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Sport, Emotion, and Engagement

Abstract: Emotions are an essential feature of social life. They are the glue that can bind people together or, instead, drive them apart. In recent years, sociologists have increasingly considered a) how emotions such as guilt, joy, anger, and pride are enacted, embodied, and produced in, as well as through, relations with others, and b) the consequences of emotional experience for individual and group life. Unfortunately, there has been a paucity of corresponding inquiry within the sociology of sport. In this chapter, we consider some of the ways in which our subdiscipline might productively engage with emotions in the sporting milieu. In order to achieve this goal, the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section addresses foundational issues regarding the sociological study of emotion. The second section then provides an overview of several theoretical approaches that have been used to advance our understanding of emotion. The final section then considers some of the ways in which this theorising could be utilised to frame and enrich research in the sociology of sport subdiscipline.

Keywords: emotion; identity; culture; interaction; norms; social relations; social theory

...emotions are not trivial. They are a pervasive and fundamental part of our daily lives. They give colour and meaning to virtually all of our experiences- from the most mundane to the most extraordinary situations. Although they are often portrayed as less interesting and important than thinking and acting, emotions are intricately connected to our daily thoughts and behaviours. They sustain or threaten our most valued relationships and identities. (Harris, 2015, p. 3)

As highlighted by Harris above and many others (e.g., Barbalet, 1998, 2001, 2002; Denzin, 1984; Jacobsen, 2019; Turner & Stets, 2006), emotions are an essential aspect of our everyday lives. Indeed, they feature in all social phenomena - be it the macro, micro, organisational, political, economic, cultural, personal, or the religious (Bericat, 2016; Denzin, 1984; Turner & Stets, 2006; Zietsma, Toubiana, Voronov, & Roberts, 2019). In recent decades, emotions have been the subject of sustained inquiry in mainstream sociology (Bericat, 2016; Stets & Turner, 2014). Here, scholars (e.g., Bloch, 2012; Burkitt, 2014; Fineman, 2005, 2008; Harris, 2015; Hochschild, 1983; Thoits, 1999, 2011; von Scheve, 2013; Zembylas, 2006) have utilised a variety of theoretical frameworks to not only examine how emotions (e.g., guilt, joy, anger, and pride, among others) are enacted, embodied, and produced in relations with others, but also to consider the consequences of emotional experience for individual and group life.

Despite the foundational (e.g., Dunning, 1986; Elias & Dunning, 1986; Ferguson, 1981; Maguire, 1991, 1992, 2001; Snyder, 1990; Snyder & Ammons, 1993; Zurcher, 1982) and more recent contributions of sociology of sport scholars (e.g., Collinson, 2005; Cottingham, 2012; Gearity & Henderson Metzger, 2017; Hayton, 2017; Ives, Gale, Potrac & Nelson, in press; Maguire, 2011; Nelson, Potrac, Allanson, Gale, & Marshall, 2013; Ortiz, 2010; Potrac, Mallett, Geenough & Nelson, 2017; Lee Sinden, 2013; Smith, 2008; van Ingen, 2011), emotion remains a largely under-researched and under-theorised topic within the subdiscipline's literature. Arguably, this limited coverage of emotions leaves us open to the accusation of producing strangely inhuman accounts of the relations, interactions, rituals, practices, and inequalities that comprise sporting structures, institutions, and organisations (Potrac, Smith & Nelson, 2017; Roderick, Smith & Potrac, 2017). Rather than being the outcome of a purposeful effort to relegate emotions to the "ontological basement" of

scholarly inquiry (Liston & Garrison, 2003), this situation arguably reflects the history and size of our subdiscipline.

Fortunately, there are a diverse range of generative theoretical frameworks (e.g., Burkitt, 2014; Stets & Turner, 2014; Ten-Houten, 2007; Turner and Stets, 2006; von Scheve, 2013, among others) and methods (e.g., Bellochi, 2015; Flam & Keres, 2015; Godbold, 2015; Holmes, 2015) that may fruitfully be utilised to systematically examine emotions in sport and, indeed, integrate emotion into the study of other dynamics, issues, and priorities in our subdiscipline (e.g., sport, ideology and power, sport, labour and migration, sport, social exclusion and discrimination, and sport, leadership and social responsibility, among others) (Potrac et al., 2017; Roderick et al., 2017). Importantly, the utilisation of these intellectual resources would allow for the generation of more detailed insights into, as well as explanations of, important social phenomena in sport (Bericat, 2016; Peterson, 2014). Equally, while we can use theories of emotion to enrich the sociology of sport, it is also important to recognise how research in our subdiscipline may contribute to wider sociological developments regarding emotion. That is, sport can provide a valuable arena for developing, testing, and refining theory in the sociology of emotion (Maguire, 2011; Peterson, 2014). Arguably, the latter could also constructively support our subdiscipline's efforts to address issues that have drawn scorn from some sociologists (Bourdieu, 1988; Peterson, 2014).

Reflecting the arguments made above, this chapter considers some of the ways in which we might productively engage with emotions in the sporting milieu. In order to achieve this aim, the chapter is divided into three interconnected parts. The initial "Issues" section addresses foundational information regarding the sociological study of emotion. The "Approaches" section then provides an overview of several theoretical perspectives that have been utilised to advance our understandings of emotion (i.e., symbolic interactionist, dramaturgical, relational, structural, and poststructural). Finally, the "Debates" section considers some of the ways in which such theorising could be utilised to frame and enrich emotions research in the sociology of sport subdiscipline.

Issues

Like many concepts in the social sciences (e.g., culture, identity, power), there is no one singularly accepted definition of emotion (Bericat, 2016; Harris, 2015). Harris (2015) noted that more than twenty different definitions of emotion were articulated by scholars in the 1980s and 1990s alone. Denzin (1984, p. 6), for example, conceptualised emotions as "a lived, believed-in, situated, temporally embodied experience that radiates through a person's stream of consciousness, is felt in and runs through his [sic] body, and, in the process of being lived, plunges the person and his [sic] associates into a wholly new and transformed reality - the reality of a world that is being constituted by the emotional experience". Kemper (1987, p. 267) defined emotions as "a complex, organised response disposition to engage in certain classes of biologically adaptive behaviours... characterised by a distinctive state of physiological arousal, a distinctive feeling, or affective state, a distinctive state of receptivity, and a distinctive pattern of expressive reactions". Meanwhile, Thoits (1990) proposed that emotions consist of a number of interrelated parts. These being situational cues, physiological changes, emotion labels, and, finally, expressive gestures. More recently, Burkitt (2014) suggested that emotions are best understood as complex, embodied, and relational phenomena that allow our body-minds to register socially meaningful relationships and interactions. Indeed, he argued that "without the body-mind, we could not feel our situations and patterns of relationships, yet without the social meaning of these relations, our feelings and emotions would be random and meaningless" (Burkitt, 2014, p. 15).

Despite these definitional differences, researchers in the sociology of emotion generally agree that “emotions constitute the bodily manifestation of the importance that an event in the natural or social world has for” (Bericat, 2016, p. 493) individuals and that they consist of these core elements:

- (a) the biological activation of key body systems;
- (b) socially constructed constraints on what emotions should be experienced and expressed in a situation;
- (c) The application of linguistic labels provided by culture to internal sensations;
- (d) The overt expression of emotions through facial, voice, and other paralinguistic moves;
- (e) Perceptions and appraisals of situations or events. (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 9)

Alongside recognising the “positive” and “negative” valence of emotions (i.e., they can make an individual feel good or bad), sociologists also distinguish between different levels of emotion (i.e., primary and secondary), and types of emotional experience (e.g., anticipatory, consequent, global, reflex, reflexive, situational, specific, structural) (Bericat, 2016; Turner, 2009). Primary emotions are generally considered to be universal, related to evolution, biologically innate, and to include emotions such as fear, anger, depression, and happiness (satisfaction) (Bericat, 2016; Turner, 2009). In contrast, secondary emotions are understood as those that can be formed through the combination of primary emotions and are capable of being transmitted socially and culturally (Bericat, 2016; Turner & Stets, 2005). These emotions include, but are not limited to, love, shame, resentment, guilt, nostalgia, and disappointment (Bericat, 2016; Turner, 2009). Both primary and secondary emotions can also vary in the intensity with which they are experienced (i.e., they can be experienced in strong, moderate or weak ways) (Bericat, 2016; Turner, 2009). Global emotions, meanwhile, are conceptualised as “generic responses to the outcome of interaction, which are involuntary and not conditioned by interpretation or cognitive attribution” (Bericat, 2016, p. 492). For example, an individual may experience a generalised feeling of pleasure or displeasure (e.g., feeling up/good or down/bad). In contrast, specific emotions are defined through the interpretive effort of an individual and are assigned to specific events, interactions, and objects (Bericat, 2016; Lawler, 2001). Here, an individual may feel pride if they attribute their pleasurable feelings to their own choices, actions, and achievements, or gratitude if they consider their positive feelings to result from the actions or choices of another person or group (Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2009).

For Kemper (2006, p. 97), structural emotions are those which “result from a relatively stable power-status-relationship”. This includes, for example, those between workers and their supervisors or between parents and young children (Kemper, 2006). Anticipatory emotions are those which are generated through our contemplation of the possible outcomes of future interactions and social encounters. For example, a worker preparing for an appraisal meeting with their supervisor may take into account interactions of a similar nature in the past and, importantly, their outcomes (Kemper, 2006). Indeed, it is this consideration of possible outcomes that will generate an anticipatory emotion (e.g., hope, anxiety) for that individual (Kemper, 1978a, 1978b, 2006). In contrast, consequent emotions are those that result from a particular event, interaction, or encounter (e.g., the pride a worker experiences after receiving a positive appraisal from a supervisor). According to Kemper (1978a, 1978b, 2006), these emotions “constitute the surface flux of social life, because they are often short term and most susceptible to change and variation within the ongoing flow of interaction” (Kemper, 2006, p. 97).

Jasper (2011, pp. 2-3) defined reflex emotions (e.g., anger, joy, surprise, and disgust) as those that accompany “our reactions to our immediate physical and social environments”. These emotions generally appear and subside quickly and are accompanied by various facial and bodily expressions (e.g., a smile or a grimace) (Jasper, 2011). In comparison, reflexive emotions are relatively stable, long-term in nature. For Jasper (2011), reflexive emotions comprise affective loyalties and moral emotions. Affective loyalties refer to our cognitive appraisals of others, especially our attachments to them; they are primarily concerned with love, liking, trust, and admiration, along with their negative counterparts (Jasper, 2011). Moral emotions are connected to “feelings of approval and disapproval based on moral intuitions and principles” (Jasper, 2011, p. 3). For Jasper (2011), these can include feeling compassion for those who are more unfortunate than us, and indignation over injustice.

Despite the conceptual and empirical progress made, it is important to recognise that the sociology of emotions has a relatively short academic history in comparison to other fields of inquiry. While emotions are considered “essential for forming and perpetuating human societies” (Clark, 2002, p. 155), it has only been during the course of the last 40 to 50 years that the sociological analysis of emotion has been accepted as a bona-fide area of research (Bericat, 2016; Turner, 2009). This state of affairs has been attributed to two principal reasons. The first relates to the historical development of sociology, especially its traditional emphasis on the macro-level issues, which subsequently led to emotion being positioned as an implicit, secondary concern (Barbalet, 2001, 2002; Turner, 2009). While Durkheim, Mead, Marx, Simmel, and Weber all alluded to emotions, arguably only Cooley and Goffman paid significant theoretical attention to them (Barbalet, 2001; Turner, 2009). For the former, this included how pride and shame were connected to people’s evaluations of the self. For the latter, it was showing how embarrassment was a sustaining social mechanism in organisations (Barbalet, 2001; Turner, 2009). For Turner (2009), subsequent generations of sociologists exacerbated the limited attention paid to emotion through their conservative approach to inquiry. He noted that they were “highly self-conscious of [sociology’s] classical founders (indeed, to the point of being obsessive)” (Turner, 2009, p. 340). Ultimately, then, reason and emotion came to be regarded as opposite ends of a continuum, with emotion and irrationality at one end, and cognition and rationality at the other (Turner & Stets, 2005).

The second factor that constrained the sociological consideration of emotions is the ontological positioning of emotion in many Western nations. Specifically, emotions were considered as solely physiological and psychological phenomena; they were the product of the inner working of individuals and directly related to personality and brain function (Turner & Stets, 2006; Zembylas, 2005). Consequently, they were primarily regarded as the investigative preserve of biologists and psychologists (both cognitive and social) (Turner & Stets, 2006; Zembylas, 2005). This situation significantly improved in the 1970s, when a small group of sociology scholars (e.g., Collins, 1975; Heise, 1979, Hochschild, 1975, 1979; Kemper 1978a, 1978b; Scheff, 1979; Shott, 1979) “began to conceptualize emotions more explicitly and to develop theories and research programs for their study” (Turner, 2009, p. 340). This crucial, foundational scholarship was expanded upon in future decades to the point where the sociological study of emotion came to be “considered the cutting edge of micro-sociology and, to a lesser extent, some macro sociologies” (Turner, 2009, p. 340).

Like all fields of inquiry, the sociology of emotions is not without its own share of limitations, inconsistencies, contradictions, and debates (Bericat, 2016; Turner, 2009). For Turner (2009) these unresolved issues include a) the multifaceted nature of emotions and their subsequent definition, b) tensions between the socio-cultural and biological dimensions of emotional experience, especially the degree to which emotion is activated and constrained by socio-cultural influences (e.g., vocational vocabularies, feeling and display rules, and

feeling ideologies) or, instead, by the body's biological systems, c) the limited number of emotions explored, d) a paucity of inquiry addressing the interconnections of, and relationships between, different emotions, and e) the positioning of cognitive appraisal ahead of emotional activation. In terms of the latter, for example, Turner (2009) believes that sociologists have traditionally tended to subscribe to the view that cognitive appraisal precedes emotional activation rather than considering how emotions, cognitions, social structures, and cultures may interact in more nuanced and complex ways. Turner suggested that emotional arousal may precede cognitive appraisal and "once emotions are aroused and attended to cognitively, the flow of emotions may change as individuals become aware of others' reactions to their actions, as they bring to bear relevant social structural conditions, or as they invoke cultural vocabularies and normative codes" (Turner, 2009, p. 342). In a similar vein, Bericat (2016) contends that inquiry within the sociology of emotions has tended to a) produce static and one-dimensional analyses of human's emotional lives that suggest emotions are experienced in an independent and isolated manner, and b) prioritise the micro-interactions of emotional experience at the expense of a consideration of macro-social emotions. Despite the issues outlined above, there is much we can learn from, and contribute to, the sociology of emotions as we better "incorporate affective structures and emotional dynamics" (Bericat, 2016, p. 505) into the scholarship of our subdiscipline (Jones, Potrac, Cushion, & Ronglan, 2011; Petersen, 2014; Potrac et al., 2017; Roderick et al., 2017).

Approaches

While sociologists recognise that emotions operate at different levels of reality (e.g., the biological and the neurological), their scholarly efforts have naturally focused on explaining emotional experience from a broadly social-relational perspective (Bericat, 2016; Canto-Mila, 2016; Turner, 2009). That is, rather than being "hermetically sealed" (Bericat, 2016, p. 492) away from our social and physical environments, emotions are considered to be inextricably entwined with our efforts to navigate relationships, achieve goals with other people and things, as well as the ways in which we experience the disruptions and uncertainties that social life can present (Turner, 2009).

To date, a diverse range of scholarship addressing the socially constructed, enacted, and embodied aspects of emotional experience has collectively illustrated a rich "emotion culture of ideologies, norms, logics, vocabularies, and other symbolic elements that specify what individuals are to feel in particular types of situations and how they are to express emotions" (Turner, 2009, p. 341; von Scheve & Ismer, 2013; Zembylas, 2007). Indeed, Stets and Turner (2014, p. 1) noted that, despite being "late in recognising how important emotions are in understanding the social world", sociology has made substantial progress in its exploration of human emotion at the micro, meso, and macro levels of social life. In this section, we provide a brief overview of some of the principal approaches utilised. These are a) symbolic interactionist, b) dramaturgical, c) ritual, c) structural, d) relational, and f) poststructural theories. Importantly, this list should not be considered as being definitive in terms of capturing the full range of sociological thinking on emotions. Equally, we do not have the space to do more than provide an initial sketch of underpinning tenets of these selected approaches. As such, we encourage readers to also engage with specialist texts and collections within the sociology of emotion literature (e.g., Barbalet, 2001, 2008; Denzin, 1984; Flam, Kuzmics & Kleres, 2009; Turner & Stets, 2006; Stets & Turner, 2014; von Scheve & Salmela, 2014, among others).

Symbolic Interactionist Theorising of Emotion

Inspired by the work of Mead (1934) and Cooley (1964), symbolic interactionist theorising conceptualises emotional experience as being interwoven with matters of socialisation,

identity, and the self (Bericat, 2016; Turner, 2009). Indeed, emotions are considered to be the mediating force between Gestalt and cybernetic ideas about the self that feature in symbolic interactionist thought (Turner, 2009). Here, the former refers to individuals seeking consistency and congruence both in their cognitions of the self and in their cognitions about other's responses to the self (Turner, 2009). The latter, meanwhile, addresses the ways in which individuals emit gestures that are consistent with the self, engage in role taking and actively interpret others' responses to these gestures, and, finally, make adjustments to their behaviour when the responses and feedback of others are inconsistent with their conceptions of the self (Stets & Trettevik, 2014; Turner, 2009).

Emotions such as pride, shame, anger, and distress are, then, tied to an individual's efforts to confirm and sustain the image that they have of themselves (e.g., self-concept) and the specific identities that they occupy in their interactions with others (e.g., role identity) (Bericat, 2016; Turner, 2009; Turner & Stets, 2005; Stets & Turner, 2014). For example, Schott's (1979) theorising contends that guilt, shame and embarrassment are activated when individuals consider their actions to deviate from accepted norms, leading them to feel obliged to engage in corrective behaviours.

In a related vein, McCall and Simmons (1978) and Stryker (1980, 2004) have suggested that, while identity verification can lead to positive emotions (e.g., pride and joy) and increased salience of a role identity, consistent non-verification can have the opposite effect. These can include negative emotional experiences (e.g., guilt and shame) and the relegation of a particular role identity in an individual's overarching hierarchy of identity salience (or prominence). Burke (1991, 1996) also highlighted how individuals can experience distress when there is an incongruence between their behaviours and the actual (i.e., direct feedback from others) and reflected appraisals (i.e., an individual's perception of how others view them) of others. In generating psychoanalytic variants of symbolic interactionist theorising, Scheff (1988) and Turner (1999, 2002, 2007) respectively build upon Cooley's "view that pride and shame are the gyroscopes of human action" (Turner, 2009, p. 345). Finally, and more recently, the affect control model of emotion (see Lively & Heisse, 2014; MacKinnon & Heise, 2010) considers how "emotions emerge from automatic and unconscious comparisons of the impression of the self that has been created by recent events with the kind of person that is supposed to be in the situation" (Lively & Heisse, 2014, p. 51).

Dramaturgical Theorising of Emotion

Dramaturgical theorisations of emotion are built on the foundational scholarship of Goffman (1959, 1967) and Hochschild (1979, 1983). For Goffman (1959, 1967), shame and embarrassment are the products of unsuccessful or inappropriate presentation of the self to an audience. In order to avoid such occurrences, he argued that individuals and groups strategically utilise cultural scripts (e.g., ideologies, norms, and values), staging props (e.g., objects, props, and scenery), and dramaturgical techniques (e.g., circumspection, discipline, and loyalty) to purposely manipulate and navigate their face-to-face encounters with others (Scott, 2015; Turner, 2009).

In building upon Goffman's dramaturgical insights, Hochschild (1979, 1983) developed the concept of an emotion culture. This is composed of emotional ideologies (i.e., what are considered to be appropriate attitudes, feelings, and emotional responses) and the three ways in which these ideologies are manifested or made concrete in social life. The latter

consists of framing rules (i.e., what interpretations and meanings are to be found in a social situation), feeling rules (i.e., what emotions are to be felt, to what intensity, and their valence on a continuum of positive to negative), and display rules (i.e., which emotions are to be overtly expressed in a social situation or encounter) (Charmaz, Harris & Irvine, 2019; Turner, 2009). Her theorising also illuminated the disjuncture between emotional cultures and the actual emotions that employees in service-driven occupations experience. Indeed, she coined the term “emotion work” to conceptualise the ways in which employees use impression management techniques (i.e., deep and surface acting) to manage their emotional demeanour (Charmaz et al., 2019; Hochschild, 1983; Turner, 2009).

These significant insights were further developed by Thoits (1990) and Clark (1990). Specifically, Thoits (1990) examined the discrepancy between actual feelings and feeling rules, the various emotional strategies utilised by individuals, and the circumstances that can contribute to the failure of an individuals’ efforts to manage their emotions in line with social, cultural, and organisational norms. Meanwhile, Clark (1990) examined the micro-economies and micropolitics of emotion work. The former is concerned with the strategic exchange of emotions for psychic gain or profit, while the latter refers to how individuals seek to enhance their position and status in relation to others. Here, she illustrated, how sympathy (and other emotions) could be purposively utilised to advance individual interests (e.g., as a culturally acceptable means to “put-down” another person, to highlight another’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities, or to get into the good graces of a superordinate) in specific social encounters and, indeed, the larger unit or organisation in which that encounter was embedded.

Ritual Theorising of Emotion

Primarily inspired by the scholarship of Durkheim (1965 [1912]) and Randall Collins (1975, 2004, 2008), ritual theorising of emotion focuses on social gatherings and collective interactions (Bericat, 2016; Summers-Effler, 2006). Here, rituals are considered to comprise co-presence, shared emotional moods, common values, and a mutual focus of attention (Turner, 2009). Participation in rituals can generate collective effervescence (i.e., they intensify our feelings of social experience) and a high level of group consciousness (i.e., they promote shared beliefs, ideas, and moral attitudes) (Bericat, 2016; Turner, 2009). For example, Collins’ (1981, 2004) theorising describes both the positive and often unifying emotions directed towards the group itself and the emotional energy (i.e., trust and positive emotions) that an individual can experience through their participation in rituals. For Collins (1981, 2004) emotional energy is the main motivating force in social life, incorporates both lows (e.g., apathy and depression) and highs (e.g., enthusiasm and joy), and is essential to the formation “of social bonds, group solidarity, interpersonal relationships, class cultures, networks of creativity, intellectual communities and, ultimately, macrostructures” (Boyns & Luery, 2015, p. 150). Insightfully, Collins’ work highlighted how individuals often have expectations regarding the emotional energy gains to be realised through their participation in certain rituals. As such, individuals are inclined to gravitate towards those that transcend their expectations and produce increases in their emotional energy, whilst limiting their participation in those that are underwhelming and lead to a subsequent decrease in emotional energy (Boyns & Luery, 2015).

While Collins’ (2004, 2008) theorising largely concentrated on the positive dimensions of emotional energy, others (e.g., Boyns & Luery, 2015; Summers-Effler, 2002) have sought to conceptualise the negative dimensions of emotional energy. For example, Summers-Effler (2002) highlighted that when individuals believe they are both powerless and trapped in an interaction ritual, they may experience emotions such as fear, guilt, shame and

anxiety. In these circumstances, individuals may also utilise strategies to help minimise the loss of emotional energy rather than maximise their levels of positive emotional energy (Summers-Effler, 2002; Turner, 2009). Summers-Effler (2004a, 2004b) also adopted a different perspective on the self to the one favoured by Collins. Specifically, rather than viewing the self as solely a situationally flexible and strategic front that is presented to others, she emphasised its stable and coherent aspects. Here, she illustrated how the affirmation of the self can enhance positive emotional energy and make an individual more willing to commit to group symbols, while the converse can lead to less emotional energy and a reduced likelihood of feeling solidarity with, and commitment to, group symbols (Summers-Effler, 2004a, 2004b; Turner, 2009).

Structuralist Theorising of Emotion

Structural theories of emotion address the distribution of emotional energy across social classes (Turner, 2009). Indeed, theorists adopting this position (e.g., Barbalet, 1998, 2001; Collins, 1975, 1990; Turner, 2010) “argue that valued resources like money, power, prestige, or anything of value are always distributed unequally, thus creating social classes or subpopulations who share a given level of resources, including types and levels of emotional energy” (Turner, 2009, p. 350). For example, Collins (1975, 1990) highlighted how people’s access to, and control of, various resources can impact micro-level encounters and interactions. Here, he suggested that those who comprise the upper echelons of society are more likely to experience positive emotions (e.g. pride, confidence) toward the self than those in the lower classes. In a similar vein, Barbalet (2001) highlighted how emotions such as fear, confidence, shame, vengefulness, and resentment can be distributed differently across social classes. Central to his theorising are the processes of social comparison and attribution, where individuals assess and interpret their share of resources in relation to those of others. Such comparisons can generate feelings of resentment when members of a particular social class perceive another group to have gained resources in a manner that violates normative beliefs about social justice and fairness.

Equally, there is evidence that fear can arise when a social group considers themselves to lack the power to pursue their interests. This fear can be subsequently transmuted into alienation when a social group considers their limited access to resources to be of their own making or, indeed, anger, aggression and vengefulness if another subpopulation is believed to be responsible for their situation. Here, Barbalet (2001) suggested that confidence is often generated when individuals consider their futures to be both controllable and predictable; a circumstance that is often disproportionately distributed to members of the more powerful and affluent classes in a society. More recently, Turner (2010) highlighted how the uneven distribution of resources brought about by structural arrangements leads those in the lower classes to experience more negative emotions. These emotions can not only include shame and humiliation when individuals blame themselves for not being able to secure necessary resources, but also intense anger towards institutional entities (e.g., corporations, schools, political systems) that are considered to be responsible for their situation (Turner, 2010).

Relational Theorising of Emotion

In recent years, emotions have been examined by scholars subscribing to the relational turn in sociological inquiry (e.g., Burkitt, 2014; Crossley, 2010). At the heart of this evolving line of theorising is the assertion that emotions cannot be turned on or off in our interactions and relationships with others. Instead, they are “a permanent dimension of our being in the world and being towards others” (Crossley, 2010, p. 62). From this perspective, emotions are considered to be generated in, and through, our networked relations with others

(Crossley, 2010). Indeed, it is our relational positioning to others that informs the meanings we give to their behaviours and choices, and the ways that they affect us. We cannot love or hate, for example, “without that relational sense”, as “when we love or hate someone it is usually to do with the way that they have affected us or the way they have behaved in a certain situation” (Burkitt, 2014, p. 15).

Burkitt (1997, 1999, 2002, 2014) also described how everyday emotional experience is connected to wider cultural norms and practices (e.g., gender, social class, and ethnicity relations). Here, networks of relations are considered to overlap and intersect, so that there is no separation of “the macro - the relations between classes, groups, and factions - from the micro - the face-to-face interactions of particular situations” (Burkitt, 2014, p. 20-21). However, rather than influencing emotions in a deterministic manner, he argued that emotional experience is informed by the emotional scripts that individuals bring to their encounters with others and, indeed, the emotional dispositions (i.e., a tendency to feel certain emotions) that an individual has developed through their biography (Burkitt, 2014). As such, while relations of power can influence emotional experience, social relations retain elements of dynamism, unpredictability, and are, ultimately, co-created (Burkitt, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2014). Finally, in drawing upon the insights of Bourdieu (1979/1984), Dewey (1983) and Elias (1978), Burkitt’s theorising recognises that emotions have corporeal and embodied aspects. In particular, he described how individuals appropriate “certain forms of bodily carriage and movement”, as well as “ways of handling objects and manipulating them, which are culture specific” (Burkitt, 1999, p. 116). That is, “the body is essential in making (rather than simply) experiencing meaning” (Burkitt, 2014, p. 116).

Poststructuralist Theorising of Emotion

Poststructuralism is associated with the theorising of scholars such as Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault (Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2017). Although Foucault did not construct a theory of emotion per se, scholars have primarily drawn upon his theoretical approach to understand the discursive construction of emotion (e.g., Dadich & Olson, 2017; Zembylas, 2002, 2003, 2014). In particular, sociologists adopting a poststructural perspective have addressed the role of ideology, culture, and power in creating emotion discourses, as well as the ways in which people may resist or adopt them (Zembylas, 2011, 2014). They do this by a) focusing on what emotions do and their effects, b) situating emotional experience within a historical analysis of relations of power-knowledge, and c) considering how these relations have contributed to our enactment of, or resistance to, particular emotions (Zembylas, 2011, 2014).

Poststructural theorists frequently place the body (i.e., its cognitions, emotions, and behaviours) at the heart of their analyses. One of Foucault’s central concepts is that of the docile body, which he defined as a body “that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved” (Foucault, 1977, p. 136). Here, he argued that in capitalist societies organisational practices in schools, workplaces, and hospitals (among other settings) are purposefully utilised to produce docile bodies (Bialostok & Aronson, 2016; Leung & Caspersz, 2019). These organisational practices, also known as technologies of discipline, primarily relate to the strict control of time, space, and flow in many institutions. Other docile producing practices include what Foucault labelled the means of correct training. These consist of hierarchical observation, normalising judgement, the examination, and the panopticon (Ball, 2019; Kelly, 2016).

Rather than positioning emotions as biologically determined or psychological traits, Foucauldian inspired scholarship seeks to illustrate how dominant discourses and the disciplinary practices described above produce an individual’s emotions and their effects

(Zembylas, 2011, 2014). Here, Abu-Lughod and Lutz (1990, p. 14) noted that “power relations determine what can, cannot, or must be said about self and emotion, what is taken to be true or false about them, and what some individuals can say about them...Emotion discourses establish, assert, challenge, or reinforce power or status differences”.

Relatedly, poststructuralists also raise important questions regarding who benefits from these relations of power-knowledge and their effects (i.e., Who would want to evoke a particular emotional response within an institution and why?). Here the technologies of discipline provide useful theoretical concepts to understand the “normalisation of emotion” (Lee Sinden, 2013, p. 613). For example, the reinforcement of certain emotions (e.g., guilt and shame) for not working hard all the time subtly coerces people to work harder. Indeed, if an individual accepts and normalises these emotions, then they may never critique or problematise the relations of power-knowledge that gave rise to them.

Similarly, positive emotions (e.g., happiness or tranquillity) can also shape people’s outlook to social life and could result in the production of a docile body. Building on Foucault’s concept of the technologies of the self, Zembylas (2011, 2014) suggested that we should practice increased emotional reflexivity in our everyday lives. That is, we should problematise emotional experience as it is connected to the relations of power and social discourses that shape them (Zembylas, 2011, 2014). Ultimately, it is only through this questioning of taken-for-granted assumptions that we can change social structures and develop new, and hopefully better, ways of living (Zembylas, 2011, 2014).

Debates

In this final Debates section, we outline some ways in which we might a) enhance our understanding of emotions in the social relations, institutions and structures that comprise sport, and b) contribute to the wider sociological analysis of emotions through sport (Peterson, 2014). It is, of course, important to recognise that the topics and issues explored below do not exhaust the ways in which we might fruitfully consider emotion. Indeed, there are numerous theoretical approaches (e.g., attribution, power-status, cultural, exchange, and evolutionary theories) (see Bericat, 2016; Turner & Stets, 2005; Stets & Turner, 2014) and issues (see Jacobsen, 2019; Potrac et al., 2017b; Roderick et al., 2017) that we were unable to address in this chapter. Equally, the issues we focus on should not be assumed to represent the most important topics to explore. Rather, they reflect our orientations, baggage, and interests as researchers. Taking our lead from Peterson (2014), we do, however, hope that they might stimulate inquiry and debate and contribute to an emotionally rich(er) sociology of sport.

The concept of identity has been, and remains, at the heart of much inquiry within the sociology of sport subdiscipline (e.g., Dean, 2019; Hickey & Roderick, 2017; Ives et al., 2019; Joncheray, Level & Richard, 2016; Jones, 2006; Thorpe & Olive, 2016, among many others). Researchers have provided rich and nuanced insights into the various ways in which identities are “created, maintained, communicated, presented, negotiated, challenged, reproduced, reinvented, and narrated” in sport (Scott, 2015, p. 21). Despite the progress made, there has been little consideration of the ways in which emotions can act markers of adequacy in identity performance (Serpe & Stryker, 2011). That is, how emotions might tell individuals that their role performances are adequate or, indeed, inadequate (Serpe & Stryker, 2011). Potential avenues for developing such scholarship, as well as contributing to the wider examination of emotions through sport, include critically exploring the connections between emotion and a) negative/stigmatised identities, b) multiple identities, as well as c) within and across social encounters (Stets & Trettevik, 2014). In terms of the former, future research could systematically address the emotions that are produced when a

negative/stigmatised identity is activated in sport. For example, a stigmatised identity such as being a gay male footballer, coach, or match official in men's professional soccer may generate a mixture of positive and negative emotions. These could include positive emotions that emanate from others' viewing the player, coach or match official in the same ways that the individual views themselves. Equally, an individual may experience negative emotions through such identity verification. Indeed, Stets and Trettevik (2014, p. 46) suggested that, in such circumstances, the individual holding this identity "may feel negative emotions because they activate the third-order belief system that society devalues this identity". That is, the negative emotions result from the individual's understanding of wider socio-cultural norms and beliefs, rather than the identity verification process itself (Stets & Trettevik, 2014). Arguably, such insights would help move our understandings beyond the view that successful identity verification always results in positive emotions (e.g., joy, pride, happiness) and raised self-esteem and, conversely, that only non-verification generates negative emotions (e.g., distress, anxiety, shame) and lowered self-esteem (Stets & Trettevik, 2014).

Much existing research addressing identity in sport has tended to focus on the experience and performance of one identity at a time (e.g., being a player, manager, coach or fan, for example). There has, in comparison, been a paucity of work that has explicitly addressed the emotional experiences associated with the multiple (and perhaps conflicting) identities that individuals hold, as well as the ways in which their salience is hierarchically organised (Hickey & Roderick, 2017; Ives et al., 2019; Stamp, Nelson, & Potrac, 2019; Stets & Trettevik, 2014). Here, it may be argued that social life may present situations where more than one important identity is activated for an individual (Stets & Trettevik, 2014). This could include a coach being fired for the unsuccessful playing record of a team. In this case, the coach might experience anger and frustration at their employer's decision to terminate their employment, guilt for letting other people down (e.g., players, fans, and boosters), shame at not being able to perform the role in a successful manner, fear, guilt, and sadness at not being able to provide for their family (as a spouse or parent), and the embarrassment that might come from revealing this status change to family members, friends, and colleagues. In such cases, the non-verification (i.e., the perceived failure to perform roles to the required identity standard) of two or more identities (e.g., being a coach, a parent/guardian, a spouse, a son or daughter, among others) may lead to more negative emotions being experienced than if only one identity (e.g., being a coach) was not verified. Similarly, successful performance and the awarding of a new contract may not only generate positive emotions that come from the individual's coaching identity being verified (i.e., performing a role in line with, or exceeding, normative identity standards), but also the emotions tied to their being seen to perform other important roles successfully (e.g., being a "good" spouse or partner, parent/guardian, and son or daughter, among others) (Ives et al., 2019; Stets & Trettevik, 2014). Indeed, the verification of two identities might generate a different emotional experience (e.g., types and intensity of emotion) to that when only one identity is verified by others (Ives et al., 2019; Stets & Trettevik, 2014).

To date, research addressing the emotional dimensions of identity verification has tended to focus on emotional experience at one point in time (Stets & Trettevik, 2014). In contrast, there has been limited inquiry addressing the temporal and emergent nature of emotions (i.e., how emotions carry over from and, indeed, inform future situations) (Magill, Nelson, Jones & Potrac, 2017; Thompson, Potrac & Jones, 2015). As such, researchers in the sociology of sport may wish to consider how the emotions that an individual brings to a situation may influence those that are experienced in that situation and, importantly, connect to identity verification (or non-verification) (Stets & Trettevik, 2014). For example, following a run of poor competition results, a head coach meeting with administrators and

boosters/sponsors may enter the encounter feeling frustrated and anxious. In this case, these emotions may predispose the coach to interpret the comments, reactions and feedback of others in a manner that disconfirms their identity (i.e., that others disapprove of the individual's role performance as a coach). Similarly, the opposite may apply for a head coach, who having enjoyed a series of good competition results, enters this situation feeling happy and confident (Stets & Trettevik, 2014). In both cases, prior emotions may influence current feelings including felt identity verification. Relatedly, researchers might also consider how identity verification (or non-verification) in an earlier encounter might influence emotional experience in a later encounter with the same group or individual or, indeed, others (Stets & Trettevik, 2014).

Alongside exploring issues pertaining to emotions and identity verification, scholars may also wish to further develop our critical understanding of the emotional demands and strategies that feature in the doing of sports work (Potrac et al., 2017a; Roderick et al., 2017). While researchers (e.g., Hayton, 2017; Magill et al., 2017; Nelson et al., 2014; Potrac et al., 2017a, 2017b) have generated initial insights about the emotion management and emotional labour that sporting volunteers, coaches, managers, and athletes might respectively engage in, there is considerable opportunity for furthering our empirical and conceptual insights of this topic. One way of working towards this goal is to utilise Clark's (1990) micropolitical typology of emotional strategies that individuals use in social encounters (especially contested ones) to navigate hierarchy and advance their place or standing in a particular social network (e.g., within a sporting organization). These are a) expressing negative-other emotions, b) expressing positive other-emotions indicating own inferiority or equality, c) controlling the balance of emotional energy, d) eliciting obligation, and e) expressing positive other-emotions indicating own superiority. From our perspective, this framework also provides a productive avenue for building on our existing understanding of the micropolitical interactions that feature in the everyday doing of sports work (Potrac & Jones, 2009; Potrac, Jones, Gilbourne, & Nelson, 2013; Potrac et al., 2017a, 2017b; Toner, Nelson, Potrac, Gilbourne, & Marshall, 2012).

Another avenue of potential research involves utilising Bolton's (2005) expansion of Hochschild's (1983) ground-breaking theorising. Like Hochschild, Bolton (2005) argued that emotional labour entails more than capitalist organisations cajoling and coercing employees into displaying prescribed emotions and managing proscribed emotions in exchange for a wage. Indeed, rather than being passive, compliant, or "crippled actors" within organisations (Bolton, 2005, p. 48), she positions employees as active and reflexive agents, who are, within constraints, capable of "making their own histories" (Bolton, 2005, p. 39). That is, they are able to "navigate, negotiate, and [sometimes] overcome [organisational] feeling rules that have the capacity to constrain employees" (Addison, 2017, p. 12). Based on the assumptions outlined above, Bolton (2005) developed her own typology of emotion management, which consists of the pecuniary, the prescriptive, the presentational and the philanthropic.

Pecuniary emotion management is that which relates to commercial values (e.g., profit seeking, cynical performances, and instrumental motivation), while prescriptive emotion management is based on organisational and/or professional rules of conduct (e.g., an altruistic and sincere desire to provide a high-quality experience or service). Both pecuniary and prescriptive emotion management are primarily tied to the role and obligations an individual has within an organisation. In contrast, presentational and philanthropic emotion management are seen to operate outside of organisationally created feeling rules and are associated with our social literacy (i.e., our understanding and application of the wider social rules of interaction). Here, presentational emotion management occurs when a social actor purposely seeks to maintain the "interaction order" and support "a sense of stability and

ontological security to participants” (Bolton, 2005, p. 97). This could include, for example, an athlete showing a teammate a smile because they said or did something kind or using humour to defuse a tense or difficult situation.

Finally, philanthropic emotion management is that which is undertaken as a gift from one social actor to another (e.g., a coach showing kindness to an upset athlete or anxious parent). It is, of course, important to recognise how this framework is not without its criticisms. However, we believe that there is much to be gained from our engagement with Bolton’s ideas, and those of her critics (e.g., Addison, 2017), if we are to better understand the ways in which sports work can entail managing our own emotions, influencing others’ emotions, and be variously demanding, exciting, boring, exhausting, tedious, arduous, joyful and stressful (Charmaz, Harris & Irvine, 2019). Indeed, Bolton’s (2005) and Clark’s (1990) respective theorising could prove useful in future efforts to recognise how emotion management in sports work is both an inter-personal, as well as an intra-personal, phenomenon. Indeed, there has, to date, been little direct consideration of a) the ways in which sports workers “simultaneously manage their own emotions as they manage others” (Charmaz et al., 2019) and b) how such emotion work is experienced and undertaken in hierarchical, collaborative, and/or adversarial relationships (Charmaz, 2019).

Exciting possibilities also exist to advance our understanding of emotion and social relations through using poststructural approaches. For many years, scholars have drawn upon Foucault’s (1977) work to show the problems associated with sports’ reliance on disciplinary practices within a neoliberal society (e.g., Denison, 2007; Gearity & Mills, 2012). Whilst illustrating the discursive construction of coaches and athletes as docile bodies, this work has unfortunately tended to ignore the emotions that inherently feature in these social processes and interactions.

This situation arguably stems from researchers centering on Foucault’s original emphasis on uncovering the logic and rationalities that underpin and guide cultural practices in sporting organisations. That is, scholars have tended to address questions related to the discursive construction of knowledge, where knowledge is synonymous with reason, not emotion. As such, there remains considerable promise in critically examining emotions as they are connected to the transactions “between larger social forces and the internal psychic terrain of the individual” (Zembylas, 2011, p. 33).

To address the limited poststructural consideration of emotion in sport, Crocket (2017) recently called for a greater examination of how “affect, emotions, and embodiment” (p. 22) relate to the discursive construction of identities. Following Zembylas’ (2003, 2014) inquiry in education, researchers could examine how affect, emotions, and embodiment create sport workers’ identities and, in turn, how sport workers may problematise certain identities. The findings of such work could be utilised to inform the preparation and ongoing development of sports workers, especially in terms of helping them to critically interrogate their beliefs and values (Denison, 2019), and to recognise the “ways in which emotions colour their decisions and practices” (Zembylas, 2011, p. 39). Importantly, feminist scholars and scholars of colour have been doing this work for some time (Ahmed, 2014; Butler, 1990; Collins, 2002; Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984) and often in response to the patriarchy, sexism, racism, and misogyny produced by societies’ dominant rationalities.

Drawing upon the work of Ahmed (2004, 2014) and Bishop (2002), we could extend the sociology of sport by examining the emotions involved in relations of othering and, indeed, allyship (Bishop, 2002). Such work could, for example, examine the emotions exhibited towards National Football League player Colin Kaepernick following his act of taking a knee during the playing of the US National Anthem (Ahmed, 2004). Here the

emphasis would be on connecting emotions to the profound aversion that some individuals and groups have towards others based on skin colour, as well as the emotions experienced by those who are against racism and oppression (Ahmed, 2004, 2014).

Scholars might also probe further into the emotions of othering and allyship involved in ageism, sexism, racism and forms of discrimination related to religion, sexual orientation and disability in sport. Furthermore, while it is generally accepted that microaggressions result in emotional harm to the receiver of these identity-based insults and attacks, the emotions of the perpetrator are understudied within sport (Gearity & Henderson Metzger, 2017). Again, following Ahmed (2004, 2014), sociologists of sport could research why, for example, a white, non-disabled, heterosexual coach, administrator, or owner may feel that it is acceptable to look at those belonging to other (intersectional) communities with disgust and thus feel compelled to microaggress, discipline, and treat them as something lesser or inferior.

Notably absent in Côte and Gilbert's (2009) oft-cited definition of coaching effectiveness and expertise is any mention of emotion. Clearly, emotions feature intrapersonally and interpersonally in coaches' working lives, but their impact on the self and others, as well as how coaches learn what emotions do, is not well understood (Potrac, Mallett, Greenough, & Nelson, 2017). Here, Zembylas' (2002, 2011, 2014) work addressing the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and sociopolitical dimensions of emotion could help to develop new insights in the sociology of sport, especially in terms of understanding the ways in which certain emotions may be allowed or disallowed and, relatedly, their connection to the complex webs of power relations in which coaches, athletes, and other sports workers (e.g., match officials) are enmeshed. Finally, Matias and Zembylas' (2014) approach to understanding the complex intersection of racism, emotion (e.g., disgust, care), allyship, whiteness, and white teacher education could be combined with the literature addressing care in sport (Cronin & Armour, 2018) to support interventions and research concerning the development of anti-oppressive practices and policies in sport.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we considered the sociological dimensions of individual and collective emotional experience. We also outlined a number of ways in which the sociology of sport researchers might incorporate emotions into our study of sporting institutions, relations, and interactions. These ideas not only represent ways of enriching our understanding of emotion in sport, but they may also represent a means of contributing to a wider investigation of emotion through sport (Bericat, 2016; Petersen, 2014; Turner, 2009). Ultimately, we believe it is important that our accounts of the interactions (including the everyday, the mundane, and the dramatic) and relations that comprise the social worlds of sport recognise how emotion and cognition are inextricably intertwined (Harris, 2015; Potrac et al., 2017b). Indeed, rather than being solely the innate and private property of individuals, emotions are also socially constructed, negotiated, and regulated phenomena (Petersen, 2014; Stets & Tuner, 2014). Importantly, they are capable of enabling and constraining personal and collective experiences, actions, and opportunities. As such, emotions warrant further and detailed consideration in our scholarship (Charmaz et al., 2019; Harris, 2015).

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