Improperly Obtained Evidence and the Epistemic Conception of the Trial

Ward, Tony (2017) Improperly Obtained Evidence and the Epistemic Conception of the Trial. Journal of Criminal Law, 81 (4). pp. 328-338. ISSN 0022-0183

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This article criticises H.L. Ho’s argument that the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence can best be understood in terms of a ‘political’ rather than ‘epistemic’ conception of the criminal trial. It argues that an epistemic conception of the trial, as an institution primarily concerned with arriving at accurate verdicts on the part of an independent and impartial factfinder, is an important element of the rule of law. The court also has a duty to uphold other elements of the rule of law. The rule of law should be seen as concerned with upholding moral and political rights, including those of victims as well as defendants. The ‘vindication principle’, requiring decisions on exclusion of evidence to take account of both these sets of rights, is defended as being consistent with this understanding of the rule of law and with the epistemic conception of the trial.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: improperly obtained evidence, abuse of process, rule of law, philosophy of evidence law
Subjects: M200 Law by Topic
Department: Faculties > Business and Law > Northumbria Law School
Depositing User: Ay Okpokam
Date Deposited: 28 Mar 2017 13:39
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2021 08:22

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