Northumbria Research Link

The UK during the Brexit years – the language of immigration in broadcast news. A Critical Discourse Analysis of BBC News and ITV News prior to General Election 2015, the Referendum on Membership of the European Union 2016, and General Election 2017

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Abstract

Drawing on analyses of mainstream political manifestos and broadcast news footage between 2015, 2016 and 2017, this study explores how immigration was mediated in the UK by the major television news broadcasters, BBC news and ITV News during the 'Brexit years'.

This thesis contributes to the existing body of knowledge on media coverage of the issue of immigration during national ballots in the United Kingdom. The period under analysis for this study is of great consequence as the implications of Britain's vote to leave the European Union in 2016 is of immense political significance, certainly within Europe, and perhaps beyond. Research on media coverage of the period surrounding the referendum, and research into media coverage of UK general elections is extensive (Phillips, 2020; Deacon et al., 2018; Moore, 2018; Al Nahed, 2017; Carr, 2017; Crines, 2017; Cushion and Lewis, 2017; Berry, 2016; CRCC, 2016; Cushion et al., 2016; Deacon et al., 2016; Cushion and Sambrook, 2015). Through comparative content and thematic analyses this study adds an understanding of how the two major broadcasters in the United Kingdom, BBC News and ITV News mediated the issue of immigration in the final week of campaigning during the three national ballots which occurred during the period of political turbulence surrounding Brexit. Additionally, a Critical Discourse Analysis of the broadcast footage contributes a deeper insight into the representation of immigrants by the BBC and ITV News during this time.

The mixed methods research design facilitates both diachronic and synchronic analyses, in that it is possible to draw comparisons between the two channels at one point in time, and also to compare the evolution of key themes and/or language use over the period. From this, a deeper understanding of the role of the two major broadcasters during this crucial time is derived. The study adopts a critical approach (Hardy, 2014) to analysis of the data and seeks to establish the degree to which political logic or media logic (Altheide and Snow, 1979) is operating during each of the case studies.

The thesis finds that there were striking similarities between the two broadcasters and the manifestos of mainstream political parties on the political right, namely the Conservative Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party. This was most evident in 2016 and 2017, and more so on the BBC than ITV. Issue salience for immigration on the broadcast news channels peaked in 2016 (CRCC, 2016) during the campaigns around the referendum on Membership of the European Union, and evidence suggests that intermedia agenda setting played a significant role, as well as the adoption of a 'strategic balance' (Phillips, 2020: 151) approach to inclusion of views as opposed to the standard 'due impartiality' (Ofcom, 2017) approach which is traditionally imposed by the media regulator, Ofcom. Analysis of the sourcing patterns found a highly limited range of perspectives, and a notable degree

of journalistic control over contributions. The Critical Discourse Analysis, which was conducted using the Discourse-Historical Approach, analysed the nominative and predicative strategies adopted by the broadcasters on the subject of immigration, and established that representations of immigrants on broadcast news in the UK remain consistently negative, with dominant topoi representing immigrants as a danger or threat to British society.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed introduction to this study, which includes an outline of the key research aims and objectives, and a broad overview of the approach. It begins with a summary of the political context within which the research is situated, and outlines why an understanding of the role of the two major television broadcasters in the United Kingdom played throughout the three case studies is important. It also demonstrates why a Critical Discourse Analysis of the televised material is considered appropriate and necessary. A discussion of the nature of ideology and discourse, and how the two are inextricably linked, is presented along with an analysis of the importance of context to a Critical Discourse Analysis. Finally, an outline of the chapters contained within is provided.

1.2 Aims and Objectives

The study sets out to address the following question:

How is the issue of immigration mediated by UK broadcast news channels during the 2015 General Election, the 2016 EU Referendum, and the 2017 General Election campaigns?

- Accordingly, the objectives, as outlined and discussed in the methodology chapter, are:
- To identify any increase/decrease in salience of the issue of immigration within the news coverage between each case study;
- To consider if and how, over the 2 years between GE 2015 and GE 2017, the framing of immigration in BBC and ITV News coverage has changed;
- To examine the diversity of perspectives presented;
- To identify recurrent intertextual topoi relating to immigration/immigrants;
- To use the Discourse-Historical Approach, to identify frequent patterns in nomination and predication strategies in the broadcast news reporting of stories concerning immigration;
- To determine, via the Discourse-Historical Approach, the presence of an underlying ideology or world view in the discourse of immigration on major UK broadcast news channels;
- To map coherent ideological stances to mainstream political party manifestos.

In order to address the initial research question and achieve the above objectives, a multi-stage research strategy was implemented. Firstly, a content analysis of the selected media footage was conducted, identifying significant sourcing patterns and issue salience. Secondly, a thematic analysis of the same data was carried out to ascertain dominant themes of the broadcast news channels, and whether they differed between channels, or over the three time periods under analysis. The third stage involved a thematic analysis of the 'immigration' sections of the 2015 and 2017 manifestos of each of the mainstream political parties in England. These data were then compared with the thematic analysis of the news footage to understand any intertextual similarities and links. In other words, to

determine whether any political party's stance on immigration aligned with either of the news channels. The final stage of the project involved a Critical Discourse Analysis using the Discourse Historical Approach, analysing the spoken language of the broadcast news footage. The study focussed on nomination and predication strategies adopted in order to uncover the representative narratives disseminated by the broadcasters. Recurrent topoi were unearthed through this process, enabling an understanding of the underlying implications of the discourse surrounding immigration.

1.3 Background

The vote by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to leave the European Union on 23rd June 2016 has been widely regarded as one of the most seismic political events in recent history. It has been described as a 'bombshell' (MacShane, 2016), 'unfathomable' (Stocker, 2017: 1) and is said to have sent 'shockwaves' around the world (Goodwin and Ford, 2017: 17). Whilst Britain had always displayed varying degrees of scepticism towards the European project, with both major political parties (the Conservative Party and the Labour Party) having failed to unite their members on either a pro- or anti-European stance (Wall, 2020) the vote was very close and could have been to remain (Wall, 2020).

Between 2015 and 2017, British politics underwent a series of tumultuous events; in the 25 months from May 2015 to June 2017, the electorate were called to vote in two general elections and an 'in out' European Union referendum. Each one of these ballots produced shock results (Ross and McTague, 2017). Fieldhouse et al. (2019) argue that the general elections of 2015 and 2017 were among the most volatile Britain has seen; the delivery of results such as unprecedented support for minority parties in 2015 followed by the greatest two-party share since 1970 in 2017 illustrates a political ground in which the electorate are willing to shift allegiance from one party to another (Fieldhouse et al., 2019). In 2015, David Cameron's Conservative party won an unexpected majority to form a government in the UK. This victory, and the manifesto pledge to hold a referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, was to throw the country into an unprecedented period of political chaos and uncertainty (O'Reilly, 2016). Since the 2015 General Election, every one of the three major parties has undergone a leadership resignation and election. The UK has voted to leave the European Union and has also elected a new government in a 'snap' election called in 2017. The ramifications of the Brexit vote will affect the UK, and the rest of Europe, for many years (decades) to come (Grey, 2016). The political events which occurred in Britain during this period have reshaped the political landscape for the foreseeable future.

The 2016 vote for Brexit has been aligned with the rise of populism, which has occurred across much of Europe (Wodak, 2013a). Populism as a concept is considered difficult to accurately define as it establishes itself in different ways depending upon context (Freedan, 2016; Dix, 1978). A general

definition of populism as a movement is proposed by Dix (1978) to be a 'political movement which challenges established elites in the name of a union between a leader and 'the people' (undifferentiated by group or class)' (Dix, 1978: 334). In addition to this, and particularly useful to this study, being as it is focussed on a specific instance, Wodak's (2019) definition provides a suitable outline. Wodak (2019) considers populist parties to share a number of common characteristics:

- a belief in a shared historical narrative, one which unites the people in defence of the homeland;
- a belief in a dichotomous social structure – the 'elites' and 'the people';
- espousal of conservative values, such as traditional family values and gender roles;
- a strong brand of anti-intellectualism

In the United Kingdom, the party which closely aligns with the above characteristics is the United Kingdom Independence Party which rose to political significance during the Brexit period, most notably under the leadership of Nigel Farage. Brexit is widely believed to have been a vote against both 'the establishment' and mass immigration (Goodwin and Ford, 2017). 'The establishment' may also be referred to as 'the elite'. 'The elites' (or 'establishment') can be defined as 'political elites (parties, government, ministers, etc.), but also the media (media tycoons, journalists, etc.), the state (administration, civil service), intellectuals (universities, writers, professors) or economic powers (multinationals, employers, trade unions, capitalists' (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 324). As such, populism is concerned with the notion that the interests of the individuals who are 'up there' (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007: 324) are incompatible with those of ordinary citizens. Indeed, during the 'Brexit years', notions of identity and culture appear to have been highly significant.

Broadcast media in the UK (television and radio) continue to hold influence with regards to voter behaviour, despite the increasing use of social media platforms. According to Carr (2017) the direct influence of the written press in electoral campaigns has declined significantly, and this is illustrated by the fact that many regular newspaper readers did not actually vote in 2017 (Carr, 2017). However, the impact that television and radio has upon voters decision-making remains substantial and 'cannot be ignored' (Carr, 2017: 60) Whilst the last decade has undoubtedly seen the rise in the popularity of online platforms for accessing news, television remains a significant source of news for British people. Phillips (2020) provides strong evidence to show that televised news, most notably the BBC, continues to hold its place as the most valued news source that is accessed by citizens from both the political left and right, citing its impartiality as a core driver of this loyalty (Phillips, 2020). Scammell and Semetko (2008: 75) assert that, 'Television is easily the most accessed source of national and international political news…Moreover, it is by some distance the most trusted source of news'. This

claim is based upon results of surveys conducted for Ofcom, where between 65% and 70% of respondents consistently reported that, for political news, television remains their most trusted source (Scammell and Semetko, 2008). A 2019 report (Newman, 2019) found that television news became a more valued source of information during times of crisis in the UK, and that the medium had seen what it termed a 'Brexit bounce' in viewership in 2016. As such, despite the increased popularity of online platforms, television continues to act as a substantial and influential political news source in the UK, and appears to have been of increased significance in the period covered by this study.

The media are extremely influential in that they can be seen to set, or control, the agenda for much of the public debate around political issues. The role of the media in terms of setting the agenda for the electorate has been much discussed (McCombs, 2014; Cohen 1963; Lippman, 1925) with the media being engaged in the creation of a reality for audiences (McCombs, 2014). Through repeated messaging and 'salience clues' (McCombs, 2014: 2) the media persuade citizens of current issues of significance, with the implication being that an opinion on the matter should be formed. Where citizens accept that the issue is relevant to them, they are more likely to seek and access news on the matter (McCombs, 2014). This process is intensified by the ability of those in charge of the media agenda to control and restrict access to information (Gandy, 1982). Thus, audiences are privy to only a limited version of the reality which has been created.

The mediation of immigration is important to this study for two key reasons. Firstly, the media tend to possess greater ability to influence voting behaviour when the issue in question is one with which the electorate have little, or no direct experience (Page, 2009). As immigration is a phenomenon which has not directly impacted many voters, analysis of the source of information for citizens is vital. Secondly, voters' views on immigration are considered to have been highly significant in determining voting behaviour in the 2016 referendum (Goodwin and Ford, 2017). Whilst immigration is a subject which fluctuates in terms of salience, research tends to demonstrate that media coverage and discussion of immigration is overwhelmingly negative (Allen and Blinder, 2018; Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2012; Greenslade, 2005: van Dijk, 1993; Hartmann and Husband, 1971). Blinder and Allen (2015) note that the media, as a consequence of the construction of specific narratives around immigration, possess the potential to influence attitudes towards the subject. Berry (2016) and Weaver (1996) agree that this potential is greater when the messages are disseminated over extended periods of time, as is the case with immigration. Thus the mediation of immigration has the potential to influence voter attitudes in relation to the issue; as attitudes to immigration have been shown to have been important in the Brexit vote, an understanding of the messages disseminated by the major television news broadcasters in the United Kingdom is vital.

Much of the research into media discourse surrounding immigration in the United Kingdom has traditionally focussed on the written press; content and thematic analyses have been conducted on televised material from the Brexit period, but a detailed linguistic analysis of the broadcasters in relation to immigration during this time has not been scrutinised. Consequently, less is known regarding the discourse of the two main broadcasters, BBC News and ITV News, on the subject of immigration between 2016 to 2017. As the press in the UK is not overseen by a self-regulatory body, there is no requirement for newspapers to demonstrate any degree of impartiality in their approach. For the televised news, however, this is not the case. Thus, the analysis of language presents an opportunity to uncover an obfuscated ideological stance, not explicitly stated. It has the potential to enable the deconstruction of underlying representations (Machin and Mayr, 2012).

Broadcast news in the United Kingdom is overseen and regulated by Ofcom, the body responsible for maintaining standards across communications networks: television and radio, as well as on-demand services. Part of the role of this regulating body is to ensure that the rules set out by the 'Ofcom Broadcasting Code' (Ofcom, 2020) are consistently applied to all broadcasters. There are ten sections to 'The Code', covering programming for children and young people, and commercial references, for example. Section Five of 'The Code' concerns impartiality. The first rule stated in Section Five is that 'News, in whatever form, must be reported with due accuracy and presented with due impartiality' (Ofcom, 2017: 4). For clarification, impartiality is taken to mean 'not favouring one side over another' (Ofcom, 2017: 3) and accuracy 'getting the facts right' (Ofcom, 2017: 4). Thus, the regulating body places pressure upon the broadcasters to ensure that news programming is sufficiently impartial, with no undue prominence given to any one particular view, and is accurate in terms of the information provided to audiences. No such regulation is applied to the press, and this may go some way to explain the degree of trust audiences appear to place in the BBC and, though to a somewhat lesser extent, ITV News.

ITV News is produced by ITN, and is the most popular commercial news channel in the UK (ITN, 2015). The impact of the commercial interests on the impartiality of these news programmes (and others) has been often questioned. In the case of the BBC, however, it has been claimed that, due to its funding by the British licence fee paying public, and that broadcasters in the United Kingdom are regulated, there is a greater degree of freedom from commercial interests, and therefore a higher degree of impartiality in its news reporting. Alex Doherty's (2006) attempt to apply Herman and Chomsky's (1988) Propaganda Model to the BBC vehemently disputes this, arguing that the appointment of the board of governors, being heavily influenced by government ministers, ensures that the interests of the ruling elite are all-pervasive within the organisation. Indeed, Media Lens (2013), an online organisation which considers mainstream media outlets to be operating as

propaganda machines for those in positions of power, goes so far as to suggest that little has changed since the early days of the BBC and the then general manager Lord Reith's comment that, 'They [the establishment] know they can trust us not to be really impartial' (Higgins, 2014).

The concept of trust appears to remain crucial to the BBC's long-standing reputation. This is perhaps exemplified by the BBC's Royal Charter, which sets out the BBC's fundamental mission as being 'to act in the public interest, serving all audiences through the provision of impartial, high-quality and distinctive output and services which inform, educate and entertain…To provide impartial news and information to help people understand and engage with the world around them' (BBC Royal Charter, 2016: 5) once again stressing the impartiality and accuracy demanded by the role of the broadcaster. According to the BBC's Annual Report and Account 2012/13 (BBC, 2013) 49% of viewers turn to BBC for 'impartial news coverage' (BBC, 2013) with ITV drawing 14% of viewers desiring impartiality. The figures confirm that the BBC remains a hugely significant provider of news to viewers in the UK; it is where the majority turn for information that they feel they can trust, that does not need to be questioned, a position which, as Doherty (2006) points out, has been a key element in its enduring success. Therefore, the BBC's role in the creation of reality, in the construction of what 'people see and believe' (Bourdieu, 1991:170) is an immensely powerful one, and one which requires regular scrutiny. Whilst ITV draws fewer viewers than the BBC, they remain key agents of news in the British sphere, so their place in the study is justified.

The issue of immigration has for decades been a controversial social and political issue which the BBC, along with other news media, has reported on at some length. According to Smith (2014) immigration has been an issue of discussion in almost all election campaigns post-WW2, although certain periods (for example, Enoch Powell's popularity in the 1960s) show immigration being of greater electoral concern than others. Smith notes that the topic returned to the fore of political campaigning in the 2000s (Smith, 2014). More recently, concerns over eastern European immigration, so-called 'benefits tourism' and illegal immigration have been widely reported in the both the print and visual media, despite research demonstrating the falseness or misleading nature of these fears (The Migration Observatory, 2014). Given the vital role the media play in the construction of reality and discourse, an analysis of how much, or indeed, little attention is given to the topic, and the manner in which it is framed could provide insight into contemporary sociocultural beliefs concerning migration.

This emergent, comparative study will conduct a content and thematic analysis and a Critical Discourse Analysis of verbal text taken from excerpts of BBC and ITV News focussing on discussion of, and reference to, immigration-related issues. Three case studies over a two-year period have been selected for analysis:

- the week preceding the UK General Election on the 7th May 2015;
- the week prior to the UK referendum on membership of the EU on June 23rd 2016;
- the week preceding the UK General Election on 8th June 2017.

1.3.1 Discourse

Discourse is defined as being 'comprised of ideas, values, identities and sequences of activity' (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 11). Wodak and Reisigl (2009) consider discourse to be delineated by four key elements:

- A cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action
- Socially constituted and socially constitutive
- Related to a macro-topic
- Linked to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different points of view

(Wodak and Reisigl, 2009: 89)

Discourse is inherently reflexive. Consequently, discourse not only reflects society, it plays a fundamental role in shaping society (Fairclough, 1989). Lacey (1998: 109) highlights the frequency of the appearance of the 'common sense' discourse in media text which is, in its appeal to what is supposedly inherently natural, particularly powerful. The common-sense discourse presents itself as being just that, not constructed by society in any way but existing as a fundamental, objective truth. For the purposes of this study, a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is applied to broadcast news footage to uncover how the linguistic choices made by contributors, including the presence of 'common-sense' discourse, serve to transmit particular ideologies.

1.3.2 Ideology

Ideology is a central concept within Critical Discourse Analysis. The term originates from the early-1800s work of French philosopher, Stutt de Tracey, but is most frequently concomitant with the work of theorists in the Marxist tradition in the 1930s (Machin and Mayr, 2012). Whilst Marx's view of ideology is concerned with the manner in which it is employed to exercise power and control over the proletariat class, a wider and more neutral definition has emerged more recently, in which ideology is considered to represent a belief system, either of an individual or a social group (Machin and Mayr, 2012). Ideologies, according to CDA, mirror the inherent capacity of widely-held beliefs and values to uphold the interests of the powerful.

A Critical Discourse Analysis looks to bring these ideologies, otherwise hidden, to the fore (Machin and Mayr, 2012). Lacey (1998) notes that ideology is present in the discourse of the text (for example, through vocabulary or grammatical structures) and that, by and large, it is the dominant ideology. CDA seeks to uncover the assumptions, attitudes and values held by a specific social group, as it is this value system which constitutes an ideology (Bloor and Bloor, 2007).

The work of Antonio Gramsci in the 1930s linked the notion of ideology with a redefined conceptualisation of hegemony, a term which had traditionally referred to the power of one country over another a form of overt authority or domination (Ives, 2004). Gramsci's work realigned the concept of hegemony to highlight how consent of citizens is organised through less observable means, such as language and cultural practices (Ives, 2004). Thus, 'hegemony' can be considered to be the concept of power being exercised over citizens without obvious force, but more through ideology (Bates, 1975). In accordance with this, Thompson (1990) asserts that an ideology is a means by which hegemonic power relations are perpetuated. Wodak and Reisigl (2009) concur and argue that this perpetuation is carried out through various aspects of discourse: for example, 'establishing hegemonic identity narratives, or by controlling access to specific discourses or public spheres' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 88). Thus, CDA views ideology and discourse as fundamentally intertwined, with the latter operating as a conductor of the former. As Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 89) succinctly assert, 'Power is legitimized or de-legitimized in discourses'.

1.3.3 The importance of context

Numerous studies (Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Bloor and Bloor, 2007; Brown and Yule, 1983) have emphasised the importance of an awareness of the context in which an interaction takes place when conducting a CDA. Reisigl and Wodak consider discourse to be fundamentally 'context dependent' (2009: 89). Therefore, it is vital that the events of the period during which the media footage selected for analysis was broadcast is clearly delineated. The time period in which the recordings took place was one of significant political instability in the United Kingdom. This is perhaps best illustrated by the numerous resignations of mainstream political party leaders that occurred between 2015 and 2017, including that of the Prime Minister, David Cameron. Additionally, immigration salience was high in 2015 and 2016, and the issue has been noted as having played an instrumental role in the campaigns to persuade the UK electorate to vote to leave the European Union. Consequently, references to immigration and immigrants during this period of time could be considered to be of heightened sensitivity, and thus the messages communicated to audiences regarding this subject to be of great consequence.

1.4 Overview of the study

This study begins with a media theory chapter; this section examines how the key dichotomy within theories of media production, that is liberal pluralism and critical approaches, can be applied to explain the nature of the output. As the study aims to analyse broadcast media discourse to ascertain the potential presence of a dominant political ideology, this theory chapter serves to underpin any findings with an understanding of the concept of how media output is constructed and influenced. Consideration is also given to the theory of mediatization, the process whereby the role of the media and politicians evolves, and how the agenda may be set increasingly by media logic as opposed to political logic. Also presented here is the concept of inter-media agenda setting; for the purposes of this study, this is the tendency for the right-wing press to influence television news broadcasters, despite the regulation of impartiality that is in place for televised news. The theory chapter explains and justifies my decision to approach the data from a critical perspective, highlighting how this approach is most suitable for the nature of the study.

Following on from the exploration of media theory, Chapter 3 constructs a chronological account of immigration to the United Kingdom, beginning with what has become known as the 'Windrush Generation' (Winder, 2004). This is the starting point for the context as it is considered to have been the beginnings of large-scale immigration to the UK from outside of Europe (Panayi, 2014). The account considers the patterns of inward migration that have occurred from 1945 to the present day, and how the issue became so heavily politicised. There is also discussion of the role the media have played throughout and how immigration and immigrants have been represented by mainstream publications and channels. This historical overview of the manner in which the issue of immigration tends to be mediated, and how this has evolved (or not, as the case may be) over the twentieth century is presented. As the study is concerned with the mediation of immigration throughout a specific time period, an understanding of the role the media have traditionally played is essential to gain a deeper awareness of the power the media hold in influencing public opinion, particularly in this area.

The methodology chapter provides a justification for the various methodological decisions that were taken on the part of the researcher. The method of data selection, for example, is explained with sound reasoning regarding the process. A rationale for the adoption of a multi-method approach (content analysis, thematic analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis) is presented. The decision to analyse the data using Critical Discourse Analysis is also justified, along with an explanation of why other, potentially relevant, discourse analysis approaches were considered less appropriate.

The results chapter presents a detailed report of the outcomes of the analysis, along with tables and charts to better understand the relevance of the data. It contains an initial content analysis of the selected media footage and the sections of the 2015 and 2017 political manifestos which are specifically concerned with immigration. Following on from this, a more detailed thematic analysis of both types of text is performed. The broadcast news footage is also subjected to a sourcing analysis, as an understanding of the diversity (or lack thereof) of the voices heard works towards a deeper understanding of the nature of the output. Finally, a Critical Discourse Analysis of the media footage is conducted to ascertain the dominant topoi present in the footage in relation to immigration and immigrants, and to gain a deeper understanding of the framing of the issue and people involved.

The discussion chapter serves to analyse these results, drawing on relevant literature. There is detailed discussion of the context specific to the findings. The chapter includes an examination of each of the three ballots that are under analysis in this thesis (General Election 2015, Referendum on Membership of the European Union 2016, and General Election 2017) and consideration of the political climate in which they took place. The focus is, as is appropriate, on the role immigration played in each of these ballots, and how the mainstream political parties manipulated the issue. The fluctuating degree of salience of immigration is considered, along with an overview of the research as to why increased voter concern surrounding immigration might have occurred. As has been explained, in order to conduct the Critical Discourse Analysis, an understanding of the context within which discourse occurs is vital. Consequently, this chapter provides a detailed – and crucial - overview of the time period in question and the role immigration played politically throughout. An attempt is made to ascertain the presence of a dominant political ideology in the sample by linking analysis of the key themes present in the media footage with analysis of the key themes of the political manifestos. Consideration is given to the dominance of political logic over media logic or vice versa based on the findings. The Critical Discourse Analysis seeks to provide a comparison of representations of immigrants in BBC and ITV News bulletins, and to consider how these portrayals are constructed, and what they might tell us about the political stance of the channels. There is an attempt to determine whether the dominant discourse of each broadcaster on the issue of immigration is aligned with any particular political ideology as delineated in the various manifestos.

The study is drawn to a close in the concluding chapter, which sets out the key findings of the analyses. This chapter also considers scope for future study, which includes the potential of analysing the output of other UK broadcasters, and also of extending the study into social media. The limitations of the study are also presented.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter has set out the key aims and objectives of the research, along with a concise outline of the stages of the project, all of which will be discussed in more detail in the methodology chapter. A brief background to the study has been provided, with an outline of the political context within which the data was generated. Discussion of terms central to the research has been presented, along with an explanation of the importance of the political context to the study. Finally, there is an overview of the chapters enclosed within the thesis, with a summary of the contents of each.

Chapter 2: Theories of Power in Mass Communications

2.1 Introduction

Whilst media representations are considered to be dynamic in nature and to shift over time, Cottle (2000) and Carey (1989) assert that their fundamental function is the 'maintenance of society in time' and they are concerned with 'not the act of imparting information but the representation of shared belief' (Carey, 1989: 43). The role the media plays in setting the public agenda has been established by many key researchers (McCombs, 2014; Cohen 1963; Lippman, 1925) with more recent research demonstrating that this power is of particular prominence when the issue under scrutiny is one which citizens perceive to be of particular relevance, and which has the potential to cause them significant discomfort or uncertainty (McCombs, 2014). Therefore, the ability to control the media agenda is one which commands a vast degree of power.

The concept of power is central to western political thought (Parsons, 1963). Critical political economy seeks to understand the nature in which institutions maintain unequal distribution of power (Hardy, 2014). From this perspective, the mass media being a social institution, understanding the manner in which power is manifested within the media is vital. According to Hardy (2014: 7) 'ways of organising and financing communications have implications for the range and nature of media contents, and the ways in which this is consumed and used'. Additionally, as Freedman (2014: 2) observes, 'It is hardly controversial to suggest that the media are powerful social actors'. Therefore, it is important to consider the different perspectives on the role the media plays in the social distribution of power, and how this then impacts upon media content.

There are competing alternatives as to how the media operates within society (Curran, 2002) and within this, there are two key approaches to consider: liberal pluralism and what shall, for the purposes of this study, be termed critical (or radical) perspectives. In this chapter, liberal pluralist and radical perspectives on the media and power will be discussed, outlining the contrast between the two approaches. The liberal pluralist approach tends to be more concerned with audience effects whilst critical approaches are more involved with research into media performance (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1982). Therefore, whilst the contribution of liberal pluralism to the debate surrounding media theory should not be overlooked, greater attention will be paid to critical perspectives. How, subsequently, the news agenda is formed and the agenda set, will then be considered. Recent changes regarding the digitisation of the media and the proliferation of fake news will also be discussed, with consideration given to whether or not digitisation has engendered access to a greater plurality of

views. The theory of mediatization, in which political communications are considered to have become increasingly inclined towards media logic (Altheide and Snow, 1979) rather than political logic, will be presented. Finally, the focus will be drawn to the nature of discourse and how framing of issues, in particular immigration, takes place.

Examination of media performance grew out of the 1960s assertion that the media have little influence over audience beliefs (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982). Prior to this, in the decades following the Second World War, it was frequently argued, among both left- and right-wing researchers, was that the media were all-pervasive and highly powerful. Due to unprecedented dissemination of mass media messages, alongside an accepted public perception that society had become less stable, a belief that citizens had lost traditional values and were thus more susceptible to manipulation, and the notion that media had been used to brainwash and engender fascism during the World Wars, the media were considered to be injecting messages into the minds of a helpless and inactive audience (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1982). As a result, research during this time was concerned primarily with attempting to measure the depth of the impact of media messages upon the audience, a media effects approach (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982). However, by the 1950s, critique of this view had emerged. Work by Hovland (1948) and Ivey (1948) contended that the individual's social grouping and everyday communications with others formed the basis of opinions and decision-making processes. In addition, Lazarsfeld's (1948) Minimal Effects Theory proposed that the power of media messages was largely mitigated by the interpersonal relationships in which the audience member is involved. Thus, it would seem that media messages are not necessarily the foundation of an individual's beliefs, values or preferences. Simultaneously, the notion that mediation of messages constitutes an entirely hierarchical relationship was also under enquiry, with research demonstrating that status alone did not guarantee influence, and that the moulding of public opinion was not necessarily solely linked to power and wealth (Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982). According to Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott (1982: 12) during this period, 'the conventional belief in the power of the media seemed to be demolished'.

This assertion of the limited power of the mass media prevailed until towards the 1970s; however, at this time, two new, seemingly dichotomous approaches challenged the existing orthodoxy. The two approaches, liberal pluralism, and the Marxist view, had strongly opposing perspectives on the nature of power and its dissemination via the mass media. Consequently, they presented highly polarised accounts of the role of the media within democratic society. This chapter will consider the manner in which the media are engaged in agenda setting and agenda building. Following on from that, a discussion of who sets the agenda will be presented, which will include the two overarching

approaches of liberal pluralism and the Marxist view, this now being more appropriately recognised as 'critical perspectives'.

2.2 Agenda setting and agenda building

This study is concerned with the manner in which UK broadcast news potentially set and built the agenda for anti-immigration sentiment during the three national ballots the country faced between 2015 and 2017. Therefore, a theoretical understanding of how the mass media tends to set the agenda in relation to immigration is vital to this research.

Agenda building refers to the manner in which news organisations select and filter stories for publication and/or broadcast. As discussed, news is a product available for consumption and as such certain stories and reports of events inevitably gain priority over others during the selection process (Nisbet, 2008). This process is constrained by various aspects of the news production cycle: organisational factors, such as time pressures on journalists to produce stories which will attract viewers and/or readers, as well as more individual factors, such as the socio-economic status or political persuasion of the journalist. A further factor which influences the manner in which stories are selected and the agenda is subsequently built is that of ideology. From a critical perspective, the agenda is built according to what serves the interests of those in positions of power, and is unlikely to include anything which presents an overt challenge to the status quo (Nisbet, 2009). Thus, the theory of agenda building highlights how news exists as a neatly-packaged product reporting upon a highly selective range of stories and events.

Agenda setting differs from agenda building in that the former is concerned with how the media influence the public discussion. As has been established, the mass media play a unique, and potentially highly powerful, role in determining which issues are at the fore of public concern. Much of what citizens perceive to be happening in the world is not so much the result of direct experience, but of media communications, to the extent to which McCombs (2014) asserts that 'citizens deal with a second-hand reality, a reality that is structured by journalists' reports' (McCombs, 2014: 1). The media, with repeated messaging and 'salience clues' (McCombs, 2014: 2) persuade audiences of the issues which are of the greatest importance, and on which individuals should hold an opinion. This is in accordance with the work of Lippman (1925) and Cohen (1963) both of whom argue that it is the media which constructs citizens' perceived reality and determines everyday concerns.

Agenda-setting occurs at its most powerful when individuals deem an issue to be of relevance to them and feel significant levels of uncertainty around the matter (McCombs, 2014); where an issue is considered to be of little relevance, individuals are unlikely to seek 'orientation' (McCombs, 2014) from the news media, as it is of little concern and thus causes no real anxiety. Additionally, where an

issue is perceived to be of relevance, but individuals feel relatively well-informed, there is little or no uncertainty to address (McCombs, 2014). However, should an issue attain a status as being of high relevance and also cause a high degree of uncertainty, individuals are found to require a high degree of orientation, and this is when they are especially likely to pay greater attention to the media agenda (McCombs, 2014).

In addition to the notion of orientation, Gandy (1982) notes how the media are engaged in the process of 'distribution control' (Gandy, 1982: 3) whereby control is exercised over what information is available, and to whom access is given, thus ensuring that the public are not privy to the same information as those in elite echelons of society. Gandy (1982) appears to consider the notion that 'knowledge is power' as being beyond contention; therefore, it can be argued that, by limiting the extent of information available to audiences on any particular issue, the media is exercising considerable power over them.

A further aspect of the agenda setting process concerns the transfer of the agenda from one medium to another, known as intermedia agenda setting. Barnett (2017) notes how the (right-wing) British press retains its ability to influence the agenda by setting the agenda for television broadcasters. Cushion et al.'s (2016) content analysis of the 2015 General Election media coverage concluded that right-wing newspapers had frequently dominated the broadcast news agenda, and that this dependence on partisan sources potentially compromises the broadcasters' capacity for impartiality (Cushion et al., 2016). Phillips (2020) asserts that the intermedia agenda setting as evidenced in the 2015 election campaign affected all television news, although the satellite broadcaster Sky, took more stories from the press (63%) than did the BBC. The most influential newspaper in terms of intermedia agenda setting was found to be *The Telegraph* (Phillips, 2020). Whilst the decline in sales of the traditional newspaper in Britain could be seen to be evidence of a loss of power, intermedia agenda setting suggests that these publications continue to hold significant influence with regards to setting the agenda.

Following the establishment of the agenda-setting and agenda-building functions of the media, especially surrounding issues which trigger citizens' need for orientation, the subsequent question which requires addressing is that of who/what controls the agenda. Two major schools of thought evolved which attempt to address this matter: liberal pluralism and critical perspectives. These will now be discussed.

2.3 The liberal pluralist perspective

The liberal pluralist perspective is notable in that it defines power (and, therefore, unequal distribution of power) as not only a necessary, but a desirable, aspect of a functioning society; it is, fundamentally,

the 'power to' rather than 'power over' (Freedman, 2014: 3). Whilst hierarchy and conflict is not denied (Freedman (2014) these are seen as forming an essential element of a collective society, as these inequalities are consensual and enable citizens to operate effectively, both in individual roles and also when engaging with others (Parsons, 1963). Power here is an issue subject to 'individual regulation' (Freedman, 2014: 3) and does not involve subjugation. Moreover, as organisations and individuals compete within this complex structure, power relations fluctuate, and no single body is in constant dominance (Curran, 1990).

Thus, liberal pluralism offers a constructive perspective on the nature of the mass media, and the manner in which it functions in society. According to Curran (2002) liberal perspectives on the media emerged alongside the adoption of democratic principles and institutions, and are therefore the oldest, most established views. Fundamental human rights, in particular that of an individual's right to freedom of speech are viewed as being protected by a free market media (Allan, 1999).

Additionally, given the ability of the media to widely disseminate information, it enables the potential for the electorate to be well informed. Mc Nair (2009) asserts that the type of journalism which seeks to challenge and question (and which is independent of government) is a fundamental aspect of a functioning democracy. This conceptualisation of the media and its role as a great influence in democratic societies is frequently referred to as 'The Fourth Estate'. Journalism, as a result, is a practice which draws upon numerous diverse perspectives in order to provide audiences with a range of views and a broad spectrum of sources, thus facilitating a well-informed public to form balanced opinions and hold decision-makers to account (Allan, 1999). This relationship also contains a reciprocity: the media operate as a form of 'consensual…surveillance', gatherers of public opinion which then ensure corporate organisations and governments are inclined to respond to said opinions accordingly (Allan, 1999). From this view, the media plays a vital role in strengthening democracy (Curran, 2002). The media became increasingly independent throughout the nineteenth century, the liberalist view is that this free press served to empower ordinary citizens and to scrutinise those in powerful positions (Curran, 2002). As Hallin and Manicini (2004) note, the early stages of commercialisation served (at least to some degree) to free the media from dependency on political subsidy, thus opening up opportunities for more open debate. As survival became dependent upon mass sales, it was vital for the press to reflect the views of many, not an elite few (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The mass media serve, within a democracy, to inform and, therefore, to ensure 'democratic accountability and fairness' (Hardy, 2014: 39). Additionally, the mass media enabled communication between various social groups, which hitherto had not been possible (Curran, 2002). Thus, from a liberal pluralist perspective, the media can be seen to be strengthening democracy and enabling the

electorate to better hold politicians and decision makers to account. Controls on the mass media, where placed, may be viewed as being in the 'public interest' (McQuail, 1992: 8).

Ownership of the media in the UK is concentrated in the hands of a small number of powerful companies and individuals (Davies, 2009; Doyle, 2002). However, from a liberal pluralist perspective this does not engender a media without plurality of views; the point is made that share ownership in media organisations ensures that owners cannot manipulate media content in order to project their own ideological stances (McNair, 2009). According to Curran (1990) the liberal pluralist view is that the selling of shares in the industry has served to separate media ownership from managerial decisions over content, and that media executives thus enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Furthermore, the freedom from editorial control that journalists possess enables a wider range of views to make it to print or broadcast (McNair, 2009). Therefore, although media ownership is highly concentrated, there are systemic checks to ensure that the media cannot be used for ideological dominance by the elite.

The liberal pluralist stance, therefore, perceives the media as an integral segment of a functioning democracy. By informing the electorate and holding those in power to account, it empowers ordinary citizens and enables political engagement at all levels. In addition to this, it facilitates communication between various communities. Where the potential exists for power to become over-concentrated and ideological dominance to corrupt it, the media has in-built checks to ensure this does not occur. From this perspective, without the mass media, democracy ceases to function. However, critical accounts of the media, as discussed below, provide substantial opposition to this view.

2.4 Critical perspectives

There are significant challenges to the liberal pluralist view that power is concerned with the ability to do, a fundamental aspect of a functioning society, and that the media enforces democracy and reflects society, rather than creating it; indeed, according to Bennett (2016: xiii) 'there is no guarantee the media will suit the needs of a democracy' and this is extended to suggest that media broadcasts should be accompanied by a 'consumer warning' (Bennett, 2016: xiii) to inform viewers that what they are watching may in fact be contrary to their interests. Critical analysis of the media and its societal role presents opposition to the liberal pluralist perspective, where the media informs and supports the democratic process; these challenges will now be discussed.

From a critical perspective, power is, by its very nature, concerned with 'power over' rather than 'power to' (Freedman, 2014: 3). According to this perception, power of one inevitably involves subjugation of the other. As stated by Lukes (2005), an intrinsic aspect of power lies in creating the preconditions for the acceptance of a dominant ideology; this enables the dominant to 'secure compliance to domination' (Lukes, 2005: 111). The notion of structural power is concerned with the

legitimation of certain all-pervasive presuppositions, the acceptance of which serve to benefit the elite (Gill and Law, 1989). An example of this might be the demonization of the benefits system being accepted by the working classes, those who may need it most.

The critical view, therefore, perceives the media as being complicit in the reproduction of capitalist inequalities, in clear contrast to the liberal pluralist account, which depicts the mass media as a mirror reflecting society (Hardy, 2014). Curran (2002: 33) considers that the radical perspective views the media as being a method of 'elite control', whilst Blumler and Gurevitch (1982: 240) write of the media as being perceived as 'agencies of social control...helping to promote the *status quo*', i.e., the dominance of one social class over all others. This concurs with Herman and Chomsky (2002) who argue that, where elite consensus on a particular issue exists, the media, on account of various restrictive forces such as ownership, advertising, is likely to uncritically reflect that consensus in their coverage. Consequently, the media effectively run elite 'propaganda campaigns' (Herman and Chomsky, 2002: 2) whereby citizens are exposed to only a very limited range of opinions and a highly restricted amount of information which serves to benefit those in positions of power. From this perspective, the role of the media in society is to propagate the interests of the ruling class and reproduce existing power dynamics. Access to the media sphere is tightly controlled and restricted to a small minority elite. Overall, the media are engaged in relaying stories and perspectives which accord with the interests of the dominant class (Curran, 1990).

Habermas (1989) famously argues that social transformation in the nineteenth century led to the domination of commercial enterprises over the institutions of power. One factor in this process was taxation; stamp duties had been applied to the press as a consequence of various laws passed during the 18th and early 19th centuries. They were levied in an attempt to prevent subversion (Curran, 2018e). Nevertheless, the UK had a thriving radical sector of the press based in London which, until 1836, was not subject to stamp duty; this changed when the government tightened restrictions and introduced harsh penalties for tax evasion (Curran, 2018e). These measures swiftly brought about the demise of the unstamped press; by 1937 there were no longer any in publication (Curran, 2018e). Secondly, Herman and Chomsky (2002) outline how, during the nineteenth century, advertising revenues became vital for publications to remain viable economically and that this impacted both seriously and negatively upon the working-class press, as they were seriously disadvantaged in the pursuit of advertisers. For example, working class readers are likely to have less disposable income than their more affluent, middle-class counterparts. Therefore, they are potentially a less lucrative market, and consequently advertisers are less attracted to publications which appeal to a predominantly working-class readership. As advertising revenue became increasingly important to sustain a publication, those which contained predominantly working-class ideologies and issues were

unable to compete. As a result, the press which survived increasingly promoted a more right-wing perspective, and the breadth of opinion in the mainstream press narrowed. McNair (2009) notes how fear of losing advertising revenues continues to impact upon media content, and Hardy (2014) concurs that advertisers can, and do, exert influence over media output.

2.4.1 Content selection

According to Hall et al. (2000) news is not the straightforward process of reporting what is important at any given time in any given place – it is a systematic selection process, one which is constructed by the society in which the journalist is operating. This is in accord with the work of the Glasgow Media Group (1995: 62) who argue that news broadcast on television is most definitely not 'the news as it happens'.

Herman and Chomsky (2002) argue that there are filters through which stories are put before broadcast or publication:

> The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleaned residue fit to print. They fix the premises of the discourse and interpretation, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place, and they explain the basis and operations of what amount to a propaganda model.

> (Herman and Chomsky, 2002: 2)

It does not follow that the journalists operating within this structure are themselves complicit; the filtering process occurs in such a seemingly natural manner that they believe that they are operating with objectivity and in adherence to a professional code of conduct (Herman and Chomsky, 2002). Whilst journalists themselves do not necessarily belong to the elite who could be described as 'propagandists', the stories they cover, and the way in which they cover them, are often heavily influenced by the views of the propagandist (Richardson, 2007). This is, in many (if not all) cases, the views of the 'dominant political group' in a given society (Glasgow Media Group, 1995: 86). And, as Bennett (2016) illustrates, politicians' views are unlikely to be challenged by journalist unless they can locate a contrasting viewpoint from a source of similar stature. This then provides politicians with greater flexibility regarding truth, and thus power takes precedence over reliability (Bennett, 2016). Tuchman's (1978) view that the nature in which news reports are gathered serves to maintain the status quo further reinforces the point that broadcast news is promoting the interests of an established elite.

In contrast, Davies (2009) argues that news today, being more commonly owned by large corporations than wealthy individuals with political agendas, is perhaps less of a propaganda tool and more of a

lucrative enterprise – profit is the bottom line to which news media must adhere. This is supported by Doyle's (2002) analysis of media ownership, which concludes that, despite regulation to supposedly curb media monopoly, the concentration of media ownership does have cost efficiencies which make it more financially viable than other models. However, as Herman and Chomsky (1988) point out, the commercialisation of the media has led to the news media shaping reality to protect the interests of the owners of the wealthy corporations – the ruling elite: '…the powerful are able to fix the premises of discourse, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear and think about, and to "manage" public opinion by regular propaganda campaigns' (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: xi).

In accordance with this, Bagdikian (1997) contends that the extent of the control of the conglomerates is such that 'from creation of content to its delivery, no content – news, entertainment, or other public message – will reach the public unless a handful of corporate decision-makers decide that it will' (Bagdikian, 1997: 149). This is further supported by Golding and Murdock (1991: 157) who discuss the manner in which the media are increasingly 'commandeered by large corporations and moulded to their interests and strategies', and Freedman (2014: 4) who writes of 'the acutely uneven capacity of the right to speak (as well as the ability to listen) in contemporary market-driven societies'.

Doyle (2002) concurs that this heavy concentration of media ownership has a severe negative impact upon diversity of views and plurality, enabling owners to promote a specific political agenda at the expense of all others. The conclusion appears to be that, regardless of whether the motive is political, ideological or economic in nature, there is little (or perhaps no) space for views alternative to those of but a few members of an elite social group. This media monopoly, Doyle (2002) contends, goes against the fundamental principles of the free market, in that it does not allow for an allocation of resources which ultimately benefit society as a whole. Lack of plurality in turn poses a danger to democracy; for a democracy to function successfully it is vital a diverse range of voices and opinions are aired (Doyle, 2002).

The lack of diversity of voices in the mainstream media can be explained by the notion of 'filters' (Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Galtung and Ruge, 1965) which are applied to determine the value of any news item. Boden (2016) contends that the worthiness of news items is determined by the socio-political context, cultural values and power relationships of the environment in which the story is produced. Many researchers (Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Schlesinger, 1978; Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Schramm, 1948) have argued that news stories are carefully and systematically selected before broadcast. If it is accepted that the concentration of media ownership entails the premise that news stories are carefully selected for broadcast, gaining an understanding of the nature of the selection process is vital.

Herman and Chomsky (2002) and Galtung and Ruge (1965) conducted research which concluded that news stories and their presentation are subject to a number of 'filters'; these filters determine which stories are selected for broadcast. According to Herman and Chomsky's (2002) *Propaganda Model*, news must pass through five filters before it is likely to be considered suitable for broadcast. These include the size of the media conglomerates and their profit-driven objectives; the need for media outlets to placate advertisers or risk loss of revenues; the difficulty, given their severe time constraints, journalists may face if attempting to find alternative, reliable sources of news and opinions; the degree of criticism that is levied from the powerful onto the media outlets which dare to oppose the status quo; finally, an underlying, all-pervading, anti-Communist agenda. Only stories which do not contravene these filters will make it to the mainstream.

The five filters converge to produce systematically selected media content which serves the interests of the wealthy and powerful. Stories therefore tend to be dichotomous in nature and skewed to serve the domestic interest. The choices of selection or suppression are governed by this, and material is handled in different ways, depending upon whether it is favourable or not (Herman and Chomsky, 2002).

Whilst Herman and Chomsky's (2002) five filters provide a macro-overview of how media content is selected and manipulated, Galtung and Ruge (1965) identify twelve filters (and a number of subfilters) through which a story may pass before being deemed sufficiently newsworthy as to make it to the broadcast stage. Typically, in order to achieve newsworthiness, a story must unfold quickly, be dramatic unambiguous in meaning, and culturally relevant to the audience. Further filters increase the newsworthiness – where the event is unexpected, and/or concerns an elite nation or persons, and/or refers to something negative, its appeals heightens (Galtung and Ruge, 1965).

The factors highlighted by Galtung and Ruge (1965) and Herman and Chomsky (2002) do not necessarily operate in isolation; there can be any number of them operating simultaneously. This is consistent with Galtung and Ruge's (1965) further assertion that the news, from selection to digestion by the audience is not only filtered and selected, but also distorted. Aspects of the story will be emphasised whilst others are overlooked. Schramm (1949: 289) concurs that 'no aspect of communication is so impressive as the enormous number of choices and discards that have to be made between the formation of the symbol in the mind of the communicator and the appearance of a related symbol in the mind of the receiver'. Similarly, Manning White's (1950) work on gatekeepers considers the extensive chain of communication through which stories must pass. Below (Figure 2.1) is the 'chain of news communication' according to Galtung and Ruge:

Figure 2.1 Galtung and Ruge's 1965 'Chain of news communication'

Figure 1. *The chain of news communication*

world events → media   → media → personal   → personal
              perception ↑ image   perception ↑ image
                      selection   selection
                      distortion   distortion

In this manner, we can see that:

1. The more events satisfy the criteria mentioned, the more likely that they will be registered as news (selection).

2. Once a news item has been selected what makes it newsworthy according to the factors will be accentuated (distortion).

3. Both the process of selection and process of distortion will take place at all steps from event to reader (replication).

(Galtung and Ruge, 1965: 9)

In addition to the filters, it is important to note that this process is conducted under one particularly pressurising constraint – time. Given the frequency of today's news bulletins, time plays a hugely important role in the selection process. As Schlesinger points out, '[Time] cannot be ignored, and not only because journalist assert its importance. Rather, it is because much of our sense of what is important….is structured by mass media production cycles' (Schlesinger, 1978: 121). The constraints of time, and the 'frenetic…feverish' (Schlesinger, 1978: 123-124) nature of the newsroom can only ensure that Galtung and Ruge's filters are applied with less sensitivity and care. Schlesinger (1978) notes how the lack of time for proper consideration leads to news broadcasters simply using their own initiative and intuition to decide the newsworthiness of a particular story. What this tells us is that audiences have access to a restricted, selected, filtered news agenda. Due to the filters of newsworthiness, and the severe constraints of time, only a tiny, subjectively assessed, fraction of stories actually make it to broadcast. Jäger and Maier (2012: 48) contend that a news item does not constitute a 'discursive event' (i.e. one which has far-reaching political and social significance) if it is covered by the media in 'intensively, extensively and for a long period of time' (Jäger and Maier, 2012: 48). Thus, many news events are short-lived and have little obvious long-term impact.

Furthermore, this selection of news items has also been filtered through several stages of distortion. As Boden argues, '[the] mass media often present superficial and biased information…. Distortions

exist at the level of: news selection, news value and presentation, language, the people reporting, dissident voices and self-censorship' (2016: 121 - 134). Consequently, the likelihood of an audience being able to ascertain the facts of an event, or a balanced view of world events are, at best, negligible.

The process of marketization also impacted, naturally, upon the quality of the debate. Where once the media had encouraged and led rational debate, the new mass media, propelled by commercial interest, actively encouraged political apathy amongst citizens. Commercialisation also led to more entertainment in the form of media, which served to distract citizens from social inequalities (Curran, 2002). And, as democracy progressed, the mass media emerged as a public relations machine for those in positions of power, with Western governments establishing press officers from the early 1900s onwards (Curran, 2002).

Whilst arguments regarding the ownership and commercialisation of the media are of clear relevance to the commercial channels, it could be argued that a public service broadcaster, such as the BBC, being free from the potential constraints of a dominant proprietor or powerful advertisers, is at liberty to produce news content which does not serve the interest of the elite. The BBC holds the banner of impartiality high, as is evidenced in the 2007 report 'From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel: safeguarding impartiality in the 21st Century' (Bridcut, 2007) an eighty-one-page document which uses the word *impartial* (or derivatives of it) a total of 461 times. There are, however, a number of arguments as to why the BBC's apparent commitment to impartiality may be questioned. As McNair (2009) points out, there is a distinct lack of diversity in, for example, the backgrounds of top BBC journalists. McNair (2009) notes that, as of 2006, more than half of all top BBC journalists were educated at independent school, with 45% having attended Oxbridge, and logically contends that this results in a lack of diversity of views. However, it should be noted that, whilst attending private school and being educated at Oxbridge is more likely to lead to employment as a BBC journalist, there is evidence of the BBC having run anti-establishment stories (McNair, 2009). Additionally, a central argument of critical approaches asserts that media reliance on elite sources, a practice which necessarily alienates alternative perspectives (Curran, 1990) is inherent to public service broadcasters, just as it is to commercial outlets. Additionally, whilst media moguls (such as Rupert Murdoch) may view themselves as 'anti-establishment' (Curran, 2018b: 164) the multiplicity of relationships between media magnates and political leaders would suggest strong links between the two (Curran, 2018b). Thus, it cannot be assumed that a public service broadcaster such as the BBC operates independently of elite political influence.

Whilst liberal pluralists might argue that the mass media serve a function to challenge the political establishment, and that this can be seen in, for example, political interviewing, Hallin's (1984) content

analysis of the US media's reporting of the Vietnam War provides challenge to this view. Although news during this period did appear to include negative coverage, Hallin (1984) demonstrates that this apparent balance was largely superficial, in that journalistic practices and approaches themselves did not alter; sources of news remained largely the same (i.e. official statements) and few comments or explicit views were expressed. Simultaneously, negative coverage of the South Vietnamese government increased (Hallin, 1984). Gandy (1982) argues that sourcing patterns are a significant factor in the limited scope of journalism; Hallin (1984) demonstrates the same in 1984.

Studies have shown that politicians are in a position to influence the media agenda. Semetko et al.'s (1991) research into UK and US election coverage noted that, in the UK, political parties appeared to hold more sway over the television news agenda than they did over the press. Bennett's (1990) study of the US media concurs that sourcing patterns remain largely based on the information of government officials. A similar dynamic is also reported in the UK by Philo et al. (2013). Three potential explanations of this are provided: the first is that the limited source range is simply the product of journalistic decisions being made with little time and resources – the information from official sources is readily available and holds a degree of gravitas. A second is that the relationship between journalists and officials is inherently reciprocal in nature, mutually beneficial, in that these sources provide much-needed information to effectively fill information gaps, whilst speaking to journalists offers an opportunity for officials to hone their skills and build contacts. The third rationalisation is that officials are actually representatives of the general public; as such, journalists are promoting the democratic agenda by referring to elected officials and their mouthpieces for information (Bennett, 1990). The dependence on government sources limits the scope of debate and enables officials to set the media agenda (Bennett, 1990). Bennett views media content as being the inevitable outcome of the process of journalists and sources working together: 'norms emerge in patterns of interaction between individuals who are transcending their separate realities to create a coherent social performance or product. In our case, the news is the coherent normative product of this complex interaction' (Bennett, 1990: 111). Bennett (1990) appears to view media output as more of an inevitable outcome of current practices, rather than an inherently conspiratorial process. Nevertheless, there is agreement that the product is highly limited in scope.

The work of Bennett (1990) is supported by Wolfsfeld's (1997) Political Contest Model, in which the dominance of official sources over and within the media agenda is also asserted (Wolsfeld (1997). Indeed, the competition less established viewpoints face to gain media focus is framed as a battle of David and Goliath proportions (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Nevertheless, Wolfsfeld (1997) contends that 'it is not all doom and gloom' (1997: 5). Minor, less established sources which challenge the mainstream agenda do gain media attention on occasion – this may be due, for example, to the 'blunders'

(Wolfsfeld (1997: 5) of those in positions of power. As Wolfsfeld (1997) sees it, the media is largely dominated by the views of the established and already powerful. However, it is not impossible, in the right conditions, for challengers to rise and gain a degree of control over the agenda.

Critical accounts perceive the media as a tool of elite dominance, manipulated by the wealthy and powerful to subjugate ordinary citizens (Curran, 1990). Whilst, in the early days of the print press, diverse opinions were disseminated, the process of commercialisation throughout the 20th century has seen all dissenting voices squeezed out of the mainstream. As a result, all news is heavily filtered to adhere to an ideological stance which only serves the interests of those in positions of power (Herman and Chomsky, 2002). This influence is not only present in the commercial sector, but also impacts upon seemingly neutral public service broadcasters (Curran, 1990). From this perspective, there is a severe lack of diversity within the mainstream media, with right wing voices achieving dominance. Furthermore, the tendency for the media to entertain rather than inform has damaged democracy by helping to engender an apathetic electorate.

2.5 Digital Media

Whilst much research has been conducted into theories of media performance in relation to the press and television, the recent advent of the Internet and social media sites has produced a new arena from which audiences can attain information and entertainment, with 1.5 billion people worldwide having access (Hardy, 2014). In 2012, Newman et al. considered the digital sphere to constitute 'an emerging *Fifth Estate'* (2012: 6). This has impacted news media in a number of ways, not least due to its unprecedented effect on communication. Hardy (2014) considers whether the introduction of digital communications technologies has impacted upon the validity of previous research. Whereas communications relationships have traditionally been vertical, the Internet has made possible mass horizontal communications (Hardy, 2014). Whilst Marxist perspectives are more concerned with the former, awareness of the latter should not be overlooked. Fuchs (2012) stresses the increased interest in Marxist interpretations of the media, including the digital media following the global banking crisis of 2008.

Digitisation of the media brought with it expectations of revolution in the production and consumption of news, due to its having made available a 'treasure trove of information' (Curran and Seaton, 2010: 285-286) and its wide dissemination of user-generated subject matter; Hardy (2014: 131) refers to this as the 'democratisation' of content. Croteau and Hoynes (2014) also note that, due to its highly decentralised nature, the Internet can appear to be free from the constraints known to exist within the traditional media and suggest this may herald a return to the early days of the press, where greater variety of viewpoints were published. Curran (2018d: 347) notes how new media have been heralded

as being in the process of 'remaking the world'. However, research shows that, despite the proliferation of internet access across the western world, the revolution, as it currently stands, may not be as great a transformation as anticipated.

According to Hardy (2014) it was commonly believed in the 1990s that the Internet would end the power and dominance of the traditional proprietor, replacing the status quo with an abundance of options and viewpoints. Hardy (2014) purports that this has not been the case, and points to the continued success of media conglomerates such as Disney. However, it would seem that the shift to Internet sources has effected a reduction in the power of the traditional role of the proprietor. McNair (2009) contends that the news brand is now more important to the commercial success of a site. Previously, the editorial comment and ideological stance were the keys to market appeal, but this has altered. This, therefore, potentially reduces the ideological power of the proprietor (McNair, 2009). Hardy (2014) concurs that the Internet has challenged the traditional media, but points to the fact that TV continues to dominate viewing figures and remains the main source of news for the majority of the population, thus maintaining the status of the media magnates to a large degree.

Additionally, television has sustained its role as the major source of news for consumers (Hardy, 2014; Curran and Seaton, 2010). Similarly, despite the exponential growth in the number of available TV channels, in the UK the traditional broadcasters (BBC, ITV, Channel 4) have retained their popularity (Curran and Seaton, 2010); Curran and Seaton (2010: 249) therefore contend that the potential revolution brought about by new media has frequently, at least for the moment, been 'overstated'. Nevertheless, although TV, and in particular, broadcast TV, viewing remains extremely popular, Curran (2018d) points out that, in 2016, 41% of British people reported using social media as a means of accessing news stories. Furthermore, in 2017 more than 70% of UK adults reported owning a smartphone (Curran, 2018d) with social media use comprising the majority of adult online time (Hardy, 2014). Thus, it is evident that the internet and smartphones have become a significant source of news (as well as, of course, entertainment and communication) for many British citizens. This has impacted far more significantly amongst younger citizens (Hardy, 2014), which suggests that, in future, television news will be largely replaced by the Internet.

According to Curran (2018d) currently, television remains key to news consumption, but the advent of the internet has caused old paradigms to shift. The digitisation of the media led to an exponential increase in the number and availability of channels and websites, and that the traditional problem of 'scarcity of supply has been overcome' (Hardy, 2014: 72). Whilst it may seem that this promises a return to a diverse range of views being available to all, Curran (2018d) argues that a better-informed populace has not been the outcome. Hardy (2014) concurs:

The potential of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to facilitate 'strong democracy', participative democracy where people are fully involved in decision-making on all issues which affect them or are important to them, must seriously be questioned…

(Hardy, 2014: 114)

Firstly, where fragmentation of the media, due to the proliferation of channels and sites, has occurred, rather than providing citizens with diversity of perspectives, it has instead enabled the active avoidance of those viewpoints with which the consumer disagrees, thus simply reinforcing already-held views. As Brode, Vraga and Thorsen (2018) elucidate, individuals tend to be motivated more by the need to encounter information in accordance with already-held beliefs than the search for accuracy. The ability for the Internet user to filter content to the extent that no counterarguments are encountered can be said to pose a serious risk to the democratic process (Curran, 2018d) and has potentially led to greater polarisation of views amongst citizens (Curran, 2018d).

Furthermore, although it is generally understood that the Internet has transformed message exchange and has precipitated communications between individuals of all social backgrounds on an unprecedented scale (Hardy, 2014) questions remain as to whether this has enabled greater consumer access to, and digestion of, a wider diversity of views. Platforms such as Twitter enable members of the pubic to communicate directly with decision-makers, such as politicians, journalists and broadcasters in a manner hitherto unseen. Whilst such access to power would be thought to bring about improved democratic relations, Hardy (2014: 133) argues that 'the opportunities to realise such communications fully are constrained by the dominance of corporate capitalism' as the manner in which the Internet has developed has inevitably been shaped by the already-dominant media conglomerates (Hardy, 2014). Indeed, online media continue to heavily depend upon advertiser revenues in the same way the traditional media did before them (Hardy, 2014; Croteau and Hoynes, 2014). As with the traditional media, advertising has impacted substantially upon online news outlets (Hardy, 2014) and therefore exerts considerable influence. The commercial development of the Internet has led to consumers' data being constantly assessed, with their preferences being subject to complex algorithms (Curran, 2018d). Consequently, Internet users are under constant (largely undetectable) surveillance by the social media behemoths (Amazon, Google, Facebook) which use 'huge amounts of [consumer] data' (Fuchs, 2009: 1) to further their commercial gains. Therefore, whilst the Internet may seem like an abundance of options, this is, largely, an illusion; users are continually directed towards certain choices, with their data being collected to further tailor the content with which they are presented. Online media are thus able to predict user behaviour and subsequently guide their choices online – however, this monetizing of attention, a business with which

the media have always been engaged, presents a significant danger in that, in the online sphere, there is a severe lack of regulation from a public interest perspective (Curran, 2018d).

In addition to this, digitisation has enabled advertisers to target more accurately their desired audience. A key aspect of the transformation of communications via the Internet is the proliferation of user-generated content (UGC) (Hardy, 2014). Many of the platforms which are provided to facilitate this communication (Facebook, YouTube or Twitter, for example) allow access to their application without charge to the consumer. However, despite the seemingly free nature of this relationship, Fuchs (2012: 703) argues that this constitutes the 'commodification of data'. Information about users is sold to marketers in order that advertisements may be highly targeted to reach the most appropriate audience (Hardy, 2014). Facebook, additionally, sells advertising which can be specifically targeted to the correct demograph (Hardy, 2014).

Whilst generating content which enables advertisers greater opportunities to target their products and/or services, users are also engaged in the business of generating content for the service provider, thus becoming 'prosumers' (Hardy, 2014). In return for their labour, they are allowed access to the platform in order to communicate and, inevitably, produce further content. As Fuchs (2012: 704) contends, 'on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, etc, all consumption time is commodity production time'. Thus, the consumers provide their labour, potentially several hours per day, for no monetary reward. This lack of ultimate control users possess over their data and the platforms for which they generate content is essentially alienation from the fruits of their labour (Fuchs, 2012). The profits to be made remain firmly in the hands of the media conglomerates and the advertisers (Fuchs, 2012). The Internet, therefore, is the current embodiment of the 'audience commodity' (Hardy, 2014: 141).

A final, and highly contentious issue that has dominated concerns regarding the Internet is the veracity of information available, a phenomenon commonly known as 'fake news'. Curran (2018c) provides a detailed account of spurious media stories (most notably in the press and concerning migrants) and argues that during the 1980s, 'there was an increased blurring of the distinction between facts and opinions. It was accompanied by the weakening of a stress on accuracy' (Curran, 2018c: 185). However, the nature of the Internet has intensified this issue greatly; Frederikson (2017) notes that it has become increasingly difficult to ascertain online the veracity of stories and claims, denoting this to the online environment. According to Brode, Vraga and Thorsen (2018) social media, the platforms upon which the majority of adults spend most of their online time, is largely responsible for the wide dissemination of misleading information. This can be as a result of unchecked user generated content or the sharing of unverified content by users. Tandoc et al. (2017) also denote this to the changing nature of advertising revenues. In online reporting, media outlets attract greater advertising revenues

in direct correlation to the number of clicks an item receives; thus, speed becomes paramount and may be prioritised over fact-checking (Tandoc et al., (2017). Once again, it is apparent that the commercialisation of the media is, at least in part, responsible for the decline in gravitas.

The digitisation of the media has undoubtedly confronted society with new paradigms and has occasioned the media conglomerates to reassess their strategies in order to retain control. However, many arguments exist to challenge the notion that the Internet and social media has provided the audience with a greater degree of freedom. Firstly, the traditional media remain powerful despite the rise in Internet access, especially amongst the older generations within the UK. Secondly, issues around USG and the commodification of data, which have led to users becoming, in effect, prosumers, has maintained, and perhaps even increased, the power and influence of the advertisers. In addition to this, where it has been argued that time constraints have impacted upon the authenticity and reliability of news on television and in the press, this concern has been dramatically amplified by the online media, leading to the proliferation of what has come to be known as fake news. Overall, it appears that the Internet, and the way in which it is managed, remains firmly in the control of the media conglomerates and the marketers, meaning that, in terms of power dynamics, it is likely that little has shifted.

2.6 The Mediatization of Politics

Mediatization is a 'worldwide phenomenon' (Mazzoleni, 2014: 42) precipitated by the swift evolution of communication technologies, particularly since 1945 (Mazzoleni, 2014). Mediatization theory considers the extent to which the media assert control over various aspects of society, including politics and voter sentiment. Blumler (2014) contends that mediatization constitutes the 'prime axis on which the modern political communications process revolves' (Blumler, 2014: 31) and, therefore, an awareness of the process and an understanding of how it operates is vital for any democracy (Blumler, 2014).

Schulz (2004) delineates the four stages through which mediatization, a complex evolutionary process, takes place. The first is 'Extension' (Schulz, 2004: 88); the media transcend the traditional boundaries of human communication which are, by nature, limited. Via media, however, temporal and spatial boundaries are overcome, and communications can take place outside of the typical constraints. The second is 'Substitution' (Schultz, 2004: 88) whereby media forms are considered to have replaced alternative interactions. An example of this this would be watching television rather than talking or using text message rather than meeting a friend. This is considered to work simultaneously with 'Extension' (Schulz, 2014: 88) though it should be noted that certain media communications may invoke traditional interactions; for example, discussing a sports event or talking about a television

drama. The third stage Schulz (2004: 89) terms 'Amalgamation', whereby the use of media communications becomes intricately interwoven with almost all other aspects of daily life: cooking whilst listening to the radio or reading a newspaper whilst waiting for the bus. Mazzoleni (2014) highlights the manner in which media influence and everyday life are so deeply intertwined that it is not possible to envisage the separation of the two. Thus, social reality and media reality are melded, or amalgamated (Schulz, 2004). The final stage of mediatization is known as 'Accommodation'; this involves an acknowledgement of the power of the media as a generator of wealth and jobs, which is capable of bringing about social change. The media provide lucrative advertising space and, as such, wield influence over business. This influence extends to other aspects of society, including politics, whereby actors must yield to media logic in order to gain access. This results in loss of political autonomy (Schulz, 2004).

As Blumler (2014) notes, the relationship between politicians and the media has always contained a degree of reciprocal dependency; however, through mediatization, the nature of political communications can become skewed to the media agenda and this can produce undesirable consequences, such as overt stereotyping of social groups, limited choices for audiences, and less scrutiny of policy (Blumler, 2014). Consequently, where media logic is considered to be exercising too much control over the agenda, it is '"bad news" (excuse the pun) for democracy' (Blumler, 2014: 37).

Strömbäck and Esser (2014) set out the process by which the media, over an extensive period of time, have become increasingly influential in the political sphere, and in decision-making. In this process, four dimensions are identified:

- The extent to which the media are a source of information;
- The degree of independence between the media and social institutions, self-governance by the media;
- The degree to which the media are guided by media logic or political logic;
- The degree to which political actors are guided by media logic or political logic.

Strömbäck (2008) and Strömbäck and Esser (2014) report on several research works into mediatization in various countries and observe that the extent to which each dimension is implemented may vary. For example, it is possible for the media to be very highly regarded as a source of political information, whilst being relatively free from the influence of social institutions. Nevertheless, the dimensions are closely correlated. The process of mediatization can be observed to have taken place when the media have become a highly trusted source of information and are acting largely outside of the control of social institutions. As this occurs, media logic takes precedence over political logic – the media select stories and cover them in relation to media standards and perceptions

of newsworthiness. Strömbäck (2008) defines political logic as being a situation where communications place the needs of the political system at the forefront, whereas media logic is a scenario whereby the wants and needs of the media audience (ie what attracts the audiences, and what ensures commercial viability) are the priority. Altheide and Snow (1979) describe how the pressure upon broadcasters to attract high viewing figures is paramount; thus news becomes an entertainment form and the potential for news programming to inform audiences is, to a large extent lost. In both cases, the manner in which political communications are selected, constructed and communicated may differ greatly (Strömbäck, 2008). In the fourth dimension, political actors, in order to gain influence, begin to adapt to media, rather than political, logic (Strömbäck and Esser, 2014). Consequently, adapting to media logic to attain coverage becomes a primary aim for those engaged in the political sphere, and media logic asserts control (Strömbäck and Esser, 2014). As Mazzoleni (2014: 43) explains, 'the logic of the political sphere – or a good part of it – is yielding to the supremacy of the logic and imperatives of the media in contemporary societies'. This results in news broadcasts which are more entertaining than informative, and highly 'limited in its length and focus' (Altheide and Snow, 1979: 79). There is also the tendency for news coverage in the course of an election campaign to present the process as a form of battle or contest, highlighting conflict and personalities, rather than providing information (Phillips, 2020).

2.7 Conclusion

The liberal pluralist approach is significantly more likely to be concerned with audience effects than critical approaches (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1982). As the liberal pluralist view of election coverage would be one where differing viewpoints and arguments are presented, it follows that research into how these messages are received, and how significant the impact of different forums might be is considered highly relevant. For the critic, however, the election process is viewed more as one in which 'hegemonic definitions of social relations, serving to maintain the interests and position of the dominant classes' are widely disseminated (Blumler and Gurevitch (1982: 239). This lack of plurality of viewpoints renders research into audience effects 'a dubious or unnecessary enterprise' (Blumler and Gurevitch (1982: 239). Consequently, a critical approach is significantly more likely to be concerned with media performance.

Curran (1990) questions, however, the assumption of an essential dichotomy of the liberalist pluralist perspective against the critical narrative. Analysis of the progress made in media performance theory throughout the 1980s requires acknowledgement that more nuanced approaches have accepted that the radical Marxist view lacks subtlety (Curran, 1990). It follows that a more probable account is one whereby critical perspectives incorporate certain aspects of liberal pluralism; consequently, whilst the media may predominantly serve the interest of the more powerful in society, it should not be assumed

that there is one, single dominant narrative. Within powerful circles, there exist competing narratives and interests, many of which fluctuate. Therefore, to insist, as critical accounts of the media tend to have done, that there is one, identifiable, dominant ideology is to oversimplify the complex nature of power relations within society, and to ignore temporal shift (Curran, 1990). Likewise, the liberal pluralist view has had to accept the importance of shifting power relations and how it impacts upon reporting (Curran, 1990) thus undermining the premise that the media operates entirely autonomously.

The theory of mediatization of politics adds to the arguments surrounding media control. Schulz (2004) elucidates the stages in the process of mediatization, highlighting how media permeate almost all aspects of social lives, resulting in a blurring of social and media realities. Strömbäck (2008) and Strömbäck and Esser (2014) set out the four dimensions of mediatization which operate within societies at varying degrees. The outcome is one whereby political logic is subjugated by media logic, and the interests of the media dominate over the requirements of the political system, producing news that is lacking in depth and severely limited in scope (Altheide and Snow, 1979).

Analysing media coverage from a critical perspective, and with a framework which accounts for the political/media logic debate is more appropriate in a study concerned with output rather than effects. In addition, given the importance of mediatization to the political communication process (Blumler, 2014) understanding to what degree it may be operating is vital. However, it is noted that the rigidity of the traditional critical approach may be unhelpful. Consequently, this study will examine television news broadcasts from a critical perspective, assuming the presence of a dominant ideology, and attempting to map this to a political source (in this case, manifestos). Subsequently, it may be possible to deduce whether media logic or political logic is dominating. However, it will take account of Curran's (1990) view that the dominant ideology/ies may alter over time. For this reason, three case studies will be examined, and an attempt will be made to ascertain whether the discourse has shifted throughout the time period, and through the analysis to determine to what degree the agenda appears to be set according to media logic.

Chapter 3: The Mediation of Immigration

3.1 Introduction

According to much research (Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Bloor and Bloor, 2007; Brown and Yule, 1983) an effective Critical Discourse Analysis must include an understanding of the context in which the discourse has been constructed; discourse is by nature 'context dependent' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009:89). Whilst Chapter 5 will present the specific context and political events of 2015-2017 in the UK, it is important to note that immigration has been the subject of discussion in Britain for 200 years (Panayi, 2014). However, the period since 1945 is considered to be the time when large-scale immigration began; Panayi (2014) highlights the fact that, since 1945 more people have moved to the UK than had done so in the previous 165 years. Consequently, in order to situate the findings of the study within their proper context, this chapter initially provides an outline of the nature of immigration to Britain since 1945, the people who came and where they came from, how they were received and how governments dealt with the issue via election campaigns, slogans and legislation.

Following the contextual discussion, this chapter will consider the role the media play in the construction of reality for their audiences, arguing that this role is highly significant, in particular with regards to an issue like immigration, where views are often formed without direct experience. Subsequently, an account of how the issue of immigration has been mediated, beginning in the 1950s, will be provided, demonstrating that, overall, coverage has been predominantly negative. Whilst openly racist representations may no longer be acceptable in the mainstream, this paper argues that, through use of 'common-sense' discourse, adopted from right-wing tropes, the media continue to disseminate largely pejorative representations of immigrants. The analysis concludes that the mainstream media in the UK have played a significant role in the creation and durability of negative sentiment towards immigration.

3.2 Immigration in Britain during the post-war period

On 20th April 1968, the then Conservative MP Enoch Powell delivered a speech which came to be known as the 'Rivers of Blood' speech, and which has since encapsulated the spirit of right-wing British politics, with Powell himself representing this political standpoint. Powell's speech was delivered as a response to post-war immigration from Commonwealth countries to the UK. Prior to 1945, almost all migration to Britain had been from within Europe (Panayi, 2010). This first experience of mass non-European migration is considered to have been of 'particular demographic and political significance' (Coleman, 1987: 6). Spencer (1997) also notes the major impact mass immigration had on British demographics, politics and culture. Whilst migration to the UK from Europe and other parts of the world, such as China, continued throughout the 20th century, the greatest numbers of people came

from Commonwealth countries, mainly South Asian. The discussion below sets out the major events of the time, and how they shaped the political landscape up to the present day.

Prior to Powell's now infamous speech, post-war Britain, struggling with rationing and austerity, had seen an increase in immigration from post-colonial countries. This began most notably in the late 1940s, when on 22nd June 1948 a ship, the *Empire Windrush* landed in Britain from the Caribbean (Winder, 2004; Paul, 1997). On board were 492 skilled migrants, mostly men, seeking employment (British Library, no date). Many of these men had experienced life in Britain during the Second World War (Winder, 2004) working, for example, in the RAF (Peach, 1991) and, given that Britain displayed little racist sentiment during the war years (Winder, 2004) came expecting to be warmly welcomed back (Paul, 1997). Contrary to expectations, upon arrival, the reception was mixed; the Evening Standard flew a plane to welcome them and printed the headline that evening, "Welcome Home! Evening Standard plane greets the 400 sons of Empire" (Alexander, 2015) whilst simultaneously there were small crowds in the docks holding placards stating, 'GO HOME' (Winder, 2004). Despite the many difficulties these migrants faced – local tensions over housing, workplace discrimination and colour bars (Alexander, 2015) - the majority of them remained long-term in Britain, mostly within the London area (British Library, no date).

However, a letter by Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 5th July 1948 is clear that these migrants were considered to be of benefit to British society:

> It would therefore be a great mistake to regard these people as undesirables or unemployables. The majority of them are honest workers, who can make a genuine contribution to our labour difficulties at the present time.

(The National Archives, 2013a)

In this instance, immigrant workers were regarded as essential to boost a challenged post-war economy. According to Wood (2015) over the next two decades, workers from the West Indies were encouraged to travel to the UK for employment and to help rebuild the economy; public services such as British Rail, London Transport and the NHS were important influencers in this drive. Figure 3.1 below illustrates how West Indian immigration grew, peaking in the early 1960s.

Figure 3.1 Net West Indian Migration to Britain 1948-1988

FIGURE 1　　　NET WEST INDIAN MIGRATION TO BRITAIN 1948-1988

(Peach, 1991: 7)

This immigration was driven largely by market forces and post-war labour shortages. Peach (1991) asserts a clear inverse correlation between immigration from the West Indies and unemployment. West Indian migration served as a replacement population, workers from these countries taking up employment in sectors in which the white British population no longer wished to work (Peach, 1991). However, it is clear that the arrival of these migrants stirred up racial tensions that had hitherto been unobserved (Winder, 2004).

On 30th July 1948, the British Government (Labour) passed the British Nationality Act, 1948 (UK Government, 1948) which gave equal status and full British citizenship under law to all colonial subjects. Migrants, although being subject of discriminatory practices whilst resident in the UK, were arriving in relatively small numbers from the colonies, and the government of the time did not foresee mass immigration, and for the subsequent five years immigration numbers remained relatively low (Foot, 1965). Foot (1965: 125) states plainly the lack of significance attached to the issue: 'No one bothered with a formal announcement that all British subjects in the Empire were automatically British citizens because it did not make the slightest bit of difference'. In 1951, politically immigration continued to be an issue of little importance, and those minsters responsible felt no impetus to change the law regarding access of Commonwealth citizens to the UK (Foot, 1965). Any restrictive laws which existed served only to restrict the entry of 'aliens'; Commonwealth citizens were at this time not

considered as such (Coleman, 1987). In accordance with the free movement of Commonwealth citizens, little reliable data is recorded as to their numbers during this period (Coleman, 1987).

However, by 1954, the number of immigrants arriving from the West Indies had grown significantly, and concerns were increasing over racial tensions and pressures on housing (Coleman, 1987) to the point at which the government (Conservative) concluded that it may be necessary to begin:

> …the preparation of draft legislation designed to place suitable restrictions upon the admission of British subjects from overseas to the United Kingdom and upon their subsequent stay there, and to submit such draft legislation for consideration by the Cabinet.

> (UK Government, 1954)

No action was taken in 1954, and immigration did not surface as a concern in the General Election of 1959 (Foot, 1965; Spencer, 1997) but by 1960, the numbers of immigrants arriving had increased further to 49,650 (The National Archives, 2013d) and the Conservative government decided to legislate to impose restrictions on access to the UK for citizens of the Commonwealth. Further details on the numbers of Commonwealth immigrants between 1953 and 1961 are illustrated in Table 3.1 below:

Table 3.1 Immigration to the UK from Commonwealth Countries 1953 - 1961

	West Indies	*India*	*Pakistan*	*Total 'Coloured' Commonwealth*
1953	2000	-	-	2000
1954	11000	-	-	11000
1955	27000	6000	1800	42700
1956	30000	5500	2000	46850
1957	23000	6600	5200	42400
1958	15000	6200	4700	27450
1959	16000	3000	860	21550
1960	50000	6000	2500	58300
1961	66000	24000	25000	125400

(Foot, 1965: 126)

The campaign for changes to immigration legislation was initially led by the Conservative MP, Sir Cyril Osborne, whose racialist views are well documented (Foot, 1965). In 1952, Osborne began what was to be a successful campaign to restrict Commonwealth immigration, claiming that Britain was allowing

idle and sick immigrants from less developed countries to enter the UK to abuse the welfare state (today's welfare tourism) (Foot, 1965). Relying less on facts and statistics, Osborne's slogan, 'Keep Them Out!' was widely disseminated with the aid of national newspapers, predominantly *The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph* (Foot, 1965). It should also be noted that colour was considered to be the major issue – there was a clear distinction between 'whites' and 'coloureds' which leads Paul (1997: 124) to assert, 'The significance attached to skin color in the post-war period...cannot be understated'. Osborne persevered with his campaign, based heavily on 'anti-coloured' rhetoric and was an influential figure in the bringing about of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (Foot, 1965).

The 1950s had seen economic boom in Britain, and many migrant workers were eagerly employed in menial jobs and, particularly, the northern textile industry. The middle of the decade had seen the beginnings of immigration from the Commonwealth countries of India and Pakistan, and a 1958 government working party wrote of these people that they were uneducated and only suitable to be used in menial employment. These migrants, in the views of the working party of officials which had been tasked with identifying 'the social and economic problems arising from the growing influx of coloured workers' (Paul, 1997; Spencer, 1997), fared poorly against those from the West Indies (Paul, 1987). The party failed to find significant evidence with regards to 'public order, crime, employment and health' to suggest that the immigrant workers were indeed a problem (Spencer, 1997: 119).

Additionally, a small recession towards the end of the decade, coupled with a rise in the number of Commonwealth immigrants arriving in the UK helped to justify the need for immigration law change (Paul, 1987). The working party described the immigration figures in wholly negative terms: 'startling...disturbing' (Spencer, 1997: 118). The conclusion of the report of the working party proved to be based more on a forecast of the future than the facts of the day. It was observed that it was essential to restrict Commonwealth immigration as the arrival of further migrants was likely to disrupt social cohesion, lead to strain on resources (particularly housing) and cause racial tension (Spencer, 1997).

3.2.1 The 1960s – 1980s

In 1962, the government passed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which restricted immigration to the UK for Commonwealth and colonial citizens; in order to attain a job voucher for entry, immigrants had to satisfy one of three criteria. The Act stated that successful applicants would need to:

- have a job to come to
- possess special skills which were in short supply or
- be part of a large undifferentiated group whose numbers would be set according to the labour needs of the United Kingdom economy

However, an unintended consequence was that the current settlers (the majority of whom were male) committed to remaining in the UK permanently, as the Act now made it difficult for them to be replaced by a younger family member later in life (Spencer, 1997). Additionally, there was a surge in arrivals of women and children arriving from South Asia to join their husbands prior to the Bill becoming law (Spencer, 1997). Indeed, in 1961, the numbers arriving from the 'coloured' Commonwealth were double those of the previous year (Foot, 1965). According to Paul (1997: 168) "' New Commonwealth' migration into Britain between 1960 and 1962 was greater than the sum of all postwar colonial migration preceding it". This dramatic increase is considered to have bolstered the position of the anti-immigration lobbyists, led by Sir Cyril Osborne, a Conservative MP, whose 'Keep them Out' slogan was taken up by agenda-setting newspapers such as *The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph;* such was the influence that Osborne expected immigration control to be the key issue of the upcoming Queen's Speech (Paul, 1997). The issue was also coming to prominence within the Conservative Party more generally and was a much-considered topic of their conference in 1961 (Paul, 1997).

Whilst the Labour Party was, at its inception, against the Act of 1962, with time the party, under the leadership of Harold Wilson, began to move away from their initial position of opposing immigration control, for fear of unpopularity with the electorate (Spencer, 1997). Indeed, during the (successful) election campaign of 1964, Labour committed to retaining the Act until new directives could be put in place (Spencer, 1997).

The Act of 1962 permitted entry to immediate family members, for example spouses and dependent children; this led to many dependants travelling to the UK between 1962 – 1964, anxious that free entry may not be available to them for long. A profound difference that this migration brought with it was that the South Asian migrants were no longer temporary visitors to the UK; these families settled to remain. During the 1960s and 1970s (partially due to forced expulsion from East Africa) Asian families arrived and settled in the UK in significant numbers (Panayi, 2010).

In 1965 Wilson's Labour Government had moved to restrict access further, removing some of the categories for legal entry, limiting and restricting the issue of vouchers, and beginning entry control procedures, which included identity checks and interviews. Interviews with Entry Control Officers became essential for entry; thus, scheduling of interviews could be structured as such to further control numbers. Whilst the Act of 1962 appeared to control immigration from the 'coloured' Commonwealth, it was in 1965 that it truly began (Spencer, 1997). Given that the UK at the time was

suffering a labour shortage (Spencer, 1997), and that they were inconsistently applied to allow access to white Commonwealth citizens from Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Paul, 1997) these tighter controls can be viewed as entirely political in nature (Spencer, 1997). This concurs with Panayi's observation that, despite immigration being closely aligned with Britain's economic needs, British politicians:

> …influenced by a combination of a xenophobic and racist public opinion, whipped up by right-wing newspapers and populist politicians…passed a series of nationality and immigration laws to placate the racists…

> (Panayi, 2010)

Whilst subsequent years saw the introduction of legislation and initiatives to address problems of discrimination against, and integration of, immigrants (The Race Relations Act 1965, The Race Relations Act and Commission 1968, The Race Relations Board 1975 and The Race Relations Act 1976) the underlying "context of control" (Paul, 1997: 176) and the rhetoric of the need for it, severely undermined these efforts. As Winder (2004) attests, the fundamental political message was undoubtedly that migrants were unwelcome; the legislative attempts to outlaw discrimination were in actual fact effective disguises for anti-immigrant views.

At the same time, immigration salience had risen amongst the electorate. This is in clear evidence in the results of IPSOS Mori' Issues Index of Trends 1974-78 (IPSOS Mori, 1988) which illustrates public responses to the question of what the biggest issues facing the country (in this case, Britain) are. Whilst some issues register extremely highly (for example, inflation) immigration rose to significance throughout the mid-1970s. In 1974, it was considered the most important issue by only 7% of respondents, but this figure had risen to 27% by 1978 (IPSOS Mori, 1988).

Winder (2004) notes that during these decades racial tensions were high with many indigenous locals feeling "under siege" (Winder, 2004: 378). Protests and racially motivated attacks became more frequent (Winder, 2004). In 1965 Foot wrote "The subject of race and immigration has taken hold even more firmly of the British imagination, and it is hard nowadays to open a British newspaper without some reference to it" (Foot, 1965: 251). In 1967, the National Front was founded, a fringe organisation which consisted of a merging of three extreme far right bodies; one key tenet was the resistance of non-white immigration (Fielding, 1981). The National Front, who advocated Enoch Powell for Prime Minister, were aggressive and active, endorsing vandalism and violence as a legitimate means of political protest. By 1978, they were settled into headquarters in the heart of London's most racially hostile areas (Winder, 2004) and were garnering ever-increasing support at

elections and by-elections (Yonwin, 2004). Although 1974 was their strongest year, in 1979, having contested 303 seats, they received 191,719 votes, 0.47% of the electorate (Kimber, 2012).

Alongside the rise in popularity of the National Front, and the UK having undergone the fabled 'Winter of Discontent' of extensive industrial action in 1978 (Rowbotham, 2014) a Conservative government, headed by Margaret Thatcher, was elected in 1979. Prior to her election, Thatcher's views on immigration were unequivocal. On the ITV's popular *World in Action* in 1978, Thatcher, it would seem, very clearly used immigration as an issue to sway voters:

> People are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture. And you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in. So if you want good race relations, you've got to allay people's fears on numbers. That's one thing that's driving some people to the National Front….if we don't want people to go to extremes, and I don't, we ourselves must talk about this problem and we must show that we are prepared to deal with it…we must hold out the clear prospect of an end to immigration.

> (Thatcher, 1978)

According to Panayi (2010) this speech reconfirmed to the UK electorate that the Conservative Party were opposed to immigration, and this stance engendered a reduction in support for the National Front. Indeed, Hall (1988) views Thatcher's approach as constituting a form of populism. It is arguable whether Thatcher's words were merely a response to the reality of British sentiment towards immigrants, or whether they performed a more self-fulfilling role. Nevertheless, the early 1980s record race-related riots, violence and heavy-handed policing (Panayi, 2010). Areas deeply affected were Toxteth in Liverpool, Bristol, Brixton and Southall (Winder, 2004).

The Conservative government completed the process of removing citizenship rights from all former colonial subjects with the 1981 British Nationality Act, in which full British citizenship was only one of three possible categories, the others being subject to significant restrictions for entry (UK Government, 1981). The introduction of the three immigration acts between 1968 and 1981 led to a significant reduction in the number of people immigrating to Britain (Curran, 2019). Goodfellow (2019) notes that, during the 1980s, non-white people were often subject to disproportionately negative treatment – for example, they were more likely to encounter harassment from the police, and were consistently cast as the enemy within in the press. Gilroy (2002) wrote of the persistent demonisation

of black people in public discourse, while (Panayi (2014) notes that black people in Britain were largely trapped in decades of deprivation.

Whilst Thatcher appears to have openly stated the Conservative stance on immigration, Labour's message was somewhat contradictory; although promising to repeal what they viewed as discriminatory acts, the party continued to assert that control on immigration was vital (Goodfellow, 2019). By the end of this decade, Britain was amongst the strictest countries in Western Europe with regards to border controls (Goodfellow, 2019).

Murray (1986) discusses the role the media played during this period, and highlights how the mainstream press were engaged in what can be considered a campaign against 'anti-racism' (Murray, 1986: 5). 'Anti-racism' is an area of political activity which purports to condemn racism in all forms; it is seen to have arisen during the 1970s but to have been adopted by more formal institutions in the wake of the riots in 1981. This impacted authorities in many ways – one example may be the introduction of equal opportunities programmes within local authorities. (Gilroy, 2002). Curran (2019) describes how London became the epicentre of this, with many left-leaning (Labour-run) councils adopting what was considered to be a radical approach. These councils oversaw a process whereby individuals of ethnic minority backgrounds were co-opted into local authorities (giving them a degree of influence over policy). Multiculturalism within schools was encouraged through recruitment processes (Curran, 2019). Petley (2019) notes that these Labour councils were never far from scorn in the mainstream media – ' Within [sic] weeks of Labour winning control of the Greater London Council on 7 May 1981, its leader, Ken Livingstone, was regularly being described by newspapers as 'barmy' and 'loony'' (Petley (2019: 58). As opposed to previous media discourse concerning the area of race – the dissemination of crude stereotypes, for example - during this period what seems to have emerged is an approach aiming to discredit all those who denounce racial prejudice (Murray, 1986). Newspapers such as The Daily Mail and The Express disseminated the views that Britain is a country which never actually wished to embrace multi-culturalism, and that those who propose greater integration are anti-British. This indicates a shift in media coverage of race and immigration issues, from not only condemning those who enter the UK, but also attacking those who support 'multi-culturalism' (Murray, 1986).

3.2.2 The 1990s and 2000s
By the 1990s, racism in Britain had become the subject of academic research and institutional racism had become accepted as a concept, with particular reference to the police force in this regard (Panayi, 2014). Goodfellow (2019) notes how cultural shifts were promoted though films such as 'Bend it like Beckham' or books like 'White Teeth'; however, this is viewed as a largely superficial exercise and, although the Labour government under Tony Blair employed the rhetoric of equal opportunities,

Goodfellow (2019) argues that little changed under their leadership. Panayi (2010) however, notes that public perceptions of, and concern regarding, immigration is not constant and has fluctuated, reaching peaks at various points in time. Duffy (2014) argues that public sentiment towards immigration was relatively less hostile during the 1990s. Therefore, whilst it may be that few changes were made during the 1990s in relation to legislation around immigration, the decade seems to have been one in which the issue was of less concern to the British public. This may be due to the proliferation of findings of academic research around aspects such as institutional racism, making it less socially acceptable to behave or speak in an openly racist manner.

Whilst immigration appears to have been of little salience during the general elections of 1997 and 2001, Europe and the possibility of Britain joining the Euro formed part of the campaign strategies (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002; Butler and Kavanagh, 1997). What is notable is that the Conservative Party fought both of these elections as the most Eurosceptic of parties (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002). In their campaign of 1997, the Conservatives produced a poster warning that a Labour government would lead to Britain becoming a 'province of Europe' as opposed to the 'free nation' a Conservative government would deliver (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 84). During the 1997 campaign, Europe featured as the most prominent issue in broadcast news coverage, thus ensuring its salience (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997). In both 1997 and 2001, despite their more pro-European stance, Tony Blair's Labour Party achieved what were hailed as landslide victories, with clear majorities in the House of Commons (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002) thus demonstrating that Europe - and therefore, freedom of movement - was not a determining factor amongst the electorate during this period. Indeed, Butler and Kavanagh (2002) argued that 'the failure of attempts to excite the British public for or against the euro, were reiterated and must leave their mark on political thinking in the years before the next election' (2002: 251). Having failed to secure votes on a Eurosceptic stance in two consecutive elections, it appeared to be clear that the British electorate were not especially concerned about the question of Europe, and that it certainly was not an issue on which an election victory could be secured.

Whilst Europe was of prominence in the politics of the late 1990s, in the election of 1992, the economy and taxation were of greatest salience. Butler and Kavanagh remark that, in the 1992 campaign, along with the recently dropped poll tax, Europe was 'an absentee…[a] lost issue' (1992: 165) and this was reflected in both the campaigns and the broadcast news coverage (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992). Given that Britain's economy was undergoing the most protracted period of recession it had seen since 1945 (Vaitilingham, 2010; Butler and Kavanagh, 1992) it is perhaps unsurprising that the key issues centred around economic competence. Furthermore, as the Conservative Party were viewed by the electorate as more economically competent, and Labour more caring (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992), the (albeit

narrow) Conservative majority victory was the likeliest of outcomes. Whilst immigration did not appear to be of great salience in 1992, it is notable that, in the final days of campaigning, when campaigning reaches a peak, The Express newspaper warned its readership that Labour's reluctance to impose restrictions on the intake of asylum seekers would lead to a 'migrant flood' (Kavanagh and Butler, 1992: 206). Whilst this does not appear to have been a major factor in voter decision-making, it may serve as evidence of the awareness of the media that immigration plays to an underlying anxiety amongst the electorate. Nevertheless, economic competence, or lack thereof, seems to have been the determining element for electoral success in 1992.

It appears to have been the early 2000s which sees the beginnings of the rise in public concern around immigration. In 1986, the European Union had passed the Single European Act, ensuring the free movement of people, goods, capital and services between member states. Initially, the movement of people between member states was relatively small and seems to have been of little political significance (Geddes, 2014). However, the European enlargements in the 2000s (2004, 2007 and later, 2013) saw thirteen new, less prosperous members, and this dramatically increased the rate of immigration to the UK (Geddes, 2014). Many of those entering the country arrived from the newer member states; in 2011, of 2.7 million EU residents in the UK, 1.1 million were from those countries which had joined during the enlargement of the 2000s (Geddes, 2014). Duffy (2014) notes UKIP's success in conflating the issue with that of EU membership, and how the mainstream parties had to rethink their stance on immigration in response to UKIP's success. By the mid-2010s, immigration had become a highly salient issue, and negativity towards immigrants appeared to be growing. In 2013, Archbishop Desmond Tutu spoke of his concern that the UK was returning to the sentiment of the time when Powell's Rivers of Blood speech was made, that anti-immigrant feeling and rhetoric were a problem for the country (Gledhill, 2013). Much of the literature contends that the 'turning point' for immigration as a key issue amongst the British electorate fell between 2003 and 2005 (and later 2013), when a number of Central and Eastern European countries joined the European Union; the then Labour government opted not to impose restrictions on the movement of people, and as a result, immigration from these countries increased significantly (Clarke et al., 2017; Goodwin and Ford, 2017; Mosbacher and Wiseman, 2017; Geddes, 2014). Prior to that, immigration appears to have been of relatively little salience amongst the UK electorate. Indeed, Nigel Farage has noted that, when campaigning for the 1999 European elections, he did not refer to immigration as an issue on any occasion (Mosbacher and Wiseman, 2017). This concurs with Clarke et al.'s (2017) analysis that UKIP electoral support rises when attitudes towards immigration become increasingly negative. Denver et al. (2014) show that in 2001, immigration was not considered to be one of the top five most important issues facing the country, but in 2005 it was considered the most important (24% of the electorate)

and in 2010 the second most important. This rise in salience may also be reflected in the political response, notably that of the Conservative Party – under the leadership of Michael Howard, the election slogan in relation to immigration was, 'Are you thinking what we're thinking?' (Quinn, 2008: 192), the implication being that the electorate are all very unhappy with immigration levels but feel uncomfortable openly admitting to their discomfort. Given that UKIP so successfully exploited the issue in later years, it can be argued that, in late 1990s, early 2000s Britain, immigration was not considered highly significant amongst the electorate, but that it did become so.

3.3 The role of the media

The powerful role the mass media plays in setting the agenda for the country's population is well-documented. As McCombs (1977) asserts, 'the fact that the mass media have major influence on awareness of public issues and other major social topics is a truism' (McCombs, 1977: 90) stressing the power of the media to influence the public agenda. A wealth of studies (Richardson, 2007; Hall et al., 2000; Herman and Chomsky, 1988) have also demonstrated that the choices made in terms of selection of stories and narratives surrounding these selections are far from neutral. The framing of events by the news media is powerful in that it determines the message audiences receive about any particular issue. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) argue that framing has the potential to influence audience sentiment towards an issue, both positively and negatively. The influence of the media is highly significant (van Dijk, 1993). Strömbäck and Esser (2014) note that, due to the media's influence in the formation of public opinion, their role in the political sphere is one of great importance.

Whilst news stories undergo a process of selection, so too does language (Conboy, 2007; Fairclough, 1995) and this selection carries with it ideological significance. Hart (2010) contends that language choice is both politically and socially motivated. As such, analysis of media discourse is of great importance (Fairclough, 1995) as it can serve to uncover broadcasters' political affiliations and alliances.

3.4 Agenda setting

In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position. In reflecting what candidates are saying during a campaign, the mass media may well determine the important issues—that is, the media may set the "agenda" of the campaign.

(McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 1)

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The role of the mass media in agenda setting and the construction of reality for the audience has long been established. McCombs (1977) and Shaw (1979) wrote of the power of the media to influence the public agenda, and to persuade people of what is of concern to them. Bourdieu (1991) wrote of the media's 'symbolic power'; that is, the ability to form and shape reality, to change or influence the way people view the world and its events. The media, along with schools, universities, and churches (for example) exercises this symbolic power; that is, they are involved in the process of knowledge-production and meaning exchange' (Hartley, 1999). Given that 'reality is a scarce resource' (Carey, 1989:87) an institution such as the news media, which plays this role in the manipulation of reality, is in possession of a fundamental form/source of power. According to van Dijk (2003: 241) 'None of the other power elites, and especially the political elites, and their discourses could be as influential as they are without the mediating and sometimes reinforcing functions of the press, radio and television'. In this genre, the symbolic shaping of reality is achieved by story selection, image selection, and results in the news media being powerful enough to determine what 'people see and believe' (Bourdieu, 1991:170). More recently, Hodgkinson states:

> On our own and in the company of others, media entertain us, enable connections with friends and communities, provide interpretations of the world around us and offer resources for the forging of identities and imaginations. And their importance to everyday lives and routines suggests that the media also must have the most significant implications for the nature and character of the broader culture and society that surround us. We live, it may be argued, in a media culture, a media society.

(Hodgkinson, 2017: 2)

The media, it is argued, are omnipresent, and it is this omnipresence which serves to embed their messages within our psyche to the extent that they play a role in the creation of our culture, our beliefs, values, understanding of the world, and identity. Weaver (1996) despite questioning the power of the media to deeply influence voters during short election campaigns, writes, 'Attitudes and opinions are not constructed from thin air but rather from the information that people believe to be true and that is most salient or easily accessible to them' (Weaver, 1996: 36). Cohen (1963) also stressed that, whilst media do not form the public's opinions for them, they do assert significant control over the issues about which people feel concern.

Early studies of the mediation of immigration concur with the above studies into agenda-setting; Hartmann and Husband's (1974) analysis of the UK press highlighted the importance of this role: 'Newspapers make people aware of certain things, and suggest the degree of importance that

different events and issues have by the amount and prominence of coverage that they give them' (Hartmann and Husband, 1974: 128). Hence, as van Dijk asserts,

> the *overall* influence of the media, particularly the news media, on the structures and contents of social cognitions of groups is considerable… In other words…in the field of ethnic relations, the news media are the main source of information and beliefs used to form the interpretation framework for such events.

> (van Dijk, 1993: 242)

Thus, although the direct influence of the media to shape opinions has been questioned, it is understood that the media bring issues to the fore of the public consciousness and inform society of those matters upon which they should focus, and construct the frames of reference within which they should be discussed. Recent studies have added to the understanding of the role media perform in determining issue salience; Chernov et al. (2006) found that audience exposure to repeated messages deepened awareness of the issue in question. This chapter will attempt to highlight the significance of the media's role in helping to form UK citizens' opinions regarding immigration. Subsequently it will consider how the issue of immigration has been mediated in the UK, beginning with early studies in the 1970s, and moving through to the present day. It will demonstrate that, although media attention to immigration has fluctuated, and aspects of framing have altered over time, it has been overwhelmingly negative in tone and immigrants have consistently been cast in a pejorative light.

3.5 The mediation of immigration

Stories concerning immigration are ever-present within the British media (Smith and Deacon, 2018) although the salience of the issue fluctuates (Smith and Deacon, 2018; Hartmann and Husband, 1974). From this coverage, and the narratives espoused by public figures, British people are made aware of the issue in ways which extend far beyond that which they experience themselves. As Allen and Blinder note, 'Mass media play critical roles in many normative theories of representative democracy' (2018; 203); Van Dijk (2000: 36) concurs: 'Media discourse is the main source of people's knowledge, attitudes and ideologies' whilst Page observes that 'Many individuals have only encountered the rising volume of immigration through the media … For many regions, in the United Kingdom, the most visible sign of increased immigration prior to 2004 was the heavy media coverage of asylum migration' (Page, 2009: 136-137). This is further supported by Blinder and Allen (2015):

> Media coverage provides depictions of immigrants…that may form the raw material from which members of the public build their understandings of these complex, heterogeneous communities.

This may be further illustrated by the finding that, whilst two thirds of British citizens view immigration as a significant problem nationally, fewer than one fifth consider it a local issue (Page, 2009). Indeed, concern about immigration has been shown to be highest in those areas which have the lowest levels of actual immigration, whilst more culturally diverse communities tend to be the least concerned (Page, 2009). It can, therefore, be argued that those in less culturally diverse communities are particularly prone to acceptance of media interpretations and representations precisely because they lack the personal experience of interaction with people from other cultural backgrounds (Hartman and Husband, 1971; van Dijk, 1993; Page, 2009: Blinder and Allen, 2015), and thus it follows that 'the media elites are ultimately responsible for the prevailing discourses of the media they control. This is specifically also true for the role of the media in ethnic affairs' (van Dijk, 2000: 36). McClaren (2018) contends that the less direct experience the public has with an issue, the greater the power of the media in this particular sphere. As such, the media are playing a highly significant role in setting the agenda for this particular conversation (Deacon and Smith, 2018; McClaren, 2018). This is in accord with Blinder and Allen's (2015) assertion that the media 'help shape' (215: 5) public perceptions of the nature of immigration and immigrants.

The 1970s saw the beginnings of 'robust' research into the manner in which the media cover immigration (Smith and Deacon, 2018: 8) and their 'powerful role in the reproduction of racism in Western societies is far from tenuous' (van Dijk, 1993: 242). An early seminal study into the role played by the media in the perpetuation of racist ideology was that carried out by Hartmann and Husband (1974) entitled 'Racism and the Mass Media'. According to van Dijk (1991) the authors specifically selected 'racism' rather than 'race' for the title, as they wanted to be wholly unambiguous regarding the conclusions of their work. Van Dijk's (1993) later analysis of media discourse argued that:

> Many of both the subtly and blatantly racist events that define the system of everyday racism are enacted, controlled or condoned by white elites, that is, by leading politicians, professors, editors, judges, officials, bureaucrats and managers.

(van Dijk, 1993: 6)

Whilst media attention given to the issue of immigration has undoubtedly fluctuated over the last 45 years, it has been found to be consistently negative in its portrayal of inward migration (Smith and Deacon, 2018; Berry, 2016; Greenslade, 2005). Cottle concurs that the findings of decades of research into media representations of ethnic minorities 'makes for depressing reading' (Cottle, 2000: 9), whilst Greenslade notes that the UK press 'has *always* adopted a negative stance towards immigrants and

refugees' (2005: 7). Whilst the consensus appears to be that mediation of immigration has, for the most part, been profoundly negative, changes in the way the issue is addressed have been noted (Cottle, 2000).

3.5.1 1950s – 1970s

Early studies of the mediation of immigration were primarily concerned with racism, as inward migration had become heavily politicised in the 1950s, with non-white immigrants consistently receiving a significantly more hostile reception from the British public, politicians and the media than their white counterparts (Smith and Deacon, 2018). Thus, the issue of immigration actually emerged as being based primarily on skin colour, and was therefore more of an issue of race, and racism. Hartmann and Husband (1971) found that the salience of immigration within the UK press increased to become the provider of 'a steady stream of race-related information' (1971: 270) in the 1970s and was predominantly concerned with 'a central theme…of keeping them out' (1974: 136). The 1974 study, which covered UK press coverage of immigration between 1963 and 1970, also demonstrated that 60% of stories were devoted to issues surrounding illegality, refusal of entry, and the issue of Asian citizens fleeing Kenya due to 'draconian' (BBC, no date: 1) immigration laws (Hartmann and Husband, 1974). The period of analysis illustrated a significant increase in issue salience, in which immigration-related stories doubled between 1963 and 1968 (the year of Enoch Powell's Rivers of Blood speech). Britain's non-white population were consistently portrayed as problematic and troublesome, as being on the outside of UK society (Hartmann and Husband, 1974). Key themes were centred around having to keep immigrants out of the UK, inter-group conflict, regulation of discrimination and Enoch Powell's opinions (Hartmann and Husband, 1974). More peripheral concerns were focussed on housing, education and employment (Hartmann and husband, 1974). Hartmann and Husband's (1971) study found that media portrayals of the black community tended to 'define the situation as one of inter-group conflict' (1971: 271), whilst the notion of immigrants as a threat was also apparent. Hartmann and Husband (1971) suggest two key reasons for this negativity in the 1960s and 1970s: firstly, Britain's colonial history abounds with condescending and demeaning jokes and cartoons concerning non-white people, and that media coverage is a continuation of this tradition. Secondly, that the notion of an external threat is highly newsworthy, and therefore easily passes through any journalistic filters which may be applied. Thus, stories about foreigners invading are highly newsworthy (Hartman and Husband, 1971). UK newspaper coverage of immigrants during the 1960s and 1970s has been shown to have been predominantly negative, centring on the themes of the need to deny entry, and the conflict between whites and non-whites.

3.5.2 1980s -1990s

A dichotomous media representation of Britain as being divided between whites and non-whites persisted into the 1980s. Van Dijk (1993) illustrates how, throughout the 1980s and 1990s 'ethnicism and racism continue to be a major problem of white-dominated societies in Europe' (1993: 7), yet openly racist acts and discourse had become less socially acceptable. However, these had been replaced by a more subtle, seemingly benign, form of racism which van Dijk (1993: 7) termed 'everyday racism'. What could be regarded as explicitly racist had been legislated against, and this led to a veiling of racist discourse, often preceded by a disclaimer such as 'There is nothing wrong with the black community, *but…'* (van Dijk, 1993).

Analysis of the media during the 1980s found that stories concerning immigrants, particularly those of West Indian origin, which reinforced negative stereotypes (for example, criminality) were assigned greater prominence, whilst those which might highlight negative behaviour on behalf of the white population (for instance, racial discrimination) would be afforded a lower priority (van Dijk, 1993). An example would be the race riots in 1985, during which coverage paid far more attention to drugs and violence than any underlying social problems, such as poverty or unemployment (van Dijk, 1993). Van Dijk (1993) concluded that the media continued to reproduce the dominant ideology of Them and Us, with the latter being awarded significantly greater positive characteristics. Furthermore, the reproduction of racist values, propagated by racist elites, would have almost no effect if it were not 'covered, adopted and emphasized by the mass media' (1993: 281).

Van Dijk (1993) also notes mid-1980s media stories recalling Enoch Powell's ideologies and placing responsibility for peaceful assimilation very much at the door of the black community, whilst the white community are subject to little obligation with regards to reciprocation, or indeed leading the process.

3.5.3 Post-2000

Whilst the 1990s appears to have seen a decline in terms of devotion to coverage of the matter of immigration, Blinder and Allen (2015) note that the late 1990s saw a marked increased in issue salience, and Page (2009) observes that, post-2000, attitudes towards immigration, influenced by the media, 'hardened' (Page, 2009: 150). This may be due to the fact that, once again, the dominant messages were profoundly negative. Greenslade's (2005) study of the mediation of asylum seekers in the UK found that 'the hostile tone and negative coverage echo the...treatment meted out to all immigrants into Britain in the past decades' (2005: 5). Echoing the findings of van Dijk's (1993) study of racism within elite discourse, Greenslade identifies, despite racial discrimination legislation, an underlying anti-immigrant ideology within the UK press:

…modern race relations legislation, the acknowledgement of the UK as a multicultural society and wider educational sensitivity to racial matters generally has made the current generation of journalists (as with the majority of British people) much more aware of overtly racist language, attitudes and actions. Yet this awareness has not necessarily changed an underlying bias against immigrants…

(Greenslade, 2005: 11)

Greenslade (2005) also notes an increasingly anti–European Union sentiment, which denotes a conception of both incomers and greater European integration as equal threats to British culture and identity.

Allen and Blinder's analysis of press coverage of immigration from 2006 to 2015 found that issue salience increased significantly during this time period. In the early 2000s, immigration was amongst the three most important issues for the British electorate, and remained high on the agenda: Page (2009: 1) writes that 'Public concerns about immigration into the United Kingdom have reached unprecedented levels in the last decade' and notes that, although hostility had historically been highest amongst more elderly citizens, this was now a concern for the majority of under 29s (Page, 2009). During this time, the theme of the need for a reduction in numbers remained constant in the majority of publications, reflecting the Conservative (under David Cameron's leadership) pledge to cut net migration to below 100,000 per annum (Allen and Blinder, 2018). The study of collocations regarding immigration have found that one of the most common collocations used in conjunction with immigration is *illegal*, thus highlighting the angle of media coverage of the issue (Blinder and Allen 2015). Allen and Blinder's (2018) found *illegal* as the third most common collocation, succeeded only *mass* and *net* and followed by *uncontrolled* and *high*; therefore, it appears that a significant media preoccupation with numbers in relation to immigration is apparent; immigration is perceived as quantitative in nature, rather than qualitative. During this period, reporting of immigration in terms of the scale, the numbers of people migrating was particularly prevalent, and this significantly increased in 2014-2015, whilst the notion of illegality reduced in salience (Allen and Blinder, 2018). Indeed, reporting on the scale of immigration, by 2015, accounted for almost 60% of all immigration-related stories in the British press (Allen and Blinder, 2018). What is also clear from this analysis is that the overall framing of immigration as a problem to be dealt with, as in the 1970s, continues into the present. However, the frames of reference have shifted from concerns regarding inter-racial conflict to worries regarding the magnitude of the issue from a numerical perspective; in other words, the number of people entering the country. This, nevertheless, does reflect an enduring concern with

keeping immigrants out of the UK, as highlighted in Hartmann and Husband's (1974; 1971) early work on the dissemination of racist messages by the media in the 1960s and 1970s.

Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy's (2012) study of the mediation and politicisation of the migration of 'new' EU citizens to the UK argues that, whilst UK government policy was less discriminatory towards these groups due to the apparent invocation of a 'shared whiteness' (2012: 680) media coverage, particularly tabloid, demonstrated 'a cultural racism that is exclusionary on the basis of putative cultural differences' (Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2012: 681). Nationalities most commonly selected for such treatment in this instance were Romanians. During the post-2004 period, media coverage (as also reported by Blinder and Allen, 2018) focussed heavily on the scale of the migration, the quantity of people moving into the UK; 'flood' and 'invasion' metaphors were highly prevalent; the continual references to numbers, along with the notion of threat, can lead to fear amongst the reader/viewership (Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2012). Additionally, the study found that, along with the notion of threat and nuisance, this migration was also commonly linked to criminality. It was further noted that, whilst Polish migration has been far more significant in terms of numbers, negative attention was considerably more focussed on Romanian and, to a far lesser extent, Hungarian migrants; the economic insecurity of the Romanians may offer explanation (Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2012). The study concludes that the tabloid media, through a process of racialization, effectively 'darkened' (2012: 692) Romanian migrants.

Whilst much of the earlier research into the mediation of immigration has focussed on the written press, rather than the broadcast news, it is the written press which largely guides the content of other media: '...the press, by setting the agenda, influences the rest of the media…' (Greenslade, 2005: 7). Therefore, analysis of the print media can inform analysis of the broadcast media. And, as Greenslade asserts, 'the popular press, sometimes tacitly assisted by the broadsheet press, has *always* adopted a negative stance towards immigrants and refugees' (2005: 7). Therefore, unearthing anti-immigrant bias in UK media news reporting is certainly 'not a new phenomenon' (Greenslade, 2005: 21).

The Internet has begun to revolutionise the manner in which news is broadcast, and it is therefore important to consider the manner in which immigration has been mediated in the digital realm. However, it should be noted that the legacy media remain highly influential within the news sphere (Smith and Deacon (2018). Online platforms are regarded as spaces where 'strongly polemical discourses or hate-speech' are more apparent (Musolff, 2015: 41). A comparative analysis of metaphors employed to describe immigrants in the UK press, online blogs and forums (Musolff, 2015) finds that the Them and Us scenario persists in the 2010s, with immigrants frequently characterised as parasites or scroungers in online communications, most commonly blogs. Such terminology, which

acts to dehumanise the subject, was markedly less frequent in the press, although both tabloid and broadsheet were considered to have approached the issue form a negative standpoint (Musolff, 2015). Berry (2016) argues that all UK media have consistently discussed both European integration and immigration in almost wholly negative terms; for its part, the broadcast news has, at the very least, failed to counteract or contradict any of these messages. Thus, EU integration and immigration are presented as issues of conflict, rather than mutual consent (Berry, 2015). Key depictions surrounding immigration were identified as immigrants as parasites, and/or criminals (Berry, 2015) thereby reflecting the findings of Musolff (2015).

A comprehensive analysis of UK press and online media reporting of issues in 2016 (prior to the EU referendum on 23rd June) was conducted by Moore and Ramsay (2017); it was found that, whilst the economy was the most covered issue, reporting on immigration (the second most salient issue) more than tripled during the campaign period, and accounted for more headline stories than the economy (Moore and Ramsay, 2017). Furthermore, although reporting on the economy was frequent, after 27th May, 47% of economy-focussed articles also referred to immigration. With regards to how immigration was covered, it was found to be overwhelmingly negative, with immigrants being held responsible for social and economic difficulties; a common theme was that of immigration having placed an unsustainable demand on UK public services, whilst the linking of immigration and criminality persisted (Moore and Ramsay, 2017). Specific nationalities were, as previous studies (Fox, Moroşanu and Szilassy, 2012; Hartman and Husband, 1971) have indicated singled out for particularly critical treatment; in 2016, this was predominantly Turks and Albanians, but also Romanians and Poles (Moore and Ramsay, 2017). Moore and Ramsay characterise the coverage of the EU referendum debate by the media as particularly 'acrimonious and divisive' (2017: 10).

Whilst causation has not been established, Blinder and Allen (2015: 33-35) view 'media coverage as plausible contributor to public opinion toward immigration…British media coverage may shape attitudes toward immigration, not through persuasive arguments for or against immigration, but through selective depiction of immigrants'. Berry (2016: 1) in agreement with Weaver (1996) argues that 'the more powerful effects of the media are actually via long term processes of political socialisation, where voters are exposed to messages many times'. In the case of immigration, the British public have been exposed to negative messages and selective representation for decades; therefore, it could be argued that the UK media has proven influential in establishing a deep-rooted Them and Us ideology.

3.6 Conclusion

Any effective Critical Discourse Analysis must be conducted within an understanding of the broader context within which the discourse under analysis is situated (Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Bloor and Bloor, 2007; Brown and Yule, 1983). This chapter has, therefore, delineated key milestones in relation to immigration in the United Kingdom since the 1945, the time at which large-scale immigration is considered to have commenced (Panayi, 2014). What can be seen is that the degree of concern the British public appears to feel regarding the issue has fluctuated, with peaks of concern in the 1960s, the late 1970s and early 1980s, and then again in the mid-late 2000s. Throughout all of these periods, UK governments (regardless of political party) have typically legislated to tighten immigration controls, and attempts at reducing hostility towards immigrants have been considered to be largely superficial (Goodfellow, 2019). According to Smith (2014) immigration has been an issue of discussion in almost all election campaigns post-WW2, although certain periods (for example, Enoch Powell's popularity in the 1960s) show immigration being of greater electoral concern than others. Smith notes that the topic returned to the fore of political campaigning in the 2000s (Smith, 2014). Most recently, concerns over eastern European immigration, so-called 'benefits tourism' and illegal immigration have been widely reported in the both the print and broadcast media, despite research demonstrating the falseness or misleading nature of these fears (The Migration Observatory, 2014). Furthermore, 'British state policy towards ethnic minorities has had a symbiotic relationship with public attitudes…the press have played a central role in the marginalisation of minorities' (Panayi, 2010: 205-206). Given the vital role the media play in the construction of reality and discourse, an analysis of how much, or indeed, little attention is given to the topic, and the manner in which it was framed during between 2015 – 2017 could provide insight into how the discussion informed the 'Brexit' debate.

Research into media influence demonstrates that the media exercise significant influence over issue salience and importance, and that the messages conveyed are far from neutral. The selection of news stories, the manner in which selected stories are framed, and the language employed to tell the stories all serve to construct a particular version of reality, a particular world view (Hartley, 1999; Carey, 1989). These messages form part of individuals' cultural identity and shape their understanding of the world and its events (Hodgkinson, 2017). This power is especially potent when the issue undergoing mediation is one with which audiences have little or no direct experience; immigration is one such issue (Page, 2009). Thus, the media play a highly significant role in shaping the British public's perception of people immigrating to the UK, and the issue of immigration as a whole.

This chapter has illustrated that, whilst the salience of immigration has fluctuated, analysis of media coverage of immigration since the 1950s illustrates the high degree of negativity that is consistently attributed to this issue (Smith and Deacon, 2018; Berry, 2016; Greenslade, 2005). Media

representations of ethnic minorities are overwhelmingly pejorative (van Dijk, 1993). The division of society into white/non-white persisted into the 1980s and, whilst overtly racist language and stories may have become less acceptable during the 1990s, negative framing persists (Page, 2009).

Issue salience in the media increases significantly in the years prior to the EU Referendum and is accompanied by a rise in concern among UK voters. At this time, the predominant theme appears to have been the need to reduce the number of people entering the country (Allen and Binder, 2018) highlighting a focus on immigration as a quantitative issue, rather than, for example, a human story.

The 'Them and Us' ideology, promoted by the print and broadcast media, has in recent years flourished online (Musolff, 2015) and all UK media platforms are involved in the dissemination of negative tropes regarding immigration. This includes those from the European Union, with whom integration and cooperation have often been presented as conflict, rather than consent (Berry, 2016).

Although the establishment of causation is challenging, this chapter concludes that the UK media has been engaged in the regular dissemination of deleterious frames in relation to ethnic minorities and immigrants, and that this has been influential in the establishment of a 'Them and Us' ideology prevalent amongst the British public.

Chapter 4: The Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The following chapter sets out the research strategy. This emergent, comparative study consists of a content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the spoken language taken from excerpts of BBC Ten O'Clock News and ITV News at Ten focussing on how the issue of immigration was reported during three specific time periods in the United Kingdom. The findings of the CDA will subsequently be mapped to coded data from the written text of the manifestos of the major political parties in England, in order to determine whether or not broadcast news discussion of immigration adheres to a particular political ideology, and whether or not this adherence (or lack thereof) may have altered over the three years that this study spans. Details of the process of data selection, along with a delineation of the stages of the project, are provided. Justification of my choices is also contained within.

4.2 Primary research question:

How is the issue of immigration mediated by UK broadcast news channels during the 2015 General Election, the 2016 EU Referendum, and the 2017 General Election campaigns?

4.2.1 Objectives:

To identify any increase/decrease in salience of the issue of immigration within the news coverage between each case study;

To consider if and how, over the 2 years between GE 2015 and GE 2017, the framing of immigration in BBC and ITV News coverage has changed;

To examine the diversity of perspectives available;

To identify recurrent intertextual topoi relating to immigration/immigrants;

To attempt, using the Discourse-Historical Approach, to identify frequent patterns in nomination and predication strategies in the broadcast news reporting of stories concerning immigration;

To attempt, via the Discourse-Historical Approach, to determine the presence of an underlying ideology or world view in the discourse of immigration on major UK broadcast news channels;

To map coherent ideological stances to mainstream political party manifestos.

4.3 Stage 1: Content analysis of broadcast news coverage

An initial content analysis of the broadcast news footage was conducted, as this enables an understanding of the nature of the product (i.e. the text in question) and provides valuable insight into 'trends and changes in content' (Berelson, 1952: 29) thus is suitable to address temporal changes in, for example, issue salience. Through this, it is possible to ascertain what is being brought to the public's attention (Berelson,1952). According to Krippendorf (2004: xvii) analysis of this nature is

considered to be scientific, and is 'an empirically grounded method, exploratory in nature, and predictive or inferential in intent.' Berelson's early work proposed three key characteristics of content analysis: 'a research technique for the objective systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication' (Berelson, 1952: 18). It follows that content analysis should be replicable and analysis must be applied equally to all relevant texts, in order to avoid bias (Berelson, 1952). Whilst the systematic nature of content analysis is noted (Holsti, 1969; Altheide, 1996; Krippendorf, 2004) challenges to the notion that it is entirely quantitative have been made. Holsti (1969) argued that frequency of, say, a phrase or word, alone is not sufficient to assess degree of importance, and that most quantitative studies will involve the use of 'nonnumerical procedures at various stages' (Holsti, 1969: 11). Thus, it is suggested that a content analysis is more reflexive than Berelson (1952) contends, and therefore should involve the use of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies where appropriate (Holsti, 1969; Altheide, 1996).

It is also the case that content analysis, and the manifest content it uncovers, is assumed to be 'meaningful' (Berelson, 1952: 19). Holsti's later work builds upon this but challenges the notion that only manifest meanings may be derived using a content analysis. Whilst the early stages of coding may only be suited to revealing the surface meaning of any given text, the later interpretation phases enable the researcher to engage in 'reading between the lines' (Holsti, 1969: 12). Thus, whilst an initial content analysis may uncover the bare facts of a text in quantitative form, further analysis may uncover the deeper meanings which may be attributed; that is, inferences may be drawn.

The use of a content analysis method enables researchers to systematically and transparently understand the representation of a specific item, and how it may alter over time (Bryman, 2016); indeed, analysis of temporal changes and trends in data is one of the most important uses of content analysis (Berelson, 1952). Like Berelson (1952) Krippendorf and Bock (2009) note that the potential for researcher bias in content analysis must be avoided during the sampling process. In order to ensure this, data selection was made based on dates relevant to the three national ballots, thus maintaining objective selection, and providing genuinely comparative footage, and all categories of analysis were applied to all data, as recommended by Berelson (1952).

Krippendorf (2004) stresses the prerequisite of clear research questions prior to conducting a content analysis. These questions form the basis of the approach and provide the researcher with a clear purpose whilst examining the selected text(s). The initial content analysis of the news footage aimed to answer the following questions, based on Wahl Jorgensen et al.'s (2013: 3-4) content analysis of BBC and other major broadcasters:

Which voices, views and groups are heard in BBC and ITV News at Ten programming?

- What are the occupational and demographic features and political affiliations of news sources?
- Do these sources represent a broad spectrum of opinion?
- Which minority opinions are given expression?
- How does BBC and ITV News at Ten programming include public opinion?

How does the coverage of immigration in routine news covered by the BBC compare to that of ITV?

- Is immigration equally prominent on the news agendas of the respective broadcasters?
- What is the respective prominence assigned to immigration?
- What percentage of stories are about or related to immigration?
- What length of time is devoted to items about or related to immigration?
- Where in the order of items do items about or relating to immigration fit?

As the study is attempting to understand whether an underlying ideology is present in the news coverage under analysis, it is notable that Berelson (1952: 72) contends that 'a major use of content analysis' lies in its ability to uncover the potential intentions of those who communicated the message. As applies in this study, it is possible to compare the outcomes of one content selection with the analysis of content with a clear ideology (in this case, political manifestos) in order to reveal any similarities (Berelson, 1952).

The initial content analysis, employed to identify key themes and aspects of the texts selected, addressed the following issues:

- Duration
- Running order
- Themes and sub-themes
- Sourcing patterns

Selected footage was analysed and coded, and all data recorded in spreadsheets as set out in Bryman (2016).

A coding frame was devised to record the data generated by the initial analysis. Only footage which had been selected as being specifically related to the issue of immigration was analysed. More details of the selection of texts for analysis are provided later in the thesis – please see Section 4.8. All other footage, for example, relating directly to the national ballot of the time, was discarded. A source analysis of all footage was conducted in order to ascertain the nature and diversity (or, indeed, lack thereof) of different types of sources. Any individual who took a turn in speaking on the issue of

immigration was included in this analysis. A 'turn' in speaking was defined as a section of narrative or a discrete conversation. For example, if a conversation piece occurred, where two (or more) speakers took turns in rapid succession, this was recorded as one turn each. However, for longer pieces which included dialogue accompanied by various visuals, each extended turn in speaking was recorded as one instance. For example, in instances where a journalist provided a voiceover, then cut to someone else speaking for an extended period, then returned to the journalist, these were recorded as separate units of analysis. Similarly, if the item began with the journalist in the studio, then went to the report, then ended with the journalist in the studio, the journalist in studio scenario was recorded as two distinct units of analysis.

4.4 Stage 2: Content Analysis of GE 2015 and GE 2017 Manifestos

As stated earlier, the study attempted to understand whether an underlying ideology is present in the news coverage under analysis. Therefore, it was necessary to compare the outcomes of one content selection with the analysis of content with a clear ideology (in this instance, political manifestos) in order to reveal any similarities (Berelson, 1952). The dynamics of referenda differ from those of general elections in that there is often a less definite division between political parties (de Vreese and Semetko, 2006). In the case study in question, there was considerable disagreement between members of the same political parties, and both Leave and Remain campaigns consisted of members of both the Labour Party and the Conservatives. Indeed, the two opposing official campaigns were each led by leading Conservatives, David Cameron (then Prime Minister, Remain) and Boris Johnson (Leave). One consequence of this cross-party alliance is that the 'information cues' can be less clear (de Vreese and Semetko, 2006: 18). Thus, whilst literature was available for the EU Referendum, it was not in the form of a coherent manifesto; there was web content and leaflets, for example, but no clear 'sections' devoted to immigration. Accordingly, this proved difficult in terms of comparability. As such, only the coherent political manifestos of 2015 and 2017 were included in the analysis.

To ascertain if the broadcast news footage selected for analysis reflected a particular party ideology, it was necessary to conduct a content analysis of the party-political manifestos from 2015 and 2017; this would provide an illustration of the manner in which each mainstream party addressed the issue of immigration. As the study is concerned only with immigration, and not with asylum or refugeeism, sections which specifically related to the latter issues were excluded from the analysis.

The content analysis of the manifestos, employed to identify key themes and aspects of the texts selected, was conducted abductively and in two stages, and addressed the following issues:

- Proportion of text devoted to the topic of immigration
- Prominence of issue of immigration (where placed in text in terms of order)
- Words used (i.e. simple count)
- Themes and sub-themes

The first stage of the content analysis involved ascertaining the quantity of coverage each party had devoted to the issue of immigration in the respective manifestos. The second stage of the content analysis sought to ascertain key themes from the manifestos with regard to the issue of immigration. Following an initial coding of each manifesto, minor themes were grouped together into macro themes and a tally chart was drafted.

4.5 Stage 3 – Comparison of news footage with GE 2015 and GE 2017 party political manifestos

In order to examine the agenda-setting influence of the government and/or other political parties during the 2015 General Election, the 2016 EU Referendum and the 2017 General Election, the research endeavoured to align the major themes and discourses of the broadcast media, as outlined in earlier stages, with the key themes and narratives of the party-political manifestos of 2015 and 2017.

Therefore, the third stage of this mixed methods study involves the comparison of the analyses from the broadcast news footage with the literature from the relevant campaigns. The coded data were compared to identify:

- The ideology of which political party agenda tends to dominate TV news bulletins on the issue of immigration?
- The Conservative Party was in government during the three time periods – does it follow that their stance on immigration provides the dominant theme for both BBC and ITV news footage?
- To what extent did BBC and ITV news bulletins include the positions/proposals of contender parties (i.e. Labour, Liberal Democrats, Greens, UKIP, etc.)?

4.6 Stage 4: Discourse Analysis of broadcast news footage

Language and linguistic choices constitute a fundamental aspect of daily existence and operate as strong social influencers. According to Han (2015) the primary way in which communication and meaning is constructed is through language. Machin and Mayr (2012) extend beyond this, and argue that the language we use (and, therefore, [potentially, the language by which we are surrounded) impacts significantly on our world view. The notion of 'linguistic determinism', i.e. that language directly shapes our thinking, is rejected, but Machin and Mayr (2012) contend that linguistic choices

play an important role in determining the manner in which we view the world. Hart (2014) concurs that language acts as a determiner of an individual's ideology, or normalised sets of values and beliefs. Thus, language choices are far from neutral – they impact upon society at a very fundamental level.

Discourse is defined by Fairclough (2009: 164) as a method of 'construing aspects of the world (physical, social or mental) which can generally be identified with different positions or perspectives of different groups of social actors...I use 'construe' in preference to 'represent' to emphasize an active and often difficult process of 'grasping' the world from a particular perspective'. Analysis of media discourse can benefit from a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as this provides a 'more thorough and systematic analysis of language' (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 1) than, for example, a content analysis (Machin and Mayr, 2012). The aim of the CDA can be described as 'to reveal buried ideology' (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 1). As van Dijk explains, 'Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context' (van Dijk, 2001b: 352). Given that the purpose of this study is to unearth potentially hidden ideologies within broadcast media discourse, a CDA would seem to be the appropriate choice.

A fundamental prerequisite of a CDA of broadcast news footage is the acceptance that the creation of news items 'is a heavily interpretative and constructive process, not simply a reporting of "the facts" (Fairclough, 2003: 85). Fairclough (1995) provides a clear framework for detailed critical discourse analysis of media content, given that he devises three questions which can be applied to 'any part of any text' (1995: 5). These questions are set out below:

1. How is the world (events, relationships, etc) represented?
2. What identities are set up for those involved in the programme or story (reporters, audiences, third parties, referred to or interviewed)?
3. What relationships are set up between those involved (e.g. reporter-audience, exert-audience or politician-audience relationships)?

<div align="right">(Fairclough, 1995: 5)</div>

Thus, Fairclough's work enables the analysis of any media output through the lens of these three questions; the researcher can, then, seek to identify the '*representations, identities* and *relationships'* (Fairclough, 1995: 5) within all excerpts.

In addition to this, Fairclough (1995) highlights the importance of language choice in what he considers to be the increasing conversationalisation of news broadcasts. A strategy such as conversationalisation may be regarded as reflecting a fundamental shift in power dynamics: it

precipitates a reduction in the authority of the reporter, placing him/her on a more equal footing with the viewer and thus breaking down the barriers between the journalist and the audience (Fairclough, 1995). Fairclough (1995) suggests that this does increase the accessibility of information for people and raises the status of everyday language but does not categorically conclude that they are not simply sophisticated mechanisms for better manipulation of the audience.

Regarding the analytical methods employed during the discourse analysis, a number of potential approaches are possible. Each of these is summarised below:

4.6.1 Conversation analysis

Originating in America in the 1960s (Hutchby, 2006) conversation analysis has historically focussed on everyday interactions between those of relatively equal status, though some research into news conversations has taken place (Fairclough (1995). Hutchby's (2006) analysis demonstrates the significance of the spoken word to the identification and understanding of bias in news items, but Fairclough (1995) argues that this approach does not necessarily provide an insight into how this bias might reflect or engender social change. Hutchby's (2006) conversation analysis of the discourse of politicians and journalists focusses on the interaction between interviewer and interviewee. Whilst such a dynamic does remain a relatively common feature of news broadcasts, the footage recorded for this study comprises other, more diverse constructs. As such, the methodological approach of conversation analysis is not considered appropriate for this research project.

4.6.2 Critical Linguistics and Social Semiotics

According to Richardson and Burridge (2008) social semiotics allows for an analysis of media discourse which links said discourse to wider social practices; indeed, a social semiotic approach is concerned with how the linguistic choices affect, and are affected by, social systems. Within this, language choice is viewed as an ideological choice (Fairclough, 1995), thus analysis of language from a social semiotic perspective can be employed to uncover ideological meanings. A simple illustration of this might be the manner in which the adoption of passive (as opposed to active) verb forms shifts emphasis and responsibility from one agent to another. Additionally, the location of the agent within the sentence can draw attention to it, or just as equally, allow for it to be elided (Fairclough, 1995).

Critical Linguistics is more concerned with vocabulary selection, and how this can illuminate the categorisation of, for example, different groups of individuals (Fairclough, 1995). This categorisation could be in terms of gender, race, or religion, etc.; Fairclough (1995) argues that through this process, people are assimilated to particular categories, attached to each of which there are certain characteristics.

A critical linguistic analysis considers the linguistic choices, as well as absences, along with apparent presumptions to uncover the otherwise concealed, unspecified meanings within a text. Whilst critical linguistics offers insight into the deeper implications of linguistic choices, Fairclough (1992) was critical of its failure to expose links between language choices, power and ideology. According to Machin and Mayr (2012) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) would seek to analyse this interrelationship, and to uncover veiled ideological and political convictions. CDA seeks to uncover these hidden ideologies in even the smallest aspects of language selection (Machin and Mayr, 2012).

Whilst potentially of use in this study, the failure of a critical linguistic analysis to uncover the link between language use and power renders it inappropriate.

4.6.3 Corpus Linguistics

According to Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) a corpus linguistics (CL) approach to textual analysis can mitigate a key criticism of the CDA approach, in that it allows for greater objectivity and is largely free of any unconscious bias on my behalf. Furthermore, CL has the potential to identify areas of significance (common collocations, or keywords for example) which may then be subject to deeper analysis (Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008). A further benefit of the CL approach for this study is that it can be helpful in identifying diachronic change (Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008) and may therefore serve to highlight alterations in the discourse between the three case studies. Given that framing includes selection but also exclusion, and the prominence given to stories or issues (Pan and Kosicki, 1993) both absence and presence are of significance in this analysis. Overall, the research attempts to analyse the shifting discourse in line with changing times and the political climate. However, a corpus analysis alone would not serve to link discourse practices to power relations and ideology. As such, it is not (alone) a suitable method for this project.

4.6.4 Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA)

According to Wodak and Meyer (2009: 3) a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) concerns itself with 'demystifying ideologies and power through the systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual)'. Communication in the form of a news broadcast is a combination of language, images, typography and sounds/music. An analysis of visuals along with language, a Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA) is concerned with how images, backgrounds, positioning, all things visual, work alongside language choices to create meaning. From this perspective, language and visual choices must be broken down and described explicitly; as a result of this process, it may be possible to ascertain the intention(s) of the creator though analysis of the choices made (Machin and Mayr, 2012). Van Leeuwen (2008: 292) highlights how 'social actors can, for instance, be represented as individuals or as 'types' and individually or collectively, and they can be functionalized (categorised by what they *do,* e.g. their profession or some kind of activity), or

classified – categorized by what they are deemed to *be* (e.g.by gender, class, ethnicity or nationality)' and that both verbal and visual communication work together to construct such identities. Additionally, as Machin and Mayr (2012) indicate, it may be the case, particularly in news items, that the images on screen accompanying a story may not actually accurately portray the story itself but may be employed to contribute in some other way (for example, by providing historical background). One of the key aims of MCDA is to question the seemingly natural, unbiased employment of linguistic and visual strategies, seeking to 'denaturalise' the underlying ideologies and representations they present (Machin and Mayr, 2012: 9) thus challenging social phenomena (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). The visual may perform in a similar way to the spoken word, in that it also constructs a reality for the audience (Van Leeuwen, 2008). This accords with Van Dijk (2001a) who argues that meaning in language is often implicit and is not immediately present in the text itself; Fairclough (2012) also highlights the lack of transparency in discourse and how it can influence power relations within any society.

However, as the focus of this study is to draw comparisons between the written text of political manifestos and the spoken language of news bulletins, then to conduct a detailed analysis of the latter, a MCDA has not been adopted.

4.6.5 The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)

As has been seen, the purpose of any CDA is to deconstruct the hidden power relations contained within language (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009; Jäger and Maier, 2009). Jäger (2001: 38) contends that 'discourses exercise power as they transport knowledge on which the collective and individual consciousness feeds. This emerging knowledge is...the formative action that shapes reality'. Wodak (2009) adds that language alone is not inherently powerful; its potency lies in its use by those in positions of power. Critical analysis of language use by those who have access to public dissemination of their message can uncover the manner in which inequalities continue to be legitimised. Perhaps as a consequence of its capacity for uncovering hitherto concealed inequalities, the Discourse-Historical Approach has been a great influence on the study of the discourse surrounding out-groups (KhosraviNik, 2010).

Further to this, Wodak and Meyer (2009) discuss the potential for language (vocabulary choices, grammatical structures) to conceal or obfuscate meaning. Hoey's (2005) theory of lexical priming highlights how common, frequently repeated collocations create assumptions in the mind of the receiver. Lacey (1998) notes that, in order for a message to be understood, the discourses contained within must be aligned with those with which the receiver of information is familiar. Accordingly, language is imbued with assumptions, presumptions, and significant absences, all of which serve to establish or maintain power relations, and transmit ideologies (Machin and Mayr, 2012).

The DHA is necessarily concerned with 'intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between…discourses' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009; 90). 'Intertextuality' (Wodak and Reisigl, 2009: 90) refers to the manner in which different texts are linked to one another, either though reference to similar events or by the use of the same topics or actors, or by the incorporation of similar arguments (Wodak and Reisigl, 2009). As this research is concerned with the intertextual relationships across time (2015 to 2017) and across different media (political manifestos and news broadcasts of two channels) the notion of intertextuality is of great importance.

Also of significant interest to this study is the concept of 'interdiscursivity' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 90) which considers there to be multifarious links between different discourses, given that a single discourse may be seen to be principally focussed on one particular topic. Jäger and Maier (2009: 35) also note that 'Different discourses are intimately entangled with one another'. The DHA considers the manner in which language of one subject may correspond with that of others. For example, the discourse of employment may also contain discourses from other topics such as welfare or gender. This notion that, whilst different, discourses are nevertheless linked to one another, is known as 'interdiscursivity' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 90). Accordingly, no particular discourse is necessarily fixed; they flow and merge. Jäger and Maier (2009) point out that an individual text is of little consequence; a discourse, however, 'with its recurring contents, symbols and strategies...has sustained effects' (Jäger and Maier, 2009: 38). It follows that a temporal investigation into, and analysis of, the topics which align with the discourse of immigration may lead to a deeper understanding of the nature of the representation of the out group.

The above delineates the initial stage of the DHA, one in which the subject of a specific discourse is identified; subsequently, 'discursive strategies are investigated' (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 93). Reisigl and Wodak (2009:93) propose five questions that can be asked at this stage:

1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes, and actions named and referred to linguistically?
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?
4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments exposed?
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they intensified or mitigated?

From these five questions, five discursive strategies are outlined. Discursive strategies are considered to be 'practices...adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal' (Reisgl and Wodak 2009: 94). The five strategies are: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization and intensification (Reisgl and Wodak, 2009). Following the initial content analysis, the data led me to focus on the discursive strategies of nomination and predication as a means to uncovering the representation of immigrants. Further information about these two strategies is outlined below. It is noted that van Leeuwen (2008) points to the importance of the exclusion of social actors; the use of the nominal 'immigration' is a choice which excludes the immigrants themselves. This exclusion serves to 'suppress' the social actor (van Leeuwen, 2008: 30). It may be that the exclusion is present as the audience are presumed to know who is being referred to, or it may be that the exclusion is designed to reduce the likelihood of a sympathetic response to those concerned (van Leeuwen, 2008).

According to Riesigl and Wodak (2009) nomination and predication are two of five discursive strategies employed to achieve a particular aim, whether that be political, social or psychological. Detailed clarification of the precise nature and scope of these two strategies is described in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1 Nomination and Predication (Reisgl and Wodak, 2009: 94)

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
nomination	Discursive construction of social actors, objects/phenomena/ events and processes/ actions	- Membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc. - Tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synechdoches (*pars pro toto, totum pro parte)* - Verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions, etc.
predication	Discursive qualification of social actors, objects phenomena, events/processes and actions (more or less positively or negatively)	- Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) - Explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns - Collocations - Explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) - Allusions, evocations, presuppositions/implicatures, etc. - Topoi (formal or more content-related)

(Reisgl and Wodak, 2009: 94)

Following the initial content analysis, it was possible for the researcher to determine which aspects of the above strategies would be best applied to investigate the representations of immigrants in the data

concerned. Given that the discussions surrounding migration were, in 2016 and 2017, interwoven with election footage and not necessarily confined to stand-alone news items, the decision was taken to analyse all instances of verbal language referring to immigrants and/or immigration, looking specifically at:

Nomination – membership categorization and anthroponyms

Predication – explicit predicates and collocations, recurrent topoi

Predication and nomination involve 'the labelling of social actors, positively or negatively, appreciatively or deprecatorily' (Wodak, 2018: 36) Each of these strategies is defined below.

Membership categorisation and anthroponyms: analysis of the terms which are used to refer to particular people or groups of people. As all individuals can fit into numerous categories, the choice adopted by the speaker has implications (Shrikant, 2020).

Explicit predicates and collocations: analysis of 'the lexical items [which] tend to co-occur' with a particular word or words (Bloor and Bloor, 2007: 130). Repeated use of specific collocations and predicates can expose positive or negative representations of groups under discussion.

Topoi: analysis of 'argumentation schemes in which an implicit conclusion is presupposed by the premise' (Hart, 2010: 10). The use of a particular topoi typically leads the audience to a widely assumed appropriate reaction; for example, where the topos of abuse is employed, the appropriate action would be to prevent the abuse from recurring, or action should be taken against the abuser. Analysis of the use of topoi illustrates the argument and conclusion which the receiver is being persuaded to accept. Wodak (2018) provides an overview of topoi along with the required action each implies:

> **Topos of Burdening** - if an institution is burdened by a specific problem, then one should act to diminish it
>
> **Topos of Reality** - tautologically infers that as reality is as it is, a particular action should be performed
>
> **Topos of Numbers** – if sufficient numerical/statistical evidence is given, a specific action should be performed
>
> **Topos of History** – because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation

Topos of Authority – if one refers to somebody in a position of authority, then the action is legitimate

Topos of Threat - if specific dangers or threats are identified, one should do something about them

Topos of Definition - if a person or thing is designated X, s/he should carry the qualities/traits/attributes consistent with the meaning of X

Topos of Justice - if persons/actions/situations are equal in specific respects, they should be treated/dealt with in the same way

Topos of Urgency – decisions or actions need to be drawn/found/done very quickly because of an external, important and unchangeable event beyond one's own reach and responsibility

(Wodak, 2018: 36)

Hart's (2010) work focusses specifically upon media representation of immigrants and asylum seekers, and outlines commonly used topoi and associations within this particular discourse:

Topos	Association/premise
Burden	- The out-group need to be supported by the in-group
Character	- The out-group have certain undesirable characteristics
Crime	- The out-group are criminals
Culture	- The out-group have different norms and values to the in-group and are unable to assimilate
Danger	- The out-group are dangerous
Disadvantage	- The out-group bring no advantage/are of no use to the in-group
Disease	- The out-group are dirty and carry infectious diseases
Displacement	- The out-group will eventually outnumber and/or dominate the in-group and they will get privileged access to the limited socio-economic resources over and above the in-group
Exploitation	- The out-group exploit the welfare system of the in-group
Finance	- The out-group present some cost to the in-group

(Hart, 2010: 67)

These topoi frequently operate intertextually to engender a fully constructed representation of those under discussion; hence, Hart (2010) connects those topoi which are often found to interact and which subsequently serve to create a powerful, negative portrayal of the out-group. The first connected topoi are disadvantage, burden, finance and displacement (DBFD), whereby the out-group brings no advantage, are considered useless, and cannot make a positive contribution to society. They are a burden on social welfare systems (NHS, housing, schools) and likely to cost the country economically (Hart, 2010). The second topoi, that of exploitation (E), stands alone, and represents the out-group as cheaters, looking to exploit the system belonging to the in-group. This typically relates to claiming benefits with no desire to work, benefits fraud, or false housing claims, for example (Hart, 2010). Thirdly, Hart (2010) groups the topoi of culture, character and crime (CCC), in which immigrants are presented as culturally inadequate (for example, in terms of English language skills) lazy or criminal – these topoi can operate to confirm others and cut across much of the discourse. For example, those who have inadequate language skills cannot, therefore, be considered useful to society and consequently constitute a burden. The final grouping is of the topoi of danger, displacement and disease (DDD); this can be in relation to current immigration practices/policies being represented as threatening to a stable society, or the notion that British culture is under threat. This could also include the argument that the number of immigrants is so high, the out-group will soon dominate the in-group (Hart, 2010). Following a thematic analysis of the data, the recurrent topoi will be identified and grouped according to Hart's (2010) system. This will enable a more effective identification of similarities in the discourse across the various different texts involved.

In order to uncover the discursive strategies employed during the three case studies, the Discourse-Historical Analysis asked the following questions:

- What strategies of membership categorisation and anthroponyms are employed in the media discourse surrounding immigration?
- What predicates are used?
- Which lexical items frequently collocate with immigrant/migrant/immigration/migration?
- What are the most common topoi present in the data?

The analysis concerned itself with the explicit nominations attributed to persons identified by the bulletins as immigrants. The predication analysis considered all of those recorded instances where the immigrant was spoken about in the active sense. Selected footage was analysed, and all data recorded in spreadsheets as set out in Bryman (2016).

4.7 Stage 5: Assessment of Compliance of BBC 10 O'clock News and ITV News at Ten with current legislation

According to current legislation (Ofcom, 2019a), broadcasters must ensure 'due impartiality' within news broadcasts. Whilst permitted a degree of judgement as to length of time to devote to differing viewpoints, for example, more specific guidance is outlined:

> In dealing with matters of major political and industrial controversy and major matters relating to current public policy an appropriately wide range of significant views must be included and given due weight in each programme… Broadcasters should not give undue prominence to the views and opinions of particular persons or bodies
>
> (Ofcom, 2019a: 31-32)

Analysis of the data generated in stages 1-4 should allow for testing of each broadcaster's adherence to the legislation as set out above.

4.8 Data Selection and Recording Procedure

Directly applicable to this particular study, where political events within the UK drove the evaluation of the significance of the three time periods, is Bryman's (2016: 287) observation that 'The decision about dates is more or less dictated by the occurrence of a phenomenon'. As such, purposive sampling was conducted, based on the relevance of the texts to the answering of the research question (Krippendorf, 2004); consequently, the texts selected for analysis are not representative of a larger body of units, they are the entire population (Krippendorf, 2004). Therefore, these three time periods (which occurred over a two-year period between May 2015 and June 2017) have been selected for analysis due to their political significance: broadcast news coverage during the week preceding the UK General Election on the 7th of May 2015, the week prior to the UK referendum on membership of the EU on June 23rd 2016, and the week preceding the UK General Election on 8th of June 2017. An attempt is made to link these analyses with the sociocultural and discourse practices of the time. The principal focus of the research is textual analysis, but sociocultural and discourse practices will be drawn upon in order to contextualise the analyses and make sense of what is found. The analyses begin with a content analysis, designed to identify key themes emerging from the texts; areas found to be of high significance are then examined in greater depth. The aim of the study is to ascertain whether, and if so, how, the broadcast news discourse surrounding immigration altered between the time periods in question, and whether or not the broadcasts exhibit an adherence to a particular political ideology.

4.8.1 Sampling and methods

Research indicates that media coverage of elections and political parties has the potential to influence voter behaviour (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Norris et al., 1999). Phillips (2020) indicates that, given the unusual nature of the EU Referendum ballot, this influence was potentially greater. Additionally, it is understood that political parties invest heavily in ensuring ample media coverage in the final few days of any campaign with the aim of benefitting from any last-minute swell in interest amongst voters (Hofstetter and Buss, 1980). Hofstetter and Buss (1980: 24) refer to this as the 'accelerated finish'.

This research project constitutes a comparative analysis of three case studies: broadcast news coverage from the BBC 10 O'clock News and ITV News at Ten during the UK General Election 2015, the EU Referendum 2016 and the UK General Election 2017. Despite significant rises in news consumption on social media, TV news continues to be the most frequently used source of news (Ofcom, 2019b) with 77% of those aged 16+ citing TV as their most commonly used platform for news. Of TV channels watched for news, the BBC is the most popular at 58%, followed by ITV at 40% (Ofcom, 2019c). Specifically in terms of viewership, BBC News at Ten's audience is typically close to four million, and it ranks on the top 50 most-watched shows (BARB, 2020). Thus, television broadcasts were chosen due to their sustained position as the most used sources of news in the UK, whilst the channels to be recorded were selected based on viewership – a direct indicator of influence – and ownership, with one being the main public service broadcaster and the other being the largest commercial competitor. Below is a brief description of the timing and nature of the case studies which were conducted.

As the cases under scrutiny are clearly defined, a strategy of non-random sampling (Deacon at al., 2010) was applied with regards to data selection. The three case studies were selected on the grounds that, aside from their enormous social, economic and political significance, they are all UK national ballots, and they each occurred within 12–13 months of one another, making the time lapse between each approximately 1 year. Footage from the last week of campaigning was chosen due to the importance of this period to any electoral campaign, as evidenced by Hofstetter and Buss' (1980: 24) 'accelerated finish'. The similarity of the nature of the cases, the manner in which they are politically linked, and the period of time between each allows for valid comparisons to be drawn.

Case study 1 – General Election 2015

The 2015 General Election was set for Thursday 7th May 2015 (UK Parliament, 2014). Parliament was dissolved 38 days before this date, on Monday 30th March 2015. Previously, the time period between dissolution of Parliament and the election date was 17 days but this was amended in April 2014 (Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013).

Case study 2 – EU Referendum 2016

The date for the EU Referendum was set by the then UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, on 20th February 2016; voting took place on 23rd June 2016.

Case study 3 – General Election 2017

The 'snap' General Election of 2017 was announced on 18th April 2017; the date of the ballot was confirmed as June 8th 2017. Parliament was therefore dissolved on Wednesday 3rd May, following the same procedure as in 2015.

4.8.2 Recording procedure

Channels/programmes to be recorded were selected based on three key factors. Firstly, the nature of funding. The BBC is the UK's public service broadcaster, funded by the television licence fee, whilst ITV is the major commercial competitor. Secondly, viewership: this is a direct indicator of audience reach and, therefore, influence. As Philo, Briant and Donald (2013: 51) observe, BBC1 and ITV are 'the most popular channels with the highest viewing figures'. The final element influencing selection is comparability. According to the Glasgow Media Group (1995) equitable comparisons regarding, for example, the frequency with which an item is discussed, can only be made when the broadcasts themselves are of a similar length. Given these parameters, recordings were made of late evening news broadcasts on BBC1 and ITV. This is due to the fact that BBC News broadcasts at 6pm and 10pm have the highest audience figures, on average 4.5m and 4.3m respectively (BBC, 2014) but that in terms of length of broadcast, the ITV News at Ten is most suitably comparable. Furthermore, whilst the 6pm BBC bulletin tends to have a marginally larger audience, it was decided that the final broadcast of each day would be analysed, as this is more likely to provide a definitive summation of the day's (selection of) news, and allows for the time differentials during weekends. It is also notable that, on weekdays, both channels broadcast the late evening news simultaneously – 10pm. Although BBC News has the largest viewing figures, so can be considered the greatest of the agenda setters, ITV has a considerable audience share (BBC, 2014) and is effectively the main commercial competitor. The study will therefore consider ITV News at Ten (ordinarily 10pm on weekdays) as a relevant comparison to the public service broadcaster.

In order to provide sufficient data for comparison, one week of footage prior to each national ballot was recorded. Whilst there were, inevitably, other potentially relevant broadcasts outside of the official news bulletins (for example, live televised debates, political forums such as *BBC Question Time*) these were not included in the analysis as they would not ensure the same comparability, and this could negatively impact upon external validity and replicability. A live televised debate precludes the notion of selection, whilst other broadcasts (for example, BBC Question Time or Panorama) may not

have a corresponding item on the other channels, thus compromising any comparative analysis. Therefore, this project focussed solely on the evening news bulletins as outlined above.

Recordings were made with the support of a technician within the University. An internet-based Protocol television (IPTV) system was employed, which enabled us to record streamed broadcasts. In accordance with a programming list I created, the technician set up a timer to automatically record all necessary broadcasts. These were then stored as MP4 files and transferred to a server to which I had access. From there, I was able to copy the footage on to an external hard drive, which meant that the footage was easily accessible to me. The data was played back using Windows Media Player.

Initial selection of relevant footage (based on frequency issue of immigration is mentioned/headline/order of importance in programme/length of item in relation to other items) was conducted within 12 months of recording due to storage issues relating to such large quantities of data. This was done manually without the use of a software, and the procedure followed is set out below.

One week of footage prior to each event was recorded, using the timing system set up by the technician. As this tends to be when news coverage begins to focus increasingly heavily on the ballot, this provided sufficiently rich data for analysis. Recordings were made of BBC News at Ten and ITV News at Ten. The choice of broadcast times was determined by it being the final broadcast of the day, and therefore potentially the most refined and representative summary of the day's key news stories. It also provides the nearest possible comparison for analysis, an important aspect of the selection process (Glasgow Media Group, 1995). At weekends, shorter bulletins (usually around 15 minutes) are broadcast at varying times. Where possible, the final broadcast of the day was retained. However, due to varying broadcast times, and length of broadcast, weekend bulletins were considered less comparable, and have therefore been excluded from the study. Consequently, all broadcasts were of the 10pm news bulletin on both channels. Table 4.2 below provides details of the initial broadcasts selected for inclusion in the study.

Table 4.2 Table identifying initial dates of programmes selected for inclusion in the study

	Initial recordings		
Year	**Date**	**Day of week**	**Channel**
2015	30th April	Thursday	BBC/ITV
	1st May	Friday	BBC/ITV
	4th May	Monday	BBC/ITV
	5th May	Tuesday	BBC/ITV
	6th May	Wednesday	BBC/ITV
2016	14th June	Tuesday	BBC/ITV
	15th June	Wednesday	BBC/ITV
	20th June	Monday	BBC/ITV
	21st June	Tuesday	BBC/ITV
	22nd June	Wednesday	BBC/ITV
2017	1st June	Thursday	BBC/ITV
	2nd June	Friday	BBC/ITV
	5th June	Monday	BBC/ITV
	6th June	Tuesday	BBC/ITV
	7th June	Wednesday	BBC/ITV

The primary analysis involved selecting footage for further analysis; the editing and selection of appropriate news items. The items selected were:

- Items concerning GE2015, EU ref, GE 2017 directly – where the issue was the primary subject of the broadcast;
- Items concerning immigration, where immigration was the primary subject of the discussion;
- Items concerning EU migration, where EU migration was the primary subject of discussion;
- Items concerned with the issue of 'security' which conflated the issue with immigration/EU migration

Items not selected included those concerning terrorism, extremism, refugees, asylum seekers. These were excluded as the study is solely concerned with immigration and those classified as immigrants by the broadcast news.

Once the item had been identified as being of relevance to the study, the footage was edited from the opening statement, frequently that of a journalist in the studio. An example of the edit list from 2017 BBC footage is below to illustrate (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Excerpt of edit list (2017)

File name	Time IN	Additional info	Time OUT	Additional Info
BBC10 1.6.2017	**01.55**	NR: 'also tonight, on the campaign trail'	**02.02**	NR: 'manage the Brexit process'
	15.11	NR: 'now, the European union'	**23.18**	NR: 'the latest on the campaign'
	28.00	*NR: 'Now during the election campaign'	**31.25**	*Corr: 'Kamal Ahmed, BBC News'
BBC10 2.6.2017	**01.07**	Corr: 'Tonight at 10, we're at the university'	**02.22**	Corr: 'the last election 2 years ago'
	03.34	Corr: 'Good evening, we're at the university'	**19.16**	Corr: 'John Pinar, BBC News, York'

*NR = Newsreader (in studio) Corr = Correspondent (on location)

This detailed edit list was then sent to the technician, who used this to then reduce the footage so that it only included discussion of either the ballot in question or migration. 'Freemake Video Converter' (www.freemake.com) was employed by the technician at this stage; using this software, footage can be edited to retain only the headlines and items relating to GE 2015, GE 2017, the EU Referendum 2016, immigration/immigrants. Once the initial edits were made, the footage was once again stored on the server; I then transferred it to an external hard drive for further examination. Additionally, at this juncture, a primary analysis took place. All data was recorded in Excel spreadsheets for ease of analysis, and also to enable the production of data charts and tables.

Table 4.4 details the excerpts which were selected for further analysis following the initial editing of the footage.

Table 4.4 Footage selected for further analysis after initial edit

Year	Date	Day of week	Channel	Minutes selected for analysis	Subject of footage
Initial content analysis - first stage downsampling				

Year	Date	Day of week	Channel	Minutes selected for analysis	Subject of footage
2015	30th April	Thursday	BBC	22	Election (19 mins) Migrant crisis (3 mins)
			ITV	7	Election
	1st May	Friday	BBC	14	Election
			ITV	12	Election
	4th May	Monday	BBC	14	Election (11 mins) Migrant crisis (3 mins)
			ITV	5	Election
	5th May	Tuesday	BBC	24	Election (22 mins) Migrant crisis (2 mins)
			ITV	20	Election (17 mins) Migrant ciris (3 mins)
	6th May	Wednesday	BBC	24	Election
			ITV	25	Election
2016	14th June	Tuesday	BBC	7.5	EU Referendum
			ITV	0	No relevant footage
	15th June	Wednesday	BBC	19	EU Referendum (2 items)
			ITV	6	EU Referendum
	20th June	Monday	BBC	15	EU Referendum
			ITV	15	EU Referendum
	21st June	Tuesday	BBC	21	EU Referendum and televised debate
			ITV	15	EU Referendum and televised debate
	22nd June	Wednesday	BBC	18	EU Referendum
			ITV	19	EU Referendum
2017	1st June	Thursday	BBC	12	Election
			ITV	11	Election
	2nd June	Friday	BBC	17	Election (intermingled with US and Paris Climate Talks)
			ITV	9	Election
	5th June	Monday	BBC	0	
			ITV	10	Election and security
	6th June	Tuesday	BBC	15	Election
			ITV	13	Election
	7th June	Wednesday	BBC	18	Election
			ITV	17	Election

The final editing stage was to select the data which would inform the CDA. The CDA was concerned with nomination and predication, and therefore it was vital that the footage selected be wholly relevant to this objective. The selection process involved a rewatching of the footage from the refined edits (see Table 4.4) and the noting of all nominations (and associated predications) in which immigrant citizens were social actors in the statement. Table 4.5 details the number of nominations which were identified and recorded for analysis in each year.

Table 4.5 Number of nominations identified for analysis

Final dataset - nominations		
Year	Channel	Nominations
2015	BBC	66
	ITV	17
2016	BBC	73
	ITV	14
2017	BBC	10
	ITV	10

The process of identifying the nominations required a detailed rewatching of the refined edits, noting every instance in which a reference was made to the person(s) who are considered to be immigrating; this could be any nomination: 'migrant', 'he/she/they' 'foreign workers', for example. Once a nomination had been identified as referring to an immigrating citizen, the language occurring with said nomination was also logged. The data was recorded in Excel spreadsheets.

An illustration of the nominations would be:

A) '…when you've got numbers running at 330,000 net globally' (Boris Johnson, Vote Leave and later Prime Minister, on ITV News, 2016)

In this instance, 'numbers' would be listed as a nomination. Similarly:

B) 'migrants crowding across the continent' (BBC journalist on BBC News 2016)

In this instance, 'migrants' would be the nomination.

From this, it was possible to gain an early understanding of whether nominations were typically used to represent immigrating citizens positively or negatively (Wodak, 2018). For example, use of the nomination 'migrant' is considered to engender less sympathy amongst audiences than use of the nomination 'refugee'.

However, greater depth of understanding was possible through analysis of the accompanying predications. Wodak (2018) indicates that predications are the words which run alongside the nomination in any statement. In statement A, the predication would be 'running at 330,000 net globally' and in B, 'crowding across the continent'. In both statements, there is a degree of negative representation; statement A implies that the numbers are too high and potentially out of control (they are 'running'). Meanwhile, statement B indicates two aspects of interest. Firstly, the migrants are 'crowding', which again suggests numbers are too high and out of control; it presents a suggestion of overcrowding and general unpleasantness. Secondly, the use of 'across the continent' links this to

being a European problem or, indeed, a problem with the free movement of people within European Union member states.

From this, these predications could then be mapped to Hart's(2010) topoi, in order to provide a more quantitative understanding of the dominant themes and messages broadcast from the selected footage. Both statement A and B align with the topoi of danger, displacement and disease (DDD). This category indicates language which suggests immigration may threaten the stability of the host country, or threaten the cultural fabric. It also potentially includes the argumentation strategy that the number of people is extremely high, and has the potential to dominate (Hart, 2010). Once the predication strategies had been analysed and aligned with relevant topoi, it was possible to determine which topoi were most frequently employed, both across the three time periods, and also across the two channels.

According to Bryman (2016) there may be a number of processes involved in the analysis of data. The initial analysis involved identifying issue salience: how many minutes were devoted to each of the items, and the running order in which they appeared. According to Schlesinger (1978), the two factors of duration and running order are fundamental indicators of an item's importance on the agenda. This included the headlines, and then the main bulletin. These aspects were noted in the edit lists and used to inform the later findings.

In selection of footage for deeper analysis, sampling must be objective and systematic. As Bryman (2016) states, the selection process must ensure that data designated for analysis is representative of a larger population. This is vital in terms of ensuring the validity of the results (Deacon et al., 2010). In the initial selection stage, weekend broadcasts were rejected, as these tend to be of varying length, varying times of broadcasts and are less comparable.

Having removed weekend broadcasts from the sample, it was important to ensure that the footage selected provided comparability (Glasgow Media Group, 1995). The occurrence of all ballots on Thursdays, as per UK custom, helped to ensure comparative footage. In order to achieve a spread of dates, two days from the week prior to each ballot were selected. The Thursday and Friday broadcasts were chosen, as they are nearest the following week so more likely to contain relevant footage. However, in the case of the EU referendum, on the Thursday and Friday prior to the referendum, the murder of MP Jo Cox led to a suspension of all campaigning; consequently, this footage was not appropriate for analysis. Thus, the Tues and Weds of the same week were chosen for the 2016 footage. For all three case studies, regarding the footage in the actual week of the ballot, the Tues and Weds were selected as these are the final broadcasts before polling.

4.8.3 Selection of written political material

With regards to the written literature, the manifestos of the main political parties within England were selected; these are:

- The Conservative Party
- The Labour Party
- The Liberal Democrats
- The Green Party
- The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

From these manifestos, the section relating to (and often entitled) immigration, was selected for analysis. These sections were discrete and therefore the process of downsampling here was straightforward. Additionally, this satisfied the need for comparability (Glasgow Media Group, 1995). One exception to this should be noted: in 2017, the Green Party manifesto did not address immigration (or migration) as an independent issue. Consequently, this manifesto was excluded for the purposes of the content analysis, although the absence of immigration as a key issue should be noted.

Having selected the relevant sections of the manifestos, an initial quantitative analysis was undertaken. Firstly, this was designed to ascertain the initial importance of the issue as indicated by where it appeared in the manifesto (was it, for example, the first issue, or the eighth?). Secondly, it also identified what percentage of the manifesto was devoted to immigration, also an indicator of relative importance.

The second stage of the analysis involved a more detailed reading of each of the immigration sections, and coding in relation to dominant themes. This was done employing an abductive approach, whereby the data drove the conclusions. Two examples of the coding which took place are below.

Example 1

'We will tackle criminality and abuse of free movement' (Conservative Party manifesto, 2015)

'We need much stronger action to stop illegal immigration' (Labour Party manifesto, 2015)

In the two statements above, immigration (and, therefore the immigrant) is linked to criminality. Thus, a category of 'Immigrants as law breakers' was created, and all similar instances – references to sham marriages or abuse of the system were recorded under this theme.

Example 2

'We recognise that large-scale immigration has placed strains on some local communities and services' (Liberal Democrat Manifesto, 2017)

'Immigration has placed huge pressure on public services and housing' (UKIP manifesto, 2017)

'…we have communities that are divided, often along racial or religious lines' (Conservative manifesto, 2017)

These statements (and others similar) prompted the creation of a theme which was named, 'Immigrants as a burden or threat'. This theme incorporated all statements which asserted (or implied) that migration was responsible for pressure on housing or school places, or presented any kind of challenge to British values and/or culture.

Following an initial reading of each manifesto section, and the establishment of relevant themes, a detailed rereading was conducted to ensure themes were accurately constructed, and that no examples had been incorrectly coded or omitted. The multiple sweeps of the data was conducted to ensure the validity of the coding.

The official EU referendum campaigns, *Vote Leave* and *StrongerIn*, did not produce manifestos; consequently, this raised issues of comparability. Therefore, a decision had to be made regarding literature for analysis given the lack of a discrete statement or section on immigration, as were available from the manifestos. Regarding the referendum literature, for example, it was not possible to clearly establish issue salience in relation to other issues due to the lack of a coherent manifesto with clearly delineated sections. Thus, it was decided that the data were not suitable for analysis due to the lack of comparability.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has set out the stages of the research methodology. Details of data selection, sampling, analysis, and comparison have been provided along with justification of decisions made. The outcomes of these analyses will be presented in the subsequent chapters.

4.10 Ethical considerations

As the study concerns analysis of data which is already in the public domain, there were no significant ethical issues which impeded its approval by the University Ethics Committee. Ethics approval for the study was granted.

Chapter 5: The Findings of the Research

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the key findings of the analysis of the selected texts across each of the specified time periods. In order to map the television news content and discourse to the relevant political ideologies, a thematic analysis of the 2015 and 2017 major political parties' manifestos in England is conducted, identifying the major representations of immigrants and immigration within these publications. Following this, an initial content analysis of the television news broadcasts determines issue salience for immigration across BBC and ITV News at Ten. This is followed by a breakdown of the sourcing patterns uncovered for each channel, and an analysis of the diversity of voices given airtime on the issue of immigration. Subsequently, the results of a detailed inductive thematic analysis draw out the major themes of the discussion around immigration, and how these altered over the time period under analysis. Finally, there is a critical discourse analysis of footage excerpts which considers the nomination and predication strategies adopted by the two broadcasters during each time period selected for scrutiny. A summary of key findings is provided for ease of reference.

5.2 Thematic analysis of political manifestos

The findings of the content analysis of the political manifestos of 2015 and 2017 is provided below. The first stage of this analysis involved ascertaining the quantity of coverage each party had devoted to the issue of immigration in the respective manifestos. This was best illustrated as a percentage of the entire manifesto, and is illustrated in Table 5.1 below:

Table 5.1 issue salience and prominence by political party manifesto (2015 and 2017)

Manifesto (2015)	Total pages*	Pages devoted to immigration	Proportion of manifesto	Title of immigration section
UKIP	76	4	5.3%	IMMIGRATION
Cons	84	2.5	3%	Controlled immigration that benefits Britain
Green	86	1.5	1.7%	Migration
Labour	86	1	1.2%	Controlling immigration with fair rules
LibDem	158	1	0.6%	Restoring confidence in our borders

Manifesto (2017)	Total pages*	Pages devoted to immigration	Proportion of manifesto	Title of immigration section
UKIP	64	3	4.7%	Fair, balanced migration
Cons	88	1.5	1.7%	A COUNTRY THAT COMES TOGETHER
Labour	128	1.5	1.2%	IMMIGRATION

Lib Dem	97	1	1%	Immigration and asylum
Green	26	0	0%	n/a

*A 'page' denotes 1 page of text in each manifesto. The text density of the manifestos varies significantly, so the number of words per page differs from one manifesto to another. For example, one page of the 2015 Conservative manifesto is equivalent to more than two pages of the Liberal Democrat equivalent.

A number of points can be drawn from the above table. Notably, all parties (with the exception of the Liberal Democrats, for whom there was an increase between the two manifestos) devoted a smaller percentage to the issue of immigration in 2017 than in 2015. The greatest reduction was by the Conservative party, whose coverage went from 3% of the total manifesto in 2015 to 1.7% in 2017, which equates to a reduction of 43%. Secondly, in both years, coverage of the issue was greatest for UKIP (highest on both counts) and, despite the reduction, the Conservatives. The parties which included less discussion of immigration as a proportion of their overall manifesto were, in 2015, Labour and the Liberal Democrats and, in 2017, the Liberal Democrats and Labour. It is important to note that the Green Party manifesto did not include a section on any specific form of migration in 2017 so was excluded from the analysis.

The second stage of the content analysis sought to ascertain key themes from the manifestos with regard to the issue of immigration. Following an initial coding of each manifesto, minor themes were grouped together into macro themes and a tally chart was drafted. These are illustrated for 2015 in Table 5.2 below:

Table 5.2 Manifesto key themes by political party (2015)

Theme	Conservative	Labour	Lib Dem	UKIP	Green	Total references
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	24	11	3	19	3	**60**
Immigrants as a burden/threat	24	9	3	18	2	**56**
Immigrants as criminals	17	3	1	9	1	**31**
Immigrants as victims/exploited	0	5	1	0	10	**16**
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	8	0	0	7	0	**15**
'British people' references	5	0	0	6	0	**11**
Criticism of immigration system	0	1	2	7	1	**11**
Immigrants as contributors	1	2	1	2	3	**9**
Criticism of other parties	1	1	0	7	0	**9**
Other	0	1	1	4	3	**9**
Employers/institutions require scrutiny	0	1	2	1	0	**4**

Table 5.2 highlights a considerable difference between the key themes of each party. What can be seen is that:

- the Conservative manifesto is largely concerned with the need for immigration to be controlled or cut, immigrants are frequently presented as a burden or threat (to welfare, public services, housing, job security or wages) or are referred to through the lens of criminality. There are also significant references to the British people and immigration is frequently discussed in terms of numbers/statistics.

- Labour's main theme is also of the need for controlling and/or cutting immigration. Their manifesto also focusses on immigrants as a burden or threat, but also looks at the issue through the lens of immigrants as being exploited (in this case, mainly by unscrupulous employers).

- The Liberal Democrats also covered the same issues of cutting and controlling immigration, and issues of criminality, albeit with far fewer references than the Conservatives. In addition to this, they highlighted equally weaknesses in the immigration system and the need to scrutinise employers.

- UKIP's manifesto is likewise focussed on cutting and/or controlling immigration, viewing immigrants as a burden or threat, and presenting them as law breakers. UKIP's manifesto was also notable for its frequent criticism of other parties and politicians, as well as the immigration system, and made repeated references to immigration through the lens of numbers/statistics.

- The Green Party manifesto adopted a very different approach to all other manifestos, presenting immigrants as the victims of various forms of exploitation. Whilst there was a focus on how immigrants contribute to the UK, there was also an emphasis on the need to reduce immigration.

Whilst the prominent issues for all parties (with the exception of the Green Party) were broadly the same, it is clear that 24 references to the need to further reduce or control immigration (the Conservatives) is not equivalent to the Liberal Democrats' 3 mentions of the same issue, as the former manifesto is dominated by this theme (along with themes of threat, burden and criminality), whereas the latter contains alternative content as balance and does not emphasise so strongly on one aspect of the discussion. What can be seen here is the Conservatives and UKIP more highly focussed on the negative aspects of immigration, and the representation of immigration as a burden or threat to British people, with Labour presenting a (partially) more nuanced, balanced view of positive and negative aspects of the issue. Similarly, the Liberal Democrat manifesto appears to offer more balance, whilst the Green Party uses an altogether different lens.

Overall, in 2015, the three most frequently cited themes across the manifestos were:

- The need to control or reduce immigration

- Immigrants as a burden or threat

- Immigrants as law breakers

These three issues are broken down below by political party. The charts illustrate the number of times each theme was alluded to.

Figure 5.1 'Immigration needs to be controlled or cut' by political party (2015)

Figure 5.2 'Immigrants as a burden or threat' by political party (2015)

Figure 5.3 'Immigrants as law breakers' by political party (2015)

Immigrants as law breakers - 2015 by political party

This summary of the key issues highlights two key points. Firstly, all top three themes concern negative representations of immigration for the UK. Secondly, these themes, whilst mentioned in every manifesto, are predominantly those of the Conservative Party and UKIP. Labour demonstrates a firm acceptance of these themes as relevant to the debate, whilst the Liberal Democrats and Green Party align significantly less with these perspectives.

As reported earlier, 2017 saw parties tend to reduce the amount of coverage of the issue of immigration in their manifestos. One significant alteration was the Green Party chose not to include a section on immigration. As a result, it was interesting to consider if the key themes had also been adjusted. The results of the 2017 content analysis are presented below:

Table 5.3 Manifesto key themes by political party (2017)

Theme (revised)	Conservative	Labour	Lib Dem	UKIP	Total references
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	13	0	1	11	**25**
Immigrants as a burden/threat	3	1	3	10	**17**
Immigrants as contributors	1	8	7	1	**17**
Criticism of immigration system	0	1	2	3	**12**
Immigrants as criminals	4	0	0	7	**11**
Immigrants as victims/exploited	0	6	3	0	**9**
British people references	3	0	0	4	**7**
Criticism of other parties	0	0	0	5	**5**
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	2	0	0	2	**4**
Employers/institutions require scrutiny	0	4	0	0	**4**
Other	0	1	1	2	**4**

Table 5.3 demonstrates that, for the Conservatives and UKIP, the issues remained largely the same in 2017: immigration needs to be controlled or reduced, immigrants are involved in criminal activity, and immigrants are a burden on public services and housing, or a threat to job security, wages and culture. However, the Conservative manifesto continues to make references to 'the British people', something also found in UKIP's literature. UKIP contained a high number of criticisms of the system and other parties, also seen in 2015.

By contrast, Labour's focus shifted considerably, highlighting the ways in which immigrants contribute to society, and how they may be exploited, aligning this with the need to scrutinise employers. Similarly, the Liberal Democrats concerned themselves with the contributions immigrants make, and the ways in which they can be exploited, but also made notable references to the threat or burden they present. Neither of these parties continued to argue that it is essential immigration be controlled or cut, and there were no references to illegality in either manifesto.

Overall, in 2017, the three most frequently cited themes across the manifestos were:

- The need to control or reduce immigration
- Immigrants as a burden or threat
- Immigrants as contributors

These three issues are broken down below by political party:

Figure 5.4 'Immigration needs to be controlled or cut' by political party (2017)

Figure 5. 5 'Immigrants as a burden/threat' by political party (2017)

Figure 5.1 'Immigrants as contributors' by political party (2017)

The 2017 charts demonstrate a degree of shift in emphasis from 2015. Firstly, it is clear that, although the two dominant themes have remained the same, UKIP is responsible for a larger proportion of these occurrences and the Labour Party engages very little (if at all) in these themes. The most striking change is that the third most commonly cited theme has become that of immigrants as contributors to British society, one which was not commonly adopted in 2015. This theme is a fundamentally positive representation and is largely the output of the Labour and Liberal Democrat manifestos.

5.3 Initial content analysis of broadcast media footage.

An initial content analysis of the systematically selected media footage was conducted to ascertain the following:

How does the coverage of immigration in routine news covered by the BBC compare to that of ITV?

- Is immigration equally prominent on the news agendas of the respective broadcasters?
- What is the respective prominence assigned to immigration?
- What percentage of stories are about or related to immigration?
- What length of time is devoted to items about or related to immigration?
- Where in the order of items do items about or relating to immigration fit?

The findings of this analysis are presented below.

In respect of the amount of time each broadcaster devoted to the subject of immigration, significant differences were noted. Whilst the amount of coverage of the respective ballots was similar in all years, in both 2015 and 2016, discussion of immigration on BBC News was almost double that of ITV. Whilst the two channels were more similar in 2017, with ITV having a slight degree more time devoted to the issue, overall, throughout the three time periods, the amount of time spent discussing immigration on BBC News was almost double that of ITV (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4 Salience of immigration on broadcast news channels (all years)

Year	Channel	Ballot footage	Immigration footage	% of programmes devoted to ballot*	% of ballot footage devoted to immigration	% of programmes devoted to immigration*
2015	BBC	100 mins	9 mins	57	9	5
2015	ITV	67 mins	3 mins	45	5	2
2016	BBC	75 mins	17 mins	43	23	10
2016	ITV	69 mins	8 mins	46	12	5
2017	BBC	87 mins	3 mins	50	3	2
2017	ITV	75 mins	4 mins	50	5	3

* based on running times of 30 minutes (ITV) and 35 minutes (BBC)

It is notable that, for both channels, discussion of immigration was most extensive in 2016 in the week preceding the EU Referendum, where the BBC devoted 23% of referendum footage to the issue, and ITV 12%. This is significantly higher than either 2015 or 2017, although it can also be seen that, despite this being a peak of issue salience, ITV News coverage of immigration was, again, almost half that of the BBC. When comparing 2015 and 2017, ITV News devoted an almost equal amount of broadcast time to discussing immigration (a slight increase was noted between the two time periods) and BBC footage reduced coverage of the issue by about 30%.

Figure 5.7 Number of references to immigration on broadcast news channels (all years)

Figure 5.7 details the number of references made to immigration on the two channels across the three time periods under analysis. A reference denotes any use of the word 'immigration'. As illustrated in Figure 5.7, the BBC referred to the term 'immigration' with a notably higher frequency than ITV. This aligns with the observation that the BBC committed a greater amount of broadcast time to the issue of immigration than ITV across all three years. Both channels discussed immigration most frequently in 2016, in the week prior to the EU Referendum; the increase in issue salience here is worthy of note. It also indicates that the BBC referred to the concept of immigration more frequently than ITV, potentially excluding, and therefore suppressing, the social actors (in this case, immigrants) (van Leeuwen, 2008).

The initial analysis also considered how immigration was included in each bulletin – whether it was mentioned or alluded to in the headlines or included as part of footage about the relevant ballot, or if it merited an independent item as part of the broadcast.

Table 5.5 Prominence of immigration on broadcast news channels (all years)

Year	Channel	Immigration mentioned / alluded to in headlines	Immigration as part of ballot footage	Immigration as independent item	Place in running order
2015	BBC	1	3	3	4, 6, 3
2015	ITV	1	0	1	2
2016	BBC	3	5	0	-
2016	ITV	0	5	0	-
2017	BBC	0	1	0	-
2017	ITV	0	2	0	-

What is apparent is that both channels included more immigration-related footage in 2016 than in the other two years, and that in 2016, all discussion of the issue was incorporated alongside the EU Referendum. Notably, BBC News mentioned or alluded to immigration in three of the 2016 headlines, whilst ITV did not do this at all. In 2015, BBC coverage of immigration was more frequent than that of ITV, and it was equally likely to be included with General Election footage as it was as a stand-alone item. Where included as an independent item, it tended to be later in the running order. ITV had one instance of immigration as an independent item, but it ran higher in the running order, at position 2. In 2017, neither channel mentioned nor alluded to immigration in the headlines; ITV included it twice as part of the General Election footage, the BBC once, reflecting the pronounced decrease in issue salience.

Overall, across the three time periods, the BBC was significantly more likely to mention or allude to immigration in the headlines, and slightly more likely to discuss it as part of ballot footage. Accordingly, the BBC also ran a greater number of independent items on immigration over the three time periods, although ITV awarded it greater prominence. Commensurate with the data on the amount of time devoted to discussing the issue, this analysis illuminated the fact that the number of items relating to immigration was markedly higher in 2016 than in the other two years across both channels.

Which voices, views and groups are heard in BBC and ITV News at Ten programming?

- What are occupational and demographic features and political affiliations of news sources?
- Do these sources represent a broad spectrum of opinion?
- Which minority opinions are given expression?

An initial analysis of the sourcing pattern across all years was conducted to ascertain the diversity, or lack thereof, of voices given airtime on both channels. During the time periods selected, there were 80 'turns' on BBC News and 52 'turns' on ITV News; this disparity reflects the greater salience of immigration as an issue on the BBC. The turns in question were, inevitably, of varying length; however, this is not detailed in the analysis, given that the purpose of the data is to provide an overview of the range of sources given airtime and the relative prominence of each. At times, it was difficult to differentiate as some individuals could be classified as either a business leader or an official. Given the lack of prominence of such sources, however, it was decided to group these individuals together as 'other officials'. Turns by the political leaders of parties were grouped under the party each represents, and no distinction was made between party leader or politician. This is due to the fact that the ideology promoted could be expected to fit the 'party line', regardless of whether leader or not.

Figure 5.8 BBC sourcing pattern (all years)

BBC Sourcing Pattern - all years

% of turns

Speaker	%
BBC Journalist	55%
Conservative MP	15%
Member of the Public	15%
Labour MP	9%
Other officials (business leaders, trade union representatives)	5%
Translator	1%

Figure 5.9 ITV sourcing pattern (all years)

ITV Sourcing Patttern - all years

% of turns

Speaker	%
ITV Journalist	46%
Conservative MP	17%
Labour MP	10%
Member of the Public	10%
UKIP representative	8%
Other officials (business leaders, trade union representatives)	8%
Translator	1%

As can be seen in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, the most prominent, by a large margin, of all sources on both channels were journalists – this includes newsreaders in the studio and journalist on location. On the BBC, their own journalists accounted for 55% of all turns recorded; on ITV this figure was 46%. Conservative MPs were given a significantly greater number of turns than other parties, including

Labour, and this was true across both channels. BBC gave 15% to the Conservative Party and only 9% to the Labour Party. The 15% was equalled only by members of the public, who were provided with a greater number of turns than Labour politicians. On ITV, the Conservatives were also permitted a greater number of turns (17%) and this was followed by the Labour Party and members of the public, both of which had 10% of all turns. Thus, on the BBC, during the time periods selected, 70% of all voices heard were either BBC journalists or members of the Conservative Party. On ITV, this figure was 63%. On the issue of immigration, no turns were given to the Liberal Democrats Party, or the Green Party on either channel, though UKIP did gain some traction on ITV News (8%). Therefore, it can be seen that minority parties were not heard during the selected time periods on either channel. Notably also, is that the voices of the migrants themselves were not given airtime on either channel, unless through a translator (ITV News – 1% of all turns).

Following the initial source pattern analysis, each year of footage was subject to deeper investigation. The findings are detailed below, according to year of broadcast.

5.3.1 Analysis of 2015 footage

The analysis investigated the sourcing patterns in order to uncover the degree of diversity presented within the coverage of the two channels on the issue of immigration. For this, a number of aspects of the footage were considered; this served to establish which individuals were given airtime (and what their relevant affiliations, either political or professional might be), where said contributions were broadcast from, along with the gender and nationality of speakers.

In 2015, both channels gave the greatest airtime on the issue of immigration to their own journalists, this accounting for 67% of all turns on BBC and 57% on ITV. Members of the public were awarded a lower percentage of turns across the two broadcasters, with them comprising 21% of contributions on BBC and 14% on ITV. The BBC gave time to both the Prime Minister (8%) and the Opposition Leader (4%) on the issue, where ITV did not. ITV gave time to various other officials, such as Italian border officials (14%) and translators, who were typically present in the capacity of providing a voiceover in English for migrants who were interviewed (14%). Overall, there was a greater degree of contributions from individuals outside of the media and UK politics on ITV News than on BBC.

The location of speakers reflected the findings regarding which voices were heard. As the majority of turns were taken by journalists, it is the case that the studio, formal settings and voiceover were the most frequently adopted 'locations' across both channels. BBC broadcast were more frequently from the studio (42%) and other formal settings (21%) whilst ITV made greater use of voiceovers (57%) with the studio, formal settings and more remote locations being equally present (14% each).

One notable difference occurred regarding the gender balance of speakers in 2015. BBC footage was overwhelmingly male, whilst ITV represented both genders almost equally. More specifically, of the contributions taken for analysis from the BBC, 92% of turns recorded were male (with only 8% female); on ITV, male contributions accounted for 57% of the whole, with 43% being female. It should be noted that any ambiguity in terms of gender was considered – there were no instances across the three time periods in which the gender identity of speakers was ambiguous. In relation to ascertaining the gender of members of the public, a decision with regards to gender had to be made on the available information – I was aware of this potential issue and had prepared to include an 'uncertain' category should it be necessary.

Regarding the nationality of speakers, those on the BBC were largely British (79%) with a small amount of time (13%) being given to non-Europeans (in this instance, the migrants themselves). Greater diversity was apparent on ITV; whilst speakers were also predominantly British (57%) more time was given to those of other backgrounds, both European (14%) and non-European (14%). These were European officials and migrants from outside Europe. Greater diversity in respect of speaker nationality was found on ITV News. It should be noted that it was not always possible to ascertain with absolute certainty the nationality of speakers. This is, as might be expected, particularly the case in relation to members of the public. Thus, an 'uncertain' category was including in the coding frame, and a small percentage of contributions fell into this category (for example, on ITV in 2015, 14% of contributions were from a source whose nationality was not entirely clear). Nevertheless, given the dominance of media and political voices, such instances were highly infrequent and contribute little to the overall findings.

5.3.2 Analysis of 2016 footage
Figure 5.10 BBC – who gets to speak? (2016)

Figure 5.11 ITV – who gets to speak? (2016)

In 2016, both channels gave airtime to a wider diversity of voices, although the contributions of journalists remained the greatest, especially on the BBC (48% of all turns, compared with 37% on ITV). The reduction in journalistic contributions made way largely for the voices of leading mainstream politicians - the Prime Minister and leading Conservative and Labour politicians. This included the Leader of the official VoteLeave campaign and future Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, who spoke in the televised debate and was also (briefly) included in an item on BBC News. Notably, regarding party leaders, neither channel provided footage of the Leader of the Opposition Jeremy Corbyn) on the subject of immigration, nor were the voices of the Deputy Prime Minister (Liberal Democrat) or the leader of the Green Party heard. Only the UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, was given airtime on immigration; this occurred on ITV. The remainder of voices were members of the public, businesspeople, and various other officials. The most prominent result here was that mainstream media and leading political voices dominated, comprising 76% of all turns on BBC and 73% on ITV (UKIP have not been included as 'leading' as they were not a party with any sitting MPs).

Perhaps a reflection of the wider diversity of voices, 2016 also saw a greater range of locations from which speakers delivered their contributions. The studio was far less customary a backdrop (10% on BBC and 8% on ITV) with other formal settings dominating (34% on BBC and 42% on ITV). This is largely due to the extensive coverage of a live debate involving many high-profile politicians and public figures. However, 2016 also saw more discussion of immigration in other settings – in the street, on campaign, and in the domestic context. 32% of all contributions on BBC were from a variety of settings; on ITV News, this figure was 28%.

Whilst BBC contributions on the subject of immigration in 2015 were almost entirely male, 2016 saw the channel broadcast largely equal amount of male and female voices (54% and 46% respectively). Conversely, ITV broadcast fewer female voices than in 2015, with their immigration discussion being dominated by male contributions, with 74% of contributions being male to 26% female.

One highly notable aspect of the voices given airtime on immigration in 2016 is the lack of diversity in terms of nationality. On the BBC, 96% of all turns were given to those of British nationality, whilst on ITV this was 100%.

5.3.3 Analysis of 2017 footage

2017 saw a remarkable decrease in issue salience for immigration, and this is reflected in the significantly reduced multiplicity of voices broadcast in the period of analysis. Journalists were the most commonly broadcast (67% on BBC and 86% on ITV); in addition to this, the Prime Minister and Labour leader were heard on BBC (17% each). On ITV, outside of journalistic commentary, the only other voice heard on the issue was that of the UKIP leader (14%).

The reduced diversity of voices and lower issue salience also saw a fall from 2016 in the variety of locations from which contributions were broadcast. The studio regained prominence on BBC (50%) with other contributions being broadcast from politicians out on campaign (33%) and voiceovers (17%). ITV, however, divided time between the studio (28%) politicians out on campaign (28%) on the street (14%) and voiceovers (28%) relatively equally.

With regards to the gender balance of speakers, both channels remained consistent from the balance seen in 2016. The BBC gender balance was split equally (50% male, 50% female) whilst ITV contributions were, as in 2016, predominantly male (71%).

An analysis of the nationality of contributors in 2017 found that all speakers on both channels were of British nationality.

5.3.4 Comparative analysis across the three time periods

In order to understand if there is a significant difference between those permitted to voice their views on immigration, a comparative analysis of the data across all years was conducted. Analysis of the occupational and demographic features of those given airtime on the issue of immigration illustrates that, across both channels, journalists' contributions dominate, whether this be introducing, providing summaries, narrating via voiceovers, or interviewing.

Figure 5.12 Who gets to speak? (BBC/ITV mean average, all years combined)

Who gets to speak? Mean average across all years

Figure 5.13 Location of speakers (BBC/ITV mean average, all years combined)

Location of speakers - mean average across all years

This is in accordance with the location from which most turns are delivered – formal settings (often televised debates), voiceovers and from the studio being the most common, again for both channels. It is then clear that politicians from the Conservative and Labour parties together constitute the next largest group, followed by members of the public. It is notable that, of the smaller parties, neither the Liberal Democrats nor the Green Party were given airtime on immigration on either channel; UKIP, however, was permitted a voice on ITV News, albeit minor.

Regarding the gender and nationality of speakers, there was a large degree of similarity between the BBC and ITV. A significant majority of turns were taken by males (65% and 71% respectively) and an overwhelming amount of all speakers were of British nationality (91% on the BBC and 94% on ITV). Very little airtime was given to non-British individuals.

To summarise, the diversity of voices observed across both channels was extremely limited. The majority of turns were taken by British males, and from a limited range of occupational and demographic backgrounds. Politically, inclusions were mainstream and no airtime was given to minority parties (UKIP being considered at this juncture a mainstream party).

5.4 Thematic analysis of broadcast media footage

In order to draw effective comparisons with the political manifestos of the period, an inductive thematic analysis of the news footage was conducted; this would begin to illustrate the manner in which immigrants/immigration are represented on each of the channels. The major findings are presented below, firstly by year and then comparatively.

5.4.1 Thematic analysis of 2015 footage

Footage in 2015 contained the following main themes:

Table 5.6 Broadcast news key themes (BBC/ITV, 2015)

Theme	BBC	ITV	Total references
Immigrants as victims/exploited	22	17	39
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	23	1	24
UK/EU should help	4	4	8
Immigrants as individuals/humans	6	2	8
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	5	0	5
Immigrants as a burden/threat	5	0	5
Immigration as a problem/crisis	4	1	5
Immigration is unstoppable	3	0	3
Immigrants as criminals/terrorists	2	0	2
Total	74	25	99

What can be seen is that there is a high degree of equivalence in the frequency of each channel's representations of migrants as victims. However, the BBC frequently referred to migration in terms of numbers or statistics, a theme which was not apparent on ITV. These two highly dominant themes accounted for 64% (across both broadcasters) of all references in this year. Assertions that the EU and/or the UK should help the situation were also noted, along with representations of migrants as individuals with human stories; these two themes, however, although equal third in terms of frequency, were significantly less salient than the two major representations explained above.

Figure 5.14 Broadcast news key themes (BBC/ITV, 2015)

5.4.2 Thematic analysis of 2016 footage

Table 5.7 Broadcast news key themes (BBC/ITV, 2016)

Theme	BBC	ITV	Total references
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	22	23	**46**
Immigrants as a burden/threat	23	13	**36**
Immigrants as criminals/terrorists	22	1	**23**
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	16	7	**23**
Immigration is an important issue	15	7	**22**
Immigrants as victims/exploited	3	6	**9**
Immigration is a political issue	2	6	**8**
Immigrants as workers/contributors	5	3	**8**
Migration as positive/reciprocal	5	0	**5**
Total	**113**	**66**	**179**

In 2016, there were five clearly dominant themes:

- immigration needs to be controlled or reduced

- immigrants as a burden or threat

- immigrants as criminals/terrorists

- immigrants as numbers/statistics

- Immigration as an important issue

The breakdown by channel is as follows:

Figure 5.15 Broadcast news key themes (BBC/ITV, 2016)

2016 Key themes - news footage

Both channels made highly frequent references to the need to control or reduce immigration, which alone accounted for 26% of all references. Immigrants were also highly likely to be represented as a burden or threat (20%) of all references, and that these two aspects were prominent on both channels. Thirdly was the notion of immigrants as criminals – whilst this constituted 13% of all references, it was only the BBC which discussed the issue in these terms. 2016 also saw immigration often discussed as a numerical concept, and repeatedly referred to as an important issue facing the country. It should be noted that this was significantly higher on the BBC than ITV, and that ITV made almost equivalent references to migrants as victims, and to the politicisation of migration.

5.4.3 Thematic analysis of 2017 footage

Table 5.8 Broadcast news key themes (BBC/ITV, 2017)

Theme	BBC	ITV	Total references
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	13	2	**15**
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	1	5	**6**
Immigrants as workers/contributors	3	3	**6**
Immigration is an important issue	2	2	**4**
Immigrants as criminals/terrorists	0	3	**3**
Total	**19**	**15**	**34**

As detailed earlier, 2017 saw a dramatic reduction in issue salience for immigration. Accordingly, the thematic analysis produced notably fewer key themes than in the previous years, and far fewer references to the issue overall. The notion that immigration needs to be controlled or cut continued to dominate, and references to immigrants as numbers or statistics were also relatively abundant, although this was largely due to footage from ITV. Unlike previous years, 2017 saw an increase in discussion (as a percentage of the whole conversation, though not in real terms) around the issue, including references to the contributions made to Britain by immigrants. The footage of both broadcasters also continued to assert that immigration is an important issue.

The thematic analysis served to draw out the key themes from BBC and ITV News at Ten over the three selected time periods. Between 2015 and 2016, there was a significant shift in the major messages being transmitted. To clarify, in 2015, the most dominant trope was one of immigrants as victims, struggling and in need of rescue. By 2016, this has pivoted to repeated statements that immigration needs to be controlled and/or cut, a notion which prevailed into the discussion in 2017. One theme which remained relatively constant throughout was references to immigration in terms of numbers and statistics – that immigration is to be measured and assessed in this manner.

2016 was undoubtedly the year in which issue salience for immigration peaked. During this time, the key themes around the topic were all overwhelmingly negative representations – immigration must be controlled and/or reduced, immigrants present a burden on British society (i.e. in terms of housing, education, public services and welfare) and, finally, the representation of immigrants as criminals, involved in criminal activity.

5.4.4 Thematic Analysis – All years

The data from the thematic analysis was grouped to provide an overview of the key themes on both channels across the three time periods under scrutiny. Figure 5.16 below illustrates this:

Figure 5.16 Key themes of political manifestos by party (2015 and 2017 combined)

Figure 5.16 illustrates that the dominant theme in political manifestos across the period of analysis was that of the need for immigration to be controlled or cut. This theme occurred most frequently in the Conservative Party and UKIP manifestos. Following this, the second and third most dominant themes were that of immigrants posing a threat or burden, and immigrants as criminals. These were again found largely in Conservative and UKIP literature. Criticism of the immigration system was also mentioned frequently (almost as often as the criminality theme) but this was a key theme of the Labour and Liberal Democrat manifestos, as well as UKIP. Understandably, this theme did not surface in the Conservative Party manifesto.

What the analysis identifies, overall, is that the subject of immigration was represented in an almost entirely negative light. The key concern, the manifestos tell us, is to control or reduce immigration, ergo inward migration is undesirable. The representation of immigrants is predominantly that they are a burden on British society, whether that be in housing, health care benefits, schooling or elsewhere. Additionally, immigrants are linked to criminal activity, thus presenting a danger to the United Kingdom. Where the immigration system is criticised, again the implication is that it is allowing too many people into the country – thus the suggestion is also that Immigration is too high and /or undesirable.

Figure 5.17 Key themes of broadcast news by channel (all years combined)

What can be seen is that the two major themes were the need for immigration to be controlled or cut, and discussion of immigration and/or immigrants as numbers. The former maps directly to the dominant theme of the political manifestos, most prominently those of the Conservative party and UKIP. The latter was particularly prominent on BBC News. Following this, three more themes emerged – that of immigrants as victims, which stemmed largely from the 2015 footage and was referred to

almost equally across the channels, then the notion of immigrants as a burden or threat, followed by immigrants as criminals and/or terrorists.

Figure 5.18 Key themes of political manifestos (all parties combined, 2015 and 2017 combined)

Thematic analysis of political manifestos (combined) - all years

Theme	Number of occurrences
Employers/institutions require scrutiny	8
Immigrants as contributors	9
Other	13
Criticism of other parties	14
British people references	18
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	19
Immigrants as victims/exploited	25
Criticism of immigration system	40
Immigrants as criminals	42
Immigrants as a burden/threat	73
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	85

Figure 5.19 Key themes of broadcast news (BBC and ITV combined, all years combined)

Thematic analysis of news footage (combined) - all years

Theme	Number of occurrences
Immigration is unstoppable	3
Immigration as a problem/crisis	5
Migration as positive/reciprocal	5
Immigrants as individuals/humans	8
UK/EU should help	8
Immigration is a political issue	8
Immigrants as workers/contributors	14
Immigration is an important issue	26
Immigrants as lawbreakers/terrorists	34
Immigrants as a burden/threat	41
Immigrants as victims/exploited	48
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	53
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	65

The analysis of footage and literature from throughout the time period demonstrates clearly that the key theme across all texts is the need for immigration to be controlled or reduced. A further theme which dominates across all texts is that of immigrants as a burden or threat. The theme of immigrants as being subject to exploitation is also prominent, though this is more so in TV news footage than in manifestos. The discussion of immigrants as numbers/statistics was significantly more present in news footage than in the manifestos. The theme of criminality and/or terrorism is dominant in both texts, although this occupies a higher ranking in the manifestos than the TV news footage. There is greater variation in the more minor themes, with news footage diverging from the themes of the manifestos.

Finally, the themes were separated into those which could be deemed positive or sympathetic opinions on the issue and those which are considered negative or critical. A positive or sympathetic representation would, for instance, be a reference to the contribution non-native workers make to British society, or a suggestion that there are people who need support/help. A critical representation would be, for example, the suggestion that immigration needs to be reduced (i.e. it is a problem that must be mitigated) or that immigrants are linked with any form of criminal activity. The reference to immigration and immigrants as numbers was included as negative as it is a dehumanising and suppressive construct. Given these divisions, what can be seen is that 74% of all BBC News references to immigration across the three time periods were negative; for ITV News, this figure was 61%. Overall, both channels presented a largely critical view of the issue.

5.5 Critical Discourse Analysis

The final stage of analysis concerned itself with a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of the broadcast news footage from the three time periods. This detailed analysis focussed on the nomination and predication strategies employed by those whose voices were heard on the subject of immigration. The findings uncovered as a consequence of this analysis will now be set out chronologically. The nomination strategies for each channel will be presented first, as is logical, followed by predication.

5.5.1 2015 Nomination Strategies

As discussed earlier, the issue of immigration had significantly greater salience on BBC News in the 2015 time period than it did on ITV News. Accordingly, a greater number of relevant linguistic references were made on BBC than on ITV. Nevertheless, the data uncovered notable points in the nomination strategies used across the channels.

In order to more explicitly illustrate the use of key nominations, relevant qualitative examples from both channels across the three years are provided. These elucidate the degree of positivity and/or negativity with which dominant nominations were imbued.

Figure 5.20 BBC nomination strategies (2015)

BBC 2015 Nomination Strategies

Nomination	Number of occurrences
Migrant	22
Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	17
Thousands/hundreds of thousands/numbers	5
Referred by name	4
Survivors	3
People	3
(Islamist) extremist	2
Everyone	2
Humans	1
Traffickers	1
Fatalities	1
New arrivals	1
I (first person)	1
Man	1
Baby	1
Nationality	1

Figure 5.21 ITV nomination strategies (2015)

ITV 2015 Nomination Strategies

Nomination	Number of occurrences
Migrant	6
Bodies	2
Woman	2
Child	2
Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	2
Desperate souls	1
Victims	1
Survivors	1

What can be seen from the data is that both channels used the nomination 'migrant' most frequently when discussing issues related to immigration. This may reflect the fact that the salient immigration

frame adopted by the mainstream media at this time was the 'EU migrant crisis' and was concerned with people travelling from parts of north Africa to southern Europe on dangerous boats. The second most common nomination, most clearly defined on the BBC, was the use of third person pronouns (he/she/they). Whilst this was also the second most common nomination on ITV, this channel also used other terms – 'women', 'children' and 'bodies' (relating to those who died during the journey) – equally frequently. The BBC's third most common nomination was to discuss the issue in terms of numbers (e.g. 'thousands', 'hundreds of thousands'). Other nominations were adopted, but none achieved the same frequency as those outlined above. This final nomination was the starkest of contrasts between the two channels – the BBC talked on several occasions of large numbers, whereas ITV News did not.

The most common nomination across both channels being 'migrant', illustrative examples of the use of this term are provided below:

A) 'even if just a handful of migrants made it, more will follow' (BBC journalist, 2015)

B) 'thousands of migrants have been rescued from boats trying to cross the Mediterranean' (BBC journalist, 2015

C) 'the sheer desperation of migrants in the Mediterranean' (ITV journalist, 2015)

D) 'migrants scramble to safety trying to cross the sea' (ITV journalist, 2015)

In statement A, there is the explicit suggestion that large numbers of people are trying to leave their countries, presumably to come to Britain or Europe. 'More will follow' is ominus, implying that there this scenario presents a real danger. Statement B also points to the notion of large numbers, this time situating very clearly in Europe – the implication being that, once in Europe, said migrants will be able to enter the UK. Statement C also situates the issue within Europe, but by referring to the 'sheer desperation' of migrating people, there is an implication that they require help and support from European nations, including the UK. There is a suggestion that these people do not present a threat, but are running for their lives. This is also the case with statement D. Nevertheless, whilst more sympathetic in tone than either A or B, neither C nor D represent migrating people as contributors or useful.

The second most common nomination across both channels was the use of third person pronouns. To illustrate this, the pronoun 'they' was selected, as this was the most frequent of the pronouns employed.

A) 'they all have a friend who has made it to Europe' (BBC journalist, 2015)

B) 'they may have a contagious disease' (BBC journalist, 2015)

C) 'they are the latest victims in a succession of overcrowded boats' (BBC journalist, 2015)

D) 'they saw 36 of their fellow migrants drowned' (ITV journalist, 2015)

Statement A, by telling us that all of the migrants have 'friends' who are now in Europe, implies that this is an undesirable, and unstoppable, force – there is a sense that migrating people present a threat to British people due to the number of them. If they want to come to the UK, they will – it is easy and nothing is in place to prevent them. The 'fact' that they all have friends in Europe is evidence of this. Statement B, made about a young family who had arrived in an Italian port, explicitly links migrating people with disease – this could be employed to invoke a sense of fear and disgust. Statements C and D indicate the treacherous conditions in which people are travelling. The sense here is that the journey is difficult and dangerous, with the very real probability of death. Use of the nomination 'victim' again highlights the need for these people to be rescued.

These above examples highlight that, in 2015, BBC coverage of the 'migrant crisis' tended to involve more negative representations of the issue than the ITV coverage. Analysis of the language employed by BBC journalists illustrates the presence of the implication that immigrants are dangerous (especially in terms of numbers) and that their desire to reach Europe (and subsequently Britain) is unstoppable. In addition to this, their presence is linked to disease, a clear danger to the health and wellbeing of the host nation. ITV representation, however, involved more of a sense of victimhood, with language employed to illustrate the perilous conditions in which migrants find themselves, and the implication that wealthier, more stable nations should help them.

Across both channels, there was a lack of positive representation; nevertheless, in 2015 BBC coverage of inward migration was notably more negative than that of ITV.

5.5.2 2015 Predication Strategies
Figure 5.22 BBC predication strategies (2015)

Figure 5.23 ITV predication strategies (2015)

Analysis of the predication strategies aligned with the key nominations highlighted the use of two key topoi on BBC News – firstly, that of Danger, Death and Displacement, which constituted 51% of all relevant predications, and secondly Disadvantage, Burden, Finance and Displacement, which accounted for 16% of all relevant predications. This reflects the focus of the narrative at the time: desperate people trying to access Europe. With regards to ITV News, the same two topoi were most present but Disadvantage, Burden, Finance and Displacement was most common (78%) followed by Danger, Death and Displacement (17%). The difference in focus of the two channels is indicated by the different use of predications – ITV News centred more on the desperation of those in question, whilst BBC's reporting tended to focus more on the numbers attempting the journey. Overall, on BBC News, 81% of predications aligned with Hart's (2010) connected topoi, whilst the remaining 19% were more positive reflections, perhaps neutral references giving the age of an interviewee, or their particular trade. On ITV News, 95% of all predications were aligned with Hart's (2010) connected topoi. In 2015, immigration was framed on both channels through the lens of Danger, Death and Displacement and Disadvantage, Burden, Finance and Displacement.

5.5.3 2016 Nomination Strategies

The data from 2016 saw a notable shift in the nature of the discussion across both channels, although the higher salience of immigration on the BBC was sustained. One distinct change was that the discussion centred more on immigration as a topic of discussion or concern, rather than focussing on the 'migrants' themselves. The references to 'immigration' as an issue across this time period were 25 on BBC News and 26 on ITV. This includes any use of the word 'immigration'. Accordingly, there were significantly fewer nominations employed for describing people entering the UK. Where these nominations occurred, the data are presented below.

Figure 5.24 BBC nomination strategies (2016)

BBC 2016 Nomination Strategies

Nomination	Number of occurrences
Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	12
Thousands/hundreds of thousands/numbers	11
People	8
Immigrant/migrant	7
I, we (first person pronouns)	4
Those	3
EU nationals/EU citizens/Europeans	3
The numbers	3
You (generic)	3
Someone	2
Refugee	1
Nationality	1
Enemy	1
Economic migrant	1
Militants	1
Incomer	1
Asylum seeker	1

Figure 5.25 ITV nomination strategies (2016)

ITV 2016 Nomination Strategies

Nomination	Number of occurrences
The numbers	6
Refugee	2
People	2
Who	1
Everybody	1
Staff	1
Immigrant/migrant	1

As can be seen, the nomination strategies adopted by both channels differed from those in 2015. The most frequent nominations on the BBC were the use of third person pronouns and references to numbers (either actual numbers, as in 'hundreds of thousands', or 'the numbers'). Similarly, ITV's most

common nomination strategy during this period was 'the numbers', as in 'the numbers coming here'. This was followed by the terms 'refugee' and 'people'. Highly prominent is the shift away from the nomination 'migrant' which was clearly the most common reference adopted by both channels in 2016. The nomination strategies here perhaps reflect the shift in focus from the 'EU migrant crisis' of 2015 to discussion of how immigration plays into the upcoming ballot on European Union membership. Immigrants are discussed more in terms of numbers and the distinction between 'us' and 'them' is apparent.

A highly common nomination across both channels was that of number references (on ITV this was the most frequent; on BBC it was the second most frequent). On BBC, there were also frequent references to third person pronouns, most commonly 'they' (as in 2015). The nomination 'people' also saw frequent use. Therefore, the illustrative examples of more detailed language use will be concerned with these three nominations.

A) 'hundreds and thousands of refugees and other migrants crowding across the continent' (BBC journalist, 2016)
B) 'we can't cap the numbers' (BBC journalist, 2016)
C) 'you've got numbers running at 330,000 net globally' (Boris Johnson, VoteLeave, on ITV, 2016)
D) 'limit the numbers who are coming here' (ITV journalist, 2016)

Statement A contains invokes an image of huge numbers, overcrowding – there is the sense of a swarm of people. Again, the implication that this presents a danger to British society is present. Statement B alludes to freedom of movement within the European Union, asserting that it is desirable to restrict the number of people entering the UK but that EU membership means it is not possible. Therefore, on BBC news there is both the suggestion that immigration presents a real danger to British people and that, as members of the EU, it cannot be limited. Statement C, made by Boris Johnson, who headed the official VoteLeave campaign and later became Prime Minister with a pledge to 'Get Brexit Done!' refers to a figure of 330,000; the use of such large numbers is likely deployed to engender fear in the listener. 'Running' is imbued with a sense of being out of control. Thus, the implication here is that the number of people immigration is too high, and it is out of control. Given the speaker, it should be noted that 'Take Back Control' became the leading slogan of the VoteLeave campaign. By indicating that this particular problem is out of control, the speaker is suggesting to the audience that there is a need to regain control. Statement D also alludes to the need to restrict immigration, again the implication being that the number of people coming to the UK is too high.

A) 'if they are coming here from a European country they can come in as many numbers as they want' (BBC journalist, 2016)

B) 'they are happy to work for £4 or £5 per hour' (vox pop, BBC, 2016)

Statement A again contains the suggestion that immigration is unstoppable and that the UK has no control over the number of people coming to live and work. It also implies that everyone wants to come to Britain and will do so. As the issue of immigration from Europe has been conflated with immigration from wider geographical locations, there is also the suggestion that, oncve migrants and/or refugees arrive in Europe, they will be able to enter the UK with ease. Statement B refers to the notion of migration suppressing wages and wage growth, linking immigrants with poor working conditions and pay for British employees. In both statements, migrants are seen as 'other', with the linguistic construct situating the issue as one of 'us and them'. ITV did not use third person pronoun nominations in 2016, so has not been included in this analysis.

A) 'people crossing borders unchecked' (BBC journalist, 2016)
B) 'how many people each year can the UK reasonably cope with?' (Audience member in TV debate, BBC, 2016)
C) 'control the borders and the flow of people in'
D) 'if there's gonna [sic] be more people coming to the UK, it's (the NHS) gonna [sic] be more stretched than ever (vox pop, ITV, 2016)

Statement A links immigration with criminality; the sense that people arrive in the UK without the correct paperwork and enter the country illegally. There is also the implication that the immigration system is failing and that borders are not secure. These were key tenets of the UKIP argument. Statement B, provided by an audience member again points to the notion that too many people wish to enter, and are entering, the UK> Immigration here is linked to strain on public services (in this case, the NHS), representing immigrants as a burden to the host country, and a drain on resources. Statement C contains the clear suggestion that borders are not at present secure – we need to 'control' them – and that people are entering in too high numbers. 'Flow' is a water metaphor; others might be 'flood' or 'pour' – all suggesting that immigration is both too high and unstoppable. The final statement, D, links immigration to strain on public services (again the NHS) and indicates that public services are already under strain, the implication being that more people will make this strain unbearable. Whilst it is a conditional statement, the suggestion here is that more people are indeed coming.

In 2016, there was highly negative representation of immigration on both channels. Analysis of the language employed sees numerous suggestions that the number of people wishing to enter the UK is too high and cannot be controlled. By referring to people as numbers, speakers dehumanise and potentially remove the potential for empathy on the part of the audience.

Immigrants were linked to criminal activity (illegal entry to the country, for example) and represented as a burden to society (e.g. strain on the NHS). This was found on both channels; nevertheless, it should be noted that, given the considerably higher salience the issue attained on BBC News, these representations were disseminated more frequently by BBC News at Ten than ITV News at Ten.

5.5.4 2016 Predication Strategies

Figure 5.26 BBC predication strategies (2016)

Figure 5.27 ITV predication strategies (2016)

Analysis of the 2016 saw a marked shift, particularly on ITV News, to a more balanced representation of immigration than had been presented in 2015, with 31% of predications lying outside of Hart's (2010) groupings. BBC News also generated a more positive tone in 2016, though only slightly – 26%

of relevant predications did not align with Hart's (2010) groupings. This does not mean, however, that the framing was overwhelmingly positive, as 69% did align with the work of Hart (2010). The most common topoi on ITV News was that of Danger, Disease and Displacement, which accounted for 46% of relevant predication strategies; on BBC the most common topoi was Disadvantage, Burden, Finance and Displacement (37%); these topoi largely took the form of comments relating to there being unsustainable numbers of people wishing to enter the UK, and how they would be supported once they had arrived\ (i.e. fears around freedom of movement).

5.5.5 2017 Nomination Strategies

Figure 5.28 BBC nomination strategies (2017)

Figure 5.29 ITV nomination strategies (2017)

As has been noted, 2017 saw a marked decline in the salience of immigration in the news coverage overall. This is reflected in the data relating to nomination and, therefore, predication strategies. BBC News moved away from the term 'migrant' and also from the use of numbers in the nomination

strategies; instead, references were made to 'EU citizens' and 'people'. Use of the third person pronoun retained its common use.

2017 generated a markedly smaller data sample for qualitative analysis due to the distinctly lower salience of immigration across both channels. Therefore, the decision was taken to analyse the language in relation to nominations found to be in relatively high usage in 2015 and 2016: use of third person pronouns and references to 'people'.

A) 'free movement of people will come to an end' (BBC journalist, 2016)
B) 'the number of people who settle here to under 100,000' (BBC journalist, 2016)
C) 'a group of people out there who hate who we are' (Paul Nuttal, UKIP leader, ITV, 2016)

Statement A brings with a sense of finality and the notion that something has been completed. This statement evidently relates to Brexit and the idea that leaving the European Union has brought with it something that has long been desired, in this case the removal of the right to free movement. Statement B, whilst drawing attention to numbers, refers to immigrants as 'people who settle' in the UK, a distinctly more positive connotation than the representations of illegality and burden see in previous years. 'Settle' is imbued with a warmth and stability that was not observed elsewhere in the data. ITV included only one 'people' nomination, and this was in an interview with Paul Nuttal, the new UKIP leader following Nigel Farage's resignation. Nuttal was referring to what he termed 'Islamic extremists'. 'A group' suggests a strong degree of homogeneity, evoking images of a large number of people united together in their hatred of the UK and its values. There is a very clear positioning of 'us versus them' with the notion that the 'group' to which he refers present a very real danger to the UK.

A) 'they will be guaranteed their existing rights' (Jeremy Corbyn, Labour Leader, BBC, 2017)
B) 'hearing from foreign workers about their post-Brexit fears' (ITV journalist, 2017)

Statement A, in which they nominations are 'they/their' indicates that those (of European origin) who reside and work in the United Kingdom have certain entitlements – this positions them very differently to the desperate, and likely illegal, migrants who constituted the representations of 2015 and 2016. Instead, they are legitimate UK residents with rights – this elevates the status of those immigrating to the UK considerably. Statement B encourages the audience to show some compassion towards those who work in the UK – the reference to 'workers' removes the subject from any allegations of illegality or burden; workers are contributors. In addition, we are encouraged to consider their 'post-Brexit fears', there is a sense of it being everyone's concern.

Whilst references to numbers persisted in 2017, these were (on account of the dramatically reduced salience of immigration) minimal, and the overall representation was much more positive. No longer

were those immigrating to the UK 'migrants' imbued with a sense of danger and illegality; they were 'citizens' with 'rights' and Theresa May, then Prime Minister, talked of 'the brightest and the best'. Here those who wish to come to the UK are presented as desirable, intelligent and of benefit to the nation. ITV News broadcast one item which linked immigration to terrorism and security, but this moved the issue outside of the European Union. 2017 saw notably more positive representations of European migrants when compared with 2015 and 2016.

5.5.6 2017 Predication Strategies
Figure 5.30 BBC predication strategies (2017)

Figure 5.31 ITV predication strategies (2017)


The reduced salience and more positive framing of immigration is reflected in the data on predication strategies. In 2017, only 22% of relevant BBC News footage aligned with Hart's (2010) groupings of

topoi; in this case, all 22% were situated in the DBFD category. For ITV News, the data were slightly different, largely due to the fact that an item was run on the 'radical cleric' Abu Qatada; as this contained many references to 'deportation' the item as included in the analysis as being related to immigration. As such, ITV News footage leaned heavily towards the Culture, Character and Crime grouping, with 57% of relevant topoi in this category. Consequently, on ITV News, 71% of predication strategies continued to align with the work of Hart (2010) and the positive shift present on BBC News was not apparent on this channel.

5.5.7 Nomination and predication strategies – all years

For ease of comparison, the data from all years was combined to understand the overall use of nomination and predication strategies by the two broadcasters in the selected time frames. The data is presented in Figures 5.32 and 5.33 below.

Figure 5.32 BBC nomination strategies (all years combined)

Figure 5.33 ITV nomination strategies (all years combined)

ITV Nomination Strategies - all years

Nomination	Number of occurrences
Migrant	7
	6
People	3
	3
By name (Abu Qatada)	2
	2
Bodies	2
	2
Child	2
	1
Radical cleric	1
	1
You (generic)	1
	1
(Terror) suspects	1
	1
Everybody	1
	1
Desperate souls	1
	1
Survivors	1

Figure 5.33 Nomination strategies (BCC and ITV combined, all years combined)

Nomination Strategies (combined) - all years

Nomination	Number of occurrences
Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	36
	35
	17
Thousands/hundreds of thousands/numbers	16
	9
EU nationals/EU citizens/Europeans	6
	5
Referred by name	4
	3
You (generic)	3
	3
By name (Abu Qatada)	2
	2
Bodies	2
	2
Child	2
	2
(Islamist) extremist	2
	2
Nationality	2

Figure 5.34 BBC predication strategies (all years combined)

Figure 5.35 ITV predication strategies (all years combined)

Figure 5.36 Predication strategies (BBC and ITV combined, all years combined)

Analysis of the predication strategies across the three time periods illustrates that the topoi engendered by the coverage on both channels are predominantly negative. On BBC, 71% of all predications align with Hart's (2010) categories; for ITV News, this figure is 82%. The most common topoi on BBC overall is that of DDD, whilst on ITV it is DBFD. ITV was more likely to use the CCC topoi, but this was largely due to the 2017 item on Abu Qatada and was not representative of the footage as a whole. Notably, the Exploitation topoi was barely present, not at all on ITV and very little (6%) on BBC.

5.6 Summary of key findings

Immigration salience and prominence on BBC and ITV News

The salience of each national ballot was largely equivalent across both channels.

The salience of immigration was markedly higher on BBC News than ITV (almost double).

The salience of immigration peaked in 2016 across both channels.

2017 saw a pronounced decrease in the salience of immigration, most notably on BBC News.

BBC News was more likely than ITV to mention immigration in the headlines

2015 saw independent items on immigration on both channels; 2016 and 2017 saw the issue being incorporated with footage relating to the national ballot of the time.

Sourcing patterns on BBC and ITV News – all years

The most common source, by far, was the channels' own journalists. On BBC News, this was 55% of all turns, on ITV 46%.

As a consequence of the dominance of journalists, much of the discussion which took place was either monologue or journalist to journalist.

On BBC News, the second most common source was shared by Conservative Party ministers and members of the public, each with 15% of turns.

On ITV News, the second most common source was Conservative Party ministers (17% of all turns). Third most common was Labour Party ministers and members of the public equally, each with 10%.

Neither channel gave any turns to Liberal Democrat on Green Party representatives on the issue of immigration.

On both channels, sources were predominantly male and almost entirely British.

Key themes on BBC and ITV News

The dominant theme across all years was the need for immigration to be controlled or cut. This had greater prominence on BBC News than on ITV.

The second most prevalent theme was that of immigration as a numerical concept – again, this had greater prominence on BBC than ITV.

In 2015, the major theme was that of immigrants as victims/exploited.

This shifted in 2016, when the dominant theme became that of the need to control/reduce immigration. This theme retained dominance into 2017.

Key themes in political manifestos

Issue salience for immigration was higher in 2015 than 2017; the issue accounted for a larger percentage of each party's manifestos in 2015 (with the exception of the Liberal Democrats, where there was a minor increase)

The parties which devoted the greatest percentage of their manifestos to the issue were UKIP and the Conservative Party. This was highest in 2015, with 2017 seeing the Conservatives reduce their attention on the issue significantly.

The key themes which emerged, based on number of references were dominated by UKIP and the Conservative Party.

In 2015, the major themes, in descending order of salience, were the need for immigration to be controlled or reduced, immigrants as a burden or threat, and immigrants as criminals.

In 2017 the major themes, in descending order of salience, were the need for immigration to be controlled or reduced, immigrants as a burden or threat, and, with equal prominence, immigrants as contributors to society.

The dominant theme across the time period was the need for immigration to be controlled or reduced.

The Critical Discourse Analysis

The most common nomination on both channels across the three time periods was 'migrant'. Other common nominations were the use of numbers (e.g. 'thousands') and third person pronouns.

The nomination strategies altered in 2017, particularly on BBC News, to become more positive, with terms like 'EU citizen' being employed.

Analysis of predication strategies and associated topoi revealed predominantly negative representation of immigrants. The most common topoi were Danger, Disease and Displacement, and Disadvantage, Burden, Finance and Displacement.

In 2017, the predication strategies demonstrated a more positive representation on BBC, where only 22% of topoi aligned with Hart's (2010) categories. On ITV, due to the inclusion of a special report on one particular case, the negative representation remained high, with heavy reference to the Culture, Character and Crime topoi (Hart, 2010)

In 2015, BBC News coverage of the 'migrant crisis' constituted a more negative representation of immigrants than ITV News. The language employed by speakers on the BBC tended to be imbued wit a sense of criminality, danger and burden. The discourse on ITV leaned more towards representation of victimhood, with a sense that wealthier more stable nations should offer help and support.

2016 representations were negative across both channels, with language focussing on numbers, thus dehumanising immigrants and decreasing the likelihood of audiences feeling any empathy towards those migrating. Given the notably larger amount of coverage on the BBC, it could be argued that the BBC was more negative than ITV in this respect.

In 2017, the dramatic drop in salience generated a smaller sample of data for analysis. Nevertheless, BBC representations had become remarkably more positive, with notions of immigrants as Eu citizens who work in the UK (i.e. contribute) and have rights. The status of immigrants was dramatically raised on the BBC in 2017. This was less apparent on ITV, where the focus shifted to immigration and terrorism. It should be noted that this was only one item, but that the small amount of data generated perhaps made this seem more significant.

Chapter 6: Immigration as an Issue during the Political Campaigns of the 'Brexit years' – Discussion of the Findings

6.1 Introduction

The following chapter considers the role the mediation of immigration played in the decision-making process of voters during the 'Brexit years', and discusses the discursive strategies employed by the far-right which enabled the salience of anti-immigration sentiment and resulted in identity-based politics. There is a consensus amongst the literature that, whilst immigration was an issue of significant concern to the British electorate throughout these years, it only appears to have played an overt and significant role in decision-making in the EU Referendum, and the subsequent vote for the UK to leave the European Union. In the General Elections of 2015 and 2017, whilst the immigration debate itself was salient amongst the electorate, other issues, such as the economy and the NHS, are considered to have taken prominence. This chapter considers why this may be the case and concludes that, as there tends to be little dispute between mainstream parties regarding the need to control immigration, that immigration does not typically satisfy Butler's (1988) three conditions for an issue to become decision-making; consequently, immigration has therefore featured less than one might expect in election campaigns and has, for the most part, operated as a valence issue. However, the EU referendum, along with the rise of the right-wing United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) provided an unqualified opportunity for voters to voice their concerns about national identity, and immigration, and their desire to reduce (or indeed, stop) the latter. This recent rise of the popularity of the right wing has been characterised by a salient shift in the nature of right-wing discourse (Wodak, 2013a); the nature of this shift will be discussed, and the key features of contemporary right-wing discourse presented. The chapter will conclude that immigration is, and has been for many decades, an issue of concern of the UK electorate and that the rise in popularity of the radical right has been assisted by the mainstream media, such as The Daily Mail, The Sun, The Express and The Daily Telegraph all of which are considered to sit to the right of UK politics (Breazu and McGarry, 2022; Moore and Greenland, 2018). The findings of the primary research were set out in Chapter 5; this chapter will provide a more in-depth discussion of these findings, linking results to the original research questions and the literature.

6.2 General Election 2015

The Conservative Party, which solidly won the 2015 General Election with 331 seats to Labour's 232, are a right-of-centre party. Their stance on immigration reflects this, and is commonly known; it is widely accepted that the Conservatives will take, and have always taken, a stronger stance to limit immigration than the Labour Party would be expected to adopt (Geddes, 2005). Theresa May (who subsequently served as Prime Minister from July 2016 – July 2019) as Home Office Secretary in 2013 was famously responsible for the dispersal of a fleet of vans throughout London emblazoned with the slogan, "In the UK illegally? Go home or face arrest. 106 arrests last week in your area" (Agerholm, 2016). At this time, Labour's Yvette Cooper had accused May of adopting the "language of the National Front" (Agerholm, 2016: 1). Under the leadership of David Cameron, the Conservative party had been elected in 2010 promising to reduce net migration to the UK from hundreds to 'tens of thousands – "no ifs, no buts"', as Cameron stated (Hampshire, 2015: 2). The van episode and the 2010 election promise leaves little doubt as to the stance of the Conservative Party on immigration – they were, they claimed, the party who would deal with the 'problem'. As Hampshire (2015) comments, the Conservative Party have long enjoyed a stronger stance on immigration that the Labour Party; and, as Ashcroft states, it is not only the key issues of the day which win elections; a major aspect of a party's success (or, indeed, lack of it) is the "brand" (Ashcroft, 2015: 6). The brand to which Ashcroft refers is the established, long-term image of the party; the brand is an extremely powerful influencer of voting preference (Ashcroft, 2015).

6.2.1 The Conservative Party in 2005 and 2010

There is little doubt that the Conservative brand of politics includes a strongly anti-immigration stance (Pitcher, 2006). In 2010, the party was elected despite its image, long-standing from the days of Margaret Thatcher, as the 'nasty' party (Hampshire, 2015). David Cameron had vowed to change this image following his establishment as leader in 2006 (Denver and Garnett, 2014; Enhill, no date). Whilst this perception of the party as 'nasty' does relate strongly to welfare, and welfare reductions (Enhill, no date) it also pertains to immigration. According to Geddes (2005) the Conservative strategy to remove discussion of the European Union from the general political debate, and to increase the salience of immigration as a key issue, was highly successful.

> …the Conservatives…kicked the EU issue into the long grass, at least in terms of election debate. In contrast, the salience of immigration rose to levels not witnessed in British politics for 25 years….In 2005, the Conservative election manifesto had ten words written on its cover, two of these were 'controlled immigration'.
>
> (Geddes, 2005: 280)

Perhaps more noticeably, the Conservative campaign in the run-up to the 2005 General Election contained posters declaring, "It's not racist to talk about immigration". Given that openly racist discourse has been considered unacceptable for decades - even the British National Party (BNP) denied any notions of racial superiority on their website – this denial of racist ideologies is reflective of a particular right-wing "political correctness" (Pitcher, 2006). The poster was infamously completed by a small, capitalised question in the bottom right-hand corner, "ARE YOU THINKING WHAT WE'RE THINKING?" As Pitcher (2006) states, the implication is that the British voter is having to remain quiet about their true feelings regarding race due to socially imposed values of political correctness. The "sinister undertone" (Pitcher, 2006: 7) is that the Conservative party shares these secretly racist beliefs and privately endorses them.

However, the General Election of 2015 did not appear to have been won on the issue of immigration. The Conservatives, under the guidance of Lynton Crosby, and later Jim Messina (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016; Mullen, 2016; Wring and Ward, 2015) fought the election on what have always proven to be the two key issues: the economy and the charisma of the party leader. In all elections, there are discernible themes; for the Conservatives in 2015, the strategy involved adopting one central theme, and adhering to it. On this occasion, the theme selected was the economy, most often the key issue in voters' minds when the voting decision is made. Labour, under the leadership of Ed Miliband, appeared to struggle to define their key theme of the election campaign. Over the course of the campaign, the themes altered, from the NHS to young people, to the economy, and immigration control (Mullen, 2016). The Liberal Democrats promoted three major themes: their economic competence, their being a central alternative to the two major parties, and their ability to 'reign in' a Conservative government as the minor stakeholder in the 2010 coalition. Although Labour did touch on immigration (control) as one of the themes, overall the topic was not presented by any of the three major parties as the fundamental issue facing Britain in 2015.

Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that immigration did not play its part in the Conservative electoral success of 2015: according to Hampshire (2015) by the 2015 election immigration was, in the minds of many voters, a salient issue and they were clear that it needed to be reduced.

6.3 Immigration as an election issue in the 2000s

In order to understand the significance of immigration in 2015, it is necessary to trace back to the early 2000s, when it began to resurface in voters' psyches. From the year 2000, immigration had become an increasing concern and, by 2005, 31% of British voters believed it to be one of the major issues facing the country (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Geddes (2005) reports that the percentage of the electorate viewing race relations, immigration and immigrants as a major concern rose to 40% in

February 2005. This belief may have been both propagated and escalated by the Conservatives in the preceding years; they fought the election in 2005 declaring it was vital to drastically cut immigration, yet not only failed to do so, actually oversaw an increase in net migration between 2010-2015, a period during which they were in government (Hampshire, 2015). Geddes (2005) concurs that there is a discrepancy of some significance between the commitments of politicians to the reduction and control of migration, and the reality of how immigration works within the country, and whether or not numbers can be reduced. Therefore, despite the unequivocal electoral promise, between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s, net migration (the Conservatives' target) had risen from zero to approximately 200,000 (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Consequently, what can be seen is that immigration had (once again) been brought to the fore of political debate, but little had seemingly been done to curb it; in fact, it had only further increased. The Conservatives had taken measures to reduce immigration figures, but due to EU migration, the numbers had not fallen; as such, it was assumed that nothing had been done (Hampshire, 2015). Media attention to this failure (Hampshire, 2015) had only exacerbated the electorate's frustration at the apparent lack of action.

In 2005, the Conservative Party's image as the party prepared to take strong action to reduce immigration may have served them well. The campaign, with immigration control as a central theme, saw them gain 30 seats (Norton, 2006). In post-Iraq War Britain, despite Labour's popularity declining, the incumbents remained consistently ahead in opinion polls, and Labour leader Tony Blair was still significantly more popular than either Iain Duncan Smith (Conservative Leader 2001 – 2003) or his pre-election replacement, Michael Howard (Quinn, 2006; Kavanagh and Butler, 2005). Additionally, due to infighting and financial difficulties, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), who later came to embody the notion of immigration as the greatest problem facing Britain, were not able to mount a significant presence at the 2005 election (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). UKIP were not aided by the fact that the issue of EU membership, UKIP's original *raison d'etre,* had been dropped from public view by the Conservatives, and was not a campaign issue of any significance (Geddes, 2005) Michael Howard having opted for immigration as the more powerful vote-winner (Norton, 2006). Labour's alleged inability to control immigration (which was brought to the fore in two BBC television interviews of Tony Blair by Jeremy Paxman in 2003 and 2005; under pressure to provide solid figures on illegal immigration, Blair was unable to produce clear statistics, giving rise to the belief - fully exploited by the Conservatives - that the Labour government had lost control of immigration, and that the system was in chaos) (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005; Geddes, 2005) meant that the Conservatives had an issue on which they were clearly stronger, and they placed it at the heart of their campaign (Geddes, 2005; Norton, 2006). Quinn (2006) reports that on the increasingly salient issue of immigration, the public

displayed a clear preference for Conservative ideologies; this posed a considerable threat to the Labour government, and certainly proved a cause for concern.

Under Lynton Crosby's guidance, immigration became the party's 'dog whistle' issue (Geddes, 2005) where they transmitted messages to attract those who agreed with their stance but would not cause offence to others. At this moment in time, the statistics demonstrate that there were large numbers of voters for whom this message would have resonated: according to Geddes (2005) 11% of voters agreed with the BNP stance of an absolute ban on immigration, whilst 58% desired stricter controls, and 65% reported that they believed the Labour government was being dishonest about immigration figures. Quinn (2006) highlights how immigration and national security had become heightened public concerns following 9/11; Labour favoured a liberal, market-driven approach to immigration, about which the electorate had previously been relatively relaxed (Quinn, 2006). However, the 2003 – 2005 arrival of larger than anticipated numbers of East European migrants coupled with greater numbers of asylum seekers (following the Iraq War) meant that suspicion and resentment of immigrants, stoked by newspapers such as *The Sun* and *The Daily Mail,* was beginning to grow (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005; Quinn, 2006; Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). Whilst evidence demonstrated that this surge had had demonstrable economic benefits for the UK economy, this was not the general perception of the electorate, who feared for public services and their jobs (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). As a result, given that the decision of Labour government not to impose restrictions on free movement of labour from newly-joined Central and Eastern European countries had led to significantly higher than anticipated immigration figures, (Clarke et al., 2017; Goodwin and Ford, 2017; Mosbacher and Wiseman, 2017) the Conservatives were the 'go-to' party for the voter who wanted to see a reduction in immigration and they ran a "campaign based on fear of immigration and immigrants" (Mosbacher and Wiseman, 2017: 286-287; Norton, 2006). The party looked to exploit this disquiet in southern constituencies in order to regain support from their traditional voters (Geddes and Tonge, 2005; Kavanagh and Butler, 2005; Norton, 2006). Kavanagh and Butler (2005) report that pre-election polls illustrate an increase in popularity for Howard whenever he made a public statement about controlling immigration. Whilst some Tory candidates' anti-immigration publicity material caused offence and at times backfired (Geddes, 2005) immigration, although it did not secure them electoral success, appears to have proven a vote-winner for the Conservatives in 2005.

In the 2010 General Election, no mainstream party gained a full majority in the House of Commons, a situation which led to the first coalition government in the UK since 1945 (Wintour, 2010). This election saw the beginnings of the rise of the 'others' (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 115) the smaller political parties who had hitherto been very much on the fringe of UK politics but were clearly becoming 'serious contenders for election and office' (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 115-116). This was

largely driven by the expenses scandal (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). The most prominent of those others would transpire to be UKIP. In 2006, Cameron had famously referred to UKIP as 'a bunch of fruitcakes and loonies and closet racists' (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 116) but by 2009, UKIP had placed themselves in a position to seriously challenge the established politics.

6.4 The rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

UKIP's rise to public prominence appears to originate in 2006, when Nigel Farage was elected leader of UKIP (BBC, 2016); aware that UKIP needed to broaden its appeal, he determined that the party should not only focus on withdrawal from the European Union, which was not a salient issue for the UK electorate at this time, ranking as low as twelfth in order of electoral importance (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010; McKay, 2006). Under Farage, UKIP were to develop stances on wider issues such as education, trade and immigration in order to widen their appeal (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). Farage claimed his party were the solution to 'an enormous vacuum in British politics' because there was so little to distinguish the three main parties on the key issues (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 116). Over the coming years, UKIP was to see a surge in support, heavily bolstered by timely 2009 media reporting of the MPs' expenses scandal, which can only have added to the already present public dissatisfaction with traditional politics (Allen, 2006); they saw notable success in the 2009 European Elections in which the electorate grabbed an opportunity to punish mainstream MPs:

> UKIP's campaign offered a potent mix of Eurosceptic, populist and anti-immigration messages: EU membership was costing Britain £40 million every day, and each British family £2000 each year; corruption in the European Parliament was endemic; Britain had lost control of its borders; immigration was out of control; the country was losing its national identity; and, recycling the message proposed by Dick Morris in 2004, voters should 'say no' to the EU and corrupt politicians in Westminster. The elections, which before the expenses scandal had looked to be a disaster for UKIP, now turned into another triumph.

(Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 76)

It would appear that it was in 2009 that UKIP's brand of anti-establishment, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration politics had begun to attract a significantly greater audience than in previous years. Both UKIP and the BNP gained seats in the 2009 European Parliament (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). Curtice (2010) writes of the appeal of UKIP to those 'disenchanted' (Curtice, 2010: 3) who felt extremely concerned about inequality and were increasingly disillusioned with UK political processes; this may explain the tremendous impact of the MPs expenses scandal, which dominated Parliament in 2009

(Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010; Denver and Garnett, 2014). In accordance with this, Kavanagh and Cowley (2010) report that, by 2010 a considerable section of the British electorate were distrustful of their political representatives, and perceived Britain as 'a nation in decline' (2010: 34). It is reported that 30% of the electorate were considering voting for a minor party, and that 80% felt that the mainstream parties had 'let the country down' (Cowley, 2010: 115). Many of these voters belong in the heartlands of 'Old Labour', 'where senses of vulnerability and insecurity in relation to changes such as those induced by immigration may be high' (Geddes, 2005: 292).

Traditionally, the Conservatives are perceived as the party to control immigration, while Labour are viewed as being too lenient. However, David Cameron's initiative to remove the 'nasty' label with social liberalism meant that this 'toughness' was perhaps less evident to voters than it had once been. Norman Tebbitt, who supported a strong anti-immigration stance in 2005 (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005) is said to have warned Cameron that the party risked being seen as overly lenient on both the EU and immigration, and this could leave a potential gap for a party with an alternative message, namely UKIP or the BNP (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). This shared weakness was further highlighted in all of the three Prime Ministerial television debates, in which immigration was one of the most frequently raised topics (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). And despite Farage's impromptu resignation as leader in 2009 (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010), by the 2010 election, immigration had become the second most important issue for the British electorate; only the economy was considered more important. Given the financial crisis that had begun in 2007-8, the salience of the economy is not unexpected. However, it is clear that immigration remained high on the public agenda. Indeed, David Cameron's pledge to reduce immigration to tens of thousands, 'no ifs no buts' (Hampshire, 2015: 2) was a key soundbite of the campaigns. Although no longer leader of UKIP, Farage remained in the public sphere (Hampshire, 2015) espousing UKIP policies in an unusually reverent manner, thus maintaining the salience of the issue. It was clear that anti-immigration parties, including UKIP and the English Defence League, were attempting to seize the opportunity to increase their share of the vote (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).

Notably, it was one particular sector of society who were to be the target of this brand of anti-immigrant sentiment: the Muslim population. According to Voas and Ling (2010) significant growth in the Muslim population of the UK, combined with the London bombings of 2005 had led to a resurgence of anti-Islamic feeling, not seen since the Salman Rushdie book-burnings of 1989:

> Just when religious divisions were fading into insignificance, these perceived threats to national identity and public order have propelled religion back to the forefront of communal concern. Social class, sex and race may be objectively more important, but religion – and particularly Islam – appears to provoke more anxiety than these other

traditional distinctions….Some of the reaction comes from the reaction of people who feel negatively about 'others' in general, but a larger number of people in Britain are unfavourable only to Muslims.

(Voas and Ling, 2010: 68 - 83)

Therefore, UKIP's 2010 election campaign did all it could to attract the growing number of voters uneasy about immigration and, in particular, Islamic fundamentalism; the party was clear these were key issues for them in the fight to win more votes. The popularity of anti-Muslim sentiment had been demonstrated by the success of BNP's recent anti-Muslim rhetoric (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). As such, UKIP proposed various headline-grabbing anti-Islamic measures, such as banning the burqa and niqab in public, and linked this issue to the overall concern of immigration (Ford and Goodwin, 2014), thereby melding the two issues almost into one. UKIP also looked to exploit the perceived weakness of the mainstream parties in this area (David Cameron's move away from the 'nasty' party image (Enhill, no date; Ford and Goodwin, 2014) in which Cameron had displayed a desire to embrace social liberalism and had promoted issues such as the protection of the environment (Denver and Garnett, 2014; Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010) whilst both Labour and the Liberal Democrats were considered overly lenient (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010) by claiming that UKIP were the party brave enough to deal with the politically incorrect issue of immigration. Kavanagh and Cowley (2010) state that both Labour and Conservative were relatively aligned on many issues, including placing limits upon immigration from non-EU countries, so this may have created a space for a more right-wing agenda to emerge into the mainstream; hence Farage's 'vacuum' statement. The UKIP message appealed to those who were uncomfortable with the notion of voting for the now-unpopular BNP, but who strongly identified with a populist, anti-immigration, anti-EU, anti-establishment ideology (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). And, as Geddes (2005: 291) states, "immigration and European integration both symbolise challenges to the nation, the state, national identity and sovereign authority". As such, the two issues were amalgamated to produce a very potent, extremely effective UKIP brand.

In the 2010 General Election, under the leadership of Lord Pearson of Rannoch, UKIP fielded an unprecedented 558 candidates, with Farage considered their most likely chance of victory (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). Also displaying a greater presence was the BNP, which fielded 338 (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). The UKIP anti-establishment brand is perhaps best encapsulated by the campaign poster which, above pictures of the three major party leaders (Brown, Cameron and Clegg) states boldly, "SOD THE LOT"(Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 118). This was blended with the anti-immigrant stance to produce a vote-winning, although not seat-winning formula. The Conservatives won 307 seats to Labour's 258; whilst this did not produce the outright majority the winning party required, it

did position them to join with the Liberal Democrats (57) to form a coalition government. The Liberal Democrats, under Nick Clegg's leadership, had performed well (the TV debates were particularly successful) and the appointment of Mr Clegg as Deputy Prime Minister did not appear incongruous to the British electorate (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). What is notable in this election was the apparent increase in support for the minor parties, that ultimately did not translate into votes on polling day – UKIP attracted only 3.1% of the vote, whilst the BNP achieved a dismal 1.9%. UKIP's performance in 2010 was only minimally better than it had been in 2001, and did not advance the party any further towards actual seats in the House of Commons (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Nevertheless, despite the inability of UKIP and the BNP to turn popularity into votes, John McTernan, a former aide of Tony Blair, referred to immigration as 'the dark heart of this election, the issue that everyone was talking about – except the politicians' (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 341).

It is apparent that, by 2010, the UK electorate had grown frustrated with the perceived inability and/or unwillingness of the major parties to openly and actively address the issues that voters wished to see discussed; voters felt that politicians were unaware of the problems faced by ordinary people, and that their concerns, one of which was clearly immigration, were being overlooked (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). Furthermore, by entering into a coalition government with the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats had undermined their brand as the alternative to the mainstream (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). However, aware that this anti-immigration, 'anti-establishment' frustration had not yet led voters to vote for UKIP *en masse*, Farage, elected for his second term as UKIP leader in November 2010 (Sparrow, 2010) looked to capitalise on this disconnection and exploit it to the benefit of his party, adopting a strategy (based on that of the Liberal Democrats) designed to increase the chances of winning seats in the UK's first-past-the-post system. The strategy involved focussing resources on winning by-elections as a route to seats in Westminster (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). The 'anti-establishment' stance was one which presented a broad definition of those perceived to be in positions of power (for example, politicians, media owners and professional, academics, civil servants, business leaders and trade unions), otherwise known as 'elites' and emphasised the incompatibility of their interests with those of the common citizen (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). Between 2010 and 2013, UKIP saw their performance improve dramatically, increasing their record constituency vote share in 4 by-elections and securing the party no fewer than 147 seats in local councils (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).

The Conservatives had made a clear promise to the electorate during the 2010 election campaign that they would significantly reduce net migration figures to below 100,000 (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016; Hampshire, 2015); however, this parliament was to preside over an increase in numbers. Geys, Heggedal and Sørensen (2022) observe that the over-55s are more likely to vote Conservative, and

that voters who lean to the right are more inclined to approve of more restrictive policy in relation to immigration. In accordance with this, the Leave vote has also been linked to older age (Alabrese et al., 2009). This suggests that any significant increase in immigration could place pressure on the Conservative Party to respond. Kavanagh and Cowley (2016) report that, in February 2014 the immigration figures were made public, and immigration into the UK stood at 298,000. It was later to rise to more than 300,000 (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016). Clearly this was not in accordance with Conservative election pledges. 'Cameron's pre-2010 election pledge to reduce immigration to 'the tens of thousands' with 'no ifs, no buts' lay in ruins as net migration figures increased remorselessly' (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016: 14).

Prior to the 2015 General Election, an Ipsos MORI poll conducted in 2014 determined that 62% of voters were very or fairly dissatisfied with the incumbent Conservative government's performance in relation to immigration and asylum. At the same time, only 21% claimed that they were satisfied (see Figure 6.1):

Figure 6.1 Satisfaction among British public with immigration and asylum (2014)

(Source: Ipsos MORI, 2014)

The same study also found that levels of dissatisfaction were particularly high amongst UKIP voters, with 88% being dissatisfied. Regarding leaders best equipped to deal with immigration, Cameron was

considered most appropriate with 23% of the vote; Nigel Farage was considered superior to Ed Miliband in this aspect (20% and 19% respectively) whilst 18% of those questioned claimed they did not trust any of the leaders to deal with immigration (Ipsos Mori, 2014). To place further pressure, a 2015 poll (Ipsos MORI Issue Index, 2014) considering the salience of immigration found that the issue was considered very important at this time (see Figure 6.2).

Figure 6.2 Issues considered to be most important to British voters (1993 – 2014)

6.5 Immigration as an election issue in 2015 – Labour and Conservative struggles with UKIP

Smith and Deacon (2018) highlight the significance of public concern regarding immigration in the mid-2000s. Given that immigration was a dominant factor in the determination of voting preference and party allegiance for many UK voters, this does not explain why it failed to establish itself overtly as a key campaign theme for the major parties in the 2015 General Election. Duffy (2014) illustrates how immigration had grown to be one of the highest concerns amongst much of the electorate; the issue was registering as vote-determining, and all parties had devoted significant sections of their manifestos to it (Leruth and Taylor-Gooby, 2019; Moore, 2018). Additionally, given that the Conservatives are considered more effective at controlling net inward migration, it would seem logical for the party to exploit this aspect of their brand in full. According to Hampshire (2015) immigration was the second-most important issue for voters (the economy was first), with the majority feeling that the government had to do something to reduce numbers. By 2014, Kavanagh and Cowley (2016) argue

that it had become even more important than the economy. Although the Conservative Government had taken action to reduce immigration figures, none had proven successful; however, the party adhered to their 2010 promise once again in 2015 – they would cut net migration to the tens of thousands (Hampshire, 2015).

One possible – and plausible – explanation for the apparent reluctance of the major parties to devote a significant amount of time and attention to immigration is that the rise of UKIP, a party which campaigned with immigration, and more importantly, immigration reduction, as its key theme was proving difficult for the more mainstream parties to navigate. UKIP's ascension proved difficult for both the Conservatives and Labour (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016; Hampshire, 2015). In Farage's second term as UKIP leader, he had increased the focus on immigration as the party's core issue (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016; Liddle, 2016; Hampshire, 2015; Ford and Goodwin, 2014) and this was proving effective. Hampshire (2015) cites both the previous Labour government's liberal approach and the later Conservative failure to reduce immigration to the 'tens of thousands' during their time in office between 2010 – 2015 as significant factors in the increase in support for UKIP. The perceived inadequacy of the two main parties led to neither wishing to draw too much attention to immigration during the campaign (Hampshire, 2015), a strategy apparently in accord with Ken Clarke's declaration that "You can't outkip UKIP" (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016: 53). As Curtice (2010: 2) states, 'One of the most remarkable developments during the lifetime of the 2010-15 Parliament has been the emergence of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as a significant political force.' Kavanagh and Cowley (2016) report that, in response to higher than anticipated immigration figures, the Conservative Government, with Theresa May as Home Secretary, placed further restrictions on international student visas and non-EU migration. However, these measures were not sufficient to prevent the popular rise of UKIP:

> …no party could compete with the stark simplicity of UKIP's policy on withdrawal from the EU, which was the only way to stop unrestricted entry from the Member States.
>
> (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016: 14)

This became ever more difficult for the Conservative Party. In January 2014, one poll indicated that more than 30% of 2010 Conservative voters were now planning to vote for UKIP. Maynard's (2021) work highlights how the key issue likely to lead voters away from the mainstream to vote for a more radical, populist party (such as UKIP) is immigration. This empowered the right-wing of the Conservative Party to argue that tougher rhetoric on immigration and EU withdrawal was essential for 2015 electoral success, with many concurring with UKIP that Britain should seek to leave the EU (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). Later the same year, in August, Douglas Carswell, the Conservative MP

for Clacton (a constituency in which UKIP were strongly supported) announced his resignation from the party to join UKIP. Whilst this in itself was damaging (Liddle, 2016), there was concern (ultimately unfounded) as to whether other MPs would follow suit (Liddle, 2016). This might have suggested to voters a sympathy between Conservative and UKIP ideology, but the Conservative campaign was reluctant to alienate voters by identifying too closely with the UKIP brand of 'cultural threat and anger' (Liddle, 2016: 55).

Labour were also troubled by the increased popularity of UKIP. Although initially UKIP had been viewed by Labour as almost helpful in that the party would attract conservative voters, it became apparent that support for UKIP was growing in Labour strongholds (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016) and ultimately UKIP caused greater damage to Labour than it did the Conservatives (Liddle, 2016). Although many high-profile UKIP figures had formerly been Conservatives (including Nigel Farage) and it had been assumed the party would draw voters from the political right, evidence demonstrated the that core UKIP vote consisted of elderly, white, working class males (Liddle, 2016). Ford and Goodwin (2014) concur:

> UKIP are not a second home for disgruntled Tories in the shires; they are a first home for angry and disaffected working-class Britons of all political backgrounds, who have lost faith in a political system that they feel ceased to represent them long ago.
>
> (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 33)

UKIP's message during the election campaign appealed more to the traditional Labour voter, and Farage reinforced this by frequently criticising Labour for having forgotten its traditional base (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). 'Under Farage, UKIP increasingly became a party of these "left behind" voters: working class, mostly white, and with few educational qualifications' (Hampshire, 2015: 7). Morrison considers the 'left behind' to be those who experience not only economic disadvantage but also feel culturally out of synch with what might be perceived as more progressive politics – a sense that traditional values have been abandoned and a rejection of the ideals of multiculturalism (Morrison, 2022). Liddle concurs that those with lower educational attainment were more likely to vote for UKIP, and that this was a more significant factor than social class. The successful fusion of a Eurosceptic message with an anti-immigration stance (Liddle, 2016) enabled UKIP to retain the votes of the Eurosceptic ex-Conservatives, whilst attracting the traditional Labour voters who feel alienated and marginalised by many of the changes brought about by globalisation (Goodwin, 2017a; Hampshire, 2016). The Labour leader, Ed Miliband, elected in 2010 after Gordon Brown's resignation (Denver, Carman and Johns, 2012) spoke frequently about immigration during the campaign, but was unwilling to support an EU referendum. In 2015, the electorate reportedly turned away from Labour

because the stance on immigration (although one of control) was not sufficiently severe and, whilst free movement from the EU continued, could not be adequate to allay concerns; additionally, Miliband did not appear at ease with the subject of immigration control – Miliband's parents being immigrants themselves did not strengthen his standing on this matter (Denver, Carman and Johns, 2012). Clearly, UKIP posed a significant threat to the Labour Party in 2015.

David Cameron and George Osborne's decision to install Lynton Crosby as key strategist for the Conservative campaign was to lead the party further away from the issue of immigration. Crosby was of the view that issues such as Europe were proving antagonistic to the party's support base, and therefore advocated moving away from this to focus on the incumbent government's competencies, namely having apparently rescued the UK economy following the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). As such, although immigration was a key issue for voters in 2015, and an area in which they were dissatisfied with government performance, it did not appear to play a key role in the 2015 election campaigns of the mainstream parties: firstly, in response to the UKIP threat, the Conservative/Crosby strategy was to focus solely on the long-term economic plan for the UK (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). The Conservative Party simply stopped talking about immigration (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). Secondly, Labour's decision to avoid focussing on immigration as a key issue was due to the fact that their brand is one of leniency in this area (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010), and therefore it is not a vote-winner for them. Labour's main focus during the 2015 campaign was the NHS, an electoral weakness for the Conservatives (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016) although there were a number of other issues which contributed to the campaign. Thus, UKIP further established itself as the party prepared to take strong action to control immigration. According to Kavanagh and Cowley (2016) immigration was so successful for UKIP because it was hugely salient, the other parties had apparently failed to deal with it, and there were obvious synergies with EU withdrawal and the accompanying end of freedom of movement, UKIP's raison d'etre. Liddle (2016) contends that for UKIP's four million voters in 2015, EU membership was only the fifth most important issue: it was Farage's powerful anti-immigration stance that was most significant in garnering support. Thus, by 2015, UKIP had become 'the people's army' (O'Reilly, 2016: 808) and they effectively 'owned' the issue of immigration (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016: 112).

The outcome of the 2015 Election – an unequivocal Conservative majority - was an unexpected result (Mullen, 2016; Ashcroft, 2015; Curtice, 2015). Surprisingly, the Conservatives made significant gains in terms of number of seats (+24) whilst Labour and the Liberal Democrats suffered significant losses (-26 and -49 respectively). The hitherto unforeseen but dramatic decline in the status of the Liberal Democrats, along with the rise in popularity of more marginal parties, proved the more notable outcomes of what was considered a relatively uneventful campaign (Curtice, 2015). With regards to

the latter, Curtice (2015) notes that almost 23% of votes were cast for minority parties in 2015 – previously, the greatest percentage (set in 2010) was 10%. Whilst the media rhetoric, as is typical, was of the 'two horse race' (Wring and Ward, 2015; Cushion and Sambrook, 2015; Beckett, 2015), the reality of voting preferences depicted something different. One major factor in this was the prominence of UKIP, which succeeded in placing itself as the first major new party in over ten years (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). UKIP's buoyancy in 2015 was to continue well into 2016 when Britain would vote in a referendum on the party's key issue of European Union membership.

6.6 Media coverage during the 2015 election

Smith and Deacon (2018) argue that, given the potential for the media to control the narrative regarding immigration, analysis of their role in establishing the major stories in relation to immigration is important. A number of studies have been conducted which examine the role of media coverage of immigration in the run up to the 2015 election. In terms of media coverage of immigration during the election campaign, Moore (2018) notes that the issue was highly salient in the press, most notably the tabloids, and that the coverage was predominantly negative; Moore's (2018) work, however, does not extend to broadcast news. This accords with the findings of Smith and Deacon (2015) which also noted high salience of the issue; again, this was in (pejorative) press coverage. Duffy (2014) links voter concern with immigration to choice of newspaper, arguing that newspaper readership strongly correlates with views on the issue; however, this work does not consider broadcast news coverage. McKeown et al. (2020) also note the rise in political salience of the issue of immigration during the election of 2015; their work focusses on the discourse of dehumanisation in the UK press; broadcast news footage is not included in the study. Cushion et al.'s (2018) study of the 2015 election media coverage attempts to uncover the relationship between press coverage of immigration and broadcast footage of the same, considering the role the press plays in setting the agenda for television coverage. The broad analysis, whilst finding correlation between press publication of stories and subsequent inclusion in broadcast news, was largely quantitative in nature, and did not analyse the discourse of the major terrestrial channels in any depth. Deacon et al. considered the televised media and their role during this period, but were more concerned with bias towards any political party; the study did conclude that the Conservatives benefitted from mainstream media footage. The study did not focus on immigration as an issue, however. Research into media output during the 2015 General election campaigns found that media coverage of the issue of immigration was predominantly negative; however, much of this focusses on the UK press, most notably the tabloid newspapers, with the broadcasters being largely overlooked. Cushion et al.'s (2018) work considers television output, looking at the mainstream broadcasters in the UK, and considering how the press may have influenced the agenda. However, this study is largely quantitative and does not consider the discourse employed

by said broadcasters. As such, detailed analysis of the broadcast media coverage, specifically the two largest UK channels, has not been conducted.

6.7 The Referendum on Membership of the European Union 2016

The Conservative victory ushered in the promised referendum on EU membership, to take place by 2017, with Britain's exit from the EU a realistic prospect, if far from a racing certainty.

(Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016: 383)

Not everyone who voted for Brexit did so because of immigration, but if we are going to debate what led to the Leave victory this is the big one.

(Goodwin, 2017b)

6.7.1 Britain votes to leave the European Union

On 23rd June 2016, a majority of the UK electorate voted to leave the European Union; the precise figures are below:

Remain: 16,141,241 (48.1%)

Leave: 17,410,741 (51.9%)

(Dunt, 2016: 20)

The result was an unexpected triumph for both UKIP and the official VoteLeave campaign, to such an extent that, on the day of polling, bookmakers were offering odds which pointed towards an 82% probability of a 'Remain' vote (Hannan, 2016). Furthermore, the Remain campaign, formally known as 'StrongerIn' was headed by David Cameron and George Osborne, who had only one year previously gained a majority government against the odds (O'Reilly, 2016). Hannan (2016) notes the improbability of the vote to leave the EU, given that it went:

…in defiance of all the main parties; of the mega-banks and the multi-nationals; of the CBI, the TUC, the NFU and most other trade and professional associations; of the broadcasters; of domestic and international bureaucracies; and of every politician from who David Cameron or George Osborne could call a favour.

(Hannan, 2016: 1)

Given the previous year's unexpected election majority, Cameron and Chancellor George Osborne are considered to have been buoyant about the likely outcome, confident that the side for which they would be campaigning, the 'Remain' side, would easily triumph (Behr, 2017). Once again, the

electorate was to deliver a surprise vote; however, on this occasion it would not work in Cameron and Osborne's favour. On June 23rd 2016, the British electorate voted by a relatively small majority, to leave the European Union. What follows below is an account of how that happened.

David Cameron set out the procedure according to the original promise: the UK's terms of EU membership would be renegotiated with member nations. Subsequently, the British public would vote on a simple 'in/out' basis as to whether or not they wished for the country to remain within the EU.

Negotiations with the European Council ended on February 19th 2016, following a final two days of discussion. It was vital for Cameron to return to the UK with a clear message that a significant change in current arrangements - most specifically, around 'welfare tourism', i.e. in-work and child benefits for EU migrants - had been achieved (Whitman, 2016). In November 2015, Cameron had written to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, to set out the key areas, or 'baskets' as they were termed, of the UK's negotiation. In order to secure a likely vote of 'in' in the impending referendum, the four key areas on which he needed to deliver change were:

- Sovereignty – UK exclusion from the goal of 'ever closer union', a founding principle of EU membership, dating back to the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Greater power for national parliaments
- Competitiveness – a commitment to 'scaling back unnecessary legislation' to increase the ease of trade between the UK and all member states
- Economic Governance – no discrimination against or disadvantage for businesses operating within non-euro zone countries
- Immigration – the UK would not accept free movement of people from any nations which would subsequently enter the EU. The UK would reduce the 'pull factors' for EU migrants by refusing in-work benefits and social housing until individuals have lived and worked in the UK for four years, and abolishing overseas child benefit

(Cameron, 2015)

In a white paper issued on February 2016, David Cameron's government set out his vision for the UK to remain within the European Union with a 'special status', thus giving the country 'the best of both worlds' (UK Government, 2016). The paper argued that the negotiations had been successful, and that the UK had secured significant concessions from the EU in all four areas. As a result, the UK would be 'best served' by remaining a member of a reformed European Union.

It was generally agreed that it was the fourth 'basket', immigration, which proved to be the most contentious of issues. In the other three negotiations, Cameron had secured arrangements of

adequate satisfaction (The Economist, 2016). However, freedom of movement was considered to be a fundamental principle of EU membership and therefore non-negotiable (Warren and Vasagar, 2014). As a result, Cameron's negotiations were seized on as 'weak' by a Eurosceptic Press and by the increasingly visible UKIP. Indeed, in a statement on the 20th February, Nigel Farage, then leader of UKIP, denounced the deal, particularly in relation to arrangements surrounding EU migrants, as 'pathetic', citing the need for the UK to have control over immigration as a key issue that had not been resolved (The Guardian, 2016).

Thus, the outcome of the EU referendum vote was unexpected (Curtice, 2017; Curtice, 2016); moreover, understanding the reasons why the British electorate voted as they did, and the role immigration played in voting decisions, is vital.

6.7.2 Increased voter turnout

One further surprise was the increase in voter turnout as compared to the 2015 General Election. Whilst UKIP had garnered much support from the 'left behind' (Hampshire, 2015) the general trend in the UK in the 2000s had been a marked lower turnout among working class and less well-educated voters (Tilley and Evans, 2017). According to Tilley and Evans (2017) this was a direct result of those voters feeling that none of the parties were actually representing them. Whilst voters who claimed to have a significant interest in politics were consistent in their turnout between 2015 and 2016, Tilley and Evans (2017: 2) note that in the 2015 General Election only 30% of voters with 'no interest in politics', yet in the 2016 referendum this figure rose to 43%. Curtice (2017: 6) concurs: 'Thus it appears that the EU referendum was somewhat more successful at bringing the reactively uninterested and disengaged to the polls'. Consequently, it is clear that the referendum campaign to some degree mobilised those who had previously not voted due to feeling a lack of political representation. It is therefore feasible that these voters were the disenfranchised UKIP supporters to which Hampshire (2015) refers.

6.7.3 The role of education and age in voting behaviour

Whilst the referendum succeeded in engaging previously uninterested voters, it also illustrated in its outcome, a very clear divide on the basis of educational attainment and age (Curtice, 2017; Stocker, 2017). Data from Curtice (2017: 7) demonstrates that levels of education and age groups were the strongest indicators of voting preference (see Table 6.1):

Table 6.1 Leave/Remain vote in 2016 Referendum by age and education level

Table 3 EU Referendum vote, by age group and highest educational qualification+

		EU Referendum vote		
		Leave	Remain	*Unweighted base*
Age group				
18-24	%	28	72	*108*
25-34	%	37	63	*254*
35-44	%	37	63	*326*
45-54	%	47	53	*406*
55-64	%	55	45	*425*
65+	%	63	37	*732*
Highest educational qualification				
Degree	%	22	78	*569*
Higher education below degree	%	53	47	*271*
A-level	%	41	59	*387*
GCSE A-C	%	62	38	*419*
GCSE D-G	%	69	31	*166*
None	%	72	28	*405*

+ Respondents who did not know or refused to say how they had voted in the referendum were excluded from the analysis of voting behaviour.

Curtice (2017: 7)

As can be clearly seen, higher levels of education equated to a far greater likelihood of voting remain; additionally, younger voters were also significantly more likely to vote remain. Whilst it would appear from this data that age is equally strong an indicator of voting preference, the chart below illustrates how educational attainment was the far more powerful influence (see Table 6.2):

Table 6.2 The Remain vote, by age and education level

Table 4 Percentage voting Remain, by age and highest educational qualification combined

% Remain	Age group		
	18-34	35-54	55+
Highest educational qualification			
Degree	80	81	70
Higher below degree/A-level	71	54	41
GCSE or less	37	37	30

Bases for this table can be found in the appendix to this chapter
+ Respondents who did not know or refused to say how they had voted in the referendum were excluded from the analysis of turnout.

(Curtice, 2017: 7)

Here it is apparent that those educated to degree level (or higher) were significantly more likely to vote to remain than those who hold GCSEs or lower. Of those who had graduated, 81% voted to remain, in comparison with only 37% of voters who hold GCSEs or less (Curtice, 2017). Thus, Curtice (2017) concludes that educational background, which has a strong association with social class, was the most significant driver of voter decision making in the referendum. Stocker extends this by noting that the leave vote was strongly driven by those voters who are 'most at risk of poverty' (Stocker, 2017: 2). Given that Hampshire (2015: 7) argues that 'Under Farage, UKIP increasingly became a party of these "left behind" voters: working class, mostly white, and with few educational qualifications', this provides further evidence that the EU referendum brought greater numbers of UKIP supporters to the polling stations than the General Election 2015 had done. This corresponds with Farrell and Goldsmith's (2017) assertion that the referendum 'had actively dug into the cohort of people who didn't usually vote, and discovered that this time they had – and these non-voters were voting to leave'. Therefore, the lesser educated, lower socio-economic groups, many of whom did not ordinarily vote – UKIP's 'left behind' voters had turned out, and this significantly affected the result.

6.7.4 The role of immigration during the campaigns

During the 2015 General Election campaigns, whilst the mainstream parties attempted to divert public attention away from immigration to, for example, the economy or the NHS, UKIP consistently pursued their message of the need to drastically reduce immigration; UKIP argued that leaving the EU was the only way to do so. The Conservative Party was simultaneously becoming increasingly Eurosceptic (Hopkin, 2017). Despite David Cameron having dismissed the possibility of an EU Referendum in 2010

(Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016), on January 23rd 2013, he announced in a speech at Bloomberg's London headquarters that electing a Conservative government in 2015 would involve giving that government a mandate to negotiate new terms for Britain within the EU. Subsequently, those terms would form the basis of a referendum on EU membership for the UK. Cameron stated: "And when we have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the British people a referendum with a very simple in-or-out choice to stay in the EU on these new terms; or come out altogether. It will be an in/out referendum" (Cameron, 2015). From this moment onwards Cameron had committed the Conservative Party to promising a referendum on EU membership as a part of their 2015 manifesto.

Although the mainstream political campaigns had shifted the focus from immigration during the 2010 – 2015 parliament, the Conservative Party had become increasingly Eurosceptic, with a notable number seeking to remove Britain from the EU (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). This was in part attributable to the fear of increased UKIP support from Conservative voters (O'Reilly, 2016; Hampshire, 2015). UKIP was relentlessly campaigning on a potent, and increasingly prominent, blend of two highly emotive issues: national sovereignty and opposition to mass immigration (Goodwin and Malazzo, 2017) and this proved successful. Goodwin and Malazzo (2017) state that there were three key drivers for electorate support of UKIP: anti-immigration sentiment and fear of its impact, the influence of wider anti-EU attitudes across Europe and, finally, the salience that the issue of immigration had achieved post-2004, when a number of central and East-European nations joined the European Union. This view is supported by Parker (2017: 479) who considers how the '2004 'failure' paved the way for a fused anti-immigration and anti-European (EU) discourse'. Wilson (2017) extrapolates further, arguing that the Brexit vote is just one refection of a wider populist movement that has been gaining support across all Western democracies. Consequently, by 2016, when the British people were voting in the EU Referendum, immigration was considered by the electorate to be the most important issue facing the country (Goodwin and Malazzo, 2017). Curtice (2017) concurs that analysis of the demographics of Leave voters demonstrates that that the decision is a clear reflection of concerns regarding immigration.

Cameron's decision to hold the 2016 EU referendum is therefore widely considered to have been a response to UKIP's continued growth in popularity, and was a strategic move to reunite a Conservative Party which was severely divided over the issue of EU membership (Shipman, 2017; Hopkin, 2017; Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016); meanwhile, the referendum was opposed by Labour and the Liberal Democrats, Labour having been in favour of free movement whilst in government (Parker, 2017). David Cameron's renegotiation of terms with the EU in 2013 did achieve concessions regarding free movement (Parker, 2017); however, UKIP's increasing number of voters' major concern was reducing (or even entirely halting) immigration and only leaving the EU altogether could deliver this (Kavanagh

and Cowley, 2016). According to Parker (2017) despite the renegotiation of terms, the issue of free movement (and thus immigration) remained salient, and was, for many, the core issue throughout the referendum campaign. O'Reilly (2016: 808) contends that, whilst the referendum became to catalyst for the expression of this discontent, the malaise had been 'bubbling under the surface of British politics for a long time'. This is supported by Goodwin and Ford (2017) who argue that there has emerged since the late 1990s a politically disenfranchised, 'left behind' segment of voters who feel challenged by the political dominance of social liberals. It appears that this 'malaise' of which O'Reilly (2016: 808) writes was to reach a peak in 2016 and therefore dramatically affect the outcome.

6.7.5 The 'Remain' campaign

The StrongerIn campaign, led by Cameron and Osborne, followed the 2015 election-winning strategy of Lynton Crosby by focussing on the economy, and in particular, the risks Brexit presented to the country's economy, job opportunities, and the overall economic well-being of British citizens. For example, a report was produced by the Treasury in April 2016 which argued that leaving the EU would, at best, lead to the average British household being £4,300 poorer, and a reduction in overall GDP of 6.2% (HM Treasury, 2016). The campaign was based on a premise that the British people vote primarily on economic arguments, and are generally averse to political instability (Behr, 2016). Overall, it was a campaign attempting to argue that the status quo was the more preferable of the two options. Perhaps unfortunately, this focus on the risks posed by Brexit led to the campaign being labelled 'Project Fear' (Behr, 2016). StrongerIn was supported by numerous experts from politics, industry, and even popular culture, all warning of economic peril and political instability should Britain decide to leave the EU.

Whilst the StrongerIn campaign focussed heavily on the economic benefits of remaining within the EU, Vote Leave's central message became 'Take Back Control', and this proved highly effective as it resonated with those voters who were concerned about the EU's fundamental free movement principle (Parker, 2017). A key promise of the ultimately successful Leave campaign was the resulting reduction in immigration figures that an EU exit would enable (Wilson, 2017). And as Dunt indicates, 'For many leave voters, money was less important than sovereignty' (2016: 22).

6.7.6 The 'Leave' campaigns

On the 'Leave' side, there were two major campaigns – the official 'VoteLeave' and UKIP's independent venture. However, it could be argued that, in the minds of voters there was little, if any, difference between the two. According to Clarke et al. (2017:13) there were 'two broad camps', that is, Leave and Remain. The lack of obvious distinction between the two major Leave campaigns is perhaps further demonstrated by the fact that, following the result of the referendum, Nigel Farage

was keen to distance himself from the promises made by VoteLeave, repeatedly pointing out that he had not been part of the official campaign.

The VoteLeave campaign was directed by Dominic Cummings and headed by two senior Conservative MPs, Michael Gove and Boris Johnson, Johnson being particularly high-profile and newsworthy due to his much-discussed rivalry with Cameron and his long-held ambitions for the Prime Ministerial role. Johnson was also popular amongst undecided voters, making him the most threatening force (Behr, 2016). It is believed that the decision of both Gove and Johnson to campaign for Leave was a shock to Cameron and the StrongerIn campaign (Behr, 2016). Behr (2016) argues that this Conservative vs Conservative scenario was orchestrated by the right-wing backbench members of the Conservative Party; in other words, it constituted a coup.

Central to the argument of VoteLeave were two key aspects – sovereignty and immigration. These two major issues were encapsulated by the slogan 'Take Back Control', which later became the plea of many voters, and was aired on BBC's *Question Time* on 15th June: 'I want my country back' (Foster, 2016). Whilst the campaign did touch on economic arguments (the most notable being a bus emblazoned with the figure of £350m, arguing that this is how much EU membership cost the UK, and that the money would be spent on the NHS otherwise) it was not the economy on which the campaign primarily focussed (Stocker, 2017).

6.7.7 The outcome – the salience of immigration

Research has repeatedly shown that, in election campaigns, the economy is the key issue which swings the vote (Green, 2016; Ashcroft, 2016; Gerodimos, 2015). However, the economy was the cornerstone of the Remain strategy; therefore, in the case of the EU referendum, this does not appear to have been the deciding factor for the electorate. There is a significant body of research which points to immigration as the key driver of the Leave vote. The chart below illustrates the degree of importance immigration attained during the referendum campaigns. Although the Vote Leave campaign's other key focus, the NHS, briefly overtook immigration as the most EU-related Google search, in the final three weeks of campaigning, immigration was clearly the most searched-for topic in relation to the NHS (see Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 Most commonly searched issues by week prior to EU referendum

Weekly search interest in EU referendum issues

Immigration
NHS
Economy
Sovereignty
National security

y 15 2016   May 22 2016   May 29 2016   June 5 2016   June 12 2016   June 1

Feb 14 2016   June 19 2016

Cummings (2016)

Furthermore, a British Election Study report utilised word clouds to illustrate the importance of issues in the voting campaign. The Leave vote is heavily dependent upon the issue of immigration (see Figure 3.4):

Figure 6.4 'Leave voters' word cloud

(Prosser et al., 2016)

This word cloud provides a visual illustration of issue salience, and clearly demonstrates that immigration, sovereignty and control were key drivers of the Leave vote. According to a British Social Attitudes Survey (Curtice, 2016) 73% of the electorate with concerns about immigration chose to vote to leave the EU. Stocker (2017) reports that 90% of voters who believe immigration impacts negatively upon the economy voted to Leave, whilst 88% of those who wanted to reduce immigration did

likewise. Stocker argues that (2017) economic costs and benefits did not play a significant role in the decision-making process of many Leave voters, but that their vote was a reflection of anti-immigrant sentiment and a rejection of the political establishment. Warhurst (2016) concurs that, although a number of dubious economic benefits of leaving were cited, immigration proved to be the dog-whistle issue for Leave campaigners during the referendum. O'Reilly's (2016: 808) claim that 'Brexit revealed a very ugly face of xenophobia…that had not been visible for decades' confirms that strong anti-immigrant sentiment was a key driver of the Leave vote.

For immigration to have played such a significant role in the referendum, it is clear that anti-immigration feelings were prevalent amongst the UK electorate at this time. One potential reason for anti-immigration sentiment is the widespread belief that immigration impacts negatively on employment, both in terms of availability of work, and the level at which wages stand.

Between 2004 and 2013, the UK had seen an increase in EU immigration of 120% - the largest increase of all member states, and there is evidence that, in some areas, this had suppressed wages (Parker, 2017). A report by the Bank of England in 2015 (Nickell and Saleheen, 2015) found that immigration impacts little upon wages; more specifically, the Bank's research concluded that, although immigration tends to impact very little upon average earnings in the UK, it does have a slight negative effect on the wages of low- and unskilled workers (Nickell and Saleheen, 2015). According to Nickell and Saleheen (2015:1) these findings go against the 'broad consensus among academics'. In accordance with the Bank of England's (2015 assertion, the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) in 2018 published a report into the impact of immigration on a number of aspects of British society, employment and wages being one of them. The MAC concurred that immigration impacts little (if at all) upon the wages of UK-born workers overall, but that there may be a minor negative impact for those working in low- and unskilled professions (Migration Advisory Committee, 2018). Nevertheless, many immigrants from the EU tended to find relatively low-paid work in the UK, even where educational qualifications were comparatively high (Drinkwater, Eade and Garapitch, 2009). Indeed, the Corporate Europe Observatory found evidence that the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) actively encouraged workers from eastern Europe to the UK for work, aware that this would mean highly-qualified workers for lower wages (higher wages than in Eastern Europe, but relatively low in Britain) (Balanya et al., 2003) and there is evidence to suggest that, across the European Union, free movement of labour had overall lowered wages among the lower skilled workforce (Münz et al., 2006). Thus, it could be argued that any negative impact that free movement of labour had upon the wages of UK-born workers, even if minimal, was felt by those in low- and unskilled occupations.

Whilst the impact of immigration on UK-born workers' wages appears to be minimal (though not utterly inconsequential for those in low- and unskilled employment) research suggests this negative effect, should it occur, is short-lived. More comprehensive accounts assert that EU immigration has, overall, contributed to the UK economy; EU immigration does not constitute a burden to the British economy (Parker, 2017). Portes (2019) highlights how the arrival of new workers is of benefit to the host country, as it also creates jobs, and in the longer term generates economic growth. However, as Parker (2017) states, the issue of EU immigration has been very heavily politicised since 2004; this is particularly true in the UK. What is clear, then, is that immigration, by and large, is of benefit to the UK economy, certainly in the longer term but that large sectors of the public do not believe that is the case. Thus, it would seem that, although there had been a minor negative impact on earnings for low- and unskilled workers, public hostility to immigration tends to be founded more on perception than on statistical data.

This is sustained by evidence that the outcome of the EU referendum, and the campaigns which were held throughout proved to be less concerned with the facts, and more with the feelings of voters. According to Foster (2016; 105) the referendum transpired to be 'fundamentally emotional', whilst Lilleker (2016) also contends that it appeared to be feelings which drove voter behaviour, rather than hard facts. The slogan 'Take Back Control' provoked a reminiscence, a nostalgia for, whether real or not, a country that had been lost, and it was 'undeniably effective' (Dunt, 2016: 22). This nostalgia became strongly aligned with the two key issues of the Leave campaign – sovereignty and immigration. A British Election Study report found that, for Leave Voters, these two issues were paramount amongst those who voted to leave (Prosser et al., 2016). These findings are supported by the work of Curtice (2017). Naturally, where emotions are taking precedence over reason, economic arguments, such as those set forth by the Remain campaign, are unlikely to garner support. Analysis of xenophobic sentiment and its relation to the Leave vote by Golec de Zavala et al. (2017) found that rational and factual considerations (such as economic risk) were overcome by affective (i.e. those which appeal to moods or emotions) factors, namely anti-immigrant feelings and fears over loss of national identity. Whilst voters are said to have been 'frustrated' (Ashcroft, 2016: 2) by the lack of factual information upon which to base a decision, sufficient numbers concluded that the opportunity to regain control was worth the potential (but uncertain) economic disadvantage that might ensue (Ashcroft, 2016). Thus, the Leave vote can be seen to have been influenced by voters' emotional responses, and far less by rational consideration of the facts.

The Leave campaign was not offering voters more of the same – it stood against the status quo and made great promises of a global future outside the EU. Whilst key arguments put forward lacked factual basis and appealed more to the heart than the head, Ashcroft (2016) explains that the vote for

Brexit revealed within voters 'a desire for change that goes beyond the dry questions of policy' (Ashcroft, 2016: 1). Despite the probability that more would favour the status quo, it appears that the possibility of change proved a greater mobilising force (Green, 2016).

Furthermore, voters were more concerned about reducing immigration than they were worried about the economy. This appears to have been due to a more general feeling of discontent and powerlessness:

> Leave voters thought life was getting worse for people like them, were suspicious of globalisation and unhappy with the level of immigration, and saw more threats than opportunities in the way society and the economy were changing.

> (Ashcroft, 2016; 1)

Skey (2016: 1) concurs that Leave voters were 'feeling a loss of control and a sense of anxiety' and that this led to anti-immigrant feeling. Indeed, people tended to place responsibility for perceived problems in the UK on the EU, particularly regulations, and immigration, especially immigrants who are prepared to work for lower wages (Birks, 2016). This concurs with Stocker who states that:

> The background to Brexit…was one in which anti-immigration politics and xenophobic sentiment had risen to the forefront of British political debate.

> (Stocker, 2017: 1)

As a result, the perceived potential gains to be had in reducing immigration came to be of greater significance than the apparent prospective economic risk (Ross and McTague, 2017; Ashcroft and Culwick, 2016; Dunt, 2016; Green, 2016) although, as Ashcroft and Culwick (2016) point out, there were numerous misconceptions regarding the relationship between the EU and UK immigration; for example, many of the electorate believed that the EU had imposed upon the UK a quota, a minimum number of migrants that must be accepted. One further controversy (which the Leave campaign exploited) was fear of Turkey joining the EU, the possibility of which would lead to further immigration (Ashcroft and Culwick, 2016). This unlikely claim remains unrealised today, as Turkey remains a non-member of the European Union, and there does not appear to be any imminent change to this situation. Fallacious or otherwise, the combination of these concerns relating to immigration proved highly powerful during the EU referendum campaigns and benefitted the Leave side enormously – immigration was the cornerstone of the campaign (Ashcroft and Culwick, 2016). Behr (2016: 1) reports how Will Straw (executive director of the StrongerIn campaign) complained, 'Immigration was snuffing out our opportunity to talk about the economy'. According to Shipman (2017: 392) UKIP's mantra during the referendum campaign was 'If you're talking about immigration, you're winning; if you're

talking about the economy, you're losing'. UKIP's notorious 'Breaking Point' poster, revealed in June 2016, was a publicity stunt designed only to ensure the public discussion remained centred on immigration, and in that it was extremely successful (Shipman, 2017). In the case of the EU referendum, the issue of immigration appears to have eclipsed the economy in the minds of voters.

6.7.8 The outcome – anti-establishment sentiment

The referendum result is also viewed as having constituted a reflection of continued widespread 'anti-establishment' sentiment amongst the electorate (Stocker, 2017); Behr (2016: 9) talks of 'anti-establishment nihilism' whilst Ashcroft (2016: 2) discusses the manner in which Leave voters' were further roused by their anger towards 'an out-of-touch governing élite which looked down on people like them'. By voting against the status quo, whilst unaware of the true economic consequences, Leave voters were voicing their resentment against the ruling class. According to Ashcroft and Culwick (2016) people were asked if they were happy with the current situation and their response was a decisive 'no'. However, whilst anti-establishment sentiment may have played some part in the decision to vote Leave, Curtice (2017) notes that this factor was a great deal less significant than those factors which related to culture and identity, most clearly embodied in attitudes towards immigration.

Fear of irredeemable damage to the British economy was the keystone of the Remain argument; it is notable that StrongerIn came to be known as 'Project Fear' (Green, 2016). Behr (2016: 1) sees the strategy as an attempt to convince the electorate that 'Brexit entailed deadly economic risk' and notes how Cameron and Osborne were confident that 'It will be about jobs and the economy and it won't even be close' (Behr, 2016; 3). On this occasion, however, this particular brand of fear did not impact as anticipated. According to a YouGov poll, using data from 3766 adults, and collected between 17 – 19 June 2016, a majority of the electorate did not believe that leaving the EU would benefit Britain economically (You Gov, 2016), illustrating the fact that the public voted to leave the EU despite a perceived economic risk. Green (2016) suggests this may be due to the fact that fear did not motivate the voters. Ashcroft and Culwick add that, overall, Leave voters felt there would be little, if any, economic implications of the vote, regardless of the result. However, Green does concede that fear of another nature (i.e. that of immigrants and immigration) played a significant role in the outcome.

Numerous studies have shown that immigration played an extremely important role in the referendum campaigns and was hugely salient in voters' minds during 2016, and therefore was highly influential in the voter decision-making process (Curtice, 2017; Goodwin, 2017b; Goodwin and Malazzo, 2017; Hopkin, 2017; Ashcroft and Culwick, 2016; Behr, 2016; Curtice, 2016). This is in contrast to the 2015 and 2017 General Elections, where immigration was far less discussed, the economy or the NHS and housing appearing to be the overriding issues. In the EU referendum debate, immigration, national identity (Curtice, 2017) and the fundamental EU principle of freedom of

movement (Dunt, 2016), were of paramount importance to the discussion and the outcome. Iakhnis et al. (2018) conclude that, in the case of Brexit, a merging of right-wing populism (consisting of a belief in the true nation and an external threat to this purity) combined with anti-establishment sentiment proved to be the key drivers of the Brexit vote. The result of the referendum created political turmoil in the UK (O'Reilly, 2016), the likes of which had not been seen for decades. On the morning of 24th June 2016, David Cameron announced his resignation, leaving the Conservatives without a leader, preparing for what came to be known as Brexit.

6.7.9 Media coverage during the 2016 EU Referendum

Deacon et al. (2016) analysed media content for bias and found that immigration, along with the economy, were the two substantive issues in media coverage during the referendum campaigns, noting that strong coverage on the former was beneficial for the Leave campaigns, and the latter beneficial for Remain. This is supported by the Centre for Research in Communication and Culture, who reported that immigration rose to be one of the three most prominent issues in both television and printed media coverage of the 2016 campaign period (CRCC, 2016). Deacon et al. (2016) also ascertained that media coverage linking the ballot to immigration was greater on television than in the newspapers, but that coverage of the key issues was broadly similar across the two media. In terms of political bias, the study concluded that the Conservative Party and its affiliates dominated the media discourse, and that the majority of airtime was given to male speakers (Deacon et al., 2016). Whilst Deacon et al. (2016) analysed both television and print media, no focus was given to the discourse on immigration. Evans and Mellon (2019) argue that, prior to the EU Referendum, the media transmitted negative messaging about immigration and the response of the public was to vote in line with this. Whilst the study argues that mediation of immigration is influential in persuading voters (Evans and Mellon, 2019), the analysis of said coverage is concerned with newspapers only. Berry (2016) considers the role the media played in 2016 to have been one of greater longitude than is often discussed; the British public were effectively primed to accept it was necessary to leave the European Union, as they had been presented with anti-EU, anti-immigration narratives by the media for many years. Thus, persuading the electorate to vote to leave the EU was not so difficult given that it was supported by many years of negative messaging on the issues. The conclusion is that 'the media played a powerful long- and short-term role in influencing the result of the referendum' (Berry, 2016:14) and that the challenge for the Remain campaign of making a positive case for continued EU membership was especially difficult as a result. Zappettini and Krzyżanowski (2019) view Brexit as a 'mediated critical juncture' (2019:1) and consider the language of the time; rather than a critical discourse analysis, this is more of a study of certain discursive practices and political slogans, such as 'Brexit means Brexit'. Their work finds that much of the language was driven by a populist, or nationalist,

ideological stance, that it was largely antagonistic, pitching one side against the other, and that it worked to instil a sense of crisis (Zappettini and Krzyżanowski, 2019). Moore and Ramsay (2017) also note the high degree of salience of immigration in the media prior to the referendum, and that it was almost wholly negative; their work, however, considers only print media, and not the output of televised broadcasters. Cushion and Lewis (2017) conduct a content analysis and source balance analysis of televised news reporting of the EU referendum, focussing on whether broadcasters maintained due impartiality. The study is concerned with five major evening bulletins (including BBC News at ten and ITV News at Ten) and finds that, overall, representation of the issues adhered to a right-wing ideology more closely than it did a left-wing stance, noting that Conservative affiliates secured a significantly higher amount of airtime than their opponents (71.2% of contributions were from the Conservative Party) (Cushion and Lewis, 2017). Whilst the work provides an understanding of balance (or lack of it) amongst the major broadcasters, it does not undertake a thematic analysis of the output, nor an analysis of the language employed by contributors.

A large body of research has been conducted regarding the media, discourse and the EU Referendum. Much of this focusses on print media, both traditional and digital. Where studies are conducted into televised news output, there is analysis of issues such as impartiality and messaging. However, a detailed Critical Discourse Analysis of the televised news bulletins pertaining to the referendum has not been conducted.

6.8 General Election 2017

The 2017 general election took place in the shadow of the vote for Brexit.

(Goodwin and Heath, 2017: 1)

6.8.1 Political upheaval

When Britain voted in the General Election of 2015, David Cameron was leading the Conservative Party, Ed Miliband headed Labour and the Liberal Democrat leader was Nick Clegg (then Deputy Prime Minister). By the time voters were making for the polls in 2017's unexpected election, none of these leaders remained in place. Following election defeat in 2015, both Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg had resigned. Later the same year, Tim Farron was chosen to lead the Liberal Democrats, whilst Jeremy Corbyn was elected Labour leader in July (Perraudin, 2015) and September (Mason, 2015) respectively. David Cameron's immediate resignation following the EU referendum outcome had effectively left the UK without a Prime Minister until Theresa May was elected Conservative leader in July 2016 (Johnston and Maer, 2016) an unlikely choice given that she had campaigned, albeit inconspicuously (Crines, 2017; Edwards, 2017) to remain in the EU (Wincott, 2017). A further surprise came in the unanticipated resignation of Nigel Farage on 4th July 2016, leading to a UKIP leadership

election; Diane James was elected only to resign after 18 days. James was succeeded by Paul Nuttall, who had served as Deputy Leader for six years (BBC, 2016).

Against the backdrop of this wholly significant political turmoil and despite having claimed that there would be no election until 2020 (Edwards, 2017), on 18th April 2017, Theresa May announced a snap General Election to take place on 8th June 2017 (Wincott, 2017). The 2017 General Election was a decision May need not have made (Bogdanor, 2017), and in the event it proved a 'huge political miscalculation' (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2017: 3) which 'backfired spectacularly' (Wincott, 2017: 686). The election was intended to be an opportunity for May to stamp her authority upon the party, and for the Conservative Party to increase their Commons majority and thus strengthen their position in the Brexit negotiations with the member states of the EU (Ross and McTague, 2017) by illustrating that May had the support of the British electorate (Crines, 2017). Labour were, at the time, said to be preparing for 'impending electoral Armageddon' (Ross and McTague, 2017: 65) so certain was a Conservative victory. Unfortunately for May, against all predictions (Curtice et al., 2017; Ross and McTague, 2017) the Conservative Party lost 13 seats, whilst Labour, under Jeremy Corbyn, gained 32. May, having inherited a Commons majority from Cameron in 2015, now found her party, with 318 seats, falling short of the seats required to make a majority (Wincott, 2017). An election that had once seemed a certain and unequivocal victory for the Conservative Party, now saw Theresa May's premiership in jeopardy, her party looking frailer than had been imagined possible, and an emboldened Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn (Carr, 2017). A report by the Economic Intelligence Unit (2017) considered the election to have seriously weakened May's position, her government being 'politically fragile' (EIU, 2017: 2) and unlikely to last a full term.

6.8.2 A return to two-party politics – UKIP's demise

In contrast to the General Election of 2015, where one notable outcome was a rise in support for more marginal parties (Curtice, 2015), the General Election of 2017 has been regarded by some as a return to the more traditional, two-party politics (Hennig, 2017). In 2015, 11 parties achieved representation in the House of Commons, but in 2017 only 8 of the 11 were able to return a candidate (Carr, 2017). Firstly, the electorate appeared to have returned to registering support for the two major parties and, given that 82.4% of all votes cast were for either a Labour or Conservative candidate (Curtice, 2017) this would appear to be the case. Both of the major parties saw their share of the vote increase; according to Carr et al. (2017) the Conservatives gained 2.3 million votes (13.7 million total) whilst Labour secured 3.5 million more than in 2015 (12.9 million total). Additionally, the smaller parties saw their vote share (and number of seats) decline dramatically. UKIP, who had seen a surge in support in 2015, and had then been hugely instrumental during the EU referendum, were 'decimated' (Hennig, 2017: 24):

UKIP were the biggest losers…UKIP's vote crashed from 3.9 million votes in 2015 to 594,068 in 2017 (3.04%), failing to win a seat or to come second anywhere. Having come 2nd in 120 constituencies in 2015, UKIP could only manage coming third place in 134 constituencies. They did, however, only field 378 candidates, down from 624 in 2015.

(Carr, 2017: 15)

The decline of the Liberal Democrats, which had begun in 2015, continued with them losing a further 0.5% of the vote despite their openly anti-Brexit stance (Koliastaris, 2017). They did, nevertheless, secure 5 more seats than they had done in 2015 (Koliastaris, 2017; Carr, 2017). The acceptance of both the Conservative Party and Labour of the outcome of the EU referendum meant that UKIP were effectively side-lined during the 2017 election campaign (Ross and McTague, 2017). Thus, UKIP, having been so prominent only a year earlier, saw their support dwindle.

However, the Conservative's loss of their majority was the most significant shock of the election, prompting Robert Peston on ITV news to declare it a 'political earthquake' (Carr, 2017: 21). Prior to the election, polls had shown that the electorate, having voted to leave the EU, and keen to see immigration reduced, viewed Theresa May's party as the superior to Labour in both of these areas (Carr et al., 2017). The Conservative manifesto had declared in its introduction that Brexit would define the election (Hennig, 2017) yet the results would appear to suggest otherwise.

6.8.3 The campaigns – key issues and the salience of immigration

As has been seen, during the 2016 EU Referendum campaign, immigration and the principle of free movement of people between EU member states were highly salient issues, and voter concerns in this area were hugely significant in the referendum outcome (Goodwin and Malazzo, 2017). This salience continued into 2017, with immigration remaining the most common concern leading into the election (Brooks, 2017). However, despite its clear significance to the electorate, immigration appears to have failed to maintain its salience to the end of the election campaigns. Brooks (2017) argues that there are 5 key reasons for this: firstly, the incumbent Conservative Party changed little in relation to their immigration policy from previous elections, once again promising to reduce migration to below 100,000, although they did not commit to a date (Joshi, 2017), using the Brexit negotiations as a means of avoiding commitment on the issue (Brooks, 2017). Additionally, any immigration reforms were small and insignificant, whilst the Conservatives were also aware that, as in 2015 (Hampshire, 2015) their failure to cut immigration as they had pledged meant that this was an area of weakness for them (Brooks, 2017). These three reasons illustrate why the party may have decided to campaign on other issues. However, as Brooks (2017) points out, during the campaigns, there was little success to report on immigration, and, therefore it was not in the Conservative interest to bring the issue to the fore.

Whilst there were reasons for Theresa May to avoid the discussion on immigration, there were also aspects of the campaigns themselves which detracted from the issue, diverting voter attention elsewhere. For example, the leaking of Labour's manifesto prior to its official launch took salience away from Brexit and moved the conversation on to schools and the NHS – notably issues on which Labour could triumph (Ross and McTague, 2017). Although it is widely accepted that voters base their voting decision on long-standing perceptions of the party, its leader and what it stands for (Ashcroft, 2015; Mullen, 2015) Carr (2017) argues that in 2017, the campaigns themselves were significant influencers, with almost 20% of voters changing their minds during the period. Notably, of these voters who switched allegiance late in the campaigns, 54% moved to Labour whilst only 19% settled on the Conservative Party (Carr, 2017). The party leader's popularity is of enormous significance, and evidence illustrates that Theresa may have failed to engage the electorate (Carr, 2017); whilst May began the campaign as the most popular leader since the 1970s, with 61% of the public considering her the 'most capable PM' (Carr, 2017: 52) her popularity quickly waned. In contrast, Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn became increasingly admired (Carr, 2017). This shift diverted media attention towards the personalities at play in the contest, with the nickname, 'Maybot' (Edwards, 2017: 490) encapsulating Theresa May's difficulties.

Despite immigration having been highly salient during the 2016 and into 2017 (Brooks, 2017) voters in the 2017 General Election appear to have been motivated by other factors. Additionally, the campaigns, which did appear to have influenced many voters (Carr, 2017) focussed little on immigration and more on social care and the NHS (Brooks, 2017). As expected, Brexit itself was considered the most important of all issues (57% viewed the EU exit as among the most important issues facing the UK) followed by health, then immigration and the economy (Goodwin and Heath, 2017). Whilst this suggests immigration had become less salient at the time of polling, it should be noted that a British Election Study (2017) found that 47% of respondents believed Brexit would reduce immigration; thus, whilst immigration may not have appeared to be the primary concern of voters, the salience of Brexit may have been reassuring for those concerned about immigration. Goodwin and Heath (2017) find that the marginalised, disenfranchised voters (those who were targeted by UKIP and were far more likely to vote for Brexit), although still keen to reduce immigration, were more likely to be swayed by Labour's arguments regarding the end of austerity and the need for improvements in living standards for the less wealthy. However, UKIP's losses clearly did benefit the Conservatives, and those seats in which UKIP had seen high levels of support did shift towards the Conservatives (Goodwin and Heath, 2017). This was particularly evident in predominantly working-class areas with large concentrations of the population who have little or no educational qualifications (Goodwin and Heath, 2017); according to Carr (2017) the Conservatives gained more than 50% of the UKIP vote. Ford

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and Goodwin (2017) note that these voters had, during the previous Labour-led governments, 'gradually lost faith in Labour as a party that represented them and responded to their concerns' (2017: 18). MacShane (2016) also claims that Labour's traditional working-class voters had been increasingly moving away from the Labour Party for some time. Therefore, whilst immigration remained of significance to many voters, this was not necessarily the determining factor of vote choice.

6.8.4 The battle for the UKIP vote

Whilst immigration appears to have achieved less salience and to have played a less significant role in 2017 than it did in 2015 and in the referendum, the fall of UKIP meant that the two major parties had a significant section of the electorate, many of whom had voted Leave, to gain. Ashcroft (2018) notes that Leave voters who were eager to ensure the government delivered Brexit were more likely to vote Conservative, many for the first time; those with university degrees and more 'socially liberal' (Ashcroft, 2018: 1) views moved away from the incumbents. Those against Brexit tended not to vote Conservative (Ashcroft, 2018). Consequently, the Conservative Party voter is now older, possesses more socially conservative views and is more likely to be working class (Ashcroft, 2018). This concurs with Goodwin and Heath's (2017: 4) analysis that voters with 'identity-related concerns…central to the Brexit vote' shifted towards the Conservative party. Curtice (2017) agrees that occupation and social class were of notably less significance with regards to voting preference in 2017; the political divide is, according to Curtice (2017) now based more on the debate, brought to the fore by Brexit, 'between social liberals and social conservatives' (2017: 8). Wodak (2013a) concurs that the accompanying rise in popularity of the populist right has shifted traditional left and right wing divisions, establishing 'new social cleavages' (2013a: 28). Thus, it would appear that the EU referendum altered the shape of traditional voting preferences, dividing voters according to their liberalist/conservative stance; this can be seen to be illustrated by the disagreement over immigration, and the predominance of identity-based politics.

6.8.5 Media coverage during the 2017 General Election

Starkey's (2017) comparative analysis of viewing figures and readership argues that broadcast news continued to hold sway during the 2017 election campaign, and contrasts this with the written press, which appears to have declined in influence; Temple (2017) concurs that the UK press has declined in influence at elections. Accordingly, Deacon et al.'s (2017) work covers the output of five television news broadcasters during the 2017 campaign – BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Channel 5 and Sky News. The coverage reflects the shift in British politics away from a multi-party election, and back to the two-horse race, with most contributions being from the two leading political parties, Labour and The Conservatives (Cushion, 2017; Deacon et al., 2017). In 2016, research has shown that the

Conservatives gained greater airtime across the broadcasters (Cushion and Lewis, 2017); Deacon et al. found that this continued into 2017, suggesting that more right-wing ideologies sustained their prominence into this time. The study also noted that immigration had significantly reduced salience, and was at similar levels to 2015 across the broadcasters. Cushion (2017) notes that, following the Manchester and London terrorist attacks, news reporting focussed on national security, and other issues retreated. Immigration, in contrast to it's high degree of importance and coverage in 2016, registers at 8th place in terms of time devoted to the issue (Deacon at al., 2017). The gender imbalance noted in 2015 persisted, with almost two-thirds of contributions being from males (Deacon et al., 2017). Deacon et al.'s (2017) detailed content analysis provides a wealth of information regarding the nature of output during the period under examination. However, it does not focus closely on immigration (perhaps due to the lower salience of the issue) and neither the discourse of the time, nor the key themes, are under scrutiny.

Al Nahed (2018) asserts that 2017 media coverage failed to provide UK voters with the information required to make an informed decision at the ballot box, highlighting the work of Cushion et al. regarding lack of balance, particularly within the written press. As has been seen, television broadcasters tended to be less partisan in their presentation of key issues, but on the issue of balance, they too show a preference for the Conservative Party (Cushion and Lewis, 2017).

Research into media coverage of the 2017 General Election seems to concur that immigration as a political issue had lost much of its salience, having peaked in 2016. The reported decline in newspaper influence appears to have generated greater interest in the power of the broadcast media, which has largely retained its status as a repository of information for the electorate. This is in addition to the growing body of research into the role of social media, an area with which this study is not directly concerned. Whilst TV news tends to demonstrate greater impartiality from a party-political standpoint, questions remain over the commitment to balance with regards to sources, with broadcasters appearing to have shown a clear bias towards the Conservative Party in this election.

6.9 The fluctuating nature of immigration salience

Public concern regarding immigration has fluctuated over several decades, and this has been represented in, reflected and/or generated by the mass media. This is illustrated by a series of reports on media coverage of elections generated by the Centre for Research in Communication and Culture (CRCC). The CRCC reports in 2015 that the dominant themes of media coverage of the election campaigns was, for both television and newspapers, the election process (CRCC, 2015). Immigration was ranked in sixth place on television and seventh place in newspaper coverage (CRCC, 2015). A similar report conducted in 2016 demonstrates that, whilst the process of the ballot remained a

prominent issue, immigration salience had increased dramatically, with the issue being the third most prominent across both televised and printed media (CRCC, 2016). The 2017 election saw immigration salience across the duration of the campaigns fall to being only the tenth most prominent issue, with taxation and the economy tending to dominate (CRCC, 2017).

An explanation for the fluctuation of the influence of immigration on voting preference between 2015 and 2017 is provided by Butler (1995) who sets out three conditions which an issue must satisfy to become a decision-making factor for the electorate:

> If an issue is to have an impact on votes it must satisfy each of three conditions: (a) the electorate must have strong feelings about it (if they don't mind much, their votes won't move; (b) the electorate must have a one-sided approach (if they are equally divided, any stance will alienate as many as are attracted); and (c) the electorate must genuinely perceive a sharp contrast between the party stances (if, as so often, the parties' positions are not clearly differentiated in the public mind, their stance will have little effect). Remarkably few issues satisfy all these three conditions fully enough to have much effect on election outcomes……issues that have certainly been of national importance have sometimes been excluded from serious electoral debate; the atom bomb and immigration in the 1950s…

> (Butler, 1995: 98-99)

As Denver et al. (2012) set out, immigration is fundamentally more of a valence issue than a position issue. Whilst individual voters may have varying opinions regarding immigration and its perceived drawbacks or benefits, to a large extent all parties have historically agreed that it needs to be managed in some way; therefore, it is for the voter to determine which party will best manage immigration, not whether or not it should be managed (Denver et al., 2012). This is in accord with Butler (1995) where it is clear that, although immigration has been noteworthy, no major political party has adopted a strong anti-immigration stance, and no party has undone the others' laws restricting immigration (Butler, 1995). Thus, whilst the electorate may have differing opinions on immigration, as none of the mainstream parties has offered considerably different positions on it, it has rarely achieved a vote-determining status. It is the case with valence issues that their prominence on the political stage fluctuates (Denver et al., 2012), and this can be seen to be true with immigration. Thus, whilst immigration has long existed as an area of contention amongst the electorate, it has frequently remained less significant than issues such as employment, inflation, housing, and the NHS, which have proven to be the key areas of debate (Butler, 1995).

Here it can be seen that, whilst general elections rarely offer the opportunity for voters to voice their concerns over immigration (due to the fact that parties tend to agree that it should be controlled) the EU Referendum provided an outlet for the expression of this concern. Therefore, it may be concluded that immigration remains an issue of high importance amongst the UK electorate, and that the vote to leave the European Union, to some degree, assuaged that concern. This is supported by Curtice (2016) who argues that following the Brexit vote, the British electorate is increasingly Eurosceptic, yet this did not appear to surface in the 2017 General Election debate.

Much of the literature contends that the 'turning point' for immigration as a key issue amongst the British electorate fell between 2003 and 2005, when a number of Central and Eastern European countries joined the European Union; the then Labour government opted not to impose restrictions on the movement of people, and as a result, immigration from these countries increased significantly (Clarke et al., 2017; Goodwin and Ford, 2017; Mosbacher and Wiseman, 2017). Prior to that, immigration appears to have been of relatively little salience amongst the UK electorate. Indeed, Nigel Farage has noted that, when campaigning for the 1999 European elections, he did not refer to immigration as an issue on any occasion (Mosbacher and Wiseman, 2017). This concurs with Clarke et al.'s (2017) analysis that UKIP electoral support rises when attitudes towards immigration become increasingly negative. Denver et al. (2014) show that in 2001, immigration was not considered to be one of the top five most important issues facing the country, but in 2005 it was considered the most important (24% of the electorate) and in 2010 the second most important. Given that UKIP so successfully exploited the issue in later years, it can be argued that, in late 1990s, early 2000s Britain, immigration was not considered highly significant amongst the electorate, but that it did become so.

6.10 Discursive strategies of the radical right

As discussed, immigration appears to have played a relatively insignificant role in the decision-making process for UK voters in general elections, with the economy, the NHS and education, for instance, being significantly more salient. This can also be said of polling in 2015 and 2017; thus it could be concluded that the salience of immigration, and its influence on the outcome of the 2016 EU Referendum was simply an anomaly. However, the evidence (Stocker, 2017; Panayi, 2010; Wilder, 2004) illustrates that this lack of salience during election campaigns does not mean immigration and anti-immigration sentiment do not exist within British society, nor that such opposition to immigration is a recent concept. On the contrary, Dorling and Tomlinson link the Brexit vote to a belief in British imperialism, arguing that Brexit will come to be viewed as the final remains of British colonial history (2019). Hostility towards immigrants has been linked with Euro-scepticism back to the days of Enoch Powell (Dorling and Tomlinson, 2019). Similarly, Panayi (2010: 207) writes of the 'endemic' nature of racism and xenophobia in the UK. Whilst evidence suggests that Britain is not unique in the hostility

displayed towards those arriving from other countries, and that similar (and higher) levels of racism can be found in other European countries (Evans and Kelly, 2019) this sentiment has been shown to have underpinned the 2016 vote for Brexit (Goodwin, 2017). Thus, whilst it may appear that immigration is, most often, considered to be of less importance to the electorate than the economy or the NHS, it is far from the case that British society is free of anti-immigration hostility.

Anti-immigrant sentiment and far-right movements have been playing a role in European politics since the end of the Second World War (Wodak and KhosraviNik, 2013; Panayi, 2010). In the UK, this has taken the form of the British National Party (BNP) (Wodak and KhosraviNik, 2013) and, more recently, UKIP, which has gained in influence since the early 2000s (Kelsey, 2016). According to Panayi (2010) hostility towards immigration surges most particularly during war times and periods of (reportedly) high levels of immigration; as has been seen, since 2004, the British electorate has been aware of higher levels of immigration from the European Union. Woodley (2013) also contends that periods of economic instability – such as the 2007-8 global economic crisis – provide opportunities for the radical right to increase their support base. Yilmaz (2012) notes that the far-right has been successful in both establishing immigration as a threat to the identity and culture of European nations, and in ensuring that immigration exists as a central topic in political discourse. This has been achieved by the success in achieving an enduring salience of the issue of immigration, and by addressing 'the resentment already in the popular conscience rather than generating the resentment from scratch' (Yilmaz, 2012: 371). Woodley (2013) also notes the antagonistic nature of the populist far-right argument. Whilst far-right parties generally achieve little electoral success in the UK, and have certainly never gained governmental power (Panayi, 2010) the salience of immigration is ensured by the capitulation of the mainstream parties to the messages of the far-right; mainstream parties move to the right to avoid losing (relatively small numbers of) votes to the fringe parties on the right (Panayi, 2010). Wodak (2013a) concurs:

> …right-wing populist parties cleverly manage to frame media debates; other political parties and politicians as well as the media are, in turn, forced to react and respond continuously to ever-new scandals. Few opportunities remain to present other frames, values and counterarguments, or another relevant agenda. As a consequence, mainstream politics moves more and more to the right…RWP rhetoric becomes more explicit and extreme and continuously attracts further attention…

> (Wodak, 2013a: 35)

Hogan and Haltinner (2015) concur that, although right-wing populist parties are unlikely to attain significant direct electoral success, they nevertheless have demonstrated their ability to 'significantly

reshape national politics by nudging public discourses and public policy to the right (2015: 522). The result is that ideologies once considered the domain of the extreme right are becoming increasingly mainstream (Yilmaz, 2012).

The recent rise in the popularity of the far right (Wodak and KhosraviNik, 2013) is characterised by a shift in the discourse (Wodak, 2013a). As Richardson (2013) explains, the fascists' 'constant dilemma….[is] the extent to which they should be open and honest in their propaganda about what they actually stand for' (2013: 181) and this is an inevitable influencer of discourse. Whilst the debate of the far-right is heavily focussed on immigration (Delouis, 2014), Younge (2018) argues that it is the case that overtly racist language is today considered socially unacceptable; thus far-right parties have been forced to consider how to convey an inherently xenophobic message within a discourse that does not offend. Therefore, where Conservative MP for Smethwick, Peter Griffiths, was elected in the 1964 General Election by those who felt free to adopt the slogan 'If you want a nigger neighbour, vote Labour' (Panayi, 2012: 233) such rhetoric in today's politics would be considered by the majority to be offensive and would serve only to alienate mainstream voters. Richardson (2013) notes that by the 1970s, the once overt fascist discourse had become 'veiled' (2013: 183), whilst Wodak (2013b: 3) writes of the '*rebranding*' of European fascist parties, a strategy designed to distance the present incarnation from the movements of the past. Consequently, a new far-right discourse is essential for the continued popularity of such parties, particularly in the case of those parties seeking election (Wodak, 2013b). According to Richardson (2013) that is one in which overt racism and xenophobia are concealed behind a discourse of 'simple and straightforward opposition to immigration, using arguments and terms of reference similar to those in mainstream political discourse' (2013: 200). This serves to present to the public a moderate façade; 'coded and euphemised' (Richardson, 2013: 201) language is adopted to ensure that, whist the fascist ideology remains firmly in place, the discourse is more acceptable to the contemporary voter (Richardson, 2013). Wodak (2013b) notes that this covert discourse is a potential problem for successful analysis, as the detection of fascist discourse is increasingly difficult.

It is clear that fascist discourse has adapted and evolved since the Second World War; presently, there are a number of distinct features which distinguish the rhetoric of the far-right. One key feature of fascist discourse is 'othering' (Wodak, 2013a). Wodak (2013a) argues that currently, across western European democracies, 'othering' in political rhetoric in all forms of media, and across all tiers of society, has become increasingly normalised. Richardson argues that the discourse of 'them and us' is both 'inevitable and timeless' (2013: 189). Thus, the normalisation of which Wodak (2013a) writes can be seen to have its' roots in more distant history. Further to this, Panayi (2012) observes that:

State xenophobia and racism go hand in hand with popular animosity, manifesting itself

in the creation of outsiders (especially by the press), everyday hostility, the rise of racist

political parties and violence.

(Panayi, 2012: 221)

Panayi's (2012) statement confirms the role the press play in the perpetuation of the belief in the 'us and them' discourse. This is further enforced by Wodak's (2013a: 33) assertion that, 'the rise of right-wing populist movements in recent years would not have been possible without massive media support'. Thus, it is clear that the press are, and have been, instrumental in the dissemination of the messages and ideologies of the radical right.

Where there is an 'us and them' it is an assumption that the 'them' must present as a threat. According to Richardson (2013) in the 1960s, the British National Party consistently placed immigrants as being positioned to exploit the 'generosity' (2013: 194) of the British people. The areas of burden and/or exploitation by immigrants were reportedly: jobs, health care, drugs, welfare, interracial relationships (Richardson, 2013). Thus, the immigrant is framed as both a burden on the British taxpayer, and a threat to the perceived British identity and way of life.

Wodak (2013a) sets out the key features of the contemporary populist far right movement. Within this analysis, the rhetoric of the far-right is examined, and Wodak (2013a) concludes that the 'us and them' narrative is central to the discourse. Far-right parties position themselves as the defenders of the native, using discriminated-against minorities as scapegoats (Wodak, 2013a). Additionally, the rhetoric includes the establishment of the position of the far-right party as the movement of 'THE people' (Wodak, 2013a: 30) standing against the elite or, commonly, the other, particularly those who (reportedly) will not assimilate into the mainstream culture. This coincides with a fervent anti-intellectualism, and an assertion of what are perceived as common sense (and generally traditional conservative) values (Wodak, 2013a).

6.11 Conclusion

Immigration, whilst being of fluctuating salience in UK politics since the Second World War, is clearly an issue that has found itself at the heart of public concern and debate throughout the period with which this study is concerned. The reduced salience during election campaigns, including the General Elections of 2015 and 2017 can be explained by Butler's (1998) three conditions, most notably the third: where parties are perceived by voters as differing little in their approach to an issue, it fails to achieve electoral significance. Voters appear to be disillusioned with mainstream parties' performance on the issue, therefore it does not register highly in the decision-making process at general elections.

Nevertheless, due to the persistent campaigning by the far right and the notable success of UKIP in attracting attention, mainstream parties have moved towards the right (Wodak, 2013a; Yilmaz, 2012) thus narrowing the distance between their political stances on this issue. The 2016 EU Referendum, however, overcame Butler's (1988) final condition, as continued membership of the EU entailed continued acceptance of freedom of movement; here the disenfranchised voters (Goodwin, 2017) seized an opportunity to voice their concerns regarding national identity and opposition to mass immigration.

Across Europe, there has, in recent years, been a rise in the popularity of radical right parties (Wodak, 2013a) accompanied by a shift in the political discourse of such movements (Wodak, 2013a). As such, the overtly racist rhetoric of the 1960s (Richardson, 2013) is no longer acceptable to the mainstream electorate (Younge, 2018). Key components of the radical right's rhetoric now comprise a clearly stated opposition to mass immigration (Richardson, 2013) on the grounds that it threatens national identity and culture (Wodak, 2013a) and poses a threat to the security of the ordinary worker (Richardson, 2013). A sense of 'us and them' (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015; Richardson, 2013; Wodak, 2013a) is essential to the radical right's rhetoric, with this 'other' largely being the immigrant or the political establishment.

The increase in support for the radical right has been achieved with the complicity of the right-wing press (Wodak, 2013b; Panayi, 2010). However, the role the mainstream news broadcasters played in this rise between 2015 and 2017 has been the subject of lesser investigation, as this thesis has demonstrated. A review of the body of research which currently exists demonstrates that much has been uncovered regarding the role media played in each of the ballots of 2015, 2016 and 2017 – a large amount of this has focussed on written media – the traditional press and online platforms. Where analysis of broadcasters has been conducted, it is largely in terms of content and relatively quantitative in nature. Furthermore, each ballot has been scrutinised as a discrete unit, and no comparative analysis of the broadcaster's output over this period has been conducted. How did the output alter, and why might this be the case? Therefore, this thesis sought to uncover the political ideologies most widely and frequently disseminated by the two major UK news broadcasters prior to the UK General Election of 2015, the EU Referendum of 2016 and the 2017 UK General Election through analysis of the discursive strategies adopted in the representation of immigration, and thematic analysis of both political manifestos and broadcast news output.

6.12 Discussion of key findings of the primary research

Chapter 5 provided a detailed presentation of the findings of the data selected for the study, along with brief analysis. The following section will revisit these findings and provide a more detailed

discussion of the implications of them, with reference to the literature. As elements of the research questions may interweave, it is the case that there is overlap between different sections of the discussion. The research questions will be addressed in the order delineated below.

The primary research question, as set out in chapter 4, is: *How is the issue of immigration mediated by UK broadcast news channels during the 2015 General Election, the 2016 EU Referendum, and the 2017 General Election campaigns?*

Accordingly, this discussion chapter considers:

- What was the salience of immigration in the data, and how did it fluctuate over the time period in question?
- What were the main themes relating to immigration identified across the texts analysed?
- Did these themes differ across the three case studies, and if so, how?
- To what extent did broadcast media footage align with manifesto content?

Relating to the broadcast news footage:

- What were the common sourcing patterns present in the news footage?
- How was the issue of immigration and/immigrants framed through the use of nominative and predicative strategies?
- What were the recurrent topoi in relation to immigration?
- The ideology of which (if any) political party appears to have dominated the broadcast news footage?

6.12 Immigration salience and alignment of key themes between political manifestos and news footage

6.12.1 General Election 2015

The political salience of immigration increased during the early 2000s and had risen to merit as a significant issue by the 2010 election (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010). This is reflected by the growth in stature of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) at this time, which campaigned heavily on the issue and gained notable support (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). By 2015, large numbers of voters (62%) were reporting that they were dissatisfied with the government action on dealing with immigration (Ipsos MORI, 2014), and research (Hampshire, 2015; Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016) indicates that concern around immigration was very high, with only the economy registering similar levels of unease. However, during the election campaign of 2015, none of the major political parties (including the Conservatives) adopted immigration as a key theme; this appears to have been largely due to the increasing popularity of UKIP, for whom immigration control had become a core tenet

(Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016; Hampshire, 2015; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). For the Conservatives, it was challenging because the party would have had to admit failure on their 2010 promises to reduce immigration; for Labour, it was problematic because they were depicted as having abandoned their traditional voters on the issue. Whilst neither party appears to have (explicitly) campaigned heavily on immigration in 2015, Kavanagh and Cowley (2016) indicate that both were troubled by the potential loss of voters to the anti-immigration, anti-EU UKIP. Therefore, whilst open campaigning on the issue may have been limited, each party's manifesto clearly sets out their immigration stance at this time.

With regards to issue salience in the party-political manifestos, it appears that the Conservative Party placed immigration relatively high. Whilst it was afforded a similar degree of attention as other issues (such as schools, the NHS, or pensions) in terms of number of pages devoted to the issue (two and a half pages, or 3% of the manifesto) it was one of the primary items for discussion, second only to the economy. As such, it was presented as an issue of high importance, and was intrinsically linked to the principal concern of the economy. This order of priority is alike in the UKIP manifesto, with the economy being the primary issue, followed by immigration. UKIP, however, devoted more pages to immigration (four in total, or 5.3% of the manifesto) compared to most other issues, which typically only merited two pages. Given that their arguments on immigration had proven to be a major part of UKIP's appeal, this is unsurprising. For Labour, the salience of immigration was lower. The relevant section was allocated one page of the manifesto (1.2%) and was placed in the fourth section, couched within family and community issues. The economy and healthcare were given higher priority. The Green Party did not discuss immigration per se but preferred to use the term 'migration'. The section was small (one and a half pages, or 1.7% of the manifesto) and was placed thirteenth of sixteen sections. Thus, it can be seen that immigration was not an issue on which the Green Party wished to focus. For the Liberal Democrats, the issue was also of lower priority, being placed ninth in a manifesto consisting of eleven sections and having only one page (0.6%) devoted to it. Immigration was not conflated with economic issues, but with communities and security. Thus, the issue of immigration in the 2015 manifestos gained the highest degree of salience in the UKIP and Conservative Party manifestos, both of which placed immigration second only to the economy. By placing the two issues together, there is, arguably, a degree of conflation. Immigration had significantly lower salience in the three other mainstream parties, suggesting that each political party felt it was necessary to include the issue, but that it was not one on which they wished to fight the election, or that they perceived as vote-winning for themselves. In 2015, immigration appears to have been a key issue for only the Conservative Party and UKIP.

Analysis of the 2015 political manifestos illustrates that both Conservative and Labour's major themes in relation to immigration bear striking resemblance to those of UKIP. The notion of controlling and/or reducing immigration is a dominant theme in the Conservative, Labour and UKIP manifestos, followed by the theme of burden, and then criminality. The first two are also the main theme for the Liberal Democrats, but the section devoted to immigration is significantly smaller than the other parties, so the message overall is that the issue is of far less concern to this party than it is to the others. Only the Green Party frequently frames immigration as an issue of exploitation of the less fortunate. The themes of control, reduction, and burden are largely the concern of the two major parties and UKIP, reflecting the concern of the Conservatives and Labour that votes are being lost to UKIP on this issue (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). Criminality is less apparent in the Labour manifesto, which employs the theme of immigrants as the exploited, but it is a significant theme for the Conservatives. This may be a consequence of the Conservative brand being that that the party is tough on immigration (Hampshire, 2015). A further similarity between Conservative and UKIP was the frequency of references to 'the British people' or similar, and the framing of immigration as an issue of numbers. These two themes were not adopted by the other parties; the Liberal Democrats did focus on issues of control and criminality (though to a far lesser extent than the Conservatives or Labour) but also included criticism of the current system, and the need to scrutinise employers. The Green Party framed immigrants as victims of exploitation, though there was also reference to the need to reduce immigration. The data suggests that the manifesto discourse on the issue of immigration for both of the two main parties is largely aligned with that of UKIP, although the Conservative manifesto is somewhat more so than Labour.

Issue salience for immigration in 2015 was not especially high on either of the selected news channels. Of all footage selected for analysis, the BBC devoted 5% (9 minutes) of airtime to the issue, and ITV only 2% (3 minutes). This perhaps reflects the concerns of the major political parties that heavy discussion of immigration is likely to benefit UKIP (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). The key themes which emerge from the broadcast news footage from this period reveal that neither the BBC nor ITV was closely aligned with the manifesto themes of the dominant parties (controlling and reducing immigration, burden, criminality). The footage tended to focus on what was deemed the 'EU migrant crisis', with the major theme emerging as immigrants as victims (this would align most closely with the Green Party manifesto). There was a tendency to discuss immigration in terms of numbers, with phrases such as 'many thousands more migrants' or 'forty-six are feared drowned', which would align with the Conservative and UKIP manifestos. The key manifesto theme of the need to control or reduce immigration was largely overlooked on BBC and was absent from ITV coverage of the issue. The

broadcast news footage seemed somewhat more concerned with the human story of immigration, and highlighting (to some degree) the plight of those attempting to enter the UK.

It should be noted, however, that the focus of stories around immigration focussed very much on one specific aspect of immigration: desperate people in unsafe boats. No attempt was made to provide a broader understanding of the nature of immigration to the UK. It perhaps should also be noted that no reference was made to the potential benefits immigration may bring to the UK. The overwhelming portrayal was one of people in need, desperation.

Analysis of the political manifestos illustrates that, for the Conservative Party and UKIP, immigration was one of their key areas heading into the 2015 election. As discussed, the party 'brand' (Ashcroft, 2015: 6) is extremely important in terms of electoral success; it holds substantial influence over voting behaviour. It is also understood that the Conservative Party is considered to be the party (as opposed to Labour) which will take a stronger stance against immigration (Hampshire, 2015). UKIP's ascent in the political sphere at this time has been attributed largely to their anti-immigration stance: by 2015, immigration was perceived as an issue of major concern for British voters, with 62% being dissatisfied with the incumbent government's performance in this area (IPSOS Mori, 2014). Maynard (2021) highlights how immigration is a particularly effective issue for smaller parties to gain traction and attract votes away from the mainstream. UKIP presented a powerful blend of anti-establishment and anti-immigration sentiment which It would appear had been successful in this respect (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Thus, the Conservative response to this challenge from UKIP seems to have been to showcase a tough stance on the issue early in the manifesto, denoting its importance and the party's apparent ability to deal with it. UKIP's manifesto, naturally, also ranked immigration highly, and, like the Conservative manifesto, placed it with the section devoted to the economy, thus linking the two major issues. Notably, both manifestos contained a significant number of references to 'the British people', thus engendering a notion of 'us and them'. This was not present in the manifestos of the other political parties.

Labour, as has been seen, was also struggling with the rise of UKIP; the party's brand is not one of being tough on immigration (Ashcroft, 2015) so it is unlikely the party would choose to fight an election on this issue. Nevertheless, UKIP were attracting 'Old Labour' voters and this was a concern (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). It would seem Labour decided to take a similar stance on immigration as the Conservatives, with the manifesto talking mainly about the need for reduction. However, it is placed far lower in terms of priority, well below issues such as the NHS, for example, an issue on which Labour are considered strong. This suggests the Labour Party understood a 'weak' stance on immigration

would not be palatable to many of their voters, but that they also knew the issue generally was not a vote-winner for them.

The Liberal Democrats' manifesto denotes relatively low importance to immigration by devoting a small section to the issue and placing it in a low importance position in the document. Notwithstanding this, it would appear the party chose to lean towards the tougher stance on the issue, as the key theme once again is the need to reduce numbers, albeit far fewer references than occurred in other manifestos. The Green Party adopted a different stance altogether, placing the issue as low priority and discussing it in terms of exploitation.

Interestingly, the news footage analysis suggests that, in 2015, it did not align with the stance of The Conservatives and UKIP on immigration. Both BBC and ITV News framed immigration as a story of desperation and despair, with the theme of exploitation and victimhood being most frequent. Immigration is, in this instance, frequently discussed in terms of numbers rather than individuals which has, naturally, a dehumanising effect. Nevertheless, the footage from this period does not support the notion that the BBC and ITV News are following the political stance of the Conservative Party.

6.12.2 Referendum on Membership of the European Union 2016

Following the Conservative election victory in 2015, the new government prepared to hold the promised referendum on EU membership. Kavanagh and Cowley (2016) report that the Conservative Party had grown increasingly Eurosceptic, in part as a consequence of the continued growing support for UKIP (O'Reilly, 2016; Hampshire, 2015). UKIP had successfully united the issue of EU membership, under the notion of national sovereignty, and opposition to mass immigration (Goodwin and Malazzo, 2017). Many Conservatives were fearful that this posed a significant threat, and saw withdrawal from the EU as a potential response (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016). David Cameron's decision to hold the referendum is therefore viewed as a move to diminish UKIP's presence, and to reunite the Conservative Party (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2016).

The debate over immigration was fundamental to the referendum campaigns and the outcome (O'Reilly, 2016). Much of the research into the drivers of the vote to leave the European Union points to the importance of anti-immigration sentiment and the notion that leaving would enable the UK to 'Take Back Control' of the situation (Foster, 2017; Wilson, 2017; Parker, 2017; Dunt, 2016). Thus, the economic arguments of the Remain campaign were eclipsed by notions of national sovereignty and control (Stocker, 2017; Dunt, 2016).

Neither of the 'leave' campaigns (official or otherwise) nor the 'Remain' campaign produced a manifesto. There was literature, in the form of leaflets and flyers, and also websites, but there was not a clear, coherent document which set out the key issues and each side's stance. Additionally,

neither campaign was aligned solely with one political party – both the official Leave and Remain campaigns were led by Conservative ministers, for example, and there were Labour MPs on both sides of the debate. This, as has been discussed, created challenges in terms of comparability. As such, the data from 2016 is of the news footage only, and this footage will be mapped to the manifestos of 2015 and 2017.

2016 saw the salience of immigration rise dramatically in the broadcast news footage. In 2015, the BBC devoted 9 minutes (or 5%) of the total recorded footage to discussion of immigration, and ITV gave 3 minutes (2%) to the matter. In 2016, this figure almost doubled on the BBC to 17 minutes (10%) and more than doubled on ITV (8 minutes, 5%). Whilst in both years, the BBC coverage contained significantly more references to immigration than the ITV broadcasts, the increase in issue salience in 2016 was dramatic on both channels.

In addition to the dramatically increased salience, what is also observed is a substantial shift in dominant themes, of which there were five. On both channels, the most common trope in relation to immigration was the need for greater control and reduction in numbers. This accounted for 26% of all references and was equally present on both channels (although as a percentage of overall footage, it was more apparent on ITV). This was followed by the theme of burden and/or threat, more apparent on BBC than ITV. Subsequently, there was significant discussion of criminality, immigration as an issue of numbers/statistics, and frequent references to the importance of the issue. The latter three themes were largely present on the BBC, with ITV footage consisting mainly of the first two.

Thus, 2016 sees the news footage shifting to align with the key themes contained in the 2015 manifestos of The Conservatives, UKIP and, to a lesser extent, Labour. The three major themes (need for control or reduction/criminality/numbers and statistics) are the same across all texts, with the BBC being more closely aligned than ITV. The heightened salience signifies that immigration is an important issue and places the matter in a position of significance on the public agenda. This is in accordance with the 2015 manifestos of The Conservative Party and UKIP.

6.12.3 General Election 2017

The 2017 General Election came in the aftermath of the vote to leave the European Union (Goodwin and Heath, 2017). It is widely regarded as one where the country made a return to two-party politics following a period where minor parties had gained traction (Carr, 2017, Curtice, 2017, Hennig, 2017). Possibly the most remarkable outcome of the 2017 election was the loss of the Conservative majority government (Carr, 2017). Polling prior to the ballot had shown that voters viewed Theresa May's Conservatives as the most appropriate to lead Britain through the Brexit process (Carr, 2017). Nevertheless, May did not secure an overall parliamentary majority and required support from the

DUP to form a government. One notable decline was that of UKIP, who failed to take a single seat, despite having received almost 4 million votes in 2015 (Carr, 2017). The Conservative manifesto had declared that the 2017 election would be defined by Brexit (Henning, 2017); therefore, one of the major themes for the two leading political parties in the 2017 campaigns was how to make a success of Brexit, rather than any suggestion that the decision could in any way be detrimental to the UK's interests; whilst the Liberal Democrats fought their campaign on a pledge to rejoin the European Union, the Conservatives, Labour, the Green Party, and UKIP did not.

Overall, analysis of the 2017 manifestos illustrates a decline in issue salience for immigration. During the 2016 campaigns, UKIP had successfully united the issues of immigration control and EU exit (Goodwin and Malazzo, 2017); consequently, following the vote to leave the European Union, it could be perceived that the immigration 'problem' had been dealt with. Additionally, the Leave campaigns, the official one of which was headed by leading Conservative minister and Prime Minster to be, Boris Johnson, had made much of the potential to end freedom of movement, thus reducing or stopping mass uncontrolled immigration. It is therefore not surprising, then, that in the wake of the vote to leave the EU, which had been presented as a means to 'solve the problem' of immigration, both UKIP and The Conservatives devoted smaller sections of their manifesto to the issue. This was most notable in the case of the Conservative Party, where the percentage of the manifesto concerned with immigration almost halved from 3% in 2015 to 1.7%. The Conservatives, as a mainstream political party and the current incumbents, had other key issues upon which to base their campaign; UKIP, however, remained heavily dependent on anti-immigration sentiment and, as such, this reduction in salience was less pronounced in the UKIP manifesto. Additionally, the Conservatives included immigration in the third section of the manifesto, thus lowering the priority of the issue and separating it from the economy, which remained the primary concern of the manifesto as in 2015. For UKIP, the immigration section of the manifesto was demoted to eleventh in the manifesto, suggesting that the party felt it was important to demonstrate a presence and stance on other issues important to the electorate: housing and the NHS, for example. The Labour Party covered immigration to the same extent in both election manifestos, with 1% of the whole document being given over to the subject on each occasion. On this occasion, however, immigration was promoted to the second section of the manifesto and linked specifically with Brexit. Given that immigration is traditionally not a vote-winning topic for Labour, this may suggest that the party wished to focus attention on the matter, precisely because the Conservatives and UKIP did not. The Liberal Democrats increased this section, from 0.6% to 1%, though the issue remained in a position of low priority in the manifesto, included in the eight of ten sections. The Green Party did not include a section on immigration (or migration) in this election's manifesto. Overall, some reduction in salience is seen, though this is largely on the part of

the Conservatives. It would appear, then, that the parties for whom immigration was highly salient in 2015 (ie the Conservatives and UKIP) wished to reduce the salience of the subject in 2017, most likely due to the notion that the Brexit tenet had been to deal with immigration. Highlighting it as a problem in 2017 would send the message that leaving the European Union had failed to deliver on one of its key promises. Thus, it appears that the Conservative Party wished to focus attention away from the issue of immigration in 2017 and, perhaps, that Labour wished to promote discussion in that area.

The thematic analysis of the manifestos highlights that the dominant (most frequent) themes relating to immigration to emerge from the political manifestos in 2017 remain consistent with those from 2015 and are largely the tropes of the Conservative Party and UKIP. Again, the need to control or reduce immigration is most common, followed closely by immigrants as a burden or threat. Whilst Labour and the Liberal Democrats also maintain these key themes, their manifestos are more nuanced, with Labour also framing immigration through the lens of workplace exploitation. Less frequent, in third position, is the theme of criminality. All parties (with the unsurprising exception of the ruling Conservative Party) included some form of criticism of the current immigration system; this was most frequent in the UKIP manifesto. Naturally, the party in charge of the current system is highly unlikely to overtly criticise the status quo.

News footage in 2017, like the Conservative and UKIP manifestos, also demonstrates a marked decline in issue salience, with both channels dramatically reducing the amount of airtime devoted to discussion of, or reference to, immigration. In the selected BBC footage from 2016, 10% of the total broadcasts were devoted to discussion of, and reference to, immigration; in the equivalent footage from 2017, this was only 2%. The same figures for ITV were 5% and 3%. Neither channel ran any stand-alone items on immigration, and ITV News discussed the matter only once in relation to the 2017 election. The dominant theme, though mainly on BBC News, continued to be the need for control and/or reduction of immigration. This maintains consistency with the Conservative and UKIP manifestos, both in terms of major theme and salience decline. One notable shift in the broadcast news is the framing of immigrants as contributors to UK society – this theme did not surface in the broadcast news data across 2015 and 2016 and, whilst it was significantly less frequent than the theme of the need for control, it was nevertheless present. Overall, the most striking aspect of the broadcast news is the dramatic reduction in issue salience for immigration, and this is most apparent on the BBC News. Thus, the 2017 broadcast news, especially in the case of the BBC, appears to be most closely aligned with the Conservative manifesto with regards to themes and issue salience.

6.12.4 Immigration salience and alignment of key themes between political manifestos and news footage between 2015 and 2017

The initial content analysis found that immigration salience fluctuated significantly across the three ballots. This was more pronounced in the news footage than in the overall manifesto content. Although 2017 saw the two parties who were perceived as the 'strongest' in relation to immigration (The Conservatives and UKIP) reduce their manifesto focus on the issue from 2015, the increase between 2015 and 2016, then subsequent decrease in 2017 on broadcast news was significantly more pronounced.

Thematically, the data illustrates that the key themes of the political manifestos altered little over the time period, but that there was a significant shift in themes of the broadcast news between 2015 and 2016. 2015 news footage did not closely align with the dominant political manifesto themes, led mainly by the Conservative Party and UKIP, of control and reduction, burden/threat, and criminality; both BBC and ITV News predominantly framed immigration as an issue of victimhood and exploitation, although discussion of the issue in terms of numbers was also apparent. Overall, in 2015, the level of intertextual similarity was minimal. However, analysis of 2016 footage revealed a far greater degree of intertextuality between the 2015 political manifestos (again, largely of the Conservative and UKIP manifestos, with the Labour and Liberal Democrats literature to a lesser degree). Key themes were closely aligned, and the salience of immigration on the broadcast news reached a notable peak, particularly on BBC News, falling off again in 2017.

As they are responsible for the greatest proportion of manifesto text on the issue of immigration, the Conservative Party and UKIP tend to dominate the debate. Thus, the themes of control and/or reduction, burden and threat, and criminality, along with a propensity to view the issue in terms of numbers, tends to be the overriding political narrative. What can be seen from the data is that, whilst these themes are not omnipresent in the broadcast news footage, they were highly salient at the time of the 2016 referendum.

The data suggests that in 2015 there is a notable degree of media logic operating. The news footage relating to immigration is not closely aligned with the manifesto content of the leading parties, with the issue being framed in notably different ways. There is little in any of the texts (manifestos or broadcast footage) which presents immigrants and/or immigration in an overwhelmingly positive light so, from this perspective, there is a degree of intertextual similarity; nevertheless, the broadcasters do not appear to be following the political narrative on immigration at this stage or discussing the issue on the terms of politicians. It seems to be the case that the broadcasters are deciding on the inclusion and framing of immigration in 2015 based on broadcast media notions of newsworthiness, rather than following the political narrative.

However, as the data moves into 2016, it would initially appear that political logic begins to dominate. The broadcast media footage not only aligns with the prevailing themes of the (largely Conservative and UKIP) political manifestos, the salience of the issue also increases to such a degree as for it to seem of great importance, warranting much attention. This is akin to the placement of the issue in the 2015 Conservative and UKIP manifestos in second place, with only the economy gaining greater importance. Other political parties, as discussed earlier, placed the issue in positions of far lower priority. Given the chronology – the manifestos were published in 2015 and the aligned broadcast news footage was aired in 2016, the implication is that the political agenda is leading the media agenda in this particular instance.

Whilst the themes of the news footage aligned with the dominant narrative of the Conservatives and UKIP, the parties to the political right, the influence of intermedia agenda setting must be taken into consideration. Research (Phillips, 2020; Bennett, 2017; Cushion et al., 2016) has shown that the right-wing press remain highly influential in setting the agenda for television broadcasters. Right wing newspapers have consistently produced negative stories and headlines concerning immigrants to the UK, and the issue was highly salient in 2016. Phillips (2020) notes that coverage by the right-wing press (which has far larger readership than centre-left publications) was overwhelmingly in favour of leaving the EU. The Centre for Research in Communication and Culture analysed press coverage from the weeks preceding the ballot, and found that, when taking circulation into account, the 'coverage gap' between Leave and Remain coverage was 80%:20% (CRCC, 2016). Therefore, as the footage indicated a high degree of control over the agenda by the broadcasters, illustrated by the dominance of the journalistic voice and contributions from a very limited selection of leading politicians with no perspectives outside of the mainstream, it would appear that media logic continues to dominate, and that perhaps it is the right-wing press, along with politicians, who remained the agenda setters.

In addition to the influence of the right-wing press on the output of broadcasters, the fact that the dynamics of the 2016 Referendum differed from those of a typical general election (as was witnessed in 2015 and 2017) should be taken into account. As established, immigration seems to have played a relatively minor role in the typical decision-making process for UK voters in general elections, with the economy, the NHS and education, for instance, tending to achieve greater salience. This can also be said of polling in 2015 and 2017; thus, it could be concluded that the salience of immigration, and its influence on the outcome of the 2016 EU Referendum was more an irregularity. However, Phillips (2020) highlights how, in the case of the EU Referendum, the broadcast media requirement for 'due impartiality' (Ofcom, 2017) was superseded by an approach of 'strategic balance' (Phillips, 2020: 151) where the normal conditions of ensuring no particular political party attains too great an advantage in terms of coverage were set aside for one in which each side of the debate (namely, 'Leave' and

'Remain') were provided with an equal opportunity for airtime. As the leaders of both official campaigns were mainstream Conservative politicians (with UKIP's Nigel Farage heading the third, unofficial 'Leave' campaign) this meant that the political right were the dominant voice throughout the debate (Phillips, 2020).

2017 saw an overall reduction in the salience of immigration in the political manifestos, particularly in the Conservative document. The theme of the need to control and/or reduce immigration remained dominant, again largely due to repeated references in the Conservative and UKIP manifestos. None of the parties included immigration as a high priority item in their 2017 literature – it was of significantly lower priority for all. This reduction in salience occurs also across the 2017 broadcast footage, where the airtime devoted to discussion of, or reference to, immigration declined dramatically. The key manifesto (Conservative and UKIP) of the need to control and/or reduce immigration persisted as the key theme in the (limited amount of) footage, but also included was the theme of immigrants as contributors/workers, a theme which rarely appeared in the previous two years. This theme was the third most common in the political manifestos in 2017 and was largely attributable to Labour and the Liberal Democrats. This suggests a shift in the media alignment with the political manifestos of the Conservative Party and UKIP, although the change is minimal. Overall, the most notable points from 2017 are that the key theme of the Conservatives and UKIP continues to dominate the news footage, and the reduction in salience these parties construct in their manifestos is also reflected in the footage. Whilst the themes from the manifestos, and the drop in issue salience, are very present in the news footage, it is not possible to ascertain from the data whether media logic or political logic is dominating. It is likely the case that immigration at this point was not only a political challenge for the leading Conservative Party, it was also no longer newsworthy. Thus, reducing the salience of immigration at this stage was in the interests of both the governing party, and also the right-wing media. If the traditional sources for the broadcast journalists supply different issues for inclusion, the agenda shifts.

6.13 Sourcing patterns – broadcast news footage

A key criticism of modern political communications is the lack of variety of sources upon which news is based, and the resulting narrow scope of viewpoints that are presented (Blumler, 2014; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Bennett, 1990). In order to establish the breadth of views given airtime, an analysis of the sourcing patterns of the broadcast news footage was conducted. The questions asked during this analysis were:

- Who gets to speak?
- What is the location of speaker?

- What is the gender of speaker?
- What is the nationality of speaker?

The major findings of this analysis are presented below.

6.13.1 Sourcing patterns in 2015

2015 saw a relatively narrow range of contributions, with little variety in the sourcing pattern on either BBC or ITV News. The greatest percentage of contributions across both channels were from journalists, either in the studio or out in the field (67% on BBC, and 57% on ITV). Second to this were members of the British public (21% on BBC and 14% on ITV). ITV gave equal airtime to other officials (such as Italian border officials) and also translators (voiceovers for interviews with migrants). The BBC gave a small amount of time to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition (8% and 4% respectively); besides that, there were no other contributions. In 2015, the channels' own journalists dominated the discussion on immigration.

Accordingly, given the dominance of journalistic contributions, the location of the speakers was primarily either in the studio or present as a voiceover (the latter being more common on ITV News) or in a formal setting. On BBC, these three categories accounted for 75% of all contributions and on ITV, this figure was 86%. Thus, there was little variation with regards to the location of speakers.

Analysis of the gender and nationality of speakers demonstrated greater diversity on ITV News than on BBC. The overwhelming majority of speakers on the BBC were male, with only 8% of contributions being from females. ITV displayed greater balance in this area, with 43% of contributions coming from female speakers. 79% of all turns on BBC News were taken by British contributors, with only 21% being from those of non-European (the migrants themselves) or uncertain origin. On ITV, again, there was greater diversity, with 57% of contributions coming from British speakers. Thus, 43% of contributions were from people of other nationalities; for example, the migrants themselves, or border officials. In 2015, ITV News demonstrated greater diversity in terms of gender and nationality of contributors than BBC News.

Overall, the data from 2015 illustrates immigration being discussed in a fairly tightly controlled manner, with the majority of contributions on both channels being from their own, predominantly male, British journalists. This was more pronounced on BBC than ITV. Nevertheless, the data supports the argument that there is a lack of variety of perspectives and sources in this area.

6.13.2 Sourcing patterns in 2016

As has been discussed, 2016 saw a dramatic spike in the salience of immigration across both channels. In terms of how this affected the sourcing patterns, the data appears to display greater diversity than was witnessed in 2015. However, journalists continued to be the primary source on both channels,

though more so on BBC (48% compared to ITV's 37%). The remaining turns were taken by leading politicians, namely the Prime Minister and Conservative MPs (18% on BBC and 23% on ITV) as well as, to a lesser extent, Labour MPs (10% on BBC and 13% on ITV). Neither channel included any contribution from the Leader of the Opposition on the issue, nor the Liberal Democrat or Green Party leaders. Thus, it would seem that the Conservative Party secured greater access to the media on the issue of immigration than the Labour Party. UKIP secured some airtime on ITV News, though this was not great (8%). There were also minor contributions from other speakers (members of the public, and other officials, but the dominant voices continued to be journalists and, alongside this, the Conservative Party. Whilst there was greater diversity than in 2015, the range of speakers continued to be relatively limited, and could not be considered to represent a plurality of views. Therefore, 2016 data is also supportive of the contention that sources, beyond media workers themselves, tend to be largely limited to the political mainstream.

Alongside greater diversity in speakers, 2016 saw a wider range of locations from which contributions were delivered. The most common location on both channels was a 'formal setting', namely the locations from with the televised debates on the referendum were broadcast. This along with studio broadcast and voiceovers, accounted for 68% of the contributions on BBC News, and 71% on ITV. However, there were more contributions taken in less well-prepared settings, such as politicians on the campaign trail and interviews with the public on the street or at home. Nevertheless, the majority of contributions were broadcast from settings over which the media and politicians exercised control.

Regarding gender and nationality, male voices dominated overall, though more so on ITV News. On BBC, it was almost equally divided (52% male, 48% female) whilst on ITV contributions were largely male (74%). The most striking aspect was that there were almost no contributions from non-British citizens. On ITV News, all contributions to the debate around immigration in this period were British; on BBC, the figure was 96%. Thus, no perspectives on immigration from outside of Britain were aired prior to the referendum on either channel.

2016, at first glance, appears to offer significantly greater diversity in the discussion around immigration, partly attributable to the dramatic increase in salience. However, upon closer analysis, the data demonstrates that the established voices continue to dominate. The continued significance of contributions from journalists and mainstream politicians suggests that, despite there being more contributors (a wider range of politicians were given airtime) these remained solely from the dominant parties, and largely form the Conservative Party. The data supports Herman and Chomsky's (2002) argument that voices on the political right dominate media footage.

Aside from the political leaning of contributions, what is seen is a debate around (largely European) immigration that includes no voices from outside of the UK. Leading European politicians, for example, are given no voice in the debate, nor are European citizens living in the UK. The range of diversity of voices, given the nature of the debate at this time, is striking.

6.13.3 Sourcing patterns in 2017

As discussed, the salience of immigration in the broadcast news footage declined dramatically in 2017. As might be expected, therefore, the diversity in relation to the sourcing pattern also reduced. Journalists, once again, accounted for the majority of all contributions, with this percentage being higher than in either of the two preceding years (66% on BBC and 86% on ITV) and this was reflected also in a reduced variety of locations from which contributions were broadcast. 50% of BBC News discussion of immigration was from the studio, and 33% with politicians out on campaign; for ITV, there was slightly more variation, with time being relatively equally divided between the studio, journalistic voiceovers, politicians out on campaign, and contributions on the street.

The gender balance remained consistent, with BBC dividing equally between male and female speakers, but ITV continuing to be predominantly male (71% of contributions). All contributions on both channels were from speakers of British nationality.

Thus, the data from 2017 illustrates a limited scope of views in relation to discussion of immigration. All perspectives are British, and on ITV) predominantly male. Contributors continue to be journalists and leading politicians. Notably, on ITV News, the only leading politician who spoke on immigration was the UKIP leader at the time. Opinions of members of the public and voices outside of politics were not aired. Additionally, no perspectives from outside of the UK were provided. 2017 saw dramatically reduced salience in relation to immigration, and a deeply limited discussion of the issue.

6.13.4 A summary of sourcing patterns between 2015 and 2017

Across all years, the most common contributors, by a large margin, on both BBC and ITV News were each channels' own journalists. This includes the presenter in the studio and various correspondents out in the field. This was more pronounced on the BBC, where the mean average of all contributions illustrated that 55% were from journalists; on ITV this figure was 46%. This was most pronounced in 2015 and 2017, when salience was lower; in 2016, a greater degree of diversity was apparent, though this was largely limited to more frequent contributions from mainstream politicians (and then mostly the Conservative Party). Following journalistic contributions, the Conservative party was the second most common contributor overall, and this was similar across both channels (15% on BBC and 17% on ITV). Both channels gave less time to Labour Party MPs (9% on BBC and 10% on ITV) giving Labour a similar percentage of airtime to members of the public.

The limited variation in speakers is mirrored by the lack of diversity of locations from which contributions were made; the studio, formal settings (namely excerpts of televised political debates) and voiceovers accounted for 73% of all locations on BBC, and 72% on ITV. Whilst other locations were present (in the street, on the campaign trail) the news on immigration was dominated by these three aspects of the format.

The discussion was also, across the three time periods, largely dominated by male voices. 65% of all contributions on the BBC were from men; on ITV this figure was 71%. This potentially reflects the lack of female representation in leading political speakers on the issue of immigration.

One striking finding was the almost absolute absence of voices from outside of the UK. Of the data selected, 91% of contributions on BBC were from those of British nationality, and on ITV this was 94%.

Overall, the data demonstrated that the debate around immigration in the weeks prior to the three national ballots of 2015, 2016 and 2017 was highly lacking in diversity and plurality of contributions. The discussion was dominated by voices of the establishment – journalists and leading politicians. Accordingly, there is a gender imbalance which means that female contributors are fewer. The format tends to be restricted in terms of locations, and the debate overall is limited to the perspectives of British citizens. Voices from outside of the UK are not given airtime. Consequently, the data supports Altheide and Snow's (1979) view that television news lacks depth and presents a highly restricted agenda. This appears to be very much the case in the sample chosen for this study. Thus, the data suggests that Altheide and Snow's (1979) media logic scenario is at play.

Thus, it would seem that there are elements of both political logic and media logic present in the broadcast data at different stages. In 2015, the thematic analysis suggests that media logic is determining the content selection, as the key themes differ significantly from the political manifestos of the leading parties. However, in 2016, political logic appears to dominate as the television news footage (most clearly on BBC News) follows the key themes of the 2015 manifestos of the Conservative Party, UKIP and, to a lesser extent, the Labour Party. Aside from the thematic analysis, however, scrutiny of the sourcing patterns portrays a media agenda that is tightly controlled and lacks depth or breadth of views. The range of sources is extremely limited, and the news agenda, therefore, in relation to immigration over this period, could not be considered informative. As such, it would have to be concluded that the broadcast news data is strongly affected by the process of mediatization.

6.14 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of broadcast media footage

As set out in Chapter 4, analysis of language use is helpful in uncovering ideological stance as language choices indicate a particular worldview (Machin and Mayr, 2012). Language use is indicative of an

adopted set of beliefs and values (Hart, 2014). Furthermore, as Wodak (2009) asserts, the potency of language choice exists in its use by those in positions of power. The initial analysis of the sourcing patterns within the news footage found that the voices heard were almost wholly those of media operatives and mainstream leading politicians; namely, those in positions of significant power. As the expression of overt opinion tends to be significantly lower on broadcast news than in partisan newspapers in the UK (Semetko et al., 1991) it was appropriate to work with the language employed with the aim of uncovering the beliefs being disseminated. Thus, the Discourse-Historical Approach was applied to the broadcast news data in an attempt to understand how, through language, messages regarding immigration are circulated, and to what particular ideological stance these messages may be adhering. The study focussed on two discursive strategies – nomination and predication (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009) in order to better understand to which groups immigrants were being assigned through language, to identify negative/positive representations through collocation, and to identify common 'argumentation schemes' (Hart, 2010: 10) present in recurring topoi. Topoi are of interest given the typically descriptive nature (Semetko et al., 1991) of television news; as opinions (and therefore proposed actions) are not explicitly expressed, analysis of recurrent topoi can uncover the 'implicit conclusions' (Hart, 2010: 10) each premise precipitates. The topoi identified were aligned to Hart's (2010) groupings of common topoi assigned to immigrants through media discourse. Specifically, the Discourse-Historical Analysis asked the following questions:

- What strategies of membership categorisation and anthroponyms are employed in the media discourse surrounding immigration?
- What predicates are used?
- Which lexical items frequently collocate with immigrant/migrant/immigration/migration?
- What are the most common topoi present in the data?

A discussion of the findings of this stage of data analysis is presented below.

6.14.1 Nomination and predication strategies in 2015

Analysis of the nominations in 2015 found that, whilst both BBC and ITV News made frequent use of the term 'migrant', there were differences in the categorisation strategies of the two channels. The most common nomination across both channels in 2015 was 'migrant', perhaps reflecting the salient immigration frame at this time of the 'EU Migrant Crisis'. Nevertheless, given that there is debate as to whether the people in question are in fact migrants, and not refugees, it is interesting that they are never portrayed as the latter. Berry et al. (2016) demonstrate that this portrayal was not present in all European media at the time, and that representations in Germany and Sweden, for example, were more likely to use the terms 'refugee' or 'asylum seeker', both of which are considered more sympathetic terms (Berry et al., 2016). In addition to the term 'migrant', the most common

nominations on BBC News were third person pronouns and discussion of the issue in terms of numbers. These strategies would be considered 'othering' and dehumanising. ITV News, however, adopted the nominations of 'woman', 'child' and 'bodies' as frequently as the third person pronoun, and did not discuss the people in question in terms of numbers. Overall, the nominations attributed in 2015 served to 'other' the people in question. The categories assigned clearly construct a notion of 'Them and Us' (Musolff, 2015).

A deeper, more qualitative analysis finds that BBC News coverage of the 'migrant crisis' in 2015 disseminated distinctly more negative representations of immigrants than ITV News. Language use on the BBC tended to frame migrants as an unstoppable force, threatening to overwhelm the host country, with the suggestion that there is little that can be done to prevent their arrival in huge numbers. ITV News coverage was somewhat more sympathetic, with representations leaning more toward victimhood, framing migrants as being in desperate need of help. In this respect, BBC News aligned more closely with the themes of the Conservative Party and UKIP manifestos of the 2015 election, suggesting that ITV may have a greater degree of editorial control, with the BBC adhering more closely to the establishment stance.

Consideration of the predication strategies employed illustrated that, whilst the two channels adopted different topoi, language use on both largely aligned with Hart's (2010) connected topoi. BBC News footage was associated largely with Danger, Death and Displacement, followed by Disadvantage, Burden, Finance and Displacement – these two categories accounted for 67% of BBC predications. On ITV, 78% of predications fell into the Disadvantage, Burden, Finance and Displacement grouping. This potentially reflects the different focus of the two channels – BBC News was more concerned with the numbers attempting the journey to Britain, whereas ITV tended to centre more on the desperation of those travelling. In 2015, the predications were largely negative, with 95% of ITV News footage aligning with Hart's (2010) connected topoi; on BBC, this figure was 81%. Thus there were more positive representations on BBC than on ITV, but overall the implication is one of threat and burden. Through these predications, the people in question are portrayed as being a potential burden to the UK, requiring support ad resources, or as bringing some form of danger to the country. Thus, as topoi contain an implicit conclusion (Hart, 2010) in 2015, the conclusion might be that they should be prevented from entering the country, or that a method should be found to prevent the situation from occurring.

6.14.2 Nomination and predication strategies in 2016

2016 saw a significant shift in the nomination strategies employed, perhaps reflecting the move away from the 'EU Migrant Crisis' towards a discussion of how immigration is relevant to the upcoming referendum on EU membership. The most notable change was the increased number of references to

the people in question in terms of numbers. Whilst this had been fairly prominent on BBC News in 2015, it increased in 2016, and also became the most common nomination on ITV. On BBC, this nomination was second only to third person pronouns. Both channels, therefore, discussed the issue in terms of numbers, framing the issue as being of a quantitative nature rather than any form of human story; additionally, the construction of a 'Them and Us' (Musolff, 2015) narrative persisted on BBC News, and became more apparent on ITV.

Deeper analysis of the language employed illustrated that the BBC framed the issue not only as one of numbers, but of being overwhelming in scale, with the use of terms such as 'crowding' and unchecked'. There was a sense of criminality and lawlessness, and frequent suggestions that the volume of people presented an unsustainable burden to the UK. Similar framing was found on ITV, where there was the use of water metaphor ('flow of people') and references to strain on public services. Across both channels, the language employed represented immigrants as a potential threat, a burden, or a problem that must be reduced. This aligns with the manifestos of the Conservative Party and UKIP more closely than other political manifestos, and the increased salience also indicates both channels leaning towards the political right in the framing of the issue in 2016.

Analysis of the predication strategies highlights slightly more positive representations than in 2015, in that a larger percentage of the predications adopted do not fit into Hart's (2010) groupings; on BBC News 26% of predicates were outside if these categories, and on ITV the figure was 31%. The most common predications outside of Hart's (2010) categories were politicians commenting on the contributions workers from other countries make to the UK, in areas such as the NHS.

Nevertheless, despite the apparent increase in positive tropes, the majority of predications proved negative, with 69% of ITV and 74% of BBC predicates aligning with Hart's (2010) groupings. Danger, Death and Displacement was found to be the most common topoi on ITV (46%) as much of the discussion related to the notion of there being unsustainable numbers of people wishing to come and live in the UK; on BBC the most frequent topoi was Disadvantage, Burden, Finance and Displacement (37%) and was generated by references to the implications of large numbers coming to the UK and the inability of the country to support them, the implication being that they are a burden. These two topoi accounted for 61% of all predications on ITV News and 51% of all predications on BBC News. BBC footage also contained predicates relating to Culture, Character and Crime as well as Exploitation; ITV contained predications which aligned with the Culture, Character and Crime grouping, thus furthering the suggestion that there are large numbers of people wishing to come to the UK, perhaps illegally, to exploit the country and change the culture. Thus, although the broadcast footage of 2016 appears to have generated some more positive representations of immigration, the dominant message continued

to be one of fear of displacement, or financial burden. The implied action, once again, is that this is something which needs to be halted.

6.14.3 Nomination and predication strategies in 2017

The dramatic decline in issue salience in 2017 is reflected in the data relating to nomination and predication strategies. ITV News ran a story devoted to discussion of a controversial figure, Abu Qatada (A Muslim cleric of Palestinian origin who had been accused of terrorist offences) and this resulted in the nomination strategy of naming the individual being the most common on ITV. Overall, the salience was extremely low and little data was gathered for analysis in this year. BBC News continued to demonstrate higher issue salience than ITV, although the decline from 2016 was also dramatic. Notable was the absence of nominations relating to 'migrant' or the use of numbers. The most common nominations on BBC News were (equally) 'people', EU Nationals/citizens/Europeans) and third person pronouns. Thus, whilst the notion of 'Them and Us (Musolff, 2015) persists, the nomination strategies indicate more positive representation than seen in the data from the previous two years.

Representations on the BBC were more positive than in the previous two years, with immigrants being framed as 'citizens' who work and have rights; the language employed served to raise the status of immigrants dramatically. In 2015 and 2016, they were imbued with a sense of criminality, disase and burden. They were a great problem facing the country. In 2017, they were fellow citizens who contribute to out society. ITV coverage was less positive, with the sense of criminality resurfacing in relation to one item which linked immigration to terrorism. Nevertheless, references to European migration were more positive, with the framing of European citizens as workers who have the 'right to remain'. As with BBC News, ITV also raised the status of (European) migrants through the use of language.

Analysis of the 2017 predication strategies demonstrates significantly more positive representation on BBC News, with 78% of predicates falling outside of Hart's (2010) groupings. The discussion tended to be around the opportunities afforded by people coming to live and work in the UK, and how they contribute to the country, as well as discussion of the rights of those who do so. As explained earlier, ITV ran a special report on Abu Qatada – this meant the frequent use of the Culture, Character and Crime topoi (57%). Additionally, an interview with the UKIP leader, Paul Nuttall generated predicates which aligned with Danger, Death and Displacement, with migrants being presented as a threat, people of whom one should be fearful. Thus, on ITV News, only 29% of predicates fell outside of Hart's (2010) groupings.

The data from 2017 shows a greater shift on the BBC footage in terms of topoi. Given that the employment of negative topoi implicitly signals that action must be taken (Hart, 2010) the move towards positive representation could be seen to imply that immigration is no longer a problem about which something needs to be done. The political narrative of the incumbent government at the time was that Brexit had been achieved, and the choice of government in the 2017 election was simply about which party.

6.15 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a detailed discussion of the key findings of the analysis, linking the results to the literature and theories of media power. The salience of immigration in the broadcast news footage clearly demonstrates a significant peak in 2016, at the time of the referendum on membership of the European Union. As has been seen, immigration is considered to have played a significant role in decision-making at this ballot (Goodwin and Malazzo, 2017; Curtice, 2017). In addition to this, the dominant themes of the political manifestos, most notably those of the Conservative Party and UKIP, align closely with the key themes of the footage in 2016. This is not the case in 2015, where the key themes of the media footage differ considerably from those in the manifestos. The dramatic drop in issue salience in the broadcast media footage from 2017 also equates closely with the post-referendum approach of the Conservative Party and UKIP, in that leaving the European Union was presented as a method of control on immigration; once the United Kingdom had voted to leave the EU, these political parties reduced the focus on immigration in their 2017 manifestos. Thus, the study finds that, whilst media logic appears to be dominant in the footage from 2015, political logic potentially resurfaces to some degree in 2016, with the broadcasters seemingly aligning with the key themes from the (more right-wing) political parties. However, the crucial role the right-wing press played in setting the broadcasters' agenda cannot be overlooked. Given that the press coverage prior to the referendum was predominantly in favour of leaving the European Union, and that immigration was a highly salient issue in these publications (CRCC, 2016) it would seem that media logic continues to dominate, and it is the media (potentially along with leading politicians on the political right) setting the agenda. Furthermore, as the issue was not discussed in any real depth, and contributors were very much limited, media logic can be seen to be at play (Phillips, 2020; Altheide and Snow, 1979). This continues into 2017, where the drop in salience in the news footage also aligns with the political manifestos.

As discussed, research indicates that the media are highly influential in setting the public agenda. Hartmann and Husband (1974) illustrated how the degree of salience afforded to any particular issue signals to audiences the degree of importance they should attach to said issue. Van Dijk (1993) argued that the media possessed the power to construct the beliefs around certain issues and, as Page (2009)

contends, this is particularly effective when concerned with issues such as immigration, where audiences have little or no direct experience. Thus, the increased salience of immigration in the broadcast news footage in 2016 could be considered to have been influential in increasing voter concern around this issue. The subsequent vote to leave the European Union, in which views on immigration played a vital role (Goodwin and Malazzo, 2017; Curtice, 2017) may have been impacted by this.

Analysis of the sourcing patterns of the broadcast footage found evidence to support the work of Herman and Chomsky (2002) that sources upon which the media rely are highly limited, thus severely restricting and controlling the debate. One key finding is that, during the discussion around immigration in the footage from 2016, nether channel aired any views from outside of the United Kingdom. There were no interviews with European politicians, for example, or European citizens. The debate was limited to journalists and, with few exceptions, leading mainstream politicians. Consequently, the study finds that the broadcast media footage presented a highly limited discussion around immigration, restricting contributions on the issue to their own journalists and mainstream politicians, with the Conservative Party being the most frequent voice from politics.

The Critical Discourse Analysis was then applied to the broadcast news footage in an attempt to further uncover a coherent ideological stance towards the issue of immigration. As has been argued, discourse not only reflects society, it plays a role in shaping society (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009). Thus, understanding the categories to which immigrants are assigned and the dominant topoi in relation to them transmitted via the discourse reveals much about how beliefs and values in relation to immigration are disseminated by those in power.

The analysis found that, overall, the media footage continued the consistently negative portrayal of inward migration as detailed in many studies (Smith and Deacon, 2018; Berry, 2016; Greenslade, 2016, Cottle, 2000). The most common nomination across the time period was 'migrant' (as opposed to the more sympathetic 'refugee) (Berry, 2016), followed by third person pronouns and then in relation to numbers ('the number', 'thousands', for example). This demonstrates a overwhelmingly hostile presentation of the issue (Berry,2016) where those entering the UK are presented as 'other' constructing a 'Them and Us' ideology (Musolff, 2015) and viewing the issue as being quantitative in nature, rather than a human story.

The negativity uncovered by the nominations was supported by analysis of the predications; only 26% of predications over the time period were found to be positive, with 74% falling into one of Hart's (2010) groupings. The analysis illustrated that the most common topoi constructed by both channels across the time period was Danger, Disease and Displacement (Hart, 2010) followed by Disadvantage,

Burden, Finance and Displacement (Hart, 2010). Overall, these two groupings accounted for 60% of the topoi across both channels. As topoi indicate an implied action that must be taken (Hart, 2010) it could be argued that the news footage from this time period (the majority of which was broadcast in 2016, prior to the EU referendum) transmitted an implied message that immigration presents a threat or burden to the United Kingdom and should therefore be prevented.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter serves as a conclusion to the study in that it provides an overview of the key aims and objectives of the research and discusses the significant findings. The findings are placed within the theoretical framework of the study and considered with reference to the relevant literature. Initially, there is a reminder of the political context within which the data was generated, and this is followed by a summary of the key findings, as explained by the relevant theories and literature. An outline of how the study provides a unique contribution to knowledge is provided, along with consideration of future work to extend the scope of the research.

7.2 Aims and Objectives

The study set out to address the following question:

How is the issue of immigration mediated by UK broadcast news channels during the 2015 General Election, the 2016 EU Referendum, and the 2017 General Election campaigns?

Accordingly, the objectives, as outlined and discussed in the methodology chapter, were:

- To identify any increase/decrease in salience of the issue of immigration within the news coverage between each case study;
- To consider if and how, over the 2 years between GE 2015 and GE 2017, the framing of immigration in BBC and ITV News coverage has changed;
- To examine the diversity of perspectives available;
- To identify recurrent intertextual topoi relating to immigration/immigrants;
- To identify, using the Discourse-Historical Approach, frequent patterns in nomination and predication strategies in the broadcast news reporting of stories concerning immigration;
- To attempt, via the Discourse-Historical Approach, to determine the presence of an underlying ideology or world view in the discourse of immigration on major UK broadcast news channels;
- To map coherent ideological stances to mainstream political party manifestos.

7.3 Background to the Study

Political events in the United Kingdom between 2015 and 2017 centred around the vote to leave the European Union, a decision which has widely been viewed as a seismic event (Ford and Goodwin, 2017; Stocker, 2017; MacShane, 2016) with global consequences. The ramifications of the vote are predicted to impact the UK and Europe (and, consequently, the rest of the world) for many years to come (Grey, 2016) and have reconfigured the international political landscape for the foreseeable future.

The role of the mass media in political decision-making is one of significance. In particular, television, despite the rise in popularity of online news sources, remains highly influential. Voters in the United

Kingdom continue to view television news, in particular the BBC, as the most trustworthy source of political news (Carr, 2017; Scammel and Semetko, 2008). Given that, during times of political crisis, citizens tend to view television as their most trusted source of information (Newman, 2019) and that there was a perceived 'Brexit bounce' in 2016 (Newman, 2019) this study attempts to analyse the output of the two terrestrial television news channels with the largest audience share (BBC and ITV) during the period of political uncertainty in which the Brexit vote occurred. The study focusses on the issue of immigration, as this has been shown to have been of critical importance in the vote to leave the European Union (Goodwin and Malazzo, 2017) and was of high salience throughout much of the time under scrutiny (Prosser et al., 2016). Whilst content analyses have been conducted of media content during this period, no study has attempted to align the discourse surrounding immigration with the ideology of any particular political party, nor has a detailed Critical Discourse Analysis of the broadcast media footage been conducted.

For a Critical Discourse Analysis to be performed effectively, an awareness of the context within which the discourse takes place is vital (Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Bloor, 2007, Brown and Yule, 1983). Consequently, a wider understanding of immigration to the UK in the period since the end of the Second World War was provided. This chronology illustrates how public unease regarding the arrival of residents from overseas has fluctuated, with peaks of concern in the 1960s, late 1970s to early 1980s, and again in the mid-2000s. A high degree of hostility was observed during the period which saw Enoch Powell rise to popularity, for example (Smith, 2004). Accordingly, the issue of immigration has been more to the fore in some periods of general election campaigning than others and appears to have come back into focus in the election campaigns of the 2000s (Smith, 2014).

Whilst public concern regarding immigration since the post-war period provided a background to the years of interest to this study, a closer analysis of the political role of immigration in the period (the political campaigns of 2015 – 2017) relevant to this study was also required. Whilst the salience of immigration has fluctuated since 1945, it was an issue which found itself at the core of the Brexit decision (Ford and Goodwin, 2017). Butler's (1998) three conditions relating to the potential electoral significance of any political issue potentially explains why immigration rose to such prominence in the 2016 EU Referendum vote. More specifically, the third condition, which elucidates how, if the mainstream political parties are perceived as being largely equivalent in terms of their stance/performance on an issue, it is unlikely to achieve electoral significance (Butler, 1998). Research demonstrates that the Conservative brand comprises a vehement anti-immigration stance (Pitcher, 2006; Hampshire, 2015). However, as the Conservatives had disappointed in this area (Hampshire, 2015) and Labour's brand is that they are weak on the issue (Clarke et al., 2017; Mosbacher and Wiseman, 2017) it was always unlikely that immigration would prove a deciding topic at any general

election and, despite high levels of public concern, the 2015 General Election was not won on immigration, with the Conservative Party focussing more on the economy and the charisma of the leader (Wring and Ward, 2015). Whilst immigration remained a concern into the 2017 General Election, it did not surface as a key campaign issue, on account of the Conservative Party's awareness that the topic was not a strong one for them at this stage (Brooks, 2017). However, the binary vote of the 2016 EU Referendum, which presents by its nature very different dynamics to a standard general election campaign (de Vreese and Semetko, 2016 appears to have presented an opportunity for those voters who were becoming increasingly concerned about immigration, to voice their anxiety (Ford and Goodwin, 2017). Thus, the issue of immigration was highly salient throughout the period of this study, but became more visible in 2016, and this is the only ballot of the three covered by this study, in which immigration appears to have constituted a deciding factor.

As this study concerns itself with how the issue of immigration was mediated by BBC and ITV News in the weeks preceding the ballots of 2015, 2016 and 2017, it was essential to gain an understanding of the role of the media in the United Kingdom, and how immigration tends to be mediated. Research indicates that the UK media are highly effective in setting the agenda for public discussion. According to McCombs and Shaw (1972) it is the media which determine which issues are at the fore of an electoral campaign and inform audiences of their relative importance. Altheide and Snow (1979) noted how, whilst politics had been influential in shaping the modern media, the unprecedented growth in the scale and power of mass communications has resulted in a situation it is the media which influence politics. Van Dijk (2003) concurred, stating that all powerful elites require support from media outlets in order to maintain influence, with Hodgkinson (2017) extending this to argue that 'We live…in a media society' (2017: 2). Thus, the media construct a reality for audiences and determine the issues at the heart of public concern.

In relation to immigration, media influence has been shown to be both particularly powerful, and overwhelmingly negative. It is powerful on account of the dynamics which operate when the audience has little or no direct experience of the issue at hand, as is the case for many British people with immigration. Where actual interaction with people from other cultural backgrounds is lacking, citizens demonstrate higher susceptibility to unquestioning acceptance of media representations and narratives around immigration (Blinder and Allen, 2015; Page, 2009; van Dijk, 1993; Hartmann and Husband, 1971). Media influence around immigration is negative in the sense that studies of the mediation of immigration from the post-war period to the present have largely concluded that representations of immigrants within the UK media are overwhelmingly pejorative and, despite the gradual social rejection of overtly racist language, are consistently imbued with negative framing (Smith and Deacon, 2018; Berry, 2016; Page, 2009; Greenslade, 2005).

Media attention on immigration increased throughout the years preceding the EU Referendum in 2016, and was accompanied by rising concern amongst UK voters, with the dominant issue being one regarding the number of people looking to enter the country (Allen and Blinder, 2018). Musolff (2015) has shown that the proliferation of (negative) stories regarding immigration has established a deep-rooted 'Them and Us' ideology, with integration between countries (as with the European Unio) being framed as an issue of conflict rather than cooperation and reciprocity (Berry, 2016). The study therefore approached the data from this perspective, seeking to determine the nature of the representation of immigration during the time period in question. By aligning the thematic and content analyses with the political manifestos of the same period, there was also an attempt to uncover the underlying political ideology behind the narratives.

7.4 Summary of Theoretical Framework

The study is concerned specifically with media output; consequently, the data was approached from a critical perspective. As an attempt was being made to potentially uncover the presence of an underlying political ideology via a Critical Discourse Analysis, it was appropriate to consider the data from a standpoint which assumes an underlying ideology exists. However, I was aware of the somewhat blunt tool this presents (Curran, 2000); therefore, throughout the analysis, there is an awareness of the likely nuance of the situation. In other words, it is far from an 'all or nothing' scenario. In any society, there is not only one powerful group with one set of interests, and these may alter over time (Curran, 2000). Therefore, the study sought to identify a dominant narrative, rather than an all-pervasive, entirely omnipresent one.

The theory of mediatization was also central to this study, as it highlights how all-pervasive the modern mass media are, and how they permeate all aspects of daily life, potentially blurring reality. Media logic can be seen to be dominating over political logic, when news items are more concerned with entertainment, or 'playing to the audience' than on informing, and are brief and lacking depth of analysis (Altheide and Snow, 1979). During elections, the campaign would be presented more as a form of battle or contest, than an opportunity to learn more about key issues facing a country (Phillips, 2020). Given that mediatization is the 'prime axis on which the modern political communications process revolves' (Blumler, 2014: 31) an awareness of this process is crucial to the democratic process (Blumler, 2014).

Given the above, the researcher determined that the data was best analysed from a critical perspective, and with a framework which accounted for the political logic/media logic debate.

7.5 Key Findings of the Research

7.5.1 Content and Thematic Analyses, and Sourcing Patterns

The first stage of the data analysis involved a content analysis of the broadcast media footage, identifying peaks and troughs in issue salience, and considering sourcing patterns.

The salience and denoted importance of the national ballots was largely equivalent across both channels, with BBC devoting similar amounts of time and stature to discussion of the campaigns and issues as ITV. The data clearly illustrated a notable peak in issue salience for immigration in the footage of both channels in 2016, with a sharp increase from 2015 followed by a sharp decline in 2017. Analysis of the time devoted to discussion of immigration showed that this doubled on both channels from 2015 to 2016. This was applicable across both BBC and ITV News, although throughout the time in question, immigration was significantly more salient on the BBC. Accordingly, BBC News also mentioned immigration more frequently in the headlines, thus denoting higher importance to the issue than ITV. Whilst in 2015, there were a number of independent items on immigration on both channels, in 2016 and 2017, the issue was conflated with the election campaigns.

With regards to sourcing patterns, overall, the data demonstrated that the range of sources was highly limited, even during periods of peak salience. The most common source across both channels, and during each of the three periods, was journalists, either in the studio, as voiceovers, or on location. This was also reflected in the limited number of locations from which broadcasts were made. Following journalistic contributions, the vast majority of sources were from mainstream politicians, with the ruling Conservative Party being most present. The footage was predominantly male, and almost wholly British, with no real inclusion of voices from outside the United Kingdom. Neither the Liberal Democrats nor the Green Party, both of whom had standing MPs at the time, were included in the discussion relating to immigration. The data thus supports the argument that output is severely limited in scope, and lacks any breadth of perspective, aligning with Altheide and Snow's (1979) view that television news lacks depth and presents a highly restricted agenda. The dominance of the Conservative Party is in accordance with Herman and Chomsky's (2002) contention that it is the political right which dominates media output, and voices from the political left are largely excluded.

Following the initial content analysis, an exploration into the key themes of the televised data was conducted; this uncovered three major themes. The analysis found that the dominant theme across all years was the need for immigration to be controlled or reduced; this theme achieved greater prominence on BBC News. The second most common theme was the representation of immigration as a numerical concept. Although in 2015, the dominant theme had been the framing of immigrants

as victims or exploited citizens. However, this was replaced in 2016 by the above themes, and did not regain prominence throughout the time period in question.

Regarding the manifestos, the data demonstrated a higher degree of issue salience for immigration in 2015 than 2017, with UKIP and the Conservative Party devoting the greatest percentage of their manifesto to the matter, as well as imbuing it with greater importance by placing it in section two, immediately after the economy. Given the higher salience of immigration in the UKIP and Conservative manifestos, the key themes were largely dictated by the tropes of these two parties, both of whom sit on the political right. Throughout the period, the dominant theme was that of the need for immigration to be controlled or reduced, with immigrants as a burden or threat being second. In 2015, the third most common themes was that of criminality, although this shifted in 2017, where immigrants as contributors emerged. Overall, the dominant theme was of the need to control or reduce immigration.

The study found that, in 2015, the degree of intertextual similarity between the news footage and the manifestos was limited. However, in 2016, the news footage themes had shifted significantly so as to align with the Conservative and UKIP themes of control/reduction, burden and threat, and criminality. This conflation of immigration with negative issues such as crime is reminiscent of the findings of Philo et al. (2013). The shift in tone from 2015 may be explained by the combination of the broadcasters working towards 'strategic balance' (Phillips, 2020: 151) and thus giving unchallenged airtime to the Conservative leaders of the two official campaigns, along with the intermedia agenda setting role of the right-wing press, which was far more prolific on the issue of immigration than their centre-left competitors (Phillips, 2020). Whilst salience dropped into 2017, the intertextual similarity remained reasonably consistent. The study therefore concluded that, overall, the political manifestos of the Conservative Party and UKIP aligned very closely with the news output on the issue of immigration; this was most apparent in 2016 and on BBC News. It also supports the contention that it is the right-wing politicians and media which set the agenda for broadcast news in the UK.

9.4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

A Critical Discourse Analysis, using the Discourse Historical Approach, of the broadcast news footage was conducted in an attempt to further understand the beliefs and values (Hart, 2014) in relation to immigration being transmitted by the major news broadcasters during the period in question. The CDA set out to answer the following questions:

- What strategies of membership categorisation and anthroponyms are employed in the media discourse surrounding immigration?
- What predicates are used?

- Which lexical items frequently collocate with immigrant/migrant/immigration/migration?
- What are the most common topoi present in the data?

Through analysis of the nominations and deeper qualitative study of the language adopted by both BBC and ITV News, the study found that representations of immigrants to the United Kingdom were, across the time period, predominantly pejorative. The most common nomination across all footage was the term 'migrant', as opposed to the more sympathetic 'refugee' (Berry, 2016) a nomination which was absent from the footage. Following this were third person pronouns and then discussion of the issue in terms of numbers. The nomination analysis found that the representation of immigration was overwhelmingly negative (Berry, 2016) and presented the issue as a 'Them and Us' (Musolff, 2015) scenario. Immigrants were commonly connected with criminality and stress on public services, as well as being presented as having the potential to overwhelm the UK due to large numbers. These findings would also support the contention that media logic is dominating, where situations are presented as simplistic and as persistent conflict (Phillips, 2020).

Analysis of the predicative strategies supported the conclusion that representations of immigrants on both BBC and ITV New are consistently negative. Only 26% of predications were found to be positive, with 74% falling into Hart's (2010) categories. Over the three case studies, the most common topoi constricted in relation to immigrants was Danger, Disease and Displacement (DDD), with the second most frequent being Disadvantage, Burden, Finance and Displacement (DBFD). As topoi contain an implicit message of a need for action to be taken (Hart, 2010) the analysis suggests that the implied action in this instance (the majority of which was broadcast in the week prior to the 2016 European Referendum) is that immigration presents a danger to the country and must be curtailed or prevented. Once again, the news footage appears to align with the tropes of the right-wing press and right-wing political parties, thus suggesting that media logic is dominating (Phillips, 2020).

The study of the nomination and predication strategies adopted by the broadcasters indicates that the well-documented 'hostility' (Berry, 2016) of the UK media towards immigrants persisted throughout the three time periods under analysis for this study. Representations and categorisations were overwhelmingly negative, and the issue was constructed into a clear 'Them and Us' scenario. Consequently, the data supports the notion that the broadcast news footage delivered output on immigration which is predominantly to the right of the political spectrum.

7.5 Contribution to Knowledge

This thesis contributes to the existing body of knowledge on media coverage of the issue of immigration during national ballots in the United Kingdom. The period under analysis for this study is of great consequence as the implications of Britain's vote to leave the European Union in 2016 is of

immense global significance. Research on media coverage of the period surrounding the referendum, and research into media coverage of UK general elections is extensive (Phillips, 2020; Deacon et al., 2018; Moore, 2018; Al Nahed, 2017; Carr, 2017; CRCC, 2017; Crines, 2017; Cushion and Lewis, 2017; Berry, 2016; CRCC, 2016; CRCC, 2015: Cushion et al., 2016; Deacon et al., 2016; Cushion and Sambrook, 2015). Through comparative content and thematic analyses, this study adds an understanding of how the two major broadcasters in the United Kingdom, BBC News and ITV News mediated the issue of immigration during the final week of campaigning during three national ballots which occurred during the period of political turbulence surrounding Brexit. Additionally, a Critical Discourse Analysis of the broadcast footage contributes a deeper insight into the representation of immigrants by the BBC and ITV News during this time. The study finds that BBC News coverage, most especially in 2016, was closely aligned with the dominant themes of the Conservative Party and UKIP manifestos of 2015, and that salience of the issue of immigration was particularly high. Whilst ITV News also aligned closely with the political right, the degree of salience attributed to immigration was not so high as seen on BBC.

7.6 Recommendations for Future Study

This study did not set out to determine whether the inclusion, or exclusion, of any particular narrative is deliberate, and has therefore not sought to answer this question. However, further work to consider the role editors and journalist played in the construction of stories concerning immigration during the United Kingdom's 'Brexit years' would be of interest.

The role of social media in constructing narratives around immigration is of increasing interest. The study could be extended to include data from social media platforms at this time.

As 2016 is the year of highest salience, future study could focus on this year in greater depth.

7.8 Limitations of the Study

Due to the time available to me, the footage for analysis had to be limited to one week of material from each of the two broadcasters prior to each of the three ballots. A more extensive study of one month of footage would have yielded a richer data set.

Also due to time constraints, it was not possible to include other broadcasting competitors in the analysis. Inclusion of Channel 4 and Sky News would have been valuable, as it would have provided the opportunity for comparison between different funding models.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Content and thematic analysis of political manifestos - 2015 and 2017

Initial content analysis - manifestos 2015 and 2017				
Manifesto (2015)	**Total pages**	**Pages devoted to immigration**	**Proportion of manifesto**	**Title of immigration section**
UKIP	76	4	5.30%	IMMIGRATION
Cons	84	2.5	3.00%	Controlled immigration that benefits Britain
Green	86	1.5	1.70%	Migration
Labour	86	1	1.20%	Controlling immigration with fair rules
LibDem	158	1	0.60%	Restoring confidence in our borders

Manifesto (2017)	**Total pages**	**Pages devoted to immigration**	**Proportion of manifesto**	**Title of immigration section**
UKIP	64	3	4.70%	Fair, balanced migration
Cons	88	1.5	1.70%	A COUNTRY THAT COMES TOGETHER
Labour	128	1.5	1.20%	IMMIGRATION
Lib Dem	97	1	1.00%	Immigration and asylum
Green	26	0	0%	n/a

Key themes - manifestos 2015					
Theme	**Conservative**	**Labour**	**Lib Dem**	**UKIP**	**Green**
Need to control imm	9	3		5	1
Need to reduce/cut imm	6	1		3	
Need to prioritise British people	5	0		2	
Immigrants taking/abusing welfare/benefits	7	2	1	1	
Need to enforce borders	7	4	3	5	1
immigrants as law breakers	17	3	1	9	1
immigrants as burden on public services/housing	11	1		12	1
Immigration as beneficial	1	2	1	2	3
immigrants as threat to employment/wages	3	3		3	
Immigrants need to speak English	3	1	2		1
Immigration is high/growing	4	3		6	1
Immigration threat to British culture		2		1	
Immigrants as the exploited		1			1
Immigrants as victims of system		3	1		2
Immigration system is weak			2		
Britain needs to be open		1	1		
Employers/institutions need scrutiny		1	2	1	
British people as kind, caring				2	
Immigration system is broken				3	
Immigration is a recent problem				1	
Borders are open to anyone				3	1
Immigrants having too many children				1	
Immmigration is great concern to British people				2	
Criticising other parties	1	1		7	
Commonwealth immigration positive				3	1
Visa system unfair		1		1	
Migration has always occurred					1
British people also live abroad					1
Immigrants are forced to move					1
Immigrants as victims of world events		1			2
Immigrants as scapegoats					1
Need to improve conditions elsewhere					2
Need it to be easier for families					1

Key themes (revised) - manifestos 2015

Theme (revised)	Conservative	Labour	Lib Dem	UKIP	Green	Total references
Imm needs to be controlled/cut	24	11	3	19	3	60
Immigrants as a burden/threat	24	9	3	18	2	56
Immigrants as criminals	17	3	1	9	1	31
Immigrants as victims/exploited	0	5	1	0	10	16
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	8	0	0	7	0	15
British people references	5	0	0	6	0	11
Criticism of immigration system	0	1	2	7	1	11
Immigrants as contributors	1	2	1	2	3	9
Criticism of other parties	1	1	0	7	0	9
Other	0	1	1	4	3	9
Employers/institutions require scrutiny	0	1	2	1	0	4

Key themes - manifestos 2017

Theme	Conservative	Labour	Lib Dem	UKIP	Green
Immigration as a political tool				1	1
Need for new, fairer system		4		2	
Immigration is needed for parts of workforce	1	3	3	4	
Immigrants and communities need support				3	
Immigration system can't be trusted				1	
Cannot criticise immigration policy				1	
Criticism of immigration targets		1			
Need to control imm	6			1	
Need to reduce/cut imm	4			5	
Need to prioritise British people				1	
Immigrants taking/abusing welfare/benefits	2			3	
Need to enforce borders	1		1	2	
immigrants as law breakers/terrorists	4			7	
immigrants as burden on public services/housing		1	2	2	
Immigration as beneficial		5	4	1	
immigrants as threat to employment/wages				2	
Immigrants need to speak English	1			1	
Immigration is high/growing	2			3	
Immigration threat to British culture	5			3	
Immigrants as the exploited		3			
Immigrants as victims of system					
Immigration system is weak			2	1	
Britain needs to be open					
Employers/institutions need scrutiny			4		
British people as kind, caring	3			1	
Immigration system is broken					
Immigration is a recent problem					
Borders are open to anyone					
Immigrants having too many children					
Immmigration is great concern to British people				2	
Criticising other parties				5	
Commonwealth immigration positive					
Visa system unfair			1	1	
Migration has always occurred					
British people also live abroad					
Immigrants are forced to move					
Immigrants as victims of world events					
Immigrants in slavery			1		
Immigrants as scapegoats			2		
Need to improve conditions elsewhere					
Need it to be easier for families					

Key themes (revised) - manifestos 2017

Theme (revised)	Conservative	Labour	Lib Dem	UKIP	Total references
Imm needs to be controlled/cut	13	0	1	11	25
Immigrants as a burden/threat	3	1	3	10	17
Immigrants as contributors	1	8	7	1	17
Criticism of immigration system	0	1	2	3	12
Immigrants as criminals	4	0	0	7	11
Immigrants as victims/exploited	0	6	3	0	9
British people references	3	0	0	4	7
Criticism of other parties	0	0	0	5	5
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	2	0	0	2	4
Employers/institutions require scrutiny	0	4	0	0	4
Other	0	1	1	2	4

Key themes - 2015 and 2017 combined

	Conservat	Labour	Lib Dem	UKIP	Green	Total references
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	37	11	4	40	3	85
Immigrants as a burden/threat	27	10	6	28	2	73
Immigrants as criminals	21	3	1	16	1	42
Criticism of immigration system	0	11	11	11	1	40
Immigrants as victims/exploited	0	11	4	0	10	25
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	10	0	0	9	0	19
British people references	8	0	0	10	0	18
Criticism of other parties	1	1	0	12	0	14
Other	0	2	2	6	3	13
Immigrants as contributors	2	10	1	2	3	9
Employers/institutions require scrutiny	0	5	2	1	0	8

Key themes - all manifestos combined, 2015 and 2017 combined

Theme	Total refs
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	85
Immigrants as a burden/threat	73
Immigrants as criminals	42
Criticism of immigration system	40
Immigrants as victims/exploited	25
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	19
British people references	18
Criticism of other parties	14
Other	13
Immigrants as contributors	9
Employers/institutions require scrutiny	8

Appendix 2: Broadcast news content and thematic analysis

BBC 2015

File	Day	GE in headlines? (Y/N)	If C = Y, order number	Imm mentioned in headlines? (Y/N)	If E=Y, order number	GE in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Number of minutes devoted	Imm in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Imm part of GE footage	Imm report independent of GE footage	Number of minutes devoted
BBC10 30.4.15	Thurs	Y	1	Y		Y	1,5	18:15	Y	4	Y	Y	1:09 in GE, 2:45 in separate item
BBC10 1.5.15	Fri	Y	1	N		Y	1	11:58	N		N	N	
BBC10 4.5.15	Mon	Y	1	N		Y	1,7	13:34	Y	6	Y	Y	2:26 for migrant crisis. 0:34 in GE.
BBC10 5.5.15	Tues	Y	1	Y	3	Y	1,8	23:42	Y	3	Y	Y	1:25 for migrant crisis. 0:05 in GE.
BBC10 6.5.15	Weds	Y	1	N		Y	1	31:30:00	N		N	N	
Totals		5		2		5		97:79	3		3	3	9 minutes

ITV 2015

File	Day	GE in headlines? (Y/N)	If C = Y, order number	Imm in headlines? (Y/N)	If E=Y, order number	GE in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Number of minutes devoted	Imm in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Imm part of GE footage	Imm report independent of GE footage	Number of minutes devoted
ITV10 30.4.15	Thurs	Y	2	N		Y	2	07:25	N		N	N	
ITV10 1.5.15	Fri	Y	1	N		Y	1	12:27	N		N	N	
ITV10 4.5.15	Mon	Y	2	N		Y	2	04:55	N		N	N	
ITV10 5.5.15	Tues	Y	1, 10	Y	2	Y	1	18.25	Y	2	N	Y	02:50
ITV10 6.5.15	Weds	Y	1	N		Y	1	24:41:00	N		N	N	
Totals		5		1		5		67 mins	1		0	1	3 mins

BBC 2016

File	Day	EU Ref in headlines? (Y/N)	If C = Y, order number	Imm mentioned in headlines? (Y/N)	If E=Y, order number	EU Ref in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Number of minutes devoted	Imm in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Imm part of EU Ref footage	Imm report independent of EU Ref footage	Number of minutes devoted
BBC10 14.6.16	Tues	Y	3	Y	1	Y	3	07:30	N		Y	N	02:50
BBC10 15.6.16	Weds	Y	1	N		Y	1,6	19:15	N		Y	N	08:20
BBC10 20.6.16	Mon	Y	2	N		Y	2	15:15	N		Y	N	02:27
BBC10 21.6.16	Tues	Y	1	Y		Y	1	14:50	N		Y	N	03:10
BBC10 22.6.16	Weds	Y	1	N	1	Y	1, 7	18:10	N		Y	N	00:30
Totals		5		2		5		75 mins	0		5	0	17 mins

ITV 2016

File	Day	EU Ref in headlines? (Y/N)	If C = Y, order number	Imm in headlines? (Y/N)	If E=Y, order number	EU Ref in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Number of minutes devoted	Imm in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Imm part of EU Ref footage	Imm report independent of EU Ref footage	Number of minutes devoted
ITV10 14.6.16	Tues	N		N		Y	3	04:45	N		Y	N	00:14
ITV10 15.6.16	Weds	Y	3	N		Y	3	08:43	N		Y	N	00:10
ITV10 20.6.16	Mon	Y	2	N		Y	2	14:54	N		Y	N	02:24
ITV10 21.6.16	Tues	Y	2	N		Y	2, 3	17:43	N		Y	N	05:18
ITV10 22.6.16	Weds	Y	1	N		Y	1	23:03	N		Y	N	00:34
Totals		5		0		5		69 mins	0		5	0	8 mins

BBC 2017

File	Day	GE in headlines? (Y/N)	If C = Y, order number	Imm in headlines? (Y/N)	If E=Y, order number	(Y/N)	Order number	Number of minutes devoted	Imm in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Imm part of GE footage	Imm report independent of GE	Number of minutes devoted
BBC10 1.6.2017	Thurs	N		N		Y	2, 7	12:01	N		Y	N	02:40
BBC10 2.6.2017	Fri	Y	1	N		Y	1	16:59	N		N	N	
BBC10 5.6.2017	Mon	Y	2	N		Y	2	04:25	N		N	N	
BBC10 6.6.2017	Tues	Y	3	N		Y	2, 7	15:24	N		N	N	
BBC10 7.6.2017	Weds	Y	1	N		Y	1	38:01:00	N		N	N	
Totals		4		0		5		87 mins	0		1	0	3 mins

ITV 2017

File	Day	GE in headlines? (Y/N)	If C = Y, order number	Imm in headlines? (Y/N)	If E=Y, order number	GE in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Number of minutes devoted	Imm in main bulletin? (Y/N)	Order number	Imm part of GE footage	Imm report independent of GE footage	Number of minutes devoted
ITV10 1.6.17	Thurs	Y	2	Y	2	Y	3	10:37	N		Y	N	01:20
ITV10 2.6.17	Fri	Y	2	N		Y	2, 7, 9	13:05	N		N	N	
ITV10 5.6.17	Mon	Y	2	N		Y	2	09:51	N		N	N	
ITV10 6.6.17	Tues	Y	2	N		Y	2	12:40	N		N	N	
ITV10 7.6.17	Weds	Y	1	N		Y	1, 2, 6	28:08:00	N		Y	N	02:24
Totals			5		1		5	75 mins	0		2	0	4 mins

Key themes broadcast news 2015		
Theme	BBC	ITV
Immigrants as the exploited	1	
Immigrants as victims of world events	2	1
Immigrants as scapegoats	2	
Immigrants in desperation	1	8
Immigrant deaths	5	6
situation very desperate/dangerous	7	2
Immigrants as victims of smugglers	4	
Immigrants as numbers	9	1
Large numbers are heading to Europe	14	
Britain needs to be open	1	
Europe should help		2
Migrants heading to safety	1	2
UK/EU as sanctuary	2	
Immigrants as women, children	2	1
Names of immmigrants	4	1
Immigration is high/growing	1	
EU is reason for high immigration	2	
Need to reduce/cut imm	2	
immigrants as burden on public services/housing	1	
British people are frightened	1	
Immigrants bringing disease	1	
Immigrants want to come to UK	2	
Immigration is a problem	1	
Migration is a crisis	2	1
Foreign govts do nothing	1	
Migration cannot be stopped	3	
immigrants as law breakers	2	

	Theme	BBC	ITV	Total references
P/S	Immigrants as victims/exploited	22	17	39
Neg	Immigrants as numbers/statistics	23	1	24
P/S	UK/EU should help	4	4	8
P/S	Immigrants as individuals/humans	6	2	8
Neg	Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	5	0	5
Neg	Immigrants as a burden/threat	5	0	5
Neg	Immigration as a problem/crisis	4	1	5
Neg	Immigration is unstoppable	3	0	3
Neg	Immigrants as lawbreakers/terrorists	2	0	2
	Total	74	25	99
	Positive/sympathetic representations	32	23	55
	Negative/critical representations	42	2	44

Theme	BBC	ITV
Need to control imm	7	9
Need to reduce/cut imm	4	3
Immigration is high/growing		2
EU is reason for high immigration	5	1
Migration cannot be stopped/borders are insecure	1	6
Must reform free movement rules	3	0
Need to change immigration policy	2	2
Immigrants taking/abusing welfare/benefits	4	1
immigrants as burden on public services/housing	7	7
British people are frightened	3	0
Immigrants want to come to UK	3	1
Immigrants taking UK jobs	4	1
Immigrants threat to jobs/wages	1	1
Immigration is linked to identity	1	2
immigrants as law breakers	2	0
Immigrants as terrorists	7	0
Immigrants as a danger	6	0
Migration as a security issue	7	1
Immigrants as numbers	15	7
Large numbers are heading to Europe	1	0
Immigration is a problem for the poor in UK	3	0
Migration is a crisis	1	0
Immigration is an important issue	3	3
Concern about immigration is not racist		2
Voters are concerned about immigration	9	2
Immigrants as victims of world events		1
Immigrants as scapegoats		2
There is xenophobia/hatred in the UK	3	3
Immigrants as workers/contributors	5	3
Politicians as scaremongering/exploiting insecurity	2	6
UK people can live/work abroad	4	0
Freedom of movement is positive	1	0

Key themes broadcast news 2016

	Theme	BBC	ITV	Total references
Neg	Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	22	23	46
Neg	Immigrants as a burden/threat	23	13	36
Neg	Immigrants as lawbreakers/terrorists	22	1	23
Neg	Immigrants as numbers/statistics	16	7	23
Neu	Immigration is an important issue	15	7	22
P/S	Immigrants as victims/exploited	3	6	9
Neu	Immigration is a political issue	2	6	8
P/S	Immigrants as workers/contributors	5	3	8
P/S	Migration as positive/reciprocal	5	0	5
	Total	113	66	179
	Positive/sympathetic representations	13	9	22
	Negative/critical representations	83	44	127

Key themes broadcast news 2017

Theme	BBC	ITV
Need to control imm	2	
Need to reduce/cut imm	4	2
Immigration is high/growing	1	
Need to control borders	1	
Difficult to reduce immigration	2	
Ending free movement	2	
Need to change immigration policy	1	
Immigrants as terrorists		2
Migration as a security issue		1
Immigrants as numbers	1	5
Immigration is an important issue	2	1
Voters are concerned about immigration		1
Skilled workers are required	1	
Immigrants as workers/contributors	2	
Immigration as good for economy/business		3

	Theme	BBC	ITV	Total references
Neg	Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	13	2	15
Neg	Immigrants as numbers/statistics	1	5	6
P/S	Immigrants as workers/contributors	3	3	6
Neu	Immigration is an important issue	2	2	4
Neg	Immigrants as lawbreakers/terrorists	0	3	3
	Total	19	15	34
	Positive/sympathetic representations	3	3	6
	Negative/critical representations	14	10	24

Theme	BBC	ITV	Total refs
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	40	25	65
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	40	13	53
Immigrants as victims/exploited	25	23	48
Immigrants as a burden/threat	28	13	41
Immigrants as lawbreakers/terrorists	24	10	34
Immigration is an important issue	17	9	26
Immigrants as workers/contributors	8	6	14
Immigration is a political issue	2	6	8
UK/EU should help	4	4	8
Immigrants as individuals/humans	6	2	8
Migration as positive/reciprocal	5	0	5
Immigration as a problem/crisis	4	1	5
Immigration is unstoppable	3	0	3
Total	**0**	**0**	**0**
Positive/sympathetic representations	**48**	**35**	**83**
Negative/critical representations	**139**	**55**	**194**

Theme	Total references
Immigration needs to be controlled/cut	65
Immigrants as numbers/statistics	53
Immigrants as victims/exploited	48
Immigrants as a burden/threat	41
Immigrants as lawbreakers/terrorists	34
Immigration is an important issue	26
Immigrants as workers/contributors	14
Immigration is a political issue	8
UK/EU should help	8
Immigrants as individuals/humans	8
Migration as positive/reciprocal	5
Immigration as a problem/crisis	5
Immigration is unstoppable	3

Appendix 3: Broadcast news nomination strategies – 2015, 2016 and 2017

2015 Broadcast news nomination strategies

File name	duration of relevant items	stand alone item?	Migrant	Nationality	People	Referred by name	Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	Baby	Child	Woman	Man	Everyone	Bodies	I (first person)	(Islamist) extremist	New arrivals	Survivors	Fatalities	Victims	Desperate souls	Thousands/hundreds of thousands/numbers	Smugglers	Traffickers	Humans
ITV 30.4.2015	Imm not mentioned																							
ITV 1.5.2015	Imm not mentioned																							
ITV 4.5.2015	Imm not mentioned																							
ITV 5.5.2015	170 secs	Y	6				2		2	2			2				1		1	1				
ITV 6.5.2015	Imm not mentioned																							
TOTALS	**170 secs (2 mins 50)**		**6**				**2**		**2**	**2**			**2**				**1**		**1**	**1**				
BBC10 30.4.15	1 min 9 in GE, 2 mins 45 in item	Y	7	1	1	1	10				1	2			1						1	1	3	1
BBC10 1.5.15	Imm not mentioned																							
BBC10 4.5.15	2 mins 26 for migrant crisis. 34 secs in GE.	Y	8		2	3	6	1								2	1							
BBC10 5.5.15	1 min 25 for migrant crisis. 5 secs in GE.	Y	7				1										3	1					1	
BBC10 6.5.15	Imm not mentioned																							
TOTALS			**22**	**1**	**3**	**4**	**17**	**1**			**1**	**2**			**1**	**2**	**1**	**3**	**1**		**5**		**1**	**1**

BBC Nomination strategies 2016

File name	duration of relevant items	stand alone item?	immigrant/migrant	asylum seeker	you (generic)	incomer	I, we (first person pronouns)	the numbers	militants	people	economic migrant	third person pronouns (he/she/they)	enemy	EU nationals/EU citizens/Europeans	nationality	someone	refugee	those	thousands/hundreds of thousands/numbers
BBC10 14.6.16	2 mins 50 secs	N	2			1													
BBC10 15.6.16	3 mins 50 secs throughout, then 4 mins 30 secs for special item on security	N					4	3	1	2									
BBC10 20.6.16	2 mins 27 secs - broken footage throughout	N	3	1						1	1	3	1	2			1		11
BBC10 21.6.16	2 mins 30 secs, then 40 secs,	N	1		3					5		8		1	1	2		3	
BBC10 22.6.16	30 secs	N	1									1							
TOTALS			7	1	3	1	4	3	1	8	1	12	1	3	1	2	1	3	11

ITV Nomination strategies 2016

File name	duration of relevant items	stand alone item?	immigrant/migrant	staff	the numbers	everybody	people	refugee	Who
ITV10 14.6.16	0 mins 14 secs	N				1	1		
ITV10 15.6.16	0 mins 10 secs	N						1	1
ITV10 20.6.16	2 mins 24 secs	N	1	1	6		1		
ITV10 21.6.16	1 min 30, 2 mins 27 secs, 47 secs, 34 secs	N							
ITV10 22.6.16	0 min 34 secs	N						1	
TOTALS			1	1	6	1	2	2	1

BBC Nomination strategies 2017

File name	duration of relevant items	stand alone item?	People	Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	EU nationals/EU citizens/Europeans	The brightest and best
BBC10 1.6.2017	2 mins 40 secs	N	3	3	3	1
BBC10 2.6.2017		N				
BBC10 5.6.2017		N				
BBC10 6.6.2017		N				
BBC10 7.6.2017		N				

ITV Nomination strategies 2017

File name	duration of relevant items	stand alone item?	(Terror) suspects	Foreign workers	You (generic)	Your loved ones	By name (Abu Qatada)	People	Radical cleric	Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	(Islamist) extremist
ITV10 1.6.17	1 min 20 secs	N	1	1	1	1			1	1	
ITV10 2.6.17											
ITV10 5.6.17											
ITV10 6.6.17											
ITV10 7.6.17	2 mins 24 secs	N					2	1			1

BBC nomination strategies - all years combined	
Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	32
Migrant	29
Thousands/hundreds of thousands/numbers	16
People	14
EU nationals/EU citizens/Europeans	6
I/we (first person pronoun)	5
Referred by name	4
Survivors	3
You (generic)	3
The numbers	3
Those	3
Nationality	2
Everyone	2
(Islamist) extremist	2
Someone	2
Baby	1
Man	1
New arrivals	1
Fatalities	1
Traffickers	1
Humans	1
Asylum seeker	1
Incomer	1
Militants	1
Economic migrant	1
Enemy	1
Refugee	1
The brightest and best	1

ITV nomination strategies - all years combined	
Migrant	7
The numbers	6
Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	3
People	3
Child	2
Woman	2
Bodies	2
Refugee	2
By name (Abu Qatada)	2
Survivors	1
Victims	1
Desperate souls	1
Staff	1
Everybody	1
Who	1
(Terror) suspects	1
Foreign workers	1
You (generic)	1
Your loved ones	1
Radical cleric	1
(Islamist) extremist	1

Nomination strategies - all years combined	
Migrant	36
Third person pronouns (he/she/they)	35
People	17
Thousands/hundreds of thousands/numbers	16
The numbers	9
EU nationals/EU citizens/Europeans	6
I/we (first person pronoun)	5
Referred by name	4
Survivors	3
You (generic)	3
Those	3
Nationality	2
Everyone	2
(Islamist) extremist	2
Someone	2
Child	2
Woman	2
Bodies	2
Refugee	2
By name (Abu Qatada)	2

Appendix 4: Broadcast news predication strategies – 2015, 2016 and 2017

BBC predication strategies 2015			
Social actor	Predication	Speaker	Topoi
migrant(s)	crisis in the mediterranean	J	
	the migrant he (trafficker) will soon send to Libya	J	
	even if just a handful of migrants made it, more will follow	J	
	the first sea that African migrants have to cross. A sea of sand	J	
	traffickers abandon migrants	J	
	many (migrants) die in the extreme heat	J	
	are on the truck today, they may be on a boat tomorrow	J	DBFD
	every rescued migrant gets a number and an official photo	J	
	may now expect to see this British ship coming to get them	J	
	Green Party will never blame migrants for the failure of government policies	NR paraphrasing bennett	DBFD
thousands of migrants	have been rescued from boats trying to cross the mediterranean at the weekend	NR	DBFD
	have been arriving at ports in southern italy	NR	DBFD
seven thousand migrants	Italy has picked up more than…	J	DBFD
thousands more migrants	there may be thousands more migrants in north Africa getting ready to make this trip to Europe	J	DBFD
			DBFD
			DDD
more than 7000 people	have been saved by Italian and French ships	NR	DDD
these young men	don't want to hear how many have drowned in the mediterranean	J	DDD
hundreds of thousands	put their lives in the hands of smugglers	J	DDD
Senegalese	at least 200 Senegalese died in the boat disaster off the coast of Libya	NR	DDD
everyone	who wants to come here can just come here regardless of economic suitability or affordablity, and where is everyone going to live?	Member of public	DDD
the numbers	now being rescued will worry italy and the Eurpoean Union	J	DDD
all these people	this continent now has to find a home for all these people	J	DDD
			DDD
3rd person			DDD
they	all have a friend who has made it to europe	J	DDD
they	wait under the sun with nothing to do	J	DDD
they	believe they can make it too	J	DDD
he	left the Gambia hoping to play football in Europe	J	DDD
he	what does he think he will need to get there?	J	DDD
he	is a 30-yr old mechanic from Eritrea	J	DDD
she	has been given an italian name - Francesca (relates to the baby mentioned below)	J	DDD
him, and his family	Italy has made him and his family sit away from everyone else	J	DDD
they	may have a contagious disease	J	DDD
Samifu	is 19	J	E
Noelle	who is just 1 1/2, is fascinated by the nearby police jeep	J	E
mohammed	I met Mohammed	J	E
Islamist exremists	the very real danger islamist extremists pose to the UK	NR paraphrasing Farage	CCC
extremists	could enter the UK by crossing the Mediterranean with migrants from North Africa	NR paraphrasing Farage	CCC
this baby	was born during a rescue	J	
new arrivals	we watch the country count its new arrivals - one by one	J	0

ITV predication strategies 2015			
Social Actor	Predication	Speaker	Topoi
migrant(s)	the sheer desperation of migrants in the mediterranean	NR	DBFD
	scramble to safety trying to cross the sea	NR	DBFD
	from North Africa have reached the safety of an Italian port	NR	DBFD
many thousands more migrants	have taken to the sea	J	DDD
they	say they saw 36 of their fellow migrants drowned	NR	DBFD
they	are the latest victims in a succession of overcrowded boats	J	DDD
they	Stay with the boat' they are ordered	J	DBFD
they	there is panic as they try to swim the few metres…and instead flounder in the water	J	DBFD
children and women	scramble to safety	NR	DBFD
the human tide of misery	continues in the meditarranean	NR	DDD
bodies	only 5 bodies have been brought ashore	J	DBFD
the first	exhausted, the first begin the long climb to safety	J	DBFD
many desperate souls	are saved, including women and children	J	DBFD
46	are feared drowned	J	DBFD
survivors	according to survivors	J	DBFD
people	started pushing	survivor'	0
some	fell into the water and drowned	survivor'	DBFD
5 bodies	have been recovered	J	DBFD
		J= Journalist	NR = Newsreader in studio

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BBC Predication strategies 2016			
Social actor	Predication	Speaker	Topoi
Migrant(s)	cutting migrant numbers can only start in the next decade	J	DDD
	crowding across the continent	J	DDD
	border security and the migrant crisis	J	DBFD
	could reach them via Calais	J	DBFD
	the EU cannot impose non-EU migrant quotas	J	DDD
	celebrate migrants and immigration	Boris Johnson (Leave)	
	keeping wages down	J	DBFD
people	we can't cap the numbers of people coming in here from the EU	J	DDD
	crossing (it's) borders unchecked	J	CCC
	how many people will come to the UK	Audience member (British)	DDD
	we get the people we need for our NHS	Boris Johnson (Leave)	
	how many people each year can the UK reasonably cope with	Audience member (British)	DDD
	manage the numbers of people who are coming to this country	Andrea Leadsom (Leave)	DDD
	how many people each year can the UK reasonably cope with	J	DDD
incomer	an incomer from Spain was feeling hurt and showed it	J	
I	I've been working in England for 14 years now	Audience member (Spanish)	
we	We are not the enemy, we are not the enemy, we are your friends	Audience member (Spanish)	
their	trying to improve their lives	J	DBFD
militants	a group of militants, part of the so-called Islamic state, are heading to Europe from Syria	NR	CCC
hundreds and thousands of refugees	and other migrants crowding across the continent	J	DDD
	refugees and others poured through here	J	DDD
asylum seekers and economic migrants	The UK won't stop asylum seekers and economic migrants trying to get there	J	DDD
enemy	what about the enemy within?	J	CCC
they	will take over Rome	voiceover	DDD
	will spill the blood of infidels in Rome	voiceover	DDD
	if they are not making any claim on the State	J	E
	if they are from an EU country they can come here in as many numbers as they want	J	DDD
	everything they do for our country	Boris Johnson (Leave)	
	are happy to work for £4/5 per hour	vox pop	DBFD
EU nationals/citizens	entering Britain	J	DDD
	most of the bombers in the Paris and Brussels attacks were EU citizens	J	CCC
	are free to come and work here	David Cameron	E
	if Europeans want to come here and work, they can	David Cameron	E
	there are 50K EU nationals working in our NHS	David Cameron	
	2.1m EU nationals working here today	J	
someone	if someone is on benefits and can't find a job and can't support themselves	David Cameron	E
	if someone doesn't break the law	J	CCC
them	we can ask them to leave	David Cameron	E
	the Polish builder, for example, has become part of UK life	J	
you (generic)	you pay before you can take out	Sadiq Khan (Remain)	
	you have got to work four years	Sadiq Khan (Remain)	
those	fair to those who come here and fair to those who already live here	Andrea Leadsom (Leave)	DBFD

ITV predication strategies 2016			
Social actor	Predication	Speaker	Topoi
migrant/immigrant	more than 100000 who work in the NHS and social care. Thank you	Sadiq Khan (Remain)	
people	if there's gonna be more people coming to the UK it's (the NHS) gonna be stretched even more	vox pop	DBFD
	control the borders and flow of people in	J	DDD
everybody	we can't support everybody, sorry	vox pop	DBFD
who	who can be deported	J	CCC
refugees	the poster of Syrian refugees that Nigel Farage unveiled last week	J	
	refugees who are fleeing conflict and persecution	Yvette Cooper (Remain)	
the numbers	when you've got numbers running at 330,000 net globally	Boris Johnson (Leave)	DDD
	you're not promising to reduce numbers, you have never promised to reduce numbers. You're pretending that you are going to reduce numbers	Frances O'Grady (Remain)	DDD
	to decide what the numbers are. At the moment you can't	Gisela Stewart (Leave)	DDD
	limit the numbers coming to work here	J	DDD
	the numbers who are coming here	J	DDD
staff	there would be a staffing crisis if we lost these staff	Frances O'Grady (Remain)	
		J = Journalist	NR = Newsreader in studio

BBC predication strategies 2017			
Social actor	Predication	Speaker	Topoi
brightest and best	attract the brightest and best to work and study in this country	Theresa May (PM)	
EU citizens	what about EU citizens here?	J	
	every EU national who lives here and works here, and contributes a huge amount	Jeremy Corbyn (Labour)	
	the rights of EU citizens here in the UK	J	
they/their	wont guarantee their rights	J	
	they will be guaranteed their exisiting rights	Jeremy Corbyn (Labour)	
people	free movement of people will come to an end	J	DBFD
	the number of people who move away	J	
	the number of people who settle here to under 100000	J	DBFD

Social actor	Predication	Speaker	Topoi
Foreign workers	hearing from foreign workers about their post-Brexit fears	J	
you	grant every single one of you, your loved ones, right to remain	Tim Farron (LibDem)	
radical cleric	the deportation of radical cleric, Abu Qatada, took almost a decade	J	CCC
Abu Qatada	The deprtation of Abu Qatada	J	CCC
terror suspects	more power to deport terror suspects	J	CCC
Islamist extremists	the problem is, it's Islamist extremists	Paul Nuttall (UKIP)	CCC
people	a group of people out there who hate who we are	Paul Nuttall (UKIP)	DDD
		J = Journalist	