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Global development, diasporic communities, and civic space

Abstract

Over the last twenty years increasing attention has been paid to the ways in which diasporic communities can shape global development processes, thorough a variety of intersecting scales and spatialities. This promotion of diasporic-centred development has occurred in parallel to a narrowing of civic space and it is these juxtaposing narratives that this paper interrogates. This paper firstly considers diasporic-centred development before moving on to think about how the contemporary narrowing of civic space may be (re)shaping diasporic civic life and participation in global development processes. The paper concludes that the spaces for diasporic civic participation in development are vulnerable to being squeezed in multiple intersecting ways, including through the racialised marginalisation of diasporic communities in everyday life, restrictions on diasporic associational life, the delegitimising of diasporic organisations in the (formal) development sphere and the extra-territorial narrowing of diasporic civic space by state (and non-state) actors. It is imperative that we explore the intersections in the diasporic-civic space-development nexus, with further research needed to understand how diasporic communities are responding to these changes, how diasporic civic spaces are reconfiguring and reconstituting themselves in this context, and what this means for global development.

1. **Introduction**

Over the last 20 years increasing attention has been paid to the ways in which diasporic communities can shape global development processes, in their countries of heritage, residence and transnationally.[1] The nexus between migration and development, and more specifically the roles and impacts of diasporic communities has been explored at different scales, for example, the nation state, the community and the family. Prevailing discourses of the diaspora-development nexus attend to the ways in which diasporic communities, who are often presumed to be from the 'global South'[2] yet residing in the 'global North', can utilise (increasingly entrepreneurial) knowledge, skills and investments to offset historical and contemporary global inequalities (Tan et al., 2018; Trotz & Mullings, 2013). The last 2 decades have also witnessed a changing environment for civic engagement and participation, with civic space[3] often perceived to have narrowed around the world, particularly for more progressive voices and agendas, through myriad processes of delegitimisation, state sanctioned violence and reduced funding (Buyse, 2018). This paper examines these two processes and considers how changes in civic space may be (re)shaping diasporic engagement and participation and what this might mean for global development.

The paper begins by examining the rise of diasporic communities as agents for development. It then moves on to reviewing the alterations in civic space witnessed over the last 20 years, articulating the narrowing of civic space and how this relates to global development. The final section of the paper brings these two considerations together to outline how this squeezing of civic space has the potential to (re)shape diasporic engagement and participation in development. The paper concludes that civic space is increasingly vulnerable to being narrowed in multiple intersecting ways which (re)shape diasporic participation in development. If as Hossein et al. (2019) articulate civic space is integral for development, then it is imperative that we explore the intersections in the diasporic-civic space-development nexus, with further research needed to understand how diasporic communities are responding to these changes, how diasporic civic space is reconfiguring and reconstituting itself in this context, and what this means for global development.

1. The diaspora-development nexus

At its foundation the migration-development nexus considers how the movement of people influences predominantly the socio-economic, but also the political and cultural development of multiple and unsettled locales (Mercer et al., 2008). For all states, and many non-state actors, the making of borders and the mobility of people across borders has become a key developmental concern. A feature of this mobility is the development of a diasporic subject, a body of people outside of their country of origin who are connected to and invested in it in some way (Boyle & Ho, 2017). The potential of the diaspora as agents for development has been driven by the expansion of contemporary neoliberal globalisation, the rise of digital technologies, increased ease and affordability of international travel and an emphasis on horizontal supply chains (Boyle & Ho, 2017; Sharma et al., 2011; Trotz & Mullings, 2013). Whilst the idea of development remains contested and can reflect a range of meanings, this paper is led by Wilson (2012:4) who conceptualises development as "understood broadly as incorporating the whole complex of unequal material relationships and processes which structure engagement between the Global South and Global North, as well as the primary discursive framework within which these relationships have been constructed for over 60 years". This places material, relational and discursive inequalities at the foundation of our understanding of intentional and immanent D/development, as well as acknowledging that the global development industry is a socio-political construct created within (and sustaining) these unequal relations.

In global development discourses diasporic-led development is part of wider paradigmatic changes, including the good governance agenda, the securitisation of development and shifts in the migration-development nexus, with the World Bank describing diasporas as like discovering "an untapped pool of oil", with the diaspora option promoting the building of resilient, active, entrepreneurial citizens as a response to the failure of economic restructuring and ineffective growth policies (Boyle & Ho, 2017; Mohan, 2008; Pellegrin & Mullings, 2013; Trotz & Mullings, 2013:162). Diasporic-centred development is also mobilised in response to more intimate criticisms of the global development industry, in particular white hegemony and Northern dominance, with the rise of the diaspora option also connected to discourses of participatory development (Ademolu, 2021; Mercer et al., 2008), with bilateral agencies such as the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO, formerly DFID) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) engaging in various diaspora-centred development initiatives, including facilitating remittances, encouraging volunteering and skills transfer programmes.

The dominant geographies of the migration-development nexus presume the movement of people from the global South to the global North, with diasporic-led development centred around the transfer of varying forms of capital from unified groups of migrants connected through shared ancestry and values, oriented to bringing material changes to a static homeland (Brah, 1996; Mohan, 2008; Rollins, 2010). Scholarship in development studies, politics, geography and international relations amongst others, has considered diasporic relationships to countries of heritage, often in the global South, through varying forms of civic engagement and participation for example, hometown associations (HTAs) (Bada, 2015; Fischer, 2018; Lamba-Nieves, 2018; Mercer et al., 2008; Strunk, 2014; Symth, 2017), financial and social remittances (Burman, 2002; Page & Mercer, 2012; Smyth, 2017) and political activism (Adamson, 2020; Bernal, 2018; Godin, 2018; Ho & McConnell, 2019; Kennedy, 2019; Koinova, 2018; Ndlovu, 2014). These bodies of work articulate the interconnected nature of diasporic engagement, with Mercer et al. (2008: 7) commenting "the performance of Bali dances in London and the collection of money to improve health care in Cameroon are simultaneous and inseparable manifestations of the diasporic condition."

Whilst much effort has been made to understand and conceptualise how diasporic communities may contribute to their countries of heritage critical scholarship has also questioned the type of development inherent in the diaspora-development nexus. The use of diaspora strategies and infrastructures by nation-states has been critiqued

for (re) producing inequalities of race, class and gender and for fostering exclusionary ethno-nationalistic discourses of belonging, producing narratives of 'desirable' (and 'undesirable') diasporas (Dickinson, 2012; Ho, 2011; Ho et al., 2015). With diasporic engagement considered as an instrument of statecraft, diaspora strategies have also been critiqued for reinforcing the 'norms of the market', advancing particular interests and accentuating neoliberal forms of development, with the exclusions and inequalities sustained and created by such strategies reinforcing uneven development (Dickinson, 2012; Mullings, 2011, 2012). The potential role of diasporic communities in sustaining the neoliberalisation of development can be seen in Bada's (2015) concern that the privatization of public services can be deflected and minimized by incoming diasporic remittances.

Imbalances of power have also been of concern when examining the influence of diasporic communities on development in their countries of heritage. Hometown associations have been critiqued for shaping geographical and socio-political inequalities, with the complex micro-politics of hometown associations, both internally and between HTAs and homeland communities demonstrating the delicate negotiations of power between diasporic groups, homeland communities and the state and the potential for reproducing inequalities based on gender, race, and class (Bada, 2015; Lamba-Nieves, 2018). Reproduction of power imbalances through diasporic organizing is also exemplified in the sphere of social and political activism, where diasporic perspectives may not always align with or support those generated 'at home' (Rubyan-Ling, 2019), may suppress local voices and perspectives (Bada, 2015) and reinforce patronage politics (Davies, 2010).

Global development discourse is dominated by conceptualisations of diasporic-centred development that foreground the binary between host/sending state and focus on transfers of capital from the global North to the global South (Dickinson, 2017). These flows of capital are increasingly focused on professional and entrepreneurial knowledge and skills (Mullings, 2012). Whilst these flows of capital are facilitated and encouraged, for example, by nation-states and international development agencies, the spaces through which people can participate in civic organizing have altered significantly, with civic space as an arena for associational life,4 debate and contestation experiencing myriad changes in the last 2 decades. The next section of this paper will consider these changes, followed by an exploration of how these alterations may (re) shape diasporic civic participation.

2. The closing down of civic space

Civic space can be conceptualised as the space between the market, the state and the family, in which people can "organise, debate and act" (Buyse, 2018: 967). Civic space is seen as a key element of global development, often understood within the global development context as the space for civil society to operate, with the term civil society often mobilized to refer to "formal NGOs and CSOs, often aid- or foreign-funded, involved in service delivery or undertaking a 'watchdog' function by holding government and other actors to account. Civil society is properly viewed as a broader category of actors that includes the independent media; human rights defenders; professional associations; academia and thinktanks; and social movements such as land and indigenous people's rights groups, women's and peasant movements, labour organizations, environmental activists, as well as grassroots and community-based organizations" (Hossein et al., 2019: 9). The idea of civil society has played a key role in global development discourse, with the aim of developing 'civil society' originally promoted as part of the good governance agenda, tasked with holding the state to account, decentralising power and encouraging more participatory modes of governance (Edwards, 2014). Theorisations of civil society in development are heavily influenced by Eurocentric thinking, which places associational life at the forefront of civil society and subsequent democratic development (De Tocqueville, 1840; Putnam, 2000). More critical approaches to civil society see it as an arena that both challenges and furthers the interests of the dominant order (Gramsci, 1971) and a sphere in which citizens could come together and discuss common concerns (Habermas, 1989), with Fraser (1990: 67) conceptualising civic space through the idea of multiple counterpublics as a "discursive arena where members of sub-ordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses and formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs".

Hailed as the magic bullet, with significant investment spent on attempting to build civil society for development since the 1990s, more contemporary trends have seen a change in civic space, with concerns about a narrowing of civic space around the world and across political regime types, including in 'established' democracies. This global phenomenon is connected to increasing illiberalism, populist and nationalist political currents, the rise of neoliberal authoritarianism and perhaps now COVID19 (Brechenmacher & Carothers, 2019). It must be acknowledged that whilst this narrowing is an important feature of changing civic space, other alterations such as the rise of the digital public sphere and an increase in right-wing civic activity are also key changes over the last 2 decades (Hossein et al., 2019). It is therefore important to consider for whom civic space is contracting and in what ways.5

The last 20 years have seen increasing restrictions on civic space through "political, administrative and extra-legal" processes (Hossein et al., 2019: 6), which Buyse (2018) frames as co-option, coercion and closure. This has been accompanied by more subtle attacks on civic space, for example, through the delegitimizing and intimidation of civil society actors (Hossein et al., 2019: 52). The delegitimisation of civil society actors can also be more insidious, driven, for example, by increasing regulation and the professionalisation agenda, potentially disproportionately impeding the work of smaller more informal groups. This reflects concerns about the elite capture and the depoliticisation of civil society in which civil society becomes an arena for professional non-governmental organisations, simultaneously eroding the ideals central to civil society, such as grassroots participation and empowerment, divorcing civil society organizations from their communities, neglecting nascent community groups and making civil society an exclusive space for the urban educated elite (Banks et al., 2015; Mawdsley et al., 2002). This depoliticization also presents minimal space for engagement in more progressive social and political change outside of the avenues offered by the state (Baillie Smith & Jenkins, 2011; Bolton & Jeffrey, 2008; Choudry & Kapoor, 2013). Civil society groups can also be delegitmised through associations with foreign funding or discursive reputational damage (Banks et al., 2015; Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2015).

These restrictions on civic space enable the political elite to enhance their power, defend national sovereignty and drive forms of (neoliberal) development that neglect social and political rights (Brechenmacher & Carothers, 2019; Krienenkamp, 2017; Poppe & Wolff, 2017). The rise of a more illiberal political climate around the world is diminishing civic space for many progressive organisations, yet as Hossein et al., (2019: 10) comment, civic space is not only be squeezed but also altered to incorporate more "right-wing, extremist and neo-traditionalist" social and political movements. This is perhaps most obvious in the context of gender and sexuality, with anti-feminist and anti-LGBTQI + voices shaping the discourse and policy landscape in many countries (Hossein et al., 2019). Contentious extractive land and resource use and an emphasis on large-scale infrastructure projects is often connected to a development environment that does not incorporate the potentially challenging presence of civil society, articulating the role of the private sector in the closing down of civic space (Buyse, 2018; Hossein et al., 2019). Whilst this global sense of change is important, it is also key to remember that the narrowing of civic space will present differently in different political and developmental contexts, including the measures undertaken, the impacts of such measures and responses from civil society.

With the closing down of civic space as detailed above, and more recently felt in the context of Covid19, digital civic space has become increasingly important. Advances in technology have expanded and altered the civil society landscape, driving mobilisations, spreading information and shaping who can participate (Hossein et al., 2019). The role of the digital public sphere in protest and revolutionary moments has been well documented, yet its importance is also contested (Brym et al., 2014). More recently 'hashtag movements' have combined with on-street demonstrations, with for example, #EndSARS mobilising to challenge the police brutality, violence and discrimination directed towards young Nigerians, and continuing to engage with wider issues of governance, corruption and social welfare. Whilst recent technologies and the digital public sphere can help spread information and enable transnational activism, they can also generate an exclusionary and discriminatory spaces. Digital civic space is also subject to similar restrictions as wider civic space via the stifling of digital rights through mechanisms such as surveillance, trolling and more covert means such as malware or phishing attacks (Buyse, 2018; Hossein et al., 2019; Michaelsen, 2020), and can also be censored by state and non-state actors, with occurrences of disruption to Internet access often coinciding with times of crisis (Brechenmacher & Carothers, 2019).

Civic space remains integral to global development, as Hossein et al., (2019: 3) comment "civic space is a precondition for achieving the… SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals)". As one of the remits of the civil society is to support and represent the most marginalized in society, the narrowing of civic space has the potential to reverse progress made towards reducing inequalities (Hossein et al., 2019: 2). Civic space then is a crucial element of global development as it is a space in which rights can be fought for, states held to account and the lives of the most vulnerable protected. As diasporic communities have been increasingly engaged in development by nation-states and the global development industry and as they mobilise through this changing civic space it is important to think about how these changes may shape their participation, as they continue to be promoted as agents for global development. The next section of this article will attend to these concerns.

3. Changing civic space and diasporic engagement

This paper has outlined how diasporic communities have been promoted as agents for development by the global development industry and many nation states, with critical scholarship highlighting how these strategies may reproduce inequalities, foster exclusionary narratives and reinforce the tenets of neoliberalism. This part of the paper will consider how the changing features of civic space detailed above may shape diasporic participation and

engagement in development. Drawing out three key concerns, this section will focus on how diasporic engagement and participation in development is particularly vulnerable to firstly issues of race (and racism) and ethnonationalist political discourses, secondly the legitimacy agenda within the global development industry, and finally the increasingly restrictive extra-territorial nation state.

Diasporic participation in global development has the potential to be (re)shaped by racialised increasing illiberal, anti-migrant and nationalist discourses. In Great Britain, for example, members of racialized and minoritized diasporic communities are more likely to experience inequalities and insecurities than white communities (El-Enany, 2020; Social Scientists Against the Hostile Environment [SSAHE], 2020). This is particularly the case since the advent of the hostile environment policies in 2012, and whilst these laws and policies are the result of longstanding anti-immigration discourses, the hostile environment has made all racialised and minoritized communities more likely to be discriminated against regardless of their immigration status (El-Enany, 2020). These insecurities may shape how remittances are sent and engagement with associational life, with for example, civic activities constrained by the marginalised positions of migrants, yet concurrently offering spaces of mutual support (Strunk, 2014; Symth, 2017). Despite these insecurities diasporic communities often continue to engage in development activities, but with increasing challenges and hardship on their part (Hammond, 2013; Kleist, 2014; Mohan, 2008). This may be particularly the case in relation to Covid19, where the pandemic has disproportionately affected racialised and minoritized communities in Europe and North America, exacerbating existing inequalities and potentially impacting on remittance sending (Datta & Guermond, 2020).

Diasporic associational life and the possibilities for racialised and minoritized communities to mobilise and participate in civic space in the global North has a long history of restriction and censure. This is documented in popular culture, for example, Steve McQueen's film Mangrove (McQueen, 2020) details the racialised and racist policing of Black associational life in London in the 1970s. It can also be witnessed through the racism prevalent in British trade union movement and, for example, in the marginalisation of racialised voices and experiences from the Extinction Rebellion movement (The Wretched of the Earth movement, 2019; Virdee, 2000). The development of counterpublics by racialised and minoritized communities offers alternative spaces for the contestation of dominant narratives, with Werbner (2009: 22) contending that associational life for Muslim communities in Manchester, UK provided a space to discuss matters of international concern, for example, the plight of Palestinians or the Middle East. These spaces however became unjustly identified as spaces of

"conspiracy and Western hatred", with political rhetoric connecting Muslim associational life to the failure of multi-culturalism (Werbner, 2009: 28). In the more intentional global development sphere the discriminatory restrictions placed on Muslim civil society can be seen in a letter to the House of Commons International Development Select Committee in which two of the UK's former International Development Secretaries Andrew Mitchell and Clare Short articulate their concerns about the "flow of British taxpayer money does appear to be discriminating against Muslim charities", the restrictive nature of anti-terror legislation and concern amongst aid workers about the "Guantanamo effect" (Mitchell & Short, 2016: 2). It is important to note that these constraints occurred in tandem with the prejudiced targeting and delegitimising of Muslim humanitarian organisations by some sections of the British press (Delmar-Morgan & Oborne, 2017).

The ability of diasporic organisations to engage in development is also shaped by their ability to perform and be legitimate within the more formalized global development context. This has become even more acute with changes to aid architectures that reinforce dominant institutions, sidelining smaller operations, including those run by diasporic communities (Ahmed, 2021).

The drive towards a professionalised civil society within the global development industry has been heavily critiqued for creating an elite and exclusionary sector. For diasporic organisations then there is pressure to operate in particular ways to enhance their credibility and legitimacy within this sphere, for example, through engagement with capacity building initiatives focused on accountability mechanisms, potentially sidelining the important role of emotional ties and responsibilities, which are a key facet of diasporic engagement (Craven, 2021; Kleist, 2014). The involvement of diasporic organisations in development shows how non-state actors are expected to conform to institutional processes with bilateral aid agencies focussing on supporting diasporic capacity development, network building and policy advocacy, exposing concerns about effectiveness, efficiency and representational ability (Kleist, 2014). Diasporic programmes funded through bilateral development agencies are viewed by some as a form of (racialised) governmentality, with diaspora initiatives oikonomic projects, where diasporic communities are positioned to (acceptably) modernise, civilise and reproduce Western values in the global South (Boyle & Ho, 2017). This positioning is accentuated by the under-representation of people from racialised communities in mainstream development organisations (Ahmed, 2021).

The professionalisation agenda driven by the global development community may then restrict diasporic civil society engagement with development, but diasporic communities are also subjected to extra-territorial control from state forces (Adamson, 2020; Dalmasso et al., 2018; Tsourapas, 2021). With increasing illiberalism, the need to balance emigration with the continued control of extra-territorial communities becomes important for many states, with monitoring and surveillance a key aspect of the extra-territorial control of diasporic civic space (Conduit, 2020; Tsourapas, 2021). The dominance of extra-territorial state-based authoritarianism is complicated by the role that non-state actors may also play in the repression of diasporic communities. Adamson (2020) details how diasporic politics itself can be a site of repression, using the example of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) to show how nonstate actors compete for support from diasporic communities, in doing so exercising control over large proportions of Kurdish diasporic civic life. Whilst the PKK themselves have been the subjects of transnational repression by the Turkish state they have also employed similar tactics, narrowing the civic space in which the Kurdish diaspora can operate in. Adamson (2020: 155) comments: "Ordinary people living in the diaspora may therefore in some cases be subject to intimidation, threats and forms of transnational repression from both state and non-state actors–in addition to possibly being marginalized as migrants, minorities or refugees in their states of residence."

These examples, and particularly the quotation from Adamson (2020: 155) above, articulate how diasporic participation in development processes is situated in multiple unsettled yet spatially and temporally interconnected locales, with the liminality that is integral to diasporic experience shaping such engagement (Fischer, 2018; Horst, 2018; Kadhum, 2020; Koinova, 2018). Diasporic civic participation then gives voice to social and political concerns "in, between and across specific locations" (Horst, 2018: 1353). This provides an opportunity to acknowledge the importance of race (and racism), politics and feelings of belonging, emotions and spiritualities in shaping diasporic participation in development processes (Fischer, 2018; Gilroy, 1993; Hammond, 2013; Jons et al., 2015; Mercer et al., 2008; Page & Mercer, 2012; Tan et al., 2018; Werbner, 2009; Zou, 2020). These considerations are crucial for thinking about how the changes in civic space more widely, as detailed in Section 3, may shape diasporic engagement in global development.

The spaces for diasporic civic participation in development are vulnerable to being squeezed in multiple intersecting ways, including through the racialised marginalisation of diasporic communities in everyday life, restrictions on diasporic associational life, the delegitimising of diasporic organisations in the (formal)

development sphere and the extra-territorial narrowing of diasporic civic space by state (and non-state) actors. If as Hossein et al. (2019) articulate civic space is integral for development, then it is imperative that we explore the intersections in the diasporic-civic space-development nexus, with further research needed to understand how diasporic communities are responding to these changes, how diasporic civic spaces are reconfiguring and reconstituting themselves in this context, and what this means for global development.

4. Conclusion

This paper has considered the intersections between diasporic-led development and civic space. The diaspora option as mobilised by states and the global development industry has been critiqued for becoming increasingly neoliberal, focussing on entrepreneurship and market-based interests. The last 20 years have also witnessed a closing down of civic space. Yet diasporic communities continue to mobilise, building civic engagement in, through and between multiple locales (Horst, 2018: 1353). Diasporic civic participation should be understood as embedded in multiple locales, with civic activities in the country of residence inseparable from those in 'the homeland' and as contextually situated in the historical past and contemporary present of multiple sites. This paper examined how the narrowing (and altering) of civic space may shape diasporic civic engagement in global development, considering in particular the racialised nature of civic space, diasporic legitimacy within the global development industry and the extra-territorial reach of the (repressive) nation-state, showing how diasporic communities and civic spaces are vulnerable to repression from multiple angles.

Diasporic communities shape political activity, social spaces, cultural beliefs and lifestyles in multiple unsettled locales and at varying scales (Fischer, 2018; Hammond, 2013; Mercer et al., 2008; Page & Mercer, 2012; Tan et al., 2018). This paper demonstrates that the study of diasporic civic engagement and participation within the context of global development can be understood as an analysis of transnational and extra-territorial civic and state power, with attention to diasporic communities reinforcing the transnational nature of civic space and accentuating the global processes at work in the closing down of civic space. This engages with a global and more relational geography of development and the blurring the boundaries between and the interconnected nature of the global North and South (Horner, 2020). Thinking about diasporic participation in global development also offer a lens into the racialisation of civic participation, and how this intersects with global development. This connects the everyday lives and experiences of diasporic communities with development endevours. More broadly

the idea of diasporic engagement and participation in global development brings together sometimes disparate conversations on global development and domestic immigration governance and racial inequalities.

There are however significant areas that remain unexplored, including what role does the historical and contemporary political context in countries of heritage and residence play in shaping the opportunities for diasporic engagement and participation? What influence do the everyday social lives of diasporic communities, for example, employment insecurity or sense of belonging, have on diasporic associational life? How does the narrowing of civic space shape diasporic-led development? How do diasporic communities engage in digital civic space, and how does the digital sphere shape their engagement? And what is the nature of the partnerships between diasporic communities and civil society groups in their country of origin? It is also important to consider the responses and agency of civil society groups, associations and individuals as they continue to operate within this narrowed civic space, something not touched on in this paper, but an area that is crucial for understanding diasporic civic participation as it reconfigures for our contemporary times.

Endnotes

1 Whilst I acknowledge the binary problems with terms such as country of origin, country of heritage and of residence I use

them selectively here to engage with the multiple locales connected the diasporic engagement.

2 Whilst there are multiple 'Souths' (and Norths), the employment of the term in development discourse equates the global

South geographically to countries and regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and the Pacific, but can also

be used to connate "countries that have been marginalised in the international political and economic system" (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020; Medie & Kang, 2018: 37 and 38).

3 Civic space is conceptualised here as the space between the market, the state and the family, in which people can "organise, debate and act" (Buyse, 2018: 967).

4 The term associational life is often connected to Alexis de Tocqueville's (1840), and later Robert Putnam's (2000) work, associated with the formation of associations and "contains all associations and networks of between the family and state in which membership and activities are "voluntary" including NGOs of different kinds, labour

unions, political parties, churches and other religious groups, professional and business associations, community and self-help groups, social movements and the independent media" (Edwards, 2014: 20).

5 My thanks go to the one of the anonymous reviewers for this point.

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