A Relevance-Focused Production Heuristic

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Abstract

This paper proposes that a relevance-focused production heuristic plays a role in the production of communicative acts. While the relevance-theoretic account of communication and other pragmatic theories focus on both communicators and their addressees, there has been more focus on the pragmatic processes of comprehension than on communication, with few specific suggestions about the role of pragmatic processes in production. This paper outlines a research programme which aims to build on work by other researchers by making a proposal about this. The central claim is that production is constrained by at least one dedicated heuristic, which shares some properties with the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic proposed in earlier work. The main aim of the paper is to consider some questions about the nature of this heuristic and to propose an initial characterisation.

The production of communicative acts is extremely complex. Our claim is that a production heuristic is one of many factors involved in this and that this proposal can help contribute to accounts of communicative behaviour.

**Keywords:** communication, production, interaction, relevance theory, heuristics
1. Introduction

This paper presents a specific proposal as a contribution to accounts of the pragmatics of production from the perspective of relevance theory. While relevance theory (like other pragmatic theories) makes claims and predictions about what communicators do, the majority of work in a relevance-theoretic framework has focused on comprehension and there has been little focus on how exactly considerations of relevance play a role in the production of communicative acts. Van der Henst et al (2002) and Gibbs and Bryant (2008) provide experimental evidence that considerations of relevance play a role in communication. More specifically, they show that communicators expend effort which would not otherwise be required in order to attempt to produce utterances which will meet their addressees’ expectations of relevance. We propose here that one thing which contributes to communicative production is a ‘fast and frugal’ heuristic of the type discussed by Gigerenzer et al (1999). These heuristics are parts of ‘the mind’s adaptive toolbox for making decisions with realistic mental resources.’ They ‘can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices quickly and with a minimum of information by exploiting the way that information is structured in particular environments’ (Gigerenzer et al 2000: 727).

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1 We are grateful to Deirdre Wilson, attendees at the ‘Relevance by the Sea’ workshop at the University of Brighton in 2019, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on the ideas discussed here.
The relevance-guided comprehension heuristic, which is seen as playing a key role in relevance-theoretic pragmatics (Wilson and Sperber 2004, Sperber and Wilson 2005), can be seen as fitting this model. It exploits the way that communicative behaviour is structured in such a way that addressees come close enough to understanding communicative intentions in many contexts for the cognitive gains of following the heuristic to outweigh the risks (of misunderstanding, of being misled, etc.) Our research programme aims to investigate the possibility that a similar kind of heuristic is involved in the production of communicative acts.

Our starting assumption has been that a production heuristic will share some properties with, but not fully ‘mirror’, the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic. The outcome of operations of the heuristic will be communicative acts which adjust the cognitive environments of interlocutors rather than assumptions or hypotheses about the communicative intentions of others. While we are not sure how important this terminological decision is, we propose the term ‘focused’ rather than ‘guided’ here to indicate differences in the relationships between processes and considerations of relevance. While interpreters are guided by considerations of relevance in looking for interpretations, communicators aim to produce utterances which are likely to meet the expectations of their audiences.¹ One of our

¹ We are not assuming that this is the only aim of communicative behaviour but something like this is
key aims is to develop an account, within a relevance-theoretic framework, of how
communicators formulate their utterances based on assumptions about their addressees
and about the assumptions which communicators and addressees have access to (in
relevance theory terms, their 'mutual cognitive environment').

The paper begins, in the next section, with a brief discussion of previous research which
has explored utterance production (mainly of speech) from a psychological or
psycholinguistic perspective and research on the pragmatics of production, including work
which takes a relevance-theoretic perspective. Section three considers what previous
approaches have assumed about the role of heuristics in pragmatics, including the
relevance-guided comprehension heuristic proposed by relevance theorists. Section four
considers some questions about the production heuristic and suggests some possible
answers. The conclusion in the final section is that the assumption of a production heuristic
is an important step in developing understanding of what guides the formulation and
reformulation of verbal and nonverbal communicative acts. Future work can help to develop
understanding by investigating the details of how the heuristic and other factors interact in
communication, including the interaction of production and comprehension in interaction.
2. Previous work on utterance production

Research on utterance production from a psychological or psycholinguistic perspective (e.g. Bock and Levelt 1994; Garrett 1988; Levelt 1989; Schriefers et al 1990) has tended to focus (but not exclusively) on the production of speech at phonological, lexical, syntactic and semantic levels. In pragmatics, dynamic speech processes have been analysed with reference to versions of speech act theory (Brown and Levinson 1987; Leech 1983), communication accommodation theory (Giles and Coupland 1991; Hua 2014; Yoon 1991), discourse analysis (Goffman 1981; Gumperz 1982; Tannen 1999, 2009), anxiety/uncertainty management theory (Gudykunst 1995, 2005), adaptation theory (Verschueren 1987) and what has been termed the socio-cognitive approach (Kecskés 2008, 2010, 2014; Kecskés and Zhang 2009). Most of this research has focused on the psychology, culture, or social relationship of speakers, rather than on general or specific pragmatic processes involved in speech production. We believe that bringing together insights from this wide range of research literature with ideas about pragmatic principles will help to develop understanding of communicative production and of pragmatics.

2.1 Previous work from a non-relevance-theoretic perspective
A wide range of insights have been provided by researchers who are not working with relevance theory. The research programme we envisage will combine insights from these with ideas from a relevance-theoretic perspective. There is space here only to mention a small number of ideas and to briefly indicate how we think our proposal might interact with them.

In the field of pragmatics, dynamic speech processes have been analysed with reference to: versions of speech act theory (Austin 1962) discussing how speakers use speech acts to show their intention; communication accommodation theory (Giles and Coupland 1991) showing how communicators’ social and psychological statuses affect formulation; discourse analysis (Goffman 1981; Gumperz 1982; Tannen 1999, 2009) exploring how different communicative behaviours depend on different social contexts; and linguistic adaptation theory (Vershuren 1999) suggesting that speakers may choose their speaking strategy within the constraints of social contexts.

One influential approach from a psycholinguistic perspective is Levelt’s model of speech production (Levelt 1989, 1999a; Bock and Levelt 1994; Levelt et al 1999). This includes four major stages: conceptualisation (deciding on the message to express meaning); formulation (transformation from concepts to linguistic representations); articulation (speaking, writing, signing); monitoring (through the comprehension system). We believe that ideas about the
principles which constrain pragmatic processing can play a particularly significant role in the first and last of these: conceptualisation and monitoring.

Some criticism of psycholinguistic models (e.g. Hickock 2014) has suggested that they focus too much on linguistic levels and not enough on interactional processes. However, psycholinguists have considered aspects of pragmatics. Levelt, for example, considered aspects of production which can be understood as referring to aspects of pragmatics. Conceptualising involves producing a ‘preverbal message’, selecting relevant information to make realise communicative intentions. Levelt (1996; 199b: 226) suggested that we should consider ‘shared knowledge and discourse context’ (Levelt 1999b: 226) when speakers formulate a lexical concept to refer to a target object.

While Levelt seems to see pragmatics as involved in early stages of production, some work in psycholinguistics sees a larger role for pragmatics more. Gibbs (1994) suggested that pragmatics is involved throughout production. Gibbs and Colston (2020) stated that ‘pragmatics does not come into play only at certain temporal points in language use, and is not turned on and off in people’s linguistics and non-linguistic experiences’. Others have explored the interplay between psycholinguistics and pragmatics. Pollard (2012) considered Levelt’s work and ideas from relevance theory in considering how speakers’ production
could be affected by the hearers’ responses. The aim of our research is to consider the role in production of pragmatic principles similar to those which constrain interpretation.

2.2 Previous work from a relevance-theoretic perspective

Some research applying ideas from relevance theory has focused on aspects of production. Clark and Owtram (2012) reported pedagogical work with student writers focusing on the likely inferences of readers. Clark (2012) considered the role of pragmatics in editing prose fiction. Kolaiti (2015) explored the production of literature and art within a relevance-theoretic approach.

Focusing more closely on the nature of pragmatic processes in production, Van der Henst et al (2002), Hayashi (2005) and Gibbs and Bryant (2008) presented experimental evidence which shows that speakers consider what is likely to be relevant to interlocutors when formulating utterances. More specifically, a significant number of speakers chose to give rounded answers (‘five past . . .’, ‘ten past . . .’ etc.) when asked the time even when this involved extra effort for them, e.g. when reading the time from a digital watch so that they would have to move from a display like ‘11.52’ to an utterance like ‘ten to twelve’. They were also more likely to give rounded answers in some contexts (e.g. when simply asked the time by a stranger) than others (e.g. when the stranger first said that ‘My watch has stopped’).
Building on this work, Gibbs (2012, 2013) and Gibbs and Van Orden (2012) considered what is involved in the pragmatics of speech production. They argue for the importance of researching the pragmatics of production while recognising that it involves the interaction of many factors. In light of this, they propose a view of pragmatics based on complexity theory, arguing that 'pragmatic choice in discourse does not reflect the output of any dedicated pragmatic module but arises from a complex coordination or coupling between speakers and their varying communicative tasks' (Gibbs and Van Orden 2012: 7). A key idea developed in this series of papers is that:

'Pragmatic action and understanding is not producing or recovering a “meaning” but a continuously unfolding temporal process of the person adapting and orienting to the world.'

(Gibbs 2013: 70)

We agree about the complexity of production and that both producing and recovering meanings are continuously unfolding processes.¹ However, we also assume that something

¹ For a recent discussion of the complexity of communication from a relevance-theoretic perspective, see Heintz and Scott-Phillips 2020.
must be guiding and constraining the processes of production. We propose that explaining production requires the assumption of specifically pragmatic processes and that the many factors involved in production may include a dedicated sub-module. A natural assumption in general is that pragmatic principles which share properties of those involved in interpretation must be involved in guiding the process of formulating utterances. A natural assumption from a relevance-theoretic perspective is that speech production involves one or more heuristics which share properties with the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic which guides comprehension (an idea implicit in earlier relevance-theoretic work and discussed explicitly in Wilson and Sperber 2004, Sperber and Wilson 2005). The next section discusses assumptions about heuristics in neo-Gricean pragmatics and then considers the nature of the comprehension heuristic assumed in relevance theory. After that, we move on to consider some questions about what a production heuristic might be like.

3. Heuristics in pragmatics

The idea that pragmatic processes involve heuristics is not new but it was not present in the influential work of Grice (1975, 1989). In suggesting that interaction is governed by underlyingly rational principles, one key idea Grice had was that implicatures should be ‘calculable’, i.e. that we should be able to spell out the stages involved in inferring particular
implicatures. In developing understanding of the nature of pragmatic principles, later work, particularly the approach developed by Levinson (1987, 2000) has involved the assumption that certain kinds of ‘heuristics’ are involved.

3.1 Heuristics in neo-Gricean pragmatics

The neo-Gricean approaches developed by Horn (1984, 1988, 1989, 2004) and Levinson (1987, 2000) each proposed to replace Grice’s maxims with a smaller number of principles. Levinson (2000: 31) proposed three principles: a Q-Principle, an I-Principle and an M-Principle. These are maxim-like principles which guide communicators and their addressees. For each one, he proposed associated heuristics which act as ‘constraints that limit the search space of sets of premises’ (Levinson 2000: 30) in working out the communicative intentions of others. Brief versions of the heuristics are:

(1) Levinson’s three heuristics

$Q$-heuristic: ‘what isn’t said, isn’t’

$I$-heuristic: ‘what is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified’

$M$-heuristic: ‘what’s said in an abnormal way, isn’t normal’

(Levinson 2000: 35-38)
In proposing the three pragmatic principles, Levinson proposes both maxims which speakers follow and ‘corollaries’ for hearers. While the different principles and heuristics might seem to contradict each other, Levinson sees them as interacting in communication and makes suggestions about how they are likely to apply in specific situations. While they are different from the maxims proposed by Grice, the principles are seen as maxim-like and they seem to suggest that pragmatic inference is similar to more general reasoning. The heuristics seem to be general statements which it is helpful to be aware of while carrying out these inferential processes. They can be seen as playing a role in both production and comprehension. Important things to notice here are that Levinson proposes heuristics as well as principles and that he makes suggestions about what both speakers and hearers do.

3.2 The relevance-guided comprehension heuristic
The comprehension heuristic assumed within relevance theory differs from the heuristics suggested by Levinson in at least two significant ways. First, the principles on which it is based are not seen as maxim-like but rather as law-like generalisations about cognition and communication. Roughly, the generalisation about cognition is that human cognition is geared towards maximising relevance, i.e. looking to achieve as many positive cognitive effects as possible while expending as little effort as possible, while the generalisation about communication is that ostensive communication gives rise to fairly specific expectations of relevance (again roughly, that there is an interpretation which provides enough effects to justify the effort involved in deriving them). While these generalisations are grounded in rationality, they do not necessarily involve explicit, calculable reasoning of the kind assumed in Grice’s account and arguably still present in Levinson’s approach. Second, the heuristic is seen as a ‘fast and frugal’ one, sharing properties of the heuristics discussed by Gigerenzer et al (1999). A key idea in relevance theory is that ‘the expectations of relevance raised by an utterance are precise and predictable enough to guide the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning’ (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 249). This idea is spelled out more fully in the ‘relevance-guided comprehension heuristic’:

(2) Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic:
a. Follow a path of least effort in deriving cognitive effects: test interpretive hypotheses (e.g. disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc) in order of accessibility.

b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

This heuristic follows from the communicative principle of relevance and is used to account for particular interpretations. Consider this example, originally discussed by Sperber and Wilson (1986: 168):

(3) George has a big cat.

The expression *cat* is ambiguous. It could refer to any kind of cat or to the kind of cat kept as a domesticated pet in many cultures. If (4) is uttered in an area of Newcastle in 2020, the idea of a domesticated cat is likely to be easily accessible. If the hearer assumes this sense, they can reach an interpretation which justifies the effort involved in arriving at it. While other ways of understanding the expression, e.g. wondering whether George has a lion or tiger, could lead to highly relevant interpretations, the hearer will already have found a relevant interpretation and will not expend more effort considering other possibilities. Once hearers
have satisfied their expectations of relevance, the comprehension process is complete.

Hearers may go on to think other thoughts about what has been uttered, e.g. thinking about what they think of cats, friends who own cats, etc., but this means going beyond the comprehension process.

This paper proposes that a heuristic with similar properties to the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic is involved in production. It suggests that the production heuristic shares some properties with the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic but that it is also different in significant ways. A key difference is that communicators start from an intention to alter the cognitive environments of others and to realise other goals by means of this (e.g. to make someone feel happy because of what the communicator has said). By contrast, addressees are aiming to understand the communicator’s intentions as evidenced by their communicative behaviour.

4. The production heuristic

This section presents an initial suggested characterisation of the heuristic, some assumptions we have made in this initial formulation, and some remaining questions.

4.1 A first formulation
As Clark and Owtram (2012: 128-129) point out, both Grice and Sperber and Wilson refer to speakers as well as hearers when describing pragmatic principles. Hearers make inferences about what speakers will have assumed they will infer. Both production and comprehension then, involve inferences about inferences. Our initial formulation aims to reflect this while assuming nevertheless that that production and comprehension processes are distinct:

(4) Relevance-focused production heuristic

a. Follow a path of least effort in formulating and producing communicative acts (verbal and nonverbal) which will give rise to positive cognitive effects for members of your audience

b. Produce an utterance which permits members of your audience to find an interpretation which meets their expectations of relevance (one which is optimally relevant)

c. Look for evidence of how addressees are understanding your communicative acts

d. Reformulate or produce new communicative behaviour when there is evidence that expectations of relevance have not been met or that you have been misunderstood
The reference to meeting audience members’ expectations of relevance in (4b) means, of course, that they can find an interpretation which gives rise to enough cognitive effects without expending too much effort.

We are unsure about the status of (4c) and (4d). Clearly communicators do monitor interpretations of what they have produced and sometimes reformulate or add something to adjust interpretations. However, we are unsure whether these should be considered part of a production heuristic or simply something ongoing during and beyond moments of interaction. We have included them here for now, while recognising that this is one way in which production and comprehension must overlap.

Our belief is that this heuristic (perhaps amended as further research is carried out) can complement the work of others in developing an account of communicative production. It can, for example, be seen as accounting for the role of pragmatics in the stages of Levelt’s model mentioned above.

4.2 Production and comprehension

A starting point for our proposal is the recognition that pragmatic processes are involved in production and comprehension. Both involve inferences about inferences. A natural question
then is whether the same heuristic or sub-module is involved in both. While we believe that
this is likely to be correct, we have begun by formulating the heuristic in this way with the
aim of adjusting the idea in the light of further discussion and investigation (Park, in
progress, considers empirical data about the effects of different kinds of contextual
assumptions on production).

A further reason for seeing production and comprehension as closely linked is that, as
Gibbs (2012, 2013) points out, these processes typically occur in parallel at the same time.
In face-to-face communication, interlocutors are simultaneously producing and
comprehending communicative acts. In many kinds of writing, communicators and
audiences are separated in space and time and so we believe that further evidence on this
will come from comparisons of the practice of writers, speakers and signers in different kinds
of contexts.

4.3 The nature of communication

We began our work on this by considering what is involved in communicative acts. We came
up with a long list, which supports Gibbs and Van Orden’s (and our own) view of the
complexity of production. These included: that the communicator must have one or more
potential addressees in mind, even if the audience might not be clearly characterised
(putting aside cases of self-talk for now), that utterances are ways of realising communicative intentions, i.e. of changing the cognitive environments of interlocutors by means of an ostensive stimulus (even if the intentions are not explicitly represented or easily characterised); that communicative intentions might be related to other intentions which they help to realise (including the kinds of effects on addressees termed ‘perlocutionary’ effects by Austin 1962); that communicative intentions can be formed more or less in advance of communicative acts (or emerge during interaction, as suggested by Gibbs 2012, 2013); that communicative acts are constrained by the abilities and preferences of communicators, including their interests and personal values; that communicative acts are partly shaped by assumptions about the abilities and preferences of addressees (which are derived from a wide range of sources); that communicators aim to produce utterances which meet the addressees’ expectations of relevance, i.e. which lead to interpretations which are optimally relevant to the addressee (providing enough effects to justify the effort involved in processing them and not involving gratuitous effort given the communicator’s abilities and preferences); that achieving communicative intentions involves ‘mindreading’ in that communicators make assumptions about the minds of their addressees and inferences they are likely to make in response to particular utterances; that interlocutors constantly make and adjust assumptions about each other, monitoring these at all stages of interaction.
4.4 What activates the production heuristic?

This question has been raised by audiences when we have presented these ideas. A natural answer would be that the production heuristic is triggered when an individual forms a communicative intention. This would then, of course, lead to the question of what leads to a communicative intention. A natural answer to this would be that these are formed when communication seems an appropriate way to have effects on other people. Individuals form and aim to carry out intentions all the time and a subset of these involve performing communicative acts. On this view (which we see as part of the research programme on causal cognition), we could then move on to consider what kinds of things might lead to the formation of communicative intentions. It is easy to come up with quite a long list. Some intentions are formed spontaneously as we go about our lives and interact with other people, e.g. when we smile and say hello as we encounter a colleague at work with the aim of maintaining friendly relations. Some are caused by the behaviour of others, e.g. when somebody else speaks to us or when we see somebody doing something that might be dangerous or hinder us in some way. We also sometimes carry out communicative

\footnote{For a useful overview, see Bender 2020}
intentions carefully and deliberately, e.g. when preparing a job application, engaging in
academic writing or other kinds of professional communication (as discussed by Clark and
Owtram 2012) or writing and editing prose fiction (see Clark 2012). There are lots of
questions to answer about this, and some of them are questions about actions in general.
For now, we will simply propose that the production heuristic must be activated when we
begin to form and to carry out a communicative intention. We recognise the point made by
Gibbs and Van Orden that communication involves the complex interaction of many factors
and that interaction is often dynamic with two or more individuals working together to
construct it. We also recognise that intentions might be more or less clearly represented and
may often emerge and be modified during interaction. Nevertheless, we suggest that
intentions are involved, even if not clearly constructed or represented in advance of
interaction.

4.3 What does the heuristic do?

Our central idea is that the heuristic constrains production. Just as the comprehension
heuristic is one of many things involved in comprehension, we propose that the production
heuristic is one of many things involved in production. In verbal communication,
comprehension includes accessing linguistic forms and related representations (often
described as ‘decoding’), noticing verbal and nonverbal cues, and so on, while production
involves accessing linguistic forms and producing verbal and nonverbal behaviour. We
suggest that the role of the production heuristic is to contribute to formulations, to monitor
potential interpretations, and to lead to adjustments in plans, to new formulations and to
reformulations.

We have said that the heuristic monitors potential rather than actual interpretations
because, of course, actual interpretations are not accessible to communicators. The primary
focus of the heuristic is on what is often referred to as ‘mindreading’, although perhaps a
term such as ‘mind-modelling’ would be more accurate. The heuristic, we suggest, focuses
on what addressees are likely to infer or to be inferring, checking that these fit with
communicative intentions and leading to adjustments where departures are noticed.

Such a heuristic would contribute to an explanation of data gathered by Van der Henst
et al (2002) and Gibbs and Bryant (2008) which shows that speakers make otherwise
unnecessary effort in order to make utterances likely to be more relevant for addressees,
e.g. the fact that some speakers go to the effort of rounding when asked the time by a
stranger and that unrounded responses are more likely in some contexts than others (e.g.
when the person who asks the time indicates that they are setting their watch).
This heuristic would also play a role in reformulations and additional explanations. Here are two examples from interactions we experienced ourselves:

(5)  A:  How did you get here?
B:  I cycled. *(pause)* Well, I came on one of those electric bikes.

(6)  A:  Do you want an iced coffee?
B:  No. *(pause)* Thanks for offering but I’ve just had one.

In (5), we assume that speaker B recognises that some of the inferences that A will draw from being told that B cycled to the place where they are talking will lead to less than accurate assumptions about the trip (e.g. about the amount of physical effort involved in making the trip) and so offers *came on one of those electric bikes* as a more accurate utterance. In (6), we assume that B has recognised the risk of impolite inferences and so adds an explanation for turning down the offer of tea. The heuristic is involved when an individual begins to think about how others might interpret their own utterances and possible future utterances.
4.4 How long does the heuristic operate for?

We considered but ultimately rejected a surprising answer to this question, which is that there is no clear cut-off point for the production heuristic. This would be in sharp contrast with the comprehension heuristic which determines when an interpretation has been found that meets expectations of relevance and so determines when comprehension stops and interpretation processes go beyond what communicators can be taken to intend. Of course, one key claim of relevance theory is that there is not always a clear boundary between what communicators intend and what addressees infer on their own. In some cases, it may not be clear whether a particular behaviour is intended as ostensively communicative or not. Verbal communication is almost always taken as ostensive but it can be harder to be sure whether nonverbal behaviours are intentionally communicative or not. Such things as silences or coughs might be cases where it is not clear what is intended. We could also refer to cases where an individual in a shop stops moving to allow another shopper to pass at an appropriate distance or to wait for them to move on. Such an action could be accompanied by a smile or a hand gesture to make clear that the person who stops moving is indicating to the other that they are happy to wait. In some cases, it might not be clear whether or not this involves intentionally communicative behaviour.

Our suggestion is that we are constantly monitoring the minds of others, observing their
behaviour, considering what they might be doing or thinking, and adjusting our behaviour in the light of that. We believe that this process contributes both to the initiation of communicative behaviour (e.g. when somebody says ‘after you’ as they stop moving in a shop) as well as to the formulation, monitoring and reformulation of communicative acts. The production heuristic begins to operate when this monitoring leads to a planned act of communication. The heuristic will play a role in assessing and choosing particular formulations, noticing when a formulation might be leading to unintended inferences, and thinking about how interactions have gone after the interaction has happened. We could argue that carrying on to think about what another person might be thinking after an interaction falls within the domain of the production heuristic. We suggest instead that these processes count as part of more general mindreading and the heuristic is in operation only when an individual is involved in planning and producing communicative acts.

4.5 What accounts for variation in speaker behaviour?

We assume that a large number of factors affect the operations of the production heuristic and that this helps to account for variation in what individuals say in different situations.

Monitoring the minds of others will be affected by ongoing changes in cognitive environments, i.e. in the relative manifestness of a wide range of assumptions, and what we
say will be affected by which assumptions are accessible at the time of formulating our
utterance. The choice between the two options in (7) and (8) will partly depend on
assumptions about who we are talking to:

(7) A: What’s that you’re eating?

    B: a. Congee.

        b. It’s a kind of porridge made with rice.

(8) a. I’m reading a really good book about Grice..

        b. I’m reading a really good book about a philosopher
called Paul Grice.

If speaker B in (7) assumes that A knows what congee is, they are likely to give the first
response; if not, they are likely to give the longer answer. (8a) would be appropriate if the
speaker assumes that the addressee knows who Grice is while (8b) works better if the
speaker is not presupposing this. Being aware of what assumptions others are aware of is
important in teaching, of course, and often leads to utterances like (8b) being preferred to
(8a). Different degrees of awareness of particular kinds of assumptions also play an
important role in intercultural communication.
There are, of course, many kinds of assumptions which can be more or less manifest to different individuals and this will play a role in leading to different utterances from speakers in similar situations. Some individuals will think more than others about what will be useful to their audiences, some will be more aware than others of variation in what people are likely to be aware of, and so on. This partly explains why it is often assumed that there is very little we can say about the pragmatics of production. We do not assume that we can develop an account which will explain why individuals say particular things at particular times. We do, however, think that we can say something about what is involved in the variation, including how the accessibility (or manifestness) of different assumptions affects the working of the production heuristic.

One factor which we think plays an important role is the performance and construction of identities, i.e. we believe that more or less salient assumptions about the identities we are constructing, performing or attributing must affect the formulation of communicative acts. All human behaviour makes manifest assumptions which are relevant to the construction of identities and of course this also applies to communicative behaviour. Clark (2020) argues that ideas from relevance theory are particularly useful in thinking about identity, focusing in particular on non-communicated implications, the idea that the distinction between implicatures and non-communicated implications is not always clear, the notion of
manifestness, and the idea that cognitive environments are constantly being adjusted before, during and after communicative interactions. Differences in the performance and construction of identities (of individuals themselves and of others), and differences in awareness of how particular behaviours and utterances affect identities, will lead to differences in communicative behaviour.

This could, for example, contribute to the difference between these two possible responses to the offer of an iced coffee, adapted from (6) above:

(9)  a. No.

b. I love iced coffee but I’ve just had one, actually, but thanks for offering.

(9a) simply indicates that the speaker does not want a coffee while (9b) makes clear that the speaker appreciates the offer but has a reason for not accepting it. We could talk about this with reference to ideas from (im)politeness theory, e.g. we could say that (9b) mitigates a potentially face-threatening act. We could also say that (9a) contributes to the construction of a view of the speaker’s identity which suggests less concern for the feelings of others than (9b). The reference to liking iced coffee both rules out one reason for not accepting the offer
and contributes to the construction of the speaker’s identity. We follow Garcés-Conejos Blivitch and Sifianou (2017) in assuming a close connection between face and identity. They argue that the two are hard to distinguish because ‘they co-constitute each other and are thus intrinsically related’ (2017: 248).

Ideas about identity are important in all kinds of communication, including academic and other kinds of professional writing. Pedagogical work on professional communication varies in how explicitly it discusses this. Clark (2020) argues that a focus on identity can help in developing communicative skills in a wide range of contexts. To take just one example, the way an academic paper is formatted, its structure, the content of its introduction (in fact, all aspects of how it is formulated) help to construct the identity of the author. These also contribute to understanding of the author’s construction of the identity of the journal, its editorial board and readers.

Developing an account of the pragmatics of production, and of our proposed production heuristic, will involve consideration of identities and a wide range of other kinds of assumptions with varying manifestness within and across individuals and groups. Variation in the manifestness of particular assumptions plays a role in accounting for the variability of communicative behaviour.
5. Conclusion

We have only briefly discussed our thinking here and made a first attempt to characterise
the production heuristic which we propose. There are many questions still to explore,
including those we indicated above. We hope that we do not have unrealistic aims for this
line of research. We certainly do not believe that we are close to being able to predict what
any individual will say at a particular moment (just as we don’t think we can predict the
interpretations of specific individuals in advance). But we do think that the postulation of a
production heuristic helps to understand production and the role of relevance considerations
in production processes. We also believe that this line of thinking can help to develop
understanding of the interactive nature of communication. We hope that future work will
develop a fuller account of communicative interaction and the heuristics which help guide
and constrain it.

While the relevance-guided comprehension heuristic guides the interpretation of
utterances, the production heuristic contributes to the formulation and reformulation of
utterances in the light of inferences about the responses of others to possible or actual
formulations.

Finally, we think an important question to consider is whether our account could be
replaced by one which simply sees the heuristic we propose as the application of a more
general mind-reading capacity. Sperber and Wilson (2002) make a convincing case for a specific comprehension heuristic saying that ‘given the particular nature and difficulty of the task, the general mind-reading hypothesis is implausible’ (2002: 20-21). We believe that a similar argument applies to production and that it therefore makes sense to postulate a heuristic which is focused specifically on production. We hope that further work will develop and test more specific proposals, leading to fuller understanding of the pragmatic processes involved in the production of communicative acts.

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