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***Racist Violence in a Northern English
City: Experiences of Victimisation and
the Police Response***

Steven Kirby

Doctor of Philosophy

2021

***Racist Violence in a Northern English
City: Experiences of Victimisation and
the Police Response***

Steven Kirby

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Northumbria at Newcastle.

Department of Arts, Design and Social
Sciences

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Abstract

This is a qualitative study into the experiences of racist violence and the policing response in Newcastle upon Tyne. It has been conducted by an operational Police Sergeant in Northumbria Police.

The key objectives were to explore the nature, extent, and impact of racist violence; understand the needs and expectations of victims; examine and evaluate policing interventions; and make recommendations towards meeting victim's needs.

56 interviews and focus groups were conducted with victims of racist crime; partner agencies; and police officers, in 2008 and 2020.

The research found that racist violence was a part of daily life for some black, Asian and minority ethnic communities in Newcastle upon Tyne. Participants suffered harmful emotional responses to attacks. Victims reported that policing responses failed to meet their needs, leaving them feeling ignored, unprotected and sometimes, more victimised. Police officer participants in 2008 identified institutional pressures, a low relevance of racist incidents, lack of empathy and understanding, and fear of making mistakes led to poor policing interventions. The impact of austerity from 2009, resulted in loss of resources, but participants felt policing responses to racist violence were better by 2020, with more focus on vulnerability and harm reduction. Interestingly, victims did not articulate any reflection of those improvements in the second period.

The study argues that police officers could develop empathy with victims which would lead to a more appropriate, professional, and needs-led response. That would improve trust, confidence, and legitimacy. It concurs with contemporary literature that describes the harmful impact of racist violence on victims. Also, that despite decades of policy intended to improve policing responses and evidenced attitudinal shift in police officers of all ranks, significant gaps remain.

Four proposals for policy are made, that translate the findings of this research into evidence-based actionable response options for contemporary policing.

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Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges opinions, ideas, and contributions from the work of others.

Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this commentary has been approved. Approval has been sought and granted through the Researcher's submission to Northumbria University's Ethics Online System on 14.01.2020.

I declare that the word count of this thesis is 83911 words.

Name: Steven Kirby

Date: 30th November 2021

Chapter 1, Introduction

1.00 Background to the research

In 2003, I had been a police officer for 5 years, working in an operational and neighbourhood capacity in Northumbria Police. Around this time, the organisation began to roll-out compulsory diversity training to all police officers. The term 'compulsory training' always struck me as an awful way to get anyone interested in that training, however it was the police and that was management culture language. For me, diversity training sounded interesting, even if it was 'compulsory.' Training was delivered face to face, using an external agency, Ionan Management Consultants, contracted by the Home Office (Rowe and Garland, 2003a) to support police trainers in facilitative style sessions over two days. As the first delegates returned from their training, their cynicism and warnings were intriguing. Rumours of individuals and the organisation being accused of racist attitudes and behaviours were commonplace, causing many to have serious anxieties about attending it. Though I did not know it at the time, these were the findings of Rowe and Garland in their study into Community and Race Relations Training for police in England and Wales (*ibid.*, p.403). Inevitably some of my peer's anxieties infected me, but just an hour into my training, that anxiety had gone. It had been replaced by a fascination with the attitudes and behaviours of my colleagues, and the skilful facilitative style of the trainers. The trainers used examples from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry to get learners into the affective learning domain, where their attitudes about race and racism could be explored and developed. But the anger and resentment displayed by many officers toward the trainers, and towards the notion that the investigation of Stephen Lawrence's murder had failed due to institutional racism, was not what I expected. I wanted to know what was driving those emotions and behaviours, which I felt were serious blocks to individual and organisational learning, at least for the subject being taught. This made me want to study diversity and to teach it in the police service.

Shortly after this course, I was able to take a 'Diversity Trainers Course' and began to deliver the training myself. I was promoted out of training and into the Community Engagement Department in 2005, as a Sergeant. That post meant

working with statutory and third sector organisations with a predominant focus on race relations, policing racist incidents, and community tension monitoring. It provided a solid professional base to explore 'diversity' to doctoral level. A telephone call to Peter Francis at the University of Northumbria, and I was on my way to defining a thesis around policing and diversity. Reading, professional engagement with the current issues in policing racist violence, and further discussion with Peter Francis, led to the formulation of the broad research focus, and what is now the short thesis title:

'Racist Violence in a Northern English City: Experiences of Victimisation and the Police Response.'

This is a qualitative study that gives voice and priority to the victim experience. As such, it follows the principles of grounded theory (Harding, 2019). Qualitative semi-structured interviews were the primary source of research data, in order to capture the lived experiences of victims and the professional experience of participants from police and partner agencies

I started this research in 2005 and conducted sufficient fieldwork to complete the thesis. However, personal circumstances and shift working led to a suspension of the study between 2009 and 2019. I re-commenced it in October 2019 and conducted a second period of fieldwork in 2020, to bring it up to date. Other than efforts to track down and conduct second interviews with some of the original victim-participants, the methodological approach remained consistent with the first period of study. This second round of interviews significantly added to the richness of the data and research findings. Conducting it across such a period of time, meant that the study was able to capture the impact on racist violence of events such as the EU Referendum; Brexit; COVID-19 (Clements, 2021); and the effects of austerity. It also provided an opportunity to examine how the attitudes, behaviours, policies and procedures of police and partner agencies had developed over that time with the revised legislation and improved responses (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). This required slight revisions to the original research objectives, in order to capture changes over the period between 2005 and 2020.

Newcastle upon Tyne is chosen for this research, providing a new geographical context for such a study. It is chosen because it has a history of racist violence (Flug and Hussein, 2019, Council, 1990), of changing community dynamics, socio-economic challenges and is policed by one of the top performing national forces, Northumbria Police. Partnership working in Newcastle, under the Safe Newcastle Partnership, has seen significant change over the period of this study. In 2008, Agencies against Racist Crime and Harassment (ARCH) was the partnership established to manage and coordinate agency responses to incidents of racist violence (Clayton et al., 2016). It incorporated a third-party reporting system and a case management system. Austerity brought resource cuts, leading to the discontinuance of ARCH in Newcastle. However, the changing economic and political landscape led to the formation of a broader partnership arrangement under the Hate Crime and Community Tension Monitoring Group (HCCTMG). Change is still happening. Northumbria Police changed their operating model in 2020, resulting in 60% of hate crime being dealt with by telephone, and COVID continues to change how people live. Nationally, claims for asylum in the UK are at their highest in 20 years (BBCNews, 2021), which will impact on the demographic of social housing estates in Newcastle, as the dispersal of Central African asylum seekers did in the first few years of the millennium.

The Northeast is also the region where I have lived most of my life, and Northumbria Police service is where I have worked for 25 years. Consequently, I have extensive experience of the organisation, and from previous roles, working experience of policing partnerships. This creates opportunities to bring together research data, literature, and my own observations as an insider-researcher.

1.10 Policing racist violence, in context

Incidents of racist violence are the most horrific manifestation of racism. They have a devastating impact on the immediate victim, and can have a pervasive, harmful impact on the wellbeing of families and communities (Chahal, 1999c, Walters et al., 2020, Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). For many, they have been a part of everyday life to the present day (Dafyd, 2021) . Without an appropriate policing response to racist violence, communities feel at risk, unsupported and

ignored (Hesse and Waltham, 1992). Lack of robust enforcement, emboldens offenders to continue in their ways, further perpetuating the problem (EUMC, 2005).

At the turn of the century, racist violence in the UK and In Europe was not considered any different to ordinary crime. In the last twenty years, this has changed. Policy has responded to growing political and public attention and racist violence is increasingly recognised as morally outrageous (Bleich, 2007). The developing mission and prioritisation of policing around themes of vulnerability, safeguarding and problem solving, set new frameworks of policy response, effectively provoking more efficient and innovative approaches to counteract the impact of austerity (Hobbs, 2020). This post-austerity era brings the national recruitment target of 20,000 new police constables in England and Wales to restore the establishment to its 2009 high (Kim, 2020). There is an opportunity to make a significant impact on policing generally, and support the policing of racist incidents, but only if interventions are effective.

The first firm evidence that ethnic minorities were more at risk of victimisation in the United Kingdom, relative to their white counterparts came from the 1988 British Crime Survey which included a large enough sample of black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) people to compare their experiences with white people (Mayhew et al., 1989). The immediate experience of racist violence and offending can have a very acute impact upon the victim even when considered as isolated incidents. Victims are being targeted because of their personal identity. Racist crimes can be committed randomly, in locations such as restaurants, shops, public spaces or commonly by neighbours in and around the home. They may be committed by unknown people, thugs, active racists, even family members (Iganski, 2008). Chahal and Julienne found that victims experience an impact on all aspects of their lives; reporting is only an option when harassment becomes intolerable; there is a lack of support for victims; that family and friends stopped visiting when the problems became known; as a result of limited support, families take action to make themselves harder targets in order to live a normal life; and all members of the targeted family are affected, impacting on how they engage with the wider community and environment (Chahal, 1999). This deeper impact and adaptation

of lives to cope is also discussed by (Virdee and Policy Studies, 1995). Moving forwards in time, current literature continues to identify hate crime generally as *“one of the biggest global challenges of our time and blights the lives of millions of people across the world.”* (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, p. 3). It is essential to consider the cumulative effect that multiple victimisations may have, and the indirect victimisation effects of belonging to the same family or community as the victim. Authors such as Bowling and Hall provide valuable commentary on how the issues of hate crime should be considered by policing agencies, noting that unless there is an identifiable trend of racist incidents in a specific area, or against an individual, policing responses tend to deal with incidents in isolation (Bowling, 1998, Hall, 2005). They suggest that crime in general, and racist hate crime in particular should be seen as an ongoing process: The experience of racist victimisation is not a series of unconnected incidents which spontaneously begin then end, it should be seen as dynamic and continuous. Incidents have a cumulative effect on victims, resulting in the perception of continuity between what may one day be insults, the next threats, damage, or assault. The harm of such experience will have a disproportionate impact on the victim and their community (Hall, 2005). Chakraborti’s recent studies highlight additionally, that the harms of racist violence and hate crime more generally, demand criticality of approach in recognising and understanding how some communities are more acutely impacted than others and are often disproportionately less visible (Chakraborti, 2015b, Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). This would have been particularly evident in Chakraborti’s scholarly work in the broad domain of communities harmed by hate crime, but true also in the narrower range of communities impacted by racist violence.

Whilst the harm of racist violence has resulted in policing responses being mainstreamed into government policy, prioritising responses across organisations and nations, there remains much that we do not know. The following section summarises how this study is located within the context of contemporary government and policing policy; tracks the emergence of racial victimisation on the political agenda; examines the harm of racist incidents in terms of the impact of racist victimisation on victims, their families, and the community; identifies how

police and partner agencies have responded to racist incidents; and links the study to theory of policing racism and policing racist violence.

Following the racialised disorders in the northern towns in 2001, it was identified that whilst the primary cause was segregation of communities said to be living 'parallel lives,' two of the contributing factors to the breakdown in cohesion were racist victimisation and inappropriate policing of minority ethnic communities (Cantle, 2005). The Government responded by increasing policy focus on community cohesion (Bourne, 2007). Clearly, a greater knowledge and understanding of racist incidents, the harm they cause, and the policing response is necessary to achieve more cohesive neighbourhoods.

Police, housing providers, local authorities, other voluntary and statutory agencies that have a duty to provide a service to the victims of racist incidents in England and Wales have produced a number of good practice guides detailing how they should respond. However, as Chahal and Julienne note, very few of these guides consider in any depth, the harm that such experiences have on the victim (Chahal, 1999b). Goldberg states that whilst many BAME people experience racism, much of the research conducted falls short of providing descriptions of the impact it has on them (Goldberg, 1992). Evidence based policy and practice requires evidence, and without an understanding of the victims' needs, it is unclear how the most appropriate agency response may be provided. This study will address the shortage of literature by exploring in detail, the qualitative harm that racist incidents have upon victims, and what their needs are as a result of their impact, thus connecting victimisation to victim needs, and the policing response. As Chahal & Julienne, and Webster argue, most existing research in this context, such as the British Crime Surveys, tend to provide quantitative data (Chahal, 1999c, Webster, 2007). This can present a limited insight into the lived experience and tends to hide the processes of racist victimisation (Webster, 2007, Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). Chahal and Julienne's report, whilst giving valuable evidence of impact, did not consider the victim's perception of the policing response. More recent studies begin to consider the disproportionately higher harm of crimes that are aggravated by hate, on victim's emotional and physical wellbeing (Vedeler et al., 2019). This study builds upon their work by identifying the harms caused by

racist incidents in Newcastle; bringing it up to date; and producing findings which are a product of the integration of local service provision with respect to the variables of harm and racisms.

There is a large amount of literature that, over the last 3 decades, reports the policing response to violent racism to be inappropriate (Bowling, 1999), responses *'which undermine their credibility and effectiveness in the eyes of victims.'* (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, p. 161). Only the very recent literature begins to consider the policing response from the victim's perspective, hence the majority fails to examine, and evaluate the service from the experience of those who need a resolution the most. Clearly then, this limited approach would not identify what nature of response victims might hope for or even expect. In earlier studies it was indicated that the police did not do enough to deal with racist crime and the treatment of the victim was often poor (Imbert, 1987). Hesse identifies the following factors as significant failures in policing: police objectives do not address the needs of victims of racist incidents; police and local authorities do not respond to reports of racial harassment; agencies taking reports of racist incidents fail to accept the racist element; action is rarely taken against perpetrators, and if any is taken, it is usually ineffective (Hesse and Waltham, 1992). Even in the latter period of this study, victims, academics and policy makers still found responses to be ineffective (Walters and Brown, 2016, Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). Maynard and Read found, through interviewing police officers who had dealt with racist crime and incidents, that there was a lack of clarity about what should or should not be recorded as a racist crime. They combined quantitative and qualitative methodologies, identifying that there is a large amount of variation across police forces in the way racist incidents are recorded (Maynard and Read, 1997). Critical comment about policing is commonplace, often poorly evidenced and fails to consider other operational pressures that impact upon the service provision. But, such criticism has changed since the landscape of the 1990s and 2000s. There is still criticism, there are still frequent examples of ineffectiveness in policing racist violence and examples of racist police officer behaviours. Since the Macpherson Report mentioned earlier, (Foster et al., 2005b, Docking, 2005) identify the improvements that have been made relate to: the recording, monitoring and responses to hate crime; consultation with local communities; and elimination of

racist language from the police service. Hardy and Chakraborti identify that mainstreaming the term 'hate crime' within academic literature and policy has '*acted as a catalyst for improved awareness, understanding and responses*' (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, p. 3), meaning the victim experience may well have changed, even improved. At a tactical level, third party reporting of hate crime (Clayton et al., 2016), the use of specialist hate crime officers, community link workers, and compulsory re-visits to victims of racist incidents, have been considered positive developments. At an operational support level, an increase in the use of inter-agency working to deal with racist crime in a problem-solving context was reported as a success, as were the use of independent advisory groups to provide experience and expertise in local policing issues.

The thematic focus of this policy-based literature tends not to connect with the experiences of victims. Policing response, being policy-driven and performance managed, tends to be on short-term high profile initiatives where empirical results can be visibly demonstrated (Bhavnani et al., 2005). Such approaches are informed by cumulative surface knowledge rather than deeper understanding, and therefore the underlying causes of racist victimisation are not tackled, leaving the problem unsolved. The theories and explanations of racism in society are well documented and will be covered in the following sections in terms of their relevance to this study, but the policing interventions to tackle racist incidents are not (Banton, 1987, Bulmer and Solomos, 1999). Bhavnani considers that this lack of evaluation of policing response makes it difficult to identify whether they have been successful (Bhavnani, 2005). This study critically examines the strength of the negative comment regarding policing intervention as they appear in the major academic and thematic studies, evaluating the evidence upon which criticisms are made.

The term 'policing' is used to describe not only the interventions provided by the Police Service, but includes a broad range of policing functions, such as those provided by Tenancy Enforcement Officers from housing companies, Newcastle City Council, and community wardens. In many respects, the Local Authority is the agency best placed for developing the most comprehensive strategic impact upon racist harassment, provided the police are able to provide the front-line role

effectively (Hesse, 1992). For partnership responses to racist incidents to be appropriate to the circumstances, then the nature and theory of hate crime needs to be better understood. The development and value of partnership working with respect to racist violence is a key theme in this study. It was not until 1981 that it was described as a '*first and essential constructive step*' in tackling racist violence (Home-Office, 1981, in Bowling, 1998, p. 78). Bowling suggests that following the formation of police community relations units in the 1960s, set up to address the problems perceived to be presented by the presence of ethnic minorities, successful multi-agency initiatives were established (Bowling, 1998). The principle of police collaborating with the local authority and other agencies dovetailed neatly with the recommendations of the Scarman report (Scarman, 1982). Sampson proposed two models of agency cooperation with the police as: '*the conspirational model*', where the police motivate other agencies, often including the community, to pursue police-defined objectives; and the '*benevolent approach*' whereby appropriate managers from partner agencies and influential community leaders would be extracted from their respective organisations and brought together in response to crisis situations (Sampson et al., 1988, p. 481). Bowling comments that the most telling of police arguments for the multi-agency approach would be to allow others to create the social environment that would reduce the risk of racist violence, hence reducing the dependence upon policing interventions (Bowling, 1998). This study examines how the evolution of neighbourhood policing in Newcastle has impacted on the success of multi-agency working. Flannigan argues that true neighbourhood policing extends beyond the existence of partnership working to solve issues of crime and disorder, to a more mainstreamed culture of joint working (Flanagan, 2008).

The two-stage nature of this study has also allowed the impact of recent significant trigger events such as Brexit and the upturn in online racist hate crime (Awan and Zempi, 2017) to be discussed, albeit none of the victim-participants expressed any experience of the latter. It also allows the thesis to engage with the broader impacts of the Black Lives Matter movement (Wright et al., 2022) and contemporary issues of trust in policing (Ali et al., 2022, Jung et al., 2019, Murphy et al., 2021).

1.20 Aim, objectives, and fieldwork

The full research question this study answers is:

‘What is the impact of racist crime and incidents on victims, their families and communities, and how does the service provided by Northumbria Police and partner agencies address their needs and expectations.’

As the study was conducted in two distinct time periods, the original objectives were revised. This was because, rather than simply bringing the study up to date with some recent participant perspectives, I wanted to explore what changes had taken place within the policing organisations and how those changes were experienced by both practitioners and victims. The objectives below are the revised version, generated in 2019 ahead of the second round of fieldwork:

- i. To examine and qualify the nature, extent and impact of racist crime and incidents, on victims, their families, and their community and what if any changes are evident since 2009.
- ii. To identify the needs of the victims, families, and communities in response to their experiences.
- iii. To examine and evaluate the current and developing response options delivered by Northumbria Police and partner agencies and assess how this has changed since 2009.
- iv. To advise and inform the police and partners in aligning their response to racist crime and incidents to match the needs of the victims, their family and community.

The original objectives are shown in the methodology chapter, which describes in detail, how they changed from the originals set in 2005. Objectives (i) and (iii) were revised. Objective (i) additionally explores any changes to the experience and impact of racist violence. Objective (iii) changed to capture organisational changes, perceptions of the practitioners, and any shift in attitudes towards policing racist violence.

1.21 Methodology

The study follows a qualitative methodology, to gain an in-depth understanding of the victim-participant's lived experiences (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, Chakraborti and Garland, 2013) of racist violence, their experiences of policing responses, and the perspectives of those providing the service. It took a grounded approach, ensuring that the study and literature review are built around the victim experience as portrayed by the victim-participants, rather than being led by theory or by my expectations as a police officer. The fieldwork was conducted in Newcastle upon Tyne, as a geographical case study area. The literature review was conducted alongside the fieldwork, as themes began to emerge. The literature review was brought up to date in 2020, to ensure that theory and the research data could be brought together in the discussion chapter, allowing the contribution to knowledge to have currency and clarity.

1.22 Fieldwork undertaken

A total of 56 semi-structured qualitative interviews and focus groups were conducted over the two periods. Of those, 28 were with victims of racist violence; 3 with community leaders; 19 were with police officers ranging from Chief Superintendent to Police Community Support Officer; and 6 with partner agency representatives. Most of the interviews were conducted face to face and audio recorded. Due to COVID, a small number had to be conducted by Skype and by telephone in 2020, to follow the guidance issued by Northumbria University, in line with Government advice. I transcribed all interviews and coded them to generate the key themes and learning.

1.30 Key findings of the study

The experience of racist violence in Newcastle was wide ranging and harmful in both 2008 and 2020. Victim-participants spoke about a range of incidents from verbal racist abuse and threats to a racist murder that happened in Newcastle's West End in 1992. They also evidenced how the political climate impacted on the nature and frequency of incidents, citing 9/11 as a life changing event for Muslims.

Police-participants commented on the spikes in racist violence caused by Brexit and COVID-19. The impact of incidents were felt by the victim, but also by their families and the community. Victim-participants felt that police and partner agencies consistently failed to meet their needs in delivering interventions. They had a lack of trust and confidence in policing, caused by slow responses to calls for help, inaction at the scene, failure to listen and engage with the victim's experience, minimising their account, and not providing feedback or updates on any action taken. Some felt targeted by police and that some police officers were racist.

It was apparent that in the first period of the study, racist violence was not a priority for many operational police officers. But that was at odds with policy and procedure, which sought to increase trust and confidence in policing among minority communities. Some officers expressed resentment about having to provide a service that they felt was enhanced over what a white European victim would experience. Police officers felt anxiety about dealing with racist violence, anticipating additional scrutiny of their intervention, being under-skilled in dealing with it, and the risk of getting a complaint that implied racism or incompetence. White European police officers had little empathy with BAME victims of racist violence and were unable to fully engage with the victim or their experience. In the robust performance culture of the first period of study, police officers wanted quick and easy wins, and they came from straightforward jobs where detections were likely outcomes. To the operational police officer, racist violence was anything but straightforward. Participants felt that policy demanded they spend more time with victims, but the victims were unlikely to support a prosecution. That meant there was no tangible performance indicator, hence the job was pushed down the scale of operational relevance (Bowling, 1998).

These themes, distilled from responses by police-participants in the first period of the study correlate with the themes victims felt were failures in policing responses and interventions. They also contributed to the issue of under-reporting and under-recording of racist violence. Under-reporting, because victims could not see any point in reporting incidents to the police as their collective experience was not positive. Under-recording because police applied their common-sense operational

police practice and autonomy in interpreting the nature of the incident into police terms. Their assessment of what needed to be done, was then based on that assessment, viewed through their lens of capability, capacity, and relevance. They were responding to, and recording incidents they did not fully understand, did not have the time to deal with, and felt may end up as a performance or misconduct issue.

The second period of police interviews portrayed transformation in the operational police attitudes towards policing racist violence. The performance culture had gone, and through national strategies, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) inspection results, and austerity, focus had shifted to protecting the most vulnerable and fighting crime. Neighbourhood officers were forthcoming in explaining that victims of racist violence were vulnerable and racist incidents were unacceptable. For neighbourhood policing teams, the incorporation of harm reduction plans and safeguarding practice in partnership with partner agencies was normal daily business. Police leaders explained that austerity had reduced resources, but the focus on vulnerability meant racist violence was more of a priority for police and partner agencies. They felt that the service provided to victims had improved as a result, though there was concern that under the new force operating model, 60% of hate crime was dealt with by telephone.

Council and police leaders shared the view that the services they were providing to victims of racist violence had improved, despite austerity. They felt their resources were more effectively and efficiently focused, tackling the issues that really mattered. But these improvements were felt more keenly by police and partners, than the victim-participants. The victim-participants, as findings chapter 2 identifies, felt that in 2020, policing responses and interventions were still problematic, as does contemporary literature in this domain (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). The discussion chapter elaborates on this gap in perception between the improvements in services that police and partners articulated they had made, and how the victim experience remained largely unchanged. This was a significant finding of the study and offers a contribution to knowledge only made possible by the two-stage approach to data collection.

My post in Northumbria Police, as an insider-researcher has allowed me to take an appreciative stance on the policing service. This has provided insights that differ from the majority of academic literature in the context. The two-stage nature of the study is unusual. It has provided evidence to support the arguments about the impact of the political climate on the nature and extent of racist violence and allowed the research to track changes in service provision. It is also unusual for a study to explore both the service user and the service providers in parallel. This too, allowed for better correlations to be drawn between the victim experience of policing and how policing agencies perceived and delivered the service. This kind of study has not been conducted in a Northeast city before, hence it broadens the national understanding of the phenomenon, and offers a better local understanding for service providers.

1.40 Structure of the thesis

There are 9 chapters in this thesis. Chapter 1, this introduction, provides background on myself and why I decided to conduct doctoral research into policing racist violence. It then outlines the case for such a study, how it fits into the national context, and defines the objectives by which the study sets out to contribute to knowledge in this field.

Chapters 2 and 3 are the literature review. Chapter 2 explores the literature on the measures, nature, extent, and impact of racist violence. It outlines the conceptual framework of the thesis and contextualises it within the current and developing political landscape. This is the theoretical angle on objectives 1 and 2 of the study, the victim experience and impact of violence. Chapter 3 is a review of the literature on policing racist violence. It looks back in time at how police race relations developed and the eventual recognition of racist violence as a political concern. It considers the impact of Scarman and Macpherson and how police and partners have responded to that in terms of policy and practice. This addresses objective 3, policing responses.

Chapter 4 is the methodology. It describes the qualitative approach to the study, adds further background and support to the two-stage nature. It outlines the ontological and epistemological standpoints, that give primacy to the experiences and accounts of the victim-participants. It describes the objectives of the study, how the research was conducted, how themes were generated from the interviews and what the key findings were.

Chapter 5, the research site, describes the case study area of Newcastle upon Tyne. It details its socio-economic background and gives a sense of place to the study. It also outlines what policing partnerships existed in the context of policing racist violence and how the police service has changed over the study period, hence addressing part of objective 3. This allows others to draw comparisons between the findings of this research and how they could apply in other areas.

Chapters 6 and 7 are the research findings. They are the outcome of repeated reading and coding of participant transcripts, presenting direct quotations and themes that emerge from them. Chapter 6 is the victim's experiences of racist violence in Newcastle, the harm it has caused them, and their experiences of the policing responses received. Chapter 7 explores the extent of victim focused policing interventions, and police-participant's attitudes towards it. It then presents the challenges that police felt they faced in delivering the kind of response policy and victims required. It ends by providing participant insights into the partnerships that operated through the period of study and how they provided support to victims.

Chapter 8 is the discussion chapter. It brings together the empirical findings of the study with the literature to derive and articulate how the study has contributed to the existing corpus of knowledge in this field. It also outlines the strength of arguments and the limitations of the study. These findings are set against the objectives of the study, to show the extent to which they have been met.

Chapter 9 is the conclusion. It summarises the research and describes how the research question and objectives have been met. It then reiterates the key contributions the findings of the study have made. It ends by outlining how the

findings identify opportunities for further research in the contemporary context of policing racist violence.

Chapter 2: Literature Review (a), Racist Violence

2.00 Introduction

Policing and racist violence are dynamic concepts that engage with sociological, criminological, and legal theoretical frameworks concerning race; racism; violence; policing; and the racialisation of policing. It is broadly recognised that racist incidents happen on the streets, in schools, workplaces, and many other contexts, emerging, escalating and mutating with political, economic, and historic social influences, see (Perry, 2005, Gover et al., 2020).

The organisations responsible for policing race and racism, have undergone significant change in the last few decades, evolving and transforming through similar influences, and landmark enquiries into policing race and racism, namely Scarman (Scarman, 1982) and MacPherson (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999) see (Rowe, 2013, Lentin, 2018, Hall et al., 2009). The two literature review chapters critically examine the literature on racist violence; and how it is policed. They highlight what is known on the subject, what the key arguments are, the gaps in knowledge and create a landscape against which the findings of this study can be discussed. The two literature review chapters are (a) racist violence; and (b) policing racist violence.

Part (a), racist violence describes and defines the phenomenon and how it impacts on victims, their families, and communities to provide the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework of the thesis emerges from the broad arguments and theories of leading academics in the field to the narrowed legislative framework which provides definitive, actionable direction to practitioners. The chapter examines how the literature addresses objectives 1 and 2 described in the methodology chapter of this thesis. Specifically, it examines and qualifies the nature, extent, and impact of racist violence, and whether the resulting needs of victims are clearly articulated and empirically supported.

To understand the national experience of racist violence, the chapter begins by looking back at its history in the UK, to outline their early emergence and component parts. This provides the foundation of the conceptual framework for the

early and more severe manifestations and the dominant discourses of the eras when it was taking place. The two key component parts therein, the physical act and the accompanying mode of targeting are the factors that frame the incidents of concern. Some more recent examples of racist violence are included, to bring the review into today's context.

The causal link between racist prejudice and the commission of incidents and crime is then examined, to further draw-out the conceptual framework, particularly as it relates to the realities of victimisation on the streets of Newcastle upon Tyne. Here, the inclusion of racist incidents into the broader category of hate incidents is covered, as is the utility of the term 'hate.'

The legal framework and definitions are then outlined, showing the actionable, procedural pathways available to policing organisations to respond to crime, along with academic perspective of the powers and how they are applied.

Having established a conceptual framework, the chapter explores the two main sources of data on racist incidents and crime, that inform local and national statistics, noting that police data, in particular, is considered unreliable by many commentators by the longstanding and global challenges of under-reporting and under-recording (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, Hall, 2013, Bowling, 2002). It presents racist crime in the context of hate crime, providing comparative data to illustrate trends.

The next section, covers the extent of racist incidents in England and Wales, interpreting the 'extent' to present range of incidents and how far reaching the harm is transmitted through direct victims, their families, and communities. The nature of racist incidents is then explored, in part from police data that breaks down offence types, but then on a deeper level by exploring their qualitative components, spatial aspects, and what it is about their nature that allows victims to recognise them as racist. The majority of the chapter focuses on the kind of incidents that are happening in Newcastle most frequently, drawing the term 'street-level' to distinguish it from some of the large-scale disturbances presented early in the chapter.

The chapter then explores the impact that racist incidents have on their primary and extended victims, in terms of their emotional responses and lifestyle changes. This is to both recognise the gravity of the problem and to support the thesis aim of identifying the needs of victims.

2.10 The History of Racist Violence in England and Wales

Today, incidents of violent and non-violent racism are phenomena that are globally and overtly condemned, particularly by European Governments (EUMC, 2005). In England and Wales, it was not until 1981, that violent racism was officially recognised by the Home Office as a political concern (Netto and Abazie, 2013, Bowling, 1998, Pilkington, 2001). Conceptually, there is still little academic consensus about how it is defined, (Goodey, 2007, Schweppe, 2021). Nor is there consensus about how we define the broader concept of hate crime (Boeckmann and Turpin-Petrosino, 2002, Gerstenfeld, 2017), into which racist incidents have been categorised. There is a significant lack of solid research on which to base theory (Perry, 2009a in Altschiller, 2009). However, by reflecting on the historic accounts of racist violence in England and Wales, the next section describes the key elements that are present.

2.11 The 1100s - World War 1

Bowling draws upon a broad academic base to chart the emergence of violent racism as a public issue in the United Kingdom (Bowling, 1998). He starts with the massacre of 30 Jews in a riot in London in 1189, which led to similar attacks in other parts of the country until the Jewish population was expelled in 1290 by the king, Edward I (Nicholson, 1974). The entire Jewish population of York died by '*self-immolation in Clifford's Castle*' while extreme violence was being used against Jews in France (Barkey and Katznelson, 2011, p. 486). In this situation, the Jewish population were targeted because of their racial identity and horrific violence was used against them. The use of violence against the Jews spread rapidly to other parts of the country.

Four centuries later in 1601, Queen Elizabeth I, issued a proclamation that *'the negars and Blackamoores... which are crept into this realm should be, with all speed, banished and discharged out of Her Majesty's dominions,'* (Fryer, 1984, p. 12). In that era, Nubia argues that the pathology of colonialism was behind racist antipathy and suggests that black people were generally considered to be violent (Nubia, 2020). Both of these early examples provide stark accounts of racist discourse from national leaders, calling for deportations, in the face of public antipathy and violence. Bowling identifies that this is an historic echo of the violent racism we see today (Bowling, 1998), responding to the concurrence of prejudiced discourse and associated violence.

2.12 Post-World War I

In 1919, there were racist attacks on Middle Eastern and West Indian seamen, including alleged lynching and an *'anti-black reign of terror'* in Liverpool, when gangs of white youths, numbering in their 1000s, *'roamed the streets, savagely attacking, beating and stabbing every negro they could find.'* (Fryer, 1984, p. 301). Evans argues that colonial racist immigration legislation was employed as a result, to limit immigration from the colonies. This example identifies that large groups of white people were using extreme violence, targeting black people in the locations where they were emerging, working, and living. Additionally, the political response appeared to solve the problem by limiting immigration. The Northeast of England saw racist violence erupting in this era too, with hostilities towards the Asian and African seamen in the local ports around Newcastle and South Shields (see research site chapter).

2.13 Post-World War 2

Following WW2 there was a period of relative stability, however by 1958, racialised tensions in English cities saw large mobs of white people, often armed with weapons, attacking black and Asian people, fire-bombing their homes, leading to serious injury and loss of life. Accompanying the physical violence delivered by the *'mobs'* was the language of *'Let's get the blacks'* (Bowling, 1998, p. 30) and *'nigger hunting,'* (Hiro, 1991, p. 39). The political language of that era

was about restricting immigration (Daily Sketch, 2nd September 1958) in (Bowling, 1998). Bowling highlights that the 3 main discourses on the causes of racist violence around 1958, were hooliganism; immigration; and an emerging, albeit unpopular suggestion of white prejudice. In that era, gangs of ‘Teddy Boys’ committed a large proportion of the violence in what was termed ‘*wog-bashing*’ and ‘*paki-bashing*’ (Holdaway, 1996, p. 106). Holdaway notes that this was not drawing any real attention from the public nor was it registering any particular need for police engagement with the BAME communities. In the 1970s, the teddy boys were replaced by skinheads, who perpetuated ‘*paki-bashing*.’ It is notable that group identities emerge here, carrying with them a reputation for violence and racism. Bowling notes that ‘*Paki-bashing*’ and ‘*Nigger-bashing*’ was taking place in schools during the 1970s. The targeting of young people in and around schools adds another sinister dimension to the problem, both reinforcing and increasing fears amongst BAME communities that not only were adults at risk, but children were also being violently attacked due to their race. The emergence and proliferation of terms like ‘*Paki-bashing*’ are also significant developments, providing a language for offenders to associate with and feel part of a larger movement. Racist murders continued and racist attacks became daily events in some parts of the country in that era, as did a more overtly racist discourse by those committing them, seemingly justified in their acts by the racialised language of senior politicians, seeking to identify immigration from the commonwealth as the problem, ‘*with the solution being deportation*’ (ibid, p. 56). The research site chapter provides details of the situation in Newcastle around the 1980s.

Findings chapter 1 identifies the kind of incidents that victims in Newcastle were being subjected to across the time period that the fieldwork was being conducted. Thankfully the nature and scale are not as serious and widespread as the situations described by these preceding sections. There were however similarities in some of the racist language used by offenders and in the political narratives that influenced offending. In recent years, trends in hate crime have been led by national and international events, including the EU Referendum, Brexit, COVID 19, and the use of social media platforms to proliferate hate speech and racist harassment, threats, and insults. This is examined in more detail later in this chapter.

2.14 How historic racist violence contributes to a broad definition

These examples summarise stark images of the problem portrayed in the literature, BAME people being abused, violently attacked, or killed, where racist targeting is a component part of the attack or is the motivation for the attack. To be a component part, typically the offenders would use racist language before, or at the time of the attack. This would apply to violence against people, but equally to violence against property such as in the case of racist graffiti. Where racism is a motivator for an attack, racist language may be absent, but the choice of victim and decision to attack has been taken as a result of selective targeting on behalf of the offender. Accompanying the behaviours, was often political discourse that either emboldens or even instigates them.

The call by Elizabeth I, to deport black people who had 'crept' into the realm is one of the earliest examples of political speech that raised the profile of BAME people as being 'the problem,' legitimising furtherance of animosity against them by those looking for an easy target. Tompson argues that rises in racist violence is associated with '*the level of government and media-inspired mass resentment against immigration*' (Tompson and Pilger, 1988, p. 79). Press continue to describe how asylum seekers enter the United Kingdom, by the non-conventional transport systems of flooding, swamping, invading, pouring in, and taking over () in (Harris, 2000, in Bhavnani, 2005). At the street and school level, the language of the so-called '*paki-bashing*' and '*nigger-bashing*' by violent gangs noted by Bowling in the 1970s may today, sound like a thing of the past. This study will examine whether, on the streets of Newcastle, this kind of language that serves to define incidents as racist, has remained, mutated, or gone (see findings 1).

2.20 Racism as a Causal Link to Crime and Incidents

Racism is a complex phenomenon to conceptualise. Kleg defines it as: '*the belief that certain groups are innately, biologically, socially, morally superior to other groups, based upon what is attributed to be their racial composition*' (Kleg, 1993, p. 91). Cantle considers that racisms are founded on a notion of superiority and

inferiority, predominantly the views of white people that they are 'superior' and represent '*civilisation*,'; whilst black and Asian races are '*genetically inferior*,' arguing that this is a simple concept to understand (Cantle, 2008, p.16). Udriguez argues a philosophical definition of racism that reflects historic oppression, but highlights conflict in whether it leans towards why racism is bad; or towards an explanation of its causes (Urquidez, 2021). Such definitions and their foundations only partially meet the threshold of a definition that would drive the nature and extent of racist incidents, particularly violence. This ethnocentric perspective of difference is insufficient to cause the racist violence outlined above, nor what happens on a neighbourhood level today. The concept therefore of a racism that can result in harms from the scale of genocide to the neighbourhood manifestations of assault, damage, and verbal abuse, cannot be drawn from superiority/inferiority perceptions or oppression alone. A lot of street-level racist violence is simply thuggery at heart, it becomes racist thuggery because an available target is BAME, and the attacker can immediately call upon a racist discourse, assumed justification and a hate-group mentality for the violence (Stanko, 2001, p. 318). Police tend to regard those who commit racist violence as under-educated, streetwise criminal types, given typical police shorthand names of that era, such as prigs, slags, toe-rags, yobs and hooligans who hate the police and hate ethnic minorities (Reiner, 1985, Young, 1991, Bowling, 1998). Though the language has evolved, the police consensus that the majority of racist violence is still committed by the 'undesirable, anti-social behaviour, criminal' types remains. This is evident in the findings chapter of this thesis. Stanko explains that an offender selects a victim because of 'who' they are; because the offender feels they are in a position of power over them; and because there is an available [racist] discourse to legitimise it, thereby giving the offender some form of alliance to other similarly prejudiced people (Stanko, 2001). Ray and Smith similarly argue that whilst racist violence tends to be conceptualised as being committed by '*consciously motivated haters*' and such people do exist, the majority of recorded racist incidents are clouded in the ambiguous discourse of hate crime (Ray and Smith, 2004, p. 686). Ray et al.'s 2002 research with offenders (Ray, 2002b) drew conclusions that supported what Webster and Sibbitt (Sibbitt, 1998, Webster, 1999) argued, that racist violence must be seen as '*intimately connected with wider cultures of racism, of exclusion and, crucially, of violence*'. (Ray, 2003a in

Stanko, 2003, p. 125). The discussion chapter picks up the relevance of this argument, as it is important in whether or not practitioners contextualise racist violence this way or treat it as unconnected. Interestingly, both Sibbitt and Ray agree that racist violence tended to be most prevalent in areas with higher deprivation, suggesting that in those areas, BAME people were targeted to distract the white population from their own shame of social failure (Ray et al., 2004, p. 364). They also note that residents considered BAME people a '*territorial threat*' (Ray and Smith, 2004, p. 688). Most recently, Hardy and Chakraborti argue interestingly for a new definition of hate crime as '*any act of violence, intimidation or hostility directed towards people on the basis of their identity, perceived difference or vulnerability*' (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, p. 150). The inclusion of vulnerability in this definition introduces concepts of power and victim-availability to the broad spectrum of hate crime. Though the conceptual element of vulnerability does not form part of the definition of hate crime or racist violence that this study adopts, the relevance of vulnerability is discussed in the findings chapter and further considered in the discussion and conclusion chapter.

2.21 Racist violence as a hate crime

It is useful to consider racist violence in context as a hate crime. The term 'hate crime', was introduced in the UK in 1999, following the Lawrence Inquiry and the London nail bombings in April 1999, (Ray, 2002a, McLaughlin, 2002, Lee, 1999). Both the murder of Stephen Lawrence and the bombings were examples where the offenders clearly did develop 'hatred' towards their victims, sufficient enough for them to plan and use extreme violence (Garland and Rowe, 2002). However, the term does little to describe the aggravating circumstances, or what motivates the offender to attack in the majority of everyday racist incidents by neighbours, co-workers, or random strangers on the street. The notion that in committing the crime, the offender hates the victim, by virtue of race, faith, sexuality, disability, etc, is problematic. To actually hate an identifiable group of people to the extent that one is driven to attack them is a radical and highly unusual standpoint, hence Stanko's suggestion that '*targeted violence*' may be a more appropriate term in everyday cases (Stanko, 2001, p. 318). Young terms this '*systemic violence*,' describing random and unprovoked attacks, intended to diminish the victim, being

justified in a social context that 'disempowers and stigmatises' (Young, 1995 p. 83; in Perry, 2005). Like Stanko, Young does not support the group hatred or prejudice theses as the primary and obvious causal link to the commission of the crime.

Current College of Policing guidance on hate motivation identifies that hate crime victims are selected by offenders as a result of their hostility or prejudice towards them (CoP, 2020) The strength of the causal link between the prejudice and the commission of the crime, Jacobs and Potter argue, needs to be examined if the act is to be designated a hate crime (James and Kimberly, 1998). Hardy and Chakraborti's argument that vulnerability, or difference are the basis for hate attacks, suggests either identity-based animosity, or a vulnerable target that is unlikely to cause harm to the offender, becomes the victim. It would appear more likely however, that difference and vulnerability combined, render a person high-risk (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). Hatred is a difficult concept for the victim to accept. My experience in working with disability support groups, is the perception that if someone is attacked because of a collective hatred for people with disabilities, there is potential for an acute feeling of vulnerability to spread through that community. Perry argues strongly that '*serious scholars of the phenomenon understand "hate" as a kind of shorthand for the sorts of bigoted, bias-motivated violence to which it refers*' (Perry, 2005, p. 122).

Perry expresses frustration at the divisive arguments academics such as Rosebury (Rosebury, 2003), Rosen (Rosen, 1993) and Levin (Levin and Levin, 1999) present to challenge the concept of hate crime legislation as punishing thought, attitude or belief. The Law Commission's 2021 report also recognises the popular arguments against any kind of hate crime laws. Arguments that suggest hate crime laws impinge on a person's right to hold views that are different to contemporary politics, mean they are effectively policing or prosecuting people for their thoughts. Similarly, critics argue that the mere perception that a crime or incident is motivated by hostility means the offender becomes a hate-offender without any diligent scrutiny. The report provides good justification to reject these arguments by pointing out that such crimes involve both the guilty act and the

mental state or mens rea, making the offence and the harm more severe than the basic offence (Law-Commission, 2021),

In putting the victim first, this study gives attention to the impact of racist incidents on victims and their broader community. The term 'hate' is seldom appropriate to the victims of frequent street-level racist incidents who contributed to this study. The semantic, scholarly arguments of both Perry and those criticised above, are of little value to the victim, struggling to understand why their skin colour justifies a lived experience racially motivated attacks and an implied 'collective hatred' towards them. The term does have its place of course, to describe the motivations behind proscribed groups with extreme right-wing views, who focus their time, thought and actions on developing and committing acts of hatred. Stanko recognises that escalating racial tensions and divisions, as happened in Bradford leading up to 2001 (Ouseley, 2001, p.1), can escalate rapidly into rioting, as was seen in the disturbances across Northern England in 2001 (Cantle, 2008). Taking this a stage further, Stanko identifies that racialised tensions leading to riots, can result in *'Neighbours pitted against neighbours, husbands against wives, villagers against villagers. Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Zimbabwe, Northern Ireland demonstrate today's genocidal possibilities of othering.'* (Stanko, 2001, p. 323). The notion of 'hate' across these contexts then, is a developing notion, that begins as the everyday targeted violence, but unchecked, escalates and ultimately can grow into a hatred that devastates.

It is clear that some people do develop hatred towards other groups, but that is the extreme end of a continuum which may begin with a prejudice, fear, or unconscious bias. Everyday street-level attacks are more spontaneous or targeted, not necessarily because of hatred, but because of identifiable vulnerability, alliances of support, a belief that the behaviour will not have negative consequences on them, and a personal negative power drive. That every offender who commits an offence that is motivated by prejudice or involves the expression of prejudice against an identifiable BAME group is a racist, or hates the target race, is not the conceptual framework of this study. This study adopts the relatively unchanged Macpherson definition of hate crime, wherein the crime or incident is

motivated by hostility or where the offender/s demonstrate hostility based on race. This concept finds contemporary support in the 2021 Law Commission report on hate crime, that states '*Hate crime laws depend on the motivation of the offender, or their demonstration of hostility, not merely the [racial] identity of the victim*' (Law-Commission, 2021, p. 2).

2.22 The Legal Framework

While the previous section discussed arguments around the validity of hate and the academic construction of racist violence, the legislative framework in England and Wales is comparatively simple and navigable (Funnell, 2015), that is at least for racist and faith based hate crime and incidents. The law deals with incidents as isolated events. That incident may be a crime, or it may not. If the victim or anyone else thinks it is racist, then it should be recorded as such. If there is no evidence of racist motivation or content, it cannot be prosecuted as racist. This is the statutory boundary within which police and other agencies are mandated to operate. Compared with the academic concept of racist violence, the legal definition is significantly restricted. However limited, the utility of the legislation here is fundamental to understanding the circumstances under which police either have powers to act directly when an incident comes to their attention; or when it is outside of their immediate power to respond and partner agencies may need to support a joined-up response. The legal framework for racist violence is also the primary focus of the evidence base for this thesis, that is, the concept of racist violence and how it is policed. It is because of its real-world applicability, and clarity of definition, that this study can examine the majority of incidents victims spoke about, in the categories of escalating impact. There are four main pieces of legislation that policing racist crime and incidents draw upon today:

- i. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
- ii. S145 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
- iii. The Public Order Act 1986.
- iv. Racist chanting at football matches – Section 3 Football Offences Act 1991. (CPS, 2020)

It is crime aggravated according to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (i.) and racist Public Order offences (iii.) that dominate the lived realities of victims on the streets of Newcastle. Hence they define the legislative parameters of the kind violent racism the study primarily focuses upon. General prejudice and microaggressions that fall outside of the criminal justice system do have relevance for victims, as they help to define the social landscape against which racist violence needs to be seen.

2.23 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA)

The first and most widely used in policing, is the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA). This act does not create new offences but creates specific racially aggravated offences of wounding; assault; criminal damage; harassment and threatening or abusive behaviour. In total, nine offences are covered by this act, chosen as the most frequent crimes that are racially aggravated (Burney, 2002). The act followed the introduction of several Bills submitted to address the problem. It was the Bill introduced by Harry Cohen, MP in 1985, supported by the Anti-Racist Alliance, that led to the CDA 1998. Bindman argues that whilst there is little value in duplicating existing offences, there is value in identifying the offences that have racist motivation and uplifting sentencing powers accordingly. He also points out that such offences should be '*vigorously investigated and pursued by the prosecuting authorities.*' (Bindman, 1994, p. 526).

The CDA identifies what is required to be proven for an offence to be 'racially aggravated', where the offender:

- i. demonstrated hostility towards the victim based on their membership (or perceived membership) of a racial or religious group; or
- ii. the offence was motivated by hostility towards victims because of their real or perceived membership of a racial or religious group.

The CDA states that a crime is racially aggravated if:

'(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence, hostility based on the victim's membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group; or (b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group.'

There are also sentencing uplift provisions under sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, whereby a court can increase sentencing if hostility based on broader hate crime types can be demonstrated.

In practice, evidencing that racial hostility was apparent can be challenging, moreover however, evidencing that the offence was motivated by racial hostility is often problematic. A demonstration of racial hostility would be the use of racist language at the time of an attack. Capturing evidence of that hostility would require a recording or witness statement that documented the racist language used by the offender. Burney points out very few cases that get to court are about motivation, a likely result of the difficulty police find in evidencing what was going on in the mind of the offender when they planned and committed the crime (Burney, 2002). Evidencing racist motivation for a crime, would need an admission by the offender that they committed it because the victim was BAME.

Alternatively, that the crime was obviously racist, because of the existence of other factors, such as the choice of target and modus operandi. A recent study by Walters et. al., suggests that as a hate crime case tracks through the criminal justice process, there are numerous gateways at which the aggravating hostility element can be *'filtered out.'* Extrapolating data, they estimate that only 4% of crimes reported as hate crime, are actually convicted and sentenced as such, making the justice gap 96% (Walters et al., 2018, p. 7). This attrition rate involves actions by more than policing agencies alone. The criminal justice process, post-charge, has a high degree of influence, which is beyond the scope of this study. The Law Commission have conducted two reviews of hate crime laws, in 2012-2014; and the most recent one launched in 2019, published in December 2021. The first, was to examine and review whether a change in law to give parity to the four non-race related strands against the sentencing powers afforded by the CDA for racist crime. The second was to examine the *'efficacy of the legal mechanisms'* and whether any further protected characteristics needed to be added (Law-Commission, 2021, p. 5). Chapter 8 of the commission's report (2021)

recommends that no changes are made to the CDA and CJA in relation to their efficacy, nor in relation to an expansion to include additional protected characteristics. The report did highlight some opposition to the existing hate crime laws on the grounds that such powers mean offenders are treated more severely as a result of victim characteristics and that such disparity could be counter-productive to building community cohesion. However, the report provides solid justification for rejecting repeals of the laws on those grounds, based upon the offender's demonstration of hostility and the well documented higher level of harm hate crime causes its victims.

2.24 Defining racist incidents and crime

The CPS Guidance for Prosecutors (Williams, 2015) and the National Police Chief's Council provide a definition of racist incidents or crimes, as:

'Any incident or crime which is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person's race or perceived race.'
(College-of-Policing, 2014)

The definition originated from recommendation 12 of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999, p. 328). Macpherson recommended (rec 13) the term racist incident would be a blanket term that would cover incidents where a crime was made out, and non-crime incidents. Chahal felt that the definition could be misused, to include incidents where BAME people could be perpetrators against white people, or indeed, anyone could complain about another and claim it was racist. More significantly, that it ignored the lived experience of being a victim of racist violence (Chahal, 1999b). However, despite the criticisms, it is a simple definition that should not leave a lot of room for misinterpretation. The findings chapter of this thesis provides the perspectives of officers in Northumbria Police's Communities Engagement Department, wherein they provided examples of when the definition had been ignored. Police understanding and application these definitions was essential in understanding the nature of the incident and providing the appropriate service. The section on measures of racist violence below, and the next literature review chapter on policing racist violence pick up this matter.

2.25 Is it a crime, an incident, harassment, or violence?

Most contemporary literature in this context focuses on hate crime. Under the umbrella of this thesis, racist incidents, crime, and violence are used frequently, but the differences are significant. All crimes are incidents, meaning 'incident' represents the blanket term for an occurrence of some notable gravity. When all of the component parts of a crime are present in an incident, the offensive action (actus reus) and guilty knowledge (mens rea), it is a crime. When a crime includes violence against a person or property, physical, verbal or threatening, then it is considered a violent incident and, in most cases, a violent crime. The term racial harassment, used frequently in the 1980s, see for example (Hesse and Waltham, 1992, Bowling, 1993, Virdee, 1995), is somewhat confusing today. Bowling and Hesse both used the terms racist violence and harassment together, multiple times. In that context, violence is taken to be physical acts of assault and damage, that would constitute crimes. Harassment then, is racist abuse and insults (Chahal, 1999a, Ashe et al., 2016). Today, a lot of what was classed as racist harassment would meet the definition of a racist crime. Harassment, in the contemporary context is unwanted behaviour that is offensive and has the effect or intention of causing intimidation or humiliation. Harassment is a crime, and therefore is not sub-criminal behaviour.

2.26 Other legislation

The Public Order Act, 1986, created specific offences relating to racial hatred under sections 17-29. The main offences under the Public Order Act cover a range of circumstances where racial hatred is incited by the offender. Section 18 of this act is:

'using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or displaying written material with intent to stir up racial hatred, or which is likely to stir up racial hatred'

The other offences under this act are similar in content but relate to broadcasting and production of such materials. As this study focuses on the occurrence and


impact of street-level offences, these, and the offence of racist chanting at football matches will not be examined in detail due to their low relevance on the streets of Newcastle.

Outside of the criminal justice context, the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights afford people a right to sue the police or other prosecuting agency for '*racial discrimination in investigations.*' (Field and Roberts, 2002, p. 493). Replacing the Race Relations Act 1976, the Equalities Act 2010 protects people from discrimination in the workplace and in society generally (GOV.UK, 2013).

2.30 Measures of Racist Incidents

There are two main methods employed in the capture of data on racist violence. First, the most commonly used is a quantitative approach (Shilston, 2008), using data from the criminal justice agencies, the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW) and victim surveys. Secondly, a qualitative approach that draws upon ethnography and other descriptive accounts of the experience, impact, and of the policing response (EUMC, 2005, p. 58). Quantitative police data does have value in identifying trends or spikes in crime and provides a more real-time perspective on the here and now of the problem, by providing readily available figures. There are, however, limitations to the extent and reliability. Police can only record racist crime and incidents that fall within legal definitions, hence will be unable to capture sub-criminal behaviours such as discrimination, that nevertheless can harm BAME communities; police policy and practice in recording and reporting racist crime has changed over time, making any apparent long-term trends unreliable (Hall, 2013). Chahal and Julienne (Chahal, 1999c) found that reporting racist incidents was a rare first response for victims, due, according to Bowling to a lack of trust and confidence in policing (Bowling, 2002); consideration that the incident is too minor to report; the fear of repercussions if it is reported (Hall et al., 2009); and the fear that criminal justice agencies are institutionally racist (EUMC, 2005). Whilst Hall argues that the only certainty we can draw from police data is that racist incidents are happening (Hall, 2005), the available data provides a perspective that is far more illustrative than Hall's binary posture, and confirm it is still a significant

problem. Fig 1. below, shows the annual rate of the five hate crime strands recorded by the police across the last decade:



Data from Home Office, Hate Crime, *England and Wales, 2019 to 2020* (Grahame Allen, 2020)

Current Home Office data on racist violence situates it in the broader context of hate crime. In this context, it is one of the 5 strands of hate crime that are monitored centrally by Government, namely: race or ethnicity; religion or beliefs; sexual orientation; disability; and transgender identity. Along with the other hate crime strands, Home Office data indicates a steady increase in racist hate crime nationally, since 2011/12. The increase across all strands, can in part be attributed to improvements policy and in the way police have recorded them (Grahame Allen, 2020, Myers and Lantz, 2020a). Myers and Lantz felt that the use of third-party reporting centres was a positive development in the UK, albeit there is minimal evidence of their success against more recognised modes of reporting.

Leading spikes or trends in racist incidents are often global or national political events. Spalek highlights that the period post 9/11, had a '*significant impact*' on the '*safety and wellbeing*' of British Muslims (Spalek, 2002, p. 20). This is also mentioned by several victim participants in the interviews conducted in Newcastle

(see findings chapter 1). Such events provide a readily available discourse to those who wish to target members of minority communities (Hanes and Machin, 2014). Chakraborti stated, in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks in London in 2007: *'Muslims now find themselves in a position not dissimilar to that of black communities in 1970s Britain, whereby alarmist media narratives have combined with punitive political rhetoric to amplify the threat posed by Muslims and to create a new folk-devil, an object of hostility who bears the brunt of social anger and whose alien characteristics concretise moral anxieties'* (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015, p. 39). Cockbain and Tufail argue that the 'Muslim grooming gangs' narrative, articulated by far right groups in response to child sexual exploitation in the last decade, particularly in Northern towns such as Rotherham, fuelled 'anti-Muslim hostility and violent Islamophobia' (Cockbain and Tufail, 2020). Unpacking the notable increases in 2016 shown in Fig 1, it is recognised that Brexit created another rise in racist incidents (Myers and Lantz, 2020a). Burnett states *'The explosion of racist violence that followed the announcement of the EU referendum result on 24 June 2016 has been well documented.'* (Burnett, 2017, p. 1). This spike in offending could have been predicted, particularly in the era of social media, where offenders can hide behind keyboards and electronic platforms, actively spreading inflammatory discourse. However, politicians were quick to express shock that such increases were happening. Burnett's study, supported by the IRR, looked at 134 racist incidents in the aftermath of the referendum and concluded *'if a hostile environment is embedded politically, why should we be surprised when it takes root culturally? (ibid.)'*

Another significant spike in Islamophobic offending followed the Ariana Grande Manchester Arena bombing. Khanum and Khan studied discourse on social media following the attack and found that *'on sites like Twitter, hate speech was openly practiced.'* (Khanum and Khan, 2020, p. 111)

Similarly and more recently, in the spring of 2020, an increase in anti-Asian racist violence arose with the COVID 19 pandemic in the UK and the US (Ren and Feagin, 2021), as a result of individual racisms and through *'bigoted rhetoric and exclusionary policies'* (Gover et al., 2020, p. 647). President Donald Trump chose to ignore the World Health Organisation's non-offensive virus nomenclature policy

(WHO, 2015), by his repeated, public references to the Chinese Virus (Smith, 2020, Fallows, 2020), and Kung-flu (Boyer, 2020). Such language, it is argued by Chiu is dangerous, racist (Chiu, 2020) and increases animosity towards the Asian community (Little, 2020), leading to spikes in racist incidents (Cabanatuan, 2020).

Other limitations to the value of the statistical data illustrated in Fig.1 are that the ethnic or religious identities of the victims are not distinguished, hence any interpretations of it are lacking criticality (Clayton et al., 2016, Chakraborti and Garland, 2015). Therefore, in the above periods when Islamophobic offending was on the increase, the disproportionate impact on people targeted for being or appearing to be Muslim, would not be adequately represented in a graphic that counts victims as one homogenous group.


In 2014, the coalition government's interim report on their hate crime action plan 'Challenge It, Report It, Stop It,' noted that hate crime reporting remained a concern. The report identifies particularly low levels of reporting by '*Roma, Gypsy and Traveller communities and new migrants.*' (HM Government, 2014, p. 16). This further impacts on the validity of homogenous data on racist crime trends, as under-reporting occurs disproportionately in these identified groups. Cuerdon and Blakemore's 2020 study of barriers to reporting hate crime in Wales concurs with the findings of other UK studies in identifying that non-reporting remains a significant problem. They found variation in victims' inclination to make reports of hate crime was also influenced by victim gender and age range, with the highest likelihood of reports coming from males aged between 26 to 35 years of age. (Gareth and Brian, 2020).

Despite the inaccuracies, the data does serve to identify the volume of hate crimes police are recording annually. It also shows that despite the frequency of racist crime being a lot higher than other strands of hate crimes in 2011/12, that gap between racist crime and homophobic crime, the next highest strand, has widened over the last decade. Importantly, it identifies that by 2019/20, there were 76,070 racist crimes recorded by police, demonstrating the demand they face and adding

empirical value to a thesis that adds to the quantitative 'knowledge' by providing a qualitative perspective on the subject.

The other major quantitative measure of racist crime, the CSEW, that draws on survey responses from adults over the age of 16, shows a reduction in racist crime across the above period. It fell from 151,000 in the 2007/08 and 2008/09 combined surveys, to 104,000 in the 2017/18 and 2019/20 combined survey. This represents a fall of 31% (Parliament, 2021). Hall cites Home Office 2006 data, in this observation for the period up to 2008, while Home Office 2017/18 data identifies that this trend has continued up to 2018 (Hall, 2009). This dichotomy between the two measures, points towards the CSEW data being more reliable long-term in providing consistently accurate data (Parliament, 2021), whereas it is more accurate recording by police over that period that shows as an apparent rise. These improvements in police recording over parallel periods of time, means Bowling and Phillip's concerns in 2002, that *'racial "incidents" recorded by the police represent only a small proportion of all those that occur'* (Bowling, 2002, p. 112) are becoming less valid. Bowling (ibid) also distinguishes a significant gap between racist incidents reported to the police and those recorded by them, citing Home Office calculations to show in 1998, that of the estimated total of 984,000 racist incidents that year, only 41,000 were reported to the police and 12,222 were recorded by them. Webster identifies that in reality, racist incidents are both under reported and under recorded (Webster, 2007). Police recording of racist incidents will be discussed in the next chapter. Findings chapter 1 identifies many of the reasons why, in Newcastle, victims would not always report racist incidents to the police.

Compared with the other hate crime strands, the data unanimously shows racist hate crime is substantially more common than the other strands, as Fig 2 below shows, accounting for between 82% and 72% of all hate crime recorded by police between 2012/12 and 2019/20:



Data from Home Office, Hate Crime, *England and Wales, 2019 to 2020* (Grahame Allen, 2020)

Chakraborti et al confirm, there is a strong recognition that racist hate crimes are the most prevalent of the hate crime strands (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015). They go on to identify that much of the academic, political, journalistic, and practice-based literature on hate crime, is in reality, founded on racist crime, a perspective shared by Croall, who argues that hate crime is traditionally associated with racism (Croal, 2002). This is a logical, evidence-based assertion, given the history of racist crime and incidents and the volume of literature of that genre. It also supports the inclusion of argument and theory from the broader hate crime literature within this thesis.

The next section identifies how far reaching and ranging racist incidents are and describes how quantitative measures are helpful in showing the statistical extent of racist incidents and a workable scale from the low-level abuse to the more serious violence against the person and murder.

2.40 Extent of Racist Incidents

Figure 3 below, provides a helpful perspective of the range of racist crimes being recorded. The most frequent kind of incidents from this data, supported by Bowling's findings in 1998, are public order offences; offences against the person,

such as racist verbal abuse; and the low value criminal damage (Bowling, 1998). The higher category offences, such as violence against the person, are understood as serious offences, tend to be newsworthy and policing practitioners would naturally consider them more relevant to their business. Bowling argues however, that it is the whole range of incidents that cause victims the feeling of being in a hostile area, where they cannot move freely without an ever present feeling of threat (Bowling, 2002). In other words, the seemingly low-level offences merge with the more serious ones to create that hostile environment and the feeling of living under a constant threat. This will be discussed further in the section below on impact. Low level incidents are rarely a result of organised violence by active racist individuals (Iganski, 2008). Iganski points out that a lot of the literature suggests it is, suggesting it is due to influences from studies of racist violence in the US, where the situation is very different. This suggests that if organisations are to provide a victim-focused service, low level incidents should not be overlooked, because their impact on victims is significant and lasting. Additionally, a rising or changing trend in low-level racist incidents can be a symptom of increasing tensions (Cantle, 2008). The realities of whether police would overlook such incidents if they were reported, is evident in the discussion chapter, which considers victim and police perspectives of 'grinding everyday racist incidents' in Newcastle.

The location where victimisation occurs is a significant factor for the victim (Hesse and Waltham, 1992, Iganski, 2008). Bowling's 1998 study examined the locations where people were being targeted. Though this tended to vary according to ethnicity, the majority occurred in and around the home, followed by places of work, schools, colleges, pubs, and places of worship (Bowling, 1998). In her PhD, Funnell cites (McDevitt et al., 2001) in suggesting that hate crimes being committed in and around the home, have a heightened impact on victims, because the home should be perceived as a safe place, and it is not somewhere that can be avoided to reduce the threat (Funnell, 2013). Similarly, schools are not avoidable places for children and their parents, but the impact on the wellbeing of families who suffer racist incidents in and around schools is very harmful. Particularly when the abuse comes from other parents and children. Indeed, anywhere where BAME people need to live, work, study, shop and socialise,

become places to fear, when they are targeted there. Online platforms are emerging as another environment where victims are targeted. At the time of writing, four people have been arrested by the Metropolitan Police, for racist abuse on members of England's Euro 2020 team using social media platforms. This followed England's loss to Italy in the Euro 2020 finals. The Guardian reported that although the Premier League suggested 70% of the 2087 racist tweets originated from overseas, Twitter corrected their position, stating the majority originated from UK accounts (Solon, 2021). The reports were published broadly in national news, and whilst abhorrent, the attacks were unsurprising and '*unforgivable*,' with Prime Minister Boris Johnson adding '*This England team deserve to be lauded as heroes, not racially abused on social media.*' (BBC, 2021).


Victims, their families, and communities suffer harm directly and vicariously as a result of racist incidents. The Home Office were the first to identify that the harm of the incidents extends beyond the immediate victims, to impact on the whole community, stating '*the Asian community widely believes that it is the object of a campaign of unremitting racial harassment...*' (Home-Office, 1981, p. 12). This was expanded in 1994 by Feagin and Sikes (in Oliver, 1995) who argued '*these experiences not only are at the heart of the racial problem, but also have devastating individual and group effects. Their impact, moreover, is cumulative..*' going on to suggest that it extends to '*the group's collective memory over the generations.*' (Oliver, 1995, p. 605). This finding continued to be broadly supported decades later, see (Chakraborti, 2009, EUMC, 2005). Perry, Iganski and Chakraborti broaden the victimisation beyond racist hate to argue this extended impact happens in the full range of hate crime strands. Chakraborti uses the term '*message crime*' in describing how the harm of hate crimes spread through families and communities, suggesting they '*are designed to tell not just the victim, but the entire subordinate (as perceived by the perpetrator) community to whom the victim belongs, that they are 'different' or unwelcome.*' (Chakraborti, 2015b, p. 13). Though in 2001, Perry recognised that the theory of a broader impact beyond the victim was based on assumption, her later qualitative work with Alvi in 2012, found '*strikingly similar patterns of emotional and behavioural responses among vicarious victims*' supporting this cascading effect and deriving the term '*in terrorem*' to describe the collective experience (Perry and Alvi, 2012,

p. 57). This extended victimisation was observed in McDevitt's 2001 research into the impact of bias motivated incidents over non-biased incidents, from which they termed the impact '*secondary victimisation*' (McDevitt et al., 2001, p. 698).

Following recommendations in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999), the term '*critical incident*' was adopted by police in the UK (Hall et al., 2009, p. 168). The working definition of a critical incident recognises the broader potential harm that may be caused and is worded '*any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community*' (College-of-Policing, 2013a), further recognising vicarious impact, but significantly, stressing the '*effectiveness*' of the policing response to the incident as a factor in community trust and confidence. The impact of the most serious violent crime and some critical incidents has embedded the practice of conducting community impact assessments into police policy and procedure. This policy of targeted community engagement, assesses, according to the College of Policing, feelings of '*vulnerability and insecurity*' (College-of-Policing, 2013b) within the community to help inform the appropriate policing response to any tensions or fears. The extended victimisation, therefore, is both anticipated by policy and assessed in practice by policing professionals, following critical incidents. Critical incidents and community impact assessment will be examined further in the second literature review chapter.

2.50 Nature of Racist Incidents

The data set below provides a recent surface level, quantitative guide to the nature of racist crimes in England and Wales, along with their relative prevalence.



Data from Home Office, *Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2019 to 2020* (Grahame Allen, 2020).

It shows that public order offences, such as racist language and threats account for the majority of crimes (57%) with offences of physical violence, harassment and criminal damage occurring less frequently. Violence against the person, with and without injury, together comprise 20% of the total range of offences. This quantitative overview is informative in offering an understanding of the scale of what is being recorded, and despite academic arguments over their accuracy, paint a stark picture of the type and prevalence of racist incidents. Digging beneath the surface, Bimjea and Lawton's report into racist incidents in Brent, argues that there are four critical characteristics to racial harassment:

1. The definition needs to be victim-centred in its assessment. This recognises the perspective of the victim as being a significant component part of how it is understood and conceptualised.

2. There needs to be a demonstrable racist element to the incident. This is reflected in the CDA 1998, in that hard evidence is required for an offence to be proven as racist in court. However, the Lawrence Inquiry definition as we have

seen, demands only that somebody perceives it to be racist, for it to be recorded as such.

3. The incident is anchored in racism, wherein it is the imbalance of power against the victim that highlights the prejudicial motivation for it. In this characteristic, Bimjea correctly verbalises the presence of prejudice in the incident, but in making it a causal link, does not include the more commonly prosecuted racial aggravation that would be demonstrated by evidence of any racist language used.

4. There is a pattern or recurrence of the incidents, some being criminal and some sub-criminal. (Bimjea, 1988). This characteristic interestingly introduces the concept of themes of racist incidents. This would include incidents that would not normally be reported to police, such as 'the look' or 'demeanour' of the prejudiced person.

Earlier in this chapter we reviewed how some of the historic racist violence in the UK could help to define racist incidents. This section is highlighting how some of the literature looks deeper into how victims recognise these as different to other kinds of non-biased incidents. Bimjea and Lawton describe typical racial harassment as incidents such as discarding litter on victim's doorsteps; racist graffiti; racist verbal abuse; and terminology such as paki-bashing (Bimjea, 1988). Bowling's 1998 research in North Plaistow, found that the majority of incidents reported were of verbal abuse and most victims had experienced that. Over the 18-month study period, the following types of 'harassment' were reported by participants, in order of frequency:

- 1. Insulting behaviour/verbal abuse*
- 2. Threatened damage or violence*
- 3. Threatened assault*
- 4. Actual assault*
- 5. Actual and attempted damage to property*
- 6. Actual and attempted theft*
- 7. Actual and attempted arson' (Bowling, 1998, p. 198)*

Typical accounts of incidents of racist violence from victims in this study were: being verbally abused walking home from the Mosque and having stones and

bottles thrown at them; racist abuse and stones thrown damaging house windows; a group of white people taunting, racist language, then being wounded by a thrown stone, all of which are replicated in (Sibbitt, 1998). Racist violence has evolved across the period of this study, and more so since the 1980-90 era that Bowling and Hesse studied. That evolution tends to be away from the larger scale racist disorders, towards the more challenging online expressions of racist and broader hate crime. The Law Commission's review of harmful online communications makes recommendations that new offences are created to deal with online hate, and that efforts are directed towards tackling the *'the most harmful material'* (Law-Commission, 2021, p. 10).

Online space has only recently been recognised as a new *'public space'* wherein civil life is replicated (Mossberger et al., 2007, p. 199). Unfortunately, racist hate crime has found its place in that public space too. The UK government have been aware of this and prioritised it in 2015 with their revisions to communications legislation. Pre-social media, online hate received minimal attention from policing, however its subsequent proliferation has provided another, readily accessible environment for it (Williams and Pearson, 2016). Akin to trends in hate crime in the physical domain, online hate peaks in the aftermath of some trigger events such as terrorist attacks, the EU referendum and COVID (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). Social media has not replaced physical space as the place for racist violence, what this section has identified is that it has broadened the nature of it.

The majority of violent racist offences fit within the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) 1998 for racial aggravation. This is significant in policing, as it means that if an offender was prosecuted, evidence of the racist targeting could be included in the case file to seek a sentencing uplift. To examine what kind of evidence was given to support the racist definitions of these incidents, Iganski draws on responses to the Crime Survey of England and Wales for the periods 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012, highlighting elements of crimes that led victims to perceive them as racist, in order of frequency:

- '1. Because of the victim's race/country of origin'*
- 2. Racist language used*

3. *Because of the offender's race/country of origin*
4. *Because it has happened before*
5. *Because some people pick on minorities*
6. *Because offence is only committed against minorities.'* (Iganski and Lagou, 2015, p. 12)

In the above survey, the primary evidence of the racist motivation for the crimes, was the offender's use of racist language at the time of the offence, or immediately before it. The other main determinant, listed above it, was the perception that the victim had been targeted because of their ethnicity. This fits neatly with the CDA 1998 definition of racial aggravation, which requires that racial hostility is demonstrated (by words said, for example), or the offence is motivated by such hostility. The elements listed in 3/4/5 reflect Bimjea's assertion that racist incidents follow patterns or recurrence. It is clear however, that the racist nature of incidents is not always apparent or directly evidenced. In such cases, Klug argues, that an incident is racist if the victim believes it so, or if there is evidence to support a racist element (Klug, 1982).

2.60 Impact of Racist Incidents

Fig.4 below, shows a recent, quantitative view of the emotional responses of victims of hate crime. This is based upon data from the Crime Survey of England and Wales and the Office for National Statistics. It draws comparisons with emotional responses of victims of all crime, in order to highlight how being targeted because of a protected characteristic, has a different impact. We can assume this data accurately describes the impact racist hate crime, as we can infer that 70-80% of the respondents were victims of racist crime.

Fig. 4: Emotional impact of hate crime, adults aged 16 and over, 2017/18 to 2019/20
CSEW

Percentages

England and Wales

Type of emotional response experienced ¹	All hate crime	All CSEW crime ²
Annoyance	48	67
Anger	51	53
Shock	47	33
Loss of confidence or feeling vulnerable	42	19
Fear	45	17
Difficulty sleeping	29	13
Crying/tears	23	11
Anxiety or panic attacks	34	14
Depression	18	9
Other	4	3

Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics

1. Figures add to more than 100 as more than one response possible.

2. All CSEW crime excludes fraud and computer misuse.

The data above suggests that the emotional responses of annoyance and anger are not too dissimilar, though a little higher for the non-bias crime. This may well be the result of those emotions being directed outwards, towards the offenders, rather than the more harmful impact of knowing one has been targeted because of who they are. The significant data here, for hate crime victims is that the longer lasting, harmful emotions are over twice as frequent (Clancy, 2001).

The value of the quantitative data that describes the impact of racist incidents is helpful in identifying specific effects and their prevalence amongst victims. However, it does little to get into the minds of those being harmed by frequent personal experiences of racism, to uncover the harm to wellbeing or quality of life they cause (Gee et al., 2007). Gee conducted research in the US to examine the impact of discrimination on Asian Americans, but also considered whether factors such as poverty, family cohesion and socio-demographics could skew the results. Their findings provided strong evidence that the experience of discrimination led to sadness, a shaping of the victim's world-view; poor self-concept; reinforcement of secondary social status and an impact on self-esteem, citing (R. Williams and

Williams-Morris, 2000), to demonstrate how racism harms mental health. There was a reduction of the victim's sense of self-control and a feeling of hopelessness. In 1981, a Home Office study found that repeated and systematic racially motivated incidents '*increased the feeling of fear experienced by the ethnic minorities*' (Home-Office, 1981, p. 12).

Bowling and other scholars of racist violence and hate crime have argued that racist victimisation is a process, rather than a series of distinct events, (Bowling, 1998, Funnell, 2015). They are experienced as '*on-going repeat victimisation*' (EUMC, 2005, p. 63). Chakraborti and Garland found this to be true of victims in rural areas too, with interviewees expressing that racial harassment was part of everyday life (Chakraborti and Garland, 2003). Perry and Alvi describe the impact as '*a complex syndrome of reactions, including shock, anger, fear/vulnerability, inferiority, and a sense of the normativity of violence.*' (Perry and Alvi, 2012, p. 57). Indeed, Dhanwant considers the impact to be '*personal dehumanisation*' (Dhanwant, 1991, p. 159). In non-hate crimes where the emotions of anger and annoyance are high, there is presumably a relatively more rapid reduction of that emotion for the victim. However, if, per the above, racist victimisation is experienced as a process, harming the very core of the victim's existence, then the emotional half-life of the impact is significantly longer for such victims. The availability of support is a factor in the emotional impact. Chakraborti, above, found that in rural areas where community support was lacking, the impact of racist victimisation was experienced more acutely through the relative isolation inherent in those areas.

Victim responses tend to be influenced by this harmful impact. Victims of racist crime will change their behaviours in response to being targeted. These behavioural changes, extend to vicarious victims too, the victim's families and communities: '*the distal victims often engage in subsequent behavioural shifts, such as changing patterns of social interaction*' (Perry and Alvi, 2012, p. 57). Most frequent among lifestyle changes are avoidance strategies. Avoiding places considered dangerous, avoiding people, even changing how they behave in and around home. In adopting an avoidance strategy, Chakraborti and Garland found most victims tended to ignore racist abuse to prevent escalation or to prevent

future incidents (Chakraborti and Garland, 2003). A small number did retaliate, but that resulted in either prosecution or more targeting. Perry and Alvi, however, introduce a more positive impact of prolonged exposure to racist incidents, suggesting that forms of community mobilisation may take place, thus empowering minorities to act.

In their study of attacks on Muslim females, Mason-Bish point out a disproportionate impact on female victims wearing any form of veil, as the incidents *'have the effect of excluding women from certain public spaces or at least impinging upon their free movement'* (ibid, p.3), citing (Ilahi, 2009). This of course, is limited to cases when the offender is either a male, or when a female offender directs their abuse towards the veil, hence targeting females by virtue of their clothing.

The criminal justice system is not structured to take account of the 'lived experience' of repeat racist targeting, so the harm done by offenders is only partially addressed by any penalty they may receive. The trauma felt by the victim consequently goes without full validation or closure. This is a significant factor if the purpose of the criminal justice system is to bring about a resolution for the victim and action against the offender commensurate with the harm the victims has been caused and how the offender has contributed to that harm. Of course, justice for a given offender must be commensurate with the severity of the offence they committed, rather than being handed the penalty for the cumulative harms caused to the victim by the actions of other racists. (Iganski and Lagou, 2015) acknowledge this. They support the uplift in sentencing for racially motivated offences by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 but argue against a blanket uplift that implies *'every victim of hate crime must experience greater harms than every victim of parallel crime.'* In their analysis, they found that victims did not experience the same output, in other words and as the title identifies *'Hate Crimes Hurt Some More than Others.'* (ibid., p. 40). The impact and victim's responses to racist violence in Newcastle is documented in findings chapter 1.

2.70 Summary

England and Wales have been home to centuries of racist victimisation. The literature has documented historical events of racist rioting, serious assaults, stabbings, and murders of BAME people in waves of violence. Much of the violence has been accompanied by antagonistic political language or events that often caused it, supported it, or emerged from it. Racist incidents are evidently dynamic in their nature, extent, and frequency. On a positive note, the large-scale severe violence documented in the early part of the chapter has, for now at least, subsided. However, globalisation and advent of social media has meant that some events can still predictably be followed by ugly reminders that many people in this nation are prepared to unleash violence and hatred, justified by, or bonded to racial prejudices, targeting vulnerable groups. In some cases, it is conscious and deliberate manifestations of prejudices that motivate violence; in the majority of incidents, it is simple thuggery and bullying, but offenders have an available collective language set they can use to appear more powerful against their vulnerable victims. Despite its long history, there is still a lack of academic agreement about the definition of racist crime and hate crime more generally. The legal framework does provide clarity of both operational definition and actionable procedure for practitioners responding to crimes in the appropriate, proportionate manner, particularly in seeking sentencing uplifts.

While there is a lot of doubt cast upon the reliability of police data on the types and frequencies of racist crime, and changes in recording have skewed apparent trends, the data still has utility. However, it is only by listening to the accounts of victims, that we can capture the true nature and impact of racist incidents. There is agreement among academics and in government reports, that racist incidents are experienced as an ongoing process, not in one-off events. All incidents blur into one lived experience. This experience, and the harm it causes extends beyond primary victims to their families and communities. Incidents happen in various locations that cannot be avoided, such as schools, around the home and in the workplace. Their impact has a damaging effect on the wellbeing of victims, striking at the heart of the victim's identity, an identity that cannot be escaped. Their nature has evolved, and the spread of racist hate online has increased

exponentially. However, that does not mean racist violence has subsided on the streets, in favour of online media.

This part-chapter has examined the literature that describes the phenomenon of racist incidents and examined the major themes therein. It is the academic angle on Findings Chapter 1 of the thesis, that sought to determine the nature, extent, and impact of racist incidents on victims, their families, and communities by conducting face to face interviews. It provides a key structural component to the empirical foundations that are made complete as the discussion chapter integrates findings with literature to expose the true harm of racist incidents. This then establishes a comprehensive understanding of the problem against which the policing response can be explored in the next part.

Chapter 3, Literature Review (b), Policing racist violence

3.00 Introduction

This explores the literature around policing race and policing racist violence. It provides the national perspective that connects with the research site laying the foundations for the discussion chapter to combine literature and findings.

The literature on the post-war period portrays a police service that is white male, has white colonial values, and has no intention of recognising the needs or the suffering of black and Asian communities. It highlights the context in which relations declined between the police and BAME communities, and how that relationship was reflective of society generally at that time. It is the origin of much of the mutual mistrust, ignorance, racist violence, and racist legacy that emerges in the findings chapter and discussion. The section on Scarman continues the theme on policing race, highlighting the methods by which Scarman thought the decline in community race relations could be reversed. Macpherson explored the failings that led to the flawed investigation of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence and produced recommendations that were not hugely dissimilar to Scarman's but prompted significant shift in policy. Despite both landmark enquiries, significant failings remain, albeit policy change has made a positive difference over the last two decades (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). On the ground this is not always obvious, BAME people still experience poor responses to reports of racist violence (ibid.); police culture around dealing with racist violence remains problematic; and the value of multi-agency responses to racist violence is relatively unproven compared with other more established multi-agency forums.

This part of the chapter starts with a review of police race relations after WW2, including a BAME recruitment policy that thankfully demonstrates significant progress has been made since. It then details the decline of the already poor race relations through the 1960s and 70s, at the same time as racist violence was increasing.

The two landmark enquiries of Scarman and Macpherson follow this, before the chapter closes with the ongoing themes of victim experiences of: policing; police culture and the multi-agency approach.

Part 2, Policing Racist Violence: explores the literature around policing race and policing racist violence. It provides the national perspective that connects with the research site laying the foundations for the discussion chapter to combine literature and findings.

3.10 The historical context

The primary focus of this study is policing racist violence. However, heavily impacting the protection and support BAME communities feel they get from the police, is the turbulent relationship between police and black communities in particular (College-of-Policing, 2022). Popular discourse about the origins of poor relationships between police and BAME communities tends to focus on the newsworthy stories of riots in the latter years of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980's. In reality however, the decline in relations started shortly after the end of World War II (Whitfield, 2006b).

3.11 Post-war policing race: white workforce, white values

Post war police recruitment favoured the pool of men who were ex-forces or had served as police officers in the colonies. Their values, like those of society generally, held little regard for race relations or tolerance and consequently they had little interest in learning about or embracing the cultures of black and Asian immigrants (Whitfield, 2006a, in, Rowe, 2013). Police officers, understandably struggled to accept the concept or impact of racial prejudice and racist violence. In the 1950s, Whitfield explains racial prejudice was a fact of life for BAME people, which led to confrontation and inevitable police deployment. At that time, police forces in England and Wales were exclusively white. This, coupled with their dismissive attitude to the racist element of violence; disinterest in engaging with the concerns of immigrant communities; and the perceived lack of positive outcomes of their interventions, led to feelings amongst the BAME communities

that the police service was racist. Racist views indeed existed among all ranks in the service and the few officers who tried to engage with BAME communities were discredited by their peers (Whitfield, 2003). Whitfield's thesis explains a dichotomy between the priorities of policing at that time, to fight crime and prevent disorder; and the expectations of black and Asian communities, victims particularly, who struggled to understand how police operated. This was highlighted when BAME people reported non-crime issues and were signposted elsewhere by police, who had no powers to deal with business that simply was not theirs. This was misinterpreted as voluntary inaction and led to mistrust within the immigrant communities. Any need to build trust and confidence with minority communities in that era, was way off the police radar. Consequently, there was very little appetite to report racist violence to the police, who at that time, were the only organisation who could take such a report. In the Newcastle context, there were proportionately fewer BAME people living in the area, hence the opportunities to engage and understand their experiences was more limited than it was in some of the larger cities.

3.12 Recruitment of BAME officers

In the late 1950s: *'neither the Home Office nor the Metropolitan Police were prepared to consider the possibility of recruiting an applicant of dark skin tone'* (Whitfield, 2004 in Rowe, 2013, p. 5). That such sentiments did not create a national outrage, is testament to the prejudices that were held in society at large in that period. The racial disorders of 1958, and the racist murder of Kelso Cochrane highlighted unavoidably, that racial tensions existed and prompted the beginnings of engagement between police and BAME communities. To help resolve tensions, community leaders suggested appointing BAME people as special constables, and offered to train police officers in Caribbean culture. Both offers were rejected as undesirable, by Met Commissioner Sir Joseph Simpson. Simpson, under pressure from community leaders and representatives of Commonwealth Government did begin some engagement, but this was to protect him and his force from criticism. In other words, this was for entirely self-focused reasons. This was the case for many years, among many forces (Whitfield, 2004).

3.13 The 1960s to 1979: Racist violence increases while race relations decline

The 1960s saw police race relations continue to decline, albeit there were occasions when police did take positive action in suppressing anti-immigrant disorders and arresting offenders (Panayi, 1996). The question of why, despite the growing BAME population, there were still no BAME police officers was, however, still pertinent in 1963. The Assistant Commissioner responsible for recruitment into the Metropolitan Police said:

'The truth is of course, we are not yet prepared to recruit any coloured men... coloured police officers would be at a serious disadvantage, and it would be unreasonable to expect them to perform the specialised duties of a policeman effectively' (ibid., p. 118).

This attitude may reflect the elitist, arrogant persona exhibited by the rank and file of the era, who through racial prejudice, actually believed that BAME police officers could not do the job effectively. It is likely however, that in an organisation and era when peers and society were not accepting of immigrants, they would face such disadvantage through direct racist behaviours, that they would, in effect, be unable to operate effectively nor maintain any sense of wellbeing. Although the evidence presented by Whitfield and the reports relate predominantly to the Metropolitan Police, these views were held in all ranks of the police service generally.

3.14 The view from outside the police

The Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration explored the opinions of policing of a range of BAME communities in several parts of England. In Manchester, they found that racial prejudices held by police officers were being seen in how they conducted themselves on the streets (Parliament, 1972). Young BAME people reported that police would assault them, and they were searched at a disproportionately high rate (ibid., p. 6). The 'Black Alliance' in Cardiff explained that '*racist sentiments which existed in "the large majority" of people were bound*

to be reflected in the police' (Parliament, 1972, p. 8). They noted that this meant the problem was far broader than the police alone, albeit the police were at the *'forefront of everything'* and hence became the target of community frustration. Goulbourne discusses the notion of police brutality towards African Caribbean people in British cities, in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, citing (Solomos, 1988, Humphrey, 1972).

The late 1970's saw significant racist violence in Great Britain, as immigration and integration were strongly opposed by the British people (Solomos, 2003). Despite this rise, the lack of police engagement with the notion of racial prejudice, the failure to consider racism as an aggravating factor or as a motive for targeting BAME people, and the general lack of empathy towards BAME people, is likely to have led to a generally dismissive attitude by police to reports of violence of a racist nature.

Race relations in the 1980's, Goulbourne points out, was defined by two significant events, the publication of Salman Rushdie's book, *'The Satanic Verses'* (Rushdie, 1988) and earlier in 1981, the Brixton disturbances (Goulbourne, 1998). For policing, policing race in particular, it was the Brixton disturbances that had the major impact and implications, engaging the concepts of justice and fairness in a democratic society. The disturbances took place on 10th – 12th April 1981, triggering similar disorders in other cities in July of that year. It is broadly accepted that their cause, was the major decline in the police relations with the African Caribbean community (Bowling, 2002, Scarman, 1982).

3.15 Police Brutality and failure to protect victims of racist violence

Police brutality towards the young African Caribbean males was widely publicised in the 1980s. Standout attacks in that era were when plain clothes officers from *'Operation Swamp'* beat up a black man outside of Henry Fawcett school, an assault that was observed by teachers, pupils and parents (IRR, 1981); and police viciously beating a *'respected, devout, churchman'* (Goulbourne, 1998, p. 68). At the same time, the Asian communities in Southall felt police were failing to protect them from racist attacks by skinheads (Goulbourne, 1998). The two key elements

of this relationship between police and BAME communities are highlighted here. BAME communities were being subjected to brutality and over-policed as suspects and offenders; yet at the same time, were being under-protected as victims of racist violence.

In February 1981, the Home Office published the response to their study of racial attacks (Home-Office, 1981). The report concluded that BAME people lacked trust and confidence in the ability of the police as viable protectors against racist violence, considering them to be *'unresponsive to their needs and unrepresentative of the community'* (ibid., p. 17) The report found that when BAME people did report violence to the police, they were treated as suspects, often arrested, or questioned about their immigration status, and that available lines of investigation were rarely pursued with any professional rigor. Significantly, the report found that police did not grasp the meaning or impact of racist violence on victims (ibid.). Moreover, there were reports of police officers using racist insults and threats against such victims (Virdee, 1995).

3.20 Policing race and racist violence: From Scarman to Lawrence

3.21 Scarman and the state of race relations

Shortly after the Home Office report of 1981, Lord Scarman published his findings on the Brixton disorders, or more specifically as Bowling describes, to explore *'the crisis of policing the inner city black communities and prescribe solutions to it.'* (Bowling, 1998, p. 80). Unsurprisingly, he re-identified the dire state of police race relations, going beyond the police failure to protect black and Asian communities, to document police racism directly. Scarman conceptualised police racism as the occasional, *'ill-considered and immature'* behaviours of a few operational officers (Scarman, 1982, p. 106). This theory was later termed the *'bad apple thesis'* (Bowling, 1998, Mungham and Pearson, 1976). Bourne describes Scarman's appraisal of the situation as a *'whitewash'* (Bourne, 2001, p. 10), referring in particular to his position that institutional racism did not exist in policing or in Britain, nor was it systemic. The notion that a few bad-apple police officers, who were really just *'young, inexperienced and frightened'* were responsible for the

breakdown in race relations nationally represented a sustained failure to listen to the views of the BAME population (ibid., p. 11). It represented a reduction of the concept of institutional racism to being simply a perception of BAME people, and the behaviours of a handful of prejudiced individuals (ibid.). To provide a Newcastle context on this issue, findings chapter 1 gives some examples from the longer-term memories of Asian communities who recalled examples of police racism, but also examples in 2008.

3.22 Scarman's recommendations explored

Scarman made recommendations in his report, the police-specific ones are described below:

- i. Increasing the proportion of BAME officers in police recruitment.
- ii. Improvements in police training, supervision, and oversight. Scarman suggested reforms to learning around the role and impact of police in society; discretion; race relations; and continued professional development (Gaskell, 1983, Holdaway, 1996, Rowe and Garland, 2003a).
- iii. A review of police operational practice to strike a balance between community policing and heavy-handed operations.
- iv. The introduction of a statutory system for police engagement and consultation with communities

Despite challenges, Scarman did add inertia the process of strategizing community race relations into police and community advisory groups. However, the Broadwater Farm riots in 1985 demonstrated that this process was far from successful.

In the interim period after Scarman and through the 1990s, there was recognition by police and local authorities that a lack of attention and resources were being paid to racist violence, particularly in the regions with higher BAME populations (Wong, 2009).

3.23 Macpherson: the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry

The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999) examined failings in the police response to the racist murder of black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, in 1993. Stephen was attacked and fatally stabbed by a group of *'murderers..., young men, bent on violence'* (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999, p. 1). From their initial attendance at the scene, through their failed investigation, and insensitive family liaison, Macpherson found that the police response was *'marred by a combination of institutional racism and professional incompetence...'* (ibid., p.317, 46.1). The publication of the report was quickly followed by challenges from senior officers, who were outraged by the notion that police could be incompetent and racist. However, the Police Federation took a different posture, in stating:

'The Lawrence Inquiry Report is the most searing indictment of policing ever published. It is a catalogue of professional incompetence. It shows, with the help of hindsight, how mistake was piled on mistake, leading inexorably to the miscarriage of justice that has seen the murderers go free. It has also put the stamp of "institutional racism" on the Metropolitan police and the rest of the service' (PolFed, 1999).

The defences of the Metropolitan Police, could not stand up to this statement, forcing them to accept the findings (McLaughlin, 1999, in, Crowther, 2002). Police legitimacy had been in decline, as the previous section suggests, since the 1950's (Reiner, 1992). Scarman may not have had much of an impact on that trajectory, but the gravity of the Macpherson findings and the 70 recommendations he made, were both the culmination of that decline (Marlow and Loveday, 2000), and were the most impactful force for change in British Policing (Wong, 2009). Hall et al cite (Dunleavy, 1995) in asserting that *'policy disasters'* such as this longstanding issue, brought to a head by Macpherson, can create the conditions necessary for new thinking and positive organisational change (Hall et al., 2009, p. 33), overcoming even the most powerful institutional inertias. At a policing policy level at least, this is what Macpherson inspired.

3.24: Macpherson and institutional racism

The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry was, Hall et al argue, outstanding because of its iteration of institutional racism (ibid.), found to be a key factor influencing police failures in response to the murder of Stephen Lawrence. It elevated the concept and awareness to a position of national significance (Murji, 2007). Macpherson's iteration of institutional racism was:

'The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.' (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999, p. 30, para. 6.34).

Macpherson was clear in his assertion that racist motivation was not the causal factor instrumental in creating disadvantage, rather, it was the outcome of policing interventions that were racist. Bourne suggests that anyone working in an organisation *'whose structures, cultures, and procedures are racist'* would inevitably pick up and incorporate patterns of behaviour that are racist (Bourne, 2001, p. 19). Hall et al articulate this distinction in Macpherson's definition as institutional racism, not institutionalised racism (Hall et al., 2009, p. 105), on the principle that individual racists do not infect organisations, unless they are allowed to, whereas individuals can be infected by institutionally racist policy and practice. Institutional racism was mentioned in both the victim and police interviews conducted in this research.

3.25 Lawrence inquiry recommendations: drivers of 21st Century policing policy

Institutional racism was at the heart of the inquiry, and the report's recommendations were structured around tackling it. (Rollock, 2009) categorised and summarised Macpherson's 70 recommendations for policing as below. All of the recommendations are significant and have been the subject of much academic

and professional review. This literature review will consider only the recommendations that have a bearing on how police and partners deal with racist violence, using Home Office reviews of its impact by Docking and Rollock, at 5- and 10-years post publication respectively:

- i. **1-11: Openness, accountability, and the restoration of confidence:** this was accepted by Government and incorporated, as recommended, into a Ministerial Priority for the 2005/08 National Policing plan as:

'provide a citizen-focused police service which responds to the needs of communities and individuals, especially victims and witnesses, and inspires public confidence in the police, particularly among minority ethnic communities.' (Home-Office, 2004).

As policing plans influence force priorities at the policy level, the expectation was that practice on the ground would develop in this area.

- ii. **12-14: Definition of a Racist Incident.** The Lawrence definition of 'racist incident' (see 1.32 above) was almost universally adopted, accepted by policing agencies, and written into policy.
- iii. **15-17: Reporting and Recording of Racist Incidents and Crime.** Macpherson recommended that police and local partners such as housing, schools, probation, and local government work closely to improve recording and sharing of reports of racist crime and incidents. In 2000, the Home Office responded to this recommendation by publishing the Code of Practice on Reporting and Recording Racist Incidents (HomeOffice, 2000).
- iv. **18-22: Police practice and the investigation of racist crime.** In response to these recommendations, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) published the 2000 *Guide to Identifying and Combating Hate Crime*, which was updated in 2005, to *Hate Crime: Delivering a Quality Service.* Both guides have broadened their scope from racist crime to hate crime, including the protected characteristics of sexuality, faith, and disability.
- v. **Victims and Witnesses.** This group of recommendations was intended to improve the treatment of victims and witnesses. Replacing the 1990 Victim's Charter, the first Code of Practice for victims of crime was published in 2005 (OCJR, 2005). The code provided the statutory rights that victims could expect from police, and significantly, of partner agencies such as the Youth Offending Team and Probation Service.
- vi. **32-44: Prosecution of Racist Crimes.** Focus upon bringing racist offences to court, applying all available powers. Rollock suggests that research into the use of victim impact statements would be beneficial in understanding to what extent they have been used, and what difference they make to a case (Rollock, 2009).

- vii. **48-54: Training** – Racism awareness and valuing cultural diversity. Macpherson’s recommendations about police diversity training came 18 years after Scarman made very similar proposals. Little progress had been made in the period since Scarman, but Macpherson was a trigger for a more national roll-out of compulsory learning for all police officers and staff.

3.26 Summary of Overarching Themes

Bridging across the periods outlined above, to 2020, are themes that have been addressed to some extent in policy, though progress and noticeable change on the ground is less concrete in some areas.

The legal definition of racist incidents provided by the Inquiry has led to reasonably steady increases in reporting and recording of racist incidents by police in the decades since. Bowling states that prior to the Lawrence Inquiry, in 1985, 4383 racist incidents were recorded by police in England and Wales. This rose to 23,049 in 1999 (Bowling, 2002, p. 583). Chakraborti cites Creese and Lader (HomeOffice, 2014) in pointing out a levelling off of figures in the 2013-2014 period (Chakraborti and Garland, 2015), but this was short lived, as by 2020, it had risen to 76,070 (Statista, 2020). Whilst the increase in reporting and recording cannot entirely be attributed to the definition, its clarity is solid and likely to have been a major contributor. The definition could effectively mean, that it was no longer the police officer dealing with the case who decided whether an incident was racist, but anyone including the victim, could make the call. This then reduced the opportunities for police to omit the racist element of a crime or incident in their report, or at least made that omission more culpable if others had expressed their belief that it was racist.

Notably, the definition includes racist crime and incidents, with the recommendation going on to propose that: *‘Both must be reported, recorded and investigated with equal commitment.’* (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999, recommendation 13, p. 329). This is another example of where the necessity to rigorously investigate is highlighted. The challenge therein, for police operating in a performance focused context, is that time spent investigating a non-crime incident, will not produce any tangible outcome for the investigating officer or

team. There are electronic systems in place for investigators to manage crime reports to a conclusion (detection; or undetected closure), however non-crime incidents are likely to be closed with no further action being taken, unless they relate to a victim on an existing harm reduction plan or to a persistent violent offender. Furthermore, whilst a crime may be recorded as racist on the belief of 'any person,' to prosecute that crime as racially aggravated in accordance with the CDA 1998, would require tangible evidence of hostility based upon race, not merely opinion. The impact of this on how police in Northumbria responded to racist violence in 2008, is outlined in the discussion and conclusion chapters. With meaningful partnership working however, some non-crime incidents may be addressed by tenancy enforcement or antisocial behaviour units of the Local Authorities, social housing companies and other relevant agencies. In such cases, an incident that is recorded as racist, could still be closed, but would be recorded, by police at least, as having a positive outcome.

Despite these definitions and their intended purpose of eliminating the investigating officer's judgement about whether an incident is racist, there is a continuing failure to consistently record the racist element of incidents (Myers and Lantz, 2020b). This theme emerges in findings chapter 2 and is discussed as a factor that leads to both under-recording and under-responding to incidents of racist violence. Similarly, quantitative measures of performance generally, contribute little to the understanding of the kind of impact policing is having on factors such as trust and confidence (Rowe, 2004b). Recording and reporting will be discussed in later sections of this chapter.

Foster et. al. found from their surveys of police officers in 2005, that they experienced a range of anxieties following the recommendations of Macpherson. They anticipated a greater degree of scrutiny, and that the public would be more inclined to accuse them of racism. Additionally, a response of police forces was to make efforts to prevent officers from using racist language, a response that BAME officers surveyed felt was cosmetic (Foster et al., 2005a). This is a theme that emerges in the findings chapter 2; and is discussed in both the discussion and conclusion chapters, where it is argued that this anxiety leads police officers to take evasive measures in dealing (or not dealing) with racist violence. It is also

interesting that Foster found that 72% of police officers felt that Macpherson had a positive impact on policing and that the police service had improved as a result (ibid.). Again, this theme is picked up in the findings and discussion chapters, as in the 2020 interviews, officers felt the service had improved, albeit they spoke about recent improvements.

3.30 Contemporary Issues in Policing Racist Hate Crime

Police have faced challenges in tackling online hate crime since it became more prominent with social media. Initially, it was considered to be beneath the threshold of relevance to policing, or too trivial, and hence was effectively ignored (Williams et al., 2013). Once recognised by Government as an issue that police should be dealing with, they found themselves unable to do so effectively due to the *'prevalence versus capacity'* ratio (Williams and Pearson, 2016, p. 8). Additionally, as much of the online hate is held on US servers, investigations and prosecutions were time consuming and burdened by cross-border law enforcement complications (ibid.). The prosecution of the people involved in the racist social media abuse received by the England football squad following the European cup final in 2021 is evidence that the capability to prosecute is now available. Of course, press reporting of the game and the posts made this a high-profile incident. The England squad, as then Prime Minister Boris Johnson said, were national heroes. The public interest in prosecuting the offenders in this case was very high. In the absence of these public interest factors, labour-intensive investigations are unlikely to proceed in this context. Yet Hardy and Chakraborti do not draw distinctions between the harms caused by hate in the online or offline environment, meaning online hate is causing a significant amount of harm and is under-policed (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). Partnership working in this context, needs to involve the social media providers in bringing both prosecutions and preventive measures (Williams and Pearson, 2016).

In the contemporary world of policing racist violence, Scarman and Lawrence remain the most prominent landmark reports that generated shockwaves through police forces nationally. Northumbria Police continue to use the Scarman Report and the Lawrence Inquiry in hate crime and diversity training for new recruits. The

reports are still relevant to those officers to help them develop a temporal context for their role in policing race and racist violence today. Facilitated discussion around the initial police actions at the scene of Stephen Lawrence's murder, the failings in the investigation and in the way Stephen's family and friends were mistreated by police, are used to help recruits understand where mistakes have been made and why their new role in policing race and racism is so critical in achieving trust and confidence in BAME communities. It is evident in those training sessions however, that the attitudes and behaviours of those criticised in the reports is vastly different to those of new recruits, many of whom were not alive in 1999. For those officers who were in post in 1999 and remember the strong feelings in the aftermath of those reports, the political, organisational and policy landscapes are now vastly different, led by a series of UK Government Action Plans, namely:

- *'Challenge it, report it, stop it: The government's plan for tackling hate crime (Government, 2012).*
- *'Challenge it, report it, stop it: Delivering the government's hate crime action plan (Government, 2014).*
- *'Action against hate: The UK government's plan for tackling hate crime (Home-Office, 2016)*

Most long-serving officers have accepted them, or adapted to them, believing that they are now providing a more appropriate service. New recruits accept them as policy norms, having never operated in the pre-Scarman/Lawrence era. The second findings chapter of this thesis evidences the shift in police participants attitudes between the first and second period of study, particularly in terms of treating victims of racist violence as vulnerable, however it does not broadly evidence a recognition of the historical legacy-context of policing and race. The College of Policing's recently published national Police Race Action Plan has recognised that most white European police officers have minimal understanding of the historic relationship between policing and black communities. The plan has 4 key objectives, to ensure *'Black people feel:*

- i. Not under-protected*

- ii. *Not over-policed*
- iii. *Involved*
- iv. *Represented'* (College-of-Policing, 2022)

Bridging these objectives is a promise to ensure police officers are educated to understand the legacy of the strained police relationship with black people that both Scarman and MacPherson attempted to resolve. A resolution that the recent Black Lives Matters movement and the racist messaging between police officers using WhatsApp uncovered in both the Metropolitan and Merseyside Police between 2016 and 2021 (Fekete, 2022), shows is still in its infancy. This plan was published after this study's empirical research was conducted, hence has not yet been implemented. The next section identifies how earlier actions plans have not necessarily translated into a more positive victim experience of policing today.

3.40 BAME People's Experience of Reporting Racist Violence

Reporting racist violence to the police or other agencies is widely recognised as being a last resort for many victims. In 1995, Virdee identified three main reasons why BAME people would not make reports as being a fear of repercussions from offenders who lived, worked or studied near them; low expectations that their reports would be responded to effectively by the police; and victims considered that police contributed to racist violence, rather than responding to it (Virdee, 1995). This broad themes also emerge in the findings chapters of this study. The establishment of community safety units, under the CDA 1998, supported Macpherson's recommendations around reporting and recording racist violence. Many such partnerships developed third-party reporting centres to take reports in neutral locations and specialist units to tackle racist incidents. These units would tend to be made up of local housing, police, schools, and victim support, who developed experience and expertise (Foster et al., 2005a). Though schools were specifically encouraged to report racist incidents to the police, there is evidence that they were concerned about exposing issues of racism and avoided doing so (Docking, 2005). In 2005, under recording was still widespread in the police, by officers who considered reports as too minor; failed to understand the definition of

racist incidents; or did not want the perceived additional burden of having to deal with a racist incident (Foster et al., 2005a, Docking, 2005, Rollock, 2009).

Hesse et al found that police in general, did not provide an effective response to racial harassment. Though *'insensitivity and racism'* were common themes, six main themes emerged from their findings:

- i. *The police do not treat racial harassment seriously (i.e., as a crime).*
- ii. *Where the police do respond, there is no follow-up.*
- iii. *The police do not take action against perpetrators.*
- iv. *The response of the police is not encouraging.*
- v. *The police do not provide support.*
- vi. *The police treat victims as the problem.* (Hesse and Waltham, 1992, p. 70)

The findings chapters of this study identify that the above themes were not dissimilar to what victim-participants in Newcastle described in the 2008 period. In 2018, Chakraborti reported that under-reporting of racist violence was still a concern. He cited two examples from his research where black males would not consider reporting racist verbal abuse because they believed police would not take them seriously. He reflects on how previous bad experiences of reporting, both direct and those communicated within communities can impact on the anticipated response police and other agencies will provide. Additionally, how practitioners are not expected to have any real understanding of *'vulnerability and difficulty'*, nor would they have any understanding of, or empathy with, the effect that racist violence has on victims. Also of concern, was that victims reporting hate crime to the police felt they were not being listened to, not being taken seriously and not being treated with an appropriate level of decency and empathy (Chakraborti, 2018). This concept of being under-protected is not new, however its significance is reflected in the UK's 2022 Police Race Action plan, which determines to make black people safer and improve criminal justice outcomes. Specific attention is drawn therein to preconditions of tackling racist violence and better understanding the needs and vulnerabilities of black people (College-of-Policing, 2022).

Under reporting is a problem, but moreover, it is a symptom of the deeper problems highlighted in the reasons why BAME victims are not reporting the full extent of racist violence. Hesse found that victims considered police response to racist violence was not effective, was not sensitive to the needs or experiences of the victim, was dismissive, and was itself racist (Hesse and Waltham, 1992). Such perceptions introduce the concept of secondary victimisation by the police response. Two decades after Macpherson, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, responded to a concern expressed by Baroness Lawrence, Stephen Lawrence's mother, that progress towards the 70 recommendations had '*become really stagnant and nothing seems to have moved*' (Parliament, 2021, para. 25). They conducted a review of the situation in 2021. The report, confirming Baroness Lawrence's position, concluded that despite increasing trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities being a ministerial priority in the Macpherson report, the recommendation was not being met nationally. Having identified a '*significant decrease in confidence among some black and minority ethnic populations in the last year,*' it concluded that increasing confidence in BAME communities is not a police or Ministerial priority currently (ibid., p176).

The report did find promising developments in how policing agencies identify and respond to racist crime, along with strong leadership in this area. This was described as a '*seismic change*' that happened as a direct result of the Lawrence Inquiry. There were inconsistencies across forces in how local responses were made. Victims of hate crime generally, had lower levels of satisfaction with policing responses and felt they had not been treated with respect. There was a lack of information on racist violence and how BAME communities experienced it, with a recommendation for further research in that area. The increase in police recorded racist violence vs the drop measured by the CSEW in their latest surveys, reflects both improved recording and improved confidence in reporting. The report is quick to point out however, that 76,000 racist crimes in England and Wales in the 2019/20 period, is very high. The most significant concern found in the 2021 report, was the rise of online racist crime via social media. The committee felt that progress in addressing this had been too slow and much needed to be done to support a contemporary policing response to this matter (ibid., p. 177).

3.50 Police Culture and Racist Violence

Bowling cites Reiner in arguing that in the early 1980s, police officers regarded victims reporting racist violence as unworthy of police attention (Reiner, 1985). There was a tendency to dismiss or ignore the racist element to the incidents and ultimately, the job itself was considered to be '*rubbish*' (Bowling, 1998, p. 251). Police would, consequently, often downgrade crimes and record them as disputes or neighbourly falling-out. At that time, the legal definition of racist incidents meant that violent racism would not have to be recorded nor dealt with as such. Interestingly, Seagrave surveyed victims of racist violence on behalf of the Home Office in 1981 and 1987. In 1981, it was predominantly victims who were discounting the racist element of incidents, rather than the police. However, in their 1987 work, that had reversed and in $\frac{3}{4}$ of cases when there was disagreement about a racist motive, it was the police arguing it was not racist (Seagrave, 1989). Whilst policy dictates that racist violence and more recently hate crime is dealt with appropriately and according to the victim's needs, it is the actions of the responding police officers, how they apply their powers, discretion, competency, and ethical values about supporting vulnerable victims, who determine the quality of the outcome (Hesse and Waltham, 1992, Virdee, 1995). In the hierarchy of [police] relevance, (Bowling, 1998) racist violence was not real police work. The advent of the performance culture, where frontline officers were required to hit arrest, detection, and proactive targets, also impacted on how they did the job. Measures, as Marlow points out, were purely quantitative (Marlow and Loveday, 2000), victim satisfaction did not count for much. With racist violence already being low on the hierarchy of relevance, the perception that the racist element will require more time or process by the investigating officer, and a perception that BAME people are unlikely to support a prosecution, such jobs became increasingly pointless, as they did not attract any tangible evidence of performance. The removal of quantitative performance indicators and the subsequent focus on victim satisfaction mid-way through 2010s, significantly changed the dependence upon tangibles. The appeal of responding to racist violence, therefore, could be improved if there is no pressure on the attending officer to hit detection or arrest targets and they are free, even empowered to spend time supporting the victim, if indeed workload allows. With the publication of

the 2000 and 2005 ACPO guides on identifying and policing hate crime (2.35, iii. above), police responsibility increased from law enforcement, to *'an explicitly anti-racist activity: one in which a proactive interventionary role is taken to challenge the problem of racism.'* (Rowe, 2004a, p. 141). Seventeen years after these ACPO publications, the 2022 Police Race Action Plan again commits that police will now take an anti-racist stance and reiterates that police responses to hate crime have improved. The 2018 HMICFRS report, *'Understanding the difference: the police response to hate crime'* identified that there was no consistent commitment among command teams to prioritise victims of hate crime (HMICFRS., 2018). The contradictions in this clearly highlight the huge organisational inertia that resists a change of movement in the context of both attitudes and behaviours, from those leading the organisation, despite the pockets of commitment to improve.

The compulsory diversity training, per Macpherson, rolled-out to police officers and staff had a mixed reception and impact in the early years. Though trainers rarely set out to be confrontational, heated arguments often arose. Many officers were outraged at the notion they could hold and act on prejudice; that there was any hint of racist behaviour behind the response and failed investigation of Stephen Lawrence's murder; or that stop and search of BAME people was disproportionately high through police racial bias. The sessions were very challenging for the trainers to facilitate (Rowe and Garland, 2003b). This training was intended to address the policing race agenda. It explored hate crime; explained institutional racism to officers who did not understand it; helped officers to understand how their actions, and those of their peers impacted on trust and confidence; identified how prejudices can impact on the quality of service delivered and how it was perceived by BAME communities.

3.60 Multi-Agency Working

The problem of racist violence cannot be addressed by policing agencies working in isolation, it is too multi-faceted for the powers of a single organisation to be effective. A comprehensive approach is required (Hesse and Waltham, 1992). The Home Office stressed this point, in a somewhat aspirational manner in 1989, stating *'the response to racial harassment would be greatly improved if all the*

agencies with a role to play recognise their responsibilities and took unilateral action... if agencies were to work more systematically together as part of a multi-agency approach.' (HomeOffice, 1989, in *ibid.*, p. 198) The Home Office went on to suggest that the impetus for establishing a multi-agency approach to racist violence could come from any of the agencies in the statutory or voluntary sector, it did not matter. But if none existed, it should be the police who initiate them (*ibid* 191-195). The problems were raised with agencies such as housing, local authorities and the third sector in the 1980s by Select Committees, and by 2000, 78% of areas had established multi-agency working (Lemos, 2000). At an operational level, Lemos found in their study of 67 local areas, that at an operational, casework level, 51% of areas had agencies working together on racist violence. They reported that resources were a challenge, that there were often tensions between agencies, but they were able to find good examples of agencies working well together. Partnerships formed to tackle racist violence, according to Hesse, should adopt 5 minimum requirements, which he states are: *'common objectives and perspectives...; equal and relevant status of "representatives"; clearly defined expectations and roles of the agencies; confidentiality...; a lead agency who is not also a domineering agency.'* (Hesse and Waltham, 1992, p. 200). Clearly experience of police behaviour had a bearing on these minimum requirements. Some initial partnership approaches had fallen foul of not meeting the objectives Hesse suggested, leading Booth et.al to coin the term MANGOs, to describe Mutually Non-effective Groups of Organisations (Booth, 1992, in, Francis and Matthews, 1993). To be effective, the Home Office proposed similar suggestions to Hesse above, the outcomes of which would lead to greater understanding between agencies, better outcomes for individual agencies and most importantly, would provide evidence that partners are taking racist violence seriously (HomeOffice, 1989, para. 191). Following Macpherson's recommendations, ministerial priorities, and requirements of the CDA 1998, led to the establishment of specialist units within police forces to enhance the service towards BAME communities. These units worked with partner agencies as a matter of daily business. Docking and Tuffin found, however, that response and neighbourhood officers viewed this as preferential treatment for BAME people, that would lead to resentment amongst the broader community who did not enjoy an enhanced service (Docking, 2005).

Sampson et al. conducted a study of the literature on multi-agency approaches to local crime in 1988. They proposed the existence of two models of joined-up working, albeit recognised the boundaries between each were blurred. The first model, termed '*the conspirational model*' was crudely described as a '*police takeover*' (Sampson et al., 1988, p. 479) wherein police task other agencies and sometimes the community, with police derived objectives. Citing Scraton and Donaldson, Sampson states this model becomes one of '*multi-agency policing*' (Scraton, 1985, p. 139) and, 'total policing' (Donnison et al., 1986, p. 58), a mantra adopted by Northumbria Police's Chief Constable Mike Craik in 2005. The model describes a partnership where tensions are likely, between the objectives of the police, versus those of other agencies, rather than agencies working together to resolve a mutual problem, in this case, racist violence. The second model, termed 'benevolent corporatism and paternalism' is predicated on the notion that representatives from key agencies will come together to resolve a community issue of mutual interest, as and when required. The outcome thereof, would be in the interests of the community, and brought about by collaborative multi-agency work. In the second period of study, police leaders explained (see findings chapter 2) the Hate Crime and Community Tension Monitoring Group, supported by the Joint Engagement Group and Joint Action Group, tended to be stood-up in a model that would fit the benevolent corporatism description from 2018, when ARCH was discontinued.

During the period of this study, partnership working in the Northumbria Police area had made significant progress at the organisational level, with layers of collaborative work being supported by policy in the field of policing racist violence. This is detailed in the research site chapter. Generally, the 21st century saw real progress in partnership working in safeguarding practice. Multi Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) were established alongside other thematic sections of vulnerability, formalised into policy and practice. For some groups, co-location was normal practice, for others, less formal arrangements would suffice. Shorrock found however, that some of the historic problems above, still existed (Shorrock et al., 2020). Establishing multi-agency partnerships remained complex, requiring a shift in single-organisational cultures; whether real improvements in outcomes for

vulnerable people result, is still unclear; decision-making and awareness of responsibilities is still a challenge; and as yet, no training in how to design and run a multi-agency group has been provided (ibid.)

3.70 Summary

This part-chapter has explored the origin and impact of poor race relations between the police and BAME communities. It highlights the failings of police and government departments to make early interventions to stem rising tensions and to build trust and confidence in the police. It sets falling race relations against rising racist violence and a situation in the 80s when black and Asian people were over-policed as communities and under protected as victims. This backdrop established a legacy of mistrust, violence towards the police and sometimes violence from the police, which still exists in the police-community dynamic. The Scarman report and Macpherson Inquiry provided landmark opportunities for reflection and change. Changes have happened, shift in culture and policy are evident in police and partnerships, but the situation on the ground, from the victim perspective still has room for improvement. Police performance in relation to racist violence is affected by more than the legacy of individual racism or institutional racism. Pressures to perform and meet tangible targets distracts attention away from the lived experience of the victim, as does an increased workload and reduced resource levels. BAME people still expect and experience poor police responses to reports of racist violence. Police culture and performance around racist violence is developing, but not yet fully mature. Multi-agency working has shown promise, and in many cases has demonstrably delivered solutions that are greater than the sum of its parts. Nevertheless, many partnerships still suffer from a lack of structure, hierarchical pressures, and self-interest. This often results in the needs of one organisation being dominant and adversely directing partnership work to achieve the aims of that dominant organisation, rather than meeting shared objectives.

This connects with Findings Chapter 2, and further supports the narrative of the discussion chapter, providing the academic theory against which the findings provide valuable insight and contribution to knowledge. It does this by critically

examining the literature on the historical context of policing and BAME communities, identifying the prominent barriers to the provision of a fair and viable policing service for BAME communities; and the policy measures that have been implemented to addressing them. The literature identifies:

- i. A legacy of poor race relations and an historic lack of professional motivation to resolve it.
- ii. Under-representation of BAME people in the police service.
- iii. A legacy of police racism, expressed as brutality, iterations of institutional racism and occasional examples of direct racist behaviours.
- iv. Lack of understanding of racist crime and its impact.
- v. The diversionary pull of a performance culture.
- vi. Challenges in establishing and maintaining partnership working with consistent positive joint outcomes.

The extent to which these issues have changed over the decades since WW2, as a result of policy and the landmark enquiries is significant as the discussion chapter integrates the findings over the fifteen-year period of this study, with what the literature is telling us. The boots-on-the-ground service delivered by police and partners to victims of racist violence has not been good, but it is improving. The uncertainty about the extent to which the above barriers are directly responsible for this service gap were subject to academic debate at the end of the 20th Century (Haacke, 1997)

Chapter 4, Methodology

4.00 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodological approach and research design of the study, to identify what was done, why it was done and to qualify the findings against the approach taken. To understand and explore the victim experience of racist violence and the subsequent policing response, demanded a research approach that was led primarily by what was pertinent from the victim perspective. Capturing research data that could create a valid, representative, reliable (Davies and Francis, 2018) and sufficient understanding of the impact that racist violence has on victims, and consequently what needs they had in terms of support and law-enforcement, required victims to disclose and discuss events, harm, feelings, and behaviours; then to explain to what extent the policing response met, or fell short of meeting their needs. The perspective of the policing family response was required to balance victim experience with that of the organisations who provide a service. The data would need to be such that it would contribute to conclusions that had value for both operational policing and academia (Davies and Francis, 2018). Emerging themes from the fieldwork informed the direction of the literature review. This allowed triangulation of extant literature and theory with the research findings (Moses, 2007)

A qualitative research design was the only way understand '*how the world looks to other people*' (Harding, 2019) and hence to obtain the in-depth perspective on the victim's experience of racist violence and policing. This is supported by (Silverman, 2000a) who acknowledges that qualitative research can provide a deeper understanding of social phenomena. (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Van Maanen, 1988, Silverman, 2000b) further validate the selection of a qualitative approach in gaining insight into people's lived experiences, whilst Van Maanen (Van Maanen, 1977 in Harding, 2019) argues that qualitative methodologies identify people's perceptions, assumptions, prejudgments and presuppositions. A constructivist approach (Costley, 2010), in ensuring that the victims social and individual derivation of knowledge from experience, had the highest priority in the research data and acted as the directional compass of the study to keep on track

with the victim agenda. My writing and research direction gave voice to the subjective, spoken real life experiences of participants.

This general methodology was adopted by Choi et al in their study of the victim experience and needs from restorative justice (Choi et al., 2010). Choi used qualitative, semi-structured face to face interviews with victims, to understand their perspective on needs and empowerment through the Criminal Justice process. Like Choi, semi-structured face to face interviews were the primary data collection method chosen, and focus-groups where I was able to access a group of participants at any one time. Though the victim paradigm (including their families and community) was the main driver of the thesis; the perspective of Northumbria Police and Partner Agencies formed a substantial part of the field study, in providing professional accounts of practice, partnership working, challenges and opportunities.

4.10 Background Context, a 12-year study

I started this thesis on a part-time basis in 2005, whilst working full time, as a uniformed sergeant in the Community Engagement Department of Northumbria Police. The Monday to Friday, office-based nature of the job, combined with the regular operational interventions in cases of racist crime and community tensions, created favourable circumstances to undertake a study on policing racist incidents. Following the initial project approval and research design processes, I commenced a pilot study to validate the field research methodology, interviewing a small sample of victims, police officers and staff, and members of partner agencies. The pilot study confirmed that the interview questions developed, and the target participants, would yield rich data and would follow the university's code for research ethics. The field study continued until 2008, when 41 interviews had been conducted and transcribed. Towards the end of that period, I successfully defended my work in the Mid-Point Progress panel.

In 2009, I returned to response policing, working a rotating 24/7 shift pattern, and had my first child. Work and domestic commitments substantially reduced my capacity to progress the research with the pace and focus demanded. I took the

decision at that time, to suspend the study. After 7 years as a response and neighbourhood sergeant and a year's parental leave, I returned to a more family-friendly shift pattern, working as a Training Sergeant in the People Development Department of Northumbria Police. In October 2018, this role brought me back into the Northumbria University academic context, as the university and police embarked upon the blended Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship programme. The unfinished work of the study had been weighing heavily on my mind since 2009, so it did not take a lot of encouragement from my primary academic supervisor to re-start it in October 2019. Being back in the academic context provided excellent opportunity and motivation to re-commence, update, and bring it to completion.

This two-stage approach created an opportunity to examine the impact of political and procedural changes on victim experience and service delivery across the period. It added a substantial amount of academic literature and research data to the evidence base, to track what changes had taken place in that time. This contributed richer data over two periods and ensured my findings were up to date, particularly in relation to:

- i. The victim experience of violence and policing response.
- ii. The changing police priorities; leadership; structure; force operating model.
- iii. Changes in racist incident reporting options.
- iv. The impact of austerity on organisations.
- v. National and international events.
- vi. New and emerging academic literature.

This second period coincided with the implementation of Northumbria Police's new Force Operating Model on 4th November 2019. This represented a major change in how police responded and followed-up incidents, whilst maintaining a neighbourhood policing service standard. I hoped that the impact of the model would have been evident in victim accounts. However, the lag between service changes and their impact on the ground, meant that only police officers were able to articulate any impact. The gap in the study introduced other challenges too. As I wanted to explore how the victim experience of racist violence and the policing

response had changed over time, ideally, I would need to speak to some of the original participants again. I found that most had moved-on or were no longer considered appropriate for other reasons given by gatekeepers. As a result, only one person was a victim-participant in both periods of the study. Police officers too, moved around the organisation and retired in the intervening time. The second round of police interviews were with new post-holders and people in new posts, meaning some had no experience of how the service was in 2008 and were unable to draw comparisons themselves. The new FOM meant that the operational remit of the main frontline policing teams had changed significantly. Similarly, due to the impact of austerity, the partners did not have such key individuals operating full-time in the context of racist violence in 2020, as ARCH and the RHPT were able to offer in 2008. These challenges are reflected in the discussion and conclusion chapter, and evidence the proposed further research on the back of this study.

Policing racist violence remained as much a contemporary issue in 2020, as it was in 2006, but national and international events such as the Covid-19 pandemic; Brexit; and terrorist attacks in the UK, introduced new dynamics of victimisation in communities. The two-stage nature of the study also provided opportunity to support existing theory around the impact of significant political events, and to examine how the HCCTMG are able to respond to it.

The chapter starts by revisiting the research aims and objectives to focus on the kind of outcomes it set out to achieve, and how that changed. It then moves on to more focused methodology around the theoretical approach taken, literature review and the geographical case study. Next, the fieldwork design and implementation section describes how I accessed participants and the practical application of interviews and focus groups. Following that, security/coding/analysis section describes how participants were kept anonymous and how their contributions were analysed to produce findings. The final sections of the chapter discuss conducting doctoral research on the organisation that employs me, the politics and ethics of research, reflections, and conclusions.

4.20 Research Aims and Objectives

The brief thesis title 'Policing Racist Incidents' provided a high-level description of what this study is about. The research aim however is defined in more detail by the original research question:

Aim: What is the impact of racist incidents and crime on victims, their families and their community within Newcastle and how does the response provided by Northumbria Police and partner agencies address their needs and expectations?

Gaining an understanding of the victim perspective of the experience and impact of racist incidents; and the response provided by Northumbria Police and partner agencies was the primary focus of this study. Secondly, gaining an understanding of the challenges and organisational practices of the policing service providers, was required to compare with the victim experience, and facilitate the development of discussion and conclusions about the service provision. In keeping with definitions of research aims (questions) and objectives, (Davies and Francis, 2018), the research question is the overarching statement of intent that describes the '*scope, scale and conduct*' of the inquiry; whilst the objectives break down the aim into purposes (Harding, 2019, p. 28), The objectives followed a logic and structure that steered the thesis, through identifying the experience of racist victimisation; the harm it caused; what the victim reasonably needed and expected vs the reality of the service they received; to a position of knowledge, where policing response policy and procedure could become more effective and efficient in addressing victim needs. The original objectives were:

1. To examine and qualify the nature, extent and impact of racist crime and incidents on victims, their families, and their community.

Key under this objective was to give voice to the victim experience in the case study area, to highlight what had happened, and to enable comparisons to be drawn to the national situation.

2. To identify the needs of the victims, families, and communities in response to their experiences.

Following on from objective 1 that established the nature and scope of incidents the victims had experienced, objective 2 was to allow them to identify what they needed and expected from the policing family as a result.


3. To examine and evaluate the current and developing response options delivered by Northumbria Police and partner agencies.

Both the victim and policing agency perspectives on service delivery was examined under this objective, to provide balance, and to enable explanations to be drawn in the discussion chapter, about what led to the victim experience.

4. To advise and inform the police and partners in aligning their response to racist crime and incidents to match the needs of the victims, their family and community.

By gaining an understanding of the gaps in service delivery; what works well; and what the capabilities and capacities of the policing family are, an outcome of this study is the provision of realistic proposals on service improvements in policing racist incidents.

The diagram below (Fig 1) illustrates the progression from the brief thesis title, building knowledge of the situation through the field study and literature review, and synthesis of the data to produce the study outcomes. It shows how the research objectives followed the aim and answered the research question.



While the aim of the study, to understand the impact of racist violence on victims and assess the response provided by the policing family remained unchanged, there was necessary change in the methodology. This was to accommodate and evaluate the organisational; political and social changes that happened between the two periods of study. New academic literature that was published across the timeframe was also incorporated to ensure the study was fully up to date. This required revision of the original research objectives to ensure the two-stage nature of the study was reflected and would lead to richer findings. The introduction chapter presents the revised findings, which are shown again below to illustrate how they developed from the originals:

Objective 1: To examine and qualify the nature, extent and impact of racist crime and incidents on victims, their families, and their community; and what if any changes are evident since 2009.

Objective 2. To identify the needs of the victims, families, and communities in response

to their experiences.

Objective 3: To examine and evaluate the current and developing response options delivered by Northumbria Police and partner agencies and assess how this has changed since 2009.

Objective 4. To advise and inform the police and partners in aligning their response to racist crime and incidents to match the needs of the victims, their family and community.

The revisions to the objectives were made to capture what was qualitatively and quantitatively different about the victim experiences over time. Knowing that there had been significant structural change in the policing organisations, particularly through austerity, was a key element to the timeline perspective here, and of interest was where and how those changes were being felt.

4.30 Methodology

My intention was to avoid starting the study with any preconceived ideas about what the experience of racist violence and policing responses was going to be. That was to prevent any assumptions or prejudices I may hold, or had experienced professionally, from creating bias in how I framed the study questions. It also recognised what Foster et. al., in their assessment of the impact of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry assert that racism needs to be understood from the perspective of those subjected to it (Foster et al., 2005a). As a white European, I had not had direct experience of it, and did not want my racial, cultural, religious, or professional standpoints to influence how I interpreted the participant's responses. That meant I was starting with data collection and analysis, rather than working from existing theory. According to Harding therefore, that made my approach inductive (Harding, 2019). This approach was enabled by using semi-structured interview questions to guide conversation with respondents towards identifying and evidencing the essential elements of the victim paradigm, giving them the space to express themselves. As victim experience and perception were the prime drivers of the study, its focus was directed to the greatest extent, by what victims

said were their major issues. This was contrasted by data from professionals in the field of policing, supporting victims, and community leaders. Police officers and other professionals, particularly those more senior in rank, or with expertise in this field were, like some community leaders, classed as what (Marshall and Rossman, 2006) terms 'elite' persons. Such individuals, in accordance with Marshall, were influential, prominent, and well informed enough to offer expertise and research data. Capturing and documenting the experiences of victims and front-line professionals, however, did provide the richest, and most accurate form of first-hand, unbiased data. The methods used involved:

- i. Literature review.
- ii. Elements of a case study approach.
- iii. Individual interviews (primary source).
- iv. Focus groups.

4.31 Literature Review

Following the description set out in (Ridley, 2008), the literature review: contextualised the study by providing the historical background of racist incidents in the United Kingdom; brought it up to date, situating the research within current debate, issues and questions; identified and discussed the theories and concepts of policing racist incidents, upon which the research was based; defined the terms used in the text; showed how this research related to that of others in the field, in particular to the gaps in knowledge it addressed; and identified why there was a current demand for research in this field.

The foundational literature review took place between building the initial project approval document and the mid-point review, 2005 to 2009. There were two main sections to it, namely:

- i. Literature review (a), racist violence.
- ii. Literature review (b), policing racist violence.

Literature searching initially used:

The National Police Library (Bramshill) database, for historic and up to date material from their multi-subject directory; National Police Library monthly online scanning service to provide new, emerging literature of the necessary scope up to 2009. I searched the Northumbria University library databases and obtained theses by other researchers around the subject area. As a cross check, I reviewed the bibliographies of other literature, including theses, which occasionally provided additional material.

The high-level, topical search parameters were: 'policing racist incidents; policing racism; racist incidents; racist crime; policing hate incidents; policing hate crime; hate incidents; hate crime. This provided a broad list of potentially valid literature to review. Additionally, as themes became developed in the literature review and discussion chapters, more specific thematic literature searching via the university library search facility and Google Scholar was conducted.

Following the break in the study, the opportunity was there to incorporate the impact of what had happened between the two periods, to include policing under austerity, changes in social policy and the impact of events on the experience of racist victimisation. The later part of the literature review followed grounded theory principles, in that it was led by the fieldwork (Harding, 2019), as the focus of the review followed the findings, themes and concepts that emerged from participant accounts.

My primary academic supervisor was also able to provide me with a substantial amount of valuable printed materials from previous research he had done.

Most of the literature in the field of race; racism; racist victimisation; and policing are built upon quantitative methodologies, particularly surveys (Webster, 1998). In capturing the lived experience of victims of racist violence, through qualitative methodologies, this study throws a spotlight on the phenomenon from the victim perspective, and from the perspectives of operators in the policing family. The literature review formed two distinct chapters in this thesis.

Chapter 1 looked at the post-war policing of race, with particular attention to factors that influenced policing racist incidents, the conceptual and legal framework, measures, extent, nature, and impact. Milestones therein are Scarman and after, Lawrence and after, and policing racist incidents in the 21st century.

Chapter 2 examined the continuities and discontinuities in policing racist incidents, the themes and issues arising in the literature. It provides the theoretical background and justification for the study. Moreover, it highlights what we currently know and supports the drawing out of the contribution this thesis makes in the discussion chapter.

4.32 Case Study

Being in post as a sergeant in Northumbria Police, with access to police officers, partner agencies and victims of racist incidents, it was both convenient and logical to conduct my field research by drawing upon a case study approach in this geographical context. Kathleen Daly (Davies and Francis, 2018) points out that there is no universally agreed definition of a case study, but adopts John Gerring's (Gerring, 2017, p. 211) definition. Gerring states that *'a case is bounded in time and space, and it comprises the phenomenon you want to describe and explain.'* In the context of this study, Newcastle upon Tyne was the spatial dimension, and 2005 to 2020 was the time dimension. Within that space and time, the primary data from the field study obtained was the victim experience and impact of racist incidents, and their experience of the policing response. This balanced and triangulated with the policing agency perspective of how that service was provided. The phenomenon being 'policing racist incidents,' per the thesis aim and objectives. Gerring states numerous objects of case study in the social sciences are valid and includes a *'racial-ethnic'* group which herein are the BAME victims of racist incident and a *'particular type of organisation or institution,'* (Davies and Francis, 2018, p. 483) namely police and partner agencies.

Newcastle has the geography, demography and history that provided ample qualitative data for a doctoral study into this subject. The case study methodology is recommended, according to Daly (Davies and Francis, 2018) for providing a

localised contribution to knowledge, with findings that had national value. Several case studies have been conducted nationally on racist crime and harassment. Hesse conducted the enquiry *'Beneath the Surface'* that explored the phenomenon of racist violence in the London Borough of Waltham Forest (Hesse and Waltham, 1992); Bowling, in 'A multi-agency approach to racial harassment' explored how early policing partnerships worked to tackle racist violence (Bowling and Saulsbury, 1992); and more recently, Netto and Abazie investigated the enforcement and broader options to tackle offending in 'Racial Harassment in Social Housing in a multi-ethnic city' (Netto and Abazie, 2013). Chakraborti conducted a four-year quantitative and qualitative research into rural racism by conducting postal surveys, followed by semi-structured interviews with victims. He also interviewed white residents in the area, to capture their perspectives (Chakraborti, 2010). This study differs from those above, in that the fieldwork sources were predominantly victims (as service users), but also representatives of the policing agencies (as service providers). It did not seek to engage with perpetrators, nor to obtain the perspectives of un-involved white European neighbours. Hardy and Chakraborti's most recent study emphasises the need to adopt a more rigorous approach to engaging those victims who have been rendered invisible by typical hate crime studies and by policing interventions (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). There is fluidity in the research approach I have taken to this study, not wishing to be restrained by the confines of previous work or the textbook descriptions of what constitute true case study. In reality, there is little academic consensus on the definition of a case study (Yazan, 2015). But the value of drawing upon case study methods, is in the contribution to *knowledge 'in such situations where the boundaries between phenomenon and geographical context are not clearly evident'* (Yin, 2003, p. 13). The Newcastle-Northumbria Police and Partner context was central to this research, but many of the findings were generic to the national and international perspective. Daly (in Davies and Francis, 2018, p. 483) points out criteria where case studies are valid methodologies. These are shown below, as they connect with the context of this study:

- i. *'Generate hypotheses, rather than test hypotheses:'* This was an exploratory study that built knowledge of racist incidents in the area; the

harm they caused; the policing response; and shed light on what mechanisms determine the extent policing agencies meet victim needs.

- ii. *'Have internal validity (ensure that the interrelationships in your sample are correct) rather than external validity (the ability to generalise from a sample to a larger population).'* Internal validity was a given, based upon the relatively large sample size and solid methodology. The integration of the local field study with the broader literature review allowed a degree of external validity, as identified in the discussion and conclusion chapters.
- iii. *'Understand causal mechanisms (know how one or more variables relate to the others) rather than predict causal effects.'* The major causal mechanisms explored were, incidents vs impact; policing response vs victim satisfaction; policing policy vs quality of response.
- iv. *'Have a deep, rather than a broad, understanding of phenomena.'* Giving primacy to the victim experience, adopting a large sample size, and the selection of some 'elite' participants yielded deep and valuable qualitative data. Similarly, interviewing a broad range of professionals, provided strong evidence of factors influencing how policing agencies can meet victim needs.

Based upon these four criteria, drawing upon a case study approach to guide research design is beneficial to the process and outcomes of this study.

4.33 Fieldwork design and implementation

As a confident interviewer, having experience of conducting, assessing, and directing police interviews with victims, witnesses and suspects, qualitative semi-structured interviews for primary data collection were an obvious choice.

Additionally, with experience of running focus groups, these would also be used to supplement data collected in interviews when groups of participants could be engaged together. This choice is strongly supported by academic text, e.g.

(Barbour, 2008, Hennink, 2011) which describe qualitative interviews as the '*gold standard*'. (Hennink, 2011, p. 109) breaks down the specific areas where interviews have value, each element having a direct relevance to this study as follows:

- i. *'In determining how people make decisions'* - police/partner decision making in prioritising and formulating an intervention, or level of service.

- ii. *'In examining people's beliefs and perceptions'* – evidencing and understanding the victim, police, and partner agency paradigm.
- iii. *'In identifying motivations for behaviour'* – why victims report/do not report; what factors influence policing attitude and response.
- iv. *'In determining the meanings that people attach to their experiences'* – how each category of interviewee interprets the situation and responds.
- v. *'In examining people's feelings and emotions'* – the impact of incidents; the impact of policing response; the attitude and challenges of policing responders.
- vi. *'In extracting people's personal stories or biographies'* – the lived experience of racist violence and policing response.
- vii. *'When covering sensitive issues'* – victimisation and policing
- viii. *'In examining the context surrounding people's lives'* – the impact on family and community.

To capture data that richly described the impact of the experience of racist violence and policing response, demanded, per (Harding, 2019), the detailed questioning of a small number of participants. By adopting the flexible semi-structured approach to interviewing, the real issues at the heart of the participants were elicited. (Gorden, 1969, in Harding, 2019) identified the advantages of interviewing as being capable of obtaining complete and immediate data, being able to guide participants to give their own perspectives and to afford the interviewer control over the flow and engagement.

Chahal and Julienne successfully used qualitative interviews with victims to gain a valuable understanding of the impact of racist victimisation on people in four case study areas (Chahal, 1999b). As resources allowed, I also conducted a small number of focus groups, with police teams and with one Newcastle BAME association.

In consultation with my supervisors, I designed a set of semi-structured questions for each category of interview or focus group: victim; police; partner agency. These were sufficient to lead the interview to address the research objectives, but flexible enough to give the participants space to express what they felt were the

real issues. The final question for each category, asked whether these had been the right questions for the participants. In doing this, the initial interviews served as a pilot study and should adjustments have been necessary, would have informed any revisions. The second period of the study required additional questioning that explored the impact of significant events and organisational development since 2009, such as austerity; the impact of terrorist attacks; Brexit; political changes such as new government, new Police and Crime Commissioner, new Chief Constable/s. Participants were asked about the impact of these changes, both in terms of offending behaviours and policing responses. The third sector organisations who operated in support of the BAME community across this period were also asked to reflect and advise on the changes they had experienced. Changes in the victim experience of racist violence and in service-delivery were an area where I was not confident that compelling evidence would be obtained from their accounts, particularly because it would be unlikely that I could interview anyone from the first period of study again in 2020.

Sampling conformed to Harding's assertion that it should be directed towards cases that will support emerging theory (Harding, 2019). This was enabled by the continued use of semi-structured questions, drawing-out meaning from the initial research data, and using additional pertinent questions to validate or challenge apparent findings.

4.40 Participant selection: profiles and contribution

4.41 Victims

The selection of victim participants had to ensure primarily, that they were able to speak about their experiences of racist victimisation and of the policing response they received. The requirement was that they had been direct victims of racist violence, regardless of whether the incidents were sufficient to make out a criminal offence, albeit most did; and that they had involved the police in response to one or more of those events. Secondly, I wanted them to be representative of the many and varied minority ethnic communities; gender; family circumstances; age; employment status; and dynamic variations such as recently dispersed asylum

seekers and established communities. The two main geographical concentrations of BAME communities of Newcastle West and Byker proved to be the predominant origins of most victim participants. Some victim-participants had moved around the area and were able to comment on their experiences living in predominantly white areas, and then moving to areas with higher BAME populations. The modes of access led to a sufficient number of victim-participants being available to provide the breadth and depth of data required, however predominantly they were from either the Asian or African communities. The Asian participants were second and third generation Bengali, Pakistani and Indian ethnicity, in order of decreasing population and sample size. In the first period of interviews, asylum seekers and refugees from central Africa were suffering a lot of racist violence, hence comprising the second major category of BAME victim classification in this study. In the second round of interviews, attacks on asylum seekers had reduced and only two African participants were available for interview. One of those was a community leader who was able to comment on the experiences of numerous African associates of his. Victim participants in the second period were predominantly Bengali and Pakistani, with the exception of one Eastern European.

The references made to BAME victims of racist violence in the field study, therefore, reflect a sample of the population that is narrower in diversity than the true cross-section of the local and national demographic. The data does not capture any nuanced experiences, perceptions or needs of communities such as the Chinese or Czech Roma in Newcastle. The contributions of the settled Asian participants are however rich in data, as are those of the African asylum seekers. Both these categories have experienced the phenomena differently, the Asian communities being more settled, while the African communities were emerging at the time of the study. The needs of these communities were sufficiently elicited in the field study. Table 1 provides specific details of each participant in this study, identifying ethnicity, role (if significant) and method of access. This ensures criticality in the definition of 'BAME' in the thesis.

4.42 Northumbria Police officers and staff

The sample of police officers was selected vertically and horizontally through the organisation, to capture the perspectives from a range of departmental and individual functions, each with a remit in the context of policing racist incidents:

- i. Response Policing Team (RPT or 24/7): Newcastle-based: Typically providing the initial response to high priority incidents. These officers would be the victim's most impactful and vividly remembered engagement with police. Their experience of that initial service could determine the level of satisfaction felt towards the service generally. The officer's contribution about their priorities, capacities and capabilities was the important data.
- ii. Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPT): Provided a primary and secondary policing response to racist incidents in their geographic area of responsibility, increasingly focused on vulnerability; investigation; problem solving; and community cohesion. NPTs were engaged as individuals and focus groups, with ranks from PCSOs to Inspector.
- iii. Newcastle Community Relations Unit (CRU, later re-named as Communities Engagement Team CET): Incident review and community engagement. This department oversaw the handling of all hate crime and ensured that neighbourhood teams conducted re-visits to victims of hate incidents. They provided a liaison role with vulnerable communities and individuals, developed strong connections with minority communities and managed the local Key Individual Networks for community engagement. I used a mix of focus groups and individual interviews with this team.
- iv. Community Engagement Department, force-wide: Strategic overview of hate crime and community tension monitoring. The department closed in 2009.

Senior ranking officers including Area Commanders and the Superintendent responsible for Hate Crime were also interviewed to provide strategic and tactical perspectives on policing racist incidents. The Area Commander was at the front line of policy, accountable for the overall direction and performance of Newcastle Area Command, the Superintendent was in a similar position, but also held the force-wide portfolio for Hate Crime. The policing of racist violence, whilst a fraction of the Commander's range of responsibilities, was a significant priority business area. The Chief Inspector of Criminal Justice was involved in oversight of the performance and direction of partnership working, particularly ARCH, and the role of the Community Cohesion Unit.

4.43 Partner agencies

Partner agencies with key roles in responding to racist violence were selected for interview and approached directly or via the CRU. Each of these agencies had their own core functions, but also worked in partnership with Northumbria Police in a range of operational capacities to police racist incidents or support victims. This provided perspective on victim experience; organisational services; the impact of partnership with Northumbria Police; and how well the range of partners can address victim needs. Partner agency interviewees were able to provide an account of changes to their own service; how partnership working with the police had evolved; and how this has impacted on victims.

4.50 Access and participant safety

Once approval was granted by the university ethics panel, the process of identifying, contacting, and arranging interviews and focus groups with victims; community advocates; partner agencies; and police officers began. The range of desired interview categories was designed and tabulated to ensure the correct breadth of representation across and within groups. Ahead of every interview or focus group, I emailed or handed the consent forms to the participants and made a pre-interview telephone call to allow them to clarify anything about the research or process.

4.51 Victims and victim-advocates

Access was initially gained by using the key individual networks available in my professional role in the Community Engagement Department of Northumbria Police. The Newcastle Community Relations Unit (Northumbria Police officers and staff) facilitated consent and access to people who were accessing police services. Members of the police Strategic Independent Advisory Group (SIAG) were able to provide a good range of victim-participants to work with from their associates. The SIAG was a voluntary group of community members who provided advice to police at a commander/executive level and were usually strong

community influencers and advocates. The respective member made the first contact with victims whom they were supporting, to seek their permission and agreement to be contacted and interviewed by me. I then made a telephone call directly to the participant to arrange a time, date, and place for interview. The interviews were conducted in locations appropriate for the victim, which was usually at their home address or community venue. Only victims who had access to professional or third sector support mechanisms were engaged, to ensure that if any post-interview welfare needs arose, they were provided for. The victim-participants were made aware that I was a police officer, with the understanding that the research was for academic purposes on behalf of Northumbria University, not the police. I attended interviews and focus groups wearing plain clothes, to minimise any concerns about repercussions and to ensure optimal disclosure of experiences. The relationships that developed during good interviews provided opportunities for a chat, and a polite hint that additional participants would be helpful. It also allowed a little ego building, as Gordon, described, by giving the respondent praise about the quality of their contribution, some recommended others for interview (Gordon, 1975). I ensured that the participant made the initial contact with prospective others, to obtain authority for this and to ensure that they did have access to a support network post-interview. A process of snowball sampling (Harding, 2019), or chain referral sampling (Davies and Francis, 2018), was then effectively used to ensure that a broad range of individuals, beyond associates of those already engaged with the police, were selected.

4.52 Police Officers

This was relatively easy, given my role. Access to interview police officers was authorised by the Chief Superintendent (Area Commander) of Newcastle, and the Corporate Development Department who monitor police research activity by simply asking them for permission and following-up by email. I contacted operational team inspectors and requested interviews with them directly. Once those interviews were conducted, I then requested further engagement with their Sergeants, Police Constables, and Police Community Support Officers, either individually or as focus groups. Police officers and staff were aware of my role as a researcher for the purpose of the study, but also reminded of my responsibility to

report any inappropriate behaviours that may be disclosed. This was done in a tactful manner, to ensure rich but safe conversations took place. All police interviews and focus groups were conducted at police premises.

4.53 Partner Agencies

Within each contributing organisation, I identified the most appropriate representative to speak to, in terms of geographical area of business; professional remit; and experience of working with victims and police. Both public sector and the third sector bodies were sampled and engaged. I made direct contact to partner agency representatives either in person, by email or telephone, according to the professional relationship I held with the respective people. Participants were aware of my professional role in the police, and that the study was being conducted independent of my role. Participants ensured gained authority to take part in the study from their respective senior manager. I contacted Newcastle City Centre to secure a Local Authority interview, and Your Homes Newcastle for the Social Housing perspective of both tenant support and tenancy enforcement.

4.60 Interviews

The fieldwork proceeded, gathering data guided by the agreed semi-structured questions, with flexibility to follow the direction that participants wished to take it. As I progressed through the second period of study, the COVID-19 global pandemic brought about the introduction of social distancing policy, eliminating the option of face-to-face engagement with participants. On Friday 13th March 2020, in anticipation of national lockdown, I conducted an interview by telephone, as a pilot, recording the conversation on a voice recorder. I emailed the participant information sheets and consent forms to the interviewees, to ensure procedure was adhered to. The interview was very productive and became my standard practice for the remainder of interviews. The University of Northumbria later provided instruction to cease any form of personal contact research during the lockdown period, which required that I continue to use the telephone interview method. The home-working element of lockdown resulted in a very slow response from those who I had relied upon to provide participants.

Harding states that there is a preference for face-to-face interviews in that they allow for complete communication practice (Harding, 2019) and that in a telephone interview, the conversation may be diminished by people using their telephone mode of communication, with brief answers, more to the point. However, Harding does go on to recommend that to maximise the productivity of a telephone interview, more thorough preparation, and briefing; encouraging the interviewee to seek a comfortable location for the interview and pre-arranging the day and time will help. I therefore conducted at least one telephone or Skype call with each participant, prior to the interview itself, wherein the nature and scope of the questions, purpose of the research and ethical considerations were discussed. This gave people the opportunities to ask questions of me, and to prepare themselves for the main interview.

A significant benefit of interviewing, particularly victims and community leaders, is that the interview can, according to Gorden, be a cathartic process, and the respondent actually feels better for having 'got it off their chest' (Gorden, 1969). This cathartic opportunity was evident in some victim interviews I conducted, and in one case led to the participant providing contacts of three additional interviewees.

4.61 Focus groups

In 5 cases, when I was able to group participants together, such as Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) or Police Constables from Neighbourhood Policing Teams, I opted to use focus groups rather than individual interviews. These were all conducted face to face, the norm for focus groups, (Harding, 2019). Like interviews, face to face focus groups allowed for a more comprehensive range of communication both between those taking part and between participants and myself as the facilitator. Having worked in a training and supervisory context for many years, I was already skilled at conducting focus groups both as a learning method, and as a means of capturing group opinion, problem solving and project planning. I used the same questions as for the individual interviews, and ensured that this was not simply a group interview, by briefing and encouraging participants

to engage with each other, by '*asking each other questions or making statements that the other participants respond to*' (Davies and Francis, 2018).

To prevent the more dominant members of any given group from limiting the involvement of the quieter ones, I ensured the groups remained small and effectively chaired the meetings to ensure all participants were encouraged to make contributions. I ensured that the police groups were all the same rank. Either all PCSOs or all PCs, to avoid any rank-based dynamic from impacting on participant's willingness to speak frankly.

Preparation for focus groups needed to be more thorough, as Harding points out that getting it wrong with a single interview is a frustration, gathering a lot of participants together for a focus group, then suffering a technical failure is far more problematic (Harding, 2019). This is acutely important when a group of police officers have given up their valuable time for this research, particularly when I aimed to secure further interviews with them.

Analysing the focus group data was more complex than single interviews, as often participants backtracked to earlier question topics, hence the logical flow was lost. I also found, as Krueger explained, the focus group acted as a learning event for the participants, as they bounced ideas off each other, influencing one another with their opinions (Krueger, 1998b). Focus groups were discontinued during the COVID pandemic for participant safety.

Table 1. Participants and engagement conducted

This table lists all interview participants and focus groups conducted, as well as how they were accessed and the date of the meeting.

Victim Interviews					
No	Date	Category	Description	Method	Access
1	16.05.06	Victim	African asylum seeker, Byker	Recorded interview	Your Homes Newcastle Staff
2	19.09.06	Victim	African refugee, Newcastle	Recorded interview	Newcastle United FC staff
3	02.10.06	Victim & supporter	African asylum seeker. Supported African community.	Recorded interview	Snowball
4	02.04.07	Victim & supporter	African asylum seeker. Community support and advocacy.	Recorded interview	Professional key individual network (KIN)
5	20.06.07	Victim	African asylum seeker.	Recorded Interview	Snowball
6	27.06.07	Victim & supporter	African asylum seeker. Community support and advocacy.	Recorded Interview	KIN
7	17.11.07	Victim	Asian family, resident Ncle 35+yrs	Recorded Interview	KIN
8	25.11.07	Victim	Asian, taxi driver	Themed discussion	KIN
9	28.11.07	Victim & Community worker	Runs support network	Recorded interview	Previous associate.
10	30.11.07	Victim and Civic role.	Settled resident and professional. Civic role.	Recorded interview	KIN
11	30.11.07	Victim and Civic role.	Settled resident and professional. Civic role.	Recorded interview	KIN
12	14.12.07	Victim	African Refugee. Youth and community worker.	Recorded interview	Snowball
13	26.06.08	Victim	Asian Youth worker, settled	Recorded interview	Snowball
14	18.08.08	Victim & youth worker	Asian youth worker	Recorded interview	Snowball

15	31.08.08	Victim & youth worker	Asian youth worker	Recorded interview	Snowball
16	30.04.07	Community leader (Asian)	Over 30yrs as resident and community leader in Newcastle.	Prof. discussion	Professional (KIN)
17	20.05.07	Community Elder (Muslim)	Asian community elder	Recorded interview	Snowball
18	4.07.08	Victims	Muslim community organisation	Focus group	KIN
19	10.07.08	Victim	Asian male (20yrs)	Recorded interview	Newcastle College
20	19.08.08	Victim & Civic role.	Asian female	Recorded interview	Associate
21	20.08.08	Victim & partner agency	Asian Muslim female	Recorded interview	Associate
22	12.02.20	Victim	African community support and advocacy	Interview	Previously interviewed
23	11.3.20	Victim	Sikh Community	Interview	CET
24	11.4.20	Victim	Asian taxi driver	Interview (tel)	CET
25	090420	Victim	Eastern European resident	Interview (tel)	VFN
26	100420	Victim	Asian shopkeeper	Interview (tel)	CET
27	130420	Victim	Student	Interview (tel)	CET
28	100420	Victim	Asian taxi driver	Interview (tel)	CET

Police Officers/Staff					
No	Date	Role	Location	Rank/Method	Notes/Data
29	24.6.06	24/7 Response officer	Newcastle City Centre	Constable Interview	Reactive policing; capacities; challenges.
30	01.6.07	Neighbourhood policing team	Newcastle East	Constable and CSO Focus group	Citizen focus; workload; partnership; priorities.

31	02.6.07	Neighbourhood policing team	Newcastle West	Constable and CSO Focus group	Citizen focus; workload; partnership; priorities.
32	27.12.07	Community Engagement Team (CET)	Newcastle	Constable and CSC Focus group	Victim needs; challenges.
33	9.05.06	Community Cohesion Officer	Newcastle Area Command	Police staff Interview	Community engagement: victim needs; challenges; Asian officer perspective.
34	01.05.07	Area Commander	Newcastle	Chief Supt. Interview	Strategic focus; organisational priority.
35	1.07.08	Criminal Justice	Newcastle Area Command	Chief Inspector Interview	Tactical/strategic; partnerships.
36	1.06.07	Neighbourhood Policing	Newcastle East	Inspector Interview	Tactical/strategic; partnerships; priorities.
37	20.05.07	Neighbourhood Policing	Newcastle West	Inspector	Tactical/strategic; partnerships.
38	14.11.07	Neighbourhood Policing	Newcastle West	Inspector	Tactical; partnerships; challenges; priorities.
39	12.11.07	Neighbourhood Policing	Newcastle West	Sergeant	Tactical; partnerships; priorities; workload.
40	23.02.06	Community Engagement Dept	HQ – race relations officer	Inspector	Strategic/Tactical; race relations; priorities.
41	6.12.07	Diversity training	HQ Training Unit	Constable	Asian officer's experiences
42	6.2.20	Neighbourhood Team	Newcastle	Inspector	Strategy, tactics, challenges.
43	12.2.20	Neighbourhood Team	Newcastle	Inspector	Skype interview. AVATAH; Priorities
44	21.2.20	Community Engagement Team	Newcastle	Sergeant	Engagement; partnerships.
45	4.3.20	Neighbourhood Team	Newcastle East	PC Focus Group	Victim engagement; safeguarding; challenges

46	4.3.20	Neighbourhood Team	Newcastle East	PCSO Focus Group	Victim engagement; safeguarding; challenges
47	14.5.20	Hate Crime Lead	Force-wide	Superintendent	Strategic; austerity.

Community Leader (informal)

	Date	Category	Description	Method	Access
48	30.04.07	Community leader (Hindu)	Over 30yrs as resident and community leader in Newcastle, now Freeman of the City	Prof. discussion	Professional (KIN)
49	20.05.07	Community Elder (Muslim)	Bangladeshi community elder and Islamic bookshop owner	Recorded interview	Snowball
50	4.07.08	Community Leaders	Muslim community	Focus group	KIN

Partner Agencies

No	Date	Role	Agency	Method	Access
51	05.05.06	Asylum (housing) support officer, Newcastle	Your Homes Newcastle	Recorded interview	Professional KIN
52	10.01.07	Racial Harassment Prevention Team	Newcastle City Council	Recorded interview	Professional KIN
53	22.01.07	Victim Support Newcastle	VS Newcastle (VCS)	Recorded interview	Professional KIN
54	15.11.07	ARCH	Newcastle City Council	Recorded interview	Professional KIN
55	13.3.20	Hate Crime Monitoring	Newcastle City Council	Telephone interview	Direct Contact
56	10.3.20	Victims First Northumbria	Victim Support Service	Skype interview	CET

4.62 Security, Coding and Analysis

The focus groups and all but 2 interviews were audio recorded. Each participant was given a copy of the Northumbria University Participant Information sheet, annotated to make it specific to this study, given the opportunity to read it and ask any questions. They signed the consent forms when face to face, or, provided electronic confirmation for remote engagement. Signed forms were stored securely in a locked cabinet at my home address, and electronic confirmations securely coded and stored on my password protected Microsoft OneDrive account. Each participant was offered the chance to read through a transcript to confirm the content, however none opted to do this. The audio recordings were transferred to OneDrive' account and given secure coded references. I personally transcribed each recording, mostly in full. Despite my best efforts and police interview/facilitation skills, several participants went a little off topic at times, so occasionally those parts were recorded as short descriptive notes within the body of the text, to avoid unnecessary work. Completed transcripts were stored under the same reference as the audio recordings, in my OneDrive account. The participant information sheets, audio recordings and transcripts were saved under titles that used anonymised descriptors to identify the nature of their contribution and the date, with coded references to avoid personal data that could identify them as individuals.

The process of conducting the interviews or focus groups, transcribing them into full text, then as Neuman advises, thoroughly reading and re-reading through them many times (Neuman, 2006), was the basis on which I extracted what emerged as the initial themes. This ensured that my analysis captured the most significant ideas and sections, as Schmidt suggests (Schmidt, 2004 in Harding, 2019). The themes did not always directly correlate with the questions I designed and asked, and this added to the fluidity of the study. I organised them initially by category of participant, victim, police, partner agency. These were data-coded and batched on spreadsheets in an iterative process to continuously develop the early emerging themes, rather than locking-in final findings, because as Yin points out, excessive focus on coding can divert attention away from the meaning of the material (Yin, 2011). The coding provided some benefit, because the amount of

transcript generated from 56 interviews and focus groups was huge, and as Harding advises, coding is important when working with a lot of data (Harding, 2019). Though helpful for creating some order to the data, coding was secondary to thorough reading, reflexivity, and challenging discussions and feedback from my academic supervision. The developing themes were supported by participant quotations extracted from transcripts, as evidence and statements to add impact to the subsequent findings chapters.

Early in the study, I experimented with the use of computer assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS), specifically NVivo. Advocates of CAQDAS argue that it can be a very efficient way of analysing data (Bryman, 2008, Gibson, 2009), releasing the researcher to spend more time focusing on what the data is saying about the topic of study. I found that the software approach tended to categorise the data quantitatively, focusing on the frequency of language used, rather than the subtle meanings and nuances reflected in the deeper context of conversations. Harding acknowledges this as a potential disadvantage of using CAQDAS (Harding, 2019). For this reason, I did not pursue the use of CAQDAS for the study.

Numerous guides on qualitative research argue that focus group transcripts need a different method of analysis to individual interviews (Duggleby, 2005, Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2009, Krueger, 1998a). Indeed, Krueger suggests that in focus groups:

'participants influence each other, opinions change, and new insights emerge.'
(Krueger, 1998a, p. 20)

I remained conscious of this possibility in conducting and analysing focus group data. However, my observations were that in some cases, the peer support in focus groups emboldened some participants to express and share their opinions, particularly on politically sensitive topics. This was an advantage of the focus group methodology and did not require any alternative methods of analysis.

4.70 Doctoral research in my organisation

My situatedness as a Sergeant in Northumbria Police, conducting doctoral research on a theme high on the political agenda, provided a unique perspective on the entire research, not merely the organisational response. This perspective has inevitably shaped the product, as identified by (Costley, 2010). My ontological standpoint, clearly influenced by 22 years as a police officer, shaped the kind of knowledge I sought to generate, my epistemology, and the qualitative methodologies applied to that task, (Davies and Francis, 2018). However, this is not standpoint research (Davies and Francis, 2018), the core theme being the victim experience and therefore a clear statement of my ontological and epistemological approach is in the value given to the victim perspective throughout. Nonetheless, Sprague and Kobryniewicz argue that the authority gained from having conducted a study that draws on the reflections of others and reflections on my own experience, demands a high degree of personal responsibility in the presentation of informed perspective, in keeping with standpoint theory (Sprague and Kobryniewicz in Costley, 2010). I needed to ensure that my informed perspective, therefore, was objective, avoiding or at least recognising where my personal ideologies or values and those of Northumbria Police may have influenced my writing. I drew on personal experience to provide balance to much of the academic corpus that portrayed very negative and prejudiced opinion of policing, and a working knowledge of the context in which colleagues delivered the policing response.

My post may also have had a negative impact on the willingness of police officers of lower rank and of victims, to be completely honest and frank about their attitudes and experiences. None of the victims I interviewed appeared to be holding back from expressing their real views on policing racist incidents. I did experience some hesitation in police constables in expressing their views about the organisational influences through policy and leadership practice. However, by reminding them that their opinions and contributions are anonymised, this barrier was addressed. Costley argues that insider-led research renders true anonymity to be almost impossible to achieve (Costley, 2010). There was inevitably a degree of ownership implied by particularly police and partner participants, of the

contributions they made. The responsibility on me, was to ensure that this was clearly articulated and agreed prior to interview; securely recorded and stored after interview; and written-up with respect and regard for professional, ethical and research boundaries. Obtaining the signature as the informed consent of interviewees to take part in the research and for the data they provide to be used, was authority for me to write and publish my findings. However, as an insider-researcher this was, as Costley points out, a more complex issue that did require a considerable amount of thought and consultation.

Though an insider (Coghlan, 2017), I looked outside to capture rich data directly from the victim experience and from literature. I also looked inside at the people, policy and procedure that shape response. I did not use the secondary data that was available to me, such as meeting notes, actions, operational orders, briefings, etc., but my knowledge of this material was likely to have influenced my thinking and writing. My position, particularly during the second period of the study, provided access to an element of feedback on what was emerging from the findings. By asking victims; partner agencies; and police interviewees about what I saw as emerging themes during interview; and by discussing these with my peers and of course my academic supervisory team, live feedback was available so support the validation of my work. This provided opportunity to address any disproportionate influence that my own ontology was having, by having other people to validate or challenge my themes. There is the risk that an insider-researcher, being fully engaged in work in the context of the research, may '*fail to see the obvious*' (Costley, 2010, p. 4). Costley recommends the researcher seeks external feedback to address this concern. In my former Community Engagement Department role, this risk was a real one, however with the guidance of my academic supervisory team, it was minimised.

Police culture is a broadly researched topic, (Rowe, 2004b). Rowe asserts that this culture shapes the world view that justifies and directs police behaviour. I had experienced this and microcosms of it, in and between police departments, even teams or rotas. As with many organisations or groups, there are those who join and immediately assimilate themselves, even model themselves to such group culture as a conscious and deliberate act. Others acquiesce and become partially

moulded to it, whether consciously or unconsciously, whilst a small proportion resist as far as possible. I fell into the category of those who at least try to resist any form of assimilation, having joined the organisation after 17 years of employment in industry at a range of levels, bringing a wealth of life experience. At least half of my policing experience had been non-operational, allowing me to maintain a perspective that was more observant of, rather than influenced by the typical corporate attitudes and behaviours developed by many police officers. My professional role also afforded convenient access to police officers of a range of ranks, police staff, and partner agencies in the geographic area served by the organisation.

I have been cognisant of how police attitudes and behaviours have influenced participant's contributions to this study, whether in relation to their own operational experiences, their perception of partner agency and partnership effectiveness, or the quality of service provided to victims of racist violence. I do however hold a high degree of respect and admiration for most police officers, who work very hard, with diligence, under circumstances and pressures that are increasingly challenging to the individual and the organisation. I feel a responsibility towards those officers to counterbalance their efforts respectfully and objectively against some of the historic academic literature that has been very critical of them and their leaders. My insider experience has facilitated fulfilment of this responsibility.

Considering how to include my experience in writing this thesis, how, where, and when to incorporate my informed opinion was challenging. Whilst I could have included it in the findings chapter, I chose to use it as an opportunity to robustly strengthen the discussion chapter. Therein I balanced my observations and experiences with emerging themes and theory.

4.80 Politics and ethics of the research

Seeking ethical approval to conduct research, demands that the researcher has considered broad and specific challenges as they relate to the protection of all participants. Noddings et al state that this duty of care is:

'a three-phased social process consisting of engrossment, empathy and disposition to act on behalf of another.' (Noddings et al., 2003)

At the initial project approval stage, ethical approval was achieved and authorised by a written account of my research aims, objectives and methodology; combined with a strategy to address any risk of harm; to maximise anonymity; and to prevent inappropriate use of personal data. Access to police officers was granted by the authority of Newcastle's Area Commander at the time.

Prior to starting the second period of research, I submitted a far more in-depth ethical approval request, having rated my research as 'high risk' according to university standards. This high-risk element was primarily due to the vulnerable nature of victims of racist violence who I needed to engage with. I obtained organisational authorisation through our Corporate Development Department, who obtained the consent of the Head of People Services and new Area Commander of Central Area Command.

There were a range of ethical considerations specifically relating to the nature of this research:

4.81 Victims

- i. Victims of racist violence were deemed vulnerable by Northumbria Police in the second period of study. Costley argues that the interview process requires participants to expose their vulnerabilities (Costley, 2010). This implied a more committed involvement of myself as the researcher, rather than simply being an interested observer, particularly because the participants knew my profession.
- ii. It was considered inappropriate for me to access victim details from police records, hence I needed to go via a gatekeeper. I arranged that the gatekeeper would initially be the Community Cohesion Unit (CCU), who were in support of existing victims and could identify those appropriate for sampling.
- iii. The use of the CCU as my gatekeeper, ensured that those victims I approached, had an existing support structure they were engaged with. This support would have been available, should the interview process have caused any further distress that needed intervention.

- iv. As a police officer, I was putting myself in a situation of potential risk when visiting the home addresses of victims and conducting interviews. I made my colleagues aware of what I was doing and always had my mobile phone with me in case I required assistance.
- v. Victims could have disclosed offences that were unreported, which may have required follow-up from me. They may also have spoken about issues of misconduct, which again may have required action from me.
- vi. I had to be careful to ensure that victims were not left with any unrealistic hopes that this research would result in any quick fixes to their situations.

4.82 Police officers and policing family

- i. Police officers and partner agency representatives were very willing to be interviewed or attend focus groups in both phases. As with victim-participants, police and partners needed to feel that if I was given any information that could harm them (professionally/reputationally), I would not do so (Costley, 2010). Therefore, I always provided a pre-amble into the interviews as well as a participant information sheet, which was explained to them.
- ii. The participant information sheet was also explicit that should evidence of misconduct or gross misconduct be given, my professional role would require that I reported it.

For all data collection, there was a political dynamic between me and participants in relation to rank, role, status, experience, and expertise. When interviewing officers who were junior in rank, I needed to ensure they were comfortable in speaking frankly, likewise I wanted to ensure that those senior in rank understood the nature of my research and were committed to supporting it. In victim interviews, the risk of a power imbalance needed to be carefully managed, to ensure that there was genuine informed consent.

4.90 Reflections on the Study

This study has been a challenging, yet very rewarding experience. The time commitment in doing it part-time, felt excessive and often made completion seem unachievable. When I changed roles and returned to operational policing, this feeling led me to pause the work. On reflection, having returned to the study years

later when I had a young family, it was clear that it could and should have been done in one go, back in 2009.

Having conducted far more interviews than would be required of a PhD, particularly capturing the thoughts, feelings, and experiences of my participants, generated a strong feeling to complete the study and produce a thesis that really does justice to their efforts.

I have gained deep insights into the experiences of victims of racist violence in Newcastle directly, but also into the academic literature that describes the picture nationally and internationally. I have needed to plan, structure, and organise my time around a demanding full-time job, a demanding full-time family, and business interests. As a procrastinator, this has been challenging, particularly as chapters were submitted to my supervisors and returned with what appeared to be vast amounts of revisions to be made. However, with perseverance came personal development, and the revisions resulted in far more focused and academically presentable writing.

The semi-structured approach with guideline questions yielded some rich conversations which in turn generated valuable data. In a small number of the interviews with police officers, their attitudes reminded me of the defensive dialogue I had witnessed in my diversity training sessions between 2001 and 2004; others surprised me with frank denials that they've seen racism in the police or have dealt with racist incidents in their work. Others spoke in elitist language about how good they are as individuals or as a team. In general, however, the participants were supportive of the study and were willing to contribute. Many professional participants were a little nervous in answering questions about what policy and procedure directs their work in this context and consequently that specific question did not produce real data of interest

The depth and breadth of data obtained from participants in the first period of study, proved sufficient to enable the creation of findings in this study that were valid and reliable both in 2007 and remained valid in 2020, showing what had changed and what remained the same.

Participants in professional roles were able to talk about the changes they had experienced in the service provision they were involved with, as the professional impact of conditions such as austerity, were obvious to them. Only one repeat victim interview was possible with an advocate of the African community, who was able to speak about changes over time.

Victim participants nevertheless generated a very rich range and depth of research data. The thesis objective, 'to determine the experience of racist violence and the policing response,' meant that victim-participants who had involved the police at some time, were the optimum population to be sampled. The experiences, perspectives, and rationale of those who had never contacted the police was not explored herein. Such individuals were likely to have been able to provide different contributions and viewpoints to those who access services. This is a minor limitation to the scope of this study insofar as it examines the impact of racist violence. As participants who were already accessing support were able to talk about both victimisation and response, they were the richest source of data relevant to the objectives and were the most readily available. Many victim-participants, however, were able to speak about occasions when they opted not to involve the police and gave their reasons for not doing so.

I found it relatively easy to establish rapport with almost all participants and this led to very productive conversations. Victims were very willing to talk about their experiences of racist violence and the harm it caused them. They were also willing to describe the policing response and how well it met their expectations, citing some interesting examples to support their accounts.

4.91 Conclusions

This chapter started with the research aim and objectives to focus the methodology on what the study was about and the impact that conducting it over two distinct periods of time had. The methodology sought to establish the core issues at the heart of policing racist incidents, by conducting a qualitative case study in the geographical area of Newcastle, and a literature review based on national and international material. Research design and implementation yielded

a total of 56 interviews and focus groups, despite the latter part being impacted by the restrictions necessary in the COVID 19 pandemic. The chapter identified how the participants were accessed, engaged and how their safety and security were considered, as well as describing how interviews were conducted during COVID. The chapter has described my analysis of the very large amount of data generated by a process of transcription, detailed reading, and re-reading. This was both intensive and extensive but conducted with a drive to do justice to the contributions made by my participants, two solid findings chapters were produced. The chapter then discussed the ethical and political issues associated with researching racist incidents, and of my position inside the main organisation of interest. Overall, the chapter allows the reader to understand the validity of the findings chapters, discussion, and conclusions.

Chapter 5: The Research Site

5.00 Introduction

The following chapter describes the research site, in particular how it relates to the aim and objectives of the thesis and the value of selecting the area as a case for study in policing racist violence. It provides the reader with an understanding of the service infrastructure and how it has changed between 2005 and 2020. This creates a sense of place, how the area feels for those who have lived there and what changes they have felt. The Methodology, Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations chapters discuss how these changes impacted on the conduct of this study, and on service delivery. Most significantly, to establish whether it has changed the victim experience. It allows comparisons to be drawn between this local authority area and others nationally, so that the findings can be considered and mapped against conditions elsewhere.

The chapter begins by describing the research site from the significant geographic; demographic; social; political and economic perspectives. This supports a broad understanding of the areas in which the study participants and communities lived, worked, or spent their leisure time. The chapter then goes on to describe the levels of crime, victimisation, and specifically racist violence, set against the national context. This provides a more focused view of the criminality in the area and in particular, the feel for how frequently people are targets of racist crime and incidents compared with other areas. This also helps to qualify and quantify the volume of work police and partner agencies face on a daily basis in Newcastle; how it has changed over time; and therefore, the value of a study situated here.

The latter sections of the chapter detail the public sector and voluntary organisations that form part of the key policing family and victim support groups: namely Northumbria Police; the Local Authority; the social housing company Your Homes Newcastle; victim support groups and other community-based organisations. Individually and together these groups provide the response to racist violence: investigation; enforcement; problem solving; and pastoral care. Key staff from within these organisations have participated in the study as

interviewees, to provide their perspective of how professionals and volunteers deliver their respective services. This chapter allows the reader to understand the who and how of service provision.


Finally, the chapter details the structure and practice of partnership working between the organisations, to address racist violence and community tension management. It is anticipated that through partnership working, the most holistic response options and problem-solving opportunities are possible. Hence partnerships have a high degree of relevance to the aims and objectives of this study.

The make-up of the research site influences the research design presented in the Methodology chapter. It is important in contextualising both the experience of racist violence for victims in the area and the policing response provided, when reading the Findings and Recommendations chapters.

5.01 Geographical boundary

The research site is Newcastle Upon Tyne, including the City Centre and the surrounding residential areas of Newcastle East and West. The city is situated in the Northeast region of England, on the North side of the River Tyne, approximately 8 miles from the North Sea and 46 miles south of the Scottish border. It is the largest of 2 cities in the Metropolitan County of Tyne and Wear. The study area boundary is the Newcastle Upon Tyne Local Authority area, that incorporates the three main areas, Newcastle West End, the City Centre, and the Eastern Riverside. The methodology and research design aimed to sample victim-participants from across the city. But the majority of victims interviewed were from Byker, Walker; Elswick, Benwell and Scotswood wards known as Newcastle East and Newcastle West respectively. The reason for this, is that the areas tended to be where the majority of the BAME population lived. In 2008, most of the asylum-seeker participants lived in Byker and the Asian participants lived in the West End (see methodology chapter) These areas can be located in the map below which also illustrates that they are some of the most deprived areas in the country:

Fig. 1. Newcastle Local Authority Boundary Map incorporating National Deprivation Indices (Nettle, 2015).



The West End of Newcastle is has a reputation as being a rough area (Nichol, 2020). Nichol's 2020 article in the local online news Chronicle-Live reported the accounts of some local business owners who complained about antisocial behaviour, drunks, and a lot of discarded litter (ibid.). I recall the litter situation being a real concern in parts of the area when I worked there in 2015. Many residents refused to use their council provided wheelie bins, preferring to dump their litter onto the lanes behind their houses. This appeared to have worsened in 2020 (Goodwin, 2020) and was evidently still an issue in 2021, as Chronicle-Live reported on new plans to tackle fly-tipping in back lanes that was leading to rat infestations (Holland, 2021). As well as the health and fire risk of this practice, it contributed an unpleasant, neglected feel to the area. Byker too has an unpleasant reputation, as an area that has experienced social challenges not unlike other inner city social housing areas, typically youth crime and criminal damage

(Konttinen, 2011). The level of street crime was high in Byker in the 1990s and through the period of austerity, the main high street, Shields Road suffered such decline, it was rated 'the least vital' of 1000 shopping centres in the UK (Harper Dennis Hobbs, 2017, in *ibid.*).

5.02 Socioeconomics of Newcastle, *the Big River.*

Newcastle has a rich economic history, which rooted the 'Geordie' culture around the coal mining and heavy engineering industry, as the major employer of predominantly men. It is this history that inspired Jimmy Nail and Mark Knopfler's song 'Big River' in 1995, an elegy to the days when the Tyne was home to this large-scale industry. The historical snapshot below, like the song, describes how in the last 4 decades, this has changed and what impact this has had on life in Newcastle today.

In the 1600s, coal mined from the local area became the main export, to supply London's demand. Newcastle's importance as a shipbuilding, ship repair and heavy engineering hub began to emerge during the Industrial Revolution in 1800. The coal and shipbuilding industries grew to become the major economy of the region, as well as the dominant employers of local people. The Tyne shipbuilding and repair industry was one of the largest in the world, shaping the river-bank landscapes and housing that surrounded them. However, by the late 20th Century, most of the mining had ceased as had the shipbuilding and repair industry. With that, the major source of employment, economy, and local identity had all but gone. Some engineering works, serving the offshore oil and gas fields still remain, however the Newcastle area is now more engaged in the newer industries of service; vehicle manufacture and electronics (Britannica, 2020). The decline of the coal mining and heavy engineering industry had an impact on the economy of the region and in 2020, unemployment in Newcastle was the highest in the UK at 6.1%, against a national average of 3.9% (ONS, 2020).

Whilst the regional unemployment in the Northeast has risen and fallen alongside national trends dominated by the economic downturn and recovery, Newcastle has remained the highest in the country for 15 years. Unemployment in the Byker, Benwell, and Scotswood wards of Newcastle was three times as high as the

national average, at 16% in 2011 (ONS, 2020). Inevitably, aspirations for employment took a significant downturn. In the period from January 2019 to December 2019, 43,500 unemployed people in Newcastle stated they did not want a job (ibid.). Interestingly, the percentage of unemployed people who stated they did not want a job, is identical to the larger unemployed population of Great Britain at 79.2% (ibid.).

5.03 Economic Risk

On the approach to Brexit in 2019, a report in The Financial Times identified Newcastle and the North East region generally, as the most vulnerable economy in the UK (Strauss, 2019). The report identified that the region lagged behind the rest of the country in spending on productivity and on innovation; has the highest unemployment rate; and was '*bottom of the class*' in educational performance (ibid., p. 20). Prospects for economic and social recovery, were consequently very low.

Throughout the period of austerity that followed the global financial crisis of 2007, Newcastle suffered from drastic cuts in Government funding, disproportionately higher than other similar cities. This added significantly to the already high levels of deprivation (Flug and Hussein, 2019). Newcastle was 40th most deprived of 343 local authorities in England in 2010, rising to 30th place in 2019, however, the levels of deprivation in some of the West and East suburbs was far higher than the Newcastle average, with the Walker area of Newcastle East being the most deprived area of the region and the 32nd most deprived area of the country. Byker, also in Newcastle East, was rated 8th most deprived in the region and 76th in the country.

Young people in the area have experienced these changes in the social, economic, and political climate. Their cultural identity, originally founded around the major employers above, had to be adapted to this post-industrial era. The level of disadvantage in economy, culture and lack of a meaningful expression of working-class masculinity, according to Ray et al gives rise to cultures of '*violence, grievance and racism that characterise neighbourhoods where offenders tend to*

live' (Ray et al., 2004, p 112). Ray argues that these levels of deprivation, unemployment, and other disadvantage, lead to a feeling of shame that becomes the source of anger towards those considered as blameworthy for the situation. In their interviews with racist offenders, Ray found that this led to motivations towards racist violence, when south Asians were seen as responsible for the decline of their area (ibid.), but also appeared to be more successful. The situation, according to Ray, leads to racist violence becoming a normal part of life in those areas (ibid.). An interview participant in 2008 highlighted this perspective, talking about how the Asian people were prepared to take any kind of employment, whereas many white Europeans were settled into a culture of long-term unemployment:


'My family background has been working class, my dad has had all the shittest jobs, really crap wage, the six of us and a religion to follow. Looking back now, you've got the "chava" community. When you become councillor, you study different levels of the community. There is a very high level of unemployment in Scotswood, Elswick, and Wingrove, and mostly it is young people. Me and a colleague looked into this, and it is a culture that for 3 generations these people have not worked, and they are very racist, that's it, charvas (sic) are racist.' Asian Councillor, 2008 interviews.

The term '*charva*' is the local variant of 'chav,' that refers to the criminal class, typically unemployed and troubled.

5.04 Demographics of Newcastle

2011 Census data shows that the BAME population of England and Wales was 19.5%, whilst the regional data indicates the Northeast to be the least ethnically diverse area, at 6.4% BAME. Fig 5.2 below, shows both the ethnic mix in each region of England and Wales, to illustrate how the Northeast lags behind others.

Title: Areas of England and Wales by ethnicity. Location: England and Wales. Time period: 2011. Source: England and Wales 2011 Census| Ethnicity Facts and Figures GOV.UK



In 2019, the Office of National Statistics reported the population of Northeast England to be 2,657,900; and Newcastle to be 300,200 people. The report identified that 88% of the population of Newcastle were white European, with the remaining 12% Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) classification. The BAME school-age population was significantly higher, at 22% (ONS, 2019).

Newcastle West has an established Asian community who are second and third generation, having established business and community in the area over many decades. The main road through Newcastle West, 'West/Westgate Road' has a large number of successful restaurants, takeaways, hotels, and stores.

Despite being among the 20% most deprived local authorities in England and Wales, Newcastle City Council have been determined in making the city host to asylum seekers. In 1999, it was among the first Local Authorities to implement the

asylum dispersal system, with support from the Nick Forbes, the leader of the City Council. This has been a sustained commitment, with Newcastle becoming a 'City of Sanctuary' in 2014, leading to involvement in the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme in 2018 (Casala et. al. 2018 in Flug and Hussein, 2019).

In this study, many victim-participants were asylum seekers and refugees. Their experiences of life in Newcastle upon Tyne and of racist victimisation was very difficult, as findings chapter 1 identifies. Those who contributed as victim-participants in this study's 2008 fieldwork, were predominantly housed in Byker, under the dispersal scheme. Their arrival, at a time when immigration was in the political and media spotlight, brought a visible change to the demographics of the estates. Areas that had been 'owned' by the white European community, became home to African asylum seekers. Families and individuals escaping persecution in their countries of origin, found themselves housed in some of the country's most deprived areas. They quickly became the target of much antisocial behaviour and racist violence, from locals who wanted to resist the changes they brought to 'their area.'

The next section examines crime and victimisation levels in the study area, drawing comparisons with England and Wales generally, before focussing more specifically on racist violence. This provides the local crime and victimisation context.

5.10 Crime rates in Newcastle

In the year to December 2019, the Office for National Statistics, based on police data, showed Northumbria Police had the 4th highest recorded crime rate nationally. Of these crimes, 32% were violence against the person, the 8th highest nationally.

Set against the national perspective, Newcastle had the 23rd highest rate of violent crime against the 104 national postcode areas and an annual violent crime rate of 37.4 per 1000 people (Plumpot, 2020). Both the city East and West areas had similar levels of crime, which are substantially higher than the remaining wards outside of the city centre. Police present crime levels to a council ward level. The

wards where the victim-participants tended to live, as section 5.01 identified, were the areas of relatively high crime and antisocial behaviour (ASB) rates. The city centre had high rates of violent and acquisitive crime associated with the night-time economy and commerce. However, the residential areas of the city East and West tended to attract the neighbourhood-level problems of ASB, vehicle crime and burglary. Notably, all 3 areas show a downward trend in recorded crime generally, based upon police data. This is in keeping with national data from the British Crime Survey that shows crime reducing steadily in England and Wales since late 1996. Violent crime also follows this trend, however more serious violence, homicide and offences involving knives or sharp instruments has increased in recent years both locally and nationally (NorthumbriaPolice, 2020).

The categories of anti-social behaviour, violence, sexual offences, and public order offences are the uncomfortable realities of life around Newcastle's most deprived residential areas, although the city centre was not immune to ASB. These were the jobs that response and neighbourhood teams tended to spend most of their time dealing with. The West End had been a notorious area to police since the 1990s. A Detective Sergeant recalled that whenever they went to a job, they could not leave their police car unattended outside, otherwise it would be attacked. That meant ensuring two cars went to such jobs, one to deal with it, the other to keep an eye on their car. In the 90's a Detective Chief Inspector described working in the West End as like being on a rollercoaster, when you're on it, you want off, but once you've been off for a while, you want to go back on. Such was the intensity of police work and the level criminality. The prevalence of shoplifting, assumed by police to fund drug or alcohol addiction, was significant to some of the participants of the study who were shopkeepers, and also significant to the police during the performance culture era.

Based upon one month of raw crime data in 2017, the local press, Evening Chronicle Online, identified the City Centre as the most dangerous place in the Northumbria Police force area; the inner-city wards of Byker and Walker (Newcastle East) were second; and Benwell & Scotswood (Newcastle West) were eighth according to the report, which drew upon deprivation and crime data (Chronicle Live, 2017).

5.11 Racist Violence in Northumbria – historic context

Newcastle and the surrounding area have some history of challenged race relations and racist violence. In the 1900s, Geordies stood shoulder to shoulder with Arab seamen and ship workers from Somalia and Africa around the docks on the Tyne, particularly South Shields. During the time of World War One, there were around 2000 black, Asian and minority ethnic workers based around Tyneside, predominantly on ships. These people represented the first Muslim communities to settle in Britain. During the depression between the world wars, hostility became directed towards the BAME community due to a perception that they were taking jobs away from the locals. In 1919, serious street violence erupted against foreign workers in South Shields. Arab boarding houses and cafes were attacked (Bowling, 1998, Panayi, 1996). The 1920s and 1930s saw hostility and racism towards the Arab population, with regular letters sent to the local newspaper the Shields Gazette. Around 1930, a group of white and Asian workers formed a left-wing group called the Minority Movement. This group were established to challenge the under-representation and lack of support provided for black and Asian seamen. On 29th April 1930, 13 Somalis crossed the river from South Shields to North Shields, to enlist as firemen on a ship. However, they were attacked and severely beaten by a group of white people in an effort to stop them from getting to the Union Office. Shortly after this incident, on 2nd August that year, amid rumours that the Arab seamen were bribing shipping companies in order to gain employment, a mob of white seamen walked the streets around the quay, looking for Arabs. A gathering of the Minority Movement took place that day, and when it was learned that four white workers had been hired by a ship, fighting broke out between a large group of Arabs and white workers. This violence escalated into what was the first race riot in Britain. Four police officers were stabbed by armed Arabs. There were 20 Arabs and 6 white people arrested, all were convicted of riot or affray. A haul of weapons from knives to chair legs were presented to the court. (BBCNews, 2014).

In the 1980s and 90s, Newcastle West's BAME community were suffering '*grinding day-to-day racism*' (Vickers, 2016, p. 106). In 1982, the Evening

Chronicle reported an arson attack on an Asian-owned chip shop; gangs of white people using *'two-way radios to track targets and attack with stones and half bricks'* (ibid., p. 106); leading to black people being forced to leave the area. In one attack, a family had their flat burgled, racist graffiti was painted on their doors and windows, and it was set on fire (Evening Chronicle, 1982, in ibid., p. 106). The community centre used by young Asian people was frequently attacked and consequently had windows boarded and bricked up, making it appear *'fortress like'* (Young, 1989 in ibid., p. 106). Vickers interviewed Asian people who reported regularly being attacked as they walked to and from the centre. Stating residents would throw bricks and set their dogs on them (Vickers, 2016). The Mosques in Newcastle were also targets for attack. A report by the Local Government and Racial Equality Subcommittee in 1987, stated that a Mosque in Newcastle North and one in Newcastle West had been subject of arson attacks (Messina, 1987). A study conducted by Newcastle City Council in 1990 found that 58% of BAME residents had experienced at least one racist incident in the last year; 12% suffered from them every day; and 10% experienced racist violent attacks more than once per year (NewcastleCouncil, 1990). In 1992, there was a series of attacks on worshippers attending the West End Mosque. Then in September that year, Koaz Aziz Miah was attacked and beaten to death by a gang of white locals, as he was going to his Mosque. This incident was not recognised as being racist until day one of the trial. The offender was given a life sentence for the murder (theguardian.com, 1999). In 1992, Newcastle City Council's Racial Harassment Support Group reported back from their casework that: *'Racism is part and parcel of everyday life for black people. In Benwell it is stark, unremitting, and largely unchallenged by statutory agencies. It has an insidious, pervasive, and destructive effect on people's lives.'* The report went on to describe details of some incidents that had been reported to them: *'firebombing, excrement, urine and rubbish on and through front doors, burglary and the setting of fires, usually old sofas near the homes of black people.'* (NewcastleCouncil, 1990, p. 26).

5.12 The current situation in Newcastle

National and international events and politics have an impact on racist violence in Newcastle, as they do across the country (Burnett, 2017, Chakraborti, 2015b, Ren

and Feagin, 2021). Eastern European migration to the UK, the war on terror, Brexit, and COVID-19 to name a few, have impacted on the lives of the BAME communities in Newcastle, particularly as they experience hostility and prejudice. Most recently, ugly scenes of racist violence erupted as right-wing protesters attacked a Black Lives Matter protest in the Monument area of the city centre on Saturday 13th June 2020. Police officers, police dogs and horses were injured, whilst 13 people were arrested for public order and criminal damage offences (Graham, 2020).

The national picture of racist violence, according to police data shows an increasing trend since March 2016 (see Literature Review chapter 1). However, the trend in Newcastle Local Authority area is almost static across the same period. That is for both racist crime and racist incidents.

5.13 Survey Data

A residents survey conducted by Newcastle City Council (Council, 2011) identified that young people were concerned about antisocial behaviour in their area and racist attacks on ethnic minorities based upon skin colour or perceived faith. Ethnic minorities were in general, less satisfied with their area and accommodation, did not feel as strong a sense of belonging to the neighbourhood than white participants and had a lower sense of trust. Similarly, they felt more concerned about antisocial behaviour and felt that the public sector services were less likely to treat them with respect and consideration. This sets the local scene for BAME victims of racist violence and captures the living conditions of many victim-participants who contributed to this study.

5.20 Local support infrastructure

This section outlines the public and voluntary sector organisations that provide an enforcement, safeguarding and harm-reduction service to victims of racist violence. This includes the support and pastoral care that is provided directly by voluntary and statutory bodies. Beginning with Northumbria Police, this will provide an insight into what provision exists within each of these organisations and

what recent structural changes may have impacted upon how the service is delivered on the ground. As Northumbria Police are the organisation with the primary responsibility for providing the policing service, this is the primary focus herein.

5.21 Northumbria Police

The Northeast region is policed by three forces, Northumbria Police; Durham Constabulary; and Cleveland Police. Northumbria Police patrols an area that includes six Local Authorities: Northumberland; North Tyneside; Newcastle; Gateshead; South Tyneside; and Sunderland. Northumbria Police is the most northerly of the 43 police forces in England and Wales. It serves an area of 2000 square miles, from the border with Scotland in the North, to Durham in the South and West as far as the Pennines, with the North Sea to the East. It is geographically one of the largest policing areas in the country and also one of the best performing. The population of the Northumbria Police area is 1.5 million people, living in 623,061 households. The force is part of the Northumbria Criminal Justice Board that includes Northumbria Police and Crime Commissioner and Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunal Service (LCJB, 2020).

At the outset of this study in 2005, the establishment was over 6000 police officers and staff, with over 4000 in constable ranks. These were divided across 6 Area Commands, with a Chief Superintendent (Area Commander) leading each. Following the financial crisis of 2007, austerity measures from 2008 led to the government enforcing funding cuts to all police forces. Northumbria Police was the worst affected of all England and Wales forces, being reliant upon 81% of its funding from central government and only 19% from local funding. Reductions in staff and constable ranks were inevitable over the years that followed. On the 1st of March 2020, the overall establishment was down to 4940 people comprising of:

3079 Police Officers (all ranks)

214 Police Community Support Officers

1647 Police Staff. (Police, 2020)

These reductions translate into a 29% reduction in police staff between 2010 and 2016; and a 20% reduction in police officers during the same period (PCC-Northumbria, 2017). That reduction is compounded by heavy abstractions of front-line police officers to work in safeguarding and other non-response roles. That adds pressures to those delivering response policing, which inevitably impacts on the time they have to spend with victims. Time pressures were a concern for police officers interviewed, many of whom felt they simply did not have sufficient time to provide the kind of service victims needed (see findings chapter 2). However, Prime Minister Boris Johnson's pledge to restore the nation's police numbers by an increase of 20,000 police officers over the next 3 years, has seen a marked increase in recruitment to Northumbria Police. That, given time, should restore capacity and with an evidence based policing approach to tackling racist violence, has the potential to improve interventions for victims. Since March 2019, most recruits are joining via the Police Education Qualifications Framework (PEQF) onto the Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship (PCDA) programme. This programme transforms how police officers learn, with at least 50% of the learning in years 2 and 3 being delivered by academics at Northumbria University. The programme should transform more than just the learning, making police officers autonomous learners, with professional qualifications to match those of their NHS, teaching, and council partners. It will empower officers to take local ownership and develop evidence-based approaches to tackling neighbourhood problems in partnership with other agencies. The degree apprenticeship requires that a high proportion of their off-the-job learning is delivered by academics. This could serve to break any unhelpful legacy issues that may impact on how a police constable develops their world view, or more specifically their view of a given area or given community. For policing racist violence, given the legacy of police failings, this would be a positive move. This research, therefore, would provide a contribution to knowledge that would support the PCDA programme.

Northumbria Police currently have a 1.7% BAME workforce, compared to a 5.4% BAME population in the force area (Gov.UK, 2019). This is an increase of 15% since 2017, primarily as a result of a positive action campaign. The campaign was launched to meet a workforce objective in the 2017-2021 Police and Crime Plan to make the workforce more reflective of the communities served. The relevance of

the ethnic make-up of the organisation, in particular the aim to have a workforce that is demographically reflective of the communities it serves, is covered in more detail in literature review chapter 2. It is explored further in the findings and discussion chapters, that discuss how police officers struggle to have empathy with BAME victims of racist crime, having never experienced racism or similar disadvantage themselves.

5.22 Governance of Northumbria Police

Until 2012, Police Authorities were the bodies that ensured police forces were running efficiently and effectively. Northumbria Police Authority were the governing body who provided Northumbria Police with strategic direction for the medium to long term. In 2012, to enact the Police Reform and Social Responsibility act 2011, an elected Police and Crime Commissioner replaced the Police Authority. The PCC is responsible for the efficiency and effectiveness of the police by:

- i. Drawing-up the Police and Crime Plan, setting the strategic direction for the police force via the Chief Constable.
- ii. Holding the Chief Constable to account for meeting the above plan, within the budget set.
- iii. The PCC appoints and removes the Chief Constable.
- iv. Provision of community safety services through funding or commissioning organisations to support victims and reduce offending.
- v. Victims First Northumbria (VFN) and the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU).
- vi. Collaboration with the local authority and other partner agencies to address contributors to crime.
- vii. Support national and international policing, including counterterrorism and serious, organised crime.
- viii. Engage with victims and the community.

(NCVO, 2017)

It is in the policing plans, that ministerial priorities become policing policy.

Northumbria's first PCC, Dame Vera Baird QC, was elected in 2011 and served 2

terms, publishing 2 Police and Crime Plans for Northumbria Police. Kim McGuinness was elected PCC in 2019 when Baird stood down. The following section summarises the strategic direction across the period of this study:

5.23 Force Strategy and Direction from 2006 – 2020

Ministerial priorities, regional, and force area conditions direct the strategic priorities of Northumbria Police that cascade down through policy, to how the service is delivered on the ground. The sections below summarise the chronology of force strategic direction. The key elements of these are examined in detail in the Literature Review and Discussion chapters of the thesis. The relevance of strategic direction is in how it impacts on service delivery to victims of racist violence.

5.24 Strategy Plan 2006 – 2009

In 2006 the Chief Constable Mike Craik and Northumbria Police Authority jointly produced the three-year Strategy Plan for 2006-2009. From this Strategy Plan, a Local Policing Plan (LPP) was produced, to reflect the Priorities set out by the Home Secretary and the needs expressed by the local communities. The vision presented in the LPP at that time was

‘To build trust and confidence in the community and reduce crime and disorder’
(PoliceAuthority, 2006)

This was to be achieved through focus on the following strategic priorities:

- i. Increase confidence in our diverse society
- ii. Reduce Crime & ASB
- iii. Increased detections for crime
- iv. Increase number of offences brought to justice
- v. Increase safety; reduce crime on roads
- vi. Tackle serious & organised crime & terrorism
- vii. Diverse, effective & flexible workforce

Mike Craik introduced his strategy 'Total Policing' as a platform to meet the demanding targets set out in the LPP. Both the vision and the first four strategic priorities would appear to be positive developments for policing racist violence and reflect what victims in this study felt needed improvement (see findings chapter 1).

5.25 Total Policing (2006)

The pledge was to provide a service that was Total Policing, which would be:

'the uncompromising pursuit of offenders, coupled with our commitment to continually increase the number of crimes detected and offenders brought to justice' (Police Authority, 2006)

Under 'Total Policing', six key areas of reform were required, namely:

- i. Leadership
- ii. Performance management
- iii. Marketing
- iv. Partnership
- v. Training
- vi. Strategic resource management

The essential organisational activities required to successfully deliver the plans were identified as: Neighbourhood Policing; National Intelligence Model; Risk management; Best Value; Communication and engagement; and Customer focus. At the delivery end of the organisation, it created a robust focus upon individual police officer performance, measured in arrests, detections and other enforcement-based outcomes, a policy that is discussed in the Literature Review and Discussion chapters of this thesis. It had a significant impact upon what police officers were driven to focus their efforts upon and received some critical comments from police-participants in the findings section. Indirectly, victims of racist violence experienced a police service that was focused upon performance tangibles, not on victim satisfaction.

5.26 Policing Northumbria (2009 – 2011)

Sue Sim, as Temporary Chief Constable, and the Northumbria Police Authority produced the joint policing plan 'Policing Northumbria 2009 – 2011'. The vision remained unchanged from the previous plan, though the force introduced six values that police officers and staff would use as a platform to deliver the vision. They would be attentive, responsive, reliable, skilled, polite, and fair. Eight strategic aims were presented to assist in the delivery of the vision and objectives:

- i. People: empowerment and investment in the workforce.
- ii. Communities: engagement with communities and responding to their needs.
- iii. Information and Intelligence: expanded and more proactive use of intelligence.
- iv. Justice: speeding-up the criminal justice process.
- v. Partnerships: enhanced partnership working.
- vi. Innovation and Technology: making use of available technology.
- vii. Sustainable Development: including environmental management,
- viii. Value for Money: achieving best value.

(PoliceAuthority, 2009)

My experience and anecdotal evidence of leadership under Sim was characterised by autocratic communication styles and allegations or experiences of bullying, a practice that by its very nature, cascaded down from the Chief, through the organisation as senior leaders followed suit. The focus on individual performance and competitive cross-departmental practice flourished, as did the careers of those leaders who appeared outstanding at robustly managing their teams, and critically exploiting the errors of other teams. This further cemented the drive for tangible performance, and league tables to compare teams and area commands and did further harm to the potential for rank-and-file officers to provide a supportive service to vulnerable victims and communities. Engaging with communities was a

positive element of this plan, but as the findings chapter 1 demonstrates, there was little engagement with BAME victims.

5.27 Northumbria Police and Police Authority Plan for 2012 – 2013

Chief Constable Sue Sim and the Chair of Northumbria Police Authority Cllr Mick Henry produced the policing plan for the period 2012 to 2013. In the foreword, the Police Authority stated their aim was *‘to ensure Northumbria has a police service in which all local people have trust and confidence.’* (PoliceAuthority, 2012). It also states that their *‘job is to make sure Northumbria Police is doing a good job and fighting crime.’* (ibid.)

The priority areas in this plan were broadly unchanged, albeit rephrased, reduced to 4 headings and referred to partnership working to achieve the objectives. The delivery plan under this Chief Constable focused very much upon driving performance, building upon the often over-bearing ‘robust’ management styles:

- i. Force-wide Performance: effective leadership; target-based performance management; reviews and surveys.
- ii. Area Command and Department Performance: local Business Plans; reviews; neighbourhood performance; surveys; responsive deployment.
- iii. Neighbourhood Performance: public meetings; surveys; individual performance management.

(PoliceAuthority, 2012)

In the findings chapter, the results of this regime become apparent and are broadly examined in the subsequent Discussion and Conclusions chapters. It is discussed in terms of the police role and what level of priority it is to provide support and pastoral care to victims of racist crime and incidents, when officers are being robustly managed to hit more quantitative metrics. Owing to the apparent popularity of surveys in this plan, it was not uncommon during the period to see police officers in uniform around Newcastle City Centre, with clipboards in hand, diligently seeking the opinions of any members of the public prepared to engage. One of the mantras I recall, was the campaign ‘we asked; you said; we did.’ I

found this a rather ironic campaign as I studied policing racist violence and the history of police race relations. Particularly as BAME communities and victims of racist incidents felt their needs were ignored, unheard and insignificant to the police.

5.28 Police and Crime Plan 2013-18

PCCs were required on election, to produce a Police and Crime Plan to commence in 2013. PCC, Dame Vera Baird QC, produced the first Northumbria Plan for the period 2013-18. This document set out the priorities for the Chief Constable which they are held to account for. This is a national policy. Whilst continuing to respond to ministerial priorities and local conditions, the PCC's plan drew upon extensive public consultation and the Safer Communities Survey to generate the Police and Crime Objectives:

- i. Putting Victims First
- ii. Dealing with ASB
- iii. Domestic and Sexual Abuse
- iv. Reducing Crime
- v. Community Confidence

(PoliceAuthority, 2012)

Of the 5 objectives, four of them would have direct implications for the victim-participants in this study. Putting them first, as the findings and discussion chapter highlight, would significantly improve the service they experienced. Similarly, improving community confidence would have led to more reporting of racist violence.

Sue Sim stood down as Chief Constable in June 2015, amid a probe into misconduct allegations of failing to treat colleagues with courtesy and respect. (Hutchinson, 2015). This did not come as a surprise to many of the rank and file, nor to the leaders who had experienced the 'hairdryer treatment', also known as bullying. It also reinforces the position that strong team and individual

performance in relation to tangibles such as arrests, detections, summons, were the core business of the organisation at the time.

5.29 Police and Crime Plan 2017-2021, and Proud to Protect

Vera Baird (PCC), produced the most recent Plan for the period 2017 – 2021, presenting 6 priorities for the force under Chief Constable Steve Ashman:

- i. Domestic & sexual abuse
- ii. Putting victims first
- iii. Effective criminal justice system
- iv. Reducing ASB
- v. Cutting Crime
- vi. Community Confidence

The Chief Constable then developed the new delivery plan, published annually on the PCC website. The corporate strategies produced by Northumbria Police then fall under this delivery plan.

Introduced by Steve Ashman in 2016, the revised vision and values under Proud to Protect, sought to restore pride amongst police officers in doing their jobs, with a vision that: *‘Northumbria Police will be outstanding in the service we provide.’* Steve Ashman retired just over 2 years later and in March 2018, Winton Keenen was appointed Chief Constable. Later that year, the force introduced Strategy 2025, setting the vision for the next 7 years. The schematic below identifies the key elements of Strategy 2025, in which ‘vulnerability’ is highlighted as the primary focus.

Fig. 3. Strategy 2025



The Proud to Protect values and mission statement remain, along with the vision to be 'outstanding' in the service delivered. Around the outer arc of the dashboard are the strategic priorities, with the key enablers occupying the inner arc.

Following the period of sustained funding cuts through austerity, staff cuts and increased safeguarding workload, the organisation needed to re-focus efforts on supporting the most vulnerable in society. The results of the inspection by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy (PEEL) 2018/19 (HMICFRS, 2019) further highlighted that the organisation required improvement in how it supported vulnerable people, investigated crime and applied problem solving practice. These three strategic areas were adopted as the Vulnerability, Investigation, Problem Solving (VIP) focus. This aimed to ensure that police resources were directed towards those who needed them the most, the most vulnerable in society. Supporting this focus was a change in how Northumbria Police respond to incidents, known as the new Force Operating Model (FOM). This vulnerability-

focus is clearly significant to the study of policing racist violence, particularly in the kind of support victim-participants experienced, hence it is covered in the findings and discussion chapters. In the second period of study, police-participants expressed their belief that victims of racist violence are inherently vulnerable, and as such, they were afforded the same kind of harm reduction plans and safeguarding measures as other vulnerable people were.

5.30 Force Structure

The organisation is supported by corporate and specialist departments to provide the comprehensive policing function. The two major front-facing strands are the Response Policing Team (RPT) and the Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT), backed up since November 2019 by the Secondary Investigation Unit (SIU) who conduct the subsequent investigation of most crime. Response officers work a 24/7 rotation of shifts and will usually be the first attenders at any incident where an immediate uniformed response is required, hence they are likely to be the officers who first attend to a report of racist crime. Neighbourhood officers and investigators tend to provide follow-up service, with longer term support, problem solving, and safeguarding.

Each area command have a dedicated Communities Engagement Team (CET). This is a non-uniformed team of police staff and officers who support force and partnership interventions; victim signposting; community tension monitoring; and educational responses to patterns of hate crime. This unit review all hate crime and incidents. Owing to their engagement with victims of racist violence and the associated support groups, the Newcastle CET were very supportive of my research and signposted me to many victim-participants, as well as participating in interviews themselves. Responsible to the ACC for safeguarding is a Superintendent, who holds the portfolio of Hate Crime Lead for the force. This officer has daily oversight of hate crime and therefore is the lead for the policing response to racist violence. They were interviewed in period 2, as the post did not exist in period 1.

5.40 Newcastle City Council

Newcastle City Council are the local authority responsible for public services in Newcastle. In 1990, the council conducted a review of policy entitled 'The Response to Racial Attack in Newcastle'. This was generated when the extent of racist victimisation became clear (NewcastleCouncil, 1990), and recognised how inner city deprivation, poverty, rising crime, and unemployment was exposing BAME people to this risk of harm. It led to the formation of the council's Racial Harassment Support Group, a group of community case workers who supported victims but also reported on the realities of the racist violence they were suffering. This was the beginning of partnership working in Newcastle to tackle racist crime and incidents. Tyne and Wear Anti-Fascist Association (TWAFSA), the RHSG and housing organisations began joined-up working on an ad-hoc basis (ibid.). In 2005, the RHSG had been replaced by the Racial Harassment Prevention Team (RHPT), consisting of two support workers. Working closely with Your Homes Newcastle (YHN) tenancy enforcement officers and partner agencies, the team provided support, signposting, and advocacy to victims of racist violence living in social housing. The RHPT was discontinued during the period of austerity from 2008. The later sections of this chapter will identify the partnership structures the council established to tackle racist violence and community tensions.

By 2020, the city was in its 10th year of austerity. In the period from 2010 to 2022, the council will have had to save £327M. Staff who had been employed to support hate crime partnership working (specifically ARCH, see below) were cut substantially. The council responded to the funding and staff cuts with a determination to ensure the city remains a safe place to live, work and visit. This section identifies the individual groups who provided services to victims of racist crime, then the partnerships that formed to serve that purpose.

5.41 Housing Provision and Support

The majority of social housing is managed on behalf of the City Council by YHN. YHN currently manage 28,900 mostly council homes (YHN, 2020). YHN, have an Anti-Social Behaviour team, who liaise closely with police and other partners

around tenancy support and enforcement. This team respond to support victims of racist violence who are YHN tenants; and with tenancy enforcement work to tackle the offenders, when they are YHN tenants. YHN also had Asylum Support Workers who provided housing support to new arrivals. In cases of serious violence and risk, it is YHN who would house and re-house victims within their stock. During the early 2000s, YHN employed Asylum Support Workers to provide support to asylum seekers accommodated in their properties. One such worker provided an interview and insights into the operational work of ARCH.

5.42 Social Services

As part of a consultation document that proposed partnership working to develop practice with racially motivated perpetrators (NewcastleCouncil, 2002), the council reported that Social Services had developed policies on racist violence, though they found little evidence of such policies being put into practice. The report proposed further consultation to establish the impact Social Services were having, and could have on racist violence, and in particular how they could support children who were suffering from it.

5.50 Voluntary Sector Support Agencies

5.51 Victim Support

In 2005, the charity Victim Support were very active in Newcastle, providing support for victims of racist violence, working in partnership with the Northumbria Police, YHN, Safe Newcastle and the voluntary sector. A large part of their work in the first period of study, involved working with traumatised asylum seekers who were suffering racist violence in Newcastle. I interviewed the lead officer in Victim Support during phase 1 of the study and they kindly signposted me to victim-participants. Due to funding cuts, their services were discontinued in 2012.

5.52 Victims First Northumbria (VFN)

Established in 2015, VFN is an independent victim referral service, to support victims of crime in the Northumbria area. On average, the group support a victim of crime every 30 minutes; meet with 62 victims per year; and provide signposting support to more than 22,000 people. Since their formation, 90,219 victim referrals have been received (VictimsFirstNorthumbria, 2020).

Most referrals to VFN come directly from Northumbria Police, however others are received from agencies or victims directly. Although VFN was established to provide support to victims of all crime, racist crime is a significant proportion of their work and is one of the areas where staff have specialist training. The proportion of face-to-face meetings with victims is substantially lower than the number of cases seen, due to the limited staff capacity. I interviewed the officer who supports victims of racist violence as a professional participant in phase 2 of the study.

5.53 African Community Advice Northeast (ACANE)

ACANE is a small voluntary group that provide support to African asylum seekers and refugees in the region. Based in Newcastle East, the group promote integration and participation in the local community. The leader of ACANE is passionate about supporting equality and opportunity for African people. ACANE provide a drop-in service, after-school child-care, weekend activities and training courses. The group support victims of racist violence and can provide an advocacy service on their behalf. I interviewed the leader of this organisation in both phases of the study and was signposted to victim-participants, who provided very rich interviews.

5.54 Ethnic Minorities Training and Education Project (EMPTEP)

The group was established in 2003, in the West End of Newcastle. The young founders were concerned about the social problems facing many BAME young people in local communities and wanted to improve the lives and opportunities of

all young people in the community. They have developed and implemented a range of projects to support young people. The group actively support victims of racist crime and bullying in schools, often conducting supported visits to staff with victims to encourage resolutions. They work with other partners in the community to promote cohesion. In phase 1 of this study, I interviewed one of the leaders of EMPTEP, who signposted me to additional victim-participants.

5.60 Community Safety Partnership

Safe Newcastle is the statutory Community Safety Partnership for Newcastle upon Tyne, formed to reduce crime in the community and help people to feel safer.

Their vision is:

“To create a safe Newcastle by tackling crime, alcohol, drugs, anti-social behaviour, and their impact. By working together, we will develop effective, sustainable solutions to local concerns, improve confidence and build stronger communities”. (SafeNewcastle, 2020)

The partnership comprises of ‘responsible authorities’: Newcastle City Council; Northumbria Police; Tyne and Wear Fire and Rescue Service; Clinical Commissioning Group; National Probation Service; and Community Rehabilitation Company. The business of Safe Newcastle is written into an annual action plan, based upon data from the constituent partners and community participation, which is used to produce a delivery plan. The latest delivery plan is:

Safe Newcastle Priorities 2019/20:

- i. Reduce the Impact of ASB
- ii. Reduce the harm/impact of drug & alcohol misuse
- iii. Reduce violence against women and girls
- iv. Tackle modern day slavery, trafficking, and exploitation
- v. Prevent radicalisation, hate crime and community tensions (ibid.)

In 2000, Safe Newcastle introduced a multi-agency racist crime intervention and advocacy service, Agencies against Racist Crime and Harassment (ARCH). This supported partnership working between a group of public, private, and voluntary sector stakeholders to:

- i. encourage and increase the reporting of hate incidents.
- ii. to coordinate and improve interventions by agencies and in partnership.
- iii. to deliver learning and training to improve knowledge and understanding of racist violence.
- iv. develop and lead on problem-solving and preventative work.
- v. develop community tension assessment, community intelligence and conflict management.
- vi. address the Home Office Code of Practice on the Reporting and Recording of racist violence.

In an effort to increase the reporting of racist crime, the ARCH third-party incident reporting platform was set up in a broad range of centres across the city. This 24-hour system was to encourage reporting by victims who may be reluctant to use the mainstream organisations such as Northumbria Police. As well as reporting at the venues, victims could also report online or by telephone. This platform allowed agencies to 'switch' incidents for the attention of other partners who had the software activated on their electronic systems (NewcastleCouncil, 2000). Some felt that third party reporting offered significant value to victims (Clayton et al., 2016), however compared to the volumes of crime and incidents reported to the police, third party reports were consistently low. Indeed, many reports that were submitted via third party platforms, had already been reported to police. Northumbria Police received some reports from ARCH; however, the police were by far, the biggest contributor to the incidents recorded on the system, accounting for 88% of all incidents logged.

In addition to case management work around racist violence, ARCH also gathered and responded to intelligence around community tensions. They provided training to local agencies in identifying and tackling community tensions.

In 2005, Newcastle City Council had a team of 3 staff who managed the ARCH system as a platform for the 6 core functions above. From 2009, austerity led to staff cuts and the loss of officers dedicated to these functions. In 2018, Newcastle City Council's newly established Hate Crime and Community Tensions Monitoring Group (HCCTMG) conducted a hate crime review, amidst a period when hate crime had increased nationally from 2015 to 2017 by 29% and across the same period in Newcastle, had increased by 68%. The sharpest rate of increase took place around the time of the EU Referendum in 2016, however since 2017 that rate of increase slowed. The review, which drew on desktop research, online consultation, and workshops, identified that ARCH, as a platform had become dated and was no longer fit for purpose. Further, the absence of staff to manage it and its associated tasking meant case management could no longer be supported. It was discontinued and the Safe Newcastle Board chose to use Stop Hate UK as the third-party reporting platform (Council, 2017).

The HCCTMG was launched in January 2018 by Safe Newcastle, to lead on the strategic priority of community tension monitoring and assessment, which necessarily requires oversight of racist and religious violence. It is a partnership, including the following agencies:

Safe Newcastle – the community safety partnership for Newcastle

Newcastle Council for Voluntary Services (NCVS)

Northumbria Police

Your Homes Newcastle (YHN)

Vulnerable Adults' Learners Team – Newcastle City Council (NCC)

Environmental Health – NCC

Youth and Play - NCC

Tyne and Wear Fire and Rescue

Newcastle University

Northumbria University

Newcastle College

Safe Newcastle also introduced an Anti-Social Behaviour Risk Assessment Conference in 2011, known as AVATAH (A Victim Approach to Anti-Social

Behaviour Hub). As a Neighbourhood Sergeant, I was involved in its development; delivered multi-agency training to participants; chaired many of the meetings; and brought problems and interventions to the group. Racist violence and anti-social behaviour were regular features at the conferences. The hub would ensure that the core agencies worked together in tackling anti-social behaviour in a victim-focused approach, bringing real solutions to victims.

5.70 Reflection on Newcastle as a Case Study area

Overall, Newcastle provided a wealth of valuable data on which to base this study. It has a richness of diversity; pockets of deprivation; pockets of wealth; areas of high concentrations of African asylum seekers; areas of high concentration of settled Bangladeshi communities; relatively new concentrations of Czech Roma residents; and areas where BAME people do not live. It also provides a social environment where crime, safety, isolation, integration, welcome, rejection, low BAME residential concentration and high BAME residential concentration exist within small geographical areas. The figures quoted in Table 2.0 above identify that racist violence is a problem here and that the majority of victim-participants were drawn by default, from these areas. Newcastle has seen a lot of change in the last few decades too. Changes in demographics, economics, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have had huge impacts on how local people have lived, worked, socialised, and played.

The demographics and the support services identified herein, allow readers interested in policing racist violence in other parts of the UK, to draw comparisons between the factors at play here and other areas.

Chapter 6, Findings (1): The Victim's Experience of Racist Violence and the Policing Response

6.00 Introduction

This chapter draws from the research interviews, to present the victim's experiences of racist incidents in Newcastle. It is the baseline nature and scope of what happened, and how participants experienced the policing response. Findings chapter 2 takes the perspectives of those in the police and partner agencies to balance the experiences of the service users with the service providers.

Victim-participants recalled a broad range of incidents. They happened on the street, at victim's homes, in and around schools, in the neighbourhood and at work. Offenders were neighbours, co-workers, strangers, and other parents. The immediate harms of the incidents were apparent in the examples provided: damaged property, physical injury, shock, fear, and financial loss were observable and usually, quantifiable outcomes. Victims reported longer term harm to their wellbeing; that of their families; and community, depending upon how they were able to respond and the nature of any support they felt was provided. Feelings of anger; hatred; depression; anxiety; and loss of self-esteem, were reported.

Victims expressed that policing response rarely met their needs. There was a lack of trust and confidence which reduced victim's desire to report incidents. Police responses were slow, officers were often dismissive, arguing that incidents were not racist. Victims needed to feel understood, believed and validated, yet they felt ignored and not taken seriously. Victims were rarely provided with updates on their cases and police often failed to provide tangible outcomes, leaving victims and communities feeling disempowered.

The early Asian communities of Newcastle reported frequent, targeted racist incidents, to the extent that it was a daily feature of life in the 1970s and 1980s. As that community grew and became better established, incidents were less frequent. However, major national or global events, such as terrorist attacks, Brexit and the

COVID pandemic, brought changes in the nature, scope, and frequency of the incidents.

The chapter starts by presenting the nature and scope of the racist incidents. It then explores their impact on victims, their families, and community. Having set the scene, the chapter details what the victims needed from the policing partnerships and the extent to which their needs were met. The final part of the chapter provides a temporal account of how experiences changed over the duration of the study.

6.10 Racist Violence, Nature, and Scope

The victims spoke about a broad spectrum of incidents they had experienced. They ranged in severity and in frequency. These incidents are presented in order of increasing severity, structured on a scale that is a hybrid of academic theory (Kleg and Allport), sentencing tariffs and victim perception. The scale does not consider the cumulative impact of multiple victimisations on individual participants but reflects a scale of increasing harm. Kleg used a derivation of Allport's scale to develop continuum of aggression in 'Hate Prejudice and Racism' (Kleg, 1993). Kleg's continuum orders incidents as:

1. Avoidance – taking tangible steps to avoid engagement or proximity with the group being discriminated against.
 2. Defamation, forms of verbal abuse that are written or spoken.
 3. Acts against property, criminal damage including graffiti.
 4. Verbal and physical assaults.
 5. Murder and genocide
- (ibid., p. 39).

The limitations of this scale are that it does not provide a level that would include discrimination as a distinct category. However, as Bowling and Phillips argue, aggression in the context of racist violence, is the acting out of prejudice (Bowling, 2002) and is therefore by nature, discrimination. All of the levels of aggression in Kleg's scale are, hence, racist behaviour. Verbal abuse under the title of

defamation, is presumed to be lower-level abuse, as opposed to the more sinister verbal assaults such as threats to kill or injure.

(Allport, 1954), provided the foundation of literature and practice on the social psychology of prejudice for half a century (Roets and Van Hiel, 2011). Whilst social science literature can become outdated within ten years, Allport's work remains the most frequently referenced work on prejudice (Dovidio et al., 2008), because of its insights, balance and elegance. It was '*ahead of its time*' (Pettigrew, 1999, p. 415), and '*organised the study of prejudice*' for the next 50 years (Fiske, 2000, p. 361). Allport developed a five-point scale of acting out prejudice, which he described as action-based, with each step reflective of the increasing amount of '*energy*' involved in the action, which is a manifestation, or acting-out of prejudice in society (Allport, 1954, p. 14). Allport's scale is ordered as:

1. Antilocution: Talking about one's prejudice in 'like-minded' company, or with strangers, but not directly to the subject.
2. Avoidance: Allport described this as the prejudiced individual taking action to avoid the group they dislike.
3. Discrimination: When the individual takes substantial action to disadvantage members of the group they dislike. Legalised or institutionalised racism fit into this category.
4. Physical attack: A culmination of raised emotional tension which leads to physical acts of violence: damaging gravestones in a Jewish cemetery; gang turf-wars; and severe threatening behaviour.
5. In this category, Allport uses genocide; lynching; organised massacres as examples of what he describes as the '*the ultimate degree of violent expression of prejudice*' (ibid, p. 14).

The criminal justice sentencing guidelines reflect the harm caused to the victim and the blameworthiness of the offender or their culpability

(Sentencingcouncil.org.uk, 2022). Considering this and victim-participant perspective, the scale of increasing harm is:

1. Verbal racist abuse: name calling, offensive language.
2. Physical attack: criminal damage to property; significant threats to cause damage or to assault; physical assault against the person.
3. Murder.

Figure 1 below, outlines the hybrid scale created to provide logical structure to the kind of incidents victim participants disclosed during interviews.

Fig. 1. Hybrid scale of reported incidents

EXTERMINATION	Taking the title from Allport's scale, this is the highest level of incident in this study. It relates to racist murder; and includes people being forced to leave their homes because of racist violence.
PHYSICAL ATTACK	These incidents are the most frequently reported racially aggravated offences, and in herein cover threats of violence and threats to kill, violent physical attacks on people, and criminal damage to property.
AVOIDANCE AND DISCRIMINATION	Allport described this as the prejudiced individual taking action to avoid the group they dislike, but in this study, it includes minority groups acting or changing their behaviour to avoid being victimised. The discrimination element relates to examples of disadvantage faced by participants on the grounds of racial profile.
RACIST VERBAL ABUSE	This category represents offensive racist language directed intentionally towards BAME victims.

It is important to recognise in presenting any scale of racist violence, that what matters is the harm it caused, not necessarily the severity or category of the crime. It is also recognised that there is porosity between each category on the scale, and overlap, because victims experienced verbal abuse, physical abuse, subtle aggression, and combinations of them. Also, that it was usual for participants to have experienced multiple victimisations, hence there is fluidity of categorisation and porosity in the in how victims remember, perceive, and present their accounts.

6.11 Racist Verbal Abuse

Racist verbal abuse featured as the most frequent form of incidents in the lives of most of the victims interviewed. Some spoke about how difficult it was to be one of only a small number of BAME families living in a deprived area, particularly during the decades leading up to and including the first period of study.

“But there are so many incidents where you are verbally abused, mostly you just ignore. You learn how to manage it.” Focus Group, Newcastle Muslim Association (NMA), 2008.

Asylum seekers, faced racist abuse that targeted children and adults around school:

“Every morning when I drop my children at school, they spit and call my children ‘monkeys’.... calling me ‘fucking black bastard.’” African asylum seeker, 2008.

Though spitting does constitute an assault, it was part of the racist language examples described by the victim and in this category, it highlights the fluidity of the way this thesis presents findings. Children were also targeted in schools by other children, apparently prompted by their parents:

“...my son tells me ‘People are calling me some bad names.’...their kids will tell me that their parents were saying things about their colour. Then my kids ask, ‘why am I black? and why am I dark?’ African care worker, 2008.

In some contexts, racist verbal abuse was a constant, even increasing factor for some Asian people:

“My husband is a taxi driver, and he will experience racism once or twice per night... It’s happening more often.” Asian Councillor (c), 2008.

This kind of contextualised abuse was still a problem in 2020:

“Give me that racial hate speech, or being racist towards me yeah, I feel like lashing out. Why are you calling me these names.” Asian Taxi Driver, 2020.

Shop keepers, and taxi drivers, had little opportunity to avoid it, and victims were in vulnerable positions. A survey conducted in Newcastle in 1990, for the City Council, identified that the most frequent forms of racist abuse were:

‘walking through areas covered with offensive graffiti, personal abuse or insults...’ (Council, 1990).

Notably, participants in my study did not mention racist graffiti as a concern, suggesting that the incidence of this kind of attack was substantially less frequent by 2008. There had been a partnership activity led by Agencies Against Racist Crime and Harassment (ARCH) that aimed to remove racist graffiti within 24 hours of it being reported. That may account for the absence of it in victims experiences in Newcastle. But both studies revealed that verbal abuse for some victims, was a daily occurrence.

Racist verbal abuse in the examples provided, did not necessarily escalate into physical violence. However, the next section identified that physical attack was always accompanied by racist verbal abuse.

6.12 Avoidance and Discrimination

The interview questions were designed to allow victims the space to speak freely about what they considered to be racist incidents. As the parameters were not pre-defined, their accounts were often broad experiences of racist attitudes and behaviours, far wider than the nature and scope of typical policing incidents:

“...everything negotiates through race. If I’m talking to you, it is negotiated through race..., you feel rage all the time because of this constant racial injustice. There are so many sides to racism. I was born in a racist society and will die in a racist society, it’s as simple as that.” Asian Youth Worker, 2008.

Several BAME participants gave examples of when they had been on public transport and people had visibly avoided sitting next to them, sometimes getting up and moving away to sit somewhere else. This also happened in the workplace for two participants. On a broader community scale, reflective of the 'parallel-lives' situation in the Northern towns in 2001 (Cantle, 2001):

"...most white English people will not interact with people of other cultures unless they are going to the shop for a kebab or... getting a taxi..." Asian youth worker, 2008.

Avoidance on this scale reflects political, cultural and social norms (Cantle, 2008, p. 69). BAME people faced discrimination on public transport: bus drivers refused to lower the ramp to allow African mothers access with their push chairs; deliberately ignored their requests to stop the bus where they wanted to get off; and refused access to a Muslim male with a beard. BAME youth workers spoke of an environment where their opinions as team-members were overlooked. There was a constant need to demonstrate their competence or qualification to work alongside white youth workers, or in one case, to justify why they were in the country. In 2020, only one example of this kind of discrimination was found, a tenancy enforcement issue against an African resident. This was on grounds of 'the smell of the food they cooked,' having been triggered by a complaint from a neighbour. The participant felt that this was a clear example of racist attitudes going unchallenged and being supported.

6.13 Criminal Damage, Assaults and Threats to Harm

Criminal damage and assaults were the most frequent form of incidents reported to the police by participants. There were several reports of cars having been damaged outside of homes or whilst visiting places of worship, both churches and Mosques:

"When I park my car, two guys broke... 3 glasses and I could not use the car... Quite a lot of damage and expensive to repair." Asian taxi driver, 2020.

The immediate impact of this incident was the shock to the driver, but also the extent of the damage, the cost of repairs and the fact that he would be unable to drive the car and earn money until the expensive repairs were made.

“I was really powerlessly looking at my car while it was being destroyed and I was being verbally racist abused by people shouting at me and telling me to go back to my country.” African Community Pastor, 2008.

For this victim, the attack was part of a series of racist incidents he was facing, along with his community. African asylum seekers were subjected to frequent racist attacks in the period around their arrival in Newcastle, and the language in this attack is typical of the negative reception from some of their neighbours. The underlying message of *‘go home, you don’t belong here’* (Council, 1990, p. 5), reinforces the victim’s perception that these attacks are racist in nature.

Asylum seekers reported attacks on cars outside of their homes; and on homes directly, in some cases orchestrated by parents, making their children carry out the attacks:

“We would have things thrown by the kids in the community... We pleaded at them to stop, but the parents just folded their arms and laughed.” African Care Worker, 2008.

“They will hit the door a few times, shouting ‘you fucking Paki,’ and they were going to do this, ‘I’m going to do that’ Eastern European, 2020.

Having things thrown at the house and windows was alarming for the occupants, however, for one victim, the attacks were more intrusive than broken windows:

“...they were putting shit of dog into envelope and putting through the letterbox, that is a sign of racism. They did a lot, a lot.” African asylum seeker, 2008.

Damaging vehicles or windows sends a strong message to victims, but requires little time, or pre-meditation. However, to put dog faeces into an envelope and

push it into someone's home, takes a lot of thought, planning, and preparation. This, and the next example, strongly support the broad assertion that racist incidents are 'message crimes,' (Dixon and Gadd, 2006, Perry and Alvi, 2012, Iganski, 2001). In these examples, the message that the victim, and people like them were not welcome, is far more dominant than it was in the more frequent, spontaneous incidents.

"Flame from a lighter, then they put it to a piece of paper and then they dropped it through the letterbox, burning you know, my children were small." African asylum seeker, 2008.

This second incident is reminiscent of the numerous arson attacks against BAME people in London between 1981 and 1985, which predominantly featured:

'inflammable liquid... poured through their letterbox...' or 'burning paper had been stuffed through the letterbox setting the front door curtain alight...' (Hesse and Waltham, 1992, p. 25).

This section includes incidents of violence against the person. Asian participants spoke of their school days, where in addition to the verbal abuse, racist attacks were frequent:

"...in our school was a thing called PAKI BASHING DAY. That was every half term. ...white youths... used to beat the Asian lads up." Asian Councillor, 2008.

Attacks on children outside of the school context, in their neighbourhood were also regular occurrences and understandably were horrific for the children and their parents:

"I was the only Asian family living there and the children was young then, they kept getting beaten up." Asian Female, 2008.

In this case, isolation was a factor that exacerbated fear and the impact. Newcastle, as the research site chapter described, has historically had a low

BAME population. Feelings of isolation and marginalisation are therefore more acute here. Another high-risk activity for young people, was walking to the youth club:

“You always had to look out in case someone was going to set their dog on you, or throw a brick from their garden, this happened all the time.” Asian Councillor, 2008.

Another spoke of being attacked as he was walking to the local store:

“He said... ‘this is my country, but you don’t belong here, go back to your country. ...he punched me in my face and on the head”. Asian student, 2020.

Several participants reported being assaulted at work in the context of youth work, adult care, and taxi driving. In these examples, it was difficult for the victims to avoid conflict situations:

“He came over and said, ‘what you going to do you paki’, and headbutted me.” Asian youth worker, 2008.

The result was a significant injury that required 3 months off work. The impact was worsened because his peers and supervisors made no contact with him while he was absent. In another example, a participant was attacked in a bar when he was supporting a client:

“This person said: ‘we shouldn’t have niggers looking after our own people, we should have our own looking after our own.’... before I knew it there were blows coming from all over.” Care worker, 2008.

The victim in this case described how he suffered significant facial swelling from being beaten. A taxi driver recalled a serious racist crime against him by passengers he was working:

“...they were beating me up; they almost beat me to death; it was an attempted murder. ...they stole my car with the keys and the money in it.” Asian taxi driver, 2020.

Many incidents of racist damage and assault happened in and around functional locations, where victims needed to be.

6.14 Racist Murder and Forced Relocation

As the earlier sections have identified, central African asylum seekers faced a lot of hostility when they arrived in Newcastle in 2004-08. Like in other parts of the country, they were allocated housing that was usually the least desirable, in the most deprived areas (Flug and Hussein, 2019). Police officers were often dismayed that asylum seekers were repeatedly accommodated in addresses that had suffered long term antisocial behaviour. They felt it was inevitable that BAME people being housed there, would suffer racist incidents. Three African asylum seekers in 2008, reported victims being forced from their homes because of racist violence:

“It was a racist things but with a physical attack. The woman was the broken fingers and the man, a black man was beaten. He couldn’t see... That family decided to move from Newcastle.” African Community Voice, 2008.

Participants felt that moving people from homes was a failure to solve the problem, but it was usually the safest option. These moves were often facilitated by police and housing provider interventions. Forced eviction, particularly for asylum seekers who had fled persecution elsewhere, was very traumatic.

Three participants spoke about the anxieties felt by the Asian community in the 1992 era. This was punctuated by the racist murder of Koaz Miah in Newcastle West, on 24th August 1992:

“There was a murder in the Jubilee estate... A Bengali person was going to the Mosque, he was attacked and... he died. It was a racist crime straight away. Asian Councillor, 2008.

The participant spoke of how the fear led to groups of Asians descending on the police station to protest for the arrest of the offenders. He also spoke of the motivation this gave him, even at a very young age, to combat racism. This murder, understandably, was broadly reported in local and national press (Bennetto, 2011, Proctor, 2013). To the Asian community, this was still fresh in their minds, 14 years after the event, highlighting the kind of impact it had on them.

6.20 The Impact of Racist Violence

This section now examines the impact or harm, beyond the immediate experiences of racist incidents, on the victim (primary); their family (secondary); then on the broader BAME community (tertiary), following a framework of the expanding reach of harm proposed by (Corteen et al., 2016). It provides evidence of the how far-reaching the impact was. Victim responses followed different trajectories; hence the evidence is divided into two parts. The first presents the harmful impact, how people suffered and how they changed behaviours as a result. The second highlights how some victims were able to respond by challenging and fighting back, whether with fists or education and support.

6.21 Emotional Impact

The most common impact discussed from sustained experiences of racist incidents, tended to be negative emotions, feelings of depression and anxiety:

“you get let down and you get depressed. I know how devastating the racial incident can be. You could be in your mind for ever and ever. That is very dangerous...” Asian shopkeeper, 2008.

Having supported others in his community, this shopkeeper was able to reflect on how he had observed the impact of incidents. For others, they were immersed in the problems as victims:

“I’m emotionally depressed, I’ve not worked because I was unwell. Now it’s really giving me sleepless nights.” Racist bullying and threats from a neighbouring family, 2020.

Many felt a strong feeling of anger towards the offenders, and occasionally towards white people generally:

“I was angry all the time. I come here and I thought I would be safe... here they just want to target you and take power. Makes you take away the feeling that I can be proud of me.” African asylum seeker, 2008.

For a father, this loss of self-esteem was upsetting. In the next example, the victim’s anger turned to hatred, and she caused her children to feel hatred for white people too, broadening the impact:

“I was so angry, I thought the police was right, I don’t belong here. I was crying a lot and I was hating... I put that hatred to the children as well.” Asian female, 2008.

For some, reporting incidents to the school or police did not resolve anything, further adding to the anger they felt:

“When we did tell the teachers, it was ignored. So, this made me more and more angry, to think that this society doesn’t respect or accept you.” Asian Councillor, 2008.

These responses suggest that when there is no restoration of power, or satisfactory support, anxiety, depression, aggression, and hatred can develop.

“The community feel very frustrate... there is a massive fracture.” African community voice, 2008.

Four participants spoke about concerns for their children's safety and sense of self-worth, as it was often children at the frontline of attacks (Lou Hemmerman and Sirriyeh, 2007). Chahal and Julienne found too, that the impact of racist violence on children because they can experience it at school, and on their journey to/from school (Chahal, 1999c). Many spoke of how the impact extended beyond the victims and their families, to their community:

"...my neighbours as well are so affected it's not just me, they didn't only throw eggs or broke windows only at my place." African Asylum Seeker, 2008.

... I thought it was just me being targeted, but now I know it is all of the community. It kills off your confidence in going out." African asylum seeker, 2008.

Discussion about the harm to children was a common theme, and parents worried about the impact on their development, a concern supported by (Kleban, 2008).

Understandably, a family or community subjected to marginalisation, could interpret offenders as trying to undermine any sense of entitlement or belonging they had hoped to have. This was true for settled communities in the 80s and 90s, and for the asylum seeker communities in 2008. Depression was a common outcome for participants who felt powerless to do anything about it, or for those who felt the policing family were not helping. Some victims described a general anxiety, feeling unsafe in various public contexts. Contemporary literature supports this impact on victim's mental health (Hambly et al., 2018, Law-Commission, 2021), corroborating that twice as many hate crime victims reported a *'loss of confidence, difficulty sleeping, anxiety, panic attacks and depression'* compared to victims of non-hate crime (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, p. 5)

For the African asylum seekers in 2008, having fled violence and persecution to seek sanctuary in Newcastle, this was traumatic on many levels:

"Forced displacement ruptures the connections that knit us into place. Isolation, the unknowns of the asylum process and the loss of control over everyday

circumstances can be profoundly dehumanising. These challenges can and do feel insurmountable and unyielding at times.” (Degnen, 2020)

Having gone through the process of seeking asylum in the UK, some anticipated a warm welcome from the locals:

“...in my country, say you were on the streets, and I identify that you are white and a foreigner, they will extend their hand and say how are you, can I help you. And I expect someone behave in the same way...” African Community Leader, 2008.

But as many victim-participants found, their reception that was far from welcoming. The fact that Newcastle had become a city of sanctuary for asylum seekers, appeared to be a contradiction when people were being attacked because of their status and colour.

6.22 Responses to racist victimisation

People from both settled and emerging communities had to adopt strategies relative to their strengths and opportunities. For some, responses were empowering, such as in moving in large groups to harden the target; responding to violence with violence; or in more reasoned responses; whilst others tended to put up with abuse; or withdraw themselves and their families from normal community life. It was a common finding that victims wanted to leave an area or school and go somewhere safer for them. Some people changed their behaviours in the face of racist incidents, to avoid it, or to confront it.

“I had a bottle thrown at my face at the Haymarket because I was wearing my scarf. Now I don’t wear it.” Asian female, 2008.

Participants said they avoided places considered too dangerous for them, naming several parts of Newcastle as notoriously racist. Some Asian participants would ensure they were with friends in high-risk areas to avoid being attacked. This was when walking to the youth centre; or avoiding ‘*paki-bashing*’ at the end of school term. Three African asylum seekers stated that they would avoid letting their

children to play out in the streets around Byker, as they would be attacked, pointing out that they were not alone in this predicament:

“I keep my kids indoors. I’m not going to let them play in England, because... they are going to be attacked.” African asylum seeker, 2008.

“My kids now they don’t go out more often. At school they had the same problem... some of them were attacked, harassed at school. ... my son has become more aggressive now.” African Community Pastor, 2008.

Stopping children from playing out was a decision for many asylum seeker parents in 2008, to avoid incidents, but the impact on their mental health was a concern. Many asylum seekers felt angry, and withdrew from community life, to avoid victimisation. The Asian community, however, became more resilient and greater in number over the decades. Being able to choose a response, shaped the character and future of the stronger people, reducing harm to their wellbeing and reducing the frequency of further victimisation.

“When I was in school, the only way that we dealt with racism was through fighting. ...it developed me as a person...” Asian Youth Leader, 2008.

Others chose their response, depending on the nature of the individuals involved or the incident:

“So, I would gladly beat the shit out of them or engage in a very heated but educated conversation with them.” Asian Councillor (b), 2008.

Several African asylum seekers, said they had wanted to fight back:

“I told him... that next time I will fight back, and she say to me ‘you don’t have to do that, because once you do that, can have the chance to be deported.’...we haven’t got many rights.” African community pastor, 2008.

This desire to fight back was similar to that reported in the Asian community, but asylum seekers lacked the 'power' to do so, owing to their isolation; the trauma of persecution and relocation; and for some, warnings from the police about being deported if they defended themselves.

An Asian councillor, though disappointed at the lack of support from his teachers in combatting racism in school, spoke passionately about attending a racism conference:

"That was the happiest day of my life, because I could actually speak about racism, combat it, instead of with my fists." Asian Councillor, 2008.

This had a very positive impact on him:

"That conference had changed me. After that conference I realised that I have potential, I can speak, I have got something, and I am determined."

For this participant, it was the determination to combat racism, and the opportunity to do it, that enabled him to take a stand. Some of the African asylum seekers interviewed, also responded to their experiences by voluntary work as supporters of others in their communities. It is evident then, the resilient members of BAME communities have challenged racism, when possible, with some positive outcomes. This was because of feeling unsupported by those in authority, or an unwillingness to involve them. For others, according to one participant, facing racist violence has led to his peers becoming involved in substance abuse, crime and inevitably prison sentences.

6.30 Victims Experience of the Policing Response

Victims tended to speak mostly of the police response, with little mention of how they had engaged other agencies such as schools and housing to address problems. The term policing here is meant in the broadest sense to cover all such agencies. I have presented the content of this section in 4 main categories: Trust and Confidence in Policing, which influences whether victims report incidents or

not; The Initial Response to the Incident; Validation and Understanding of the Victim Experience; finally, The Resolution and Closure process.

6.31 Trust and Confidence in Policing

For many BAME victims, the barriers to reporting incidents are substantial and prohibitive. This research has identified reasons why BAME people would not consider reporting racist incidents to the police. The recent death of George Floyd at the hands of police officers in Minneapolis in May 2020 (US, 2020), raised concerns globally about policing and BAME people. The 2021 Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities report (CRED, 2021) suggests, albeit controversially, that Britain is no longer systematically *'rigged against ethnic minorities,'* but a deep-rooted legacy of mistrust continues (BBC News, 2021). The findings evidence the victim's experience and expectations of the policing response. They justify their perspective that significant failings remained.

It evidently took something quite substantial to push many BAME victims to report racist violence; and doing so required confidence that the organisations would meet their needs.

"...a lot of people don't have trust or faith in the system... there's no point in me doing [reporting] it because nothing is going to come of it." Asian community/youth worker, 2008.

"It is a waste of time, nothing gets done, it might come back worse on me. So, there is that fear, that issue of being a grass, the sign of weakness." Asian taxi driver, 2020.

The settled Asian community cited many reasons why they may not report racist violence. For less serious incidents, there appeared little point in making the effort as nothing would be done see (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, Myers and Lantz, 2020b); it could make the situation worse for them; and they did not want the stigma of being considered a grass (sic).

“I myself, won’t report any racist crime unless it was something that was quite serious. And how do you make that link between it being a racist attack or just a crime.” Asian community/youth worker, 2008.

It was significant that the racist element may not be recognised or recorded by the police, implying the relevance and importance of this detail being accepted. This concern was reflected in Hardy and Chakraborti’s contemporary studies on broader hate crime, where it was argued that police and partner agencies *‘would fail to grasp the seriousness and prevalence of hate incidents’* (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019) Asylum seeker participants had other reasons for not reporting low-level incidents, giving examples of attending officers first questioning their immigration status and how they came to be in possession of a vehicle, before taking details of the incident they were reporting:

“being asylum seeker put them in a vulnerable situation when they can’t report any incident to the police because they sometimes got their immigration check first.” African community pastor, 2008.

Several participants spoke about this kind of police action, where they treat the victim as a suspect. This was a concern expressed by Baroness Lawrence in her evidence to the Home Affairs Committee in February 2019:

‘From 1993 until about 2006, that level of trust was never there. Initially, I wanted to trust, and I wanted to believe, because I thought that they would see Stephen’s death as something so horrendous that they would want to do something to solve it, but they weren’t interested. All our meetings and our visits did not give me any hope that they really understood what we were going through. We were more or less treated as if we were the criminals, not the victims of Stephen’s murder. That carried on over the years.’ (Parliament, 2021, q. 23)

It was also a concern in this study, that whilst some police officers do provide a good quality of service, others do not.

“Now I realise that some of you police, some of you are nice and some are bad, they harass us like those children.” African asylum seeker, 2008.

Harassment in this example, was more about a perceived indifference to the impact that incidents were having on the victim; rejection of the racist element; and what she felt were unacceptable reasons for slow responses. This study did not set out to explore racist attitudes and behaviours by police officers, but some participants expressed perceptions of police racism that undermined trust and confidence in the service:

“...and some of the police are seen as racist themselves. There is no doubt that there are police officers that are racist.”

Interviewer: “Have you experienced that?”

“There are some who tell me that that cop is racist, you can tell by his attitude, you can tell by the way he looks at us or does something.” Asian community worker, 2008.

Many, like the above example, were third party observations, but others were direct experiences.

“It is this things that make people not call the police. And I find... this police officer is a racist. It is not they like to support me, because I am not from this country...” African community leader, 2008.

Here, the police treat the victim with suspicion, choosing to question how he came to be in possession of his personal belongings, rather than dealing with the incident. This has been interpreted as a racist attitude, though other examples could reflect an insensitive choice of language.

“...it was quite astonishing for me when the police told me ‘You don’t belong here, you don’t belong in this neighbourhood’.” Asian refugee, 2008.

The participant took the statement from the police to be racist, though other interpretations would be viable, such as a recognition that the area was not a safe location to house a single Asian female parent. The most recent example of police officers behaving in a racist manner comes from a taxi driver based in Newcastle, recalling when he was stopped by police in Swansea:

“...he picked up my gloves and then said, ‘these gloves smell of curry’ and I said ‘sorry?’ He says ‘yeah, these gloves smell of curry and you smell of curry.’” Asian taxi driver, 2020.

There is no ambiguity in this victim experience, the comments were clearly racist and impacted on his perception of police. It notable that this example of blatant racism from a police officer was not evidenced in the second period interviews as a Newcastle issue. Some of the participants involved in work with Northumbria police, acknowledged that they were trying to improve trust and confidence, but recognised that changing the opinions of any community, is challenging. Yet the need for trust and confidence in the services is a clear feature in this study. Without that, and for the lower-level and more frequent incidents, under-reporting is an inevitable outcome. The feeling that police are unlikely or unwilling to take any tangible action appeared as a collective experience, particularly in the early period of the study.

6.32 A Positive and Timely Response

For more serious, ongoing incidents, where the threat and harm were immediate and substantial, BAME victims identified that they were more inclined to make a report and expected a prompt response. In many cases, the police response was considered too slow, particularly on Friday and Saturday evenings. Usually, by the time police had arrived, the incident was over. This was true for other incident types too, as the first contact anyone had with the police, tended to result in a drop in confidence (Shilston, 2008). Others spoke of times when the police did arrive, but their handling of the situation did not meet expectations.

“They didn’t do enough to combat the issue which really killed off my morale to report any more... they took too long to come, then they just interviewed me and go away. African asylum seeker, 2008.

Experiencing a poor response after a report was frustrating, particularly as some felt that reporting carried a risk of further targeting. In the following example, the failure to respond after the first call, and then to respond late to another call, two weeks later caused fear and upset:

“No, they didn’t come, after 2 week I had another racist incident again, ... and then they said ‘today is Friday we are just so busy, just stay in.’ I said, I’m not in safety, how can you say that to me.” Asylum Seeker, 2008.

An Asian shopkeeper was frustrated that police and housing association were not working to resolve his problems. A bail hostel opened across the road from his store, and he was subjected to racist incidents from the residents:

“I told him the guy lives across the road who was being racist, stealing and threatening me. And they said he can’t just go and warn and caution him. And of course, they can... but sometimes I feel they is reluctant.” Asian shopkeeper, 2020.

The following examples suggest a mixed level of service for this participant, where he has experienced concerning responses, and finally a positive outcome during the same period:

(1) *“the police turned up the following day you know, the following day. So that’s what made me really upset.”*

(2) *“...another car was damaged but this time the police did their work, they caught people they send them to court. The police did their job properly, even though they came late, but they give me an explanation... it was justified.”*

African community pastor, 2008.

Here, there has been positive engagement between the police and the victim. An Asian student attacked in a supermarket car park, also provided a positive example:

“The police that came... helped me a lot, ...they take my witness statement, and the identification. They telephoned... ambulance. They were really helpful good, good.” Asian student, 2020.

It is clear that a timely response; positive engagement; explanation of what action will be taken; and a disposal that meets the victim’s needs is required.

6.33 Empathy, Understanding, and Validation

Victims often complained that police did not listen to, nor accept what they were telling them. This led to frustration and a feeling of being undermined by the agencies supposed to be helping them:

“We are not the only one priority but at least we need to be listened to.” African victim, 2008.

This respondent implied a lack of interest from the police about what the victim had to say, or an indifference to the racist nature of incidents.

“There are some that have got that empathy, especially those who are neighbourhood and understand their community and their background. But some of them just don’t have the time.” African community, 2020

Lack of empathy with the victim was a more frequent theme in the earlier study period:

“Empathy, I guess. You don’t come knocking on the door, if you don’t have any experience saying, ‘oh we understand’ you don’t!” Asian asylum seeker, 2008.

The victim explained police could never understand or empathise with an Asian victim of racist crime, who, along with her young family, had been targeted by white neighbours; verbally abused outside of school; whose children were frequently attacked at school; and who had been assaulted in the city centre because she wore a headscarf. It appeared to her that nobody listened to her concerns or validated her experiences. This was a finding in the broader study of hate crime conducted by Hardy and Chakraborti, wherein victims did not feel that police had or showed empathy towards them (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). Another parent spoke of how the police would try to down-play the incidents:

“...they always minimise the problem... they think I have problem in head. It’s really painful.” African asylum seeker, 2008.

Many subtle examples of how concerns have been ignored or minimised can be read-into other accounts. In this response, we see almost a direct lift from a Macpherson finding, that:

‘the Police Service and other agencies regularly ignore and belittle such incidents.’ (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999)

This feeling, that professionals were failing to listen and empathise meant victims did not have their experiences validated and felt ignored. The leader of the African support network explained:

“...it is not about ignorance; they are trying to minimise and to undermine the people who are coming from the other country.” African Support Group, 2008.

An asylum seeker participant recalled many cases of police not taking them seriously when they made reports. He suggested police issue him with an identity card confirming he is supporting victims. He hoped that would make officers take him seriously:

“...if the police officer knows you are supporting the victim, that could change all the things, and the police officer will think I must take it seriously and I must help.”

African community voice 2008.

Wanting to hold a form of identification, so police would listen and take him seriously, spoke volumes for the relationship he felt his community had with them. The lack of feedback about cases was a common theme, and evidently trust and confidence would be improved if it was provided. Lack of feedback from the police however, was not restricted to BAME victims, it has been a common theme across many crime and victim types (Maguire, 1991).

Examples have been given of police advising victims that an incident was not racist, but when a victim believes it is, their failure to accept that element, exacerbated concerns that the police were indifferent to racist incidents.

“The police and the council consider it is not what they call a hate crime. For us it is a hate crime. ...to make people agree with us that it is a hate crime is difficult. ...every incident gets recorded as ASB, not as racist and that has to be improved.”

African Community Leader, 2020.

To the victims, these were racist attacks; and more examples of agencies ignoring the racist element. This participant was involved in national integration projects. He spoke about a knife crime conference he attended in London:

“...those young people in London were saying their concerns were being ignored and that’s what’s happening here too, we are being ignored.” African community leader, 2020.

The participant drew comparisons between young black males in London feeling ignored by the authorities in relation to knife crime; and the BAME community in Newcastle feeling ignored about racist violence. While knife crime and racist violence are two very different topics, the concept that the authorities ignore the black community in both cases, was significant.

6.34 Feedback, Resolution and Closure

Beyond the initial call out of the police or partner agency, victims want the incidents to stop happening. They expect the police and partners to be able to bring about resolutions that will improve their quality of life. This may take the form of enforcement action or providing reassurance patrols in the area. Even just strong words of warning from the authorities, a visit to the offender from the police or tenancy enforcement officer. The experience of victims in this study was of a frequently disappointing conclusion to their reports, or a lack of feedback about actions or outcomes, leading to a loss of appetite to make further reports.

“The incidents keep happening which means they have not dealt with the issue.”
African asylum seeker, 2008.

If the victim did not see the situation improving, and did not get any updates from the police, they felt the response had not been sufficient.

“I believe they did a shit job truthfully because it carried on for 5 weeks. ... just taking the piss, they haven’t done anything about it.” Asian male, 2008.

A frequent comment was a lack of communication from the police about the progress or outcome of their cases. A participant explained that feedback would create trust:

“If we’ve got the feedback from the police, trust was created. But you know, when you haven’t got the feedback, or ‘Oh, that isn’t racism, that is nothing,’ you know what I mean?” African community voice, 2008.

“The police officer should come back to me and tell me that he got 3 months or a fine. That way I feel that my report is worth it. But if I don’t get feedback, I feel myself oh nothing happened to him” Newcastle Muslim Association, Focus Group, 2008.

Updates from the police or authorities was absent in many accounts. The lack of communication was interpreted as a nil response. The incidents continued and the perception that authorities were not supportive of the BAME communities was perpetuated.

The section found that victims required positive engagement from policing agencies where they felt heard, believed, and validated; a tangible solution that stopped or at least reduced harm; and feedback from the authorities about what had been done, providing closure. Even in cases where nothing could be done, an explanation about why that was the case, would have been sufficient to satisfy victims that their situation had been understood and taken seriously.

6.40 Continuities and discontinuities in the victim experience over time

Whilst this study captures research data provided around two distinct periods, 2008 and 2020, some victim-participants interviewed in 2008, provided their recollections of racist incidents from as far back as the 1960s. Plotting the findings of this chapter on a timeline from the experiences of the first-generation Asian communities provides an interesting temporal perspective of the experience of racist incidents and how they were policed. The emerging Asian communities in the 1970s, represented a visible change in the traditional white European working-class neighbourhoods. They experienced frequent racist verbal abuse, threats, and physical attacks.

“Our family and another 2 or 3 Asian families lived in our area and that was it. So, you could imagine the scale of abuse, physical and verbal that you were subjected to on a daily basis. ...you got up and left the house and you just faced it.” Asian Councillor, 2008.

They spoke of growing up on the estates of Newcastle:

“In the 60s my father had gone through quite a lot of overt racism, just as my uncle did. I received racist abuse in the form of verbal abuse from young people in the school.” Asian youth worker, 2008.

This happened in the immediate neighbourhoods, in schools and when walking through other areas. The frequency of racist incidents caused a feeling of fear among Asians. Second generation Asians remembered how the racist murder of Koaz Miah elevated their anxieties about being attacked, particularly in the more notoriously racist areas of the city.

“When I was a young lad, you would never come to Scotchy, it was a different kind of racism. These days it doesn’t happen.” Asian Youth Worker, 2008

For some, this led to depression and anxiety, whilst others developed a more resilient approach towards it, re-calibrating the power balance in their favour. The Asian population grew through the 1990s, and whilst racist incidents continued to happen, some were able to take steps to resist it, often responding defensively or offensively, becoming violent themselves. Other resistive approaches taken by Asians were in anti-racist work with youth and working with others to provide advocacy and support. Participants commented that aggression from the white European community began to reduce at the turn of the century, expressing that progress was being made. This was in all but the most vulnerable of contexts such as taxi driving and shopkeeping. The study gained a small amount of comment on policing in that period, several accounts were provided of police indifference and inaction in the face of blatant racist crime.

“They were giving him all this racist abuse. Two policemen drove up and asked, ‘what’s wrong mate?’ to which they replied, ‘we’re just trying to get these pakis to sell us some beer, what’s the big fucking deal?’ and the police said, ‘oh just carry on’ ... and drove off.” Asian Councillor, 2008.

The terrorist attack of 9/11 spread a new strain of racist violence to the Asian community. Participants described how the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the anti-Islamic discourse surrounding it, caused Islamophobia to surge as a new mutation of racism. This impacted on all Asians, not only Muslims and undid much of the progress that had been made in community cohesion:

“On 11th September 2001, everything that you had hoped for finished. It is getting worse for me because you see it everywhere you go. Islamophobia” Asian Councillor, 2008.

Several participants suggested that the media perpetuated Islamophobia.

“What’s in the media is that anyone who looks like me is a terrorist. People stereotype, I’m Indian and I’m fucking so angry about what they’ve done.” Asian Youth Worker, 2008.

Asylum seekers and the Asian participants felt that policing agencies were not for them in 2008, with examples of poor response times, indifference to the victim experience, ineffective resolutions, and an absence of feedback.

“There has been a... dislike since that day as they are not here for us, they will not do anything for us. And there was that Secret Policeman...” Asian Councillor, 2008.

In 2004, as Central African asylum seekers were arriving in the deprived neighbourhoods, they reported being the target of many racist incidents. This was likened to the experiences of the early Asian communities in the 1970s.

“There’s all this hatred for asylum seekers... and they are probably experiencing what I experienced being black.” Asian Councillor, 2008.

This, for the asylum seekers, was a period when they felt the same long-term impact of violence in depression, anxiety, and a withdrawal from community life as Asians reported in the 80s and 90s. The BBC’s 2003 Secret Policeman documentary (Panorama, 2003b) further impacted on trust and confidence in policing during that period.

In the 2020 interviews, the frequency of racist attacks against Asians and asylum seekers had for most participants, reduced. The same vulnerable contexts of taxi driving and shop keeping, appeared as the last bastions where racist violence remained a regular experience. New channels for racism emerged around the EU

referendum when political discourse focused on anti-immigration postures, and later a spike of anti-Asian violence was associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and its presumed Chinese origin.

“Corona Virus... and the rise in hate crime. ...random people approaching Chinese people, saying ‘F’ing Corona Virus; get back to your own country’.”
Sergeant, Communities Engagement Team (CET), 2020.

This response is significant, as it shows that the CET have recognised how recent external factors have caused spikes in incident frequency, a broadening of target communities, and a context for racist language (Allen, 2010, Koopmans, 1996). It implies a bias-fluidity in offending behaviour, where offenders are influenced by current affairs and adapt or change their offending to incorporate new language or modes of targeting accordingly.

Lack of feedback from the police was still a factor, as it was across all victim categories, but indifference and racist attitudes were less frequent. The asylum seeker community were no longer newcomers and had become more integrated in employment and engagement generally, stating that overall, things had improved since 2008.

Interviewer: *“how has the experience of racist violence and targeting changed since we last spoke?”*

“It has improved a lot. I must say that some of the services are still a problem.”
African support group, 2020.

The participant explained that by 2020, for the African asylum seekers who arrived around 2004, there were a lot fewer racist incidents happening, but there was still much room for improvement in the public services.

6.50 Summary

This chapter has presented a view of the nature and scope of racist incidents faced by BAME people in Newcastle, captured in the two distinct periods of study, but covering victim experiences from the 1960s to 2020. The two-stage approach has provided insights into the victim experience of racist violence. It has shown how the political climate impacts on the levels and type of racist violence in communities. It has given voice to the victims in expressing what happened, and how it impacted on them, on families and on communities. It has then given the victim's experience of the policing response and their perspective on the viability of police and partnerships to protect them from racist incidents.

It finds that racist incidents were devastating experiences for victims. They ranged in nature from verbal abuse to a racist murder in 1992, that was still on the minds of many interviewees in 2008. It was most commonly incidents of criminal damage and assaults that were reported to the police. Participants felt that acts of avoidance and discrimination also fit their definition of racist incidents and contributed to their lived experiences of the problem. The frequency of incidents for many participants was high, and that had a significant impact on their wellbeing, in terms of anxiety, depression, loss of self-esteem, frustration, and anger.

Most victims tended to take passive or avoidance responses to incidents, changing their movements to avoid further incidents wherever that was possible. For some, avoidance was not possible, when incidents were happening around their children's schools, around the home, neighbourhood, and workplace. A small number of victims were able to respond to racist incidents in more empowering ways, such as with reciprocal violence, heated challenges, and longer-term support of others in their communities.

Though victims wanted a policing service that inspired trust and confidence, that was not the experience. They experienced slow response times; dismissive attitudes from the police about the incidents themselves, such as discounting the racist element or minimising the severity; an anticipation and in some cases an observation that police were racist towards them; not there for Asians; or in the

case of asylum seekers, police treating them as suspects not victims, contributing to apathy and fear of reporting all but the most serious of incidents; a lack of initial actions at the scene to support them; a failure to listen, understand and validate their experiences; and a lack of updates on the progress of their cases, interpreted as a nil response and reinforcing their poor expectations.

Whilst the balance is delicate, progress against racist violence has been made, but events such as 9/11 and the COVID pandemic have caused new spikes in frequency and an adjustment of focus on who the target has been. Visible changes in community dynamic, such as the dispersal of asylum seekers and the apparent rapid population of some neighbourhoods with Czech Roma, have influenced offending against them. There is a cogent argument herein, that in some, racism holds dormant for periods of time, but when the gravitational pull of change, opportunity and mindsets make it justifiable, causes outbreaks of individual, collective, localised, or national trends of racist violence.

The study did not find any variation in the impact of racist incidents over the period. Where several cases of racist attitudes from police were given in the first period, by 2020 none were offered. There was still evidence of a reluctance of police to accept the racist element of some crimes. Overall, through both periods of the study, there was a theme that BAME communities tended not to view the police and partners as viable or legitimate protectors against the occurrence, impact, and harm of racist violence.

The findings of this chapter present, arguably the most important perspective on how the police were responding to racist incidents. Findings chapter 2, takes the perspectives of those in the police and partner agencies, providing insights from officers who delivered the service, to balance the experiences of the service users with the service providers. Together, the findings chapters provide the empirical foundations to combine with the literature review in the discussion chapter, to synthesise the contributions this thesis makes.

Chapter 7: Findings (2): The Police and Partnership Agenda

7.00 Introduction

Findings Chapter 1 built the case for interventions in racist incidents that included timely attendance; meaningful engagement; validation of the victim experience; an agreeable resolution; ideally to stop further incidents; and feedback to explain the outcome. It also indicated undesirable behaviours by some police officers in the earlier period, and failures to meet victim's needs and expectations. This second findings chapter presents evidence from interviews with police officers, staff, and members of other agencies to give insights into the factors that impact on the quality of response; what may prevent delivery of the kind of service victims need and expect; explore the motivators behind police behaviours; and look at how policy, attitude, behaviours, and partnership working have developed over the study period. This directly addresses objective 3 of the thesis: to examine and evaluate the responses of Northumbria Police and partner agencies over the study period. It also provides evidence for the discussion chapter to triangulate the literature review with the study data, to address objectives 4 and 5: to advise and inform the police and partners in aligning their response to racist crime and incidents to meet the needs of victims, their family and community; and to develop a theoretically informed needs response policy for Northumbria Police and partners.

The study found that in the first period, senior ranks and specialist teams understood the need for victim focus and support. But there was a lack of enthusiasm among some operational officers to engage with racist incidents or the victims. Behind this subdued appetite were concerns about the increased workload they assumed would be involved in a racist incident; apprehension about their ability to deal professionally with BAME victims; being labelled a racist officer; legacy issues about police race relations; and dismissive or overly critical attitudes about providing an appropriate service to BAME victims; and an assumption that victims would not support a prosecution. By the second period, this had improved and officers, particularly Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs), were generally more proactive in recognising racism and more supportive of victims. Workloads

were high throughout the study and in the earlier period, officers felt they simply did not have the time to adequately engage with victims to understand their concerns, particularly during the performance culture era. Partnership working was a way of collaborating with other agencies to provide a more holistic response to victim's needs. The form and function of statutory and casual partnerships developed over the study period and was impacted significantly by austerity. The outcome of resource cuts was more streamlined and targeted partnership arrangements that were felt to be more efficient and effective than their predecessors.

The chapter is structured into three sections. Section 1 explores the victim focused agenda, how it was understood within the police and the attitudes towards it. Section 2 then examines how policies and pressures influenced police prioritisation and purpose around racist incidents. Section 3 plots the emergence of partnerships in policing racist incidents, how they developed and operated.

7.10 Victim-Focused Agenda

This section presents evidence of the attitudes and behaviours of police officers and staff towards providing a victim focused service for racist incidents. Findings Chapter 1 identified that victims needed police to have empathy with them, to understand and validate their experience, and provide the appropriate response. But they felt this need was seldom met, instead more negative, suspicious, even racist attitudes and behaviours were experienced. This section looks to the police for attitudinal cues as to why victims may get this impression. It found that in the earlier period of the study, the more senior ranks or specialist posts understood the value of a victim focused service. Operational ranks had a dismissive attitude towards the impact of racist incidents and expressed that they did not want to deal with them. Victim's needs were low in the hierarchy of police relevance in that period. In the second period of the study, there was a clear shift in attitude amongst operational officers, who expressed a more empathetic, supportive posture towards victims and recognised inherent vulnerabilities in victims of racist incidents. There was a feel throughout both periods however, that some

reluctance to deal with racist violence was due to a fear that police were considered racist.

This section starts with the perspectives of senior officers and others who articulated the importance of good quality engagement with the victim and their situation. It then presents some negative responses from neighbourhood officers in 2008 and a disregard of what victims think about the service. Finally, it identifies how empathy and engagement with racist incidents improved during the second period of the study.

7.11 The essence of a good service

At the strategic level, leaders felt that listening to, understanding, and responding to the victim or community experience of racist violence, was an essential priority in delivering a quality service:

“To actually listen to the concerns of the community, or individuals, and take you seriously. A positive outcome is a bonus. The least helpful would be to just brush off things that we may regard as trivial, but they are actually very, important to them.” Area Commander, 2008.

At the corporate level, a victim focused response emerged as: listening to the victim, taking them seriously, understanding and validating their experience and how it impacted on them; establishing what the victim needed; taking action to address that; and providing timely updates and feedback on the case. These principles were also articulated and understood in the Community Cohesion Unit; by some Neighbourhood Inspectors; and officers who had been victims themselves:

“Every racial incident I’ve dealt with, I have said I know how you feel, how frustrated and angry you feel towards everyone else. I can relate totally to that. And that’s it, that’s the barrier broken down immediately.” (mixed-race) PCSO, in NPT Focus Group, 2008.

Of all response officers and PCSOs interviewed, this participant was the only one able to provide evidence of true empathy with victims of racist violence and their needs. This was because they too, had experience of being targeted with racist abuse. The victim-need was well articulated by a response from ARCH:

“One of the things they want is someone to listen to them. That is one of the most important things, for someone to take them seriously. They want to talk; they need to let someone know what has happened to them. ...sit there and ask questions, like ‘how did that make you feel’ is starting the process” ARCH, 2008.

The issue of police officers failing to show empathy with victims of racist violence is an under-developed concept in scholarly work, albeit contemporary literature is beginning to recognise its value, see (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019) The principles provide a helpful benchmark to assess how professionals in the policing agencies operationalise victim focus, in practice.

7.12 Dis-ease in policing racist incidents

The introduction to this section highlighted the strategic perspective and that of officers with competence, confidence, and passion to support BAME victims. However, in the first period of the study, many of the operational officers were not enthusiastic about engaging with the victims of racist violence nor the anticipated additional work burden associated with racist violence. This was expressed blatantly in a focus group with a neighbourhood policing team:

“Nobody wants to deal with a racist incident.”

“That’s a good point.”

Interviewer: “Why is that?”

“Because the thing flags up, and the workload.”

“The scrutiny you get put under.”

“In-case you get one little mistake wrong.”

“People feel that they have to give an extra bit service to the victim of a racist crime than they would do to any normal person, or any other person, should I say.”

“rather than just going and taking a crime report, you are then faced with other issues.” NPT focus group, 2008.

This identifies that although the team may know the strategy, there is a degree of resentment implied, that the victim of racist crime will need additional police effort, over and above what a *‘normal (sic)’* victim would, and that is very significant here. Also significant is the fear of scrutiny which is likely linked to the fear of making mistakes. In analysing the evidence of victim-focus, the perspectives of this team, appeared to focus more on the unwanted burden to the officer, than it did on supporting a victim according to their needs. Within the same interview, there was further evidence that officers held resentment about policing racist violence:

“You may think I am being judgemental, but before they came along, we were busy, then along came this extra burden of refugees and asylum seekers.” NPT Focus Group, 2008.

The use of the terms ‘burden’ and ‘they’ is supportive of Bowling’s argument of a police hierarchy of operational relevance (Bowling, 1998) which renders the needs of this group of victims to be irrelevant and outside of the *‘natural agenda’* (Grimshaw and Jefferson, 1987, p. 107) of proper police work. The victims themselves, and their needs as victims was, in these responses, of lower significance than how busy this team already were. The outrage, therefore, was not in the fact that they were being targeted with racist violence, but their arrival was making the job of the police harder.

Some police participants spoke about anxieties and apprehensions in dealing with racist incidents, in addition to a lack of understanding:

“Not the crime, but I really do think that there is a fear of dealing with the victim. We are really worried that we are still perceived to be racist.” Neighbourhood Inspector, 2020.

“On the tail end of the Macpherson report, when I joined the police, I was immediately a racist homophobe and I think that is the public perception of the police. And I think, what’s changed since then?” NPT Focus Group, 2020.

The fear of getting it wrong, being accused of being racist or incompetent, and getting a complaint, emerged regularly. The legacy the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999); police diversity training (Rowe and Garland, 2003a); and the 2003 BBC documentary ‘The Secret Policeman’ (Panorama, 2003a), were cited as causes of this professional anxiety. Waddington describes a *‘defensive solidarity’* in policing teams, where real *‘ever-present danger lies in taking action that is judged improper.’* (Waddington, 1999a, p. 301). Waddington describes this fear of getting it wrong as a broad concern in operational policing, that leads to *‘preoccupation with avoiding and minimising “in the job trouble.”’* (ibid., p. 302). The findings here tend to evidence a hybrid of Bowling’s *‘subcultural’* and *‘class-functional’* models of policing (Bowling, 1998, p. 240). The subcultural model is reflected in how the senior police officers, Inspectors and above, who are closely connected to policy, want the policing service to focus on victim needs. They articulated that they wanted their officers to be engaging with victims, understanding them, and responding accordingly. The contrasting (sub-cultural) responses on the ground, show indifference to the victim’s experience and needs, and a push-back against providing a more supportive intervention. Bowling suggests this model results in *‘an apparent failure to act sympathetically or effectively to instances of violent racism’* (ibid., p. 240). The class-functional model infers an explanation that the empirical reality of a poor response to racist violence, where BAME people are *‘under protected as victims’* (ibid., p. 241), is simply a reproduction of *‘existing relations of class and race exploitation’* (ibid., p. 242).

Perhaps in support of the defensive nature of police officers, and in contrast to empirical studies, a Neighbourhood Inspector commented on the quality of service their team provided as:

“I think we are excellent. I would be very disappointed if when you interview victims of racist crime, if they feel that they haven’t had a good service. And I would even go so far as to say that they were wrong. Because they get a better service than any other victim of crime.” NI, 2008.

This strong opinion identifies a void between victim experiences, and how well this inspector felt they met their needs. It assumed the additional work for racist incidents, resulted in an excellent service, and the victim’s opinion was of little value. Victim focus then, whilst it is recognised at the strategy end of business, is blurred at the delivery end by lack of understanding; resentment of additional burden to officers; and a fear of being considered racist, predominantly during the first period of the study.

7.13 Tracking changes in attitude towards victim-focus

Responses in the 2020 interviews with PCSOs, PCs and Inspectors articulated a shift in how those with their boots on the ground, understood their roles in policing violent racism, particularly those in neighbourhood policing teams:

“We put vulnerability at the centre. Our biggest risk is that people become so isolated that they won’t ring the police and that Fiona Pilkington case could play itself out.” NI, 2020.

This reflected a new general approach to vulnerability in 2020. In relation to racist incident:

“We will go to a diary appointment for ASB, but it turns out there is a racial motive behind it.”

Interviewer: *“How does that happen?”*

“It’s usually when the victim tells us, and it is usually racist language. I think people living in the area put up with it. But I tell them they don’t have to put up with that.”

“It is normalised.”

“That’s right.”

“So, for me, it is important that the victim is supported, and they get the service that they want.” PCSO Focus Group, 2020.

The PCSOs in this case, rather than dismissing a racist component to the incidents in the store, have recognised it. They have gone further too, by informing the victim that it does not need to be tolerated, or normalised; and by ensuring that it is properly recorded:

“I think first and foremost it is safeguarding the victim. Making sure that they are safe and then the investigation. Taking positive action, we are told to do this by the organisation, but it is the right thing to do. You know we aren’t living in the dark ages; racism isn’t acceptable.” NPT Focus Group, 2020.

Whilst this officer does refer to procedure as a driver positive action, they asserted it is right to safeguard the victim, and racism is unacceptable. Their focus was on victim support, meeting their needs, and acknowledging the racist element. There was no sense of resentment about additional workload, and they were quite clear that racism was not acceptable. Similarly:

“We do need to gain a greater understanding of victim’s needs. Victim personal statements are not used to the extent they should be.” NI, 2020.

It was felt that the victim personal statement would capture an account of the impact the incident had, giving the victim an opportunity to express themselves.

The introduction of the new Force Operating Model in 2019, meant that in 2020, the roles of response and neighbourhood changed significantly (see Research Site chapter). RPT, were dealing with high priority calls only; neighbourhood were providing the longer-term harm reduction and problem-solving responses to the most vulnerable victims. Some participants expressed how they were able to empathise with victims of racist incidents, but that empathy was not consistent:

“Some do, some don’t. I don’t think it is anything to do with them being cops, it is a personal trait. I think if you can turn-up at a job and give them reassurance that you’re going to take it seriously and that it won’t be tolerated, they are sometimes taken aback.” PCSO Focus Group, 2020.

The fact that victims can be taken aback by a positive engagement with police, who were prepared to accept and deal with racist incidents, suggests that prior experiences or expectations, have not been positive.

Between 2008 and 2020, participants presented a changing attitude towards victim-focus. In 2008, it was the strategists, specialists or BAME officers who recognised the need to understand, validate and respond to the victim experience and their needs. There was evidence of an operational level push-back against dealing with racist incidents at that time, explained as: a perception of increased scrutiny; a degree of resentment about a presumed, additional needs to be met; and a legacy concern that they would be stereotyped as being racist. By 2020, there was a broader understanding of the harm of racist violence and more compassion to engage with victims to support and safeguard them, though the fear of getting into trouble, particularly being labelled racist, was still an issue. Compassion was not wholly consistent, with a suggestion by lower ranks, that response officers still did not take time to engage, or that it was dependent on which officer attended, as reflected in victim interviews from Findings chapter 1.

7.20 Police prioritisation and purpose

This section presents evidence of the pressures police officers felt they were under, particularly during 2008. It contributes to an understanding of the negative

attitudes about racist incidents that police officers articulated in the previous section; and behaviours that victims observed in the previous findings chapter. Organisational demands appeared counter-productive to providing an optimal response to victims. Pressures came from the impact of limited police capacity to meet the high number of ongoing incidents, investigative enquiries, and associated background administrative work. There was a notion of additional workload involved in dealing with racist incidents too, making them less desirable, particularly during the performance culture period. In some cases, attending officers did not record the full extent of incidents and often missed out the racist element in 2008, but in 2020 it tended to be call takers who failed to record it. The study finds that performance targets did not encourage victim focus, in fact they restricted it, tending to influence prioritisation and purpose towards hard tangibles. The advent of austerity and policy change, reduced resources, but improved victim focus. Officers became more attuned and responsive to racist incidents, particularly vulnerability by 2020.

7.21 Capacity, demand, and deployment

Police officers spoke about being under-resourced, in the period leading up to 2008. This meant longer response times and less time available to spend dealing with victims, both of which were recognised as detrimental to the victim experience and to trust and confidence in the police. All officers in this study said that their workload was high, even excessive. With other jobs queueing up for allocation, there was always time-pressure to move on from one job to the next, particularly in 2008:

“The 24/7 have never had so few cops out on the shifts. They are really strapped for time. We never have any staff.” NI, 2008.

All participant groups identified that police responses need to be prompt and officers need to spend time engaging with victims. The high-volume nature of the job, meant officers rarely met this requirement:

'It is again the point that you've got so much to do that I quite often feel that I don't give the service that people need.' PCSO, NPT Focus Group, 2008.

Despite the high workload, some senior ranks asserted that neighbourhood teams did have time to deal with victims more thoroughly:

"...the advantage for the NBM's is that they've got the time to do that bit more, to provide that bit extra support and presence that the 24/7 just don't have the time to do" NI, 2008.

However, that capacity to provide victim focus was often seen as spare capacity by senior leaders, and they were frequently redeployed:

"You can't do everything...Nightmare, just a nightmare. We are pulled in every single direction, every day." NPT Sergeant, 2008.

This was a typical frustration in 2008 for NPTs, who were tasked with the longer-term crime and ASB reduction for their areas. Abstraction of resources to deal with other demands created a void in their geographic area and an inability to keep on top of harm-reduction activities. Contrary to the belief at higher ranks, the NPT PCSO/PC/Sergeant level, reported being too busy; being re-deployed elsewhere; or backfilling a shortage of response officers. Throughout my experience as a police officer, the notion that police are under-resourced, has always been there. It was a topic of conversation in the canteen, in the briefing room, in the police car and on socials. When serious incidents that demand a lot of resources happen, the shortages are very evident. Similarly, when intelligence suggests increased demand ahead of planned events, rest days are broadly cancelled, because the normal resource levels are insufficient to deal with the increases. When I joined Northumbria Police in 1997, my peers said their workloads were consistently high. That was despite having two or three times the number of response police officers that we had in 2020. In 2020, when officers talked about their pressures and workloads, they were consistently excessive.

Under the new Force Operating Model in 2020, the Superintendent explained that the Telephone Investigation Unit (TIU) dealt with a high proportion of jobs without officer deployment, so the volume of incidents for the response team (RPT) had reduced substantially. Response targets were being met; and response officers did have more time to deal professionally with victims. Additionally, they suggested that the NPTs had less abstractions from their core functions. This meant from November 2019, the capacity for response and NPTs to provide a more victim-focused service had improved. However, under the new model, all but the highest priority hate crimes, were dealt with by the TIU, meaning response officers visited a smaller proportion of racist incidents. The majority would be dealt with by telephone:

“Are we delivering as good a service now by not sending an officer, I’m yet to be convinced. ...we do know from hate crime victims that, even that personal interaction, you’re always going to get the satisfaction level.” Superintendent, Hate Crime Lead, Phase 2.

The victim interviews in 2020, did not provide any evidence to reflect or give the victim perspective of these changes, but coming only months after their implementation and mid-COVID pandemic, it was premature to expect that. Interestingly however, Hardy and Chakraborti's work provides recent insights into this issue of prioritisation on a national scale, identifying a *‘perceived tendency to prioritise other types of offence with easily identifiable perpetrators and more obvious resolutions’* (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, p. 163). Whilst the era of performance management is over, at least for now, the prioritisation of more straightforward jobs that carry an identifiable element of recognition for the police officer, still appears to be prevalent.

7.22. Grasping the [racist] nettle or avoiding the sting

In the 2008 period, operational officers felt dealing with BAME victims of racist incidents involved a disproportionately high amount of work for them, a lot more than dealing with white European victims. This made such jobs unattractive. Officers also are reported to have written the racist element, or other significant

components of a crime out of their reports, closing incidents as non-racially motivated or no crime. Evidence from the 2020 interviews suggests the practice of writing the racist element out of the report was reversed, with officers proactively probing victims, encouraging accurate reporting and recording. There was concern that call-takers at the front end may, however, be failing to recognise racism when taking initial reports.

Commenting on their perception of the relative effort his team was required to put into policing racist violence, a Neighbourhood Inspector commented:

“So, the amount of time that hate crime gets is disproportionate to the amount of crime and incidents that there actually is.” NI, 2008.

Hate crime was flagged for the attention of supervisors and the Community Cohesion Unit (CCU). Victims received a re-visit by police, usually neighbourhood officers. There is a sense of frustration and resentment in this response. The NI was the most outspoken in stating how much time and effort police had to dedicate to racist incidents.

“Quite frankly, as soon as the word racism or anything like that is mentioned, that person gets 10 times more resources than someone who is not the victim of racist crime... rightly or wrongly, I don’t know” NI, 2008.

This clear expression of doubt about the worth of spending what is in their opinion, an excessive amount of time on racist violence, while there are so many other pressures, is a genuine concern. The concern of additional work, is suggested in the next response to have caused officers to omit the racist element off an incident report, to avoid more work:

“Often, we get a report of a racist incident where on the first page of the incident report it is a really serious racist incident, by the last page nothing has happened. But then we see the same incident reported through ARCH, it clearly is racist.” Focus Group, CCU, 2008.

In this example, a call taker has created an incident as racist, based upon the nature of the call for help, in other words, what the caller has told them. The attending officer has been out to see the victim, conducted what they felt were reasonable enquiries, then updated the incident record to state it was not racist, and has minimised the severity. The later review by the CCU confirms that the original report was the more accurate. Bowling comments on this element of police behaviour, stating:

'police continue to deny that racist violence is a problem and are, in practice, frequently unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of racist motives for many attacks...' (Bowling, 2002, p. 123) see also (Rowe, 2004b, Hesse and Waltham, 1992).

It was not only the racist element that was occasionally omitted from an officers interpretation of the incident:

"Sometimes on the log for example, 'given verbal abuse in the street.' when you go out, they have been slapped." CCU, 2008.

This example identifies cases where the police officer attending the incident has written the racist assault out of the incident report, however on further engagement with the victim by the CCU, the true extent is revealed. It suggests that some officers had either applied a degree of dishonesty in their reporting, calculated to keep their anticipated workload down; or have somehow interpreted the victim account as an overly inflated version of events, recording only the officer's judgement of what really happened. This is an example of where police have minimised the victim experience in their incident recording.

"I don't know whether it is a fear of more work. You know, a victim was told to get back to their own country and a black bastard, but it was not racist? How can that be anything other than racist?" CCU, 2008.

These experiences suggested a sub-culture of under-recording racist incidents. It may be an unwitting omission through failure to empathise with the victim, a

deliberate omission to avoid additional work, a preference to stay within a comfort zone, or a judgement call. Grasping the nettle herein, would mean recognising racist violence and dealing with it as such. Avoiding the sting in police language, would be 'cuffing the job' by obscuring the racist or burdensome element in the way the incident is recorded, not taking appropriate action, and likely avoiding the provision of feedback to the victim, knowing the job was not properly dealt with. The definition of racist incidents (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999) was very clear in the post-Lawrence period, and the language used in the last example was not ambiguous. But racism was written-out of the script, leaving the attending officer free to go to the next job. Rowe, in 2004 argued that this '*denial of the racist motivation, seen as a fundamental problem by many commentators in the 1980s and 1990s, has been addressed, at least in policy terms*' (Rowe, 2004a, p. 101). The pull of a demanding workload may be an explanation for this failure, and there is no doubt that it would have an impact. But the other explanations may be just as valid, or interchangeable depending upon how the officer feels about the incident, the victim or the response demanded.

Interviews with partner agencies too, revealed frustrations that people tended to minimise incidents the victims felt were racially motivated:

"Officers from the council or the police will still say the classic line 'how do they know it is racist?' ...they are not comfortable dealing with it.' Racial Harassment Prevention Team, 2008.

Clearly then, it was not only police officers who failed to accept the racist element of some cases.

7.23 The impact of a performance culture

In 2008, a robust performance culture had been embedded in Northumbria Police. Officers were required to make their quota of arrests, detections, and incident attendance. Failure to achieve targets was considered under-performance. These targets existed for both response officers and NPT. They were considered

counter-productive to a victim-focused service, particularly to victims of racist incidents:

“Operational officers... are under a great deal of pressure, they’ve got performance indicators from all over the shop, so they just turn up, hear what they’ve got to say, do as little as possible and just move on.” Race Relations Inspector, 2008.

Officers felt compelled to deal with jobs quickly and move on to those likely to have a tangible outcome for them. The policy-pressure tended to displace appetite to spend time with the victim:

“...in January last year I had 2 arrests, so I was action planned to get my 6. ...if they want to action plan me again, I will ask, what about your customer focus?” NPT Focus Group, 2008.

Jobs that demanded a lot of time supporting victims, did not attract performance indicators. This officer valued victim-focus over the need for making their quotas but knew the performance regime operated contrary to this. The performance culture therefore rendered racist incidents high cost/low value, as typically there was little chance of getting something measurable out of them. In 2013, Crane and Hall surveyed police officers to establish how they perceived the service they were providing for victims of racist incidents. They found that contrary to officers being indifferent to the plight of victims, they had a *‘vision of success at the front-line that was driven by the Police Performance Assessment Framework’* (Crane and Hall, 2013, p. 232). This generated a dichotomy, between the victim’s need for engagement, validation, and resolution for their experiences (see findings chapter 1); and the police officer’s need to get something concrete and tangible out of the job. The officer’s choice was talk or chalk:

“10 years ago, we got three stop searches locked-up; got a couple of warrants; got a couple detections; I was the top boy on shift; Steve was working with a vulnerable victim for two days got a house move for them; got the domestic

offender, wouldn't have featured in a debrief." Superintendent, Hate Crime Lead, 2020.

Crane and Hall concluded that although the national policy shift towards victim satisfaction was evident *'a cultural legacy may remain where police performance, or success, is interpreted by most officers as a detection'* (ibid., p. 232).

This section has shown that in the first period, there was a gap between what the victim expected of the police, and what the police were driven to deliver. Performance measures were interpreted to identify the best operators and the worst, calibrated against the Police Performance Assessment Framework criteria selected by institutions. That criteria did not represent a victim-focused agenda (Collier, 2006, Crane and Hall, 2013).

7.24 A focus on vulnerability and a new Force Operating Model

Northumbria Police developed a Hate Crime Delivery Plan, following the 2018 HMIC thematic inspection (HMICFRS, 2018), tightening up incident recording practice and focusing more upon service delivery to vulnerable victims.

Supporting the internal review, the CCU explained that their ongoing daily incident report auditing, meant that very few hate incidents were missed. And those that were recorded, were flagged to the respective NI to ensure they had a good understanding of what was going on in their sector. Evidence from the PCSOs in a focus group interview, corroborated that sometimes the control room do not record the racist element of incidents, but this is a shift from the practices seen in 2008, when responding officers wrote significant details out of the script:

"I think the call takers need to be saying more. Like this is a racist incident, rather than not recording it." PCSO Focus Group, 2020.

Being more attuned to the nature of racist violence and being prepared to record it ethically when attending, was considered by police participants to be a positive change. However, the introduction of the new Force Operating Model (FOM) quite significantly impacted on how Northumbria Police responded to most hate crime:

“...last month 60% of hate crime got dealt with and closed at PIC [Primary Investigation Centre], which was terrifying for me. ...it's a force decision, victims are being dealt with over the phone.”

It was too early in 2020, to triangulate these changes with evidence from the victim perspective. However, concerns about having 60% of hate crimes written off without a visit, are understandably concerning. The evidence from this study identifies the need for engagement with victims, to understand and validate their experience and therefore assess the most appropriate policing intervention. Austerity and policy change ahead of the 2020 interviews, ended the performance focus on hard tangibles, to a posture that focused resources on protecting the most vulnerable in society:

“The attendance rates is higher than ever. ...a year ago, they just need to move on move on move on; ...the neighbourhood team have some more time now because they're not backfilling response.” Superintendent, Hate Crime Lead, 2020.

“That PI doesn't happen now; it is about that victim focus... As long as that victim gets the appropriate service, that's what we need.” Sergeant, CCU, 2020.

The change in organisational focus, away from the Statutory Performance Indicator, towards Vulnerability, Investigation and Problem-Solving (VIP) under Northumbria Police's 'Strategy 2025' (Police, 2019), was seen by police participants to be far more aligned to supporting victims of hate crime:

“...we're actually better at it. As austerity came, we let go of stuff, but we did move towards vulnerability, so they balanced themselves out.” NI, 2020.

Although resources were cut by 25%, the strategy of focusing on the most vulnerable; only investigating cases with a realistic possibility of a prosecution; and selecting jobs where problem solving work was likely to generate worthwhile

results, meant they were doing more productive work for vulnerable victims, with the limited resources:

“we take the ones that are more vulnerable, where the impact has been greater. I would rather stop or stem the flow of this type” NI, 2020.

Neighbourhood teams were more committed to safeguarding victims in 2020. Vulnerable victims had a harm reduction plan, a nominated neighbourhood officer, and oversight by supervision. That brought more responsibility and accountability to the officer in charge:

‘Whereas now it is safeguarding and harm reduction plan and all that kind of thing’ NPT Focus Group, 2020.

A NI felt the focus on hate crime and community cohesion, for them, became everyday business by 2020:

“Back 10yrs ago it felt like a push back because it was quite new. Today it is everyday business, ...so there are reminders all over the place that it is to be taken seriously.” NI, 2020.

This again would imply both a progressive improvement in how the service is delivered on the ground, and a policy influence from Strategy 2025. Presumably, this would become recognisable by victims and their advocates once the shift was more broadly experienced by BAME communities.

This section found that under-resourcing and the performance culture was harmful to victim-focus. This was disproportionately harmful to victims of racist violence, who needed that additional support to restore confidence, as findings chapter 1 identified. Participants argued, that through no fault of their own, police officers could not provide the kind of service that victims of racist violence needed; although the failure to record the racist element of incidents or other significant factors was considered unethical. Under Strategy 2025, police officers and leaders

now hoped the service was better at meeting the needs of vulnerable victims and felt that they were doing a better job.

7.25 Revisits and positive outcomes

The policy and procedure around conducting follow-up re-visits to victims of racist incidents was not very well understood or received by some neighbourhood officers in 2008, who felt it was contrary to the wishes of victims. They were intended to provide reassurance to the victim by making a second visit within two weeks of the initial call, providing feedback on any case, support, and signposting. When asked why officers conduct revisits, one participant answered:

“To ask if there have been any further problems. You leave them your contact number, otherwise you get tied up with nonsense....” NPT Focus Group, 2008.

The Neighbourhood Inspectors tended to see some benefits.

“We are looking for reassurance of the victim, but we are also looking for a positive outcome.” NI, 2008.

The re-visits represented an opportunity for engagement with BAME victims. They could have assisted in the investigation or supported other interventions that led to positive outcomes. However, the term ‘nonsense’, suggested an attitude that discounted the victim needs, or implied, as we have seen in earlier sections, it was not worthy police business. This was a feeling historically across a range of police jobs, such as domestic abuse and antisocial behaviour but has particular relevance in this study of racist violence. Other than reassurance, the tangible result from a revisit could be the police defined ‘positive outcome’, which in the early period was a performance indicator:

“A positive outcome is if we put someone on a charge or a summons. Even if the victim says that is Johnny Bloggs who is shouting at me, and they don’t want to give a statement or go to court but they want him spoken to, that’s a positive outcome for us.” NI, 2008.

Though enforcement action by police was often desired and necessary, both responses suggested a gap between police derived positive and the victim derived positive outcomes. In the first, reassurance is one objective and distinct from a positive outcome. The second refers to an outcome being positive for the police “us”:

Interviewer: *“would it be a positive outcome for the victim?”*

“Yes, and if you ask the victim, they probably say that it wasn’t a positive outcome, as they would probably want them put in prison.” NI, 2008.

Though this response asserts that it would be positive for the victim, they also recognise that the victim would not agree. Sometimes, common sense would dictate that a positive outcome, a detection, or any form of action will not be possible. For many low-level incidents, there really are no options open to the police, or perhaps, as the NI suggests, the victim’s expectations of what the police can do, are too high. Strategy 2025 created a more positive culture of victim support. NPT officers revisited victims of racist incidents to provide reassurance; advice; an update on investigations; and to establish if further incidents had happened. Victims of racist incidents were considered inherently vulnerable and therefore had the attention of the NIs. This, however, was the case for any vulnerable victim. Consequently, harm reduction plans and follow-up visits became the day job for most neighbourhood officers, eliminating any room for a perception that BAME victims got an enhanced service.

7.30 The Emergence and Development of Policing Partnerships

This section gives perspectives into why effective partnerships were important in policing racist incidents and describes how they emerged and developed over both periods of the study. The police rank of Inspector and above saw value in the efficacy of partnerships over police in isolation, providing more comprehensive interventions for victims and offenders. In the period leading up to the turn of the century, partnerships were recognised as beneficial, but were ad hoc, and lacking

structure. Agencies Against Racist Crime and Harassment (ARCH) was formed in 2000 and brought needed structure, responsibility, accountability, and purpose to key partnerships, with a dedicated team developing frameworks of working practice. The relationships between partners did bring some frustrations, but overall, participants were positive about their value. The impact of austerity caused Newcastle City Council to discontinue ARCH in 2018, although some of the problem-solving forums they had set up, continued. Additionally, the Local Authority established the Hate Crime and Community Tension Monitoring Group, and other joint groups, who had a remit to respond to trends or spikes in hate incidents. The section starts by identifying why partnership working was believed to be important, before examining how it developed and became embedded in the city. It then provides an insight into the impacts of austerity and their form and function by 2020.

7.31. The value of partnership working, why the multi-agency approach?

A Neighbourhood Inspector at Newcastle East explained why partnerships were valuable:

“Effectiveness – we are more effective, there is no doubt about it. Often, we can’t arrest our way out of things. ...having the partners to take other actions is very effective.” NI, 2020.

The term ‘effective’ in this sense, meant in cases where police enforcement was not an option, or other additional actions were desirable, agencies responded collaboratively, and felt that their combined powers, provided comprehensive interventions for victims and offenders.

“Understanding issues from their perspective. We have different things we can offer. If you pull them together, you get all sorts of solutions.” NI, 2008.

Perspective sharing, and joint responses yielded more holistic solutions, each agency having accountability for their agreed deliverables.

“YHN (Your Homes Newcastle) have a positive effect on families by enforcement and threatening to take homes. From my police head, lets sort the racists out and get some positive action.” NI, 2008.

For the offender, this was sometimes a double-edged sword, being prosecuted by police and having their tenancy conditions enforced, thereby increasing the efficacy of the enforcement response.

“You cannot solve the problems singular. You need a range of agencies, all doing what they are good at, to actually work together. Everyone brings different things to the table” ARCH, 2008.

Police were the main enforcers, with a range of tools in their box. Where these tools were not appropriate or sufficient, they engaged partners to deliver other interventions, such as tenancy enforcement, education, victim re-location, crime prevention and victim support.

7.32 The emergence of multi-agency partnership working

Government policy on combatting racist violence in the 1980s and 1990s was in partnership working. It was broadly recognised, as Bowling and Phillips identified, *‘complex social problems like racism and violence are rooted in such contextual factors as housing, education and the consumption of alcohol, a multi-faceted approach involving the police, local government, community organisations, schools and other social institutions was called for’* (Bowling, 2002, p. 124). Although there was recognition in the late 1990s, that policing partnerships could work in Newcastle, they were not well established in addressing racist incidents:

“There was a real lack of joined up work. ...one agency would do one thing and another agency would do something else, and in the meantime the victim was then waiting for the police to do something.” ARCH, 2008.

While the gist of this response, is a situation where partners were working in isolation, unaware of what the other was doing, it appears typically that partner agencies were frustrated with the lack of a police response, and were unable to expedite the actions of others:

“One weakness is that we can’t really enforce other agencies to do their work. We can do a joint visit with the RHPT or Victim Support, but there is nobody actually doing anything.

I sometimes wonder what the victims are thinking, you know, ‘it’s great to see Jenny and Pol every day, and they’ve brought Colin from the RHPT’ but, nothing else is happening. We say we’ve talked to the police and the housing, but they have done nothing. So, the client must be wondering whether we are doing our job?” Asylum Seeker Support Worker, 2008.

Here, the Asylum Seeker Support Worker had taken situations to the partnership meetings, had told the victims what they were doing, yet others were not taking responsibility for their respected areas of business, leading to inaction and embarrassment. Some agencies worked together on an ad-hoc basis, with mixed results. The existence of the RHPT; Asylum Seeker Support Workers; and Police Link Workers enabled cross-agency working as and when required.

7.33 Agencies Against Racial Crime and Harassment (ARCH)

In 2000, the Safe Newcastle Partnership formed ARCH, responding to the statutory obligation under S.5 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Formalising an arrangement between key partners the ARCH Operational Support Group was dedicated to tackling racist crime and harassment.

“Then when ARCH came in with the reporting and referral side of things, that made it more joined up... What I’ve seen professionally since then has improved dramatically. So, Police, Victim Support, Environment Agency, YHN actually now accept that there is a partnership need and they are actually working together to do it.’ ARCH, 2008.

It allowed organisations the confidence to reflect on their limitations, and to mutually fill the gaps. The fact that multiple agencies were involved, appears to have eased tensions between some groups too:

“Joined up work I do think, the case management side means that we all get together, sit down do the operational support group, we all talk about our cases.”
ARCH, 2008.

Some of the tensions discussed in the previous section were resolved and agencies became more comfortable working together, accepting their limitations:

“Because of the work we’ve done..., it is now actually a really friendly group. So now, people will be honest and say, ‘as an agency we are not very good at that,’ it is a safe environment to ask other agencies for help. That has been invaluable.”
ARCH, 2008.

For the process of partnership working, this was clearly seen to be beneficial.

“But for victims, that has meant that they are getting a service... Not all agencies do it, some are still slacking, but RHPT and the police always respond at the right time, as soon as they get it, they deal with it” ARCH, 2008.

ARCH provided case management, with ownership of victims and problems; and actions were managed as a group. Having the ARCH team, dedicated to supporting the partnership brought opportunity for quick responses to issues either reported to ARCH directly, or from others such as the police:

“I monitor what incidents are coming in every day. If there’s cases that trigger within my professional knowledge, I will make contact with the agencies.... If I know there’s something serious, or if the victim has told me they are really concerned or distressed, I can step in and make it happen quicker.” ARCH, 2008.

ARCH incorporated a third-party reporting system, where racist incidents could be reported in locations such as libraries, community centres and housing offices:

“Newcastle had the ARCH 3rd party reporting scheme. It gave reassurance to people that things could be reported, and they could remain anonymous.” Area Commander, 2008.

Whilst the value of a third-party scheme was accepted, it was pointed out that most reports were made directly to the police. A frustration of the Area Commander was that a crime reported anonymously could not be detected and the victim could not be engaged in any form of intervention.

The ARCH team were passionate and dedicated to helping victims by pulling together the right responses for the situation at hand:

“The things that have enabled me to deal with this particular job is my experience, my first-hand knowledge. So, my drive comes from me, that’s what drives me in my job, that’s why I am doing my job, because I really believe in what I’m doing.” ARCH, 2008.

The presence of ARCH; Asylum Seeker Support Workers; and the Racial Harassment Prevention Team in 2008, meant there were dedicated resources for responding to racist incidents. They felt they were the right people, in the right jobs, doing their best.

7.34 Criticisms and termination of ARCH

Police, housing companies and schools, had agendas far broader than racist violence alone, meaning ARCH were often required to chase-up them up on their agreed actions and responsibilities. Occasionally there were tensions between agencies. Police leaders often regarded ARCH as over-enthusiastic or trying to justify their existence by suggesting things were worse than the police believed them to be.

“They can hijack the agenda, put out the wrong message. I mentioned ARCH being a bit over enthusiastic. They have other agendas too. Sometimes it is

mischievous and sometimes they just haven't grasped what we are talking about..." NI, 2008

The Newcastle West NI believed he was the driver behind getting positive interventions from ARCH:

"I will involve them and get them to do the ringing around and get people to attend. I will make sure that they take the minutes and I steer the thing, ultimately my cops do the policing on the ground."

The perspective that it was the police driving the ARCH based responses is at odds with the reports from ARCH themselves, where they felt that police were not always responding well. But the notion of police driving the partnership agenda does reflect the model of a police takeover.

Whilst many policing partnerships existed at the same time as ARCH, in the beginning ARCH was dedicated to racist crime and harassment. It evolved to address a broader range of hate crime and became involved in community tension management and national reporting. Additionally, ARCH, developed a broad neighbourhood level structure of problem-solving meetings, known as Multi-Agency Problem Solving (MAPS) and Safe Neighbourhood Action and Problem Solving (SNAPS) for crime and antisocial behaviour. These groups were still operating in 2020:

"Each partner would bring the problems to the table. We would look at rehousing, getting offenders moved out of housing; and we have AVATAH. If this problem would take absolutely hours to talk about, we would have a SNAPS." NI, 2020.

The Hate Crime Lead from Newcastle City Council in 2020, described how the impact of austerity led to a review of ARCH (Council, 2017), concluding it should be replaced with a third-party reporting system 'StopHate UK.' The staff, the operational support group, and case management were discontinued in 2018. Where ARCH, with 4 dedicated staff members were working to support victims of

hate crime, by 2020 the participant was the only individual working on hate crime, among a range of other community safety agendas.

7.35 Post austerity, partnerships in 2020

“...partnership work is significantly different now. ...community safety have gone from large, dedicated hate crime teams..., to a lead for hate crime. But then she has domestic violence as well. The HCCTMG group is the right people..., but the resource and the money is not there.” Superintendent, Hate Crime Lead, 2020.

They explained that the Hate Crime and Community Tension Monitoring Group was established by the Safe Newcastle Plan. This group had a focus on counter terrorism community tensions and hate crime. Agencies developed the Joint Engagement Group (JEG) and the Joint Action Group (JAG) problem-focused groups to respond to significant spikes community tensions and hate crime. Where events happened, such as Brexit, the Manchester bombing, and COVID-19, the JEG consult efficiently to establish the broader impact. The JAG then implemented actions to resolve tensions, provide reassurance and drive down hate crime:

“...it starts with the Brexit vote, the significant spikes we’re getting in hate crime. What we do see, is our response, we bring it under control very, very quickly.” Superintendent, Hate Crime Lead, 2020.

They pointed out, that the forum enables holistic support for the victim and holistic enforcement against the offender. On a broader scale:

“Strategically, you have the force CONTEST meeting... Area Commanders and the Local Authority executive. Your racist violence approach... So, it's right on our radar at that level. ...you have the Local Authority and Hate Crime Community Tension Monitoring Groups.” Superintendent, Hate Crime Lead, 2020.

How the strategic partnerships direct operational service on the ground, was a difficult connection to make in these responses. The CET Sergeant, felt that

engagement with public and private sector organisations via JEGs created responses to support of victims and potential victims, quickly reducing the frequency of incidents back to normal, following a spike. The impact, therefore, was the spike does not last as long, was smaller and consequently there was less victimisation. The importance of having the right people involved in partnership work, those who care about communities and victims was a strong theme in both periods of the study:

“You know Steve, you need passion, and you need knowledge. But if you got right people from the right communities, you can do a lot of work.” Victims First Northumbria (VFN), 2020.

They emphasised the need for trust between organisations and the communities, as necessary ingredients for success:

“If the trust between organisations and communities has been built up there is an accountability and there is a communication between police and the victims there is support organisations who comes in straight away. If you are missing one of those things and the victims of hate crime will never be supported appropriately.” VFN, 2020.

They spoke of the gaps in service if agencies or individuals were not engaged in mutual problem solving, explaining it was the victim that suffered. They also identified that the Victims Code of Practice (VCoP) is another policy that requires criminal justice agencies to work together to support victims. VCoP, like most partnership arrangements depended heavily on individuals who were motivated by values, not necessarily policy or procedure, to keep challenging and strive to improve services. Additionally, this comment drew attention to the value of the third sector, where victims can be signposted to more tailor-made community support groups.

This account discusses that ARCH and many of the other dedicated partners were discontinued, with some of their functions taken over by the Newcastle Hate Crime and Community Tension Monitoring Group. The obvious reduction in capacity had

an impact, and the remaining organisations needed to streamline what they did, to focus on the most significant issues. Therefore, whilst the impact of reduced resources was clearly felt, there was also a feel that partners were doing the right things and doing them better since the resource reductions. This opinion was shared by the City Council's lead on Hate Crime and Domestic abuse.

Partnerships have been addressing racist crime and incidents for 20 years. While they have changed their form and some of their functions, it was still felt they were effective and active in addressing the problem. Austerity has reduced staff and resources across all key agencies, but what remained was said to be appropriately focused and engaged. Public sector organisations were driving and delivering most of the services, though there were some discontinuities about who tended to lead on joint action. Third sector organisations were valued, and it was generally recognised that they were an under-utilised resource. The longer-term pastoral care for victims of racist incidents could be served by local community groups, with a good understanding of their specific needs. The overall benefit of partnerships emerging, is of a larger, extensive toolbox around enforcement, problem solving and engagement, that became better organised and more productive through ARCH. They became more streamlined and focused on the most vulnerable during the later period of the study.

7.40 Chapter Summary

This chapter has identified that leaders who are close to the policy and strategy end of the business, were able to accurately articulate the needs of victims of racist incidents and were attuned to the indicators of community impact or tensions. Additionally, officers and staff in community engagement posts, many of whom were BAME, had the knowledge and understanding of victim needs, as well as the confidence and passion to engage with them, seeking positive resolutions. The rank and file were not as comfortable in dealing with these incidents or the victims. There were examples of under-recording, requiring service recovery by the Community Cohesion Unit when they elicited more accurate details, usually from their engagement with the victims. Police officers in response and neighbourhood roles were very busy, and in the earlier part of the study they were

subjected to a robust performance culture. This high workload and demand for tangible results from incidents, rendered spending a lot of time with victims of racist incidents, who seldom supported an investigation, undesirable. Some officers were dismissive of the needs of victims and others were apprehensive about their abilities to deal with the victims without getting a complaint. The apprehension of being labelled as a racist and facing scrutiny over their actions was something that existed in both periods of the study, the legacy of the Macpherson report and the BBC documentary 'The Secret Policeman' were cited amongst the causes of this fear. In some cases, this led to the omission of the racist element of victimisation in police reports, consequently under-recording and a sub-optimal response for the victim. Police were generally positive about the value of partnership working, as were the partners interviewed. In the early period of the study, partnerships had the benefit of dedicated staff and teams working to address racist crime and harassment. These partnerships evolved and developed problem-solving forums, some of which still existed in 2020, when austerity had significantly reduced resources. The negative impact of austerity was felt in the number of resources available in terms of staff and funding. However, police and partners felt that their efforts were better targeted to support the most vulnerable victims; and addressing the broader issues of hate crime and community tensions.

This chapter has exposed a period of change in attitude and behaviour of police officers. From being dismissive of the occurrence and impact of racist incidents in the early period, to being more understanding, supportive, and responsive to victims and their needs, by 2020. It has evidenced factors that led to some officers having negative approaches to racist violence and the victims. The impact of these approaches was evidenced by the observations of victims in the previous chapter, and by the observations of some police officers and staff in this chapter. It has also shown how policy, practice and capacity issues have impacted on police officer's abilities to provide the service that victims needed and how a recent change in the force operating model, may change that. The attitudes and behaviours of officers of all ranks has evidently improved. They believe the interventions they are now taking are more productive in support of victims, particularly those most vulnerable. Policing partnerships have also undergone similar changes and concurred that by 2020, they were operating more efficiently

by targeting their limited resources at the right problems. The victim interviews conducted in 2020 were too soon after the introduction of the Northumbria Police's new force operating model to capture its impact on the victim experience. Similarly, the recent focus on vulnerability and problem solving from Strategy 2025 may not have filtered down to any noticeable change on the victim's perception of the police response.

The value of conducting the field work in two periods, gave interesting and unique perspectives on changes in policing racist incidents in this chapter. It enables the discussion chapter to explore, examine and evaluate the developing response options, connecting the field work with the literature review and distilling the contribution of the thesis. It will also enable the consideration of new policy for police, by bridging the gap between victim needs and expectations; and how the police are responding to that. Similarly, it will allow for recommendations in the conclusions chapter about what further research could reasonably be conducted to develop some of the observations found herein.

Chapter 8: Discussion

8.00 Introduction

The chapter revisits the extent, nature, and harm of racist violence in Newcastle, summarising the impact of incidents on victims. Incidents in Newcastle were similar to other comparable areas in the UK. The impact of political discourse and national events on racist violence on the ground are broadly discussed in literature. These connections were illustrated in practice, by the experiences of victims and police officers, spanning the period from 9/11 in 2001, to the COVID-19 pandemic, identifying how offenders may have bias-fluidity, according to what is current.

The chapter discusses that incidents did not attract sufficient recognition or response from policing agencies until the latter period of study. In the earlier interviews, police conveyed resentment towards policy on race, and a dismissive attitude about dealing with racist incidents, reflective of post Lawrence Home Office research findings. The police dismissiveness or resentment would have adversely influenced how they dealt with the job from start to finish. It would also have been detectable to the victim too, framed against other experiences of disadvantage. Victims hoped for positive, constructive responses from police when they called them, but for most, they were left feeling ignored, minimised, and unprotected. It was felt that police were unlikely to have sufficient empathy with BAME victims of racist violence, may not recognise racism in their assessment of an incident and would fail to grasp the gravity from the victim's perspective. Police officers were concerned about the notion of being scrutinised over how they dealt with such incidents or being complained about. This, combined with the era of the robust performance culture, made for a lowering of the relevance of racist violence to policing. Police tended to avoid meaningful engagement with the victim, the incident, or the investigation, which allowed them to move on quickly, and avoid being '*tied up with nonsense*' as one neighbourhood officer put it. This meant that the policing intervention did not capture the victim experience and did not meet the victim's needs.

The value of being able to revisit the situation 12 years later, was evident from the policy changes policing agencies had made in this context. From the organisation's perspective, the service had vastly improved. Police and partners explained that austerity had cut resources and funding. But their work had become more efficient and targeted, eliminating time spent on non-productive work, tackling vulnerability, investigation and problem-solving. The new partnership arrangement, the Hate Crime and Community Tension Monitoring Group (HCCTMG) was considered to be effective at managing spikes in incident frequency. Unfortunately, the victim perspective did not corroborate that improvement. This contradiction is a significant finding from the empirical fieldwork outlined earlier in this thesis. It suggests that reform to police policy and practice might not be recognised or 'appreciated' among victims or the wider public; and reform may not actually impact positively on the ground.

The chapter has drawn together the study findings and the literature review, to argue that the failings of police and partner agencies, reported by victim-participants and some policing-participants have been caused by:

- i. Police did not take sufficient notice of racist violence to develop any outrage about its commission. That resulted in a resentment towards victims and a lack of professional rigor in driving responses that met victim's needs.
- ii. Police did not sufficiently engage with the victim's experience to gain an understanding of the incident, or the impact it had on the victim. Consequently, significant components of incidents were missed out of reports and not acted upon.
- iii. Institutional pressures of making mistakes, having one's work scrutinised, and being ostracised either as a racist or under-performing, led to avoidance in dealing with racist violence.

The chapter argues that the above drivers meant racist violence was under-recorded, victims were ignored, and policing responses did not address incidents holistically.

The chapter starts by merging victim and practitioner perspectives of the main themes, racist violence; how it is policed; and what improvements were made between 2008 and 2020. It then explores some potential reasons for ineffective

police responses and lack of empathy for victims. Next, the elements of the findings that were unexpected are discussed. The core themes are then contextualised into the key themes and arguments in the literature review, to highlight the contributions the thesis makes. The penultimate section identifies the limitations of the study before the summary makes the standout statements about the research outcomes and connects the chapter to the broader thesis.

8.10 Towards an understanding of policing racist violence

8.11 Outrage at racist violence or outrage at the burden it causes

For many victims, the experience of racist violence in Newcastle has been a brutal, persistent, and pervasive part of life. Victim-participants reported being targeted every day in some cases, while others reported their children had been attacked and abused at school. The impact of the violence, beyond the immediate harm, was reported in some cases as horrific, and extended through families and communities. The nature, extent, and impact, however, have not received the appropriate recognition, recording or response from policing agencies until very recently. Early interviews with police-participants identified attitudes towards victims of racist violence that rendered their reports as an unwanted burden on the police, to the extent that it was not desirable to deal with them. There was evidence of resentment that an enhanced service would need to be provided and that victims would not be satisfied with any outcome considered positive by the police. There were no resonating expressions of moral outrage about racist violence in the first period of study, other than by victims or agency staff whose job made them specifically tasked to support them. The outrage in policing, was more inwardly focused, about how the arrival of asylum seekers made neighbourhood officer's jobs harder, and had changed an area notorious for antisocial behaviour, to an area notorious for racist crime. What emerged from this, was the gulf between the abhorrence of the violence and the harm it caused; set against the failure of police to grasp the gravity of what was going on and why it should have been abhorrent to them and to society generally. In this respect, racist violence or hate crime more broadly, have followed a similar trajectory to domestic abuse. It

has only recently been recognised and accepted as worthy police business and serious public concern.

8.12 Understanding the victim needs, and the role of empathy in policing responses

Victims felt that police and partners such as schools and housing had the powers to take action to reduce or prevent violence; and to take proportionate action against offenders. But their experience was that policing agencies were uninterested and unwilling to act. There was also a concern, sometimes confirmed by police, that any policing intervention could make things worse for the victim. Therefore, there was little motivation to report the everyday grinding racist incidents to police, as nothing would happen. Victim-participants frequently expressed how distressed single or multiple victimisations made them, and that immediately after the events they needed to police to help them to feel safe, validated and believed. But a response that met this need or expectation was seldom forthcoming in both periods. Instead, victim participants were left feeling that responses were not reassuring. They recalled feeling ignored, invalidated, and minimised by the attending officer's dismissive language and behaviour. At the extreme end of the scale, examples were provided where police had allowed ongoing racist abuse to continue and left the scene; and on another occasion had arrested the victims and ignored the offenders. Both these cases were in the first period of study. Intra-community messaging about their experiences of inadequate interventions; police having treat the victim like a suspect; and experiences of police officers exhibiting racist attitudes, have influenced the BAME community perceptions about how police will respond and deal with their reports. Subsequent, direct experience of police responses had the effect of validating and perpetuating that perception.

Every police officer has their own perspective on the impact of crime on victims. They respond to a broad range of incidents on a given tour of duty, facing violence, public order situations, and reports that should not be police business. This is the context and landscape of response policing through which officer's see the world, or at least their beat. Their personal standpoint, as a police officer who

has professional experience of the harms inflicted on others in violent acts, is different to the standpoint of the general public who do not encounter violence daily. Moreover, without having endured the lived experiences of victims of racist violence, the majority of police officers construct an empathic standpoint that will always fall short of a true connection with the victim experience, because it is not rooted in reality. They have not suffered discrimination or repeated victimisation on the basis their race. The police officer's standpoint is that of someone with an affiliation and requirement to follow the policy, values and identity of an organisation that has long been considered institutionally racist. They deal frequently and objectively with violence and victims of violence, within their case-by-case interpretations of policy and the procedural parameters of what policing means for a given incident. Their common-sense operational police antenna would have been far less attuned to the experience and harm of racist violence, than the highly sensitised victim's. The behavioural result identified in this study, was the apparent failure to engage with the victim's experience and expression of the content, context, and gravity of racist incidents satisfactorily and visibly. Without doing so, the true nature was not recognised, not recorded comprehensively, and the victim was left feeling ignored and invalidated, introducing a secondary victimisation by police. When the incident was not recorded sufficiently, particularly if the criminal or racist element was omitted, it would not receive the appropriate intervention, supervisory attention and was more likely to have been closed with minimal or no further action.

BAME police participants expressed an empathy with victims of racist crime as people who shared a lived experience of it. They felt this gave them the capacity to truly engage with the victim and their experience, in ways that white European officers could not. They expressed that this broke down barriers with victims and significantly enhanced their intervention. In the second period, empathy for vulnerable victims was becoming more of a general cop value, particularly in Northumbria Police, with the campaign 'vulnerability is everyone's business.' But the absence of a genuine empathy, was still likely to have impaired the white European officer's ability to see the racism a victim saw, or have limited their capacity to appreciate the extent of its impact.

Current academic perspectives continue to suggest that hate crime victims who have experienced historic poor service from authorities and consequently lack trust in them, consider that '*front-line professionals fail to show sufficient empathy or kindness*' to victims (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, p. 163). Hardy and Chakraborti's study reinforces the fact that hate crime still remains under-reported in 2019, with the victim perspective identifying that reporting would be '*a waste of time*'; that '*police and partner organisations would fail to grasp the seriousness and prevalence of hate incidents*'; and that police would '*prioritise other types of offence*' where more tangible outcomes were apparent (ibid., p. 163).

This study identifies that if police were to exhibit sufficient empathy with victims of racist violence, trust and confidence would be improved; they would have capacity to grasp the tangible nature of the incident; would be more likely to gather rich evidential data; a more accurate record will be generated; a more victim-focused response or outcome is likely; which could begin to turn the tide on under-reporting.

The predominant references to empathy in policing in England and Wales relate to its use in building rapport between police officers and victims or witnesses being interviewed, to elicit evidence by encouragement and understanding (Jakobsen, 2021). Jakobsen also argues that empathy would support vulnerable victims. Recent research conducted by Maddox identifies that when a victim perceives an interviewing police officer has empathy with them, there is a positive correlation (in the case of rape victims) of their expectation that the case will go to court. Additionally they found that empathy reduced the correlation to post traumatic stress disorder and feeling of shame (Maddox et al., 2011). Other researchers however, found less conclusive evidence of the value empathy had in enhancing the richness of victim and witness interviews (Oxburgh et al., 2012).

From the findings of this study and the extant literature on police empathy, it is clear that empathy in providing a service to victims of racist violence would be of value to both the victim experience of the response and the overall outcome of the policing intervention. There is however little research into the use of empathy in policing (Dando and Oxburgh, 2016) generally, and little academic consensus on

the definition of empathy in police interviewing (Jakobsen, 2021). Davis provides a broader definition of empathy as having 4 component parts:

- i. Antecedents, which relate to the characteristics of the parties involved in a given exchange or the context of that exchange. In our context, these are characteristics of the police officer and victim or witness.
- ii. Processes, which describes the mechanism by which the observer gains the empathy from the observed party. This is in the affective domain wherein the observer imagines the situation from the other's perspective.
- iii. Intrapersonal outcomes, where the cognitive or emotional impact of the empathic connection produces a response in the observer, such as sympathy or anger. Davies suggests that this is primarily a cognitive process wherein the observer attempts to understand how the observed party thinks and feels.
- iv. Interpersonal outcomes which is the manner in which the observer communicates their understanding of the other's perspective back to them. This would typically be the verbal and non-verbal content of the police officer's response, and whether or not they provided any help or support. (Davis, 2018)

In their work on empathy, Davis argues that developing, or at least displaying empathy is something that can be learned, albeit this was within the psychology context. But the ability to develop empathic skills within policing can be learned, particularly when there is anticipated value in doing so. It is a tool in conflict management, to de-escalate hostile situations, as much as it is a tool in investigative interviewing of suspects and witnesses. Where police officers have a desire to understand the lived experience of being a victim of racist violence, empathy is a professional skill that can be learned and practiced. The police officer's standpoint may rarely support a position that is fully empathic with such victims, but they could learn to at least articulate and contextualise what the victim is expressing in a manner that helps the victim to feel heard, believed and understood.

There is a risk to the wellbeing of police officers who have higher empathic capacities, as they can become susceptible to compassion fatigue (Turgoose

et al., 2017). The breadth and depth of circumstances in which police officers should show empathy with victims, is therefore a balancing act between providing a service that meets the victim's needs, and one that is mindful of the negative impact of compassion fatigue. Capacity issues in police and partner agencies further impacts on whether resources have the necessary time to build rapport and empathy with victims when responding to incidents or making follow-up enquiries.

8.13 The institutional pressures and getting into trouble

In the working memory of police officers in both periods of the study, was the organisational impact and fallout of the Lawrence Inquiry and the Panorama Documentary, the Secret Policeman. Both featured in press, and in diversity training, as forces for change, an anti-racist drive, and an anti-racism threat. How compelling a force for change it was at the individual officer level, is beyond the scope of this study. But what this research did identify, was that this force for change became a source of anxiety for some response officers. The policy impact of Lawrence was visible in procedure and organisational discourse, particularly from senior leaders. At the mid ranks to the ground level, the discourse was for a while, one of denial, feeling spotlighted, and a tendency to weaponize diversity to gain an albeit shallow impression of moral high ground over others. In reality, these reactions were iterations of Roycroft et al's assertion of a *'police culture dogged by cynicism, indifference, and poor organisational memory'* (Roycroft et al., 2007, p. 167). The outcome was that police were walking on eggshells, frightened to say the wrong thing and perhaps couch a prejudice. Those who did have prejudices, quickly learned that expressing them and being seen to act on them, could mean trouble. In both periods of study, some officers were very quick to point out that in all of their service, they had never witnessed a police officer being racist. Reflecting on this, I am reminded of Donald Trump's assertion that *'Kung Flu'* was not racist; and cricketer Rafiq's report that England captain Joe Root had been present on many social events when he had been called an offensive racist name, yet stated *'he had never witnessed anything of a racist nature'* (Guardian, 2021). Rafiq felt that racism was so normalised in British cricket, that frequent use of racist language did not strike good people as being

offensive. The point is not that officers in Northumbria Police were openly using such language in 2008, far from it. But those who said they had never witnessed racism in the organisation in 2008 and in 2020, may not have been as likely to detect it, as BAME people who had experienced discrimination would have been. Assertion by white European police officers, that they had never witnessed it before, was not an assurance that it never surfaced. Police officers were anxious about dealing with racist violence, the fear of being under-skilled, of making mistakes and being stereotyped as racist in the inevitable complaint were the main issues. Additionally, under the performance culture, there was a perception that the outcomes were not likely to attract a tangible performance indicator for the officer or a positive outcome for the victim. That meant there was little point spending a lot of time and effort responding and investigating it. That created a situation where the attending officer was inclined to take the minimum amount of action. Racist language or crime needed to be written out of the script, avoiding the threat of additional intangible work, and reducing the risk of scrutiny. The responding officer could then move on to the next job. That anxiety is further reason why, both under reporting and under-recording happened, but also why incident reports were not always comprehensively written or satisfactorily resolved.

The performance culture in the early period of the study, heaped pressure on already busy police officers, to achieve tangible targets derived to show and drive performance. But the performance measures of arrests, detections, stop and search, summons, etc., did not, according to some officers, equal victim focus. A Superintendent described working in that culture as '*horrible*', a Constable described being action planned for not getting enough arrests and therefore being unable to spend sufficient time supporting victims. This was institutional pressure on officers to do the minimum at the scene (with the victim) and move on, or to prioritise attending jobs with more likelihood of tangible performance measures. From the victim perspective too, the officers were too busy to provide the service and support they needed, reflected in slow response times, minimal engagement, minimal follow-up, and an absence of any update or outcome for closure. In 2020, this form of performance measure had gone, with officers describing far more focus on supporting, risk assessing and safeguarding victims with harm reduction plans.

What did not emerge from the findings, however, was any widespread discourse from victims in the second period that was reflective of the positive changes and progress police felt had been made. There was an assertion that the situation for African asylum seekers was a lot safer, with a big reduction in violence. However, they still felt police response officers were too busy to provide the right service and would not accept the racist element of some crimes. Neighbourhood officers were considered to have more understanding of the needs of the BAME community, yet overall, the African community still felt somewhat ignored.

8.20 The impact of multi-agency partnerships

Real partnership working, as the research site and findings (2) chapters identify, was implemented by the Safe Newcastle Partnership. To tackle racist violence specifically, they launched ARCH. The dedicated team behind ARCH, and the multi-agency operational support group managed cases, driving collaborative responses to support victims. This formalised and professionalised how partners worked together, and led, according to the agency-participants, to improved experience of services for victims. ARCH also developed the groups Multi Agency Problem Solving (MAPS) and Safe Neighbourhood Action and Problem Solving (SNAPS) which remained in 2020. Austerity changed some of that, in particular the discontinuance of ARCH, loss of dedicated staff and loss of the Operational Support Group. But the national focus on vulnerability and Northumbria Police's Strategy 2025, streamlined and rationalised how and when policing partners resources are deployed. The findings chapter identified that racist violence, in the context of hate crime, was a significant agenda item for neighbourhood policing direction and control meetings. It was also a significant part of the new multi-agency partnership group, the HCCTMG. Another partnership of interest was AVATAH, A Victim Approach to Antisocial Behaviour Hub, launched in 2014. The use of AVATAH, SNAPS and MAPS were available to address incidents and patterns of racist violence. More established groups managing high risk sex offenders and violent offenders, MAPPA, MASH, MARAC, etc, were all reducing risk and enforcing measures to prevent offending. What appeared, were multiple opportunities for police and partners to work together to tackle violent racist

offenders, provide holistic support, safeguarding for victims, and to manage broader threats from hate group activities jointly. Both ARCH and the HCCTMG were policy level responses that addressed the recommendations of Macpherson on the ground. The findings chapter, and my observations as an insider-researcher, evidence that multi-agency casework was genuinely being done, and agencies were being held to account for delivering against their commitments. Police and partners were confident that their responsiveness and service was a lot better in 2020, than it had ever been. But victim-participants provided little evidence of how partnership approaches had addressed their problems, either in the ARCH nor HCCTMG eras. Some did comment on how, as a result of serious violence, victims were rehoused. That required police and housing working together. But in general, experiences and expectations were poor and poorly evidenced. It is possible that multi-agency responses to racist violence was not seen or understood as such by the victims. This may have been the result of poor communication, despite members of the Operational Support Group visiting some victims and providing updates in the earlier period. It could also mean that the victims interviewed had not received any response from partners other than the police. There was a professional and ethical obligation to ensure victims were aware of what the policing interventions have been and what the outcomes were. But this clearly has not been met, despite evidence from partners that suggested it was being done.

8.30 Reflections on Researcher Standpoint

My situation as a police sergeant in Northumbria Police, could have been a block to full and frank disclosure from victims and professionals alike. When interviewing police participants, I was doing so as an insider (Davies and Francis, 2018, Coghlan, 2017). In some cases, that probably did limit what participants were prepared to tell me, as they would be unlikely to talk about incriminating behaviour or anything that would breach the code of ethics. But the interviews with police officers yielded rich data, sometimes openly and honestly, sometimes perhaps unwittingly. There were occasions when 'over-rapport' as Hammersley and Atkinson suggest, could have led to my failure to detect 'subtle nuances' in accounts (Hammersley, 1995 in, Davies and Francis, 2018). But my knowledge of

operational policing practice, also made it more compelling to dig deeper into accounts to discover more detail.

In interviewing victim-participants my standpoint was very different. I was an insider in the police; a researcher; and an outsider to their community. The experience of interviewing victims, watching their non-verbal language, as much as listening to what they said, made it apparent that they were providing unrestrained accounts of racist violence and the policing response. Most were very explicit about the nature and extent of what they had suffered, and equally as explicit about the impact it had on them and on their respective communities. They also provided stark, uncompromising accounts of the policing response they received.

The nature and extent of racist violence that participants spoke about, was worse than I expected in the city of Newcastle. Some of the incidents, particularly for repeat victims from the asylum seeker community were traumatic. I found the reports of frequent attacks on children in school, and threats from other parents outside of school to be repugnant beyond what I had anticipated. Similarly, for asylum seekers who had called the police as victims of crime, to be treated as suspects, questioned about how they came to have possessions, and even arrested, was surprising. The negative impact of racist violence on victims, their families and communities was anticipated. Withdrawal from community life, depression and anxiety were no surprise. Being forced to move house or move out of the area, was again an unsurprising outcome as I had been involved in cases where moving a victim was a necessary safeguarding measure. But, interviewing some participants, who explained how being a victim had made them stronger and more determined to combat racism was interesting. With a robust character, the determination to fight back either physically, verbally, or both, five victim-participants became community advocates, supporting victims and their communities against racist violence. They turned their fears and anger to positive use, helping others in their position and helping policing agencies to build bridges to their communities. These victim-advocates were only available to me as a result of my post in the Community Engagement Team at the time, which made access relatively simple.

The typical complaints about police from my experience, are poor response times, lack of action taken at the scene, little or no feedback, and incivility.

Understandably the victim-participants had the same experiences. But BAME victims of racist violence already had low trust and confidence in police, hence for many, the poor response they experienced reinforced their assumptions and was often interpreted as racial bias. This reflected the gist of much literature in this field also. But as an insider in the police, my awareness of these very general failings, did not lead me to assume that race was the cause, rather to recognise the generality of the failings.

The research site chapter outlines that Your Homes Newcastle, as the main social housing provider, had antisocial behaviour officers in period one. Similarly, ARCH had dedicated staff, and Victim Support were actively engaged in providing individual pastoral care. Findings 2, and the methodology chapter identify who was interviewed from those partner agencies. The participants spoke passionately about the support they were able to provide victims, in terms of pastoral care and resources. They also spoke of heavy caseloads. Yet there was very little comment in victim interviews about how other partners had responded to their needs. Clearly, partner agencies had been involved in supporting victims, as house moves, for example, were not uncommon for those suffering serious violence and threats. House moves needed the housing providers to investigate and act. But victims did not contribute any significant perspective on their work. This is despite senior leaders and practitioners strongly advocating the value and successes of partnership approaches to tackling racist violence. I anticipated that victims would have commented more about the responses from agencies other than the police. That would have provided evidence about how other professionals dealt with them, which could be compared and contrasted with the police responses. It was both my working knowledge and experience of ARCH, and Your Homes Newcastle staff and how they work with victims, that made this victim standpoint appear surprising.

The impact of austerity provided unexpected comment from police and council leaders. Both organisations felt that although cash and resources were

significantly reduced, the changes they had made were effective and efficient. Through the HCCTMG, they were better at recognising and responding to spikes in racist violence and community tensions, returning them to normality a lot quicker than other regions. I hoped, particularly for the police participants, that this improvement would have been recognised by victim-participants, but it did not appear in their accounts.

Findings chapter 2 evidenced that in 2008, police felt they were the enforcers, there to deal with criminals, not to provide time-consuming support to vulnerable victims. Of course, as their performance was assessed by tangibles, such as arrests and detections, that perception was reinforced as the reality of the job. But in 2020, the Superintendent and Neighbourhood Inspectors interviewed, said the police policy shift away from the performance culture, of the 2000s, to victim satisfaction; protecting the most vulnerable; investigation; and problem-solving, were very positive steps. They felt that it afforded neighbourhood teams particularly, the time to focus on jobs where they could make a positive difference for vulnerable victims; to capitalise on investigation opportunities that would address significant crime trends; or where problem-solving actions would address ongoing issues. The police officers and PCSOs interviewed in 2020 agreed, that protecting the vulnerable, was among the priorities, supporting the VIP mission statement from Strategy 2025. When I was last in an operational role, in 2015, the legacy of the performance culture remained strong. Officers of most ranks judged the performance of their best cops and peers, on how many arrests they made, how often they remained on duty after hours to complete investigations to get a detection, and how many jobs they cleared up per tour of duty. There was moderate cynicism about elements of the shift in focus from proper police work, towards victim satisfaction (see research site chapter under Chief Constable Steve Ashman) but for many, the job was still about finding and arresting the criminals they felt were at the root of local problems. Again, Reiner's argument that police officers have autonomy to shape the way the job is delivered on the ground, meant for many, drug dealers, prolific burglars, persistent vehicle criminals, violent and sexual offenders, were the targets. The notion of providing harm reduction and safeguarding support to vulnerable victims was on everyone's radar but was only accepted as police business by a small percentage. It tended to be a task that

officers were required to do, instead of choosing to do it over the more desirable enforcement work. As a supervisor, it was the safeguarding and harm reduction planning that required the most leadership in delivering. Five years later, participant responses identified that protecting the vulnerable was far more embedded than I expected. The definition of vulnerability was broad, but police-participants of all ranks were quick to point out that victims of racist violence are vulnerable and as such would likely be afforded the protection of harm reduction plans and safeguarding as appropriate. The mantra of protecting the vulnerable and fighting crime was evidently well embedded.

8.40 Connecting research findings with the literature review

8.41 Contextualising experiences in Newcastle with the national situation; violence, impact, and issues in policing responses

The nature and extent of racist violence in Newcastle created a harmful experience for many BAME people. In some cases, it was unavoidable, in other cases victims had to change their use of social space to avoid it. It was concerning to learn in 2008, that the ‘paki-bashing’ discussed in older academic texts (Holdaway, 1996, Bowling, 1998), was something that my victim-participants were familiar with in their school days. In their era, teddy boys and skinheads were no longer the offenders, but the practice remained. The impact too, tended to follow typical patterns of emotional and physical harm discussed in the key academic texts (Perry and Alvi, 2012, Chakraborti, 2015a, Hesse and Waltham, 1992), cascading out from the individual target, to their families and communities. For communities effected, this created an ongoing, lived experience of being targeted (Bowling, 1998), rather than a series of discrete incidents. See Chapter 4, Literature Review.

The study evidenced the link between political discourse, or significant national and international events, and the extent, frequency, and nature of racist violence. Victim and police participants said they anticipated and experienced increases and changes following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (2001), 7/7 (2005); the dispersal of African asylum seekers in Newcastle in 2000-2005; the Brexit vote (2016); and the

COVID-19 pandemic (2020). This finding, yielded from conducting a study in two distinct time periods is of value in developing a better understanding the impact of harmful language or insensitive reporting. Police data and participant testimony identified timeline spikes in the frequency of racist violence, caused by the upwards pressure those events created. Perhaps more accurately, the way those events were portrayed in the media. This vertical pressure on the frequency of incidents is well documented (Chakraborti, 2015a, Burnett, 2017, Ren and Feagin, 2021). The real impact was felt as a devastating realisation by the Asian community in the aftermath of 9/11, that any progress in race relations had been reversed and life would change. The African asylum seekers who were recently dispersed at the time of the first period of study, came to Newcastle at a time when (anti) immigration was high on the political agenda. This had a significant impact on their capability of integrating into life on deprived housing estates. The qualitative methodology of this study captured this impact well. The research found that the nature of the violence, in terms of who was targeted, or targeted more, was led by what offenders were hearing and seeing in the media, on the streets, and in social venues. It created a lateral pressure that broadened the scope of violence, as well as the vertical pressure that raised the frequency. The lateral pressures following 9/11, led to Muslims, and the broader Asian community being targeted with violence, but in addition to racism, participants reported that Islamophobia surged. The appearance of African asylum seekers on the deprived housing estates, who were reportedly 'swamping and flooding into the UK' (see Chapter 4, Literature Review) resulted in targeting with a territorial, exclusionary theme.

Incidents reported to the police in the above cases, would rightly be recorded as racist or religious hate crime. However, the victim experience provides insight into the theoretical arguments about hate. Firstly, the antagonistic perspectives that bad thoughts should not be punished (Rosen, 1993, Levin and Levin, 1999, Rosebury, 2003) are, as Perry would argue, invalid. The research findings invalidate them, because of the targeted nature of racist violence, and the inherent vulnerability of the selected individual or community. This is what hurt victims more than the physical injury itself. Increased sentencing then, because of the notion of hate or targeting, is welcome and just, particularly from the victim perspective

(Iganski, 2001). Perry's language around bias-motivation (Perry, 2005), strengthens in validity in these circumstances, as the dynamic nature of events and associated targeting with violence, imply that offenders have bias-fluidity. This means in that hate-based bias can be directed towards whatever is causing them fear or concern at a given time. This would be supported by Cantle, who argued that drivers of targeted violence, can be explained as *'new fears and prejudices provoked by political events and the response to them in the mass media'* (Cantle, 2008, p. 107). Stanko's position on 'targeted violence' (Stanko, 2001) and Young's 'systemic violence' (Young, 2020) are accurate in these situations, as victims explained their experiences were more about being selected as obvious targets in the context of applicable current affairs. The literature describes how the media have given thugs an available hate-group affiliation, which creates renewed 'justifications' for racism. The study has provided further evidence to support this impact of political events and shown how this can be combined with Stanko's targeted violence theory, to give more context to the nature of targeting on the streets of Newcastle.

Findings Chapter 1 identified that victims did not have sufficient trust and confidence in policing. Emerging from their testament were the following perspectives on the failings in police responses that led to this situation:

- i. Delayed responses to ongoing incidents or nil response.
- ii. Lack of initial actions at the scene.
- iii. Dismissive attitudes from attending officers – not accepting that incidents were racist; minimising the severity; not listening to the victim; invalidating victim experiences.
- iv. A perception in 2008 that some police officers were racist.
- v. BAME victims being treat as suspects.
- vi. Lack of tangible resolutions to the call for help, and lack of feedback or closure.

The above six points are almost a direct lift from the findings of Hesse et. al in 1992, which shows, particularly in the 2008 period, the situation in Newcastle was similar to other parts of the country. Additionally, as Findings Chapter 2 notes,

there were examples of under-recording of racist violence, where police officers had written racism out of the script in their incident report. Chakraborti confirms, that in 2018, under-recording of racist violence remained a concern (Chakraborti, 2018). The next three sections present arguments from this research that contribute to understanding of why these perceived failings have existed locally and nationally, for decades.

8.42 Police interpretation, autonomy, and disadvantage – cuffing the job

The dire state of British policing represented in Scarman and Macpherson (Scarman, 1982, Macpherson of Cluny, 1999), became the evidence on which Macpherson in particular, led widespread policy change in policing agencies. This study found that Area Commanders (Chief Superintendents, and Superintendents) were able to articulate the value of delivering this policy on the ground, and in that respect, they talked a good job. But in the first period, the victim experience did not suggest that the policy changes were being delivered to those who needed it. Police officers had limited knowledge of policy on racist violence (Docking, 2005), but more outstanding was their apparent resentment of the pressure racist violence was putting on them. This meant, as Hesse et. al., would agree, the victims were the problem (Hesse and Waltham, 1992). None of the police participants expressed outrage at the act of racist violence. Instead, they looked inwards at the burden it was causing them. This research finds that in the 2008 period, officers with boots on the ground neither talked a good job, nor walked a good job in this context. The discourse from operational police participants in Newcastle, was that the victims, and the organisation were creating more work for them, similar to several Home Office study findings in that decade (Foster et al., 2005a, Docking, 2005, Rollock, 2009). By the second period of study, resentment and misdirected outrage had transformed in a positive direction. Officers couched a passion to support vulnerable victims of crime and an outrage that they were targeted for racist violence. Yet this transformation in service delivery was not yet detectable in the victim-participant experience portrayed.

Myhill, in their work on policing domestic abuse, argue that police officers often skilfully navigate ways around policy when they think the risk is low (Myhill, 2019).

Reiner supports this, suggesting that the nature of police culture provides operational officers with sufficient discretion to decide what will happen on the ground in practice (Reiner, 1992). There is autonomy therefore, for the attending officer to re-frame an incident into something less serious, which they are more able to deal with quickly and efficiently, but not effectively. Minimising the severity of an incident report in Northumbria Police, is known as ‘cuffing the job’ and is applied across many incident types. It describes the common yet unprofessional practice of writing off an incident with minimal effort, without making it obvious they have done so. This is a particularly important skill in jobs that are considered ‘*rubbish*’ (Bowling, 1998) a term Bowling argued applied to racist violence. In the first period, racist violence appears to have frequently sat in the ‘rubbish’ category of jobs. But Reiner went further, suggesting that it was the victims of racist violence who were not worthy of police attention in the 1980s. Police attendance at an incident was the point of contact and assessment that set the trajectory for how the victim would be treated, what their experience of the policing response would be, and as Hesse and Virdee agree, the outcome of the response itself (Hesse and Waltham, 1992, Virdee, 1995). But those attitudes, motivations and institutional pressures were infected with legacy, ignorance, stereotypical judgements about victims of racist violence, and minimal appreciation of its gravity. This was apparent to many victim-participants, hence some felt that police were racist, indifferent to racist violence, not there for Asians, and not willing or able to do anything for them.

The summarised finding of this section, particularly in the 2008 period, was that frontline and neighbourhood police officers did not grasp the abhorrence of racist violence. Instead, their expression of outrage about the additional burden victims were putting on already busy police officers is significant. With a resentment of the work pressure racist violence caused (or required) and the absence of moral outrage about it, there was little motivation to approach and investigate it with any professional rigor. That, combined with the officer’s autonomy to define the incident in more operationally favourable terms, presented clear opportunity to ‘cuff the job’ meaning it was written off as something far less serious. There would have been little meaningful engagement with the victim, leaving them feeling ignored and unprotected. The policing response, recording, investigation, and

resolution would have been based on the officer's preferred 'operationalised' interpretation of the victim's account. In incidents where that interpretation was factually reduced from the true nature of the incident, the response and intervention would fail to meet the victim's needs.

The 2020 interviews identified that the organisational focus on protecting the vulnerable, was a policy embraced by the Superintendent, Inspectors, Constables and PCSO ranks. From the police perspective at least, it would suggest that victims of racist violence, would by nature of their assumed vulnerability, be afforded a service that better recognised harm and risk. But as findings chapter 1 identifies, that improvement was not described by victims.

8.43 Failure to engage with the victim experience

At a Black and Minority Ethnic Police Association (BMEPA) conference in Spring 2021, a senior police delegate said: *'The average white European police officer on the street does not understand the legacy of how police have mistreated BAME communities.'* The comment is a reflection on the contextual aspect of policing and race. It is also a vital component in many engagements between police officers and BAME victims. In effect, without sufficient experience, or learning, a white European police officer is unlikely to understand the impact of racist violence, nor be as sensitive to its presence in an incident as the victim was. Both findings chapters provided evidence from police and victim participants, that in 2008, the capacity for police officers to empathise with BAME victims was limited, unless they had direct experience of it themselves (i.e., they were BAME) or they were in specialist community engagement posts. This finding is corroborated by Chakraborti, who found that victims felt that police did not listen to their concerns, did not take them seriously, did not treat them with decency, and did not have empathy (Chakraborti, 2018). For the police to approach a victim of a racist incident from a position where they have minimal appreciation of the impact or broader context, presents a challenge. That position would significantly impair their assessment of the nuances of a given incident and would impair their judgement of what an appropriate response should be.

Without an element of humility, the police officer could not begin the process of genuine engagement with the victim or their situation, to learn and understand it. Stanymere's work on cultural humility, entitled 'Seeing my Whiteness' describes how the impact of the practitioner's racial identity is pivotal to their '*ability to develop meaningful and productive relationships*' (Stanmyre, 2019, p. 1). Where the police officer did not have the humility to recognise and acknowledge this dynamic, components of the incident that were most significant to the victim, could be overlooked. Perhaps more importantly, the opportunity to engage with, validate and support the victim would also be overlooked, leaving them feeling ignored and dismissed, per findings chapter 1. In many victim-participant interviews, participants felt the police minimised their accounts. In doing this, the officer was negotiating the nature of the incident with the victim, to better reflect their blinkered, common-sense interpretation of it. In this respect, the police officer is unable to see the problem in the same way as the victim. Consequently, their report and intervention was the minimum possible. In the numerous examples in this study where the racist element of an incident was written-out of the script, as Myers suggests it still is (Myers and Lantz, 2020b), the response ignored the most vital part of the victim experience. A further missed opportunity to build a better understanding of the nature and impact of racist violence is the Victim Personal Statement (VPS). There was admission by police in both periods of study, that the VPS was under-utilised. The intention of the VPS in criminal justice, is to allow the victim to help others understand the physical, emotional, psychological, or financial impact the crime has had on them (Gov.UK, 2018). This is a written, personal account taken by a police officer from a victim of crime, after the evidential issues are addressed. Taking such a statement, would provide the officer with a better understanding of the impact, and would have given the victim an opportunity to be heard, and validated, rather than being ignored. Rollock suggests further research into the use and value of the VPS (Rollock, 2009), which I argue would be a valuable tool for both learning about the impact of racist violence, and demonstrating to the victim, that police are prepared to listen to and understand the harm it causes.

The definition of a racist incident and a racist crime was very clear in 2008, all police officers had been trained to understand that. But the failure to engage and

recognise the racist element as this section argues, means that in many cases, police simply did not see the racist element in an incident and would be dismissive of the victim's assertion that it was a significant part. A lack of understanding of the definition, as (Rollock, 2009, Docking, 2005, Foster et al., 2005a) suggest existed in 2005-2009, would also explain under-recording and a service that failed to meet the needs or expectations of the victim.

8.44 Conflicting institutional pressures

In the period of the hard, tangible performance culture, police were required to meet individual quantitative targets, usually around arrests and detections (Marlow and Loveday, 2000). This was to prove themselves to leaders who were encouraged to deliver robust and intrusive supervision to drive performance. This culture was described in this study as '*horrible*' (see findings 2). Although it was short lived, teams and area commands were required to keep and display league tables in prominent places, to show which were the best performing area commands and teams. Such was the pressure to perform, and the degree of competitiveness at all ranks. The findings from police interviews identifies that they stereotyped BAME victims as unwilling to support a prosecution. Therefore, they would choose to attend incidents that would carry more likelihood of an arrest and detection, rather than racist incidents that would not. This type of job was inevitably considered low-value work, as the collective expectation was that BAME victims did not provide a witness statement, meaning no arrest and no detection. Additionally, there was a risk that the victim may need an interpreter if a thorough account was to be taken, and that could take hours. That meant no tangible evidence of performance hence little passion for providing an appropriate level of service. This has the effect of further pushing racist violence down in the hierarchy of police relevance (Bowling, 1998, Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019).

There was also the fear-factor, or as Radebe puts it '*White fear of Blacks*' (Radebe, 2021, p. 3), the risk of being labelled or '*ostracised as a racist*' (ibid., p. 3) for failing to deal with a BAME victim appropriately, or being under-skilled to do so, meaning police officers were, as a Neighbourhood Inspector put it, '*walking on eggshells.*' The origins of this fear in Northumbria Police, as described in Findings

Chapter 2, were the backlash of the Macpherson enquiry, particularly misunderstanding what institutional racism meant; diversity training that for some, served to create more fear of getting into trouble; and the impact of the BBC documentary 'The Secret Policeman.' Officers felt they were likely to be regarded by the public as racist as a result of the behaviours the documentary revealed in Bruge Police Training Centre. There was a further fear that officer's responses to racist violence would result in additional scrutiny from the organisation, again playing on the concerns about being exposed or accused of being a racist or incompetent police officer. Waddington describes this as '*The truly ever-present danger*' (Waddington, 1999b, p. 300) in policing, describing it as the greatest threat that police officers face. He goes on to explain that policing is a "*punishment-centred bureaucracy*' in which officers are rarely praised for good practice... but face draconian penalties if they are deemed to have behaved improperly" (ibid., p 301). In my 25 years of police experience, I have felt the anxiety that this danger presents. Often, it felt far more acute and pervasive than the obvious risks inherent in confronting physical violence and threats and other operational policing risks.

As in all of the arguments this section presents, the perceived low-value, high risk stigma attached to responding to racist violence, led to officers writing racism out of the incident report, under recording and failure to deliver an appropriate response to victims of racist violence.

8.45 Policing improvements, diverging perceptions

Every police participant with over 5 years of service in 2020; and the Newcastle City Council lead for Hate Crime, spoke about how they had made significant improvements in policing racist violence (see findings (b)), or in hate crime more specifically. The City Council pointed towards the need to make the service more efficient and focused on critical business, as the driver of this positive change following austerity. This same force for change was articulated by the police Superintendent (Hate Crime Lead) and Neighbourhood Inspectors. Police officers of all ranks spoke also about how treating victims of racist incidents as vulnerable, meant they got a far better service in terms of a harm reduction plan, safeguarding

and the attention of the Communities Engagement Team. This was driven by the outcome of the Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire & Rescue Services PEEL inspection (HMICFRS, 2019), and the implementation of Northumbria Police's Strategy 2025.

But this improvement was not articulated by victim-participants in 2020. Findings chapter (b) outlines evidence that victims in the second period still felt there were significant gaps in service, citing a lack of feedback on progress or outcomes; little point in reporting as nothing gets done; police ignoring communities concerns; and a refusal to accept the hate crime element to what they felt were racist crimes. There were no references to police being indifferent to racist violence in 2020, but victim-participants felt that some officers were still too busy to offer any empathy to them.

This is a significant finding of the study, made possible by virtue of the two-stage approach to the fieldwork. The policing perspective of improved services was very clear and very different from the findings in the 2008 interviews. In 2008, there was resentment of the notion of having to provide an enhanced service, moreover one Neighbourhood Inspector felt that if victims of racist violence felt they did not get a better service than other victims, they were simply wrong. Foster, cited in literature review chapter 2, found that in 2005, almost 3/4 of police officers surveyed, felt they provided a better service post Lawrence (Foster et al., 2005a). This study shows how that perception has accelerated among policing agencies since 2005 but did not gain traction with the experiences or perceptions of victims on the ground.

8.50 Explanation of unexpected results

The resentful and dismissive attitudes of some police officers towards racist violence in the first period of study was unexpected. Their focus on the increased workload it brought them and the enhanced service they were required to deliver against frequent re-deployments, and backfilling response officers, was the issue for many. Only one PCSO commented that this meant they could not provide the service victims needed. That officer had experienced racist violence themselves

and explained how they were able to communicate their understanding and acceptance of the victims experience with them. For most, the demand and expectations were the problems. This was rich data for the study. Participants were unaware that by expressing their resentments and perhaps misunderstandings, they were showing me a snapshot of how they presented to victims and how they went on to deal with cases. To express this to a sergeant who was conducting research into policing racist violence, suggests that they were unaware of what their comments implied. It also suggested that they felt my research could contribute to addressing the problems as they interpreted them. Conversely, in the second round of interviews, the marked improvement in police officers attitudes towards racist violence was unexpected. The improvement was reportedly due to the relatively recent focus on vulnerability and risk, through Strategy 2025 (NorthumbriaPolice, 2019), rather than focusing on embracing diversity, race, or performance measures. Race and policing may have become the folk devil that scarred police officers more than any of the other organisationally associated risks. Consequently, police avoided engaging with it, until it was re-framed, unintentionally in the context of risk and vulnerability in an era when vulnerability, investigation and problem solving (VIP) were the prime focus.

Some of the victim-participant accounts of daily racist threats and verbal abuse outside of schools from other parents, were unexpectedly abhorrent. As a police officer, I felt acutely aware of how sickening some categories of crime could be. But as a parent, learning that single female African asylum seekers and their children were subjected to this kind of abuse was beyond my expectations. This is likely as a result of my own failure to wrestle with the realities of societal racism and the experience of BAME victims, particularly asylum seekers before commencing this study. My observations of the emotional reactions from victims recalling their experiences lead me to trust their factual accuracy and their accounts of the impact they had. I recognise however, that victims hoped my research would begin to address the situation they faced and could be motivated to embellish their accounts to that end. But equally plausible, is that they could have minimised the impact and trauma of their experiences in their accounts, or not have recognised those in their children.

The majority of academic writing and research identifies the harms of racist violence. But some victim-participants spoke about positive impact it had on their lives, inspiring them to rise and challenge it, using and developing their skills to help others. Typical sampling strategies would capture typical victims of racist violence. My position at the time of the first round of interviews was unique. It gave me access to people who had experienced racist violence yet became very influential community activists in the area. The range of social-mobilities of victims in this study provided this richness of perspective.

Police and council participants spoke about the positive impact of austerity on elements of policing practice. It had the effect of streamlining what was done, to further direct resources to cases that had vulnerability, and investigative or problem-solving opportunities. This effectively reset what was culturally classed as low value. Non-vulnerable crime such as shoplifting in a large store, where the impact is relatively low, was ascribed a lower priority. Directing resources to cases of increased risk and vulnerability, along with the recognition of the risk and harm of racist violence, was said to have raised the significance of that and other hate crime. Further drivers of this re-focus came from some national cases, such as the death of Fiona Pilkington following failed police practices in tackling disability hate crime (Taylor et al., 2012). Failings in risk and vulnerability practice hit Northumbria Police in 2016 too, when officers missed vital opportunities to safeguard Alice Ruggles from her ex-partner Trimaan Dhillon. Alice reported that Dhillon was stalking her, however police did not take her reports seriously, were not aware of his offending history and did not implement harm reduction measures. Dhillon entered her home, waited for her to return and murdered her (Korkodeilou, 2020, Mawson, 2019). Following these cases, officers of all ranks in Northumbria police received training and became more sensitive to vulnerability, and indirectly therefore, racist violence was further elevated on the hierarchy of police relevance.

8.60 Strengths of key position/arguments and alternative explanations

There is a high confidence that the kind of incidents reported in the first period of the study, and their frequency, are accurate representations of what victims in Newcastle had experienced and were experiencing. Using the hybrid scale of increasing impact to provide structure, accommodated multiple participant accounts at each level. Their accounts of the impact were equally valid research data. That confidence comes from the large sample size and the strong corroboration between unconnected participants. It is also reflective of the studies of racist violence published in the decades from 1990 to 2010, and the accounts of participants supporting victims. The fact that little had changed in the victim accounts expressed in the 2020 interviews, validates both sets of data and interpretations. They support the key academic arguments that racist victimisation is experienced as an ongoing process, that pervades the lives of victims, their families, and communities. The victim's corroborating evidence of how they had experienced the policing response also provided strong confidence that their accounts were accurate, particularly when that too, replicated the findings of other key studies. As this study brought together the victim and police/partner experiences, the fact that police and partners also corroborated their accounts confirms findings that were sufficient, accurate, relevant, and reliable. There was an intangible risk, that the legacy of police failures to provide an appropriate service to victims of racist violence, influenced how they experienced it, how they framed it, and how they communicated it to me. That dynamic could have led to an unconscious exaggeration of how bad things really were. In that respect, it successfully captured the victim perspective, but that perspective may have been calibrated against a legacy of poor responses.

The study argues that the major reasons why policing responses failed to meet the needs of victims were: a lack of outrage about racist violence, or a dismissive attitude; a failure to recognise or record the racist element of an incident; a failure to engage and empathise with the victim, hence not grasping the gravity of the incident; a fear of making mistakes and being considered a racist; a tendency to minimise the severity of incidents to avoid unnecessary work; resentment of the additional burden inherent with racist violence; and the era of a counter-productive

performance culture. There will be inter-dependencies between some of these, for example the concern that dealing with racist violence is more labour intensive, combined with a performance driven culture, could have put pressure on busy officers to omit elements of an incident from their report. The suggestion by participants in the first period, that some police officers were racist, would be a logical explanation underpinning each of these factors, were they limited to just a few bad apples, as Bowling describes (Bowling, 1998). It would be naïve to think that in 2008 and in 2020, there were no officers who held racial prejudice or unconscious bias, strong enough for it to appear in their professional practice. That may have been the force behind the resentment some officers expressed about the so-called 'enhanced service' BAME people had to receive or the argument that 'nobody wants to deal with a racist incident.' But that would be unfair to the majority of police officers I interviewed, especially in the second period where outrage about racist violence was directed towards the offenders. This is a large and positive attitudinal shift in policing from the landscape of the 1980s-2000s and is detectable across the timescale of this empirical study. Area commanders, neighbourhood inspectors, police constables and the CET all agreed that many officers feared dealing with racist incidents, and that the time-pressures of operational policing tended to cause responders to do the minimum at the scene, then move-on. There was mixed opinion about empathy with BAME victims in 2020. Some officers agreed that white European officers may be unable to empathise with victims of racist violence, though an NPT focus group argued that police officers must have empathy with all victims. The dominant perspective on the police empathy argument from victims, was that they did not have any. Certainly, that was the finding with victim-participants who had suffered racist violence. Other crime types or victim types, where the officers have more cultural or experiential association, are where empathy is more likely to be aligned with the victim experience.

The outstanding change of attitude identified in the 2020 interviews with police officers, was likely to have been influenced or led by Strategy 2025. The strategy led the organisation towards a focus of resources on vulnerability, and opportunities for investigation and problem-solving, which solidified the position that policing racist violence was a priority. It was a priority in the context of

protecting vulnerable people and a sub-category of hate crime. The snag, however, was that victim interviews did not reflect this improvement in service. But Strategy 2025 was quite new in 2020, and how victims experienced the police response is likely to have lagged significantly behind any real improvements. This may have been a reflection on the sample of victim-participants taken in the second period of study. It was smaller than the first, aiming to examine the situation 12 years after the first period and bring the data up to date in 2020. Specifically, it was to identify what changes were apparent from the victim perspective. The finding was, that very little appeared to have changed. Hardy and Chakraborti corroborate this persistent victim position, finding *‘a perception that reporting would simply be a waste of time, either for the victim (because the police and other partner agencies would fail to grasp the seriousness and prevalence of hate incidents) or for the police (because of a perceived tendency on the part of the police to prioritise other types of offence with easily identifiable perpetrators and more obvious resolutions)*. They also argue that trust and confidence is lost when police and partners fail to show *‘sufficient empathy and kindness’* to victims (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019, p. 163). The Superintendent in charge of hate crime, Neighbourhood Inspectors, Police Constables, and the Communities Engagement Team (CET) argued that the organisation had made substantial advances in their policy and practice. The City Council lead felt that partnership working was more focused and efficient following austerity, and all agreed that inevitably this would be felt as a better service. The contradiction herein, is that police officers of varying ranks believe that police are providing a better service, yet victim participants did not corroborate this improvement.

8.70 Reflections on the study

8.71 Limitations

Access to victim-participants in both periods of study relied upon recommendations from partner agencies, the Communities Engagement Team and snowballing. The total number of victim-participants engaged was high and data captured was rich. But the approach did not allow any selection based on the types of crime they had experienced, frequency of victimisation, nor how many

times they had police responses. There was a risk that in some cases, participants did not provide a holistic account of their experiences, choosing to focus more on their negative experiences, rather than positives. For a victim of a racist crime, that would not be unreasonable. It also meant that in the second period, finding victims who could talk about any changes in their experiences of racist violence and the policing response, was highly unlikely. Only one such person was interviewed. Consequently, the reliability of data regarding changes in how victims experienced the policing response, and findings made from it, were dependent on individuals accounts at both stages. There is opportunity for police-based research to take a different sampling methodology. One such approach would be for a police-researcher to use historic incident data to select repeat victims, who had experienced racist crime and policing responses over a 10-year period. The sample could be categorised into:

- i. Crime/incidents experienced
- ii. Policing outcomes – charge/no further action/harm reduction plan/etc.
- iii. Victim ethnicity/status
- iv. Level of assessed risk

Had this sampling methodology been available to me, tracking changes in how victims experienced offending over time, would have been more practicable. It would also have allowed for more detailed probing of responses to specific incidents. Clearly ethical and information security considerations would make this a high-risk strategy.

Access to partner agency staff in the first period of study was readily available, particularly as I had a close working relationship with many of them. But the fluid nature of the HCCTMG in the second period meant that only police and council participants were available for interview. A more thorough method would have been to attend the monthly HCCTMG meetings over a period of time sufficient to observe and examine their proceedings in relation to racist violence. A year of proceedings would appear sufficient to that end. The core group could then have been engaged as a focus group, followed by individual interviews to gather data.

That would have provided a richer and more inclusive data on how partnerships were operating in 2020.

COVID and methodological assumptions meant the sample size in period two was smaller and conducted by telephone or Skype after March 2020. Therefore, the data gained from the interviews may not have been as rich as in the first part. The smaller sample size meant fewer experiences and fewer insights too. The absence of the inter-personal cues that I could get from a face-to-face interview meant that probing and inferring opportunities were less frequent. The PhD deadline and uncertainty of when face to face interviews could resume, ruled out the option of waiting for the COVID risk to reduce.

The research data on victim needs was not as comprehensive as anticipated. Victims tended to speak mostly about the incidents themselves, and the problems with the policing response. Very few elaborated on what they wanted the intervention to do, other than by inference from what they said it failed to do. That was despite specific questions on that subject. It suggests a possible lack of understanding on behalf of the victim, about what policing interventions can be. It could also identify false expectations, wherein victims expected more than what agencies could realistically provide. There was also minimal comment from victims about how they had experienced the services of partner agencies, and nothing about partnerships. This limited the scope for discussion around the value of partnership arrangements, the impact of ARCH or the HCCTMG on the victim experience. This could be addressed in part, if access to police data could be granted and incident logs viewed to identify cases that had multi-agency harm reduction plans attached. This is unlikely to have been authorised by the university ethics panel for doctoral research. But as police-based professional review, it could have yielded participants who were able to provide more comprehensive data on their experiences of partnership interventions.

None of the victim participants spoke about online racist abuse. Consequently, this study can only reflect on the existing literature to discuss the incidents and policing in this context.

8.72 Implications for policy

Operationalising safeguarding and harm reduction plans for managing vulnerable victims is a positive development in contemporary policing across agencies. Though they were not measures implemented to address historic failings in policing racist violence, evidence from police and partners suggests it has provided a framework in which better victim protection is afforded. Victims who have harm reduction plans assigned to them, have their cases managed by a neighbourhood officer, overseen by their line management. The proportion of victims of racist violence on harm reduction plans was not considered as part of this study but increasing that proportion is likely to improve outcomes. Introduction of policy for racist incidents that requires victims to be automatically deemed vulnerable and assigned a managed, proportionate harm reduction plan, could ensure this was cemented into practice. This study augments Hardy and Chakraborti's concerns that victims are reluctant to report hate crime because they felt it would not be taken seriously and would not be adequately prioritised (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). A policy that requires a vulnerability-based policing intervention both raises the priority and raises the perception that it is a priority for both police and victim alike. This would require sensitive, mindful messaging to operational police officers and safeguarding teams, to ensure they understand the rationale for the vulnerability classification. As the findings of this study identify, if responders and leaders do not grasp the value of additional measures of protection and comprehensive incident management for racist violence, resentment can develop. Resentment subsequently leads to operational behaviours that minimise the policing response and adversely impact on the victim experience of policing. This proposal would give victims of racist violence a degree of parity with victims of domestic and sexual violence, in terms of how police and partners understand and consequently, work to address their vulnerabilities. Implementing this policy which demands far more meaningful and constructive engagement with the victim, could begin to reverse the findings of the recent HM Government Action Against Hate report that hate crime victims are more likely to be very dissatisfied with the policing response than with other crimes (Home-Office, 2016) by expanding the framework of victim engagement.

The need to address the legacy of poor race relations and disadvantage in service delivery remains a significant task. A policy response that encourages police officers to engage with and understand the victim's perspective, in the context of their experience, would be a step towards addressing the empathy gap.

Developing the police capacity to accept and understand the trauma victims are experiencing, would result in consistently accurate recording and a service that is more responsive to the holistic needs of the victim. To achieve this, a significant increase in the proportion of racist incidents where victim personal statements (VPS) are obtained, could be made. This would include partner agencies taking a VPS, not the police alone. All cases of racist violence should be considered in the context of a legacy of disadvantage; the lived experience of racist victimisation; and the nuances of the incident at hand. Taking a victim personal statement will be a learning process for officers and a cathartic process for victims who feel they are being listened to. The proposal herein, is that for every incident of racist violence reported to the police, a police officer or PCSO visits and obtains a VPS from the victim, and where appropriate, from other people impacted by the incident (family/friends/associates). Similarly, where other agencies receive a report, a member of their staff attends and takes a VPS. Where other agencies are obtaining VPSs, an inter-organisational sharing of impact data is implemented. Additionally, a thematic focus on the personal and community impact the VPSs present is collated and communicated across police and partner agencies. This could be fed into training packages for call takers, responders and investigators and used to inform future policy and understanding, locally or nationally via the College of Policing. Periodic reviews for quality assurance, training implications and response options based upon qualitative data could be undertaken to ensure that the VPS remains a valid and valuable component of a comprehensive response to racist incidents. The legacy of poor responses, lack of empathy and kindness from practitioners in the policing agencies that Hardy and Chakraborti argue was reinforcing the lack of trust within minority communities (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019), could be reduced by this practice. This proposal addresses the reported deficit and offers an actionable procedure to improve trust and confidence.

The impact of the performance culture on historic responses to racist violence was evidently a negative experience for victims, police officers and many leaders. The change to a new force operating model within Northumbria Police that resulted in 60% of hate crime being dealt with by telephone was a concern for current practice. Particularly as this study has learned that quality engagement and empathy with victims has been lacking. The Hate Crime lead in 2020 explained their concerns about this but stated a 'cradle to grave' evaluation of how this impacted on the victim experience had not shown any decline in satisfaction (see Findings ch2). The fact that racist crime figures recorded by police is still tracking upwards, while CSEW data is relatively stable, provides evidence that reporting and recording practice is improving. The police, as a public sector, are mandated under the Equalities Act 2010, to comply with certain Public Sector Equality Duty policy objectives to avoid disadvantaging people with protected characteristics (Equality Act, 2010). However, as Pyper points out, they are not required in law, to conduct an Equality Impact Assessment before implementing new policy (Pyper, 2020). Changes in policy that may impact on the quality of service experienced by victims of racist violence could be subject to equality impact assessment (EIA) before implementation. This process could create opportunities to anticipate negative effects of revised practices, which can be either minimised, eliminated, or managed. But in the case of this cradle to grave review of the policy to respond to 60% of hate crime by telephone, if the victim perspective was already poor, the review merely demonstrated that the change had not made it any worse. The need to improve the victim experience arguably still remains. This study did not review the EIA for this policy, but the extent and detail of how it addressed the hate crime victim-experience of policing versus the drastic need to reform operational policing, could have offered valuable insight into command level decision making. This study proposes that EIA needs to be front and centre in the development and implementation of policy when it can impact on trust and confidence in minority and vulnerable communities. Furthermore, members of those communities need to be honestly, objectively, and constructively engaged in that process to the extent that their voice is evident in the resultant policy.

Further training of existing police and PCSOs and on all recruitment courses could be developed to address the history of policing race, the empathy gap, trust deficit,

to develop greater understanding of racist violence as a concept, the inherent vulnerabilities, the harm it causes and the response options available. Broad training is necessary, however the use of local racist violence lead (RV Lead) on each operational team to both cascade training and act in an advisory capacity to their peers and supervision could be pivotal. The material generated in the VPS study above would be of value to the RV Lead once collated and reviewed, and it would be useful for officers in those roles to be given time to do some of the reviews themselves. Options for recruitment of RV Leads could be:

- i. Student officers on the Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship Programme (PCDA) or other Police Educational Qualifications Framework (PEQF) entry routes such as PCSOs, to be offered opportunities to base final year dissertations on research and development of policy and practice in the context of policing racist violence. They could then become RV Leads post completion.
- ii. Local nominations from operational teams by supervisors who identify skilled, empathetic, and passionate officers on their teams who go the extra mile to support BAME victims of crime, particularly racist crime.
- iii. Seek expressions of interest from the pool of constables and PCSOs for the post and require a minimum tenure of 2 years. The tenure would ensure officers take the role because they value the opportunity to improve policing racist violence, rather than to enhance their opportunities to be promoted to the next rank.
- iv. Broaden the scope of the RV Lead role to include other elements of race action such as recruitment, retention, aspiration and the furtherance of anti-racist attitudes and behaviours within the organisation. Those officers would then be termed Race Action Leads (RA Leads).
- v. Where the RV Leads or RA Leads have documented a comprehensive professional portfolio of noteworthy work, their achievements could attract a competency-based payment at the 2-year stage. This process could be enhanced by working in partnership with a Higher Education Institution to build an accredited diploma at Level 4 – 8, depending upon the qualifications the officers already hold, or their rank and experience.

The need for police training in hate crime was a major recommendation of the Lawrence Inquiry, but contemporary scholars, Government and The National Police Chief's Council and the UK Government are still calling for further evidence-based training of officers at all ranks (Home-Office, 2016, Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019).

8.80 Chapter Summary

The chapter describes the solid foundation and contribution to knowledge about the experience of racist violence in Newcastle between the 1970s and 2020, using participant accounts obtained through qualitative interviews in 2008 and 2020. It has shown how external factors of politics and reporting in the mass media have influenced its nature and extent between the study dates. The empirical findings replicated what the key literature of that period said about the situation in similar areas, but the two-stage qualitative nature of this study, provided stronger and more compelling case for action.

The study found that policing agencies historically failed to understand the gravity of the situation for victims. The result of not grasping nature and impact, meant any intervention made, could not be needs-based, nor could it be appropriately supportive. Consequently, victims experienced a service that often failed meet their needs, and in some cases, resulted in secondary victimisation. In that respect, it was not unlike historic approaches to domestic abuse, sexual violence, and antisocial behaviour, where the true extent of harm, was not incorporated into police or partnership responses until recently. But for BAME victims, their families and communities, the failings were framed as a perpetuation of racial disadvantage and targeting. That left them feeling further marginalised, ignored, frustrated, and vulnerable to continued violence.

Key literature in this field naturally inferred that racism was at the heart of the failings in policing racist violence, or in police race relations generally. This was a logical conclusion, with numerous historic and recent examples to draw upon, most prominently the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Macpherson of Cluny, 1999), and most recently the murder of George Floyd in May 2020 (Samayeen et al., 2020). My two decades of experience in response and neighbourhood policing posts, afforded me opportunities to re-examine these failings. In the context of common-sense, operational policing and the challenges officers face, alternative explanations than racism have been offered. These alternative explanations do not imply that racist police officers do not exist, nor that racial prejudices have not influenced policing interventions in Northumbria Police. But what it does argue, is

that racism is not the sole cause of the failings. This is a significantly different finding to other research, strengthened by my post and by the two-stage approach to fieldwork.

The chapter discusses how the improved policing and partnership responses have developed and were felt by participants to offer a far more effective and efficient service in 2020, discussing why despite this, victims did not articulate likewise.

Framing how racist violence is experienced in Newcastle is important, if we cannot do that, we will not be able to recognise it, would not understand how much it hurts and could never provide the right kind of intervention. The study has contributed significant knowledge of that victim experience, and the harm it caused. It has provided the situation or foundation for this and other studies, by providing rich qualitative evidence of the problem.

Understanding how victims perceive the policing response is essential in identifying how policy interventions have influenced actions on the ground, what policy changes are required and how police culture and discretion translate policy into what gets done. The study has shown how post Lawrence policy and training aimed at 'diversifying' (Rowe and Garland, 2003a) Northumbria Police had only marginal impact on policing racist violence at the delivery end. What have delivered significant improvements, are reforms forced by austerity, a critical HMICFRS PEEL inspection (HMICFRS, 2019) and the strategic focus on vulnerability, investigation and problem-solving (VIP). This is interesting because it means that reforms of the broader policy issues of vulnerability, investigation and problem-solving have, by stealth, changed previously rigid attitudes and behaviours about policing racist violence. This chapter ends by making four feasible and thematic proposals for policy that would broadly improve performance in policing racist violence. These proposals are connected to contemporary scholarly material and made practical by the operational insights created by my professional standpoint.

The next chapter, Conclusions, revisits what has been done and the significant findings it has produced. In doing this, it connects elements of all chapters with the aims and objectives of the study further developing this chapter.

Chapter 9, Conclusions

9.00 Introduction

This final chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the research that has been conducted, what was found, what it means in terms of contribution to knowledge, and further research opportunities that have emerged from it. It follows on from the discussion chapter that combined the findings chapters and the literature review, in the context of Newcastle upon Tyne as defined in the research site chapter. The 4 research objectives were met by the analysis of data and provided insight into: the impact of racist violence; the experience of the policing response; the policing perspective and barriers to effective responses; and developments in partnership approaches aimed at meeting the needs of victims. The chapter summarises the rich interview data from both periods of study, identifying the harmful nature, scope, and impact of racist violence on victims, their families, and communities. The two-stage nature of the study provided insight into how events such as Brexit and the COVID pandemic increased the frequency of racist violence. It then presents the victim perspective of the policing response to show to what extent it met their needs and expectations. The perspective from the police and partner agencies, examined in parallel with the victim perspective of policing, allowed correlations to be made between how the victims experienced policing and the pressures that often led to police failures to meet their needs. The chapter summarises the key developments in policing racist violence that were seen as improvements by the police-participants interviewed. Reflecting on the overall findings of the study, the chapter ends by making recommendations for further research towards solutions for policing.

The final section draws on the themes to propose opportunities for further research across this broad area.

9.10. Answering the research question

9.11: Summary of the research

Under the brief thesis title ‘Racist Violence in a Northern English City; Experiences of Victimisation and the Police Response,’ this has been a study into the victim experience of racist violence and the policing response in Newcastle upon Tyne. It followed a qualitative, grounded theory methodology, allowing the victim perspectives to direct the research towards findings that were most important to them. A total of 56 semi-structured interviews and focus groups were conducted. Of those, 28 were with victims of racist violence; 3 with community leaders; 18 were with police officers ranging from Chief Superintendent to Police Community Support Officer; and 6 with partner agency representatives. I transcribed every interview, generating over 500 pages of written material. The interviews and focus groups were conducted in 2 time periods, 2006-2008 and 2020. A literature review was conducted alongside the fieldwork, to ensure that the material best matching the emerging themes was examined, as well as contextual theory. See the methodology chapter for further details of the research design and approaches. The major themes were identified and developed into two separate findings chapters:

Findings 1: The Victim’s Experience of Racist Violence and the Policing Response; and

Findings 2: The Police and Partnership Agenda.

The emerging themes in each findings chapter were presented according to the participant base they came from. Findings 1 generated the victim-based themes from victim-participant accounts of: what was happening to them, what was the impact, what they needed from the policing response, and what kind of service they got. Findings 2 took the major themes from the police and partner participant data. The discussion chapter brought the two findings chapters together, to explore and discuss dependencies between victim experiences and the factors that determine the policing response. This was then examined in the context of the key literature and theory of policing racist violence (see Literature Review Chapters). The contextualisation was the process wherein the study reviewed what was known about policing racist violence, and what the outcomes of this study contributed to that knowledge.

9.12: The experience of racist violence in Newcastle, nature, and extent

Victim-participants in both periods of this study had directly experienced a broad range and severity of racist violence. Additionally, they experienced hostilities towards them that were sub-criminal acts such as avoidance in the workplace, or on public transport. Those of a violent nature ranged from what may be considered minor verbal abuse or threats, to attacks on the home, on vehicles, and serious category physical assault. They provided examples of indirect racist violence too, such as attacks on their children or what had happened to their parents in the 1960s and 70s. Black parents expressed that their children were being targeted in school and asking parents why they have black skin. Three participants spoke about the racist murder of Koaz Miah in 1992, clearly experienced as an attack on the Asian community of Newcastle, not just the victim himself. The locations of offences were significant too, with people and property being attacked at or near their homes, in their businesses, en-route to places of worship, community centres, parents being abused and threatened outside of school, and children being abused by other parents outside of schools. Some victims, recalling their school days, spoke of 'paki-bashing' at the end of term and frequent racist violence. For some, verbal abuse and threats were part of daily life, but for others, were less frequent. The frequency of racist violence did appear to have declined from the accounts of participants in the first period of study, compared with the second. The core nature of the violence remained a constant throughout, but spikes and changes did happen. The most notable, according to the first round of interviews, followed 9/11. The terrorist attacks and the associated political discourse around 'Muslim terrorists' led to a spike in the targeting of Asians, with the language of Islamophobia spiking in 2001 and the years following. Visible changes in community dynamic, such as the dispersal of asylum seekers and the population of some neighbourhoods with Czech Roma, have sparked offending against them. More recently, Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic caused increased targeting against Eastern European communities and Chinese communities respectively.

This section has answered the nature and extent elements of objective 1. The next section explores the impact element of the victim experience, identifying the harm caused, to complete the answer to the objective question.

9.13 The impact of racist violence

The experience of racist violence had a profound and pervasive impact on life for many victims in Newcastle. For repeat victims, even of lower-level violence, the feeling of vulnerability and threat could be constant. Beyond the initial shock and trauma of attacks, they caused lasting anxieties for personal safety and that of their families; concerns about harm to their children's development and socialisation; loss of self-value; depression; and occasionally hatred towards the white community emerged. For the majority of victims, this resulted in withdrawal from avoidable activities or locations; or an acceptance that this was part of their everyday life. This is a pattern shared throughout targeted communities, whereby an attack on one member of a community, is an attack on the whole community. The message on the receiving end was the dehumanising feel that we are not part of this society, are not welcome, and not safe. More resilient participants had been able to respond with physical violence, even perpetrating violence themselves, to make them harder targets. For some, those responses resulted in prison, for others who were able to gain power from their experiences, it created the strength and determination to take positive action against racist violence and racism generally, through youth and community work or civic roles. Although participants were able to identify how over time, significant events caused spikes in racist violence, there was no evident change in the impact it had on them.

9.14 The experience of the policing response

Findings chapter 1 breaks down the victim needs into sections on: trust and confidence in policing; a positive and timely response; empathy, understanding and validation; and finally, feedback, resolution, and closure. The study found however, that victim-participant responses portrayed a general feel that there was little point contacting the police about minor racist violence as nothing gets done about it. Trust and confidence in policing was low, as victims would not expect a

service that met their needs. Participants experienced slow or nil responses to their calls and ineffective action at the scene. In the first period of interviews, some victims reported being harassed by the police and experiencing racist attitudes from them to the extent they felt unsupported as a result of their race or immigration status. Asylum seekers in particular, in the first period of study, reported police responses to their calls wherein they were treated with suspicion and on one occasion, arrested. There was a theme that police failed to listen to victims, did not take asylum seekers seriously, were dismissive of the impact of racist violence, and played down or rejected the racist element. Their failure to listen, and lack of empathy or validation of the victim experience had the impact of minimising and belittling their account of it and consequently belittling the victim themselves. To the victim, when police ignored or failed to empathise with their predicament, there was no chance of a follow-up service that would meet their needs, and the gap between what they needed and what they got, was interpreted along the lines of race. Feedback after initial attendance was poor throughout both periods, which was interpreted as no action taken, particularly when victims experienced a continuation of the incidents after making reports. Without feedback there was no apparent justice and no closure for the victim. This failure was often given a race-based inference by victims, who were very conscious of the legacy of police race relations. What emerged was a strong need to be validated as a victim of racist violence, but neither the victim experience nor racist violence appeared to be accepted by officers. In the second period there were no inferences of police racism and one example of a positive response. The feel of being ignored by police and the racist element of crimes against the BAME community being dismissed by police and partners was still a concern, although some victims were able to recognise that a lack of empathy may have been the result of officers simply being too busy to spend any time with them.

This section has fully answered objective 2, by identifying victim needs, then discussing to what extent they were met by the policing response. It also starts to answer objective 3, by providing the victim perspective of how policing agencies have responded to their needs. As this section tended to present a catalogue of failings, the remainder of objective 3 is addressed below, in a section that provides an appreciation of the challenges police officers faced.

9.15 The policing perspective; barriers to a positive response in 2008

Taking account of the victim perspective from the first findings chapter, the second explored the policing side of the situation. This was to gain an understanding of what was influencing the police response and what the victims saw as failings. To achieve this, findings chapter two explored participant accounts under the sections: a victim focused agenda; the essence of a good service; dis-ease in policing racist incidents; tracking changes in attitude towards victim focus; police prioritisation and purpose; capacity, demand, and deployment; the impact of a performance culture; vulnerability and the force operating model; and finally, partnership working.

There was clarity at the commander level and in the Community Engagement Team (CET), about force policy on providing a service that met the needs of victims of racist violence. From the strategic and tactical standpoints respectively, both groups articulated the value of doing so. On the ground however, it was a different picture in 2008. The policing-participants expressed attitudinal, motivational, and organisational forces that influenced what kind response and support the police teams would provide. The attitudinal forces were values-based. Officers did not, or could not, accept the racist element of some incidents and couched a resentment of having to provide a service to BAME victims that they felt was enhanced over what anyone else would get. Illustrating this, was the example where the racist violence asylum seekers were facing was described as a burden to the neighbourhood team; or where officers would not record the racist element of an offence that clearly was.

Motivational forces influenced how officers applied their knowledge, understanding and skills to an incident of racist violence. They would naturally gather information and intelligence at the scene, to make an assessment or common-sense interpretation of what the incident was, its nature. However, the next stage, doing something about the incident, is where the motivational force acts. Officers felt there were anxieties about dealing with racist incidents, with BAME victims, or the perceived scrutiny inherent with racist violence. The fear of getting into trouble or

being labelled a racist was a factor, expressed, predictably, only in the third person. Some participants suggested that these fear-factors could lead to officers failing to record the racist element of incidents, but also leaving other critical facts out of their report, such as a physical assault or injury.

The organisational force of the performance culture was widely cited by participants as something that diverted attention away from racist incidents. The perception was that racist incidents took more time and effort to deal with, and that the victims rarely wanted to provide a statement and go to court. That meant there was little or no chance of a tangible performance indicator (usually an arrest or detection) for the officer in charge, so their performance, according to the measures used to assess it, would drop. Spending time with victims of racist violence was therefore a low value task. Officers sought jobs where they would get something back, usually a statement that would allow an arrest and detection of the offence. This pressure to perform was pressure to spend as little time as possible with victims of racist violence, to do the minimum and to move on to something that would move them up the league tables.

9.16 Policing racist violence in 2020

There was a noticeable positive shift in attitude towards policing racist violence in the interviews conducted in 2020. Officers did not express any resentment about dealing with them, far from it. Instead, the police focus was less about the burden it brought, and more about supporting victims and solving such problems. There was no evidence of dismissive attitudes from police officers. Police-participants articulated that they were attuned to the racist element of offences. Officers pointed out that at the point of call, sometimes the racist element was not recorded, but on attendance they recognised the racist aggravation and ensured it was both recorded and addressed properly. The shift in force priorities to directing resources to protect the most vulnerable, meant that those being targeted due to race, were more likely to be put on harm reduction plans. That required a form of risk assessment and harm management, often with partner agencies formally or casually, and a nominated officer in charge. The removal of the PPAF performance culture, meant that officers felt less pressure to quickly move on from

racist incidents and were therefore more inclined to spend time providing reassurance. Police leaders and the Community Engagement team felt they were providing a better service to victims of racist violence since austerity, referring to the 2018 Hate Crime Action Plan and the multi-agency Hate Crime and Community Tension Monitoring Group (HCCTMG). A specific benefit the HCCTMG brought, was to identify and formalise reactive and proactive work to address spikes in the frequency of racist violence, and quickly restore normality. The Brexit vote and the COVID pandemic were cited as examples when this group had been mobilised and proven beneficial by quickly reducing incident frequency.

There was recognition that austerity had significantly cut the number of resources all agencies had available to respond to racist violence. Those cuts were felt in the capacity of agencies to respond, meaning less could be done and changes needed to be made. The change in Northumbria Police's force operating model was one such change, resulting in 60% of hate crime being dealt with by telephone, with no deployment. Similarly, ARCH was discontinued meaning there was no longer a multi-agency case management system for racist incidents. However, contrary to expressing how the loss of human resources and funding had reduced service delivery, it was expressed that austerity had forced agencies to focus resources on the most vulnerable. That meant spending time investigating and problem-solving and supporting cases where more value was likely to result from their efforts; or where risk was the highest. This may not have been a directly proactive policy move to support victims of racist violence, however police officers felt that it did do this, albeit indirectly.

Significantly however, victims did not express any improvement in their experiences of policing responses in 2020. In one example police explained how they rigorously investigated a series of vehicle crimes and found no evidence of racist aggravation, but the victims insisted they were racist attacks. The victims felt that only BAME people's cars had been attacked and that it was obvious to the victims, the police and likely to the offenders, that the cars belonged to BAME people. The participant expressed that it would have made such a difference to the BAME community in this instance, if police had accepted the crimes were racist and taken notice of what victims were telling them. This example goes part of the

way to emphasise how the victim perspective suggested that policing racist violence had not improved to the extent that the policing-participants felt it had. There is significant impact in this for policy, which has, since Macpherson, directed policing agencies towards a service that recognised and reversed historic failings, and strives to put things right for victims. The literature and policing-participant contributions all point towards a policing standpoint that felt services for victims of racist violence had improved, and there has been substantial investment in making this happen. But this investment does not appear to be making a difference for the victim-participants who contributed to this study.

9.20 Expanding on the thesis contributions to knowledge

Conducting this study in two time periods is in itself, a contribution to knowledge. It is unusual for research to be done in this way and has shown significant change in the way policing agencies view the progress they have made. It has also allowed for additional literature to be incorporated into the discussion and conclusions.

The discussion chapter has shown how racist victimisation in Newcastle was similar to that in other cities in England and Wales. In that respect, abhorrent as it was, victim accounts did not stand out as being anything different from the situations described in the literature from the last 4 decades. The case described in Findings 1, where the single female parent found burning papers pushed through her letterbox, was an alarming account that served as a reality check. It recalibrated my expectations about how dangerous an issue I was dealing with, but also how attacks typical of racist violence in the 1980s, could still happen in Newcastle in 2005. Qualitative semi-structured interviews proved instrumental in capturing the nature and impact of such experiences. Single attacks of this severity, and other persistent, pervasive examples, show the need for this research, further studies, and further action.

This research found little change in how individual victims described their experiences, between the 2005-2008 and the 2020 interviews. A representative of the African asylum seeker community felt that by 2020, 15 years after their arrival in the city, violence had reduced in frequency and intensity. That was an opinion

about the collective experience of that community. The situation for the African asylum seekers, arriving at a time when political discourse was about stemming the flow, and press spoke about them swamping and flooding in, was harmful. But over time, the levels of racist violence they experienced dropped. Policing interventions lagged behind the curve for them. This study has provided rich, additional evidence of how changing political landscape and significant events impact racist violence. The significance of this for policing, is that with proactive environmental scanning, these spikes are predictable and can be acted upon ahead of the curve, provided their community demographics are known. This is particularly relevant to address those communities who typically do not engage with the police and as such, tend to be invisible (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). Through the Hate Crime and Community Tension Monitoring Group, Northumbria Police explained they were able to take that action, restoring normality earlier in the cycle. The practice they described, followed evidence based policing methodologies (Lum and Koper, 2015, Knutsson and Tompson, 2017). The result was that the growth curve for racist violence after, for example, the EU referendum, was reduced in both height, and length. The 2020 victim interviews did not provide evidence of this being felt by victims, but the victim experience was unlikely to change. The outcome of the interventions meant there were fewer victims, not a change in the experience for individual victims. The fact that spikes in racist violence can be predicted, and that asylum seekers were a target in 2005, is pertinent in 2020. The total number of people granted asylum and settlement in the UK has risen to 20,000 (Gov.UK, 2021). If their dispersal follows similar patterns to the African asylum seekers in 2005, similar spikes in targeting are predictable.

The findings supported key academic literature which describe typical police failures in policing racist violence as:

- vii. Delayed or nil responses to incidents.
- viii. Inaction at the scene.
- ix. Dismissive attitudes from attending officers.
- x. A perception that police officers were racist.
- xi. BAME victims being treat as suspects.

xii. Lack of tangible resolutions and feedback.

My insider position in Northumbria Police and the two-stage nature of this research has provided unique insights and interpretations of the research data. My stance is appreciative, rather than condemnatory (Waddington, 1999b). I argue that the above failures, are largely driven by pressures and concerns that operational police officers had very little control over, rather than by individual or institutional racism. The pressures acted through cultural and common-sense cop practices, and the autonomy they had to determine the nature and outcome of a given situation. That determination made the difference between a response that holistically recognised and addressed the component parts of a racist incident, or one that failed to do so.

The first argument is that in 2008, the nature of racist violence and the harm it caused was not on the police radar at the constable rank, other than for those in the Communities Engagement Team. This was not dissimilar to historic failures to deal appropriately with domestic abuse or antisocial behaviour. There was no outrage about the occurrence of this kind of violence. Instead, there was a resentment of the additional burden it was causing them and of the policy pressure to deliver a service that improved trust and confidence. That was (mis)interpreted as a disproportionately enhanced service, that took a disproportionate amount of police time and made no observable difference. It resulted in police finding ways around policy to avoiding recording and responding to something that to them, was considered unworthy of police attention. That dismissive attitude was easily recognisable to BAME victims, which perpetuated their concerns that police were not for them.

The second argument is that the average white European police officer had no empathy with victims of racist violence, being unable to contextualise their experiences within a legacy of disadvantage and targeting. This led victims to feel police were not taking them seriously, not treating them with decency, and minimising their experiences. Interpreting the victim experience through a lens that had no empathy with them, has a filtering effect, obscuring the most significant aspects of the incident from police perception. The filter effectively eliminated key

details from the subsequent police report and compromised the possibility of a positive intervention.

The third argument is that the adverse impact of institutional pressures from the performance culture in 2008, and the threat of being considered racist or incompetent, drove racist violence down the scale of police relevance. The performance culture meant officers would prioritise jobs that carried the likelihood of an easy chalk, over those (such as racist incidents) that were time consuming, involved soft-skills and would not offer a detectable crime. Additionally, the legacy of the Lawrence Inquiry fallout, a recognition of being under-skilled or under-experienced in dealing with racist violence, and the fear of getting into trouble led to the avoidance of this kind of incident.

The final argument and contribution this thesis makes, is that despite the numerous transformational changes that have taken place in policing and race since the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry; the impact of being found to be institutionally racist in 1999; and a genuinely held belief that policing partnerships had made significant improvements in responding to racist violence; victims did not evidence any significant improvement in their experience of policing interventions. I have been a Sergeant in Northumbria Police throughout this period. My perspective as an insider has allowed me to take a standpoint that is appreciative of the challenges that police officers and partner agencies face. But it has also allowed me to experience first-hand, the policy shifts that led towards the impression, at least, that the organisations were improving. The two-stage nature of this study has allowed me to observe these changes within the organisations, but to see the contradictions between what police and partners felt were dramatic improvements, and failings that victims felt were still not being addressed.

The government's hate crime action plans (2012; 2014; and 2018) set out some realistic, but aspirational objectives for improvements in policing hate crime. What they do not do however, is provide guidance to policing agencies about how these objectives could be met, nor do they augment their position with references to the excellent, contemporary scholarly work in this field (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019). This thesis and the recommendations it makes in Chapter 8, complete this open

loop by merging the academic corpus with practical steps that policing agencies can take to make the necessary improvements, from the standpoint of a police sergeant/doctoral study. We are now 23 years post McPherson. There is a broad spectrum of good academic material that has been published in the interim, policy and practice have improved, yet there is still an increase in reported hate crime. From the perspective of victims and minority communities, not a lot has changed. The government evidently still feel the need to be publishing hate crime action plans for policing, otherwise they would not be continuing to do so. Much of what this study found to be failings in policing racist violence, were failings found by Macpherson and Scarman, decades ago, but they continue despite the available guidance.

Much reference has been made in this thesis to the scholarly work of Bowling, Hesse and Holdaway in the field of policing racist violence. Their insights into the situation around the 1980-1990s continue to be valid in 2022 and are supported by contemporary literature. What have changed however, are both the top-down focus on providing better policing interventions in racist violence, particularly against black people, and the personal motivations that police officers have, to do likewise.

9.30 Future Direction

The most recent official publication by the College of Policing, the *Police Race Action Plan* (College-of-Policing, 2022) that combines work of the NPCC and broad consultation, still refers to Macpherson and institutional racism as a seismic moment in policing's history, and to Scarman's exposure of the harmful impact policing had on '*Black Britain*' in the 1980s (ibid., p. 4). But the four key workstreams of the action plan are simply contemporary versions of what underpinned Scarman and Macphersons recommendations:

- i. A diversity of police officers whose ethnicity is representative of the communities they serve, and for those officers to have equality with their white counterparts.
- ii. Police treat black people and communities fairly.
- iii. Involve black people and communities in police governance and direction.

- iv. Black people are afforded effective police protection as vulnerable victims of crime.

There is a high degree of commitment made in this action plan, along with proposed platforms to embed each element and to monitor compliance against mandatory component parts. Its ambition to create a police service that is *'anti-racist and trusted by black people'* (ibid., p. 9) may be the force for change that is required to improve the landscape of policing race and racism and make a positive impact on the experiences of victims of racist violence, from their perspectives. But this comes at a time when there is a significant trust deficit in policing, and that challenges the concept of police legitimacy. The global outpouring of anger and sadness following the murder of George Floyd in 2020 was directed towards policing globally, and the UK saw significant Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests as a result. The movement, as Chief Constables David Thompson and Andy Marsh stated in their foreword to the 2022 Police Race Action Plan, *'proved a catalyst for the expression about the social injustice experienced by black people'* going on to admit that the movement was broader than policing alone, but *'it was about policing'* (College-of-Policing, 2022). In September 2022, the IOPC launched a homicide investigation into the Metropolitan Police's shooting of Chris Kaba, an unarmed black man, following a vehicle pursuit. Local protests followed this, albeit they were overshadowed by the death of Queen Elizabeth II. Even if the investigation into the shooting of Kaba concludes that race had no bearing on what happened, or the police use of firearms was justified, the harm to race relations will remain.

The national action plan is specific in its objective to improve policing for black communities. It does not include Asian nor Gypsy Roma, instead relies upon existing improvements in policing to address their needs. The plan justifies this on the strength of stark statistics from government statistical publications in 2021:

- i. Black people are 7 times more likely to be searched than white people.
- ii. Police are 5 times more likely to use force against black people than white people.
- iii. Recruitment, retention, and progression of black people in the police is significantly lower than for white people

- iv. Trust and confidence in policing among black people is significantly lower than Asian and white people.

Though restricting focus under the plan to policing and black communities may be a very positive step in many force areas, it could perpetuate, even reinforce the effects of isolation in those communities who tend not to engage with the police and do not report racist violence. The statistics above are stark, but the experiences of policing expressed by the Asian participants in this study could also be considered stark. The experiences of those who chose not to take part in the study, and of those who have never reported their incidents to the police become even less likely to be engaged in any problem-solving interventions or initiatives. Northumbria Police have broadened the scope of this plan to include Asian and minority ethnic communities, to ensure that all BAME communities are engaged, offered parity of support and because of the relatively small BAME demographic.

There is an apparent resurgence of performance focus within contemporary policing. This may herald a return back to basics, where policing reinstates itself as the enforcement agency, fighting crime and upholding public order. If performance metrics reflect that, then the organisational 'muscle memory' would very quickly revert to the culture of old, wherein what gets measured gets done and frontline officers prioritise easy chalks over supporting vulnerable victims. Conceptually, professional, and academic knowledge of policing racist violence is still developing. That development needs to continue, and it needs to evolve as the nature of racist violence evolves, rather than being pushed back to the margins of police relevance as it was in the early part of this study.

The fact that Northumbria Police have now had 2 cohorts of PCDA students complete their three-year apprenticeship in policing means that the programme is becoming embedded in the organisation. The policing uplift means that for the next three years, large cohorts of 80+ police apprentices will have End Point Assessment projects to work on and to produce dissertations on elements of community policing they have been involved with. This is a huge research resource, a fraction of which could be engaged in implementing the race action plan and the research opportunities this thesis provides in the next section. The scope to operationalise the findings of this thesis whether through further

evidence-based initiatives, with the resource that PEQF brings, is a potential force for change in the policing of racist violence.

9.40 Further research

9.41 Changes in policing racist violence

This research has examined two periods in time across which significant changes have taken place in policing and policing partnerships. In 2008, the work of ARCH and the Operational Support Group under the Safe Newcastle Partnership formalised and coordinated how agencies responded to racist violence. That should have made a positive impact for victims. The interviews with partner agency participants demonstrated their passion and commitment to victim support and to driving resolutions. However, the axing of resources during the period of austerity meant the ARCH partnership discontinued, dedicated staff were lost, and new partnerships were developed. Leaders in the Police and City Council commented that despite the lack of resources post austerity, their work was more focused, efficient, and effective. However, the study found little evidence of positive outcomes from partnership working in either period of study. This does not mean that positive outcomes were absent. Two opportunities for further research emerge from this theme

Firstly, a survey-based research project that explores what policing partnerships have been established in the country in the past decade, to address racist violence and what changes they have undergone during that period. The survey would call for information that describes the structure, terms of reference, best practice findings, challenges, and positive outcomes for victims. It would also look for what kind of evaluations have been made and their findings.

The second part of this study would be to evaluate the realities of the partnership developments on the ground. This would be done in case study areas where reports of effective partnerships suggest strong positive interventions for victims. The evaluation would draw on qualitative interviews with a sample of victims in those areas who were able to comment on their experiences of partnership

responses between 2012 and 2022. This element of the study would be led by police, using incident data, and working to high ethical standards around information security.

The objectives of this study would be to establish national best practice in partnership approaches to policing racist violence and how those developments were reflected in the victim experience.

This would be an ideal opportunity to further revisit Bowling's perspectives on the partnership approach to policing racist violence on a national scale and could yield valuable insights.

9.42 The operations and impact of the Hate Crime and Community Tension Monitoring Group (HCCTMG)

The HCCTMG has existed through the period that saw the EU Referendum, Brexit, and the COVID-19 pandemic. These events had an impact on the nature and experience of racist violence in communities. The national lockdown imposed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, created both physical and emotional isolation for most people. The impact of isolation on victims suffering racist violence in rural areas did not form part of this study, but has been explored by others (Chakraborti and Garland, 2013). The isolation brought by COVID-19, hit the urban conurbations, and victims are likely to have felt more acute impacts of victimisation in those areas throughout the lockdown phases.

The opportunity for research herein, is to narrow down the findings of this study, by looking specifically at the constitution, operations, and impact of the HCCTMG. This would be done with a specific focus on how they responded to Brexit and COVID-19. It would explore the extent to which the group took an evidence-based approach to identifying, even anticipating fallout from the events, and in how they formulated and delivered interventions to address it. The study would seek to identify individuals who had been targeted and engage them in establishing their perspective on how policing responses addressed their situation.

The objectives of this research would be to establish the constitution, operations, and impact of the HCCTMG; and to evaluate its successes between 2016 and 2022. A significant component of this research, reflecting on Hardy and Chakraborti's *'invisible victim'* thesis, would be to seek out the perspectives of specific victim groups who tend not to engage with police agencies (Hardy and Chakraborti, 2019)

9.43 The value of developing police empathy with victims of racist violence

Northumbria Police are stepping up positive action that aims to align the ethnic diversity of officers and staff, with that of the community it serves. The reality is, the force, like all others in England and Wales, are a long way off achieving that aim. This study has shown how BAME police officers and PCSOs can break down the empathy barrier and really demonstrate to victims of racist violence that they understand how it feels. But due to their low numbers, their impact in doing this is limited. The hypothesis behind this proposed research is that if white European officers were able to better understand the nature and impact of racist violence, their engagement and capacity for empathy with victims would be enhanced. This would improve the victim experience and would ensure police understood and obtained a thorough report of the incident. The subsequent response would then be more inclusive of the nature and context of the harm.

The research would select a geographic sector of an area command where racist violence was relatively frequent. A baseline survey of recent victims of racist violence would be taken that asks participants to comment on the level of empathy police officers had shown them in their interventions. A parallel baseline assessment of the empathy and understanding police officers in that area had towards victims of racist crime would also be conducted. Following that, police officers spend a period of time taking a victim personal statement (VPS) from every subsequent victim of a racist incident. An initial pilot period of one month would determine how long the practice should continue to provide sufficient and reliable data to examine. At the end of the first month of statement taking, victims would be re-contacted to establish how they felt the engagement and empathy with the police had been, and whether they felt the VPS helped to communicate

the impact. Once sufficient VPSs had been taken by police officers, their levels of empathy and understanding would be revisited to determine what level of impact the practice had provided. The objectives of this study would be to raise awareness and empathy in police officers in understanding the nature and impact of racist violence in their beat area; to create opportunity for victims to feel their situation is being respected and validated by police; to produce an evidence-based training product to support professional development of police officers in providing interventions in cases of racist violence.

The duration of this study would be determined by the volume of data forthcoming and the impact of the additional actions police were required to take at the scene.

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