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Citation: Blythe, John, Brown, Richard and Coventry, Lynne (2022) The Workplace Information Sensitivity Appraisal (WISA) scale. Computers in Human Behavior Reports, 8. p. 100240. ISSN 2451-9588

Published by: Elsevier

URL: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chbr.2022.100240>
<<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chbr.2022.100240>>

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The Workplace Information Sensitivity Appraisal (WISA) scale

John Blythe,¹ Richard Brown,^{2*} and Lynne Coventry.²

¹ Immersive Labs, Bristol, United Kingdom

² Psychology Department at Northumbria University, Newcastle, United Kingdom

*Correspondence

Richard Brown, Department of Psychology, Northumberland Building, Northumbria University, Newcastle, NE1 8SG.

Email: richard6.brown@northumbria.ac.uk

Abstract

Human error in security plays a significant role in the majority of cyber-attacks on businesses. Security behaviours are impacted by numerous factors, including individual perceptions of information sensitivity. However, there is currently a lack of empirical measurement of information sensitivity and its role in determining security behaviours. This research presents a measure of information sensitivity appraisal that predicts security behaviour. We outline the design, development and validation of the Workplace Information Sensitivity Appraisal scale. The psychometric properties were assessed with data from an online sample of 326 employees in the UK. The scale comprises of five subscales: Privacy, Worth, Consequences, Low proximity interest by others and High proximity interest by others. The final 16-item WISA scale, alongside its five subscales, represents a comprehensive measure of information sensitivity appraisal in the workplace. The WISA scale has been found to have strong factorial validity, confirmed across eight information types, strong content validity, good criterion-related validity, adequate discriminant validity, and high internal reliability. This research utilised the WISA scale to explore sensitivity differences across eight information types: four concerning living individuals (Personal, Health, Financial & Lifestyle) and four organisationally-focused information types (IP, day to day, commercial & HR). Financial information was found to have the highest ratings for overall sensitivity followed by health and HR. Finally, scores for the WISA scale predicted a range of security behaviours including password usage, secure Wi-Fi usage, physical security and avoiding security risks. This demonstrates the potential role for information sensitivity appraisal as a determinant of security behaviours.

Key words: Cyber security; Information sensitivity; Behavior change; Employee behaviors; Information security; Organizational security culture.

37 **Background**

38 Organisations are under constant attack from internal and external threats that put the integrity,
39 availability and confidentiality of their information at risk. In the UK, four in ten businesses
40 (39%) and a quarter of charities (26%) reported cyber attacks in 2021 (Department for Digital,
41 Culture, Media, & Sport, 2021). This was highest among medium businesses (65%), large
42 businesses (64%) and high-income charities (51%). The implications of security breaches are
43 vast, including service disruption, reputational damage, and extensive financial damage.
44 Recent findings suggest that cyber attacks are growing in frequency and severity (Hiscox,
45 2019), and are projected to account for a global cost of \$6 trillion by the end of 2021
46 (Cybersecurity Ventures, 2019; Lallie et al., 2021). Organisations adopt technical, procedural
47 and human defences to protect against security threats. Employees play a large role in cyber
48 security as their behaviour is estimated to account for a considerable portion of security
49 breaches (Dhillon & Moores, 2001; Mitnick & Simon, 2003; Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda,
50 & Kiountouzis, 2005; Vroom & Von Solms, 2004). An analysis of data published by the UK
51 Information Commissioner's Office identified that 64% of reported information security
52 incidents and breaches across all sectors were likely to be the result of human error (Evans, He,
53 Maglaras, Yevseyeva, & Janicke, 2019). There is a need to understand the role that improved
54 employee security behaviours can play in the defence of organisational information security.

55

56 It is important that research looks to understand the range of factors that can influence the
57 security behaviours of employees. One such approach is to study the relationship between
58 information sensitivity and security behaviours in the workplace (Blythe, 2015). Securely
59 guarding sensitive information is a goal of all organizations in order to minimize the threat of
60 data breaches. Although there has been limited research exploring the direct link between
61 information sensitivity and security in the workplace, Adams and Sasse (1999) found that
62 employees perceived sensitive information as requiring more protection and security than
63 other types. They found that confidential information about individuals (personnel files and
64 emails) were rated as sensitive, whereas commercially-orientated information (such as
65 customer databases and financial data) were often seen as less sensitive and consequently
66 needing less protection. These perceptual differences can impact security behaviours. For
67 example, the sensitivity of data has been found to have an impact on password re-use
68 (Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011), suggesting that users do consider the sensitivity of the data
69 stored on a service and adjust their security behaviour accordingly.

70

71 A significant challenge in the study of perceptual differences in information sensitivity is that
72 there is no clear consensus as to what constitutes sensitive information. In the UK, the
73 protection of citizen's information is regulated by the Information Commissioner's Office and
74 governed by the Data Protection Act (DPA; 2018). This is the UK's implementation of the
75 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The act seeks to control how individuals'
76 personal data is used by businesses and specifies different levels of protection for sensitive
77 personal data. Personal data means any information relating to an identified or identifiable
78 living individual. The act goes on to describe how the processing of personal data would be
79 considered sensitive where it relates to the following factors: racial or ethnic origin, political
80 opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs or trade union membership, genetic data, or of
81 biometric data, for the purpose of uniquely identifying an individual, data concerning health,
82 data concerning an individual's sex life or sexual orientation. However, despite the breadth of
83 this categorisation, the legal framework for sensitive information does not easily translate into
84 a theoretical account of the central constructs that encompass the nature of sensitive
85 information.

86

87 Within the research domain, the majority of studies do not provide a clear theoretical account
88 of what may be driving individual appraisals of information sensitivity. However, there are two
89 clear divides in the way that research has conceptualised information sensitivity. Some
90 accounts focus on the privacy and intimacy of information as a basis for evaluating sensitivity.
91 For example, Weible (1993) defines information sensitivity as "*the level of privacy concern an*
92 *individual feels for a type of data in a specific situation.*" Sheehan and Hoy (2000) present a
93 broader definition and argue that information sensitivity is simply the distinction between what
94 is private and what is not private. Other researchers consider sensitivity to relate to intimate
95 self-disclosures. For example, Lwin, Wirtz, and Williams (2007) define information sensitivity
96 as the perceived intimacy level of information and Moon (2000) defines intimate self-
97 disclosures as those information types that are high-risk and heighten vulnerability if disclosed.
98 The second type of definition focuses more on the vulnerability and potential exploitative
99 nature of information as a basis for evaluating sensitivity. For example, Gandy Jr (1993) argues
100 that some people view sensitive information as any information that if disclosed would likely
101 cause them harm. Mothersbaugh, Foxx, Beatty, and Wang (2012) also define perceived
102 sensitivity as potential losses associated with disclosing information. More recently Sun, Liu,
103 and Wang (2017) have defined information sensitivity as the extent to which information is
104 perceived as sensitive due to the potential for loss as a result of its disclosure. In summary, the

105 range of potential definitions for information sensitivity broadly reflect the following two
106 dimensions: 1) the perceived *privacy* that an individual ascribes to data in a given context, and
107 2) the anticipated negative *consequences* that an individual associates with the potential
108 disclosure of information.

109

110 There is currently a lack of empirical studies investigating information sensitivity and its role
111 in employee security behaviour. A lack of conceptual consensus in the literature has resulted
112 in a shortage of scales measuring how individuals appraise information sensitivity. This
113 absence of empirical measurement is likely the reason that information sensitivity is
114 considered a neglected construct within the privacy and security domain (Kokolakis, 2017).
115 This is unfortunate, as it has further been suggested that information sensitivity may play an
116 important role in explaining privacy behaviours and related phenomena, such as the privacy
117 paradox (Mothersbaugh et al., 2012). Since individuals process information differently based
118 on distinct perceptions of informational qualities, it may be appropriate to measure sensitivity
119 of information by scaling users' perceptions rather than indiscriminately dividing levels of
120 sensitivity based on general information types (Sun et al., 2017).

121

122 There is currently no widely accepted scale that measures information sensitivity within the
123 workplace. Previous studies exploring information sensitivity have largely used scales
124 investigating willingness to disclose (Cranor, Reagle, & Ackerman, 2000) or privacy concerns
125 (Buchanan, Paine, Joinson, & Reips, 2007; Preibusch, 2013). However, none of these directly
126 investigate how individuals evaluate information sensitivity in the workplace. In this article,
127 we attempt to address this gap in the security literature by returning to previous doctoral
128 research: *Information Security in the Workplace: A Mixed-Methods Approach to*
129 *Understanding and Improving Security Behaviours* (Blythe, 2015). Given the growing threat
130 of cyber attacks faced by organisations, and the central role of human error in security, we
131 believe that repositioning the previous findings of Blythe (2015) presents the opportunity for
132 researchers to employ a useful scale for measuring workplace information sensitivity. By
133 presenting the merits of the scale as a standalone contribution to the literature, we hope that it
134 may be used to better understand the relationship between the appraisal of information
135 sensitivity and subsequent security behaviours. Therefore, this research will: 1) describe the
136 development and validation of a measure aimed at capturing employees' assessment of
137 information sensitivity, the Workplace Information Sensitivity Appraisal (WISA) scale

138 (Blythe, 2015), and 2) discuss the application of the WISA scale to investigating differences in
139 sensitivity by information type, and as a predictor of multiple security behaviours.

140

141 **Method**

142 *Item generation and reduction*

143 Existing literature on information sensitivity was first consulted to aid item generation. This
144 highlighted the central components of information sensitivity as being the degree of privacy
145 concern experienced by the individual (Sheehan & Hoy, 2000; Weible, 1993) and the potential
146 for negative consequences associated with the disclosure of specific information (Gandy Jr,
147 1993; Mothersbaugh et al., 2012; Sun et al., 2017). This deductive approach for generating
148 scale items outlined by Hinkin (1998) is deemed most suitable when there are sufficient
149 theoretical grounds on which to base the generation of items. However, given the discussed
150 lack of previous research on information sensitivity, specifically in the workplace, this
151 approach was not used in isolation. Therefore, the current study used a combination of
152 inductive and deductive approaches to enhance item generation. Items were also generated
153 using verbal extracts from a qualitative study exploring factors that most influence workplace
154 security behaviours (Blythe, 2015). This qualitative study used a semi-structured approach of
155 vignette based one-to-one interviews, followed by a framework analysis to suggest a range of
156 factors that influence security behaviours. This qualitative study involved a purposeful sample
157 of 20 participants recruited from two organisations (a university & industry research
158 institution) from the North of England and South of Scotland. This qualitative analysis allowed
159 the research team to identify four themes of information sensitivity: *the private nature of*
160 *information, the potential consequences associated with information, the value of information,*
161 *and the perceived (third party) interest in information.* The four themes informed the creation
162 of the initial survey items and would subsequently be used to help define extracted scale factors.
163 An initial 22 items were generated with respect to these four dimensions (see Table 1 for initial
164 22 items). These items were devised in accordance with recommendations from Hinkin (1998)
165 to ensure the use of short and simple questions and to avoid the use of double-barrelled
166 statements and leading questions. Reverse-scored items were also included to help reduce
167 response bias. A consistent rating scale from “*strongly disagree to strongly agree*” was
168 implemented across the initial four areas of the WISA appraisal in response to previous
169 research that has highlighted prior difficulties in combining scores from different rating scales
170 (Gliem & Gliem, 2003).

171


172 ***Study Design***

173 A non-experimental survey design was employed to validate the WISA scale. The following
174 approach was used to explore the validity and reliability of the scale in accordance with
175 previous recommendations for developing novel measures (Hinkin, 1995, 1998).

176

177

Figure 1. The process of assessing the validity and reliability of the WISA scale



178

179

180 ***Participants***

181 An opportunity sample of 326 (Age, $M = 31.75$, $SD = 11.51$) individuals were recruited online
182 between August and November 2014. All recruited participants were in full-time or part-time
183 employment or unemployed for less than three months. Our sample included 87 males and 217
184 females (22 participants chose not to disclose their gender), with an average (mean)
185 organisational tenure of 5.23 years ($SD = 6.66$) and job tenure of 3.18 years ($SD = 4.7$). Of our
186 sample, 11% (34) were from a microenterprise (less than ten staff), 13% from a small enterprise
187 (less than 50 staff), 9.2% from a medium-sized enterprise (less than 250 staff) and 61% from a
188 large organisation (more than 250 staff). Participants were recruited using a variety of
189 platforms based on recruitment recommendations from Branley, Covey, and Hardey (2014)
190 which included dedicated participation sites (e.g. callforparticipants.com), social media (e.g.
191 Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), mailing lists, student participation pools and websites and
192 forums. A snowballing sampling technique was employed in order to maximise recruitment.

193 As compensation for study completion, participants were entered into a prize draw to win an
194 iPad or, if they were university students, they received institutional participation points.

195

196 ***Information types***

197 The WISA scale was validated across eight information types. Potential information types were
198 suggested by the lead researcher and reviewed and modified by other members of the research
199 team. The resulting categorisation distinguishes between two general types of information. The
200 first is information about living individuals, replicating the four information types proposed by
201 Little, Briggs, and Coventry (2011): *personal information* (e.g. address, gender, date of birth,
202 marital status), *health information* (e.g. physical and mental health history, weight, family
203 medical history), *financial information* (e.g. banking details, credit rating, loan history) and
204 *lifestyle information* (e.g. shopping habits, hobbies, interests). The focus of the items refers to
205 other individuals' information, rather than the employee's own information to capture the
206 broader perceived sensitivity information. The second general information type refers to
207 organisationally-owned information: *intellectual property* (e.g. trade secrets, creative ideas that
208 could lead to patents, copyrights, new products), *day-to-day business information* (e.g. current
209 customer & supplier details, quotes, purchase history, call records), *commercial information*
210 (e.g. strategic plans, business financial data) and *personnel/HR information* (e.g. appraisal,
211 disciplinary information, salary, sickness records). Participants were asked to respond to each
212 of the proposed items of the WISA scale for all eight information types.

213

214 The WISA scale and participant instructions are shown in Figure 2 below (note that during the
215 validation of the WISA scale participants responded to six items that were subsequently
216 removed from the final scale, identified as 'removed items').

217

218

219 **Figure 2. WISA Scale and participant instructions**

Instructions

- The following statements are about different types of information that may be stored by your organisation.
- Read each statement carefully and please rate the extent to which you agree with the statements using a rating scale from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'.

Information types

- Personal information about other people (e.g. address, gender, date of birth, marital status)
- Health information about other people (e.g. physical and mental health history, weight, family medical history)
- Lifestyle information about other people (e.g. shopping habits, hobbies, interests)
- Financial information about other people (e.g. banking details, credit rating, loan history)
- Information about or relating to intellectual property (e.g. trade secrets, creative ideas that could lead to patents, copyrights, new products)
- Day-to-day business operation information (e.g. current customer & supplier details, quotes, purchase history, call records)
- Commercial business information (e.g. strategic plans, financial business data)
- Personnel / HR information (e.g. appraisal, disciplinary info, salary, sickness records)

WISA Scale Survey Task

	<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly Agree</i>
<i>"I think [information type] is..."</i>					
• Secret	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Private	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Insignificant	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Humiliating	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Of interest to fellow employees	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Meaningless	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Worthless	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Of interest to business competitors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Of interest to criminals	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Embarrassing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Discreditable	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Confidential	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Of interest to my family	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Of interest to my friends	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Restricted	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
• Compromising	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

220

Removed Items	• Privileged	<input type="checkbox"/>				
	• Sensitive	<input type="checkbox"/>				
	• Valuable	<input type="checkbox"/>				
	• Important	<input type="checkbox"/>				
	• Exploitable	<input type="checkbox"/>				
	• Of interest to the general public	<input type="checkbox"/>				

221 *Additional measures*

222 **Organisational Citizenship Behaviour.** The Organisational Citizenship Behaviour
223 (OCB) scale was used to assess the discriminant validity of the WISA scale. We used the OCB-
224 O subscale by Lee and Allen (2002). The OCB-O scale was found to have strong internal
225 reliability, Cronbach's $\alpha = .89$. The importance of OCB has been demonstrated in occupational
226 psychology literature and has been found to have many positive consequences for
227 organisations, such as increased job performance (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Ahearne, 1998;
228 Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1997). The scale consists of eight items and all items were measured
229 on a seven-point scale that ranged from one (never) to seven (always) in which participants
230 indicated the extent to which they perform the citizenship behaviours.

231 **Security behaviour.** A measure of security behaviour was used to assess the criterion
232 validity of the WISA scale. Security behaviour was measured using a 16 item self-developed
233 scale based on best practice security behaviours identified in a report for the Department for
234 Business, Innovation and Skills (Coventry, Briggs, Blythe, & Tran, 2014). Behaviours were
235 worded to explicitly target the workplace setting (e.g. "*I share passwords with other people at*
236 *work*"). The behaviours comprised access control, software updates, anti-malware, physical
237 behaviours and reporting behaviours. The scope of the scale was broad to encompass the
238 different working conditions employees may face. The security behaviour scale had strong
239 internal reliability, Cronbach's $\alpha = .85$. All items were measured on a seven-point scale that
240 ranged from one (never) to seven (always) in which participants indicated the extent to which
241 they perform security behaviours in a workplace setting.

242

243 **Results**

244 We present the following results for 1) an assessment of the validity and reliability of the
245 Workplace Information Sensitivity Appraisal (WISA) scale, and 2) the application of the WISA
246 scale to investigate differences in sensitivity by information type, and as a predictor of multiple
247 security behaviours.

248

249 *Assessing the validity and reliability of the WISA scale*

250 **Stage 1: Face/Content validity.** The content validity of the scale was assessed using
251 subject-matter experts as well as naïve participants to evaluate the suitability and
252 comprehensibility of selected items. A workshop with subject-matter experts revealed that the
253 items were suitable for measuring the construct of information sensitivity. Ten participants
254 were recruited as naïve subjects to assess the items. In a card sorting activity, they were

255 presented with the questionnaire items and asked to sort the items into clusters they felt most
256 represented the items. This procedure was informed by previous research (MacKenzie,
257 Podsakoff, & Fetter, 1991). This confirmed that the generated items were representative of the
258 qualitatively identified themes of information sensitivity taken from the previously described
259 vignette-based interviews and theoretical background. Participants were asked to define their
260 categories. Definitions were not initially provided to participants in order to gain a deeper
261 understanding of how participants interpreted the items. This procedure allowed for a more
262 thorough analysis of the initial items and dimensions beyond what is typically produced by a
263 simple cognitive sorting task akin to traditional card sorting with definitions (Anderson &
264 Gerbing, 1991). Participants were also asked to comment on the clarity and complexity of the
265 questionnaire instructions and initial items. Finally, participants were asked to provide
266 additional examples of types of information they would classify under the eight target
267 information types. The results showed that 60% of participants indicated that survey items were
268 representative of the same themes of information sensitivity as those identified by the research
269 team, this falls below the acceptable agreement index of 75% (Hinkin, 1998). This was to be
270 expected as participants were not provided with the definitions. Therefore, another four
271 participants were recruited to conduct a simple card sorting task with definitions in which 100%
272 sorted them into their respective themes. Changes were made to the instructions and definitions
273 of the information types following the one-to-one sessions to improve the usability and
274 comprehensibility of the questionnaire.

275 **Stage 2: Principal Component Analysis.** To explore the factor structure of
276 information sensitivity appraisal, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was performed using
277 varimax with Kaiser normalization. The initial 22 items were entered into the analysis and
278 factor loadings lower than 0.30 were suppressed (see Table 1). The findings from the PCA
279 revealed that five factors (eigenvalues were above 1) could explain the data accounting for
280 79.73% of the variance. This complied with the minimum acceptable level of 60% variance
281 and recommendations of eigenvalues above one for factors (Hinkin, 1998). All items loaded
282 onto their designated factor above the accepted .40 criterion level. The four previously
283 identified qualitative themes of information sensitivity were used to label the proposed factors:
284 *the private nature of information, the potential consequences associated with information, the*
285 *value of information, and the perceived (third party) interest in information.* The fourth-theme
286 *“interest by others”* was considered relevant to two distinct factors. Factor four from the PCA
287 was assigned to those recipients of information that may be considered to be low proximity to
288 individuals (i.e. business competitors, criminals and fellow employees). Factor five, on the

289 other hand, was assigned to those recipients of information which are in high proximity to
 290 individuals (i.e. family and friends). The PCA also revealed five items that cross-loaded onto
 291 multiple factors and these were removed (see Table 1) as their values were above 0.4 (Hinkin,
 292 1998). “*I think <information type> is of interest to fellow employees*” was left in the analysis
 293 as the cross-loading was less than .40 on the second factor (Hinkin, 1998). Overall, the PCA
 294 revealed that five factors explained a large amount of the variance in the data and the items had
 295 strong factor loadings (above .40).

296

297 **Table 1.** Factor loadings for each item (factor loadings lower than .30 are suppressed)

Item	Rotation Factor Loadings				
	Factor 1: <i>Privacy</i>	Factor 2: <i>Worth</i>	Factor 3: <i>Consequences</i>	Factor 4: <i>Low proximity interest</i>	Factor 5: <i>High proximity interest</i>
“ <i>I think [information type] is...</i> ”					
• Confidential	.897				
• Private	.898				
• Secret	.850				
• Restricted	.761				
• Privileged	.656				
• Insignificant*		.834			
• Meaningless*		.895			
• Worthless*		.890			
• Embarrassing			.869		
• Compromising			.753		
• Discreditable			.656		
• Humiliating			.866		
• Of interest to my friends					.941
• Of interest to my family					.946
• Of interest to business competitors				.895	
• Of interest to criminals				.861	
• Of interest to fellow employees				.755	.360
Eigenvalues	4.89	3.37	2.72	1.52	1.06
Removed Factors					
• Sensitive	.723	.451			
• Valuable	.433	.733			
• Important	.553	.685			
• Exploitable		.359	.601	.359	
• Of interest to the general public				.670	.514

298 *Reversed scored

299


300 **Stage 3: Confirmatory factor analysis.** CFA was carried out on the data using AMOS
 301 (version 22) to explore the factor structure and estimate the degree to which the model was a
 302 good fit to the data. The five factors were presented as latent variables within AMOS and were

303 permitted to co-vary. The items for each factor were only allowed to load onto their respective
 304 factor. Covariance between error terms was only allowed where items were related to the same
 305 factor, pursuant to advice from modification indices within AMOS. The item “*privileged*” was
 306 removed as it shared too much covariance across factors, had the lowest factor loadings and
 307 was deemed non-specific within the privacy factor. Figure 3 shows the average standardised
 308 item loadings for the hypothesised model.

309

310 **Figure 3. WISA Appraisal Confirmatory Factor Analysis with average Item Loadings**

311



312

313

314 Maximum likelihood estimation methods were used and the input for each analysis was the
 315 covariance matrix of the items. The goodness-of-fit for the models was evaluated with the
 316 following absolute goodness-of-fit indices: 1) the X^2 goodness-of-fit statistic, 2) the Root Mean
 317 Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), 3) the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), and 4) the
 318 Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI). Non-significant X^2 values indicate that the
 319 hypothesised model fits the data and RMSEA values smaller than or equal to .08 are indicative
 320 of acceptable fit. However, values above 0.1 should lead to model rejection (Browne &
 321 Cudeck, 1992). GFI values greater than .95 are indicative of good fit and values greater than
 322 .90 are indicative of an acceptable fit (Marsh & Grayson, 1995). AGFI values of .90 are
 323 indicative of a good fit and values greater than .85 may be considered an acceptable fit (Hu,
 324 Bentler, & Hoyle, 1995). The final model indicated an acceptable level of fit for three of the
 325 four fit indices and this was evident across all eight information types (see Table 2). The fit

326 indices for GFI and AGFI were all above .9 and .85 and the RMSEA were all below .08. The
 327 chi-square indicated that the model was not a good fit to the data for all information types,
 328 however, chi-squared has been criticised for being too sensitive to large sample sizes,
 329 especially for samples over 200 (Hoe, 2008), as in the current study. The model had the best
 330 fit for intellectual property and the least best fit for financial information. However, it was an
 331 acceptable fit for all types. Therefore, the WISA appraisal was considered to be an acceptable
 332 model to explain the data.

333

334 **Table 2. Goodness-of-fit indices for WISA appraisal for eight target information types**

Information type	X ²	RMSEA	GFI	AGFI
Personal	x ² (92)=201.456, p<.001	.061	.926	.890
Health	x ² (92)=211.818, p<.001	.065	.921	.883
Lifestyle	x ² (92)=216.460, p<.001	.065	.928	.893
Financial	x ² (92)=252.166, p<.001	.073	.907	.862
Intellectual Property	x ² (92)=179.095, p<.001	.054	.939	.910
Day to Day	x ² (92)=170.270, p<.001	.051	.941	.913
Commercial	x ² (92)=223.679, p<.001	.066	.923	.887
HR	x ² (92)=189.792, p<.001	.057	.931	.898

335

336 **Stage 4: Internal Reliability.** The final WISA scale comprises of 16 items. The
 337 majority of WISA subscales across the eight information types demonstrated an acceptable
 338 alpha level normally deemed to be 0.70 or above (Hinkin, 1998; Kline, 2013). A small number
 339 of subscales fell short of this .70 level, however these items were still above the .65 level
 340 considered to be at the lower end of the acceptable level for new scales (Hair, Black, Babin,
 341 Anderson, & Tatham, 2006)(see supplement Table S3 for full reliability statistics for each
 342 WISA subscale across eight information types).

343

344 **Stage 5: Discriminant validity.** The findings revealed that three of the five aspects of
 345 the WISA scale were statistically unrelated to organisational citizenship behaviour, therefore,
 346 providing partial support for discriminant validity for the WISA scale. Correlations between
 347 WISA factors and organisational citizenship behaviour were all either low or statistically
 348 insignificant: Privacy ($r = .14, p < .05$), Worth ($r = .15, p < .05$), Consequences ($r = .02, p >$
 349 $.05$), High Proximity ($r = -.04, p > .05$), and Low Proximity ($r = .04, p > .05$). See supplement
 350 Tables S1-2 for descriptive statistics for organisational citizenship and security behaviour, and
 351 correlations between WISA components and OCB.

352

353 **Stage 6: Criterion-related validity.** Multiple regressions were performed to explore
 354 the predictive validity of the WISA scale in explaining security behaviour. The multiple
 355 regression model revealed that $r^2 = .089$, $F(5, 287) = 5.586$, $p < .001$ indicating that the WISA
 356 scale accounts for 8.9% of the variance in the composite measure of security behaviour. Three
 357 of the five WISA components (Worth, Consequences & Low proximity) were found to
 358 significantly contribute to the model (see Table 3). Further analyses were conducted to estimate
 359 the degree to which the WISA scale predicts individual security behaviours (discussed below,
 360 see Table 4). Overall, the WISA scale explains some of the variance in security behaviour,
 361 therefore, demonstrating reasonable criterion-related validity.

362

363 **Table 3. Tests of significance for the predicted variable of security behaviour from the**
 364 **predictors of the WISA appraisal**

Predictor variable	β	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	<i>p</i>
WISA Privacy	.100	1.454	.918	p=.114
WISA Worth	.143	2.562	1.138	p<.05*
WISA Consequences	-.125	-1.887	.906	p<.05*
WISA High Proximity	.075	-.729	.578	p=.208
WISA Low Proximity	.140	1.616	.692	p<.05*

365 *p<.05; **p<.01


366

367 ***Findings from the application of the WISA scale***

368 **Sensitivity appraisal differences by information type.** An eight (information type)
 369 by five (WISA appraisal) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to explore differences in
 370 ratings for the eight information types. There was a significant main effect of WISA appraisal
 371 on sensitivity ratings ($F(3.17, 994.48)=438.924$, $p<.001$) with Greenhouse-Geisser correction.
 372 Post-hoc analyses indicated that there was a significant difference in ratings between all WISA
 373 types. Worth had the highest ratings ($M=4.12$), followed by privacy ($M=3.94$), low proximity
 374 interest ($M=3.24$), consequences ($M=2.81$) and finally, high proximity interest ($M=2.35$).
 375 There was also a significant main effect of information type on rating ($F(5.73,$
 376 $1799.27)=92.435$, $p<.001$) with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. Post-hoc analyses indicated
 377 that financial information had the highest ratings ($M=3.49$), followed by health information
 378 ($M=3.48$), HR information ($M=3.44$), intellectual property ($M=3.34$), commercial information
 379 ($M=3.24$), personal information ($M=3.18$), day to day business information was second lowest
 380 for sensitivity ratings ($M=3.14$), and lifestyle information was the lowest for ratings ($M= 3.04$;
 381 see supplement, Table S5).

382 There was a significant interaction effect of information type and WISA appraisal on
383 ratings ($F(16.46, 5169.106)=110.43$. $p<.001$) with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. Figure 4
384 suggests that there appears to be a consistent trend in the order of the information types across
385 privacy, worth and consequences. This ordering appears to change for high and low proximity
386 interest, particularly for the information types of financial and HR for high proximity interest,
387 and commercial and day to day for low proximity interest. Financial, HR and health were the
388 three information types to be amongst the highest for privacy, worth and consequences
389 dimensions whereas commercial, day to day, and personal are amongst the lowest for these
390 three dimensions. Intellectual Property is amongst the highest for privacy and worth, and
391 lifestyle amongst the lowest. However, this observation reverses for the consequences
392 dimension. Intellectual property is considered to be highly private and has high worth but
393 consequences of its disclosure are not perceived as severe. Lifestyle information is not
394 perceived as highly private and having high worth, but it may have consequences if disclosed.
395 For perceived interest in information, intellectual property is the only information type to be
396 amongst the highest for high and low proximity interest. Health, lifestyle and personal
397 information were considered to be of interest to high proximity groups whereas commercial,
398 day to day and financial were perceived to be of interest to low proximity groups (see
399 supplement Figures S1-5 for mean sensitivity ratings for each WISA subscale by information
400 type).

401 **Figure 4. Line graph of ratings for each information type**



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Predicting specific security behaviours. The results from our sample found that employees reported engaging in some security behaviours more than others. For example, employees reported high adherence with not sharing passwords with others, and using trusted and secured connections when at work. However, employees reported low adherence with security behaviours such as scanning for available software updates, and running anti-virus and anti-spyware software at work (see supplement, Table S1, for descriptive statistics for individual security behaviours). Further analyses were conducted to estimate the degree to which the WISA scale predicts individual security behaviours. Table 4 shows that the WISA scale best predicts security behaviours relating to access control and physical security. Specifically, WISA scale scores predicted 11% of the variance in the reported use of complex passwords in the workplace and 10% of the variance of the perceived awareness of physical surroundings when online at work.

415 **Table 4. Regressions with specific security behaviours and the variance explained by**
 416 **WISA scale results**

Behaviour	Regression	Variance explained
• I use complex passwords at work	$r^2 = .106$, $F(5, 287) = 6.807$, $p < .01$.	10.6%
• I use different passwords for different work accounts	$r^2 = .056$, $F(5, 287) = 1.115$, $p < .01$.	5.6%
• I use trusted and secured connections, and devices (including Wi-Fi) when at work	$r^2 = .086$, $F(5, 286) = 5.361$, $p < .01$	8.6%
• I use trusted and secure websites and services at work and connect securely	$r^2 = .075$, $F(5, 287) = 4.670$, $p < .01$	7.5%
• I stay informed about security risks online and in the workplace	$r^2 = .050$, $F(5, 287) = 3.019$, $p < .05$	5%
• I avoid security risks online and in the workplace	$r^2 = .068$, $F(5, 286) = 4.198$, $p < .05$	6.8%
• I am aware of my physical surroundings when online at work	$r^2 = .099$, $F(5, 287) = 6.281$, $p < .01$	9.9%
• I adjust account settings on websites that I use at work	$r^2 = .040$, $F(5, 287) = 2.384$, $p < .05$	4%
• I lock my computer when I leave my workstation	$r^2 = .032$, $F(5, 287) = 1.897$, $p = .095$.	3.2%

417

418 **Discussion**

419 This article is an attempt to address the lack of scales measuring information sensitivity by
 420 returning to previous doctoral research: *Information Security in the Workplace: A Mixed-*
 421 *Methods Approach to Understanding and Improving Security Behaviours* (Blythe, 2015). We
 422 highlight the development and validation of a measure for information sensitivity to be used
 423 within a workplace setting. The resulting 16-item scale has five sub-scales: *privacy*, *worth*,
 424 *consequences*, *low proximity interest* and *high proximity interest*. The WISA scale, alongside
 425 its five subscales was found to have strong factorial validity which was confirmed across eight
 426 information types. The scale also had good criterion-related validity and was found to
 427 significantly predict security behaviour. Finally, the scale was found to have adequate
 428 discriminant validity as three of the five aspects of the WISA scale were found to be unrelated
 429 to organisational citizenship behaviour. This research sought to add further understanding to
 430 defining information sensitivity. The revised WISA structure was found to be a strong fit to the
 431 data for the eight target information types which suggests that this definition of information
 432 sensitivity provides a valuable contribution to the literature. This knowledge might be useful
 433 for how we conceptualise information sensitivity in further research and within government
 434 legislation such as the Data Protection Act (2018). Finally, scores for the WISA scale were

435 found to predict a range of specific security behaviours including password usage, secure Wi-
436 Fi usage, physical security and avoiding security risks. This demonstrates the potential role of
437 information sensitivity appraisal as a determinant of protective actions in the workplace. We
438 discuss our findings alongside early applications of the WISA scale in recent research.

439

440 *Information sensitivity differences by type*

441 Financial information was found to have the highest ratings for sensitivity followed by health
442 and HR. These aspects were also found to be the highest for three of the five sensitivity ratings:
443 privacy, worth and consequences. Previous qualitative findings have reported that employees
444 typically rate information about individuals to be more sensitive than organisational
445 information (Blythe, 2015). The findings from the application of the WISA scale support these
446 qualitative findings, however not all information types are considered sensitive. For example,
447 lifestyle information overall had the lowest ratings for sensitivity. This difference in
448 information sensitivity with regards to individuals' data supports previous research by Cranor
449 et al. (2000) which found that individuals were willing to disclose lifestyle information but not
450 willing to disclose financial information. Further research by Mothersbaugh et al. (2012) on
451 information disclosure found that sensitivity works along a continuum with demographic and
452 lifestyle factors being the information people are most willing to disclose and personal
453 identifiable and financial information as least willing to disclose. Our research supports this
454 literature, however, it adds a further level of understanding by exploring how individuals make
455 this appraisal of sensitivity by considering its perceived privacy, worth, consequences and
456 perceived interest by high and low proximity others and if it affects security behaviour.

457

458 The development of the WISA scale allows one of the first investigations of how individuals
459 appraise the sensitivity of organisationally-focused information. Previously, the findings by
460 Adams and Sasse (1999), highlighted that people rate some information about individuals as
461 more sensitive than organisational information. Information regarding health and financial data
462 is consistently viewed as sensitive across the dimensions of privacy, worth and consequences.
463 Likewise, HR information about individuals is also considered sensitive across these
464 dimensions. Personal and lifestyle information, whilst they refer to individuals' information
465 are not considered sensitive for privacy, worth and consequences. Commercial and day to day
466 organisationally-focussed information were consistently low for privacy, worth and
467 consequences. Intellectual property was the only information type that did not relate to
468 individuals but was highly rated for privacy, worth, high proximity and low proximity interest.

469 Intellectual Property was not highly rated for consequences and this was the same for other
470 organisational information. There are a number of possible reasons for this finding; firstly this
471 study defines consequences as humiliating, compromising, discreditable, and embarrassing,
472 which individuals may not associate with information that is not about people. This could
473 reflect the decline in sensitivity rating for consequences when comparing the two broad
474 information types of organisational-focussed and individual-focussed. A second potential
475 explanation could be that individuals lack awareness of consequences associated with
476 organisational information and, therefore, rate them lower. Our research confirms both the
477 findings from Adams and Sasse (1999), as well as previous qualitative research into factors
478 that influence security behaviours (Blythe, 2015), and show that employees do consider some
479 forms of organisational-focussed information to be sensitive i.e. intellectual property. This
480 suggests that a binary judgement is not sufficient for understanding how information sensitivity
481 is appraised and therefore recommends the use of the WISA scale to capture the five
482 components shown to reflect information sensitivity.

483

484 The main difference between individually-focussed information and organisational-focussed is
485 the perceived high or low proximity interest. High proximity and low proximity interest
486 revealed some interesting findings with regards to differences in the two broad information
487 types. Information about individuals (e.g. personal, health and lifestyle) was considered to be
488 of interest to employees' high proximity interest groups (i.e. family and friends) in comparison
489 to organisational-focussed information as well as financial and HR information. For low
490 proximity interest, the opposite effect is apparent with organisational-focussed information
491 (intellectual property, commercial and day to day) perceived to be of interest to low proximity
492 groups (i.e. criminals, fellow employees & business competitors). There is limited previous
493 research that looks at this form of sensitivity appraisal, the inclusion of which was driven by
494 previous qualitative findings which suggested that employees consider the audience (or
495 interest) in information that they work with and use this as a basis to evaluate the sensitivity of
496 the information (Blythe, 2015). The current study contributes novel findings that suggest that
497 future research may need to further explore perceived interest in information sensitivity
498 conceptualisations.

499

500 ***Information sensitivity predicts security behaviours***

501 The WISA scale was shown to significantly predict security behaviours, explaining
502 approximately 10% of the variance in the composite security behaviour measure. When

503 exploring the role of information sensitivity on individual security behaviours, the WISA scale
504 was found to explain between 8-10% of the variance for use of complex passwords, secure Wi-
505 Fi and awareness of physical surroundings when at work. This indicates that the WISA scale
506 may be more effective in accounting for some security behaviours in comparison to others, and
507 that further research may help to identify those behaviours most closely associated with
508 appraisals of information sensitivity. This is promising as it suggests that using the WISA scale
509 as a measure of information sensitivity may help to increase our understanding of the
510 determinants of multiple security behaviours.

511

512 The WISA scale has been further used to study factors that influence employee anti-malware
513 behaviours (Blythe & Coventry, 2018). An online cross-sectional survey of 526 employees was
514 used to identify factors that influence intentions to perform three anti-malware behaviours. The
515 consequences factor of the WISA scale was reported to predict unique variance in behaviour
516 and was a significant predictor of Anti-malware software behaviour (scanning USB sticks with
517 anti-malware software). This suggests that employees who have a greater perception that the
518 disclosure of the data they work with may lead to negative consequences (such as
519 compromising and discreditable) intend to scan USB sticks with anti-malware software to
520 protect the information. This was the first study to specifically explore the role of workplace
521 information sensitivity appraisal for a specific security threat and sub-set of behaviours. The
522 WISA scale has also been adapted to capture the perceived sensitivity of health and lifestyle
523 data in a study concerning the sharing of health data by 250 UK participants living with long-
524 term health conditions (Brown, Coventry, et al., 2022). The WISA scale was implemented as
525 part of broader efforts to understand patient perceptions and behaviours surrounding health and
526 lifestyle data (Brown, Sillence, et al., 2022; Simpson et al., 2021). Total WISA scale scores
527 were moderately associated with greater perceived risk, as well as increased concern for trust,
528 identity, privacy and security issues related to the sharing of health and lifestyle data. WISA
529 scale scores were also significantly higher among participants who reported having
530 experienced stigma as a result of their condition. Of the individual WISA factors, privacy was
531 negatively associated with overall willingness to share health and lifestyle data with others.
532 The consequences factor was strongly associated with overall perceived risk from sharing
533 health and lifestyle data with others. Finally, higher scores on the 'high proximity interest'
534 factor were associated with more frequent sharing of health data with others and greater overall
535 willingness to share. This study suggests that the WISA scale provides a useful measure for
536 capturing perceptions of information sensitivity relevant to self-generated health and lifestyle

537 data. Further validation of the scale will provide more evidence for its potential utility for use
538 within the workplace setting and beyond, and for future research focussing on information
539 sensitivity.

540

541 ***Limitations***

542 A limitation of the current study is that it is dependent on data and analysis from previous
543 doctoral research (Blythe, 2015) that did not sufficiently explore the influence of personal
544 characteristics on the appraisal of information sensitivity. It is possible that the gender
545 imbalance in our sample (87 males and 217 females) may have influenced our findings. Further
546 research may look to recruit population representative samples (as opposed to our use of
547 snowball sampling) in order to investigate the potential role that features such as age, gender
548 and additional personal characteristics may play in assessing the sensitivity of workplace
549 information.

550

551 Convergent validity could not be assessed. Convergent validity is important as it measures the
552 degree to which the current scale is correlated with scales that claim to measure the same
553 construct (i.e. information sensitivity) (Onwuegbuzie, Daniel, & Collins, 2009). Previous
554 research (Cranor et al., 2000; Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004) have used related measures of
555 information sensitivity. However, these were not considered adequate as they had not been
556 under validation assessment nor did they measure information sensitivity in the workplace or
557 were related to assessing information that is not about oneself. Furthermore, they measure the
558 information sensitivity of consumers' own information and there are potential ownership and
559 framing issues when used in comparison to the construct measured within the current study.
560 However, despite this limitation, the current study provides a solid basis for further scale
561 refinement and development for measuring information sensitivity within the workplace.

562

563 Finally, it is noted that the 'Worth' factor of the WISA scale consisted of the three items that
564 were reverse scored. It is possible that these items loaded onto the same factor due to their
565 scoring structure. Future iterations of the WISA scale may chose to not use reverse scoring
566 with respect to these three items to explore whether or not they still load onto the same 'Worth'
567 factor.

568

569 **Conclusion**

570 There is currently no consensus on defining information sensitivity within the security
571 literature. The WISA scale was developed in response to this gap in the literature and to present
572 a novel measure of information sensitivity (Blythe, 2015). The development and application of
573 the WISA scale is one of the first attempts to explore how individuals rate the sensitivity of
574 information in a workplace setting. Due to a growing need to understand the role that workplace
575 information appraisals have on security behaviours, this article sought to revisit the work of
576 Blythe (2015) to combine insights from previous literature and to identify the relevant
577 dimensions of perceptions of information sensitivity. The final information sensitivity structure
578 of the WISA scale was found to comprise of privacy, worth, consequences, high and low
579 proximity interest. This structure was found to be a strong fit to the data for the eight target
580 information types. This suggests that this theoretical account of information sensitivity is a
581 strong explanation of the data and provides a valuable step forward for understanding and
582 defining information sensitivity. The WISA scale was also shown to predict security
583 behaviours in the workplace and early findings have reported how individual dimensions of
584 the scale are predictive of specific employee security behaviours. This demonstrates the utility
585 of the WISA scale for understanding employee security behaviours and for defining
586 information sensitivity. Further research may look to apply the WISA scale to a broader range
587 of security behaviours to develop our understanding and definition of information sensitivity
588 in a security context.

589

590 **Declarations**

591 ***Conflicting interests:*** The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest.

592 ***Funding:*** This work is funded by the EPSRC, grant number EP/R 033900/1.

593 ***Data availability statement:*** The data associated with this article are no longer available due
594 to the data storage requirements of the ethical approval for the study.

595 ***Ethical approval:*** This study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics
596 Committee at Northumbria University.

597 ***Guarantors:*** JB, RB and LC shall act as guarantors, taking responsibility for the contents of
598 this article.

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
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720 Figure S1. Mean privacy ratings by information type




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
723

724 Figure S2. Mean worth ratings by information type



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
726 **Figure S3. Mean consequences ratings by information type**



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
729 **Figure S4. Mean high proximity interest ratings by information type**



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Figure S5. Mean low proximity interest ratings by information type

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Table S1. Descriptive statistics for OCB and security behaviour

Factor	Mean (& SD)	Number
OCB – total	35.6 (9.2)	310
Security behaviour – Total	54.9 (11.1)	293
I share passwords with other people at work*	4.5 (.8)	292
I use trusted and secured connections, and devices (including Wi-Fi) when at work	4.1 (1.1)	292
I log out of websites when I finish at work	4.0 (1.3)	293
I use trusted and secure websites and services at work and connect securely	4.0 (1.1)	293
I am aware of my physical surroundings when online at work	4.0 (1.0)	293
I lock my computer when I leave my workstation	3.9 (1.3)	293
I avoid security risks online and in the workplace	3.9 (1.2)	292
I use complex passwords at work	3.6 (1.2)	293
I use different passwords for different work accounts	3.4 (1.4)	293
I stay informed about security risks online and in the workplace	3.4 (1.2)	293
I ensure I run the latest and official version of software (including operating system) at work	3.2 (1.4)	293
I report suspicious or criminal activities in the workplace	3.2 (1.4)	290
I personally back up data on my workplace devices	2.8 (1.5)	293
I adjust account settings on websites that I use at work	2.5 (1.3)	293
I personally run the security software including anti-virus, anti-spyware and firewalls at work	2.2 (1.4)	293
I personally scan work devices for available software updates and install them at work	2.1 (1.3)	292

737

*Reversed scored

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Table S2. Correlations between WISA components and OCB (n=284)

Predictor variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. WISA Privacy	-					
2. WISA Worth	.361**					
3. WISA Consequences	.209**	-.098				
4. WISA High Proximity	.032	-.041	.159**			
5. WISA Low Proximity	.071	.239**	.045	.193**		
6. OCB	.137*	.149*	.021	-.039	.043	-

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Table S3. Reliability statistics for WISA total & subscales across eight information types

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Information type	Factor	No. of items	R (α =)	Number
Personal	WISA Privacy	4	.85	326
	WISA Worth	3	.75	326
	WISA Consequences	4	.69	326
	WISA High Proximity Interest	2	.98	320
	WISA Low Proximity Interest	3	.65	319
Health	WISA Privacy	4	.83	326
	WISA Worth	3	.78	326
	WISA Consequences	4	.76	326
	WISA High Proximity Interest	2	.96	319
	WISA Low Proximity Interest	3	.75	315
Lifestyle	WISA Privacy	4	.88	326
	WISA Worth	3	.80	326
	WISA Consequences	4	.77	326
	WISA High Proximity Interest	2	.98	318
	WISA Low Proximity Interest	3	.67	315
Financial	WISA Privacy	4	.76	326
	WISA Worth	3	.81	326
	WISA Consequences	4	.70	326
	WISA High Proximity Interest	2	.92	313
	WISA Low Proximity Interest	3	.76	314
Intellectual Property	WISA Privacy	4	.89	326
	WISA Worth	3	.82	326
	WISA Consequences	4	.68	326
	WISA High Proximity Interest	2	.94	316

Day to day	WISA Low Proximity Interest	3	.79	313
	WISA Privacy	4	.88	326
	WISA Worth	3	.86	326
	WISA Consequences	4	.67	326
	WISA High Proximity Interest	2	.96	314
Commercial	WISA Low Proximity Interest	3	.66	312
	WISA Privacy	4	.90	326
	WISA Worth	3	.84	326
	WISA Consequences	4	.63	326
	WISA High Proximity Interest	2	.96	314
HR	WISA Low Proximity Interest	3	.67	308
	WISA Privacy	4	.86	326
	WISA Worth	3	.82	326
	WISA Consequences	4	.77	326
	WISA High Proximity Interest	2	.93	314
	WISA Low Proximity Interest	3	.74	313

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745 **Table S4. Mean differences for ratings for all aspects of the WISA appraisal and p**
746 **values resulting from Bonferroni corrected repeated measures t-tests**

	1	2	3	4	5
1 - WISA Privacy	-	-0.179**	1.131**	1.585**	.696**
2 - WISA Worth			1.310**	1.585**	.875**
3 - WISA Consequences				.454***	-.436**
4 - WISA High Proximity Interest					-.889***
5 - WISA Low Proximity Interest					

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748 **Table S5. Mean differences for ratings for all information types resulting from**
749 **Bonferroni corrected repeated measures t-tests**

	Personal	Health	Lifestyle	Financial	Intellectual Property	Day to day business	Commercial	HR
Personal	-	2.96**	.139**	-.309**	-.155**	.045	-.057	-.255**
Health		-	.435**	-.013	.141**	.341**	.239**	.041
Lifestyle			-	-.448**	-.293**	-.094*	-.196**	.394**
Financial				-	.155**	.354**	.252**	.054
Intellectual Property					-	.199**	.098**	-.101*
Day to day business						-	-.102*	-.300*
Commercial							-	-.300*
HR								-

750 *p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<.001

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