Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry

Zhang, Pan, Xiong, Yu, Xiong, Zhongkai and Yan, Wei (2014) Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry. Operations Research Letters, 42 (2). pp. 150-155. ISSN 0167-6377

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This paper studies the problem of designing contracts in a closed-loop supply chain when the cost of collection effort is the retailer’s private information. We investigate four cases: two contracts (a two-part nonlinear contract and a collection effort requirement contract), each under complete information and asymmetric information. We derive the manufacturer’s optimal contracts for all four cases and analyze the impact of information on the equilibrium results of supply chain members.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Supply chain management, Reverse logistics, Remanufacturing, Asymmetric information, Contracting
Subjects: N100 Business studies
Department: Faculties > Business and Law > Newcastle Business School
Depositing User: Becky Skoyles
Date Deposited: 11 Jun 2019 11:40
Last Modified: 19 Nov 2019 09:50

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