ	Lagrange coefficients associated with inequal-
	ity constraints in WEM
٨	Lagrange coefficients associated with equality constraints in WEM
β	Lagrange coefficients associated with inequal-
Ŷ	ity constraints in NGM
r	constraints in NGM
-	Binary Variables
lh,t	Commitment state of CHP Startup / shutdown state of CHP
9n,t, 4h,t Ich Idis Isi	Charge / discharge / simple cycle states in
`h,t' `h,t ' `h,t	CAES

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and motivation

In competitive markets, some participants might be considered as strategic entities, which can influence market outcomes with their decisions [1]. In recent years, various strategic players have been studied in different energy market levels, including the thermal units in wholesale electricity markets (WEM) [2], virtual power plants in the day-ahead wholesale market [3], and the distribution company in WEM [4]. The purpose of these models is to reach a state of equilibrium between strategic participants and the electricity market. These models do not only outline the optimal strategy for the market participants but also aid the system operator to keep the market under surveillance and enact regulatory policies accordingly [5]. That said, the majority of these studies have only examined a single type of energy, i.e., electricity. In contrast, co-generation units, such as combined heat and power (CHP) units, electrical boilers (EB), and thermal pumps, have diverted the attention of researchers to other energy varieties (e.g., natural gas, and local thermal energy) [6]. Consequently, multiple aspects of multi-energy systems have been under comprehensive scrutiny. This MES can appear in the form of commercial, industrial, and agricultural sites, or they can represent a portion of a city [7] that are intergated with renewable generation units such wind turbines (WT). To procure their demand, the MES can simultaneously participate in WEM and natural gas market (NGM). Considering the rising penetration of MESs in various energy markets, their behavior can impose a substantial influence on the market outcomes [8]. To this end, we have scrutinized the tactical (or strategic) behavior of an MES in transactions with WEM and NGM as a price influencer. In this regard, we propose a bi-level multi-follower framework, where the NGN and WEM are independent followers for MES that is the leader. Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, the problem is reformulated a single-level mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), which ensures equilibrium between markets and MES.

1.2 Literature review

There have been various studies on different facets of MES including different management strategies [9], reliability assessments [10], environmental emission reduction [11], flexibility improvements [12], and resilience [13]. Another novel subject that has recently been in the center of attention is the way in which MES takes part in different levels of the market; particularly, in transactions with WEM, NGM and other competitive rivals. In [14], a risk-based framework was proposed for MES to participate in WEM considering compressed air energy storage (CAES), thermal energy storage (TES) and natural gas storage (NGS). Moreover, a chance-constrained two-stage stochastic programming approach was investigated in [15] for MES to join in day-ahead and realtime markets. Similarly, a stochastic decision-making framework was investigated in [16] for MES to participate in reserve and day-ahead markets. The authors in [17] scrutinized a hybridized stochastic programming (SP) and robust optimization (RO) model for an electricity retailer to seize the arbitrage opportunities. An analogous hybrid framework was also proposed in [18] to model MES behavior in NGM, day-ahead, real-time and local markets. Khorasany et al. [19] inspected a transactive energy framework for optimal energy management of multiple MESs, wherein at the first stage, the MES trades its surplus/deficit energy in the local electricity market, while at the second stage, MESs get involved in trades with various energy markets. Furthermore, a self-scheduling framework was proposed in [20] for an MES to participate in thermal and electrical markets and maximize its profit under information gap decision theory (IGDT).

The strategic behavior of energy players in different markets is another hot research topic. In energy markets, a strategic player is a participant that can have influence on the market price by

Table 1 Comparative evaluations between this study and previous publications

Def	Strategic be	havior	Netw	vork constraints	CAEC	Bi-level	Uncertainty
Rer	Price taker	Price maker	Gas	Electricity	CAES	model	modeling
[9]	1	X	X	X	×	X	-
[10]	1	X	X	X	X	X	-
[11]	1	X	X	X	×	X	Stochastic
[12]	1	X	X	X	X	X	-
[13]	1	X	X	X	X	X	Robust
[14]	1	X	X	X	1	X	Stochastic
[15]	1	X	X	×	X	X	Stochastic
[16]	1	X	X	X	X	X	Stochastic
[17]	1	X	X	X	1	X	Robust-stochastic
[18]	1	X	X	X	1	X	Robust-stochastic
[19]	1	X	X	X	X	X	Stochastic
[20]	1	X	X	×	1	X	IGDT
[21]	1	X	X	1	X	1	-
[22]	×	1	X	1	X	1	-
[23]	1	X	X	X	X	1	Stochastic
[24]	1	X	X	X	X	1	Stochastic
[25]	×	1	1	1	X	1	Stochastic
[26]	1	X	X	X	X	X	-
[27]	×	1	 Image: A start of the start of	1	X	1	Robust
[28]	1	X	X	X	1	X	Robust-stochastic
[29]	1	X	X	X	1	X	Stochastic
[30]	×	1	X	X	1	X	Robust-stochastic
[31]	1	X	X	X	1	X	IGDT
[32]	1	X	X	X	1	X	Stochastic
This							
study	×	~	~	~	~	~	IGDT

its decisions. Therefore, there has been many bi-level or multilevel studies on the tactical market response of MESs. To evaluate the trade ties of MES in local electricity distribution markets, the authors in [21] suggested a bi-level framework, where the distribution system and MES were modeled at upper and lower levels, respectively. Additionally, profit-oriented tactical scheduling of an MES in local electricity and thermal energy markets have been studied in [22]. The model includes MES profit maximization at upper level, while the lower level embodies the market clearing procedure to maximize public satisfaction. The authors in [23] have scrutinized the tactical behavior of MES players in transactions with WEM and local energy systems. Maximization of social welfare and profit of local energy system was integrated ay second level, while profit maximization of MESs made the upper level. A two-stage SP model was proposed in [24] to study the optimal MES response in trades with pool market, NGM and forward contracts considering the existence of other completive market participants. The study incorporates competitive rivals of MES at the lower level, while MES is considered to be the leader. A Two-step iteration-based framework has been studied in [25] to evaluate the tactical stochastic response of an MES in integrated natural gas and electricity markets. The first step consists of optimal dispatching of units in MES, and at the second step, the NGM and WEM are scheduled in accordance to the MES decisions. Moreover, a bi-level framework has been studied in [26] to model the trades between retail multi-energy markets and multi-energy consumers, where retail markets and multi-energy consumers form the upper and lower levels A bi-level optimization framework with single follower was developed by [27], where the leader problem is the profit maximization of integrated power and gas energy provider. The study integrated the WEM as the lower level follower

Because of their high storage capacity and low capital investment requirements, the CAES units have been the cornerstone of ancillary service markets [28]. In this respect, a hybrid SP-RO method has been proposed by [29] to evaluate the role of CAES in day-ahead and real-time markets. Likewise, an SP-RO tactical bidding/offering framework for CAES units has been studied in [30] to maximize profit. The intermittent nature of wind power is addressed by a CAES in [31], which is also subjected to unit commitment and power system constraints. The study proposes the IGDT approach to deal with unknown parameter values. To manage the high penetration of wind energy, ref [32] proposes a CVaR-constrained CAES and TES operation scheduling framework.

1.3 Contributions

The main differences between this work and other studies can be observed in Table 1. The chief downsides (DS) of the publications mentioned above are listed as follows:

- •<u>DS1</u>: In studies [9–21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31], the MES partakes in various markets as a price taker. Nevertheless, a price taker does not have any authority over market clearing price (MCP), and it is obliged to conform to the market price announced by the market operator.
- •DS2: The studies [9–20, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31] have investigated the behavior and partition means of MES in different market levels. That said, the operational mechanism and behavior models of the markets have been neglected. Modelling the limitations and mechanism of the natural gas network (NGN) and transmission system (TS) is vitally important in calculation of MCP Disregarding their models renders these studies incompatible with practical circumstances.
- •**DS3**: Some of these studies (i.e., [9–13, 15, 16, 19, 21–27]) have not evaluated the CAES's presence in the tactical scheduling of MES as a price setter in various energy markets. A CAES can be operated together with a TES and NGS to enhance the role of MES in markets and manage the uncertainties derived from volatile wind power.

•**DS4**: The studies [9–18, 21–29, 31] have proposed RO and SP methods. However, the SP method requires complicated risk measures, and RO can only provide risk averse solutions, while in real-world applications, the MES operator should have a choice between risk-averse or risk seeker frameworks. Moreover, the MES operator might want to define the amount of cost that it is willing to pay for the risk, which is not possible in RO and SP methods. The SP method requires the existence of probability distribution functions, which are unavailable for most of the real-world parameters.

To cover these DSs, this paper proposes a bi-level single-leader multi-follower framework to evaluate the tactical behavior of a wind farm-integrated MES in transactions with WEM and NGM as a price setter considering multi-carrier energy storages (MCES). At the primary level, the MES operator seeks the minimization of overall operational costs by submitting the best offer/bid in WEM/NGM, as well as deploying MCESs, such as TES, NGS and CAES. At the secondary level, the WEM/NGM operators, as individual follower operators, clear the market aiming to maximize public welfare, considering the operational constraints of the NGN and TS. Utilizing the KKT conditions, and the theory of strong duality, the problem is redefined as a conventional single-level optimization problem that is solved by a standard mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) solver. Moreover, a risk-averse and risk-seeker IGDT approach is integrated with the problem to handle uncertain wind power production without the need for any probability distribution functions. Overall, the authentic novelties of this work are listed as follows:

- 1.A bi-level programming framework is proposed to scrutinize the tactical behavior of a wind integrated MES operator as a price setter in NGM and WEMs. (Eliminates **DS1**).
- 2.The impact of merging MCESs, such as TES, NGS and CAES on a price setter MES in NGM/WEM is evaluated considering TS and NGN constraints. (Addresses **DS2** and **DS3**).
- 3.The IGDT framework is adopted under two strategies, namely risk-seeker and risk-averse, to manage wind power uncertainties and evaluates its impact on MCP of NGM and WEM. (Accounts for **DS4**).

2 Problem description

The structural topology of the proposed MES is depicted in Figure 1. Accordingly, MES is equipped with a CHP unit, WT, EB, TES, CAES and NGS. Figure 2 illustrates the algorithmic flowchart of the decision-making process for the proposed MES in NGM and WEM as a price maker. In this algorithm, after obtaining the data and information, the MES operator (as a leader) submits offers/bids in NGM and WEM. At this point, the NGM and WEM receive the offers/bids from the MES operator and other market players, e.g., generation companies (Genco) and gas wells. Afterwards, they clear their independent markets with the goal of achieving maximum social welfare. The market-clearing process yields lower-level decision variables, such as Genco production, gas well dispatch, power exchange of MES with NGM/WEM and MCP of NGM and WEM. The market-clearing alters the market dynamics, and the MES, therefore, reschedules itself to acclimatize to this new market environment. Then the MES resubmits bids/offers in WEM and NGM to purchase/sell energy. This repetitive interactive cycle between lower-level followers and the MES is conducted until reaching a state of market equilibrium. In this study, this algorithm was implemented by KKT conditions and the theory of strong duality, which convert the bi-level nonlinear problem into a single-level MILP. In such a mathematical model, the decisions of MES will prompt reactive response in WEM/NGM and vice versa, which is the reason that makes this model a price setter framework that is superior to non-interactive price-taker models.



Fig. 1: The structure of the suggested MES

3 Formulation

The bi-level problem formulation for the upper and lower levels is established in this section. This problem is converted into a singlelevel model by KKT conditions and the theory of strong duality as depicted in [27].

3.1 Multi-energy system model (leader)

3.1.1 Objective function: Eq. (1) defines the optimization objective function for the upper level. The function is composed of 7 terms. The first and the second term refer to the cost of purchasing electricity/gas from WEM/NGM. The operational costs in charge, discharge and simple cycle operation modes of the CAES are established by third to fifth terms. Eventually, the cost of utilizing NGS and TES is expressed by sixth and seventh terms.

$$OF = \min \sum_{h} \sum_{t} \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \lambda_{b,t} P_{h,t}^{MES} + \gamma_{n,t} G_{h,t}^{MES} \\ + C_{h,t}^{ch} P_{h,t}^{ch} + C_{h,t}^{dis} P_{h,t}^{dis} \\ + C_{h,t}^{si} P_{h,t}^{si} + C_{h,t}^{out} GS_{h,t}^{out} \\ + C_{h,t}^{Hch} H_{h,t}^{Hch} \end{array} \right\}$$
(1)

3.1.2 Combined heat and power unit (CHP): Eqs. (2)-(3) consecutively circumscribe the electrical and thermal output of the CHP unit within the bounds of feasible operation region (FOR). The commitment status of CHP unit is established by Eq. (4), while the linear coefficient variable of FOR is restricted by Eq. (5). The natural gas consumption of the CHP unit is modelled by Eq. (6). The FOR, which defines the interrelation between the thermal and electrical output of the CHP unit, is illustrated in Figure 3.

$$P_{h,t}^{C\,H\,P} = \sum_{R=1} \alpha_t^R P^R \ \forall h, \forall t \tag{2}$$

$$H_{h,t}^{CHP} = \sum_{R=1} \alpha_t^R H^R \ \forall h, \forall t \tag{3}$$

$$\sum_{R=1} \alpha_t^R = I_{h,t} \ \forall h, \forall t$$
(4)

$$0 \leqslant \alpha_{t,R} \leqslant 1, \ \forall R, \forall t$$
 (5)

$$Q_{h,t}^{CHP} = \gamma_p P_{h,t}^{CHP} + \gamma_H H_{h,t}^{CHP} \ \forall h, \forall t$$
 (6)

Eqs. (7)-(8) respectively define the ramp up and ramp down limits of the CHP. Moreover, Eq. (9) imposes the on/off status of the CHP. Evidently, the CHP cannot be on and off at the same time, which is ensured via Eq. (10).

$$P_{h,t}^{CHP} - P_{h,t-1}^{CHP} \leqslant \left[1 - Y_{h,t}\right] R_{h}^{up} + Y_{h,t} P_{h}^{min} \quad \forall h, \forall t \qquad (7)$$

$$P_{h,t-1}^{CHP} - P_{h,t}^{CHP} \leqslant \left[1 - Z_{h,t}\right] R_h^{dn} + Z_{h,t} P_h^{min} \ \forall h, \forall t \quad (8)$$

$$Y_{h,t} - Z_{h,t} = I_{h,t-1} - I_{h,t} \quad \forall h, \forall t$$
(9)

$$Y_{h,t} + Z_{h,t} \leqslant 1 \quad \forall h, \forall t$$
 (10)

The minimum on time constraints of CHP is imposed by Eqs. (11)-(14). Likewise, Eqs. (15)-(18) enforce the minimum off time limits of CHP.



Fig. 2: The algorithmic flowchart of the interaction between MES and WEM/NGM



Fig. 3: Feasible operation region (FOR) of CHP

$$T_{h}^{Ue} = \min\left\{T, (T^{U} - T_{h}^{U0})I_{h,t=0}\right\}$$
(11)

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T_h^{ue}} I_{h,t} = T_h^{ue} \quad \forall h$$
 (12)

$$\begin{split} & \overset{t+T_{h}^{Ue}-1}{\underset{t=r}{\overset{\sum}{\sum}}} I_{h,r} \geqslant T_{h}^{U} y_{h,t} \\ & \forall h, \forall t = \left[T_{h}^{Ue} + 1, ..., T - T_{h}^{U} + 1 \right] \end{split}$$

$$\sum_{t=r}^{T} \left(I_{h,r} - y_{h,t} \right) \ge 0 \quad \forall h, \forall t = \left[T - T_{h}^{U} + 2,, T \right]$$
(14)

$$T_{i}^{De} = \min\left\{T_{i}(T^{D} - T_{h}^{D0})(1 - I_{h,t=0})\right\}$$
(15)

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T_h^{De}} I_{h,t} = 0 \quad \forall h \tag{16}$$

$$\begin{split} & \stackrel{t+T_h^D-1}{\underset{t=r}{\sum}} (1-I_{h,r}) \geqslant T_h^D z_{h,t} \\ & \forall h, \forall t = \left[T_h^{De} + 1, ..., T - T_h^D + 1 \right] \end{split}$$

$$\sum_{t=r}^{T} \left(1 - I_{h,r} - z_{h,t}\right) \ge 0 \quad \forall h, \forall t = \left[T - T_{h}^{D} + 2, ..., T\right] \quad (18)$$

The amount of required fuel to turn the CHP on or off is defined by Eqs. (19)-(20), respectively.

$$SU_{h,t} \ge C_h^{SU} Y_{h,t} \quad \forall h, \forall t$$
 (19)

$$SD_{h,t} \ge C_h^{SD} Z_{h,t} \quad \forall h, \forall t$$
 (20)

3.1.3 Compressed air energy storage (CAES): The compressed air energy is stored in and released from CAES according to Eq. (21). The storage state of CAES is bounded by Eq. (22), while Eq. (23) enforces the initial and final state of storage. The charge, discharge and simple cycle operation modes of CAES is established through Eqs. (24)-(26). Furthermore, the air cannot be compressed in and decompressed from CAES simultaneously, which is defined by Eq. (27). Eventually, the natural gas demand of CAES during discharge and simple cycle operational states is calculated by Eq. (28). In simple cycle mode, the storage is empty and the CAES consumes natural gas as a gas turbine to produce electrical energy. It is noteworthy that this mode is the most unproductive operational state since the efficiency is half of the discharge mode [14].

$$E_{h,t}^{CAES} = E_{h,t-1}^{CAES} + \eta_h^{ch} P_{h,t}^{ch} - \frac{P_{h,t}^{dis}}{\eta_h^{dis}} \forall h, \forall t \qquad (21)$$

$$\mathsf{E}_{h,t}^{\min} \leqslant \mathsf{E}_{h,t}^{CAES} \leqslant \mathsf{E}_{h,t}^{\max} \ \forall h, \forall t \tag{22}$$

$$\mathsf{E}_{\mathsf{h},\mathsf{t}=24}^{\min} = \mathsf{E}_{\mathsf{h},\mathsf{t}=1}^{\min} \ \forall \mathsf{h}, \forall \mathsf{t} \tag{23}$$

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$$P_{h}^{ch,min}I_{h,t}^{ch} \leqslant P_{h,t}^{ch} \leqslant P_{h}^{ch,max}I_{h,t}^{ch} \ \forall h, \forall t$$
(24)

$$P_{h}^{dis,min}I_{h,t}^{dis} \leqslant P_{h,t}^{dis} \leqslant P_{h}^{ch,max}I_{h,t}^{dis} \ \forall h, \forall t$$
(25)

$$P_{h}^{si,min}I_{h,t}^{si} \leqslant P_{h,t}^{si} \leqslant P_{h}^{si,max}I_{h,t}^{si} \quad \forall h, \forall t$$
(26)

$$I_{h,t}^{ch} + I_{h,t}^{dis} + I_{h,t}^{si} \leq 1 \quad \forall h, \forall t$$
(27)

$$GC_{h,t}^{CAES} = \frac{P_{h,t}^{dis}}{\eta_h^{dis}} + \frac{P_{h,t}^{si}}{\eta_h^{si}} \quad \forall h, \forall t$$
(28)

3.1.4 Thermal energy storage (TES): The way in which the thermal energy is stored in TES is modelled via Eq. (29), while Eq. (30) declares the min/max state of storage. The initial and final state of storage is defined by Eq. (31). Eventually, the nominal charge/discharge rates of TES are limited by Eqs. (32)-(33).

$$B_{h,t}^{HSS} = B_{h,t-1}^{HSS} + \eta_h^{ch} H_{h,t}^{ch} - \frac{H_{h,t}^{ais}}{\eta_h^{dis}} \forall h, \forall t$$
(29)

$$B_{h}^{Min} \leqslant B_{h,t}^{HSS} \leqslant B_{h}^{Max} \quad \forall h, \forall t$$
(30)

$$B_{h,t=1}^{HSS} = B_{h,t=24}^{HSS} \ \forall h, \forall t \tag{31}$$

$$0 \leqslant \mathsf{H}_{\mathsf{h},\mathsf{t}}^{\mathsf{c}\mathsf{h}} \leqslant \mathsf{H}_{\mathsf{h},\mathsf{Max}}^{\mathsf{c}\mathsf{h}} \; \forall \mathsf{h}, \forall \mathsf{t} \tag{32}$$

$$0 \leqslant \mathsf{H}_{\mathsf{h},\mathsf{t}}^{\mathsf{dis}} \leqslant \mathsf{H}_{\mathsf{h},\mathsf{Max}}^{\mathsf{dis}} \ \forall \mathsf{h}, \forall \mathsf{t}$$
(33)

3.1.5 Natural gas storage (NGS): It is provided that the natural gas is stored in NGS according to Eq. (34). The nominal charge/discharge flow rate of natural gas is restricted by Eqs. (35)-(36). Furthermore, the min/max storage capacity is taken to consideration by Eq. (37). Similar to other storage technologies, the initial and final state of storage are equalized by Eq. (38).

$$GS_{h,t}^{GSS} = GS_{h,t-1}^{GSS} + \eta_h^{GSS,ch} G_{h,t}^{ch} - \frac{G_{h,t}^{dis}}{\eta_h^{GSS,dis}} \quad \forall h, \forall t \quad (34)$$

$$0 \leqslant G_{h,t}^{ch} \leqslant GS_{h}^{ch,max} \ \forall h, \forall t$$
(35)

$$0 \leqslant GS_{h,t}^{dis} \leqslant GS_{h}^{dis,max} \ \forall h, \forall t$$
(36)

$$GS_{h}^{Min} \leqslant GS_{h,t}^{GSS} \leqslant GS_{h}^{Max} \quad \forall h, \forall t$$
(37)

$$GS_{h,t=0} = GS_{h,t=24} \ \forall h, \forall t$$
(38)

3.1.6 *Electrical boiler (EB):* Besides its high efficiency, EB is an effective way of converting wind power overproduction to thermal energy. Under this rationale, the EB does not only maximize wind power usage, but also enhances the flexibility in thermal energy procurement. Furthermore, it has a supportive role at the peak demand period, when the thermal output of the CHP might be insufficient. In terms of a mathematical expression, Eq. (39) illustrates the thermal energy conversion of the EB, while its consumption is limited by Eq. (40).

$$H_{h,t}^{EB} = \eta_h^{EB} P_{h,t}^{EB} \ \forall h, \forall t$$
 (39)

$$0 \leqslant P_{h,s,t}^{EB} \leqslant P_{h}^{EB,max} \ \forall h, \forall t \tag{40}$$

3.2 Multi-energy equilibrium

The electrical, thermal and natural gas consumption/production equilibrium is ensured via Eqs. (41)-(43), respectively.

$$P_{h,t}^{MES} + P_{h,t}^{CHP} + P_{h,t}^{Wind} + P_{h,t}^{ch} + P_{h,t}^{si} -P_{h,t}^{dis} - P_{h,t}^{EB} - P_{h,t}^{D} = 0 \forall h, \forall t$$
(41)

$$\begin{aligned} H_{h,t}^{CHP} + H_{h,t}^{EB} + H_{h,t}^{ch} \forall h, \forall t \\ -H_{h,t}^{dis} - H_{h,t}^{D} = 0 \end{aligned} \tag{42}$$

$$\begin{split} & G_{h,t}^{MES} + G_{h,t}^{dis} - G_{h,t}^{ch} - (\frac{P_{h,s,t}^{CHP}}{\eta_{h}^{CHP}} + SU_{h,t} + SD_{h,t}) \\ & -GC_{h,t}^{CAES} - G_{h,t}^{D} = 0 \forall h, \forall t \end{split}$$

3.3 Wholesale electricity market operator (individual lower-level follower)

The WEM operator receives offers/bids from Gencos, consumers and MES. At this point, the WEM operator must aggregate the offers/bids and clear the market to announce finial MCP. The process of market-clearing is defined by an optimization problem, where the objective is to maximize the social welfare (or minimize operation costs) for all market participants. More information on market-clearing and social welfare function can be found in [33] The social welfare maximization objective of the WEM is established by Eq. (44), wherein the first term corresponds to the Genco power production cost, while the second term is the cost of energy MES has offered/bided to sell/purchase. The TS energy balance is declared by Eq. (45), while Gencos production limits are established through Eq. (46). Ramp up/down restriction of Gencos are declared by Eqs. (47)-(50), while Eq. (51) circumscribes the purchased/sold power of MES in WEM. Eqs. (52)-(53) limit the power flow in TS lines and voltage angle, respectively. In power flow equations, the slack bus must always have a zero voltage angle, which is declared by Eq. (54).

$$\min\left\{\sum_{t}\sum_{g}C_{g}^{G}P_{g,t}^{G}-\sum_{t}\sum_{h}C_{h,t}^{MES}P_{h,t}^{MES}\right\}$$
(44)

$$\sum_{\substack{g \in A_{b}^{g} \\ \sum b' \in Tr}} P_{g,t}^{G} - \sum_{\substack{h \in A_{b}^{h} \\ b \in A_{b}^{h}}} P_{h,t}^{MES} - P_{b,t}^{D} =$$

$$\sum_{\substack{b' \in Tr}} B_{b,b'}(\delta_{b,t} - \delta_{b',t}) : \lambda_{b,t} \forall b, \forall t$$
(45)

$$0 \leqslant P_{g,t}^{G} \leqslant P_{g,t}^{GM\alpha x} : \mu_{g,t}^{G\min}, \mu_{g,t}^{G\max} \ \forall g, \forall t$$
 (46)

$$\mathsf{P}_{g,t}^{G} - \mathsf{P}_{g,t-1}^{G} \leqslant \mathsf{RU}_{g} : \mu_{g,t}^{1,\min} \ \forall g, \forall t > 1 \tag{47}$$

$$\mathsf{P}_{g,t}^{G}-\mathsf{P}_{g,\text{ini}}^{G}\leqslant\mathsf{RU}_{g}:\mu_{g,t}^{2,\text{min}}\ \forall g,\forall t=1 \tag{48}$$

$$\mathsf{P}_{g,t-1}^{G} - \mathsf{P}_{g,t}^{G} \leqslant \mathsf{RD}_{g} : \mu_{g,t}^{3,\min} \ \forall g, \forall t > 1 \tag{49}$$

$$\mathsf{P}_{g,\text{ini}}^{G} - \mathsf{P}_{g,t}^{G} \leqslant \mathsf{RD}_{g} : \mu_{g,t}^{4,\min} \ \forall g, \forall t = 1 \tag{50}$$

$$P_{t}^{MES,Min} \leqslant P_{h,t}^{MES} \leqslant P_{t}^{MES,Max}$$

: $\mu_{h,t}^{MES,min}, \mu_{h,t}^{MES,max} \forall h, \forall t$ (51)

$$-C_{b,b'}^{Max} \leqslant B_{b,b'}(\delta_{b,t} - \delta_{b',t}) \leqslant C_{b,b'}^{Max}$$

$$\nu_{b,b',t}^{min}, \nu_{b,b',t}^{max} \forall b, \forall b', \forall t$$
(52)

$$-\pi \leqslant \delta_{b,t} \leqslant \pi : \xi_{b,t}^{\min}, \xi_{b,t}^{\max} \ \forall b, \forall t$$
(53)

$$\delta_{b=ref,t} = 0: \xi_{b=ref,t}^{l} \ \forall b, \forall t$$
(54)

3.4 Natural gas market operator (individual lower-level follower)

Eq. (55) illustrates the NGM objective that consists of two terms. The first one is the cost the gas producers, while the latter is the cost of the natural gas purchased by MES operator in NGM. The gas well production capacity is defined by Eq. (56). Since the NGN is situated at the lower level, it is necessary to use the following convex model, where the nodal pressure is ignored, and the flow rate is limited. Accordingly, Eqs. (57)-(58) model the natural gas flow in active (with compressors) and non-active (without compressors) pipelines, respectively. The amount of natural gas that MES can exchange with NGM is restricted by Eq. (59). Eventually, the natural gas consumption/production equality is defined in Eq. (60).

$$\sum_{t} \left\{ \sum_{w} C_{w}^{gas} q_{w,t} - \sum_{k} C_{k,t} G_{k,t}^{GFU} \right\}$$
(55)

$$0 \leqslant q_{w,t} \leqslant q_w^{\text{max}}; \beta_{w,t}^{1,\text{max}} \beta_{w,t}^{1,\text{min}} \ \forall w, \forall t$$
 (56)

$$-q_{lg}^{max} \leqslant q_{lg,t} \leqslant q_{lg}^{max}; \beta_{lg,t}^{2,max} \beta_{lg,t}^{2,min} \ \forall lg, \forall t \tag{57}$$

$$0 \leqslant q_{c,t} \leqslant q_c^{max}; \beta_{c,t}^{3,max} \beta_{c,t}^{3,min} \ \forall c, \forall t$$
(58)

$$0 \leqslant G_{h,t}^{MES} \leqslant G_{h}^{max}; \beta_{h,t}^{4,max}, \beta_{h,t}^{4,min} \ \forall h, \forall t \tag{59}$$

$$\sum_{\substack{w \in A_n^w}} q_{w,t} + \sum_{\{.\} \in \varphi_n^+} q_{\{.\},t} - \sum_{\{.\} \in \varphi_n^-} q_{\{.\},t} - \sum_{h \in A_n^h} G_{h,t}^{GFU}$$
$$- \sum_{\substack{dg \in A_n^{dg}}} q_{dg,t} = 0; \gamma_{n,t} \{.\} \in \{lg,c\}, \quad \forall n, \forall t$$
(60)

3.5 Information gap decision theory (IGDT)

An optimization problem can generically be expressed as follows:

$$f(x, \rho) = \min\{f(x, \rho)\}$$
(61)

$$h(x,\rho) = 0, g(x,\rho) \leqslant 0 \tag{62}$$

$$x \in Y$$
 (63)

Wherein the ρ is the uncertain parameter and Y is the set of uncertainties. Moreover, x represents the vector of decision variables. The uncertain parameter ρ is defined as follows [34]:

$$\mathfrak{u}(\bar{\rho},\alpha) = \left\{ \rho : \left| \frac{\rho - \bar{\rho}}{\rho} \right| \leqslant \alpha \right\}, \alpha \geqslant 0$$
(64)

In Eq. (64), $\bar{\rho}$ is the variable that entails the value for the uncertain parameter, considering the risk adjustments. α declares the maximum radius of the uncertainty considering the forecasted value. If the optimization problem was solved deterministically, it could be expressed as follows:

$$f_{\mathbf{b}}^{*}(\mathbf{x},\bar{\rho}) = \min\{f(\mathbf{x},\bar{\rho})\}$$
(65)

$$h(x,\bar{\rho}) = 0, g(x,\bar{\rho}) \leqslant 0 \tag{66}$$

3.5.1 *Risk-averse framework:* The final formulation defined in the previous subsection is risk-neutral. Therefore, the risk-averse IGDT is deployed, when the operator is willing to endure a prespecified amount of cost to have a more robust operational schedule considering uncertain parameters. All that the IGDT approach requires is the radius of the uncertainty around the predicted (expected) value of the uncertain parameter. Overall risk-averse strategy is mathematically expressed as follows [31]:

$$\max\{\alpha\}\tag{67}$$

$$h(\phi, \bar{\rho}) = 0, g(\phi, \bar{\rho}) \leqslant 0 \tag{68}$$

$$f(\phi,\rho)\leqslant f_b^*(\phi,\bar{\rho})(1+\sigma), 0\leqslant \sigma\leqslant 1 \tag{69}$$

$$\rho = (1 - \alpha)\bar{\rho} \tag{70}$$

As can be seen, the uncertainty radius α is maximized in Eq. (67) subjected to pre-defined cost value, which is specified as a ratio of the optimal cost at expected value of uncertain parameter in Eq. (69). In other words, the higher the value of σ (risk adjustment parameter), the more risk-averse the operation scheduling will be. In this study, the aforementioned risk-averse strategy is deployed to handle wind power uncertainties in a robust manner. Therefore, the system is scheduled for the lower and more conservative end of the predicted wind power radius as follows:

 $\max\{\alpha\}\tag{71}$

$$OF_b = \{OF : \min OF\}$$
(72)

$$\mathsf{OF} \leqslant \mathsf{OF}_b(1+\sigma), 0 \leqslant \sigma \leqslant 1 \tag{73}$$

$$0 \leqslant \mathsf{P}_{h.t}^{Wind} \leqslant (1-\alpha)\bar{\mathsf{P}}_t^{Wind} \tag{74}$$

subject to: Upper-level constraints: Eqs. (2)-(42). Lower-level constraints: Eqs. (45),(54),(60).

3.5.2 Risk-seeker framework: In a risk-seeker strategy the operator is optimistic that the value of uncertain parameter will take values that decrease the cost function. Therefore, the operator opportunistically bets on the value of the uncertain parameter, hoping to gain higher profit. The risk-seeker model is expressed as follows [31]:

$$\min\{\alpha\} \tag{75}$$

$$h(\phi, \bar{\rho}) = 0, g(\phi, \bar{\rho}) \leqslant 0 \tag{76}$$

$$f(\phi, \rho) \leqslant f_b^*(\phi, \bar{\rho})(1 - \beta), 0 \leqslant \beta \leqslant 1$$
(77)

$$\rho = (1 + \alpha)\bar{\rho} \tag{78}$$

In Eq. (75), the main objective is to minimize the uncertainty radius to gain lower cost values, which is defined by β (opportunity adjustment parameter). In this study, this risk-seeker strategy is deployed to handle wind power uncertainty in an opportunistic manner that might lead to higher profit for the MES operator. Therefore, the operation is conducted considering that the uncertain parameter might take values that are in favor of the MES operator. Overall, this strategy is established by the following equations:

$$\min\{\alpha\}\tag{79}$$

$$OF_b = \{OF : \min OF\}$$
(80)

$$OF \leq OF_b(1-\beta), 0 \leq \beta \leq 1$$
 (81)

$$0 \leqslant P_{h,t}^{Wind} \leqslant (1+\alpha)\bar{P}_t^{Wind}$$
(82)

4 Case studies and results

In this study, the WEM and NGM are established through standard 6-bus TS and 6-node NGN, respectively. The TS includes three Gencos, two load nodes, and seven transmission lines. The NGN entails two gas wells, six pipelines and four load points. The technical data on TS and NGN can be extracted from [35]. Overall configuration of the systems and connections of MES with NGN/WEM is illustrated by Figure 4. The forecasted electrical, thermal and natural gas demands of MES is observable in Figure 5. More information on equipment utilized in MES are included in Appendix A. The proposed MILP was solved with a standard CPLEX solver under the following case studies (CS):

•<u>CS1</u>: The tactical behavior of the MES, as a price setter, in the NGM and WEM is evaluated ignoring the existence of MCESs.

•<u>CS2</u>: The tactical behavior of the MES, as a price-setter, in the NGM and WEM is evaluated considering MCESs.

•CS3: The IGDT framework is added to the CS2.

CS1: In this case, the MES is tactically scheduled while neglecting the MCESs. The hourly thermal and electrical dispatch scheduling of this case is illustrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Based on the obtained results, the CHP supplies the highest portion of the load with 3425.38 MWh production. Moreover, WEM and WT account for 1134.06 MWh and 596.43 MWh of the demand. Figure 8 illustrates the MCP and hourly scheduling of the Gencos. As can be observed, at the early hours of the day (hours 2-7), when the demand is low, expensive gencos are not operative. Therefore, the MCP is as low as 13.5 \$/MWh. With a relative rise



Fig. 4: The overall schematic of the systems, connections, and nodal locations



Fig. 5: Forecasted electrical, thermal and natural gas demands of MES

in demand during hours 8-9, Genco3 is started, which increases MCP up to 17.5 \$/MWh. To account for the high MES demand at hours 10-22, Genco2 (high-cost unit) is activated, which raises MCP up to 26.25 \$/MWh. However, with the shutdown of Genco2 at hour 22, the MCP drops back to 17.1 \$/MWh.

The hourly scheduling of natural gas suppliers and MCP of NGM is illustrated by Figure 9. As can be seen, during off-peak periods (hours 1-6), the natural gas demand is supplied with the cheaper units, which leads to the MCP of 2.5 \$/KCf. Nonetheless, the upsurge in demand during the hours 7-22 is satisfied through more expensive suppliers that elevate the MCP up to 4 \$/MWh.

That said, after hour 22, the natural gas demand transcends its peak value, thereby decreasing to 2.5 \$/KCf.

<u>CS2</u>: In this case, the tactical scheduling of the MES in WEM and NGM is evaluated with the inclusion of the MCES.

- •The influence of TES on the tactical behavior of the MES: Figure 10 illustrates the influence of TES on thermal/electrical dispatch scheduling of the CHP unit. In this figure, the line graph and the bar chart illustrate the electrical and thermal production of the CHP. Moreover, Figure 11 depicts the absorbed/released thermal energy of the TES. Based on these findings, the TES is scheduled to absorb thermal energy at hours 2-7, which is the reason for this higher thermal dispatch of the CHP at these hours compared to CS1. With the release of thermal energy at hours 11 and 15-21, the thermal CHP dispatch is declined. Considering that the operation of the CHP is confined to FOR, the thermal and electrical output of the CHP are interdependent decision variables. Therefore, increasing the thermal output at hours 2-7 has led to lower electrical dispatch. On the other hand, with the higher thermal dispatch at hours 11 and 15-21, the electrical output is enhanced. The charge/discharge scheduling of the TES and MCP of WEM is illustrated in Figure 11. Notably, the inclusion of TES leads to 2.51% lower MCP compared to CS1.
- •The influence of the CAES on the tactical behavior of the MES: In Figure 12, the bar chart represents the charge/discharge schedule of the CAES, while the state of charge (SOC) is depicted by the line graph. Based on the results, the CAES stores compressed air energy at off-peak intervals, and releases it back at expensive market periods. The line graph and bar chart in Figure 13 illustrate the MCP of WEM and hourly scheduling of Genco2 (high-cost unit), respectively. Accordingly, with the integration of the CAES in <u>CS2</u>, the energy is procured at cheaper market hours, thereby leading to lower Genco2 (expensive unit) dispatch (compared to <u>CS1</u>) and 12.61% lower MCP in WEM.
- •The influence of NGS on the tactical behavior of the MES: The state of NGS and stored/released natural gas in NGS is illustrated by Figure 14. Additionally, the MCP of NGM in <u>CS1</u> and <u>CS2</u> are compared in Figure 15. It is noteworthy that the natural gas is released during hours 7-9 and 22, and it has decreased the MCP of NGM compared to <u>CS1</u>.
- •The influence of NGS on the tactical behavior of the MES: in this subcase, all of the three storage technologies (TES, CAES and NGS) are taken into consideration. The MCP of WEM and NGM in <u>CS1</u> and <u>CS2</u> are plotted in Figure 16 and Figure 17, respectively. Based on these figures, the incorporation of MCESs can bring down the MCP of WEM by 13.32%. Furthermore, the MCP of NGM is reduced by 5.36%. In other words, during hours 10-14, 18, 22, the MES has become a price setter market player in WEM, and it is a price setter player in NGM during hours 8-9, 22. Table 2 summarizes various operational costs and the cost of participating in WEM/NGM. As can be seen, the previous hypothesis on the effect of MCES is further substantiated since the cost values have experienced a dramatic reduction.

<u>CS3</u>: In this case, the impact of integration MCES is evaluated considering the uncertainties driven by wind power. In this regard, the risk-averse and risk-seeker IGDT frameworks are deployed. The risk-averse strategy is scrutinized in Table 3, wherein the risk control parameter (ζ) is increased by step-width of 0.005, from 0 to 0.02, which shows the impact that risk-averse strategy can impose. As can be seen, increasing ζ leads to a higher uncertainty radius (a), which makes the operation scheduling more reliable and robust, while imposing higher overall operational costs for MES operator. It is noted that when MCESs are included, the



35 HL-CHP-CS1 Discharge Charge Heat power dispatch of CHP (MW) 120 Electrical power dispatch of CHP (MW) 165 Charge & discharge (MW) HL-CHP-CS2 40EMCP-C _ _ _ EMCP-CS2 EL-CHP-CS1 100 25 155 30 80 EMCP(\\$/MWh) 145 15 60 20 135 40 5 10 125 20 115 0 -5 3 5 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 7 1 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 Time (h) 3 5 7 9 1 Time (h)

Fig. 10: Thermal/electrical dispatch scheduling of the CHP unit Fig. 11: Absorbed/released thermal energy of the TES and EMCP in <u>CS2</u>

 Table 2
 The effect of multi-carrier energy storage systems in the operational costs of multi-energy system

Storage systems	CS1	CS1+TES	CS1+CAES	CS1+NGS	CS1+TES+ CAES+NGS
Power purchased from the EWM	26257.01	25407.485	23270.53	27557.21	23291.28713
Gas purchased from the GWM	192541	192344.02	193327.2	182049.6	183148.4279
HSS costs	0	86.90071	0	0	98.36862931
CAES costs	0	0	1161.042	0	1708.864881
GSS Cost	0	0	0	272.5717	267.5221976
Total operation costs	218798	217838.41	217758.8	209879.4	208514.4708

value of a is higher, which illustrates how the MCESs can be helpful in risk-aversion since for the same amount of cost a higher uncertainty radius is achieved. Moreover, the influence of ζ on other important decision variables is illustrated in Table 4. For instance, when $\zeta = 0.02$, the power purchased from WEM and MCP of WEM is dropped by 11.84% and 4.159%, respectively. Nevertheless, the influence on some decision variables, such as power production of Genco3 and MCP of NGM is insignificant.



Fig. 12: Hourly scheduling charge/discharge of the CAES in CS2 Fig. 13: MCP of WEM and hourly scheduling of Genco2 in CS2



Fig. 14: The state of NGS and stored/released natural gas in $\underline{CS2}$



Fig. 16: Hourly scheduling MCP of WEM in $\underline{CS2}$

To scrutinize the influence of the risk-seeker approach on the MES, a sensitivity analysis is conducted in Table 5 on opportunity control parameter (β) with a step-width of 0.005 from 0 to 0.02. As illustrated, a higher opportunity control parameter (β) leads to a higher uncertainty radius (a). For instance, when $\beta = 0.02$ the values of a = 0.274 without MCESs, while a = 0.261 with MCESs. In other words, when the storage technologies are involved in MES, the same amount of opportunity can be achieved with lower β . In addition, other essential decision variables have been summarized in Table 6 for different opportunity function values. Based on these values, increasing the value of β up to 0.02 can reduce the purchased energy from WEM by 5.82% and MCP of WEM by 0.83%. However, the influence on other decision variables, such as the production of Genco3 or MCP of the NGM is insignificant.

Fig. 15: Hourly scheduling gas produced and GMCP in CS2



Fig. 17: Hourly scheduling MCP of NGM in CS2

5 Conclusion

In this study, the tactical scheduling of a wind farm-integrated MES in WEM and NGM as a price-setter was proposed under a bilevel multi-follower optimization approach. The WEM and NGM were considered as individual followers, while modelling MES as the upper-level leader. The MES was equipped with MCESs, such as TES, NGS and CAES, and its objective was to reduce total operational costs and the cost of taking part in WEM and NGM as a price setter. On the other hand, the objective of WEM and NGM was to maximize public satisfaction. To solve the bi-level nonlinear problem, the theory of strong duality and KKT conditions were deployed, which transformed it into single-level conventional MILP. Moreover, IGDT was applied to the wind power uncertainty under both risk-averse and risk-seeker frameworks.

Table 3 Total cost and uncertainty radius in different operational modes of risk-averse scheduling

Total operation cost	$\zeta = 0.00$	$\zeta = 0.005$	$\zeta = 0.010$	$\zeta = 0.015$	$\zeta = 0.020$
Without MCSS	218798	219910.41	220604.4	221425.04	221425
With HSS	217838.4	218926.92	219880.6	220629.58	221711.1
With CAES	217758.8	218865.83	219527.7	220632.02	221299.1
With GSS	209879.4	210937.15	211531.1	212378.14	213424.6
With MCES	208514.5	209134.3	209749.9	210798.96	211843.6
a	$\zeta = 0.00$	$\zeta = 0.005$	$\zeta = 0.010$	$\zeta = 0.015$	$\zeta = 0.020$
Without MCSS	0	0.056001	0.061018	0.1379684	0.137968
With HSS	0	0.0816969	0.124055	0.1743708	0.253163
With CAES	0	0.0610176	0.125567	0.1947832	0.257533
With GSS	0	0.056001	0.061018	0.1255155	0.202815
With MCES	0	0.0614252	0.121088	0.18027	0.23977

Eventually, the study was expanded to various case studies to study its practicality. Overall, the following conclusive points were drawn:

- 1.The participation of MES in WEM and NGM, as a price-setter with a CAES, can bring down the overall cost by 0.474% while diminishing electrical MCP by 12.61%.
- 2.Including TES in the MES does not only bring down the electrical MCP by 2.5%, but it also enhances the flexibility of the CHP at peak and expensive periods.
- 3.Integration of NGS in the MES, as a price-setter player leads to 5.35% reduction in natural gas MCP.
- 4.When the MCESs were incorporated in the price-setter MES, the total operational cost was decreased by 4.7%, while diminishing the electrical and natural gas MCP by 13.32% and 5.53%, respectively.
- 5.The IGDT approach gives the MES operator a tool to evaluate the influence of the wind power uncertainty when participating in the WEM and NGM. The operator can choose between risk-averse and risk-seeker strategies.

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Table 4 Impact of uncertainty on the important decision variables in risk-averse approach

	$\zeta = 0.00$	$\zeta = 0.005$	$\zeta = 0.010$	$\zeta = 0.015$	$\zeta = 0.020$
$\sum_{h,t} P_{h,t}^{Wind}$	596.4371	559.8008	524.2156	488.9174	453.4295
$\sum_{q,t} P_{g=1,t}^{G}$	4149.022	4161.602	4174.971	4178.822	4183.328
$\sum_{q,t}^{S} P_{g=2,t}^{G}$	308.3225	346.9572	388.0114	399.8384	413.6752
$\sum_{q,t}^{G} P_{g=3,t}^{G}$	340	340	340	340	340
$\sum_{h,t}^{S} P_{h,t}^{MES}$	1179.959	1231.174	1285.597	1301.275	1319.618
$\sum_{h,t} G_{h,t}^{MES}$	54079.84	54020.34	53944.74	54007.76	54038.27
$\sum_{i,t} \lambda_{i=5,t}$	440.12	449.2733	458.4267	458.4267	458.4267
$\sum_{n,t} \gamma_{n=5,t}$	79.5	79.5	79.5	79.5	79.5

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Table 5 Total cost and uncertainty radius in different operational modes of risk-seeker scheduling

Total operation cost	$\beta = 0.00$	$\beta = 0.005$	$\beta = 0.01$	$\beta = 0.015$	$\beta = 0.020$
Without MCES	218798	217701.1	216939.7	215972.6	214872.2
With HSS	217838.4	216749.3	215126.1	214378.4	213289.6
With CAES	217758.8	216129.9	215158.3	214266.2	213386.2
With GSS	209879.4	208827.5	208111.4	207373.5	206319.6
With MCES	208514.5	207462.2	206407.8	205343.8	204427.4
	0 0 00	0 0 0 0 -	0 0.01	0 0 0 1 =	0 0 0 0 0
a	$\beta = 0.00$	$\beta = 0.005$	$\beta = 0.01$	$\beta = 0.015$	$\beta = 0.020$
a Without MCES	$\beta = 0.00$	$\beta = 0.005$ 0.085708	$\beta = 0.01$ 0.12077	$\beta = 0.015$ 0.187303	$\beta = 0.020$ 0.273883
a Without MCES With HSS	$\beta = 0.00$ 0 0	$\beta = 0.005 \\ 0.085708 \\ 0.08525$	$\beta = 0.01 \\ 0.12077 \\ 0.121211$	$\begin{array}{c} \beta = 0.015 \\ 0.187303 \\ 0.161127 \end{array}$	$\beta = 0.020 \\ 0.273883 \\ 0.246398$
a Without MCES With HSS With CAES	$\beta = 0.00$ 0 0 0 0	$\beta = 0.005$ 0.085708 0.08525 0.074056	$\begin{array}{c} \beta = 0.01 \\ \hline 0.12077 \\ 0.121211 \\ 0.135764 \end{array}$	$\beta = 0.015$ 0.187303 0.161127 0.187303	$\begin{array}{c} \beta = 0.020 \\ \hline 0.273883 \\ 0.246398 \\ 0.259338 \end{array}$
a Without MCES With HSS With CAES With GSS	$\beta = 0.00$ 0 0 0 0 0 0	$\beta = 0.005$ 0.085708 0.08525 0.074056 0.081488	$\begin{array}{c} \beta = 0.01 \\ \hline 0.12077 \\ 0.121211 \\ 0.135764 \\ 0.116439 \end{array}$	$\beta = 0.015$ 0.187303 0.161127 0.187303 0.158699	$\begin{array}{c} \beta = 0.020 \\ 0.273883 \\ 0.246398 \\ 0.259338 \\ 0.215141 \end{array}$
a Without MCES With HSS With CAES With GSS With MCES	$ \begin{array}{c} \beta = 0.00 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{array} $	$\begin{array}{l} \beta = 0.005 \\ 0.085708 \\ 0.08525 \\ 0.074056 \\ 0.081488 \\ 0.061259 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \beta = 0.01 \\ \hline 0.12077 \\ 0.121211 \\ 0.135764 \\ 0.116439 \\ 0.124927 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \beta = 0.015 \\ 0.187303 \\ 0.161127 \\ 0.187303 \\ 0.158699 \\ 0.19275 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \beta = 0.020\\ 0.273883\\ 0.246398\\ 0.259338\\ 0.215141\\ 0.260919 \end{array}$

Table 6 Impact of uncertainty on the important decision variables in risk seeker approach

	$\beta = 0.00$	p = 0.005	p = 0.01	p = 0.015	$\beta = 0.020$
$\sum_{h,t} P_{h,t}^{Wind}$	596.4371	632.9742	670.9485	711.4001	752.059
$\sum_{q,t} P_{g=1,t}^{G}$	4149.022	4145.639	4142.565	4140.9	4133.52
$\sum_{q,t}^{S} P_{g=2,t}^{G}$	308.3225	297.9347	288.4954	283.3815	275.0773
$\sum_{q=1}^{5,2} P_{g=3,t}^{G}$	340	340	340	340	320
$\sum_{h,t}^{g,t} P_{h,t}^{MES}$	1179.959	1166.188	1153.675	1146.896	1111.212
$\sum_{h,t}^{h,t} G_{h,t}^{MES}$	54079.84	54043.46	53967.21	53766.48	53739.09
$\sum_{i=5,t}^{n,t} \lambda_{i=5,t}$	440.12	440.12	440.12	440.1198	436.52
$\sum_{n=1}^{t,t} \gamma_{n=5,t}$	79.5	79.5	79.5	79.5	79.5

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Appendix: Summery of equipment data

The data concerning the equipment in the proposed model are summarised in Table 7

Table 7 Equipment	able 7 Equipment data							
Equipment	Parameter	Value						
	T_{h}^{U0}, T_{h}^{D0}	1(h)						
	l _{h,t=0}	1						
CHP unit	R_{h}^{up}/R_{h}^{dn}	40MW/40MW						
orn unit	C_{h}^{SU}/C_{h}^{SD}	3.41K						
	T_{h}^{Ue}/T_{h}^{De}	1(h)/1(h)						
	$\gamma_{\rm p}, \gamma_{\rm H}$	2.41,0.31						
	B_{h}^{Max}/B_{h}^{Min}	180MW / 10MW						
TES	H ^{ch} _{h,Max} /H ^{dis} _{h,Max}	30MW / 30MW						
	$\eta_{h}^{ch}/\eta_{h}^{dis}$	0.95 / 0.95						
	$B_{h,s,t=1}^{Max}/B_{h,s,t=24}^{Min}$	30MW						
MEC	P _h ^{EH,Max} /P _h ^{EH,Min}	150MW /-150MW						
IVIES	Gh	1500(KCf)						
	$E_{h,t}^{min}/E_{h,t}^{max}$	20MW / 350MW						
0.50	$E_{h,t=24}^{min}/E_{h,t=1}^{min}$	80MW						
CAES	$P_{h}^{ch,min}/P_{h}^{ch,max}$	5MW / 50MW						
	$P_{h}^{dis,min}/P_{h}^{dis,max}$	5MW / 50MW						
	$\eta_h^{ch}, \eta_h^{dis}, \eta_h^{si}$	0.9 / 0.9/0.4						
	GS ^{Min} , GS ^{Max}	300Kcf / 3500Kcf						
NGS	GS ^{ch,max} , GS ^{dis,max}	300Kcf / 300Kcf						
	$\eta_{h}^{GSS,ch}/\eta_{h}^{GSS,dis}$	0.9 / 0.9						
	$ \dot{GS}_{h,s,t=0}/\dot{GS}_{h,s,t=24} $	300Kcf						
FB	η ^{EB}	1						
ЪD	$P_{h}^{EB,max}$	80MW						