What About Hope? A Critical Analysis of Pre-empting Childhood Radicalisation

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Abstract

A convergence between vulnerability, radicalisation and children has been framed as an emergent category of abuse: “childhood radicalisation”. Focusing on the UK PREVENT programme, this paper explores the ways children have become interrelated with counter-radicalisation. While PREVENT engages with people of all ages, Home Office data indicates children are a target group. This approach has been consolidated through the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) which legislates PREVENT as safeguarding. Inspired by Ernst Bloch’s “ontology-of-the-not-yet”, this article draws upon critical geographies of “hope” as a theoretical tool to unpack PREVENT. I explore the productive power of PREVENT in catalysing “hopeful” forms of subjectivity; specifically, the pedagogy of PREVENT, and de-radicalisation through Channel. The article then extends Bloch’s original apparatus to examine the ways hope acts as an assemblage of affects to enact practices of control. It is the reciprocal influence of hope, fear and anticipatory security that helps illuminate how PREVENT makes visible, and thus regulates, processes of becoming. The article traverses disciplines encompassing criminology, critical geography, critical international relations, and critical terrorism studies. This inter-disciplinary approach usefully captures PREVENT in terms of performativity, anticipatory security and the figuration of the child.

Keywords: PREVENT, radicalisation, hope, childhood, fear

Introduction

A convergence between vulnerability, radicalisation and children has been framed as an emergent category of abuse: “childhood radicalisation” (Stanley and Guru 2015; Coppock and McGovern 2014; c.f. Dryden 2017). Coppock and McGovern, for example, suggest the “would-be-terrorist” has collided powerfully with “institutionalised discourses of childhood vulnerability” (2014, 248). Coupling radicalisation to vulnerability is intertwined with anticipatory logics of governance and security. On that, research has situated counter-radicalisation as temporally pre-emptive given an emphasis on, inter alia, dissuading vulnerable individuals from “adopting extremist ideologies which can be made to justify terrorism” (HM Government 2011, 25).

From the outset it should be made clear that pre-crime and the pre-emptive logic that drives it are not synonymous with prevention; the two adopt different methodologies to capture and act
on future space-times. Prevention requires certainty to legitimate action, whereas “pre-emption emphasises action under conditions of uncertainty about a future event” (Anderson 2010, 790). It is this degree of uncertainty that differentiates pre-emption from prevention. As Massumi, explains, pre-emption “acts on time” (2005, 5) by bringing “the future into the present…mak[ing] present the future consequences of an eventuality that may or may not occur” (2005, 8).

This article explores the ways children have become a central focus of PREVENT. The terms “children” and “childhood” are used interchangeably throughout to refer to individuals aged 15 years and under thus coinciding with the first age category set out under Home Office referral and support data. The UK PREVENT programme is defined as: “a multi-disciplinary, cross departmental strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy intended to provide a holistic response to the full spectrum of terrorist risks and threats” (Innes et al., 2011, 11). Operational since 2006, PREVENT governs in a non-criminal space identifying “at risk” individuals deemed susceptible to radicalisation. To this end, PREVENT attempts to inhibit the spread and influence of radicalisation as a collective responsibility via state officials, professional practitioners, and the wider lay public.

In the UK the prevention of radicalisation has been consolidated through the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA or the act hereafter). Commonly known as the “PREVENT duty”, section 26(1) of the act placed a legal requirement on public bodies to demonstrate “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government 2015, 2). Pertinently, the CTSA legislates PREVENT as a protectionist, safeguarding endeavour; this, essentially, reconfigures the would-be-terrorist through a discourse of victimhood (Heath-Kelly 2017). While the 1989 Children Act institutionalised childhood vulnerability through child protection and safeguarding practices (Coppock and McGovern 2014), the intertwining of social care structures and counter-radicalisation requires fastidious attention at its own level (Dresser 2018).

This article follows Ben Anderson’s (2006) Blochian-inspired work and utilises geographies of hope as a theoretical tool to unpack PREVENT. While a critical geographies approach has explored pre-emptive childhood obesity policy (see Evans 2010), it has hitherto examined PREVENT. A central trope in Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of hope is the “ontology-of-the not-yet-become” (Bloch 1996, 4). Drawing upon Bloch’s figuration, this article critically analyses the role hope plays in a pre-emptive politics of risk. Like Bloch, I situate hope as “anticipatory...
consciousness” (Bloch 1986, 283) designed to foster change. It is this “hoped-for future” (Anderson 2010, 229) or, in Bloch’s (1996) terms, *unfinished mode of being* that is central to the performativity of PREVENT i.e. the transformation of future subjectivities. I draw attention to the productive power of PREVENT in catalysing “hopeful” forms of subjectivity; in particular, the pedagogy of PREVENT, and de-radicalisation through Channel.

To demarcate the arguments from Bloch, I then follow Shamess by critically exploring the way hope acts as an “assemblage of affects to enact practices of control” (2014, 63). Moving beyond examining “the hoping subject in isolation” (Shamess 2014) is important for reasons threefold: first, exploring the reciprocal influence of hope, fear and anticipatory security helps unpack the ontological conditions which redefine PREVENT as safeguarding. Second, analysing hope as an assemblage of affects demonstrates the ways PREVENT makes visible, and thus regulates, processes of becoming. Third, framing hope as a political concept of governance and power illustrates the relationship between agency and structure central to the concept of reflexivity. This dichotomy is defined by Archer as one in which there is a “failure to transcend the dualisms of subject/object, structure/agency and thus to recognise each as constitutive of the other” (2007, 41). As Archer (2012) points out, it is important to separate structure and agency through analytical dualism, and to examine their interplay in order to account for the structuring and restructuring of the social order. With this in mind I question the innocence of hope to articulate a meaningful relationship between structure and agency that obtains under pre-emptive security governance.

In developing the aforementioned arguments, it is important to be clear about what the article claims to do. The primary messages are conceptual in nature and relate to the ways PREVENT can be theorised as pre-emptive security through hope. The ambition is to: demonstrate the productive power of PREVENT in instilling hopeful forms of subjectivity; and to: explore how children as *unfinished modes of being* manage the “temporal paradox” (Evans 2010) at the heart of pre-emptive counter-radicalisation. As will hopefully become clear, I do not consider PREVENT (nor the CTSA) as a totalising discourse; rather, the constellation of ideological-power centres are recognised. As I’ve argued elsewhere, theorising PREVENT as a centralised governmental apparatus where power is practised as an antithesis of freedom and agency does not provide a nuanced account of its empirical reality (Dresser 2019; see also Busher and Jerome 2019). Treating social relations as monolithic is also tantamount to reductionism, a theoretical impasse I wish to avoid. Nor do I suggest PREVENT and/or Channel govern
exclusively on the basis of age. That said, as will be shown, Home Office data supports the assertion that Channel interventions are targeted towards the Blochian figure of the “not-yet-become”.

Before proceeding further, two caveats should be mentioned. First, it is important to note that children do not evidence high involvement in terrorist criminal activity. As Thomas (2017a) outlines however, counter-radicalisation measures - those that operate in the non-criminal space - have approached young people as a target group. Thomas’ observations echo the Communities and Local Government Committee report which, commenting on counter-extremism programmes, states: “work with young people is the most important focus … since it is this group that are felt most susceptible to becoming attracted to extremism” (CLG 2010, 24). In a pragmatic sense, one reason why PREVENT has become centred on children (and young people) is obvious; as Thomas highlights, “the state can effectively reach many young people via schools, universities and community-based youth projects, whereas it is much more challenging to persuade older adults in the community to engage in counter-radicalisation dialogue processes” (2017a, 121). Second, this article focuses predominantly - though not exclusively - on the education sector given that a large proportion of PREVENT referrals emanate from educational environments.iii PREVENT referrals from educators further demonstrate the youngest median age since 2015 (see HM Government 2017). This is not surprising given schools and further education colleges work prevalently with younger members of society. Education is nevertheless seen at the forefront of anti-terror measures (Ramesh 2014) with teachers required to identify individuals vulnerable to radicalisation as an extension of safeguarding duties. The “Trojan Horse” affair in West Midlands Muslim faith schools no doubt helped pave the way for this approach (see Miah 2017).

The structure of this article precedes in several phases. I begin by outlining risk-based counter-radicalisation with a focus on “vulnerability”; a more historical exploration of PREVENT lies beyond the scope of this article. I then provide an overview of the CTSA. Following this contextual review, the article engages with critical geographies of hope within the oeuvre of Ernst Bloch. To demonstrate Bloch’s “ontology-of-the-not-yet” and the “positive utopian function of hope” (Shamess 2014, 26) two theoretical areas are explored: the pedagogy of PREVENT; and de-radicalisation through Channel. I then extend Bloch’s original framework to highlight how PREVENT makes visible, and thus regulates, processes of becoming. In turn,
I problematise hope and fear as incompatible binaries (see also Wrangel, 2019). Conclusions are drawn in the final section.

**Preventing Radicalisation Through Vulnerability**

PREVENT was launched in 2006 as part of a wider government response to combating terrorism. PREVENT sits within the cross-government counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, with PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE making up the other strands. Whilst the latter three elements of CONTEST are police owned (and associated with clandestine and covert counter-terrorism), PREVENT is different. Operating as a government-owned programme, PREVENT engages with individuals deemed “at risk” and/or vulnerable to radicalisation in a non-criminal space. As the strategy makes clear: “(counter-radicalisation programmes) should pre-empt and not facilitate law enforcement activity” (HM Government 2011, 8).

PREVENT was revised in 2011 and centred around three overarching objectives: to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism; to provide support and practical help to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism; and to work with a wide range of institutions where there are risks of radicalisation or which support counter-radicalisation work (HM Government 2011). While the principles of PREVENT demonstrate a degree of consistency since this time, the latest iteration of CONTEST (CONTEST4 hereafter) evidences its evolution. More emphasis has been placed on disengagement and desistance, as well as addressing the dissemination of extremist material online (HM Government 2018b). Building on legislative developments through the CTSA, an emphasis on safeguarding has also been re-enforced by embedding PREVENT in “core government and local authority safeguarding systems and processes” (HM Government 2018b, 35). According to CONTEST4, PREVENT should: “tackle the causes of radicalisation and respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism”; “safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalisation through early intervention, identifying them and offering support”; and “enable those who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate” (HM Government 2018b, 32).

Emerging as a distinct objective as part of CONTEST II (2009-2011), PREVENT aims to identify and support individuals considered vulnerable to radicalisation (see HM Government 2011). Revised counter-radicalisation guidance positions the subject of radicalisation as an individual who is “vulnerable to radicalisation”, “vulnerable to recruitment”, and “vulnerable
to violent extremist messaging” (HM Government 2011, 83). Identifying the nature of such “vulnerabilities” is therefore a crucial means of preventing radicalisation. As the PREVENT strategy states: “departments and statutory partners have undertaken activity to raise awareness and help frontline staff to identify signs of vulnerability” (HM Government 2011b: 57). This discursive shift towards identifying vulnerability is enmeshed with radicalisation discourse. “Radicalisation” stands as a particular model for explaining the causes of terrorism, as well as the ways in which vulnerable individuals are exposed to extremist messages (Coppock and McGovern 2014). A prominent focus on the psychosocial well-being of individuals has been a further feature of counter-terrorism governance. As CONTEST II makes clear, “people are not only vulnerable to radicalisation because of political and economic grievances. A range of social and psychological factors are also important” (HM Government 2009, 44). This runs parallel with academic literature that has questioned the significance of a macro focus on the “root causes” of radicalisation, instead examining socio-cultural (Sageman 2008) and cultural-psychological dispositions (Kundnani 2012). Central to this is the concept of identity; specifically, “Britishness”, “integration”, and “assimilation”. This has been the subject of much critique, not least because of an interplay between “cultural resilience” (Thomas 2017b), “self-governance” among Muslim communities (Heath-Kelly 2013), and “Otherising” practices of surveillance (Kundnani 2009).

While specific radicalisation trajectories are (and have always been) ill-defined, the cultural-psychological approach asserts particular dispositions or patterns of behaviour can serve as a proxy indicator of risk (Kundnani 2012). Indicators include, though are not limited to: family or peer pressure (HM Government 2011); personal grievance; and being at a transitional phase in one’s life (see HM Government 2012a). In this way, a more complex account of radicalisation has been proposed in which a psychological process, such as a group dynamic or struggles with identity, is seen as interacting with a process of acquiring an extremist theology (Kundnani 2012: 8-9). A wider set of socio-economic factors have also recently emerged, including: mental ill health; domestic violence; marginalisation; and the neglect of legitimate fears and concerns (McCann 2020). Indeed, socio-economic factors and cultural-psychological dispositions are retained in the latest version of the PREVENT strategy which states, “individuals drawn towards right-wing terrorism are usually poorly educated males and often unemployed (although there are some cases of high-achieving individuals)” (HM Government 2011, 21).
A sequential process that encompasses socio-economic factors and cultural-psychological dispositions can be read as a “cohesive project of risk knowledge which is deployed to render terrorism pre-emptively governable” (Heath-Kelly 2012, 2). As Martin states this portrayal of radicalisation as a linear progression is rooted in positivistic epistemology which has sought to test the validity of isolated variables in terms of the potential of individuals to be radicalised (2014: 191). CONTEST4 conversely claims government research has consistently rejected the notion of singular pathways which pre-figure terrorism i.e. “conveyor belt” theory (see HM Government 2018b). That said, risk management tools such as Extreme Risk Guidance 22 (ERG22), as well as “psychological hooks” outlined in the Channel Vulnerability Assessment Framework indicate otherwise (see HM Government 2012a). For clarity, Channel is a police-led de-radicalisation programme funded by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT). It is the core instrument of the second objective of PREVENT: protecting and supporting vulnerable individuals who are exhibiting radicalised behaviour by working in partnership with communities and key partners to neutralise or manage risk (HM Government 2011). To this end, Channel relies on co-ordinated activity at local level and uses existing collaborations between local authorities, the police, statutory partners (including the education sector, social services, children’s youth services and offender management services) and the local community (HM Government 2012b). The process is entirely voluntary with over 1,000 individuals supported through Channel between 2012-2018 (HM Government 2018b).

The “PREVENT Duty”

Counter-radicalisation designed to protect vulnerable people has been consolidated through the 2015 CTSA. The act applies to specified authorities which, under the “PREVENT duty”, must demonstrate “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government 2016, 2). More specifically, section 26(1) of the act responsibilises public sector workers to identify individuals’ proclivity for radicalisation and, in turn, raise concerns to their line manager, Designated Safeguarding Lead, or Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for PREVENT. Specified authorities are set out under Schedule 6 of the act; these include: local authorities; education bodies; health and social care bodies; prison and probation authorities; and the police.

In recognising “ideology is a central factor in the radicalisation process” (HM Government 2011, 40-44) the CTSA frames PREVENT as counter-ideological work. Advocating a “risk-based approach” (HM Government 2015, 3) that is arguably consistent with hegemonic
policies and practices of safeguarding, this encompasses critical thinking skills\textsuperscript{viii} and resilience building against extremist ideologies. As just one example, the Zak initiative is said to equip students and teachers with the knowledges around radicalisation “signs”, whilst conceptualising radicalisation as a grooming process (Reeves and Sheriyah 2015). In line with Teachers’ Standards, schools and colleges are further required to actively promote fundamental British values (FBV hereafter) within a citizen-based curriculum including “digital” citizenship (see Reynolds and Scott 2016). Of note, promoting FBVs is a continuation of non-statutory guidance already set out in Ofsted frameworks rather than an entirely novel facet of the CTSA (see DfE, 2014)\textsuperscript{ix}. An obligation to prevent radicalisation was also being enforced in schools and colleges via Ofsted through its Common Inspection Framework which pre-dates the act. What \textit{is} apposite to the CTSA is a mandatory obligation that applies to the aforementioned public bodies. The Secretary of State can, under section 32(A) of the act, enforce the performance of PREVENT where any specified authority has failed to execute its PREVENT duty.

Where safeguarding concerns have been identified relating to PREVENT, these are recorded on the Police Case Management Tracker (HM Government 2019), and may be referred to the local authority who assess whether or not to forward the case to the local PREVENT Channel Panel (itself chaired by local authorities and multi-agency in nature). Channel Panels assess those cases referred by a Chief Police Officer, with specialist police officers and staff adopting a triage role (HM Government 2020). The referral evidence is then examined and a decision is made whether an individual should be adopted as a Channel case, prior to implementing a bespoke package of support. In many cases the initial assessment concludes that no further action is required or that another form of support is more appropriate (HM Government 2019) thus adhering s.36(6) of the act.

This section has explored PREVENT as risk-based counter-radicalisation. The focus has been on vulnerability, as well the CTSA which fuses specified authorities together through the inclusion of ideological abuse as a safeguarding concern. The article now turns towards theorising PREVENT within the oeuvre of Ernst Bloch. Utilising a critical geographies approach, I explore the Blochian figure of the not-yet-become through two areas of analyses: the pedagogy of PREVENT; and de-radicalisation through Channel. The article then extends Bloch’s theoretical apparatus to examine the ways PREVENT makes visible, and thus
regulates, processes of becoming. Doing so illuminates the symbiotic relationship between hope, fear and anticipatory security.

**The Pedagogy of PREVENT: The Not-Yet-Become**

We begin to understand the alignment between Bloch’s “ontology-of-the-not-yet” and preempting childhood radicalisation through resilience building against extremist ideologies. With regard to the education sector, building pupils’ resilience through dialogue and social inclusion is said to “promote pupils’ welfare” (DfE 2015, 5) as part of “broader requirements relating to the quality of education and to promoting the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of pupils” (HM Government 2015, 10). Various toolkits for counter-extremism have been produced including the REsilience project developed by the Religious Education Council of England and Wales (and supported by the Department for Children, Schools and Families). A further example is *Educate Against Hate* - a website jointly developed by the DfE and the Home Office designed to protect children from extremist influences online, as well as providing educationalists with “the guidance and support they need to protect children from radicalisation and extremism” (HM Government 2018b, 37). Moreover, Social, Moral, Spiritual and Cultural (SMSC) education - which is a continuation of non-statutory guidance (Busher and Jerome 2019; see DfE 2014) - attempts to instil in children FBVs, the “values of our society” (HM Government 2018b, 23) and/or “pluralistic British values” (HM Government 2018b, 78). This is said to help tackle extremist narratives that fragment and divide communities (HM Government 2018b). In other words, it is presumed resilient children are able to reject extremist narratives as an antithesis to FBVs (James 2019). As Stephens and Sieckelinck (2020) outline, resilience building is employed as a preventive concept; a protective “shield” from external influences and ideas that is developed around “young people”, “vulnerable individuals”, or “vulnerable young people”.

Resilience building tantamount to identity construction maps well to Bloch’s (1986) “ontology of-the-not-yet”. Drawing upon Bloch, Ellis and Tucker (2012) posit “newness” is formed through subjectivities “open to” the future, through which the new can be made in a better way. This dialectic process rejects “closed totalities” (Bloch 1996, 197) with hope acting as a method through which *real-possibilities* are realised (Bloch 1996). This is why Bloch (1996) distinguishes the Real-Possible from *objectively* possible. Real-Possible futures are woven around anticipatory thinking and thus, reach forward hopefully and wilfully acting as a catalyst
for change (Bloch 1996; Levitas 1997). More than this, “Real-Possible” relates to an unfinished mode of being that is “constantly in a state of striving to know the self as the completion of its being lies in the future, its identity is hidden: the homo absconditus” (Ellis and Tucker 2012, 440; see also Bloch 1976). This unfinished subjectivity is “not yet fully assembled; whether because they (the subject) are still maturing, or above all because new conditions - though mediated with the existing ones - arise for the entry of a new Real” (Bloch, 1996, 196). To this end, hope manifests as a “catalyst for action and exodus trajectory towards a desirable state/object” (Shamess 2014, 32). Drawing upon Bloch, Hammond outlines:

The future is Not-Yet made or, indeed, guaranteed, and as such, it contains an openness which can be influenced and altered in new and transformed ways. Therefore, hope, the hunger for hope, and each successive (chaotic) subjective irruption that emanates from within the traces of a self-encounter, contains an aspirant undisclosed code of potential transformation, of reaching-out, towards the possibility of a progressive and creative newness (2015, 225).

Bloch’s notion of the ontology-of-the-not-yet can be augmented by writings on critical geographies of bodies. Locating the figuration of childhood as an always-incomplete state, Katz, drawing upon Castañeda, outlines the mobility of children’s bodies are “one of ‘becoming,’ and that fluidity opens it as a tremendously fertile figuration upon which all manner of things, ideas, affective relations, and fantasies are projected” (2008, 7). In a similar vein, Evans, building on Gagen (2000), suggests children’s bodies are marked out as “most capable of catalysing change” (2010, 33). It is, Evans (2010) submits, the affective potential of children’s bodies in-flux which become the medium through which vulnerable, imagined bodies are realised. These bodies matter because they traverse present-future scenarios; in Evans’ terms: “what they are and what they will become, rather than what they may reveal about intended actions” (Evans 2010, 22).

It is important to note that hope and hopefulness depend on “the embodied encounters of those involved in the past, present and the future” (Everingham 2016, 14). Going back to PREVENT, Robson’s (2019) research into Early Childhood Education (ECE hereafter) provision found policy enactment of PREVENT was unconstrained by FBVs; rather, “children constructed and co-constructed values of relevance to their lives and their immediate issues of concern” (Robson, 2019: 78). In fact, in contrast to passive acceptance, the notion of “Britishness” in
FBVs was contested by ECE practitioners who instead explored values beyond subscribed FBVs (Robson 2019; see also Busher et al., 2019; Revell and Bryan 2018). Pedagogy mediated through values-based education was said to position children as competent agents in formulating their own values (Robson, 2019). This challenges the suggestion that framing young people as vulnerable to terrorism “removes their autonomy and agency” (Durodie 2016, 7). Lewis (2019) similarly found practitioners preferred to use terms such as “our values” or “school values” rather than FBVs set out in government policy documents. This was said to mitigate the negative impacts of a (silencing) “chilling effect” which, by its very nature, stifles the efficacy of PREVENT in encouraging civic and political participation. Within primary school settings, da Silva et al., (2019: 113-114) found practitioners adhered to FBVs which helped “tackle PREVENT-related issues in a child-friendly way”. Importantly, however, policy enactment of PREVENT reflected practitioners’ positive, rather than passive acceptance, with FBVs contextualised in an age-appropriate way (da Silva et al., 2019).

Pedagogy that affords children the freedom to oscillate their own understandings and the experiences of others (Ghosh et al., 2017) is in keeping with Bloch’s notion of educated hope (docta spes). While anticipatory consciousness enacts better futures on the horizon of the not-yet-actualised, Bloch is clear this is “a process of something learned” (Bloch 1996, 198). Accordingly, the concept of the “not-yet-become” emerges from the wider context of Bloch’s utopian writings. Within this line of thought, Bloch’s maps out the notion of docta spes. Docta spes anticipates and affects the future (Levitas 1990) and is thus intertwined with futurity. Here Bloch (1996) distinguishes abstract (immature dreams) from concrete (mature dreams) forms of utopia. Bloch discerns abstract utopia as compensatory, immature “wishful thinking” (Levitas 1997, 15); it therefore lacks “anticipatory elements” (Bloch 1996, 197). Conceptualised as “will-ful” thinking, concrete utopia is mobilising and disruptive (Ellis and Tucker 2012) functioning with respect to present and future(s). As Levitas suggests, “[w]hilst abstract utopia may express desire, only concrete utopia carries hope” (Levitas 1997, 67). At the same time, docta spes involves pedagogies that refuse to “impose a predetermined vision of the good on students” (Webb 2013, 404). As Shamess outlines, concrete utopia distinguishes itself from abstract utopia through its conative element or “‘act-content’ – its movement towards the not-yet-arrived – which is, ultimately, the ‘positive utopian function of hope’” (Shamess 2014, 26). Commenting on educated hope, Giroux goes further:
Rather than seeing it as an individual proclivity, we must see hope as part of a broader politics that acknowledges those social, economic, spiritual, and cultural conditions in the present that make certain kinds of agency and democratic politics possible (2004, 38).

In utilising the “ontology-of-the-not-yet” as a theoretical lens, it is important to note hopeful possibilities and human inter-subjectivities emerge in spaces of the-not-yet (Eve ringham 2016). Taking this as a departure point, (critical) pedagogy employed through PREVENT is informative. The aforementioned counter-extremism toolkits have been designed to ensure there are “no ungoverned spaces in which extremism is allowed to flourish” (HM Government 2011, 9; emphasis added). Related to this, PREVENT is said to encourage positive social narratives and foster political and civic participation. Section 29 of the CTSA outlines that schools are considered “safe spaces” in which children and young people can “understand and discuss sensitive topics, including terrorism and extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas” (HM Government 2016, 14). Critical pedagogy is thus couched as a powerful weapon in tackling radicalisation and extremism (see Ghosh et al., 2020). As Sukarieh and Tannock highlight, state schools’ anti-radicalisation policies are geared towards “equipping young people with the knowledge, skills and critical thinking to challenge and debate in an informed way”; and “encouraging young people to challenge ideas, think for themselves and take responsibility for their actions” (2015, 31). This is said to reduce the “conditions” out of which terrorist violence emerges (Martin 2014, 9-10). As the PREVENT strategy makes clear: “radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge” (HM Government 2011, 63).

This section has applied Bloch’s “ontology-of-the-not-yet” to the pedagogy of PREVENT. As highlighted, anticipatory consciousness enacts better futures on the horizon of the not-yet-actualised, though Bloch is clear this is “a process of something learned” (Bloch 1996, 198). This progression entails spatio-temporal processes involving the interaction of knowledge, structure and agency, with the concept of “educated hope” helping unpack counter-ideological work as resilience building. Moreover, educated hope (/concrete utopia) is enacted in spaces-of-the-not-yet and thus, educational environments couched as “safe spaces” for civic and political participation further reveal the relevance of Bloch. While the focus has been on counter-radicalisation interventions employed prior to de-radicalisation, the article now turns to the main method for de-radicalisation in the UK - Channel. I theoretically situate Channel
as created spaces of possibility in order to “catch glimpses of future possibilities” (Webb 2013, 403; emphasis added). While I do not suggest Channel governs exclusively on the basis of age, it is arguable de-radicalisation interventions are targeted towards the Blochian figure of the “not-yet-become”.

**Channel: The “Not-Yet-Become”**

Official language describes Channel as “a multi-agency risk assessment and case system to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalisation” (HM Government 2011, 55). The purpose of that support is to “dissuade individuals from engaging in and supporting terrorist-related activity” (HM Government 2011, 56). Channel also involves reducing “the influence of extremist ideas where they have gained traction by removing people from the influence of and contract from with terrorist groups and sympathisers” (HM Government 2011, 56). This is why radicalisation discourse separates the “radicaliser” from the “radicalised”, with the latter considered a victim of ideological abuse which pre-figures terrorism. Without conflating cognitive and behavioural change (given clear differences [see Horgan 2009]), de-radicalisation is a term which has been used to refer to both (see HM Government 2011, 2012a and 2012b).

Research suggests de-radicalisation interventions are “primarily aimed at vulnerable youths” (Elshimi 2015a, 111). This is supported by Thornton and Bouhana (2017) who draw attention to a Channel adoption threshold with PREVENT practitioners highlighting a collective struggle to change the mind-set of older radicalised individuals (as opposed to children). To set the scene, both points are supported by Home Office data. From March 2018 to March 2019, 58% of PREVENT referrals (3,343) were aged 20 or under (HM Government 2019). Those aged 20 years or under also made up the majority of the 1,320 individuals discussed at a Channel panel (839; 64%) and the 561 individuals that were adopted as a Channel case (373; 66%) (HM Government 2019). This is in keeping with previous Home Office data. In 2017-18, “of the 7,318 individuals referred, the majority (4,144; 57%) were aged 20 years or under” (HM Government 2018a, 4). There was a marginal increase in 2016-17 with 3,487 individuals aged 20 years or under referred, making up 57% of referrals overall (HM Government 2018a). Home Office data further demonstrate that in 2017-18, those aged 20 years or under were the largest cohort discussed for appropriateness of Channel intervention (i.e. de-radicalisation) at Channel Panel meetings (HM Government 2018a). The 2017-18 data mirrors statistics from the previous
year. Of the 1,146 individuals discussed at a Channel panel, those aged 20 years of under made up the majority (697; 61%) whilst 332 individuals aged 20 years or under received Channel support (226; 68%; HM Government 2017). In the years previous to officially-released PREVENT data, children made up a significant proportion of referees, with 1,839 referrals for individuals aged 15 years and under between January 2012 and December 2015 (Thornton and Bouhana 2017). Coppock and McGovern (2014: 245) also highlight that “from 2007 to 2010 Channel practitioners identified 1120 individuals as being on a pathway to radicalisation. 290 of those identified were under 16 years old and 55 were under 12”.

In what follows the aim is not to provide an exhaustive account of de-radicalisation, but to explore some of the ways Channel demonstrates productive power on a subjective level. To begin, theological and/or ideological mentoring is useful. In his Foucauldian reading of de-radicalisation as a confessional technology, Elshimi asserts de-radicalisation measures are manifested as “salvation” to “extremist” individuals through techniques of the self (2015a, 122). Such techniques are centred on psycho-cognitive change (of ideological views) via a gradual process (Elshimi 2015b). Drawing upon transformative learning theory, Wilner and Dubouloz call this the: “transformation of meaning perspective - the individual’s psycho-cognitive construction of new definitions of self” (2010, 419; italics in original). Taking this as a departure point, theological and/or ideological mentoring involves “listeners following a leader” (Drahos 2004, 19) through a positive “mentor–mentee relationship” (Lindekidle 2015, 225). As revised Channel guidance makes clear, the mentoring process involves a suitable adult acting as a role model (HM Government 2020). Channel mentors additionally provide personal guidance or pastoral care to adopted Channel cases (HM Government 2020). This is unsurprising given “the absence of positive mentors and role models” is considered a cultural-psychological disposition which pre-figures terrorism (HM Government 2009, 89). In the UK a positive mentor may be in the form of a Channel Intervention Provided (CIP) who, through their knowledge and expertise, attempt to disturb agential future orientations in the present. In contrast to coercive and aggressive state measures that are reflective of “hard power” (Ghosh et al., 2017), theological and/or ideological mentoring works as a counter-narrative to the psychological, emotional and intellectual “soft power” appeal that terrorists purport (Ghosh et al., 2017).

The above parallels with Blochian thought in a number of ways. First, Bloch maps out the locus of political agency as “a question of learning hope” (1986, 3). In elucidating hope, Levitas
notes, *docta spes* is a process of learning to be affected by hope and in turn affecting hope, an experimenting with an unfinished, open, not-yet-determined world (Levitas 1997, 66). Thus, it is the anticipatory character of hope that is central to a capacity to affect (Wrangel 2018) and be affected (Anderson 2006); what Wright (2008) calls “practising hope”. This attuned ability “to act and relate to others” (Wright 2008, 224) allows knowledge to be gained on the basis of an “ontology-of-the-not-yet” (Bloch 1986, 13; 1996, 43). As a theory-praxis, educated hope additionally offers a specific mode of subjectivity that recognises and engages with the future as “offering experience beyond what is currently known” (Ellis and Tucker 2012, 441). Through this “in process-reality” (Bloch 1996, 197; *italics in original*) educated hope refuses to accept the completeness of the present (Giroux 2004); the future, according to Bloch (1996), is not conclusively determined.

Similarly, in the context of achieving psycho-cognitive change, Channel centres on capacities to affect and be affected (Anderson 2007), and is thus concerned with “transforming affects which are *passions* into different affects” (Lloyd 1996, 99; *emphasis added*). Telling in this sense is the utopian function of hope which transcends emotion; utopia is said to be a “directing act of a cognitive kind” (Levitas 1997, 14; *italics in original*). Hope is, as Webb succinctly puts it, a *cognitive-affective activity* (Webb 2013). Hence, Levitas argues that *docta spes* “operates as a dialectic between reason and passion” (Levitas 1997, 17). The epistemological character of Channel can be read as productive power on a subjective level, or as Shamess (2014) puts it, “hopeful” forms of subjectivity. This is in keeping with security discourse under the Obama administration in the U.S. As Wrangel outlines security discourse was centred on “reorienting the desires of the potential subjects of radicalisation towards hope”, whilst “modifying the form of the desiring subject towards the creation of a hopeful life” (2018, 81).

Second, beyond theological and ideological mentoring, the types of support Channel offers are developmental in nature and extend to citizens’ welfare, including: careers advice; housing support contact; constructive pursuits; and life skills (see HM Government 2012b, 2018b, 2019). Channel further affords children - as *citizens-in-waiting* (Kennelly 2010) - capacity as agents to make positive decisions that affect their lives.\textsuperscript{xii} As Elshimi notes, de-radicalisation is generally considered a “rehabilitative model” underscored by the notion that “we are going to make you good and/or better” (2015a, 111). To this end there is an underlying pre-emptive logic to stop future radicals “from becoming bad” (Elshimi 2015b, 208).
The spatio-temporal processes Bloch draws attention to are likewise concerned with a “mode of futurity, namely a more positive one that is created through the very sense of difference that a philosophy of ‘not-yet brings’” (Ellis and Tucker 2012, 439 emphasis added). The “not-yet-become”, as Sutton points out, signifies the possibility of humans “recreating themselves anew” (2015, 8) with subjectivity built around the perpetual “not yet” finished “being”. This is central to Bloch’s concept of “anticipatory consciousness” (Bloch 1986, 283) which entails a changeability for the better that is revealed on the “horizon of the future”: what has yet to become (Bloch 1996, 196). All the while hope is anchored in the present as agency; it is the driving force that confronts becoming and carves out a trajectory towards the new (Bloch 1996, 8 as cited in Shamess 2014, 29; emphasis added). This is why the present reality for Bloch: “…rules together with the horizon within it, and which gives to the flow of the present specific space, the space of new, feasibly better present” (Bloch 1998, 283). Bloch therefore mediates our understanding of temporality as potentiality and actuality merge.

Third, commentating on Danish de-radicalisation efforts, Lindekilde notes interventions resemble the “art of the possible” (2015, 238). Governance here is one of “influencing individuals’ exercise of free will, not through control and prohibitions but through incentives, information, empowerment, and challenging interventions” (Lindekilde 2012, 123). Channel similarly constitutes the realm of possibility: the “what is becoming or what might become” (Levitas 1997, 16). This notion is central to his concept of futurity through which he marks out a genuine new (Novum) (Ellis and Tucker 2012, 443). As Levy posits, utopia for Bloch is “not the ‘end’ of all movement and development, but ‘end’ as a future which opens up ‘endless’ new possibilities” (1990, 4). In Levy’s words, the “potential realisation of the possible” (1990, 4). The ontological status of hope therefore involves a present-future axis with the existence of possibility crucial in terms of “seeing better futures as emerging from present materiality of life” (Ellis and Tucker 2012, 439; emphasis added). These future possibilities are hopeful precisely because they remain open to a future that has yet to become. For Bloch this is a “hope that hopes” (Bloch 1986) or, in Massumi’s terms, hope rooted in “seeds of change” (2002, 221). Anderson (2006) similarly connotes Bloch’s notion of “utopic” as a re-constructive process. Hopefulness, for Anderson:

Enables bodies to go on. A positive change in the passage of affect it opens the space-time that it emerges from to a renewed feeling of possibility: this is a translation into the body of the affects that move between people in processes of intersubjective transmission to make a space of hope (2006, 744).
This section has explored some of the ways Channel attempts to instil “hopeful” forms of subjectivity (Shamess 2014) which are enacted on the horizon of the not-yet-actualised (Bloch 1986). Much like resilience building as counter-ideological work, Channel can be read as a “positive vehicle hope” (Shamess 2014). This singular reading however, overlooks the way(s) hope is implemented as a use of force. In conceptualising futurity, Bloch notes “uncertainty of the outcome remains … danger and faith are the truth of hope, in such a way that both are gathered in it” (Bloch 1986, 112). Through the concept of the “not-yet” Bloch posits hope as an “excessive force”; however, in locating hope as an individual disposition, he underappreciates the way(s) hope acts through an assemblage of affects (Shamess 2014). In considering this, the final section examines the symbiotic relationship between hope, fear and anticipatory security. Building on the work of Wrangel (2019) and Shamess (2014) I extend Bloch’s original apparatus to posit hope and fear as mobilising forces that intersect to enact practices of control. Doing so highlights the ways PREVENT regulates processes of becoming and possible future scenarios (Wrangel 2019).

Regulating the “Not-Yet-Become”: Hope, Fear and Anticipatory Security

In conducting a political analysis of hope, Shamess outlines: “hope can never examine the hoping subject in isolation and must always pay critical attention to the assemblage of forces enabling the subject’s agency and the agency proper to the assemblage itself” (2014, 7). While hopeful possibilities are an imaginative reconfiguration of how it might be made better i.e. the not-yet-actualised, hope acts as a “functional multi-linear entity that is capable of operating across difference to enact practices of control” (Shamess 2014, 63). Wrangel similarly argues:

Hope is better understood as a social and political affect or entity – hope acts, it is designed to assemble bodies into formation, to produce subjectivities and to create a particular form of life – one that is deemed safer, less violent, less disruptive of the here and now (2019, 3).

Both Shamess (2014) and Wrangel (2019) highlight an assembling of forces; alignments within and across heterogeneous bodies. Here hope is portrayed not as the opposite to power but read as a governing tool which assembles bodies into formation in order to control future scenarios in the present (Wrangel 2018). Importantly, Shamess - in the spirit of Deleuzian affect theory - introduces the notion of “hope assemblages”. “Hope Assemblages” are “ad hoc, non-
totalising, non-localisable entities that are composed of heterogeneous parts which function coherently to channel movement along a particular pathway and towards a particular vehicle” (2014, 3). Hope assemblages are theoretically useful in that they invite one to critically consider an alternative account to that of “network” (McFarlane 2009).

Taking this as a backdrop, reflections on governance reform through the CTSA are instructive. Building children’s resilience through counter-ideological work is not the only responsibility placed on specified authorities. There is a concomitant duty to identify “children who may be vulnerable to radicalisation and know what to do when they are identified” (Department for Education 2015, 5). Professional practitioners are encouraged to use their “professional judgement” in identifying “at risk” individuals and act proportionately (DfE 2015, 6). To help achieve this, Designated Safeguarding Leads are said undertake PREVENT awareness training and “provide advice and support to other members of staff on protecting individuals from the risk of radicalisation” (DfE 2015, 7). PREVENT training also comes in the form of eLearning modules which cover: PREVENT awareness; PREVENT referrals; and Channel awareness (HM Government 2020). In regard to the latter, the Channel foregrounds contextual susceptibilities and motivational factors using depoliticised and non-exceptional language (see HM Government 2012b). While revised advice from the DfE outlines “there is no single way of identifying an individual who is likely to be susceptible to a terrorist ideology” (DfE 2015, 6; see also Home Office 2018b) the same advice makes clear knowledge of this conceptual apparatus should allow staff to be “alert to changes in children’s behaviour which could indicate that they may be in need of help or protection” (DfE 2015, 6). It is also pertinent to note that the CTSA reconfigures the drivers of radicalisation as another form of preventable abuse (see DfE 2015; Dresser 2018). As the duty states, PREVENT “does not confer new functions on any specified authority” (HM Government 2016, 2), but should be incorporated into “existing policies and procedures, so it becomes part of the day-to-day work of the authority” (HM Government 2016, 6; emphasis added). Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers captures this (re)framing of PREVENT:

Protecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be seen as part of schools’ and childcare providers’ wider safeguarding duties, and is similar in nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, gangs, neglect, sexual exploitation), whether these come from within their family or are the product of outside influence (DfE 2015, 5).
This intersection between pastoral responsibility and security has imaginatively reconfigured the principles of PREVENT. Connected to this, discourse illustrates the ways children are made hyper-visible through pre-crime safeguarding risk work. The notion of temporality which underpins PREVENT as a pre-emptive politics of risk is theoretically useful here. As Elshimi notes a preoccupation with future-orientated temporality “effectively moves the objective of policy-makers towards other concerns beyond solely reducing the potentiality of violence: particular ideas, behaviours, and practices in the temporality of the present become problematic” (2015a, 112). Under a pre-emptive logic, future space-times collapse as passions are activated with respect to “potentialities, irrespective of their temporal proximity in the lived present” (Stockdale 2014, 132, italics in original). This is because pre-emption - by its very nature - is less about prediction, but entails an open orientation to multiple potential futures and a valuation of action in the present despite incomplete knowledge or unknowable threat (de Goede 2014, 49). Potentiality, therefore, precipitates action as counter- and de-radicalisation programmes confront radical uncertainty that is confined to what may or may not actualise (Stockdale 2014).

This development mirrors the “psychologisation of social problems” evident in policies on children more generally (Coppock and McGovern 2014). As Coppock and McGovern state, “an obsession with controlling ‘risky’ childhoods has shifted the emphasis from a focus on ‘problems’ to a focus on the prevention of potential problems” (2014, 252, emphasis added). Importantly for the current discussion, “becoming hopeful” (Anderson 2006, 743) is contained in the not-yet; “the potentials of what could be” (Everingham 2016, 14; emphasis added). Accordingly, it is important to treat hope, not outside, nor independent of language; hope is embedded in, and made thinkable through, language (Wrangel 2018). Framing hope as a discourse of power locates potentiality as site of political contest (Wrangel 2019). In the process the-not-actualised is rendered visible (Wrangel 2019). As Wrangel (2019) notes, hope exists through and between bodies as “performative distinctions in language”, and between potentiality and actuality (Wrangel 2019). Martin (2018) makes a similar point in conceptualising Channel as a “pastoral-security gaze”. He critically questions how individuals at risk of becoming involved in terrorism are identified, and how this potential is made visible. As Martin (2018) contends, a legislative intersection between pastoral responsibility and security constitutes individuals who are vulnerable to radicalisation as visible and, in the process, produces subjects of intervention. It is, of course, debatable whether spaces of childhood have been transformed by the language and practices of PREVENT or the reverse
process has taken place (Dresser 2018; Durodie 2016; da Silva et al., 2019). On the one hand, Lewis’ research into secondary school environments suggests PREVENT was seamlessly incorporated into pre-existing technological infrastructures and normalised surveillance regimes. Robson (2019) conversely found collapsing PREVENT into ECE provision legitimised novel forms of childhood surveillance.

While the Blochian figure of the “not-yet-become” is articulated in the present through “the possibilities in anticipation of a better future” (Everingham 2016, 15), the horizon of “not-yet-actualised” is dependent on a myriad amount of factors. As Shamess observes:

> Hope may increase agency, and incite and justify action – but this is far from an intrinsically emancipatory recipe. To engage with an “increase in agency” (i.e. an instance of empowerment) is always to engage with intervening forces and bodies that have reconstituted the subject and increased its capacity to act in such a way as to endow them with the necessary power to achieve a particular goal (Shamess 2014, 34).

While I previously mapped the productive power of PREVENT in instilling hopeful forms of subjectivity, this reflects what counter-ideological work is supposed to do not necessarily what PREVENT is doing in situ. The degree to which neo-liberal education policy allows for freedom of expression, experiencing democracy, and critical (and radical) pedagogies is questionable. This is particularly so given the narrowing in scope and mission of education (Sukarieh and Tannock 2015). While protecting freedom of speech is considered a “powerful tool in promoting critical thinking and preventing terrorist and extremist narratives taking hold” (HM Government 2018, 37) this is shaped by professional and institutional cultures and contexts (Lewis 2019). As Ragazzi notes, “in many member states, students are asked to uncritically abide by a set of values – for example ‘British values’ – which cannot be questioned and which, interestingly, do not refer to human rights” (2017, 85; emphasis added)xiv. Likewise, the enactment of PREVENT in Lewis’ (2019) research highlights children were afforded agency but only when transitioning to adolescence. In support, Coppock draws attention to an inherent bias that “informs a position that suggests children’s ‘innocence’ is potentially ‘contaminated’ or harmed by ‘politics’ and so they ought to be excluded from ‘the political’ world, in their own best interests” (2014, 117). This is in keeping with Beth Evans who, commenting on discourses of childhood suggests pre-emptive childhood obesity policy demonstrates “political manipulation of the ‘spectacle of childhood’ (Katz 2008), where
actions are justified through a ‘ventriloquist form of representation’ that claims to speak in the
‘best interests’ of the (vulnerable, irresponsible, incapable) child” (Evans 2010, 24).

Shamess further discerns any analysis of hope must examine “how the assemblage works – an
interpretation that is conjoined to statements about knowledge and truth … to systems of
signification and subjectivisation” (2014, 70). Taking Shamess’ lead, pedagogy that is
democratic and emancipatory in nature is said to “realise the unknowable potentiality of
children” (Moss 2015: 233; emphasis added). Paradoxically, however, Agamben (1998) notes
it is through potentiality that the subject is produced. In Agambem’s words: “the subject […]
is a field of forces always already traversed by the incandescent and historically determined
currents of potentiality and imptentiality” (1998, 147-48). In considering this, Coppock and
McGovern suggest:

Children and young people in contemporary society are generally denied political agency;
expressions of political dissent are deemed to sit outside of “normal” childhood, making it
easy for such narratives to be pathologised as indicative of a dangerous mind in need of
“treatment” or “correction” (Coppock 2014, 250; see also Durodie 2016; O’Donnell 2016;
Quartermaine 2016).

Sieckelinck et al., add support outlining “radicalisation in a pedagogical sense occurs when a
child starts to develop political or religious ideas and agency that are fundamentally different
from the educational environment’s or mainstream’s expectations” (2015, 330). They further
assert growing political awareness that is at odds with mainstream norms, values and views is
considered problematic, subversive and suspect (Sieckelinck et al., 2015); what Coppock terms
“politically risky subjects” (2014, 116). Young people however, must negotiate the transition
from childhood to adulthood, of which, political subjectivity is a development task (Sieckelinck
et al., 2015). As Jerome and Elwick usefully put it, “the more citizens understand the
complexity (and malleability) of the political world, and the risks associated with it, the less
likely they are to embrace explanations that ignore or misrepresent that complexity” (2019,
109).

This is why hope governs life and, importantly, governs different forms of life (Wrangel 2018).
As Shamess puts it: “(hope) always involves authoritative knowledge and a particular account
about what the present is and why it is insufficient, what is possible and desirable in the future,
and how the future will be actualised” (2014, 35). In the context of counter-radicalisation, much critical commentary has explored PREVENT, paraphrasing Strausz and Heath-Kelly, as a pedagogy of suspicion “framed as part of the wider safeguarding agenda” (2019, 169). Sukarieh and Tannock, for example, state there is “emergent critical literature on anti-radicalisation in education that focuses, in particular, on its harmful effects for Muslim, black and minority ethnic youth” (2015, 24). In support, Coppock and McGovern argue “essentialised ethnic and racial identities are married to problematic constructions of childhood” and “young people by the state” (2014, 242, 246).xv

It is therefore analytically important to situate fear and hope as intimately related to anticipatory logics of security. Like fear, hope is connected to discourses and assemblages of power which render mechanisms of security visible (Wrangel 2018). Delineating fear and hope as political concepts, Ahmed outlines: “it is a question of hope for what we might yet be, as well as fear for what we could become” (2004a, 184). Framed this way, hope produces - whether paradoxically or not - (in)security, as well as subjectivities (Wrangel 2019). This, then, is a futurity centred on ontological (in)security as childhood provokes hope and fear (Kraftl 2008; see also Evans 2010). The “becomingness of children” as interrelated with “questions of futurity” (Katz 2007, 7) is exemplified by comments from the then Mayor of London, Boris Johnson. Asserting Daesh-inspired extremism as an emergent category of child abuse, Johnson marked out the figure of the “not-yet-become”:

The law should obviously treat radicalisation as a form of child abuse. It is the strong view of many of those involved in counter-terrorism that there should be a clearer legal position, so that those children who are being turned into potential killers or suicide bombers can be removed into care – for their own safety and for the safety of the public (Johnson 2014, n.p).

Finally, and going back to the CTSA, while those in leadership positions must “ensure staff understand the risk and build the capabilities to deal with it” (HM Government 2016, 3), there is a contractual obligation on behalf of local authorities to ensure frontline workers meet the statutory duty (HM Government 2016). This is achieved, inter alia, by demonstrating “an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in the area, institution or body” (HM Government 2016, 2). The PREVENT duty also extends to publicly funded ECE provision for children aged two to four (see Robson 2019). As Robson points out, inspectors of registered
early years provision assess the extent to which providers develop children’s “understanding of fundamental British values” as measured against the promotion of children’s personal development (Ofsted 2019a, 38 as cited in Robson 2019, 80). Related to this inspection judgement, Robson found pedagogical practice that encompassed FBVs was considered “performative acts” to comply with the requirements of the duty (Robson 2019). Busher et al., (2019) term this “pragmatic acceptance” through cultural compliance (McGovern 2016; see also Lewis, 2019).

McManus’ (2011) perspective of affective ambivalence to utopian hope helps unpack the enactment of PREVENT as “performance fear”. McManus outlines that a politics of fear attempts to directly orchestrate the emotional register; an intentional effort to demand and command a subject (McManus 2011). In sketching hope as an ambivalence project, McManus theorises ambivalence, not as paralysing, but foregrounds “its latent productivity so as to interrupt an affective politics in which hope is presumed to shape subversive agency while fear renders subjects complicit and governable” (McManus 2011, n.p). This utopian-affect puts both hope-affects and fear-affects to work (McManus 2011). Commenting on the politics of security, Ahmed similarly argues fear attempts to “secure the relationships between bodies” (2004a, 63), or, to put it differently, connecting collective bodies to other bodies (Ahmed 2004b). Importantly, Ahmed frames hope as a “gathering together” (2004a, 184) while “hoped-for-futures” (Anderson 2010, 229) emerge through a “disposition that provides a dynamic imperative to action” (Anderson 2006, 744). In this way, hope can read as an ontological operator (Agamben 1999; see also Wrangel 2019) that steers the actions of heterogeneous bodies tasked with individuating hope (Anderson 2006).

With this in mind, empirical studies reveal the PREVENT duty resonating with an over-reporting, “better to be safe than sorry” approach that is reflective of a professional culture of safeguarding (Lewis 2019; Dresser 2018; Busher and Jerome 2019; da Silva et al., 2019). Children are naturally implicated with reports and referrals increasing exponentially since the implementation of the CTSA (see HM Government 2017, 2018a, 2019). A nuanced account of PREVENT must therefore move beyond examining “the hoping subject in isolation” through an appreciation of hope as a psychological and political concept, one which exists within a subject, but also through and between bodies (Shamess 2014). Hope, as Shamess observes, is intimately related to “drive, agency, mobilisation, and change”, which may lead to “docility and conformity” within “larger networks and assemblages of power” (Shamess 2014, 39-40).
Conclusion

This article has extrapolated Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of hope as a theoretical tool to unpack PREVENT. Bloch’s “ontology-of-the-not-yet” shares a number of parallels with interventions employed under pre-emptive security governance. Central to both is a merging of potentiality and actuality as future space-times collapse. Drawing upon critical geographies of “hope”, it has been argued PREVENT approaches children as a target group due to their incomplete, childhood states: adults “not-yet-become”. Moreover, the article has located the performativity of hope as central to a pre-emptive politics of risk, rather than as inherently divorced (Wrangel 2019). Far from being incongruent, hope is intertwined in the processes of pre-emption: as an affective state of anticipation; an anticipated movement towards that which is not-yet-become (Bloch 1996). In developing this argument, the article has drawn attention to the productive power of PREVENT in instilling hopeful forms of subjectivity. This, in essence, is the “positive utopian function of hope” (Shamess 2014, 26).

While the figure of the “not-yet” maps comfortably to pre-empting childhood radicalisation in numerous ways, Shamess outlines Bloch’s field of vision is “limited to analysing hope myopically as a disposition in the individual rather than as the result of an interaction with a field of forces” (2014, 33). Accordingly, the article has explored the ways hope acts as an “assemblage of affects to enact practices of control” (Shamess 2014, 63). By highlighting the reciprocal influence of hope, fear and anticipatory security governance, the ontological contours of hope should not, therefore, be rendered outside of fear, nor security for that matter. Like fear, hope is connected to discourses and assemblages of power which render mechanisms of security visible (Wrangel 2018).

It is through problematising and thus questioning the innocence of hope that illuminates the Janus-faced nature of PREVENT. Practitioners responsibilised with pre-empting childhood radicalisation face a paradox between “security, temporality, visibility, and care” (Martin 2018, 3). On the one hand, PREVENT offers the potential to increase children’s agency (and instil hopeful forms of subjectivity) through empowerment, democracy and critically challenging interventions. This reflects Bloch’s (1996) notion of anticipatory consciousness which enacts better futures on the horizon of the not-yet-actualised. On the other hand, Shamess’ (2014) political analysis of hope demonstrates this is far from an intrinsically emancipatory recipe. In
the context of PREVENT, it is the unknowable potentiality of children that reduces the figuration of the child to that of “the object of protection” (Agamben 1998, 133). This plays out in spaces of the-not-yet (Everingham 2017) with knowledge produced to regulate processes of becoming and possible future scenarios (Wrangel 2019). In presenting this argument the objective has not been to provide an oppositional account of PREVENT but to explore the way children as unfinished modes of being manage the “temporal paradox” (Evans 2010) at the heart of pre-emptive counter-radicalisation. The central messages do, however, raise broader questions around the ethical implications of PREVENT(ing) through safeguarding, and the shifting mechanics of suspicion. This is perhaps even more pertinent given PREVENT is currently under independent review.

The article has also highlighted the agency-structure relationship that obtains under pre-emptive security governance. Pre-empting childhood radicalisation demonstrates a downwards defluxion of prerogative power to frontline agents (Stockdale 2014), irrespective of their non-expert status. Such figures are constrained within an overarching discursive structure and yet equally retain a degree of agency in operationalising a pre-emptive logic of security (Stockdale 2014). The implications of the arguments presented are fourfold. First, practitioners’ freedom to re-appropriate the provisions of PREVENT evidences the ways pre-emptive security is dispersed and multi-layered bringing with it sites of autonomy and translation (Dresser 2019; O’Toole et al., 2016; Thomas 2017b). In considering policing enactment, then, the ways pre-empting childhood radicalisation is shaped by professional and institutional contexts is analytically and empirically important (see Lewis, 2019). Second, children’s ability to exercise their own agency within a pre-emptive logic of risk challenges broader critiques that frame PREVENT as a securitising device (see Durodie 2016). Future research should thus be mindful of the material practices of governing (O’Toole et al., 2015), as well as how the governance subject, constituted through discourse, turns up in practice (McKee 2009). Third, paying attention to hope as an assemblage of affects helps move beyond examining “the hoping subject in isolation” (Shamess 2014); this, in turn, illuminates the ontological conditions which (re)define PREVENT as safeguarding. Finally, an inter-disciplinary approach encompassing critical geographies, criminology, critical international relations, and critical terrorism studies has hitherto examined PREVENT. It is hoped this article provides insight into pre-empting childhood radicalisation in theoretically novel ways.
References


Notes

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ii To be clear, I conceptualise the aims of Channel as “prevention is better than cure” targeted at “extremists” rather than terrorists or convicted criminals (Elshimi 2015a, 111).


iv See also the Proposed Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill, and guidance set out in the government’s *Working Together to Safeguard Children* report
Radicalisation is defined in Home Office policy as the “processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances” (HM Government 2006, 1, 9).

See Stanley (2018) for an exploration of practice issues related to PREVENT as safeguarding.

The duty extends to third-sector organisations that operate on behalf of specified authorities.

See O’Donnell (2016) and James (2019) for opposing critiques.

Promoting British values has been part of counter-radicalisation since 2011. Opposition to FBVs is also embedded in the definition of extremism of which, PREVENT aims to address in both violent and non-violent form.

This approach has been in operation since the Learning to be Safe Together toolkit was launched in 2008.

This is said to satisfy the need to protect freedom of speech under section 31 of the CTSA while adhering to section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986.

Parental consent is required for those under the age of 18.

See Deleuze (1988).

At a broader level, Thomas (2016) notes PREVENT is more in keeping with “engagement work” rather than educational discussion